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2. People v.

Carballo
62 Phil 651
Facts: On December 20, 1927, Carballo was convicted of the crime of bigamy and
sentenced to six years and one day of prision mayor. Later he was granted a conditional
pardon by the governor general which was accepted by him on january 12, 1929. During
that year he commit violation of section 874 of the revised ordinances of the city of
manila and sentence to pay a fine of P65 each with corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency .
It can be noticed that the acts complained of, as constituting a violation of the
conditional pardon granted by the governor general and accepted by the appellant are
alleged to have occured in or about and during the period from october 1, 1929 to
december 1, 1929. Prior to January 1, 1932 the date when the revised penal code was
took ffect there was n law punishing the violation of conditional pardon as a crime.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant is liable under article 159 of revised penal code for
violation of conditional pardon
Held: Carballo cannot be convicted under the revised penal code on the ground that
penal laws have no retroactive effect except in so far as they favor a person guilty of a
felony

3. Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)

Nature: Original Petition in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.

FACTS: Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to reclusion
perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and
kidnapping (along withAgapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the first two
petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last
petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each of
the petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their
convictions.

They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which negated such
complex crime, a ruling which was not handed down until after their convictions have
become final. In People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the
accused for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted
under Art. 134 of the RPC, there being no such complex offense. This ruling was not
handed down until after their convictions have become final. Since Hernandez served
more than the maximum penalty that could have been served against him, he is entitled
to freedom, and thus, his continued detention is illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a retroactive
effect is applicable in this case (WON judicial decisions favourable to the
accused/convicted for the same crime can be applied retroactively)

RULING: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied


retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall
have a retroactive effect insofar as they favour the accused who is not a habitual
criminal. The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
Constitution forms part of our legal system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional
right to equal protection, given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same
offense as they have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the only
means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision.

4. People vs. Ringor, 320 SCRA 342 (1999)

FACTS: The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was seen entering
Peoples Restaurant. A witness Fely Batanes saw the accused approach a table where
the victim was sitting, pulled his hair, and poked a knife at the latters throat. After,
leaving the restaurant, the accused returned with a gun, entered the kitchen of the
restaurant, stealthily approached the victim from behind and shot him six times
successively. The defendant was later apprehended and caught in his possession was
an unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in Camp Crame, it was found out that Ringor is
not a licensed firearm holder and that the gun was not licensed. Ringor put up self-
defense but he failed to prove Floridas unlawful aggression. He was found guilty of
murder qualified by treachery and was sentenced to death. He was found guilty of a
separate charge of possession of an unlicensed firearm with a sentence of 17 to 20
years.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the amendatory law RA 8294 (which took effect in 1997: crime
occurred in 1994) is applicable

No. At the time of the commission of the crime the use of an unlicensed firearm was still
not an aggravating circumstance in murder to homicide. To apply it to Ringor would
increase his penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Hence, RA 8294 cannot retroact
as it is unfavorable to the accused, lest it becomes an ex post facto law.

2. Whether or not RTC erred in convicting appellant for simple illegal possession of
firearms and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 17 to 20 years.

Yes. In cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of
firearms under PD No. 1866. t is simply considered as an aggravating circumstance, no
longer as a separate offence.

According to the article 22 of RPC, retroactivity of the law must be applied if it is


favourable to the accused.

3. Whether or not trial court erred in convicting accused of murder

No. For self-defence to prosper, unlawful aggression, proportionality of methods to fend


said aggression, and lack of sufficient provocation from defender must be proven. In this
case, defendant failed to prove unlawful aggression. The statement that the victim
approached him with a bolo was inconsistent to the witness statement of the victim
being in a prone position in the table. This does not constitute the requisite quantum of
proof for unlawful aggression. With the first requirement missing, the last two requisites
have no basis.

4. WON RTC erred in sentencing the accused to death for muder which was not proven
and that the alleged murder committed by the appellant, the appropriate penalty for the
offense is reclusion perpetua due to to the absence of an aggravating circumstance.

Yes. In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances to a crime of murder as


described by art 248 of RPC, a lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua has to be imposed
in according to article 63(2) of RPC

5. People V. echegaray

Facts:

The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-
appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter.

The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect,
accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.

The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the
sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false
accusation of rape against the accused. The motion was dismissed as the SC found no
substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb the verdict.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R.


Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal
Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)

A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of


accused-appellant aiming for the reversal of the death sentence.

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1)
mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged
incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional

Held: No.

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration
are denied for lack of merit.

Ratio:

Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia. To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled
that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and
inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness
pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by
the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the
nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the
black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the
unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty.

Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se.
While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in
Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges
and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or
standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal
biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing
juries.

6. echegaray v. secretary of justice

FACTS:

On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo
Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary
assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the
rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant
reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality
of judgment has already been rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable
Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.

HELD:

No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of
the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions
after their finality.

The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than
the right to life.

For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the
right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal
and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

7. People v. Esparas (1996)

Facts:

Esparas was charged with violation of DDA for importing 20kg of shabu. After
arraignmentand pleading not guilty, she escaped from jail and was tried in absentia.
She was found guilty andwas sentenced to death. She remains at large at present. This
is the issue.
Issue:

Whether the Court may proceed to automatically review Esparass death sentence
despiteher absence.

Held:

Yes. In US v. Laguna (1910), the Court held that its power to review a decision
imposingthe death penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts.
There, the Court said,mainly, that the judgment of conviction (capital punishment of
death) entered on trial is not final,cannot be executed, and is wholly without force or
effect until the cause has been passed upon bythe Supreme Court. TC acts as a
commissioner who takes the testimony and reports the same to theCourt with its
recommendation. A decision of TC does not become final unless and until it has been
reviewed by the Court. An accused who was sentenced with the highest penalty is
entitled un-der the law to have the sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon
which it is founded placed before the Court, as the highest tribunal of the land, to the
end that its justice and legalitymay be clearly and conclusively determined. Such
procedure is merciful. It gives a second chancefor life. Neither the courts nor the
accused can waive it. It is a positive provision of the law that brooks no interference and
tolerates no evasions. (The Court here applied Sec. 50, Gen. Orders No.58.)

8. People vs Munoz, 170 scra 107

FACTS: Eleven person who were mostly the bodyguards of the mayor, went toexecute
their plans to kill and shoot people who have been allegedly accused ofhurting one of
them. Early morning of June 30, 1972 Mauro Bulatao was shotstraight to his mouth thus
leaving him dead while Munoz, Mislang and Tayabawere their giving arm to Millora
upon executing his devil acts. Millora and Munozcontinued to brutally kill the Bulataos
with the help of Tayaba and Mislang. The survivors of the attack came to witness and
defend their relatives whowere killed bloodily and without mercy. One of the accused
accepted his penalty and was sentenced to the gravity ofhis charged by the other
accused pleaded that they were innocent.

ISSUES:Are the eleven persons guilty of charged? What are the charges to the rest
ofthe involved who did not participated to the shooting?

HELD: The facts and evidences showed that there were brutality with the
killingsexecuted by the accused. The court agrees that the three appellants, together
withMuoz and their seven other companions, participated in the killings of the
threeBulataos in the manner described by the witnesses for the prosecution.
Thedefenses of the herein appellants should be, as they properly were, rejected
asundeserving of belief in the light of the more convincing and telling evidencesubmitted
by the government. WHEREFORE, the court finds the appealed decision is MODIFIED
and all the accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty as principals in Criminal Case
Nos. 0176, 0177 and 0178. Each of them is sentenced to suffer three (3) penalties of
reclusion perpetua, and to pay solidarily to the heirs of their victims civil 15

indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 for each of the deceased, or a total indemnity of
P90,000.00, with costs. SO ORDERED
9. People vs Gatward, 267 SCRA 350

Facts:

The trial court handed down its verdict on March 3, 1995 finding both accused guilty as
charged, thus:

In Criminal Case No. 94-6268, accused Nigel Ric

hard Gatward is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of transporting, without legal
authority therefor, 5,237.70 grams of heroin, a prohibited drug, in violation of Section 4
of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance shown to have attended the commission of the crime, he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for thirty-five (35) years of reclusion perpetua and to
pay a fine of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 94-6269, accused U Aung Win is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of importing or bringing into the Philippines 5,579.80 grams of heroin, a prohibited
drug, without being authorized by law to do so, contrary to Section 3 of Republic Act No.
6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and in
view of the presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty,
without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for twenty-five (25) years of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).

Issue:

Whether or not the decision and penalty imposed by the trial court violated the accused
constitutional or legal right?

RULING:

Finally, no constitutional or legal right of this accused is violated by the imposition upon
him of the corrected duration, inherent in the essence and concept, of the penalty.
Otherwise, he would be serving a void sentence with an illegitimate penalty born out of
a figurative liaison between judicial legislation and unequal protection of the law. He
would thus be the victim of an inadvertence which could result in the nullification, not
only of the judgment and the penalty meted therein, but also of the sentence he may
actually have served. Far from violating any right of U Aung Win, therefore, the remedial
and corrective measures interposed by this opinion protect him against the risk of
another trial and review aimed at determining the correct period of imprisonment.

The judgment of the court a quo, specifically with regard to the penalty imposed on
accused-appellant Nigel Richard Gatward in Criminal Case No. 94-6268 and that of
accused U Aung Win in Criminal Case No. 94-6269, is MODIFIED in the sense that
both accused are sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua in its entire
duration and full extent
10. People v. Ramirez, 356 SCRA 595

FACTS:

In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General summarizes the prosecutions version of
the facts in this wise:[5]

1. On May 21, 1993 at around 7:30 in the evening, Montano Baez, after entertaining his
visitors on the occasion of the town fiesta of Bgy. San Jose, Ormoc City, was strolling in
the public plaza where he met Jonathan Jojo Alkuino, a former resident of the barangay
(pp. 6-11, tsn, July 22, 1997).

2. Montano Baez took him aside and invited Jojo to a drinking spree in a nearby store.
They sat side by side on a bench outside the store and while exchanging pleasantries
and drinking, appellant Pedro Ramirez suddenly came in front of them. Appellant
ordered beer. Then he calmly approached Jojo hitting him on the right side of the body
just below the ribs (pp. 6-11, tsn, supra).

3. Jojo Alkuino was brought to the Ormoc District Hospital and was examined and
treated by Dr. Kierulf who issued the medical certificate (Exhibit A) with the following
findings:

The stab wound that hit the victim was at his right anterior chest wall, at the level of 4th
ICS penetrating thoracic abdominal cavity, incising the right lobe of the liner with
massive hemothorax and hemoperit[o]neum

Although the victim was conscious and alive when he was admitted on May 21, 1993 at
around 9:55 in the evening, he, however, died the following day at about 5:30 in the
afternoon due to hypovolemic shock or massive blood loss (p. 24, tsn, July 17, 1998).

ISSUES :

In his Brief, appellant cites the following alleged errors:[9]


I

The Court a quo erred in giving credence to the witnesses for the prosecution.
II

The Court a quo erred in appreciating treachery notwithstanding the failure of the
prosecution to prove the same.
III

The Court a quo erred in convicting the accused notwithstanding the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING :

In convicting appellant, the trial court gave credence to the prosecution witnesses
testimonies. It ruled as follows:

We can notice that from the testimony of Montano Baez up to the last witness
Amelito Biyu, there was positive identification of the assailant, the one who stabbed
Jonathan Alkuino; there was knowledge about the accused and the victim. The
testimonies of the witnesses were in details, not in generalities, and [the] testimony of
the father, Milchisedeck Alkuino relate[d] x x x the dying declaration of his son, the
victim in this case.The evidence so far adduced by the prosecution established the
elements of the crime of murder: the killing of an individual [did] not [fall] under
parricide and the killing was attended by treachery, the fact that the stabbing was
sudden and the victim was sitting while the assailant was standing and there was
therefore no means for the victim to defend himself.[7]

On the other hand, the RTC rejected the defense witnesses testimonies for being
weak, unreliable and full of uncertainties. It concluded that the prosecution evidence
was not substantially overcome or overwhelmed by the defenses own proof or
evidence.[8]

13. Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, 136 SCRA 536

Facts:

Layno was charged with violating paragraph (e), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 as
amended. was then arraigned on October 3,1983, and was suspended pendente lite by
respondent Sandiganbayan onOctober 26, 1983. The validity of the mandatory
provision of the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act, suspending from office any public
officer against whom anycriminal prosecution under a valid information under such
statute, isassailed in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding on the ground that itis
violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Issue:

Whether or not the provision is violative of the constitutionalpresumption of innocence.

Held:

Yes.It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that
the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For
misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against
administratively or, as in this instance,criminally. In either case, his culpability must be
established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional
presumptionof innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its
continuance,however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due processquestion.
For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile hisright to hold office had
been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such acase an injustice suffered by him. Nor is
he the only victim. There isinjustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were
deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense,to
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of thispreventive suspension
had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted insheer oppression. A denial of due
process is thus quite manifest. It is to
14. Deloso v. Sandiganbayan 173 SCRA 409

Facts: This petition seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of theSandiganbayan
which preventively suspended petitioner Amor D. Deloso(accused in the criminal cases)
from his position as provincial governor of Zambales and from any office that he may be
holding.Deloso was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the localelections of
November 1971. While he occupied the position of mayor, acertain Juan Villanueva filed
a complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing himof having committed acts in violation of
the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act3019) for issuing to certain Daniel Ferrer a tractor
purchased by theMunicipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of
thePhilippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without anyagreement as to
the payment of rentals for the use of tractor by the latter,thereby, causing undue injury
to the Municipality of Botolan.Deloso was, then, elected governor of the Province of
Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local elections.

ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner be suspended indefinitely.

HELD It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitionerto
the highest provincial office in their command if they are deprived of hisservices for an
indefinite period with the termination of his case possiblyextending beyond his entire
term. The Court rules that a preventive suspension of an elective public officerunder
Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90)days under Section
42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil ServiceDecree, which period also appears
reasonable and appropriate under thecircumstances of this case. The petitioner may
still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasonsand not from an automatic
application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices Act.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The preventive suspensionlimited to


only ninety (90) days after which Deloso will assume once againthe functions of
governor of Zambales.

15.Pimentel v.Gatchitorena 208 SCRA 122

Facts:

September 22, 1995, at around 9:00 in the evening, Dulce Borero along with hisbrother
Mauro Biay y Almarinez was selling balut at Sta. Inez Almeda Subdivision, Brgy. Dela
Paz, Bian, Laguna.

Dulce Borero was about seven (7) arms length away from her brother MauroBiay.

Accused Jessie Garcia called Mauro Biay and as Mauro Biay approached Jessie, the
latter twisted the hand of Mauro and Jessies companions (co-accused) Arnold
Garchitorena and Joey Pamplona began stabbing Mauro repeatedly witha shiny bladed
instrument. Witness saw her brother Mauro struggling to freehimself while being
stabbed by the (3) accused, until her brother slumped facedown on the ground.

Arnold instructed his two co-accused to run away.

Borero claims she wanted to shout but nothing came out from her mouth.
Witness went home to call for her elder brother Teodoro Biay, but when theyreturn to
the scene the victim was no longer there as he had been brought to thePerpetual Help
Hospital.

Trial Court: Guilty, Court of appeals: Affirmed, Supreme Court: Affirmed


andModificationsDefense:Joey Pamplona denied that he participated in the
stabbingJessie Garcia defense of alibi Arnold Garchitorena defense of insanity

Issue/s:

Is there conspiracy shown in the case? (Art. 8 RPC)

Held:

Yes, accuse appellants were together in performing the concerted acts in pursuit of their
common objective. Jessie Garcia grabbed the victims hands and twistedhis arms; in
turn, Joey Pamplona, together with Arnold Garchitorena, strangledMauro Biay and
straddled the Mauro Biay on the ground, then stabbed him.

16. People v. Formigones 87 Phil 658 1950

FACTS:

Abelardo Formigones hwith his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children moved from
living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, to the
barrio of Binahian of the same municipality, his brother's house, to find employment as
harvesters of palay. On December 28, 1946, about a month's stay in his brother's
house, The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his
bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade
penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not
long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately
followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the
house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this
position he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts for help made
by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of
her mother by her father Abelardo signed a written statement wherein he admitted that
he killed The motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement he
used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company
of his brother Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations
because he noticed that his had become indifferent to him.

ISSUE:

Whether the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability under
article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:

The trial court rejected this same theory and SC is inclined to agree with the lower court.
According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined
him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not
imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong. In order that a person could be
regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so
as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. SC ruled that
the appellant is not an imbecile. According to the evidence, during his marriage of about
16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an
opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm,
raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children
of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra.
And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of
killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing
so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or
not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her
faithless. But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was
not a mere product of hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an
imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to the following effect. It is said that when he and
his wife first went to live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter
was living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant. However, after the family of
Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias not only frequented said house but also
used to sleep there nights. All this may have aroused and even partly confirmed the
suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking. In conclusion, SC find the
appellant guilty of parricide and hereby affirm the judgment of the lower court with the
modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive
imprisonment he has undergone.

25.People v. Gonzales, 359 SCRA 362 2011

39. Quinto v. Andres 453 SCRA 511 2005

Lessons Applicable: Proximate cause, EX to Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
November 13, 1995 7:30 am: Edison Garcia, 11 year-old and Grade 4 elementary school
pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto saw Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the
mouth of a drainage culvert.
Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert.
Wilson agreed while Garcia seeing that it was dark inside, opted to remain seated in a
grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage system
Only Pacheco had a flashlight. Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage
system and left without saying a word. Then, Andres came out, went back inside, and
emerged again carrying Wilson who was already dead. He laid his body down in the grassy
area.
Garcia, shocked, fled from the scene. Andres went to the house of Melba Quinto, Wilsons
mother, and informed her that her son had died. They rushed to the drainage culvert. Wilson
was buried without any complaints filed.
November 28, 1995: National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) took the sworn statements of
Pacheco, Garcia and Quinto
Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the drainage system catching fish with Andres
and Wilson
Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBIs autopsy showed that the cause death is drowning with
traumatic head injuries as contributory
NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against Andres and Pacheco with the RTC
Dr. Dominic Aguda testified that Wilson could have fallen, and that the occipital portion of his
head could have hit a blunt object, That the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of
Wilsons head could have rendered the him unconscious so he drowned. The 4x3-
centimeter abrasion on the right side of Wilsons face could have also been caused by
rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a rough surface. He also
stated that the trachea region was full of mud, but that there was no sign of strangulation.
RTC: granted demurer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
CA: Affirmed RTC

ISSUE: W/N Acquittal in criminal case bars a civil action where the judgment of acquittal holds that
the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them

HELD: YES. petition is DENIED


Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
o The civil liability of such person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code
includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential
damages
GR: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
EX: the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action
With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are
merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil.
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and
others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.
The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the
private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or
felonious act of the accused
o While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged, it is required to prove the cause of action of the private complainant against the accused for
damages and/or restitution.
o Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the private complainant is
burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence. failed
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even Garcia testified that the
drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid that he refused to join respondents
Andres and Pacheco inside
failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or
after the latter was invited to join them in fishing
GR: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
EX: civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment
in the civil action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist
a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended
o Natural - an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events
o Logical - a rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage
The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury
o Proximate cause
cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor
o There must be a relation of cause and effect,
cause = felonious act of the offender
effect = resultant injuries and/or death of the victim.
The cause and effect relationship is not altered or changed because of the
o pre-existing conditions
pathological condition of the victim
predisposition of the offended party
physical condition of the offended party
o concomitant or concurrent conditions
negligence or fault of the doctors
conditions supervening the felonious act
tetanus
pulmonary infection
gangrene
not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
1. there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the
active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or
2. the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim
The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused,
accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.
the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things:
1. first, the criminal act - objective
2. second, defendants agency in the commission of the act - subjective element of crimes
In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove:
1. the death of the party alleged to be dead
2. that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the
result of accident, natural cause or suicide
3. that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which
produced the death
44. People v. Bayotas 236 SCRA 239

PEOPLE v BAYOTAS (236 SCRA 239) September 2, 1994 G.R. No. 102007 The
Supreme Court held that the death of the accused Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. The Court
ruled that: (1) death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon; (2) the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, such as law, contracts, quasi-
contracts or quasi-delicts; (3) where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure; and (4) the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action for in such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case.

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