(Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, and means.
And if distinction or classification has
1957
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-7995. May 31, 1957.]
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of
other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by Republic Act No. 1180,
petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of
Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasuer
of Manila, respondent.
Ozaeta, Lichauco & Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing,
Salazar & Associates for petitioner.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor
Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent Secretary of
Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal
Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE POWER; NATURE
AND SCOPE. Police power is far-reaching in
scope, and it is almost impossible to limit its sweep.
It derives its existence from the very existence of the
State itself, and does not need to be expressed or
defined in its scope. It is said to be co-extensive with
self - protection and survival, and as such it is the
most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and
illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of
society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of
police power has become almost boundless, just as
the fields of public interest and public welfare have
become almost all-embracing and have
transcended human foresight.
2. ID.; GUARANTEES IN SECTION I, ARTICLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION; UNIVERSALITY OF APPLICATION.
The constitutional guarantees in Section I, Article III,
of the Constitution, which embody the essence of
individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are
not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly
universal in their application, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality (Yiek
Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed., 220, 226).
3. ID.; LAW DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR
PROPERTY; TEST OR STANDARD. The conflict
between police power and the guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws is more
apparent than real. Properly related, the power
and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence, or the indispensable
means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations
of any democratic society. There can be no
absolute power, whoever exercises it, for that would
be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute
liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy.
So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty or
property, provided there is due process of law; and
persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of
the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason.
The police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes
1|CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
been made, there must be a reasonable basis for
said distinction.
4. ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW CLAUSE;
WHEN NOT DEEMED INFRINGED BY LEGISLATION.
The equal protection of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to operate.
It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is
not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those
who do not (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
824-825).
5. ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE POWER TO MAKE DISTINCTION
AND CLASSIFICATION AMONG PERSONS;
CITIZENSHIP AS GROUND FOR CLASSIFICATION.
The Power of the legislature to make distinctions
and classifications among persons is not curtailed or
denied by the equal protection of the laws clause.
The legislative power admits of a wide scope of
discretion, and a law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification
is without reasonable basis. Citizenship is a legal
and valid ground for classification.
6. ID.; ID.; NATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL TRADE;
CLASSIFICATION IN Republic Act No. 1180 ACTUAL,
REAL AND REASONABLE. The classification in the
law of retail traders into nationals and aliens is
actual, real and reasonable. All persons of one
class are treated alike, and it cannot be said that
the classification is patently unreasonable and
unfounded. Hence, it is the duty of this Court to
declare that the legislature acted within its
legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that
the act transcends the limits of equal protection
established by the Constitution.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST OF REASONABLENESS. The
law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to
bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to
free the national economy from alien control and
dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable
because it affects private rights and privileges (II
Am. Jur., pp. 1080-1081). The test of reasonableness
of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under
all circumstances of the means adopted to carry
out its purpose into effect. Judged by this test, the
disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable
but actually necessary, must be considered not to
have infringed the constitutional limitation of
reasonableness.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; Republic Act No. 1180
TOLERANT AND REASONABLE. A cursory study of
the provisions of the law immediately reveals how
tolerant and reasonable the Legislature has been.
The law is made prospective and recognizes the
right and privilege of those already engaged in the
occupation to continue therein during the rest of
their lives; and similar recognition of the right to
continue is accorded associations of aliens. The
right or privilege is denied only to persons upon
conviction of certain offenses.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTAINMENT OF LEGISLATIVE
ASPIRATIONS OF A PEOPLE NOT BEYOND THE LIMITS
OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. If political
independence is a legitimate aspiration of a
people, then economic independence is none of
less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real
and positive if the people are subject to the
economic control and domination of others,
especially if not of their own race or country. The
removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign
economic control and domination is one of the
noblest motives that a national legislature may
pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation
that seeks to bring it about can infringe the
constitutional limitation of due process. The
attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people
can never be beyond the limits of legislative
authority.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY
MANIFESTED IN THE CONSTITUTION. Nationalistic
tendency is manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. The nationalization of the retail trade is
only a continuance of the nationalistic protective
policy laid down as a primary objective of the
Constitution. It cannot therefore be said that a law
imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying
many of the provisions of the Constitution is
unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional.
11. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; EXERCISE OF
LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW. The exercise of legislative discretion is
not subject to judicial review. The Court will not
inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass
upon general matters of legislative judgment. The
Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of
an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every
presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the
Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom
of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not
palpably in excess of the legislative power.
12. ID.; TITLES OF BILLS; PROHIBITION AGAINST
DUPLICITY; PRESENCE OF DUPLICITY NOT SHOWN IN
TITLE OR PROVISIONS OF Republic Act No. 1180.
What Section 21(1) of Article VI of the Constitution
prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails
to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature,
scope and consequences of the law or its
operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec.
1707, p. 297). A cursory consideration of the title
and the provisions of the bill fails to show the
presence of duplicity. It is true that the term
"regulate" does not and may not readily and at first
glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and
"prohibition", which terms express the two main
purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is
a broader term than either prohibition or
nationalization. Both of these have always been
included within the term "regulation".
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF GENERAL TERMS IN TITLE
OF BILL. The general rule is for the use of general
terms in the title of a bill; the title need not be an
index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, Sec. 4803, p. 345). The
above rule was followed when the title of the Act in
question adopted the more general term "regulate"
instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit".
2|CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DIRECTIVE REGARDING SUBJECT OF A BILL. One
purpose of the constitutional directive that the
subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to
apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature
and scope of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters which have not
received the notice, action and study of the
legislators or of the public. In case at bar it cannot
be claimed that the legislators have not been
apprised of the nature of the law, especially the
nationalization and prohibition provisions. The
legislators took active interest in the discussion of
the law, and a great many of the persons affected
by the prohibition in the law conducted a
campaign against its approval. It cannot be
claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring
the law invalid ever existed.
15. ID.; INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND OBLIGATIONS
NOT VIOLATED BY Republic Act No. 1180; TREATIES
SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATION OR AMENDMENT BY
SUBSEQUENT LAW. The law does not violate
international treaties and obligations. The United
Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal
obligations regarding the rights and freedom of
their subjects (Jans Kelsen, The Law of the United
Nations, 1951 ed., pp. 29-32), and the Declaration
of Human Rights contains nothing more than a
mere recommendation, or a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations. The
Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18,
1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the
Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the
nationals of any other country". But the nationals of
China are not discriminated against because
nationals of all other countries, except those of the
United States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all Prohibited from engaging in the
retail trade. But even supposing that the law
infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always
subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law (U.S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257,
260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the
scope of the police power of the State (Palston vs.
Pennsylvania 58 L. ed., 539).
DECISION
LABRADOR, J p:
I. The case and the issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing
upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and far-
reaching in significance The enactment poses
questions of due process, police power and equal
protection of the laws. It also poses an important
issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which
the disputed law purports to remedy really or
actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep,
militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law
purports to protect citizen and country from the
alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of
economy it regulates, Congress attempts to
translate national aspirations for economic
independence and national security, rooted in the
drive and urge for national survival and welfare,
into a concrete and tangible measures designed to
free the national retailer from the competing
dominance of the alien, so that the country and
the nation may be free from a supposed economic
dependence and bondage. Do the facts and
circumstances justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes
the retail trade business. The main provisions of the
Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not
citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which
are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail
trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition
in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business
on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to
engage therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in
accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and
for ten years after the approval of the Act or until
the expiration of term in case of juridical persons;
(3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and
juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision
for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail
business) for violation of the laws on nationalization,
economic control weights and measures and labor
and other laws relating to trade, commerce and
industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment
or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail
business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually
engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a verified
statement concerning their businesses, giving,
among other matters, the nature of the business,
their assets and liabilities and their offices and
principal offices of juridical entities; and (7) a
provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged
in the retail business who die, to continue such
business for a period of six months for purposes of
liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based Answer
thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf
of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1180, brought this action to obtain
a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of
Finance and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it
denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives them of their liberty and property
without due process of law; (2) the subject of the
Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title
thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission by
aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it
to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of
Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article
XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the
City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed
in the valid exercise of the police power of the
3|CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic
survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced
in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations
are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession,
only the form is affected but the value of the
property is not impaired, and the institution of
inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles
involved
a. The police power.
There is no question that the Act was approved in
the exercise of the police power, but petitioner
claims that its exercise in this instance is attended
by a violation of the constitutional requirements of
due process and equal protection of the laws. But
before proceeding to the consideration and
resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be
well to bear in mind certain basic and
fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in
the determination of the ever recurrent conflict
between police power and the guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws. What is
the scope of police power and how are the due
process and equal protection clauses related to it?
What is the province and power of the legislature,
and what is the function and duty of the courts?
These consideration must be clearly and correctly
understood that their application to the facts of the
case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue
accordingly resolved.
It has been said that police power is so far-reaching
in scope, that it has become almost impossible to
limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the
very existence of the State itself, it does not need to
be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be
co- extensive with self-protection and survival, and
as such it is the most positive and active of all
governmental processes, the most essential,
insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a
modern democratic framework where the
demands of society and of nations have multiplied
to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and
scope of police power has become almost
boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all- embracing
and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise
stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and
demands of public interest and welfare in this
constantly changing and progressive world, so we
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of
police power by which and through which the
State seeks to attain or achieve public interest or
welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the
scope or extent of the police power of the State;
what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof.
The most important of these are the due process
clause and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal
protection are found in the following provisions of
our Constitution:
"SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws." (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the
essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but
are admittedly universal in their application, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to operate.
It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is
not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those
who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
824-825.)
d. The due process clause.
The due process clause has to do with the
reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance
of the police power, Is there public interest, a public
purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation
or reason in connection with the matter involved; or
has there not been a capricious use of the
legislative power? Can the aims conceived be
achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an
unjustified interference with private interest? These
are the questions that we ask when the due
process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and
the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real.
Properly related, the power and the guarantees are
supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence
or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercise it, for that would be
tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty,
for that would mean license and anarchy. So the
State can deprive persons of life, liberty and
property, provided there is due process of law; and
persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of
the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason.
The police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes
and means. And if distinction and classification has
been made, there must be a reasonable basis for
said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial
review.
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is
the proper place and role of the courts? It must not
be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature,
which is the constitutional repository of police
power and exercises the prerogative of
determining the policy of the State, is by force of
circumstances primarily the judge of necessity,
4|CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any
law promulgated in the exercise of the police
power, or of the measures adopted to implement
the public policy or to achieve public interest. On
the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians
of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless
evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise
of the legislative prerogative. They have done so
early where there has been a clear, patent or
palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the
legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not
supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts
never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now
proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If
the disputed legislation were merely a regulation,
as its title indicates, there would be no question that
it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative
power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of
residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The
problem becomes more complex because its
subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old
as society itself, which from time immemorial has
always been open to residents, irrespective of race,
color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the
nation.
In a primitive economy where families produce all
that they consume and consume all that they
produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as
group life develops and families begin to live in
communities producing more than what they
consume and needing an infinite number of things
they do not produce, the dealer comes into
existence. As villages develop into big communities
and specialization in production begins, the
dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern
conditions and standards of living, in which man's
needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited
extents and proportions, the retailer comes as
essential as the producer, because thru him the
infinite variety of articles, goods and commodities
needed for daily life are placed within the easy
reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the
functions of capillaries in the human body, thru
which all the needed food and supplies are
ministered to members of the communities
comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the
importance of the retailer in the life of the
community. He ministers to the resident's daily
needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the
various little gadgets and things needed for home
and daily life. He provides his customers around his
store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the
vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking.
He has cloths to sell, even the needle and the
thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear
out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler,
the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator
of a department store or a supermarket is so much
a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's traits.
The alien retailer must have started plying his trade
in this country in the bigger centers of population
(Time there was when he was unknown in provincial
towns and villages). Slowly but gradually he
invaded towns and villages; now he predominates
in the cities and big centers of population. He even
pioneers in far away nooks where the beginnings of
community life appear, ministering to the daily
needs of the residents and purchasing their
agricultural produce for sale in the towns. It is an
undeniable fact that in many communities the alien
has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in
this trade, industry without limit, and the patience
and forbearance of a slave. Derogatory epithets
are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without
murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent neighbors
and customers are made in his face, but he heeds
them not, and he forgets and forgives. The
community takes no note of him, as he appears to
be harmless and extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance.
There is a general feeling on the part of the public,
which appears to be true to fact, about the
controlling and dominant position that the alien
retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and
other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily
life reach the residents mostly through him. In big
cities and centers of population he has acquired
not only predominance, but apparent control over
distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as
lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar,
flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles.
And were it not for some national corporations like
the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the
Accfa, his control over principal foods and products
would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance
and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is
said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is
imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is
merely the result of racialism and pure and
unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an
element of control; also so many unmanageable
factors in the retail business make control virtually
impossible. The first argument which brings up an
issue of fact merits serious consideration. The others
are matters of opinion within the exclusive
competence of the legislature and beyond our
prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail
trade, which put down the figures in black and
white. Between the constitutional convention year
(1935), when the fear of alien domination and
control of the retail trade already filled the minds of
our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the year
of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail
trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably
point out to the ever-increasing dominance and
control by the alien of the retail trade, as witness
the following tables:
Assets Gross Sales
Year and Retailer's No.-Estab- Per cent Per cent
Nationality ishments Pesos Distri- Pesos Distri-
bution bution
1941:
Filipino 106,671 200,323,138 55.82 174,181,924 5174
Chinese 15,356 118,348,692 32.98 148,813,239 44.21
Others 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05
1947:
Filipino 111,107 208,658,946 65.05 279,583,333 57.03
Chinese 13,774 106,156,218 33.56 205,701,134 41.96
Others 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01
1948:
Filipino 113,631 213,342,264 67.30 467,161,667 60.51
5|CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
Chinese 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,227 38.20
Others 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29
1949:
Filipino 113,659 213,451,602 60.89 462,532,901 53.47
Chinese 16,248 125,223,336 35.72 392,414,875 45.36
Others 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17
1951:
Filipino 119,352 224,053,620 61.09 466,058,052 53.07
Chinese 17,429 134,325,303 36.60 404,481,384 46.06
Others 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 .87
AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT
Item Gross Sales
Year and Retailer's Assets (Pesos)
Nationality (Pesos)
1941:
Filipino 1,878 1,633
Chinese 7,707 9,691
Others 24,415 8,281
1947:
Filipino 1,878 2,516
Chinese 7,707 14,934
Others 24,749 13,919
1948: (Census)
Filipino 1,878 4,111
Chinese 7,707 24,398
Others 24,916 23,686
1949:
Filipino 1,878 4,069
Chinese 7,707 24,152
Others 24,807 20,737
1951:
Filipino 1,877 3,905
Chinese 7,707 33,207
Others 24,824 22,033
(Estimates Assets and Gross Sales of Retail
Establishments, By year and Nationality of Owners,
Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of
Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce
and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations
and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino
establishments already include mere market
vendors, whose capital is necessarily small.
The above figures reveal that in percentage
distribution of assets and of gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the
years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the
edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more
than make up for the numerical gap through their
assets and gross sales which average between six
and seven times those of the very many Filipino
retailers Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply
superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and
sells six to seven times more, and gains much more.
The same of official report, pointing out to the
known predominance of foreign elements in the
retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were
largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As
observed by respondents, the native investment is
thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically
helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and
supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension
in Constitutional Convention.
It is this domination and control, which we believe
has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the
legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed
nationalization law. If they did not exist as a fact the
sweeping remedy of nationalization would never
have been adopted. The framers of our
Constitution also believed in the existence of this
alien dominance and control when they approved
a resolution categorically declaring among other
things, that "it is the sense of the Convention that
the public interest requires the nationalization of the
retail trade; . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67
of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and
the events since then have not been either
pleasant or comforting. Dean Since of the University
of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on
the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that
the fathers of our Constitution were merely
translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos
"of the dangers from alien interests that had already
brought under their control the commercial and
other economic activities of the country" (Sinco,
Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing
the concern of the members of the constitutional
convention for the economic life of the citizens, in
connection with the nationalistic provisions of the
Constitution, he says:
"But there has been a general feeling that alien
dominance over the economic life of the country is
not desirable and that if such a situation should
remain, political independence alone is no
guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino
private capital is not big enough to wrest from alien
hands the control of the national economy.
Moreover, it is but of recent formation and hence,
largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under
such conditions, the government as the
instrumentality of the national will, has to step in
and assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in
the struggle for the economic freedom of the
nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the
crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . It (the
Constitution) envisages an organized movement for
the protection of the nation not only against the
possibilities of armed invasion but also against its
economic subjugation by alien interests in the
economic field." (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th
ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and
predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
business men, manufacturers and producers
believe so; they fear the business coming from alien
control, and they express sentiments of economic
independence. Witness thereto is Resolution No. 1,
approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National
Convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar
resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the
Second National Convention of Manufacturers and
Producers. The man in the street also believes, and
fears, alien predominance and control; so our
newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not
only to control but to alien stranglehold. We,
therefore, find alien domination and control to be a
fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by
all the sections and groups that compose the
Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.
the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to
But the dangers arising from alien participation in
the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling
6|CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
that such predominance may truly endanger the
national interest. With ample capital, unity of
purpose and action and thorough organization,
alien retailers and merchants can act in such
complete unison and concert on such vital matters
as the fixing of prices, the determination of the
amount of goods or articles to be made available
in the market, and even the choice of the goods or
articles they would or would not patronize or
distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national
economy and of the complete subservience of
national retailers and of the consuming public are
not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and
consumers alike, can be placed completely at their
mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of
daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens,
because the producer or importer does not offer
them sufficient profits, or because a new
competing article offers bigger profits for its
introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to
refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from their
stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence,
the producers or importers of the prescribed article,
or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of
circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and
free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations
to show the pernicious influences of alien
domination. Grave abuses have characterized the
exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact
within judicial notice, which courts of justice may
not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of
truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling
on the part of the public that alien participation in
the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious
and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of
which would suffice for our purposes; that at some
time or other they have cornered the market of
essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating
artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to
unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded
essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice
of the consuming public, so much so that the
Government has had to establish the National Rice
and Corn Corporation to save the public from their
continuous hoarding practices and tendencies;
that they have violated price control laws,
especially on foods and essential commodities,
such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9,
Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate
and automatic deportation for price control
convictions; that they have secret combinations
among themselves to control prices, cheating the
operation of the law of supply and demand; that
they have connived to boycott honest merchants
and traders who would not cater or yield to their
demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade
and enterprise. They are believed by the public to
have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and
money into and out of the land, violated import
and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in
derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also
believed that they have engaged in corrupting
public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly
causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in
unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the
Government and by their own lawful diplomatic
representatives, action which impliedly admits a
prevailing feeling about the existence of many of
the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well
founded fears that worse things may come in the
future. The present dominance of the alien retailer,
especially in the big centers of population,
therefore, becomes a potential source of danger
on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not
have here in this country isolated groups of harmless
aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we
have are well organized and powerful groups that
dominate the distribution of goods and
commodities in the communities and big centers of
population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to
the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in
times of crisis or emergency. While the national
holds his life, his person and his property subject to
the needs of his country, the alien may even
become the potential enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic
survival and security.
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the
facts and circumstances that the disputed law is
not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or
discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate
desire and determination of the people, thru their
authorized representatives, to free the nation from
the economic situation that has unfortunately been
saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its
disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of
the public, any of the national security itself, and
indisputably falls within the scope of police power,
thru which and by which the State insures its
existence and security and the supreme welfare of
its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade.
The next question that now poses solution is, Does
the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As
pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the
root and cause of the distinction between the alien
and the national as a trader. The alien resident
owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his
adopted country; his stay here is for personal
convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain
and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is
neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally
lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for
this country where he temporarily stays and makes
his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and
consideration for his Filipino customers as would
prevent him from taking advantage of their
weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes
his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his
beloved country and his beloved kin and country
men. The experience of the country is that the alien
retailer has shown such utter disregard for his
customers and the people on whom he makes his
profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt
the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country
is that he never really makes a genuine contribution
to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly
contributes to general distribution, but the gains
and profits he makes are not invested in industries
that would help the country's economy and
increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this
country being merely transient and temporary, it
would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting
7|CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
the very important function of retail distribution to
his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of
distribution, as already pointed out above, their
secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and
prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their
customers and of the ultimate happiness of the
people of the nation of which they are mere guests,
which practices, manipulations and disregard do
not attend the exercise of the trade by the
nationals, show the existence of real and actual,
positive and fundamental differences between an
alien and a national which fully justify the legislative
classification adopted in the retail trade measure.
These differences are certainly a valid reason for
the State to prefer the national over the alien in the
retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact
and reality were we to hold that no reason or
ground for a legitimate distinction can be found
between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient
basis for distinction.
The above objectionable characteristics of the
exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are
actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for
legislative classification of retail traders into
nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the
wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we
answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-
making power. Since the Court finds that the
classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all
persons of one class are treated alike, and as it
cannot be said that the classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to
declare that the legislature acted within its
legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that
the act transcends the limit of equal protection
established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to
make distinctions and classifications among persons
is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of
the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a
wide scope of discretion, and a law can be
violative of the constitutional limitation only when
the classification is without reasonable basis. In
addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we
can also refer to the case of Lindsley vs. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which
clearly and succinctly defined the application of
equal protection clause to a law sought to be
voided as contrary thereto:
". . . '1. The equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the
state the power to classify in the adoption of police
laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope
of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is
done only when it is without any reasonable basis,
and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification
having some reasonable basis does not offend
against that clause merely because it is not made
with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it
results in some inequality. 3. When the classification
in such a law is called in question, if any state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the
time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4.
One who assails the classification in such a law must
carry the burden of showing that it does not rest
upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially
arbitrary.'"
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for
classification.
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a
legal and valid ground for classification has already
been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well
as in various courts in the United States. In the case
of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where
the validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine
Legislature was in issue, because of a condition
therein limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in
coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens
of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus
denying the right to aliens, it was held that the
Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal
protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The
Legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate
purpose the encouragement of Philippine
shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from
foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid
exercise of the police power, and all presumptions
are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we
held that the limitation of domestic ownership of
vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of
the Philippines does not violate the equal
protection of the law and due process of law
clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering
said decision we quoted with approval the
concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of
Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:
"'Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally
restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing
gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc.
The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that
character, and forms part of an extensive system,
the object of which is to encourage American
shipping, and place them on an equal footing with
the shipping of other nations. Almost every
commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a
monopoly of its coasting trade; and a
countervailing privilege in favor of American
shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of
the United States on this subject. It is not to give the
vessel an American character, that the license is
granted; that effect has been correctly attributed
to the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her
American privileges, as contra distinguished from
foreign; and to preserve the Government from
fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding
themselves into the American commercial marine,
as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade
coastwise, that this whole system is projected.'"
The rule in general is as follows:
"Aliens are under no special constitutional
protection which forbids a classification otherwise
justified simply because the limitation of the class
falls along the lines of nationality. That would be
requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as
a class than for similar classes of American citizens.
Broadly speaking, the difference in status between
citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power." (2
Am. Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149
(Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of
hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one
can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared
his intention, to become a citizen of the United
8|CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
States, was held valid, for the following reason: It
may seem wise to the legislature to limit the
business of those who are supposed to have regard
for the welfare, good order and happiness of the
community, and the court cannot question this
judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99
N.E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented
certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging
in the traffic of liquors, was found not to be the
result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a
deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based
on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently
acquainted with 'our institutions and our life as to
enable him to appreciate the relation of this
particular business to our entire social fabric", and
was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs.
Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 71 L. ed. 1115 (1926), the
U. S. Supreme Court had under consideration an
ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the
issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to
aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination
against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow
that alien race and allegiance may not bear in
some instances such a relation to a legitimate
object of legislation as to be made the basis of
permitted classification, and that it could not state
that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that
latitude must be allowed for the legislative
appraisement of local conditions and for the
legislative choice of methods for controlling an
apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124
N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at
bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30
(Washington, 1922), the business of pawnbroking
was considered as having tendencies injuring
public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the
scope of police power. A similar statute denying
aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also
sustained in Wright vs. May, L. R. A., 1915 P. 151
(Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle,
297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens
are judicially known to have different interests,
knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty,
hence the prohibition of issuance of licenses to
them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard,
card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of
constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State
Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902),
a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as barbers
was held void, but the reason for the decision was
the court's finding that the exercise of the business
by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals,
the health, or even the convenience of the
community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game
Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California
statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing
licenses to persons ineligible to citizenship was held
void, because the law conflicts with Federal power
over immigration, and because there is no public
interest in the mere claim of ownership of the
waters and the fish in them, so there was no
adequate justification for the discrimination. It
further added that the law was the outgrowth of
antagonism toward persons of Japanese ancestry.
However, two Justices dissented on the theory that
fishing rights have been treated traditionally as
natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley
Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law
which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-
born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of
age, was declared void because the court found
that there was no reason for the classification and
the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily
wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained.
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court
and of the State courts in the United States hold
that the distinction between aliens and citizens is
not a valid ground for classification. But in these
decisions the laws declared invalid were found to
be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or
were the result or product of racial antagonism and
hostility, and there was no question of public
interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States
Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law
making unlawful the keeping of books of account
in any language other than English, Spanish or any
other local dialect, but the main reasons for the
decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of
business there would be no other system of
distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey
to all kinds of fraud, because they would be
deprived of their right to be advised of their
business and to direct its conduct. The real reason
for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that
no public benefit would be derived from the
operation of the law and on the other hand it
would deprive Chinese of something indispensable
for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins,
30 L. ed. 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring power
on officials to withhold consent in the operation of
laundries both as to persons and place, was
declared invalid, but the court said that the power
granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for
the discrimination which attended the
administration and implementation of the law, and
that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In
State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a
law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and
peddlers was declared void, because the
discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation
to the act in respect to which the classification was
proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts
make them so. As we already have said, aliens do
not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration
and regard for customers with whom they come in
daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster
the nation's economy, except in so far as it
enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance
which the national owes to the land. These
limitations on the qualifications of aliens have been
shown on many occasions and instances,
especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can
do no better than borrow the language of Anton
vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the
reality and significance of the distinction between
the alien and the national, thus:
". . . It may be judicially known, however, that aliens
coming into this country are without the intimate
knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that
our own people have. So it is likewise known that
certain classes of aliens are of different psychology
from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is
natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign
born, whose allegiance is first to their own country,
9|CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
and whose ideals of governmental environment
and control have been engendered and formed
under entirely different regimes and political
systems, have not the same inspiration for the
public weal, nor are they as well disposed toward
the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a
part of the government itself. Further enlargement,
is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously
it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence
that the Legislature was without plausible reason for
making the classification, and therefore
appropriate discrimination against aliens as it
relates to the subject of legislation. . . ."
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation;
determination by legislature decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on the
exercise of the police power. It has been stated by
the highest authority in the United States that:
". . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often
been held, demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the
means selected shall have a real and substantial
relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . ."
xxx xxx xxx
"So far as the requirement of due process is
concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce
that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose.
The courts are without authority either to declare
such policy, or, when it is declared by the
legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen
to have a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are
satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect
renders a court functus officio. . . ." (Nebbia vs. New
York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
". . . Too much significance cannot be given to the
word 'reasonable' in considering the scope of the
police power in a constitutional sense, for the test
used to determine the constitutionality of the
means employed by the legislature is to inquire
whether the restrictions it imposes on rights secured
to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable,
and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such
rights. . . ."
xxx xxx xxx
". . . A statute to be within this power must also be
reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom
it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a
particular class, and must not be unduly
oppressive." (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302, pp. 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388, it
was also held:
". . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority
in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. . . ."
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of
Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:
"In determining whether a given act of the
Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police
power to regulate the operation of a business, is or
is not constitutional, one of the first questions to be
considered by the court is whether the power as
exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in
connection with the matter involved, or is an
arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that
power, without substantial relation to the health,
safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the
public."
b. Petitioner's argument considered.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a
common, ordinary occupation, one of those
privileges long ago recognized as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men; that it is a
gainful and honest occupation and therefore
beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and
penalize. This argument overlooks fact and reality
and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise,
i.e., that in this country where the occupation is
engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged
by him, by the alien, in an honest creditable and
unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to
the citizens and without ultimate danger to their
economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the
Legislature has found, as we have also found and
indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly
abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of
pernicious designs and practices, that he now
enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation
and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's
economy endangering the national security in
times of crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that
posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores
the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the
exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade
unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, taking into
account the illegitimate and pernicious form and
manner in which the aliens have heretofore
engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the
answer is clear. The law in question is deemed
absolutely necessary to bring about the desired
legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy
from alien control and dominance. It is not
necessarily unreasonable because it affects private
rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The
test of reasonableness of a law is the
appropriateness or adequacy under all
circumstances of the means adopted to carry out
its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test,
disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable
but actually necessary, must be considered not to
have infringed the constitutional limitation of
reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in
the explanatory note that accompanied the bill,
which later was enacted into law:
"This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its
purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens
of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon
our economic life. If the persons who control this
vital artery of our economic life are the ones who
owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no
profound devotion to our free institutions, and who
have no permanent stake in our people's welfare,
we are not really the masters of our own destiny. All
10 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
aspects of our life, even our national security, will be
at the mercy of other people.
"In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose,
we do not propose to deprive persons who are not
citizens of the Philippines of their means of
livelihood. While this bill seeks to take away from the
hands of persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines a power that can be wielded to
paralyze all aspects of our national life and
endanger our national security it respects existing
rights.
"The approval of this bill is necessary for our national
survival."
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration
of a people, then economic independence is none
the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real
and positive if the people are subject to the
economic control and domination of others,
especially if not of their own race or country. The
removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign
economic control and domination, is one of the
noblest motives that a national legislature may
pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation
that seeks to bring it about can infringe the
constitutional limitation of due process. The
attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people
can never be beyond the limits of legislative
authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention
to be within the sphere of legislative action.
The framers of the Constitution could not have
intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of
due process on the attainment of such a noble
motive as freedom from economic control and
domination, thru the exercise of the police power.
The fathers of the Constitution must have given to
the legislature full authority and power to enact
legislation that would promote the supreme
happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty.
On the precise issue now before us, they expressly
made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution
expressing their belief that the legislation in question
is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus
they declared in their Resolution:
"'That it is the sense of the Convention that the
public interest requires the nationalization of retail
trade; but it abstains from approving the
amendment introduced by the Delegate for
Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter
because it is convinced that the National Assembly
is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to
Filipino and American citizens the privilege to
engage in the retail trade.'" (II Aruego, The Framing
of the Philippine Constitution, 662- 663, quoted on
pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the
Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic
tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principal
objective is the conservation of the patrimony of
the nation and as corollary thereto the provision
limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation,
development and utilization of its natural resources.
And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no
franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is
only a continuance of the nationalistic protective
policy laid down as a primary objective of the
Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with
the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the
provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable,
invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the
plight of the nationals as manifested in the
approval of the radical measure is, therefore, fully
justified. It would have been recreant to its duties
towards the country and its people would it view
the sorry plight of the nationals with complacency
and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy
commensurate with the demands of public interest
and national survival. As the repository of the
sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature was
in duty bound to face the problem and meet,
through adequate measures, the danger and
threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to
national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law
immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable
the Legislature has been. The law is made
prospective and recognizes the right and privilege
of those already engaged in the occupation to
continue therein during the rest of their lives; and
similar recognition of the right to continue is
accorded associations of aliens. The right or
privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of
certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court on
this case, attention was called to the fact that the
privilege should not have been denied to children
and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade.
Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims
and purposes. Besides, the exercise of legislative
discretion is not subject to judicial review It is well
settled that the Court will not inquire into the
motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general
matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is
primarily the judge of the necessity of an
enactment or of any of its provisions, and every
presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the
Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom
of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not
palpably in excess of the legislative power.
Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law
attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we
find the provisions are not unreasonable. These
principles also answer various other arguments
raised against the law, some of which are: that the
law does not promote general welfare; that
thousands of aliens would be thrown out of
employment; that prices will increase because of
the elimination of competition; that there is no
need for the legislation; that adequate
replacement is problematical; that there may be
general breakdown; that there would be
repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these
arguments are directed against the supposed
wisdom of the law which lies solely within the
legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged
invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof
is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real
purpose of the bill, which is to nationalize the retail
business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein.
11 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
The constitutional provision which is claimed to be
violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
"No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more then one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill".
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that
is, if its title completely fails to apprise the legislators
or the public of the nature, scope and
consequences of the law or its operation (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p.
297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the
provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of
duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not
and may not readily and at first glance convey the
idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which
terms express the two main purposes and
objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader
term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both
of these have always been included within the term
regulation.
"Under the title of an act to 'regulate', the sale of
intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the
sale of intoxicating liquors." (Sweet vs. City of
Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
"Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring
that the subject of every act of the Legislature shall
be stated in the title, the title 'To regulate the sale of
intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the
subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors
to minors and to persons in the habit of getting
intoxicated; such matters being properly included
within the subject of regulating the sale." (Williams
vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of
Answer.)
"The word 'regulate' is of broad import, and
necessarily implies some degree of restraint and
prohibition of acts usually done in connection with
the thing to be regulated. While word regulate'
does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit,
there is no absolute reason why it should not have
such meaning when used in delegating police
power in connection with a thing the best or only
efficacious regulation of which involves
suppression." (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La.
887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the
title of a bill; it has also been said that the title need
not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 4803, p.
345.) The above rule was followed when the title of
the Act in question adopted the more general term
"regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit".
Furthermore, the law also contains other rules for
the regulation of the retail trade, which may not be
included in the terms "nationalization" or
"prohibition"; so were the title changed from
"regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would
have been many provisions not falling within the
scope of the title which would have made the Act
invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in
accord with the principle governing the drafting of
statutes, under which a simple or general term
should be adopted in the title, which would include
all other provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the
subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to
apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature
and scope of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters which have not
received the notice, action and study of the
legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it
cannot be claimed that the legislators have not
been apprised of the nature of the law, especially
the nationalization and prohibition provisions. The
legislators took active interest in the discussion of
the law, and a great many of the persons affected
by the prohibition in the law conducted a
campaign against its approval. It cannot be
claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring
the law invalid ever existed. The objection must
therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and
obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity
of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the
Charter of the United Nations and of the
Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit
in the above contention. The United Nations
Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations
regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects
(Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951
ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human
Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation, or a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p.
39.) That such is the import of the United Nations
Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can
be inferred from the fact that members of the
United Nations Organization, such as Norway and
Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail
trade, and in most nations of the world laws against
foreigners engaged in domestic trade are
adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18,
1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in
question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality
of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the
same terms as the nationals of any other country."
But the nationals of China are not discriminated
against because nationals of all other countries,
except those of the United States, who are granted
special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited
from engaging in the retail trade. But even
supposing that the law infringes upon the said
treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or
amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs.
Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may
never curtail or restrict the scope of the police
power of the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L.
ed. 539.).
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold
that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a
real actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from such
dominance and control; that the enactment
clearly falls within the scope of the police power of
the State, thru which and by which it protects its
own personality and insures its security and future;
that the law does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated,
nor the due process of law clause, because the law
12 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege;
that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry
out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident
as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate
but actually necessary and that in any case such
matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature,
with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere;
that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced
in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has
not misled the legislators or the segment of the
population affected; and that it cannot be said to
be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered into
on the subject and the police power may not be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that
the radical effects of the law could have been
made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is
stated that more time should have been given in
the law for the liquidation of existing businesses
when the time comes for them to close. Our legal
duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls
within the scope of legislative authority and does
not transcend the limitations of due process and
equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution.
Remedies against the harshness of the law should
be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond
our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against
petitioner.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes A., Bautista Angelo,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ.,
concur.
(Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v. Torres, G.R.
No. 98050, March 17, 1994)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 98050. March 17, 1994.]
PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, Secretary of
Labor and Employment, HON. RODOLFO S.
MILADO, Department of Labor and Employment
Mediator-Arbiter for Region VIII, Tacloban City, and
PHILPHOS MOVEMENT FOR PROGRESS, INC. (PMPI),
respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION
(PHILPHOS) assails the decision of the Secretary of
Labor of 7 August 1990 affirming the order of the
Mediator-Arbiter of 28 March 1990 which directed
the immediate conduct of a certification election
among the supervisory, professional or technical,
and confidential employees of petitioner
corporation. prLL
On 7 July 1989, Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc.
(PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment a petition for certification
election among the supervisory employees of
petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly
registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment it was seeking to represent the
supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate
Fertilizer Corporation. LibLex
The petition for certification election filed by PMPI
was not opposed by PHILPHOS. In fact, on 11
August 1989, PHILPHOS submitted a position paper
with the Mediator-Arbiter stating that its
management welcomed the creation of a
supervisory employees' union provided the
necessary requisites of law were properly observed,
but exempting from the union its superintendents
who were managerial and not supervisory
employees as they managed a division, subdivision
or section, and were vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies. PHILPHOS also asserted that
its professional or technical employees were not
within the definition of supervisory employees under
the Labor Code as they were immediately under
the direction and supervision of its superintendents
and supervisors. Moreover, the professional and
technical employees did not have a staff of workers
under them. Consequently, petitioner prayed for
the exclusion of its superintendents and
professional/technical employees from the PMPI
supervisory union.
On 13 October 1989, Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S.
Milado issued an order directing the holding of a
certification election among the supervisory
employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the
superintendents and the professional and technical
employees. He also directed the parties to attend
the pre-election conference on 19 April 1990 for the
determination of the mechanics of the election
process and the qualifications and eligibility of
those allowed to vote.
On 15 November 1989, PMPI filed an amended
petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought
to represent not only the supervisory employees of
petitioner but also its professional/technical and
confidential employees. The amended petition was
filed in view of the amendment to the PMPI
Construction which included in its membership the
professional/technical and confidential employees.
On 14 December 1989, the parties therein agreed
to submit their respective position papers and to
consider the amended petition submitted for
decision on the basis thereof and related
documents.
On 28 March 1990, Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued
an order granting the petition and directing the
holding of a certification election among the
"supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts,
mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.),
technical, and confidential employees" 1 to
comprise the proposed bargaining unit.
On 16 April 1990, PHILPHOS appealed the order of
28 March 1990 to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment who on 7 August 1990 rendered a
decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido
Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved
for reconsideration but the same was denied;
hence, the instant petition alleging grave abuse of
13 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
discretion on the part of public respondents in
rendering the assailed rulings. Cdpr
On 8 July 1991, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from holding
the certification election among petitioner's
supervisory, professional/technical, and confidential
employees scheduled on 12 July 1991.
There are two (2) issues raised by petitioner: (1)
whether it was denied due process in the
proceedings before respondent Mediator-Arbiter;
and, (2) whether its professional/technical and
confidential employees may validly join respondent
PMPI union which is composed of supervisors.
PHILPHOS claims that it was denied due process
when respondent Mediator-Arbiter granted the
amended petition of respondent PMPI without
according PHILPHOS a new opportunity to be
heard.
We do not see it the way PHILPHOS does here. The
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. 2 Where, as in the
instant case, petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its
position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to
consider the case submitted for decision on the
basis of the position papers filed by the parties,
there was sufficient compliance with the
requirement of due process, as petitioner was
afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side.
3 Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired,
insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the
witnesses of the other party. But it did not; 4 instead,
it opted to submit its position paper with the
Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the
opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal
to the Secretary of Labor.
As regards the second issue, we are with petitioner
that being a supervisory union, respondent PMPI
cannot represent the professional/technical and
confidential employees of petitioner whose
positions we find to be more of the rank and file
than supervisory.
With the enactment in March 1989 of R.A. 6715,
employees were thereunder reclassified into three
(3) groups, namely: (a) managerial employees, (b)
supervisory employees, and (c) rank and file
employees. The category of supervisory employees
is once again recognized in the present law.
Article 212, par. (m), of the Labor Code, as
amended, provides that "(s)upervisory employees
are those who, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommend such managerial actions if
the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary
or clerical in nature but requires the use of
independent judgment." The definition of
managerial employees is limited to those having
authority to hire and fire, while those who only
recommend effectively the hiring or firing or transfer
of personnel are considered closer to rank and file
employees. The exclusion therefore of mid-level
executives from the category of managers has
brought about a third classification, the supervisory
employees. The peculiar role of supervisors is such
that while they are not managers, when they
recommend action implementing management
policy or ask for the discipline or dismissal of
subordinates, they identify with the interests of the
employer and may act contrary to the interests of
the rank and file. 5
In its position paper submitted to the Mediator-
Arbiter, petitioner described the positions and
functions of its professional/technical employees,
(engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants,
nurses, and midwives). The guidelines, which were
not refuted by respondent PMPI, state:
. . . Professional and Technical positions are those
whose primary duty consists of the performance of
work directly related to management programs;
who customarily, regularly and routinarily exercise
judgment in the application of concepts, methods,
systems and procedures in their respective fields of
specialization; who regularly and directly assist a
managerial and/or supervisory employee, execute
under general supervision, work along specialized
or technical lines requiring special training,
experience or knowledge, or execute under
general supervision special assignments and tasks . .
. They are immediately under the direction and
supervision of supervisors or superintendents. They
have no men under them but are regularly called
upon by their supervisors or superintendents on
some technical matters. 6
Moreover, Herculano A. Duhaylungsod, Personnel
Officer of petitioner, attested that there was no
community of interests between the supervisors of
petitioner and the professional/technical
employees; that as of 25 July 1990, personnel
records showed that there were 125 supervisors and
271 professional/technical employees; that of the
271 professional/technical employees, 150 were
directly under and being supervised by supervisors,
while the rest were staff members of
superintendents. 7
The certification of Personnel Officer Duhaylungsod
that its professional/technical employees occupy
positions that are non-supervisory is evidence that
said employees belong to the rank and file. 8 Quite
obviously, these professional/technical employees
cannot effectively recommend managerial actions
with the use of independent judgment because
they are under the supervision of superintendents
and supervisors. Because it is unrefuted that
theseprofessional/technical employees are
performing non-supervisory functions, hence
considered admitted, they should be classified, at
least for purposes of this case, as rank and file
employees. Consequently, these
professional/technical employees cannot be
allowed to join a union composed of supervisors.
Conversely, supervisory employees cannot join a
labor organization of employees under their
supervision but may validly form a separate
organization of their own. 9 This is provided in Art.
245 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No.
6715, to wit:
14 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
. . . Managerial employees are not eligible to join,
assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in a
labor organization of the rank and file employees
but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own. llcd
Respondent PMPI is supposed to be a union of 125
supervisors. If the professional/technical employees
are included as members, and records show that
they are 271 in all or much more than the
supervisors, then PMPI will turn out to be a rank and
file union with the supervisors as members.
This is precisely the situation which the law prohibits.
It would create an obvious conflict of views among
the members, or at least between two (2) groups of
members espousing opposing interests. The intent of
the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors
would merge with the rank and file, or where the
supervisors' labor organization would represent
conflicting interests, especially where, as in the case
at bar, the supervisors will be commingling with
those employees whom they directly supervise in
their own bargaining unit. Members of the
supervisory union might refuse to carry out
disciplinary measures against their co-member rank
and file employees. 10
Supervisors have the right to form their own union or
labor organization. What the law prohibits is a union
whose membership comprises of supervisors
merging with the rank and file employees because
this is where conflict of interests may arise in the
areas of discipline, collective bargaining and strikes.
11 The professional/technical employees of
petitioner therefore may join the existing rank and
file union, or form a union separate and distinct
from the existing union organized by the rank and
file employees of the same company.
As to the confidential employees of the petitioner,
the latter has not shown any proof or compelling
reason to exclude them from joining respondent
PMPI and from participating in the certification
election, unless these confidential employees are
the same professional/technical employees whom
we find to be occupying rank and file positions.
LibLex
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
of respondent Secretary of Labor of 7 August 1990,
as well as the order of the respondent Mediator-
Arbiter of 28 March 1990, is SET ASIDE. The
professional/technical employees of petitioner
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation
(PHILPHOS) are declared disqualified from affiliating
with respondent Philphos Movement for Progress,
Inc. (PMPI).
The Department of Labor is directed to order
immediately the conduct of certification election
among the supervisory employees of petitioner,
particularly excluding therefrom its professional and
technical employees.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ.,
concur.
 (Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
74457, March 20, 1987)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987.]
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO,
ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY,
respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The essence of due process is distilled in the
immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades: "Strike
but hear me first!'" It is this cry that the petitioner in
effect repeats here as he challenges the
constitutionality of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626-A.
Cdpr
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
"WHEREAS, the President has given orders
prohibiting the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not
complying with the requirements of EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 626 particularly with respect to age;
"WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such
orders the violators still manage to circumvent the
prohibition against interprovincial movement of
carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and.
"WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and
objectives of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626 and the
prohibition against interprovincial movement of
carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said
Executive Order and provide for the disposition of
the carabaos and carabeef subject of the
violation;.
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby
promulgate the following:
"SECTION 1. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626 is hereby
amended such that henceforth, no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another. The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive Order as
amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as
the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef,
and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case
of carabaos.
"SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect
immediately.
"Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of
October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and eighty.
15 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines"
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a
pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13,
1984, when they were confiscated by the police
station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for
violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner
sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering
the merits of the case, the court sustained the
confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could
no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation
of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by
the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its
presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, * 3 which upheld the
trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this
petition for review on certiorari. prcd
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported across provincial boundaries. His claim
is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed
without according the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial court as
guaranteed by due process. He complains that the
measure should not have been presumed, and so
sustained, as constitutional. There is also a
challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative
power by the former President under Amendment
No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the
case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here.
The question raised there was the necessity of the
previous publication of the measure in the Official
Gazette before it could be considered
enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on
the basis of due process of law. In doing so,
however, this Court did not, as contended by the
Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the
constitutionality of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626-A.
That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts
should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not
prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest
tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of
court may provide," final judgments and orders of
lower courts in, among others, all cases involving
the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This
simply means that the resolution of such cases may
be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be
constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted.
Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their
invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then
"will be the time to make the hammer fall, and
heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant
warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow
the path of least resistance by simply presuming the
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On
the contrary, they should probe the issue more
deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing
another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the
wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the
exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking
of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or
popular censure, or any other similar inhibition
unworthy of the bench, especially this Court. LLjur
The challenged measure is denominated an
executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely
implementing an existing law. It was issued by
President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care
that the laws were faithfully executed but in the
exercise of his legislative authority under
Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that
whenever in his judgment there existed a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or
whenever the legislature failed or was unable to
act adequately on any matter that in his judgment
required immediate action, he could, in order to
meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters
of instruction that were to have the force and
effect of law. As there is no showing of any
exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary
power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to
question the validity of the executive order.
Nevertheless, since the determination of the
grounds was supposed to have been made by the
President "in his judgment," a phrase that will lead to
protracted discussion not really necessary at this
time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a
more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we
confine ourselves to the more fundamental
question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the
provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
unmistakable language to avoid controversies that
might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the
ideal. In the case of the due process clause,
however, this rule was deliberately not followed
and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In
fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934,
but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel,
Chairman of the Committee on the Pill of Rights,
who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained
by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally
vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient.
This was felt necessary because due process is not,
like some provisions of the fundamental law, an
"iron rule" laying down an implacable and
immutable command for all seasons and all
persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the
guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process
clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every
situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as
16 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
the changing times and circumstances may
require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to
adopt their own specific description of due process
lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket
that will deprive them of the elbow room they may
need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever
indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave
the import of the protection open-ended, as it
were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process
of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the
decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix
Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example,
would go no farther than to define due process -
and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more
and nothing less than "the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their
sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that
Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the
life, liberty or property of any of its subjects except
by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the
land, they thereby won for themselves and their
progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is
now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn
vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215
has since then resounded through the ages, as a
ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base,
that every person, when confronted by the stern
visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair
and open hearing of his cause. prLL
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It
is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the
other side" before an opinion is formed or a
decision is made by those who sit in judgment.
Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question;
the other half must also be considered if an
impartial verdict is to be reached based on an
informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It
is indispensable that the two sides complement
each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading
to the correct ruling after examination of the
problem not from one or the other perspective only
but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this
full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is
unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of
bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in
repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are
notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking,
may not be dispensed with because they are
intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our
judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country
is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of
our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient
rudiments of fair play. We have consistently
declared that every person, faced by the
awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law
of the land," which Daniel Webster described
almost two hundred years ago in the famous
Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has
to be so if the rights of every person are to be
secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of
mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade
the due process clause into a worn and empty
catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are
imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a
number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive
presumption, for example, bars the admission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is
based on human experience or there is a rational
connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are
instances when the need for expeditious action will
justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary
abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on
the loose, which may be killed on sight because of
the immediate danger it poses to the safety and
lives of the people. Pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are
inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a
criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing,
to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16
Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in
the interest of the public health and bawdy houses
to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances,
previous judicial hearing may be omitted without
violation of due process in view of the nature of the
property involved or the urgency of the need to
protect the general welfare from a clear and
present danger. cdll
The protection of the general welfare is the
particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The
police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and
property for the promotion of the general welfare.
18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the
great public needs and is described as the most
pervasive, the least limitable and the most
demanding of the three inherent powers of the
State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain.
The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed
in by the police power, which affects him even
before he is born and follows him still after he is
dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in
practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is
virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often
unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the
activity or the property has some relevance to the
public welfare, its regulation under the police
power is not only proper but necessary. And the
justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims,
Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, which call for the
subordination of individual interests to the benefit of
the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the
government to justify EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626-A,
amending the basic rule in EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except
under certain conditions. The original measure was
issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its
Whereases, that "present conditions demand that
17 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for
the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them
for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need
for such a measure. In the face of the worsening
energy crisis and the increased dependence of our
farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the
government would have been remiss, indeed, if it
had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States
v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration,
branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed
to be a deprivation of property without due process
of law. The defendant had been convicted
thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao
without the required permit, and he appealed to
the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed.
The law was sustained as a valid police measure to
prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which
were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic
had stricken many of these animals and the
reduction of their number had resulted in an acute
decline in agricultural output, which in turn had
caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because
of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent
increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread
alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures
for the registration and branding of these animals.
The Court held that the questioned statute was a
valid exercise of the police power and declared in
part as follows:
"To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in
behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. . . .
"From what has been said, we think it is clear that
the enactment of the provisions of the statute
under consideration was required by `the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class' and that the prohibition of the
slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so
long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or
draft purposes was a `reasonably necessary'
limitation on private ownership, to protect the
community from the loss of the services of such
animals by their slaughter by improvident owners,
tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by
a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even
when by so doing the productive power of the
community may be measurably and dangerously
affected."
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold
with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor
man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to
the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626. The method chosen in
the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for
the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals, again following the
above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by
banning the slaughter of these animals except
where they are at least seven years old if male and
eleven years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will be
conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding
and preventing their improvident depletion. llcd
But while conceding that the amendatory measure
has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, we cannot say with equal
certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method.
We note that to strengthen the original measure,
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626-A imposes an absolute
ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that "no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure
is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the
interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent
their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they
can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to
another province will make it easier to kill them
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made
to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order,
it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the
animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of
the live animals for the purpose of preventing their
slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that
there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as,
not to be flippant, dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means
and the end were to be assumed, we would still
have to reckon with the sanction that the measure
applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef
being transported, to be meted out by the
executive authorities, usually the police only. In the
Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the
penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to
be imposed by the court after trial and conviction
of the accused. Under the challenged measure,
significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the
property being transported is immediately
impounded by the police and declared, by the
measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander,
were returned to the petitioner only after he had
filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The
executive order defined the prohibition, convicted
the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard,
18 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of
elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are
occasions when notice and hearing may be validly
dispensed with notwithstanding the usual
requirement for these minimum guarantees of due
process. It is also conceded that summary action
may be validly taken in administrative proceedings
as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial
only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted,
however, there is a justification for the omission of
the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the
immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected
and the urgency of the need to correct it. cdphil
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of
time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory
treatment. The properties involved were not even
inimical per se as to require their instant destruction.
There certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not have
been proved first in a court of justice, with the
accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles,
21 EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626-A is penal in nature,
the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court
of justice, which alone would have had the
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and
only after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable
manner of the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the questioned executive
order. It is there authorized that the seized property
shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit,
in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry
may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis
supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is.
It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality
and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in
vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said
officers must observe when they make their
distribution. There is none. Their options are
apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria
shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can
supply the answer, they and they alone may
choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own
exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a
"roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority
that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged
measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge
the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There
is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we
hereby declare EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626-A
unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that
the police station commander who confiscated the
petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for
enforcing the executive order in accordance with
its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively
valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the
police, to enforce it. It would have been
impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the
President, to declare the executive order
unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility
alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in
fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel
they had the competence, for all their superior
authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen
fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them,
this case would never have reached us and the
taking of his property under the challenged
measure would have become a fait accompli
despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit.
Without the present challenge, the matter would
have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and
another violation of the Constitution, for all its
obviousness, would have been perpetrated,
allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the
limbo of relinquished rights. LLpr
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it
guarantees but in the courage of the people to
invoke them whenever they are ignored or
violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like
expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and
impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of
protection. They become truly meaningful, and
fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if
they are kept bright and sharp with use by those
who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626-A is hereby
declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed
above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and
the amount thereof is ordered restored to the
petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez,
Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and
Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., on leave.
19 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
(Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., G.R. No. 131652, 131728,
March 09, 1998)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998.]
BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO A.
SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 131728. March 9, 1998.]
BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO SAVELLANO, JR., THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and JUVIELYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN,
respondents.
Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioner Bayani M.
Alonte.
Ramon C. Casano for petitioner in 131728.
The Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for
respondent Judge.
SYNOPSIS
Bayani M. Alonte, then incumbent Mayor of Bian,
Laguna and Buenaventura Concepcion were
charged with rape based on the complaint of
Juvielyn Punongbayan. During the pendency of the
petition for change of venue, Juvielyn, assisted by
her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of
desistance. The petition for change of venue was
granted and the case was raffled to respondent
judge who issued warrants of arrest for petitioners.
Juvielyn reiterated her "decision to abide by her
Affidavit of Desistance." Petitioners pleaded not
guilty when arraigned and waived pre-trial.
Immediately following arraignment the prosecution
presented Juvielyn who testified to the validity and
voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance and that
she has no interest in further prosecuting the action.
The Prosecution then manifested that the State had
no further evidence against the accused to prove
the guilt of the accused. She then moved for the
"dismissal of the case" against both accused-
petitioners. The two accused did not present any
countervailing evidence, did not take the witness
stand nor admitted the act charged in the
information. Thereupon, respondent judge said that
"the case was submitted for decision." On
December 18, 1997, a decision was rendered
convicting petitioners of rape. IEaCDH
Due process in criminal proceedings, in particular,
require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case
is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is
lawfully acquired by it over the person of the
accused; (c) that the accused is given an
opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is
rendered only upon lawful hearing. The above
constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now
elementary and deeply imbedded in our own
criminal justice system, are mandatory and
indispensable.
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled
out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court
which should be strictly adhered to. There can be
no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be
no excuse for not affording an accused his full day
in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and
foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an
enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be
denied even to the most undeserving.
An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when
construed as a pardon in the so-called "private
crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the
criminal case once the action has been instituted.
Prosecutors are expected not merely to discharge
their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism and skill but also to act each time
with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. The
Court is hopeful that the zeal which has been
exhibited many times in the past, although
regrettably a disappointment on few occasions, will
not be wanting in the proceedings yet to follow.
TEDaAc
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DUE
PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS; REQUISITES.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in
criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that
the court or tribunal trying the case is properly
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully
acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c)
that the accused is given an opportunity to be
heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon
lawful hearing. The above constitutional and
jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and
deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice
system, are mandatory and indispensable. The
principles find universal acceptance and are tersely
expressed in the oft-quoted statement that
procedural due process cannot possibly be met
without a "law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment
only after trial."
2. ID.; ID.; THERE CAN BE NO SHORT-CUT TO THE
LEGAL PROCESS AND THERE CAN BE NO EXCUSE FOR
NOT AFFORDING AN ACCUSED HIS FULL DAY IN
COURT. The existence of the waiver must be
positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver
requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must
be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences." Mere silence of the holder of the
right should not be so construed as a waiver of
right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver. The Solicitor General
has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from
what otherwise should have been the regular
course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been
directed to present evidence to prove their
defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled
for the purpose; (2) the parties have not been given
the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor
have dates been set by respondent Judge for the
purpose; and (3) petitioners have not admitted the
act charged in the Information so as to justify any
modification in the order of trial. There can be no
short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no
excuse for not affording an accused his full day in
court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and
foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an
20 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be
denied even to the most undeserving.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE; SHOULD
NOT BE GIVEN PROBATIVE VALUE. In the case of
People vs. Junio, the Court held that: Thus, we have
declared that at most the retraction is an
afterthought which should not be given value. It
would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony
taken before the court of justice simply because
the witness who has given it later on changed his
mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will
make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can
easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses,
usually for monetary consideration, the Court has
invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly
unreliable. [Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622, citing
De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184
SCRA 128; People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.]
4. ID.; COURTS; WITH INHERENT POWER TO COMPEL
THE ATTENDANCE OF ANY PERSON TO TESTIFY.
Courts have the inherent power to compel the
attendance of any person to testify in a case
pending before it, and a party is not precluded
from invoking that authority.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE;
THOUGH CONSTRUED AS PARDON IN "PRIVATE
CRIMES," IT IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF
CRIMINAL ACTION. An affidavit of desistance by
itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-
called "private crimes," is not a ground for the
dismissal of the criminal case once the action has
been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as
so earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence
whose weight or probative value, like any other
piece of evidence, would be up to the court for
proper evaluation. EaSCAH
6. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; IT IS NOT
ENOUGH THAT A COURT IS IMPARTIAL, IT MUST ALSO
BE PERCEIVED TO BE IMPARTIAL. Relative to the
prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano
from further hearing the case, the Court is
convinced that Judge Savellano should, given the
circumstances, be best excused from the case.
Possible animosity between the personalities here
involved may not all be that unlikely. The
pronouncement of this Court in the old case of
Luque vs. Kayanan could again be said: All suitors
are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of
an independent, wholly-free, disinterested and
unbiased tribunal. Second only to the duty of
rendering a just decision is the duty of doing it in a
manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to the
fairness and integrity of the Judge. It is not enough
that a court is impartial, it must also be perceived
as impartial.
7. ID.; ATTORNEYS; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE
AND UNKIND ASCRIPTIONS CAN HARDLY BE
JUSTIFIED. While the lawyer in promoting the
cause of his client or defending his rights might do
so with fervor, simple courtesy demands that it be
done within the bounds of propriety and decency.
The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions hardly can be justified nor can have a
place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among
members of the legal profession is a treasured
tradition that must at no time be lost to it. DHEcCT
8. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTORS;
EXPECTED TO ACT WITH UTMOST DEVOTION AND
DEDICATION TO DUTY. Finally, it may be
opportune to say, once again, that prosecutors are
expected not merely to discharge their duties with
the highest degree of excellence, professionalism
and skill but also to act each time with utmost
devotion and dedication to duty. The Court is
hopeful that the zeal which has been exhibited
many times in the past, although regrettably a
disappointment on few occasions, will not be
wanting in the proceedings yet to follow.
PUNO, J., separate opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; RECANTATION;
CONSTRUED. A recantation usually applies to a
repudiation by a complainant or a witness, either
for the prosecution or the defense, who has
previously given an extrajudicial statement or
testimony in court. Repudiation may be made in
writing, i.e., by sworn statement, or by testifying on
the witness stand.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERALLY LOOKED UPON WITH
DISFAVOR. Mere retraction by a witness or by
complainant of his or her testimony does not
necessarily vitiate the original testimony or
statement, if credible. The general rule is that courts
look with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies
previously given in court. This rule applies to crimes,
offenses as well as to administrative offenses. The
reason is because affidavits of retraction can easily
be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses,
usually through intimidation or for monetary
consideration. Moreover, there is always the
probability that they will later be repudiated and
there would never be an end to criminal litigation. It
would also be a dangerous rule for courts to reject
testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice
simply because the witnesses who had given them
later on changed their minds for one reason or
another. This would make solemn trials a mockery
and place the investigation of the truth at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. The general rule
notwithstanding, the affidavit should not be
peremptorily dismissed as a useless scrap of paper.
There are instances when a recantation may
create serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused.
A retracted statement or testimony must be subject
to scrupulous examination. The previous statement
or testimony and the subsequent one must be
carefully compared and the circumstances under
which each was given and the reasons and
motives for the change carefully scrutinized. The
veracity of each statement or testimony must be
tested by the credibility of the witness which is left
for the judge to decide. In short, only where there
exists special circumstances in the case which
when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to
the truth of the testimony or statement given, can a
retraction be considered and upheld.
21 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
4. ID.; ID.; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE, GENERALLY
WITH NO PERSUASIVE EFFECT. An affidavit of
desistance is understood to be a sworn statement
executed by a complainant in a criminal or
administrative case that he or she is discontinuing
the action filed upon his or her complaint for
whatever reason he or she may cite. The court
attaches no persuasive value to a desistance
especially when executed as an afterthought.
However, as in retractions, an affidavit of
desistance calls for a reexamination of the records
of the case. cAHDES
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WEIGHT IN PRIVATE CRIMES. In
private crimes, an affidavit of desistance filed by a
private complainant is also frowned upon by the
courts. Although such affidavit may deserve a
second look at the case, there is hardly an instance
when this Court upheld it in private crimes and
dismissed the case on the sole basis thereof.
Indeed, a case is not dismissed upon mere affidavit
of desistance of the complainant, particularly
where there exist special circumstances that raise
doubts as to the reliability of the affidavit.
6. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRIVATE CRIMES;
CANNOT BE PROSECUTED EXCEPT UPON COMPLAINT
OF OFFENDED PARTY. Private crimes cannot be
prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the
offended party. In adultery and concubinage, the
offended party must implead both the guilty parties
and must not have consented or pardoned the
offenders. In seduction, abduction, rape and acts
of lasciviousness, the complaint must be filed by the
offended party or her parents, grandparents or
guardian. The complainant must not have expressly
pardoned the offender. The filing of a complaint in
private crimes is merely a condition precedent to
the exercise by the proper authorities of the power
to prosecute the guilty parties. It is the complaint
that starts the prosecutory proceeding without
which the fiscal and the court cannot exercise
jurisdiction over the case. Once the complaint is
filed, the action proceeds just as in any other crime.
7. CRIMINAL LAW; EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY; MODES. Article 344 also provides for the
extinction of criminal liability in private crimes. It
mentions two modes: pardon and marriage, which
when validly and timely made, result in the total
extinction of criminal liability of the offender. The
pardon in private crimes must be made before the
institution of the criminal action. In adultery and
concubinage, the pardon may be express or
implied while in seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, the pardon must be express.
In all cases, the pardon must come prior to the
institution of the criminal action. After the case has
been filed in court, any pardon made by the
private complainant, whether by sworn statement
or on the witness stand, cannot extinguish criminal
liability. The only act that extinguishes the penal
action and the penalty that may have been
imposed is the marriage between the offender and
the offended party.
8. ID.; ID.; PARDON IN PRIVATE CRIMES; MUST COME
BEFORE INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION.
Pardon by the offended party extinguishes criminal
liability when made while the crime is still "private"
and within the control of the offended party. But
once the case is filed in court, the pardon cannot
ipso facto operate to dismiss the case. After the
institution of the criminal action, any pardon given
by the complainant to the offender would be
unavailing, except of course when the offender
validly marries the offended party. The offended
party's pardon of the offender in a seduction case
after the criminal action had been instituted
constitutes no bar to said action. A pardon given in
a rape case after the filing of the action in court
"comes too late to hide the shameful occurrence
from public notice."
9. ID.; ID.; DESISTANCE, NOT A GROUND. Article
344 does not include desistance of the offended
party from prosecuting the case as a ground for
extinction of criminal liability whether total or partial.
Hence, only when the desistance is grounded on
forgiveness and pardon and is made before the
institution of the criminal action, can it extinguish
criminal liability. Desistance, per se, is not equivalent
to pardon.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar,
the "Affidavit of Desistance" of Juvielyn is not an
express pardon of the accused and the crime
committed. Private complainant desisted from
prosecuting the case against the petitioners
because she wished "to start life anew and live
normally again." She reiterated this reason on the
witness stand. She complained that members of the
media were bothering and harassing her and that
she wanted to go back to her normal life. She never
said that she forgave the petitioners. She did not
absolve them from their culpability. She did not give
any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about
her rape. She did not say that she consented to
petitioner Alonte's acts. Moreover, the rape case is
already in court and it is no longer her right to
decide whether or not the charge should be
continued.
11. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE
PROCESS; ACCUSED DENIED THEREOF WHERE
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION WAS RENDERED
WITHOUT TRIAL. Justice Puno agrees with the
majority that the November 7, 1997 proceedings
could not have been a trial on the merits. First of all,
the proceedings did not conform with the
procedure for trial as provided in the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. In the case at bar, petitioners
were never instructed to present evidence to prove
their defenses. The parties were never given the
opportunity to present their respective evidence
rebutting the testimony of private complainant.
There was no admission by petitioners of the charge
in the information as to justify a change in the order
of trial. Second, the admission of private
complainant's affidavit of October 21, 1996 was
made solely in response to respondent judge's own
questioning. It was this affidavit which respondent
judge used to convict the petitioners. This affidavit,
however, was not marked nor was it formally
offered before the court. Third, where there is a
doubt as to the nature of the criminal proceedings
before the court, this doubt must be resolved in
22 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
favor of the accused who must be given the widest
latitude of action to prove his innocence. It is in
petitioners' favor that the proceedings of
November 7, 1997 be treated as a hearing on the
motion to dismiss, not a trial on the merits. To rule
otherwise will effectively deny petitioners due
process and all the other rights of an accused
under the Bill of Rights and our Rules in Criminal
Procedure. AHacIS
12. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RULES
STRICTLY ADHERED TO. Our criminal rules of
procedure strictly provide the step by step
procedure to be followed by courts in cases
punishable by death. This rule also applies to all
other criminal cases, particularly where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The reason
for this is to assure that the State makes no mistake
in taking life and liberty except that of the guilty.
13. ID.; EVIDENCE; EVIDENCE NOT FORMALLY
OFFERED, NOT TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.
Evidence not formally offered in court will not be
taken into consideration by the court in disposing of
the issues of the case. Any evidence which a party
desires to submit for the consideration of the court
must formally be offered by him, otherwise it is
excluded and rejected. Indeed, following
respondent judge's finding and assuming that the
November 7, 1997 hearing was already a trial on
the merits, petitioners were never afforded their
right to confront and cross-examine the witness. The
court did not, at the very least, inquire as to
whether the petitioners wanted to cross-examine
private complainant with respect to her affidavit of
October 21, 1996. No opportunity to cross-examine
was afforded petitioners and their counsels such
that they cannot be deemed to have waived said
right by inaction.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
Pending before this Court are two separate
petitions, one filed by petitioner Bayani M. Alonte,
docketed G.R. No. 131652, and the other by
petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed
G.R. No. 131728, that assail the decision of
respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 53, of Manila
finding both petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape. The two petitions were
consolidated. llcd
On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was
filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an
incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna, and
Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a
complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. The
information contained the following averments;
thus:
"That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto.
Tomas, Bian, Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable court, the above named accused,
who is the incumbent mayor of Bian, Laguna after
giving complainant-child drinking water which
made her dizzy and weak, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with said JUVIELYN PUNONGBAYAN
against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
"That accused Buenaventura 'Wella' Concepcion
without having participated as principal or
accessory assisted in the commission of the offense
by bringing said complainant child to the rest house
of accused Bayani 'Arthur' Alonte at Sto. Tomas,
Bian, Laguna and after receiving the amount of
P1,000.00 left her alone with Bayani Alonte who
subsequently raped her.
Contrary to Law." 1
The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B
and assigned by raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC of
Bian, Laguna, presided over by Judge Pablo B.
Francisco.
On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan,
through her counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin,
and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor ("ACSP")
Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator a Petition for a Change of
Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-
12-RTC) to have the case transferred and tried by
any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for change of
venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan,
assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an
affidavit of desistance, quoted herein in full, as
follows:
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
"I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years of
age, a resident of No. 5 Uranus Street,
Congressional Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City,
duly assisted by private legal counsel and my
parents, after having duly sworn in accordance
with law, depose and say:
"1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed
against Mayor Bayani 'Arthur' Alonte of Bian,
Laguna, with the RTC-Branch 25 of Bian, Laguna;
"2. That the case has been pending for some time,
on preliminary issues, specifically, (a) change of
venue, filed with the Supreme Court; (b) propriety
of the appeal to the Court of Appeals, and after its
denial by said court, brought to the Office of the
President, on the veracity of the findings of the Five-
Man Investigating Panel of the State Prosecutor's
Office, and the Secretary of Justice, and (c) a hold-
departure order filed with the Bian Court;
"3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and
meanwhile, I have already lost two (2) semesters of
my college residence. And when the actual trial is
held after all the preliminary issues are finally
resolved, I anticipate a still indefinite suspension of
my schooling to attend the hearings;
"4. That during the entire period since I filed the
case, my family has lived a most abnormal life: my
father and mother had to give up their jobs; my
younger brother, who is in fourth grade, had to stop
his schooling, like myself;
23 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
"5. That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial
process, I simply wish to stop and live elsewhere
with my family, where we can start life anew, and
live normally once again;
"6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my
complaint for rape and the other charge for child
abuse wherein the Five-Man Investigating Panel of
the Office of the State Prosecutor found a prima
facie case although the information has not been
filed, and that I will not at any time revive this, and
related cases or file new cases, whether criminal,
civil, and or administrative, here or anywhere in the
Philippines;
"7. That I likewise realize that the execution of this
Affidavit will put to doubt my credibility as a witness-
complainant;
"8. That this is my final decision reached without fear
or favor, premised on a corresponding commitment
that there will be no reprisals in whatever form,
against members of the police force or any other
official of officer, my relatives and friends who
extended assistance to me in whatever way, in my
search for justice.
"WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June,
1997, in Quezon City.
"(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Complainant
"Assisted by:
(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Private Prosecutor
"In the presence of:
(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
Father
(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Mother
"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 day
of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
"(Sgd) Illegible
Administering Officer" 2
On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf
of petitioners, moved to have the petition for
change of venue dismissed on the ground that it
had become moot in view of complainant's
affidavit of desistance. On 22 August 1997, ACSP
Guiyab filed his comment on the motion to dismiss.
Guiyab asserted that he was not aware of the
desistance of private complainant and opined that
the desistance, in any case, would not produce
any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor
who had direction and control of the prosecution
of the criminal action. He prayed for the denial of
the motion to dismiss.
On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a
Resolution (Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC),
granting the petition for change of venue. The
Court said:
"These affidavits give specific names, dates, and
methods being used to abort, by coercion or
corruption, the prosecution of Criminal Case No.
9619-B. It is thus incorrect for oppositors Alonte and
Concepcion to contend that the fear of the
petitioner, her private counsel and her witnesses are
too generalized if not fabricated. Indeed, the
probability that in desisting from pursuing her
complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor, may have
succumbed to some illicit influence and undue
pressure. To prevent possible miscarriage of justice is
a good excuse to grant the petition to transfer the
venue of Criminal Case No. 9619-B from Bian,
Laguna to the City of Manila.
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of
Venue from Bian, Laguna to the City of Manila is
granted. The Executive Judge of RTC Manila is
ordered to raffle Crim. Case No. 9619-B to any of its
branches. The judge to whom Crim. Case No. 9619-
B shall be raffled shall resolve the petitioner's Motion
to Resume Proceedings filed in Br. XXV of the RTC of
Bian, Laguna and determine the voluntariness and
validity of petitioner's desistance in light of the
opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief
State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab. The branch
clerk of court of Br. XXV of the RTC of Bian, Laguna
is ordered to personally deliver to the Executive
Judge of Manila the complete records of Crim.
Case No. 9619-B upon receipt of this Resolution." 3
On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed
Criminal Case No. 97-159955 by the Clerk of Court
of Manila, was assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC
Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A.
Savellano, Jr., presiding.
On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan,
through Attorney Balbin, submitted to the Manila
court a "compliance" where she reiterated "her
decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance."
In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge
Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and
Concepcion "without prejudice to, and
independent of, this Court's separate determination
as the trier of facts, of the voluntariness and validity
of the [private complainant's] desistance in the light
of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst.
Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab."
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily
surrendered himself to Director Santiago Toledo of
the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), while
Concepcion,. in his case, posted the
recommended bail of P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned
and both pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. The
parties manifested that they were waiving pre-trial.
24 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
The proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge
Savellano, both parties agreed to proceed with the
trial of the case on the merits. 4 According to
Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the
prosecution to present evidence relative only to the
question of the voluntariness and validity of the
affidavit of desistance. 5
It would appear that immediately following the
arraignment, the prosecution presented private
complainant Juvie-lyn Punongbayan followed by
her parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan
affirmed the validity and voluntariness of her
affidavit of desistance. She stated that she had no
intention of giving positive testimony in support of
the charges against Alonte and had no interest in
further prosecuting the action. Punongbayan
confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to desist
because of the harassment she was experiencing
from the media, (ii) that no pressures nor influence
were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of
desistance, and (iii) that neither she nor her parents
received a single centavo from anybody to secure
the affidavit of desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes
then presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayan's
parents, who affirmed their signatures on the
affidavit of desistance and their consent to their
daughter's decision to desist from the case, and (ii)
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente,
who attested that the affidavit of desistance was
signed by Punongbayan and her parents in his
presence and that he was satisfied that the same
was executed freely and voluntarily. Finally,
Campomanes manifested that in light of the
decision of private complainant and her parents
not to pursue the case, the State had no further
evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of
the accused. She, then, moved for the "dismissal of
the case" against both Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case
was submitted for decision." 6
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an
"Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail." Assistant State
Prosecutor Campomanes, in a Comment filed on
the same date, stated that the State interposed "no
objection to the granting of bail and in fact Justice
and Equity dictates that it joins the accused in his
prayer for the granting of bail."
Respondent judge did not act on the application
for bail.
On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an Urgent
Plea to Resolve the Motion for Bail. On even date,
ASP Campomanes filed a Manifestation deeming "it
proper and in accord with justice and fair play to
Join the aforestated motion."
Again, the respondent judge did not act on the
urgent motion.
The records would indicate that on the 25th
November 1997, 1st December 1997, 8th December
1997 and 10th December 1997, petitioner Alonte
filed a Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for
Early Resolution, respectively, in respect of his
application for bail. None of these motions were
acted upon by Judge Savellano.
On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A.
Fortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte
received a notice from the RTC Manila Branch 53,
notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, on
18 December 1997, of the decision on the case. The
counsel for accused Concepcion denied having
received any notice of the scheduled
promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called,
Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano
manifested that Alonte could not attend the
promulgation of the decision because he was
suffering from mild hypertension and was confined
at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other hand,
petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would
appear not to have been notified of the
proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the
decision proceeded in absentia; the reading
concluded:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani Alonte and
Buenaventura 'Wella' Concepcion guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of RAPE, as
defined and penalized under Article 335(2) in
relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for which
each one of the them is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA or
imprisonment for twenty (20) years; and one (1) day
to forty (40) years.
"In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the
accused Buenaventura 'Wella' Concepcion for his
provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and rendered
without any further force and effect.
"SO ORDERED." 7
On the same day of 18th December 1997,
petitioner Alonte filed a motion for reconsideration.
Without waiting for its resolution, Alonte filed the
instant "Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam" for certiorari,
Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail, Recusation of
respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action
against an RTC Judge." Petitioner Concepcion later
filed his own petition for certiorariand mandamus
with the Court.
Alonte submits the following grounds in support of
his petition seeking to have the decision nullified
and the case remanded for new trial; thus:
"The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo
(Annex A) without affording the petitioner his
Constitutional right to due process of law (Article III,
1, Constitution).
"The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
25 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo in
violation of the mandatory provisions of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, specifically, in the conduct
and order of trial (Rule 119) prior to the
promulgation of a judgment (Rule 120; Annex A).
"The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when, in total disregard of the Revised Rules on
Evidence and existing doctrinal jurisprudence, he
rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A)
on the basis of two (2) affidavits (Punongbayan's
and Balbin's) which were neither marked nor
offered into evidence by the prosecution, nor
without giving the petitioner an opportunity to
cross-examine the affiants thereof, again in
violation of petitioner's right to due process (Article
III, 1, Constitution).
"The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo
without conducting a trial on the facts which would
establish that complainant was raped by petitioner
(Rule 119, Article III, 1, Constitution), thereby setting
a dangerous precedent where heinous offenses
can result in conviction without trial (then with more
reason that simpler offenses could end up with the
same result)." 8
On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the
following grounds in support of his own petition;
thus:
"1. The decision of the respondent Judge rendered
in the course of resolving the prosecution's motion
to dismiss the case is a patent nullity for having
been rendered without jurisdiction, without the
benefit of a trial and in total violation of the
petitioner's right to due process of law.
"2. There had been no valid promulgation of
judgment at least as far as petitioner is concerned.
"3. The decision had been rendered in gross
violation of the right of the accused to a fair trial by
an impartial and neutral judge whose actuations
and outlook of the case had been motivated by a
sinister desire to ride on the crest of media hype
that surrounded this case and use this case as a
tool for his ambition for promotion to a higher court.
"4. The decision is patently contrary to law and the
jurisprudence in so far as it convicts the petitioner as
a principal even though he has been charged only
as an accomplice in the information." 9
The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will
disregard, in view of the case milieu, the
prematurity of petitioners' invocation, i e., even
before the trial court could resolve Alonte's motion
for reconsideration.
The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the
somewhat strange way the case has proceeded
below. Per Judge Savellano, after the waiver by the
parties of the pre-trial stage, the trial of the case did
proceed on the merits but that
"The two (2) accused did not present any
countervailing evidence during the trial. They did
not take the witness stand to refute or deny under
oath the truth of the contents of the private
complainant's aforementioned affidavit which she
expressly affirmed and confirmed in Court, but,
instead, thru their respective lawyers, they rested
and submitted the case for decision merely on the
basis of the private complainant's so called
'desistance' which, to them, was sufficient enough
for their purposes. They left everything to the so-
called 'desistance' of the private complainant." 10
According to petitioners, however, there was no
such trial for what was conducted on 07 November
1997, aside from the arraignment of the accused,
was merely a proceeding in conformity with the
resolution of this Court in Administrative Case No.
97-1-12-RTC to determine the validity and
voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance
executed by Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been
undue precipitancy in the conduct of the
proceedings. Perhaps the problem could have well
been avoided had not the basic procedures been,
to the Court's perception taken lightly. And in this
shortcoming, looking at the records of the case, the
trial court certainly is not alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of
the Constitution provides the fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable."
Jurisprudence 11 acknowledges that due process in
criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that
the court or tribunal trying the case is properly
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully
acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c)
that the accused is given an opportunity to be
heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon
lawful hearing. 12
The above constitutional and jurisprudential
postulates, by now elementary and deeply
imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are
mandatory and indispensable. The principles find
universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in
the oft-quoted statement that procedural due
process cannot possibly be met without a "law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
26 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."
13
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled
out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court; viz:
"Sec. 3. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in
the following order:
"(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to
prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil
liability.
"(b) The accused may present evidence to prove
his defense, and damages, if any, arising from the
issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.
"(c) The parties may then respectively present
rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in
furtherance of justice, permits them to present
additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
"(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall
be deemed submitted for decision unless the court
directs the parties to argue orally or to submit
memoranda.
"(e) However, when the accused admits the act or
omission charged in the complaint or information
but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial
may be modified accordingly."
In Tabao vs. Espina, 14 the Court has underscored
the need to adhere strictly to the above rules. It
reminds that
". . . each step in the trial process serves a specific
purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of
an accused requires that an accused be given
sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So,
with the prosecution as to its evidence.
"Hence, any deviation from the regular course of
trial should always take into consideration the rights
of all the parties to the case, whether in the
prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their
discretion, judges are sworn not only to uphold the
law but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial
gavel should not be wielded by one who has an
unsound and distorted sense of justice and fairness.
15
While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment
that
"Petitioners-accused were each represented during
the hearing on 07 November 1997 with their
respective counsel of choice. None of their counsel
interposed an intention to cross-examine rape
victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after she
attested, in answer to respondent judge's
clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of
her two affidavits one detailing the rape and the
other detailing the attempts to buy her desistance;
the opportunity was missed/not used, hence
waived. The rule of case law is that the right to
confront and cross-examine a witness 'is a personal
one and may be waived."' (emphasis supplied)
It should be pointed out, however, that the
existence of the waiver must be positively
demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that
it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences." 16 Mere silence of the holder of the
right should not be so construed as a waiver of
right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver. 17 The Solicitor
General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations
from what otherwise should have been the regular
course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been
directed to present evidence to prove their
defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled
for the purpose; 18 (2) the parties have not been
given the opportunity to present rebutting
evidence nor have dates been set by respondent
Judge for the purpose; 19 and (3) petitioners have
not admitted the act charged in the Information so
as to justify any modification in the order of trial. 20
There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and
there can be no excuse for not affording an
accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly
occupying the first and foremost place of honor in
our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right
that cannot be denied even to the most
undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further
proceedings. And, since the case would have to
be sent back to the court a quo, this ponencia has
carefully avoided making any statement or
reference that might be misconstrued as
prejudgment or as pre-empting the trial court in the
proper disposition of the case. The Court likewise
deems it appropriate that all related proceedings
therein, including the petition for bail, should be
subject to the proper disposition of the trial court.
LLpr
Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few
observations on the affidavit of desistance
executed by the complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn
Punongbayan, hereinbefore quoted, does not
contain any statement that disavows the veracity
of her complaint against petitioners but merely
seeks to "be allowed to withdraw" her complaint
and to discontinue with the case for varied other
reasons. On this subject, the case of People vs.
Junio, 21 should be instructive. The Court has there
explained:
"The appellant's submission that the execution of an
Affidavit of Desistance by complainant who was
assisted by her mother supported the 'inherent
incredibility of prosecution's evidence' is specious.
We have said in so many cases that retractions are
generally unreliable and are looked upon with
considerable disfavor by the courts. The unreliable
character of this document is shown by the fact
that it is quite incredible that after going through
the process of having accused-appellant arrested
by the police, positively identifying him as the
person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of
a physical examination of her private parts, and
27 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
then repeating her accusations in open court by
recounting her anguish, Maryjane would suddenly
turn around and declare that '[a]fter a careful
deliberation over the case, (she) find(s) that the
same does not merit or warrant criminal
prosecution.'
"Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction
is an afterthought which should not be given
probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to
reject the testimony taken before the court of
justice simply because the witness who has given it
later on changed his mind for one reason or
another. Such a rule will make a solemn trial a
mockery and place the investigation at the mercy
of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of
retraction can easily be secured from poor and
ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary
consideration, the Court has invariably regarded
such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable. [Flores vs.
People, 211 SCRA 622, citing De Guzman vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128;
People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.] 22
The Junio rule is no different from ordinary criminal
cases. For instance, in People vs. Ballabare, 23 a
murder case, the Court has ruled:
"The contention has no merit. To begin with, the
Affidavit executed by eyewitness Tessie Asenita is
not a recantation. To recant a prior statement is to
renounce and withdraw it formally and publicly. [36
WORDS AND PHRASES 683, citing Pradlik vs. State,
41-A 2nd, 906, 907.] In her affidavit, Tessie Asenita
did not really recant what she had said during the
trial. She only said she wanted to withdraw her
testimony because her father, Leonardo Tacadao,
Sr., was no longer interested in prosecuting the case
against accused-appellant. Thus, her affidavit
stated:
"3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao,
Sr., the complainant therein, was no longer
interested to prosecute the case as manifested in
the Sworn Affidavit of Desistance before the
Provincial Prosecutor, I do hereby WITHDRAW
and/or REVOKE my testimony of record to confirm
(sic) with my father's desire;
"It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has
undergone trial and scrutiny by the court and the
parties simply because an affidavit withdrawing the
testimony is subsequently presented by the
defense. In the first place, any recantation must be
tested in a public trial with sufficient opportunity
given to the party adversely affected by it to cross-
examine the recanting witness. In this case, Tessie
Asenita was not recalled to the witness stand to
testify on her affidavit. Her affidavit is thus hearsay. It
was her husband, Roque Asenita, who was
presented and the matters he testified to did not
even bear on the substance of Tessie's affidavit. He
testified that accused-appellant was not involved in
the perpetration of the crime.
"In the second place, to accept the new evidence
uncritically would be to make a solemn trial a
mockery and place the investigation at the mercy
of unscrupulous witnesses. [De Guzman vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128, 134,
citing People vs. Morales, 113 SCRA 683.] For even
assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a
retraction, this circumstance alone does not require
the court to disregard her original testimony. A
retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier
declaration. [People vs. Davatos, 229 SCRA 647.]
For this reason, courts look with disfavor upon
retractions because they can easily be obtained
from witnesses usually through intimidation or for
monetary considerations. [People vs. Clamor, 198
SCRA 642.] Hence, when confronted with a
situation where a witness recants his testimony,
courts must not automatically exclude the original
testimony solely on the basis of the recantation.
They should determine which testimony should be
given credence through a comparison of the
original testimony and the new testimony, applying
the general rules of evidence. [Reano vs. Court of
Appeals, 165 SCRA 525.] In this case we think the
trial court correctly ruled." 24
It may not be amiss to state that courts have the
inherent power to compel the attendance of any
person to testify in a case pending before it, and a
party is not precluded from invoking that authority.
25
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even
when construed as a pardon in the so-called
"private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of
the criminal case once the action has been
instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so
earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence
whose weight or probative value, like any other
piece of evidence, would be up to the court for
proper evaluation. The decision in Junio went on to
hold
"While '[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape
or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor
in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above named persons, as the
case may be,' [Third par. of Art. 344, The Revised
Penal Code,] the pardon to justify the dismissal of
the complaint should have been made prior to the
institution of the criminal action. [People vs. Entes,
103 SCRA 162, cited by People vs. Soliao, 194 SCRA
250, which in turn is cited in People vs. Villorente,
210 SCRA 647.] Here, the motion to dismiss to which
the affidavit of desistance is attached was filed
after the institution of the criminal case. And, affiant
did not appear to be serious in 'signifying (her)
intention to refrain from testifying' since she still
completed her testimony notwithstanding her
earlier affidavit of desistance. More, the affidavit is
suspect considering that while it was dated 'April
1992,' it was only submitted sometime in August
1992, four (4) months after the Information was filed
before the court a quo on 6 April 1992, perhaps
dated as such to coincide with the actual filing of
the case." 26
In People vs. Miranda, 27 applying the pertinent
provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
which, in full, states -
28 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
"Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and
acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon
a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
"The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts
of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any
case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned
by the above named persons, as the case may be.
"In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of
lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the
offender with the offended party shall extinguish
the criminal action or remit the penalty already
imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph
shall also be applicable to the co-principals,
accomplices and accessories after the fact of the
above-mentioned crimes."
the Court said:
"Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted
prohibits a prosecution for seduction, abduction,
rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a
complaint made by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any
case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned
by the above-named persons, as the case may be.
It does not prohibit the continuance of a
prosecution in the offended patty pardons the
offender after the cause has been instituted, nor
does it order the dismissal of said cause. The only
act that according to article 344 extinguishes the
penal action and the penalty that may have been
imposed is the marriage between the offender and
the offended party." 28
In People vs. Infante, 29 decided just a little over a
month before Miranda, the Court similarly held:
"In this court, after the case had been submitted, a
motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of the
appellant predicated on an affidavit executed by
Manuel Artigas, Jr., in which he pardoned his guilty
spouse for her infidelity. But this attempted pardon
cannot prosper for two reasons. The second
paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
which is in question reads: 'The offended party
cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty parties, if they are both
alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders.' This provision means that
the pardon afforded the offenders must come
before the institution of the criminal prosecution,
and means, further, that both the offenders must be
pardoned by the offended party. To elucidate
further, article 435 of the old Penal Code provided:
'The husband may at any time remit the penalty
imposed upon his wife. In such case the penalty
imposed upon the wife's paramour shall also be
deemed to be remitted.' These provisions of the old
Penal Code became inoperative after the passage
of Act No. 1773, section 2, which had the effect of
repealing the same. The Revised Penal Code
thereafter expressly repealed the old Penal Code,
and in so doing did not have the effect of reviving
any of its provisions which were not in force. But
with the incorporation of the second paragraph of
article 344, the pardon given by the offended party
again constitutes a bar to the prosecution for
adultery. Once more, however, it must be
emphasized that this pardon must come before the
institution of the criminal prosecution and must be
for both offenders to be effective circumstances
which do not concur in this case." 30
The decisions speak well for themselves, and the
Court need not say more than what it has
heretofore already held.
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of
Judge Savellano from further hearing the case, the
Court is convinced that Judge Savellano should,
given the circumstances, be best excused from the
case. Possible animosity between the personalities
here involved may not all be that unlikely. The
pronouncement of this Court in the old case of
Luque vs. Kayanan 31 could again be said: All
suitors are entitled to nothing short of the cold
neutrality of an independent, wholly-free
disinterested and unbiased tribunal. Second only to
the duty of rendering a just decision is the duty of
doing it in a manner that will not arouse any
suspicion as to the fairness and integrity of the
Judge. 32 It is not enough that a court is impartial, it
must also be perceived as impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a
simple reminder on the use of proper language
before the courts. While the lawyer in promoting the
cause of his client or defending his rights might do
so with fervor, simple courtesy demands that it be
done within the bounds of propriety and decency.
The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions hardly can be justified nor can have a
place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among
members of the legal profession is a treasured
tradition that must at no time be lost to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again,
that prosecutors are expected not merely to
discharge their duties with the highest degree of
excellence, professionalism and skill but also to act
each time with utmost devotion and dedication to
duty. 33 The Court is hopeful that the zeal which has
been exhibited many times in the past, although
regrettably a disappointment on few occasions, will
not be wanting in the proceedings yet to follow.
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing,
the Court hereby RULES that
(a) The submission of the "Affidavit of Desistance,"
executed by Juvie-Lyn Y. Punongbayan on 25 June
1997, having been filed AFTER the institution of
Criminal Case No. 97-159935, DOES NOT WARRANT
THE DISMISSAL of said criminal case;
29 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed
judgment, dated 12 December 1997, convicting
petitioners is declared NULL AND VOID and thereby
SET ASIDE; accordingly, the case is REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings; and
(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge
of Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal Case No.
97-159935; instead, the case shall immediately be
scheduled for raffle among the other branches of
that court for proper disposition .
No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Kapunan, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima,
JJ ., concur.
Narvasa, C .J ., took no part: related to one of
counsel.
(Aniag, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104961, October
07, 1994)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 104961. October 7, 1994.]
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR.,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK FORCE,
respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
PETITIONER assails in this petition (for declaratory
relief, certiorari and prohibition) the following
resolutions of the Commission on Elections:
Resolution No. 2327 dated 26 December 1991 for
being unconstitutional, and Resolution No. 92-0829
dated 6 April 1992 and Resolution No. 92-0999
dated 23 April 1992, for want of legal and factual
bases. cdrep
The factual backdrop: In preparation for the
synchronized national and local elections
scheduled on 11 May 1992, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11 December 1991
Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the
"Gun Ban," promulgating rules and regulations on
bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or
other deadly weapons, on security personnel or
bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of
security agencies or police organizations, and
organization or maintenance of reaction forces
during the election period. 1 Subsequently, on 26
December 1991 COMELEC issued Resolution No.
2327 providing for the summary disqualification of
candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and
transporting of firearms, organizing special strike
forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. 2
On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr.
Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of
Representatives, wrote petitioner who was then
Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan
requesting the return of the two (2) firearms 3 issued
to him by the House of Representatives. Upon being
advised of the request on 13 January 1992 by his
staff, petitioner immediately instructed his driver,
Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from
petitioner's house at Valle Verde and return them to
Congress.
Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon
of the same day, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo
Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan
Complex some twenty (20) meters away from its
entrance. About thirty minutes later, the policemen
manning the outpost flagged down the car driven
by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint. They
searched the car and found the firearms neatly
packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in
the trunk of the car. Arellano was then
apprehended and detained. He explained that he
was ordered by petitioner to get the firearms from
the house and return them to Sergeant-at Arms
Taccad of the House of Representatives.
Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case to
the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The
referral did not include petitioner as among those
charged with an election offense. On 15 January
1992, the City Prosecutor ordered the release of
Arellano after finding the latter's sworn explanation
meritorious. 4
On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited
petitioner to shed light on the circumstances
mentioned in Arellano's sworn explanation.
Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary
investigation to confirm Arellano's statement but
also wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to
exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did
not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was
complying with it when apprehended by returning
the firearms to Congress; and, that he was
petitioner's driver, not a security officer nor a
bodyguard. 5
On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor
issued a resolution which, among other matters,
recommended that the case against Arellano be
dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against
petitioner be also dismissed. 6
Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon
recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 92-0829 directing the filing of
information against petitioner and Arellano for
violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg. 881
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, in
relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166; 7 and petitioner
to show cause why he should not be disqualified
from running for an elective position, pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Secs.
32, 33 and 35 of R.A. 7166, and Sec. 52, par. (c), of
B.P. Blg. 881. 8
On 13 April 1992, petitioner moved for
reconsideration and to hold in abeyance the
administrative proceedings as well as the filing of
the information in court. 9 On 23 April 1992, the
COMELEC denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. 10 Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of
Resolution No. 2327. He argues that the rules and
regulations of an administrative body must respect
the limits defined by law; that the Omnibus Election
Code provides for the disqualification of any
person/candidate from running for or holding a
public office, i.e., any person who has either been
declared by competent authority as insane or
incompetent or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for
30 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude; that gunrunning,
using or transporting firearms or similar weapons
and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not
within the letter or spirit of the provisions of the
Code; that the resolution did away with the
requirement of final conviction before the
commission of certain offenses; that instead, it
created a presumption of guilt as a candidate may
be disqualified from office in situations (a) where
the criminal charge is still pending, (b) where there
is no pending criminal case, and (c) where the
accused has already been acquitted, all contrary
to the requisite quantum of proof for one to be
disqualified from running or holding public office
under the Omnibus Election Code, i.e., proof
beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, petitioner
concludes, Resolution No. 2327 violates the
fundamental law thus rendering it fatally defective.
But the issue on the disqualification of petitioner
from running in the 11 May 1992 synchronized
elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid
for a seat in Congress in the elections that ensued.
Consequently, it is now futile to discuss the
implications of the charge against him on his
qualification to run for public office. LibLex
However, there still remains an important question
to be resolved, i.e., whether he can be validly
prosecuted for instructing his driver to return to the
Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives
the two firearms issued to him on the basis of the
evidence gathered from the warrantless search of
his car.
Petitioner strongly protests against the manner by
which the PNP conducted the search. According to
him, without a warrant and without informing the
driver of his fundamental rights the policemen
searched his car. The firearms were not tucked in
the waist nor within the immediate reach of
Arellano but were neatly packed in their gun cases
and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the car.
Thus, the search of his car that yielded the
evidence for the prosecution was clearly violative
of Secs. 2 and 3, par. (2), Art. III, of the Constitution.
11
Petitioner further maintains that he was neither
impleaded as party respondent in the preliminary
investigation before the Office of the City
Prosecutor nor included in the charge sheet.
Consequently, making him a respondent in the
criminal information would violate his constitutional
right to due process.
Petitioner disputes the charge that he violated Sec.
33 of R.A. 7166, which prohibits any candidate for
public office during the election period from
employing or availing himself or engaging the
services of security personnel or bodyguards since,
admittedly, Arellano was not a security officer or
bodyguard but a civilian employee assigned to him
as driver by the House of Representatives.
Specifically, petitioner further argues, Arellano was
instructed to return to Congress, as he did, the
firearms in compliance with the directive of its
Sergeant-at-Arms pursuant to the "Gun Ban," thus,
no law was in fact violated. 12
On 25 June 1992, we required COMELEC to file its
own comment on the petition 13 upon
manifestation of the Solicitor General that it could
not take the position of COMELEC and prayed
instead to be excused from filing the required
comment. 14
COMELEC claims that petitioner is charged with
violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), in relation to Sec. 263,
of B.P. Blg. 881 which provides that "the principals,
accomplices and accessories, as defined in the
Revised Penal Code, shall be criminally liable for
election offenses." It points out that it was upon
petitioner's instruction that Arellano brought the
firearms in question outside petitioner's residence,
submitting that his right to be heard was not
violated as he was invited by the City Prosecutor to
explain the circumstances regarding Arellano's
possession of the firearms. Petitioner also filed a
sworn written explanation about the incident.
Finally, COMELEC claims that violation of the "Gun
Ban" is mala prohibita, hence, the intention of the
offender is immaterial. 15
Be that as it may, we find no need to delve into the
alleged constitutional infirmity of Resolution No.
2327 since this petition may be resolved without
passing upon this particular issue. 16
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a
search warrant duly issued by an appropriate
authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a
search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of moving
vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view,
17 as well as the search conducted at police or
military checkpoints which we declared are not
illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless
search is not violative of the Constitution for as long
as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of
the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. 18
Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked
in Arellano's waist nor placed within his reach, and
that they were neatly packed in gun cases and
placed inside a bag at the back of the car.
Significantly, COMELEC did not rebut this claim. The
records do not show that the manner by which the
package was bundled led the PNP to suspect that
it contained firearms. There was not mention either
of any report regarding any nervous, suspicious or
unnatural reaction from Arellano when the car was
stopped and searched. Given these circumstances
and relying on its visual observation, the PNP could
not thoroughly search the car lawfully as well as the
package without violating the constitutional
injunction.
An extensive search without warrant could only be
resorted to if the officers conducting the search
had reasonable or probable cause to believe
before the search that either the motorist was a law
offender or that they would find the instrumentality
or evidence pertaining to the commission of a
crime in the vehicle to be searched. 19 The
existence of probable cause justifying the
warrantless search is determined by the facts of
each case. 20 Thus, we upheld the validity of the
warrantless search in situations where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by
the accused, or where the accused was acting
suspiciously, and attempted to flee. 21
We also recognize the stop-and-search without
warrant conducted by police officers on the basis
of prior confidential information which were
31 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
reasonably corroborated by other attendant
matters, e.g., where a confidential report that a
sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported
along the route where the search was conducted
and appellants were caught in flagrante delicto
transporting drugs at the time of their arrest; 22
where apart from the intelligence information, there
were reports by an undercover "deep penetration"
agent that appellants were bringing prohibited
drugs into the country; 23 where the information
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada bringing
prohibited drugs was strengthened by the
conspicuous bulge in accused's waistline and his
suspicious failure to produce his passport and other
identification papers; 24 where the physical
appearance of the accused fitted the description
given in the confidential information about a
woman transporting marijuana; 25 where the
accused carrying a bulging black leather bag were
suspiciously quiet and nervous when queried about
its contents; 26 or where the identity of the drug
courier was already established by police
authorities who received confidential information
about the probable arrival of accused on board
one of the vessels arriving in Dumaguete City. 27
In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint
was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance to
the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution No.
2327. There was no evidence to show that the
policemen were impelled to do so because of a
confidential report leading them to reasonably
believe that certain motorists matching the
description furnished by their informant were
engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in
organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to
earlier, was there any indication from the package
or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered
the suspicion of the policemen. Absent such
justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the
culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search
could not be valid. The action then of the
policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's
privacy and the security of his property, in violation
of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently,
the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right
against warrantless search cannot be admitted for
any purpose in any proceeding.
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence
of Arellano to the search constitutes an implied
waiver of petitioner's right to question the
reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and
the seizure of the firearms.
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up
of checkpoints, it however stressed that "guidelines
shall be made to ensure that no infringement of civil
and political rights results from the implementation
of this authority," and that "the places and manner
of setting up of checkpoints shall be determined in
consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban
and Security Personnel created under Sec. 5,
Resolution No. 2323." 28 The facts show that PNP
installed the checkpoint at about five o'clock in the
afternoon of 13 January 1992. The search was
made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It was
not shown that news of impending checkpoints
without necessarily giving their locations, and the
reason for the same have been announced in the
media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal
checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the
public of the purpose of its operation. As a result,
motorists passing that place did not have any
inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the
instant exercise. With the authorities in control to
stop and search passing vehicles, the motorists did
not have any choice but to submit to the PNP's
scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout albeit
innocent would raise suspicion and provide
probable cause for the police to arrest the motorist
and to conduct an extensive search of his vehicle.
In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the
car at that time it was stopped for inspection. As
conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not
know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of
fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the
operation, 29 driver Arellano being alone and a
mere employee of petitioner could not have
marshalled the strength and the courage to protest
against the extensive search conducted in the
vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied
acquiescence," if there was any, could not be
more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano's
part to the search, and "consent" given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances is no
consent within the purview of the constitutional
guaranty.
Moreover, the manner by which COMELEC
proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution. The facts
show that petitioner was not among those charged
by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election
Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor
to a preliminary investigation for such offense. The
non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the
petitioner that he was a respondent in the
preliminary investigation is violative of due process
which requires that the procedure established by
law should be obeyed. 30
COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the
chance to be heard because he was invited to
enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the
circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver,
and that petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter
of explanation regarding the incident. This does not
satisfy the requirement of due process the essence
of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit any evidence one may have in
support of his defense. 31 Due process guarantees
the observance of both substantive and procedural
rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the
Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
32 In Go v. Court of Appeals, 33 we held that
While the right to preliminary investigation is
statutory rather than constitutional in its
fundamental, since it has in fact been established
by statute, it is a component part of due process in
criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over
to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at
risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a
mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive
right . . . . [T]he right to an opportunity to avoid a
process painful to anyone save, perhaps, to
hardened criminals is a valuable right. To deny
petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation
would be to deprive him of the full measure of his
right to due process.
Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the
preliminary investigation of Arellano to corroborate
32 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
the latter's explanation. Petitioner then was made
to believe that he was not a party respondent in
the case, so that his written explanation on the
incident was only intended to exculpate Arellano,
not petitioner himself. Hence, it cannot be seriously
contended that petitioner was fully given the
opportunity to meet the accusation against him as
he was not apprised that he was himself a
respondent when he appeared before the City
Prosecutor. cdll
Finally, it must be pointed out too that petitioner's
filing of a motion for reconsideration with COMELEC
cannot be considered as a waiver of his claim to a
separate preliminary investigation for himself. The
motion itself expresses petitioner's vigorous
insistence on his right. Petitioner's protestation
started as soon as he learned of his inclusion in the
charge, and did not ease up even after COMELEC's
denial of his motion for reconsideration. This is
understandably so since the prohibition against
carrying firearms bears the penalty of imprisonment
of not less than one (1) year nor more than six (6)
years without probation and with disqualification
from holding public office, and deprivation of the
right to suffrage. Against such strong stance,
petitioner clearly did not waive his right to a
preliminary investigation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
warrantless search conducted by the Philippine
National Police on 13 January 1992 is declared
illegal and the firearms seized during the warrantless
search cannot be used as evidence in an
proceeding against petitioner. Consequently,
COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992
being violative of the Constitution is SET ASIDE.
The temporary restraining order we issued on 5 May
1992 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan
and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, Padilla and Bidin, JJ., are on leave.
(Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. v.
Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818, December 18, 1989)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 84818. December 18, 1989.]
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ,
as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa for petitioner.
Victor de la Serna for respondent Alcuaz.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; REQUISITES OF A VALID
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of
legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in making the
delegation has prescribed the manner of the
exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when
the administrative agency concerned, respondent
NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both
be non-confiscatory and must have been
established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional.
2. ID.; RATE-FIXING POWER; STANDARDS REQUIRED;
MAY BE IMPLIED. In case of a delegation of rate-
fixing power, the only standard which the legislature
is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be
reasonable and just. However, it has been held that
even in the absence of an express requirement as
to reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
The inherent power and authority of the State, or its
authorized agent, to regulate the rates charged by
public utilities should be subject always to the
requirement that the rates so fixed shall be
reasonable and just. A commission has no power to
fix rates which are unreasonable or to regulate
them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of
reasonableness comprehends such rates which
must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too
high as to be oppressive. What is a just and
reasonable rate is not a question of formula but of
sound business judgment based upon the
evidence; it is a question of fact calling for the
exercise of discretion, good sense, and a fair,
enlightened and independent judgment. In
determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is
essential also to consider the given situation,
requirements and opportunities of the utility. A
method often employed in determining
reasonableness is the fair return upon the value of
the property to the public utility. Competition is also
a very important factor in determining the
reasonableness of rates since a carrier is allowed to
make such rates as are necessary to meet
competition. (Mla. Railroad Co. vs. A.L. Ammon
Trans. Co. Inc. 218 Phil. 900 (1920)
3. ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHEN THE SAME WAS
CLASSIFIED AS QUASI-JUDICIAL WHEN SAME WAS
CLASSIFIED. In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs.
Public Service Commission, we made a categorical
classification as to when the rate-fixing power of
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is
legislative, thus: "Moreover, although the rule-
making power end even the power to fix rates
when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to
all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
Philippines may partake of a legislative
character, such is not the nature of the order
complained of. Indeed, the same applies
exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is
predicated upon the finding of fact based upon
a report submitted by the General Auditing Office
that petitioner is making a profit of more than
12% of its invested capital, which is denied by
petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-
examine the maker of said report, and to introduce
evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or
explain or complement the same, as well as to
refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the
respondent. In other words, in making said finding
of fact, respondent performed a function partaking
of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of
which demands previous notice and hearing." This
rule was further explained in the subsequent case of
The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al.
to wit: "It is also clear from the authorities that where
the function of the administrative body is legislative,
33 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
notice of hearing is not required by due process of
law (See Oppenheiner, Administrative Law, 2 Md.
L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: If the nature of
the administrative agency is essentially legislative,
the requirements of notice and hearing are not
necessary. The validity of a rule of future action
which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or
property are not involved, is not determined
according to the same rules which apply in the
case of the direct application of a policy to a
specific individual) . . . It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public
Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130,
pages 452 and 453: Aside from statute, the
necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative
proceeding depends on the character of the
proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so
far as generalization is possible in view of the great
variety of administrative proceedings, it may be
stated as a general rule that notice and hearing
are not essential to the validity of administrative
action where the administrative body acts in the
exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative
functions; but where a public administrative body
acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its
acts are particular and immediate rather than
general and prospective, the person whose rights or
property may be affected by the action is entitled
to notice and hearing.
4. ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND HEARING
NECESSARY EVEN IF THE ORDER IS TEMPORARY IN
NATURE. While respondents may fix a temporary
rate pending final determination of the application
of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary
though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as
well as the requirement of reasonableness.
Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may
not exercise the same in an arbitrary and
confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as
temporary in nature does not perforce entail the
applicability of a different rule of statutory
procedure than would otherwise be applied to any
other order on the same matter unless otherwise
provided by the applicable law. In the case at bar,
the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of
the Public Service Act which provides: "Section 16.
Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and
hearing. The Commission shall have power, upon
proper notice and hearing in accordance with the
rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the
limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving
provisions to the contrary: (c) To fix and determine
individual or joint rates, . . . which shall be imposed,
observed and followed thereafter by any public
service; . . . ."
5. ID.; ID.; TEMPORARY RATE-FIXING ORDER; A FINAL
LEGISLATIVE ACT AS TO THE PERIOD DURING WHICH
IT HAS TO REMAIN IN FORCE. The order requires
the new reduced rates to be made effective on a
specified date. It becomes a final legislative act as
to the period during which it has to remain in force
pending the final determination of the case. An
order of respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates,
even for a temporary period, could be unjust,
unreasonable or even confiscatory, especially if the
rates are unreasonably low, since the utility
permanently loses its just revenue during the
prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect
final insofar as the revenue during the period
covered by the order is concerned.
6. ID.; POWER TO REGULATE THE CONDUCT AND
BUSINESS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES; LIMITATION. The rule
is that the power of the State to regulate the
conduct and business of public utilities is limited by
the consideration that it is not the owner of the
property of the utility, or clothed with the general
power of management incident to ownership, since
the private right of ownership to such property
remains and is not to be destroyed by the
regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the
power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises,
but is the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control with due regard for the
interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the
utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore,
which operates as an effective confiscation of
private property or constitutes an arbitrary or
unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional
guaranties of due process and equal protection of
the laws.
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
This case is posed as one of first impression in the
sense that it involves the public utility services of the
petitioner Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT, for short) which is the
only one rendering such services in the Philippines.
cdrep
The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside
an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner
Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National
Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC),
dated September 2, 1988, which directs the
provisional reduction of the rates which may be
charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of
its services by fifteen percent (15%) with the
reservation to make further reductions later, for
being violative of the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative power and
a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due
process of law. llcd
The antecedental facts as summarized by petitioner
2 are not in dispute. By virtue of Republic Act No.
5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to
establish, construct, maintain and operate in the
Philippines, at such places as the grantee may
select, station or stations and associated
equipment and facilities for international satellite
communications." Under this franchise, it was
likewise granted the authority to "construct and
operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver
telecommunications services from the
communications satellite system and ground
terminal or terminals."
Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on record
that it undertook the following activities and
established the following installations:
34 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
1. In 1967, PHILCOMSAT established its provisional
earth station in Pinugay, Rizal.
2. In 1968, earth station standard "A" antenna
(Pinugay I) was established. Pinugay I provided
direct satellite communication links with the Pacific
Ocean Region (the United States, Australia,
Canada, Hawaii, Guam, Korea, Thailand, China
[PROC], New Zealand and Brunei) thru the Pacific
Ocean INTELSAT satellite.
3. In 1971, a second earth station standard "A"
antenna (Pinugay II) was established. Pinugay II
provided links with the Indian Ocean Region (major
cities in Europe, Middle East, Africa, and other Asia
Pacific countries operating within the region) thru
the Indian Ocean INTELSAT satellite.
4. In 1983, a third earth station standard "B" antenna
(Pinugay III) was established to temporarily assume
the functions of Pinugay I and then Pinugay II while
they were being refurbished. Pinugay III now serves
as spare or reserved antenna for possible
contingencies.
5. In 1983, PHILCOMSAT constructed and installed a
standard "B" antenna at Clark Air Field, Pampanga
as a television receive-only earth station which
provides the U.S. Military bases with a 24-hour
television service.
6. In 1989, petitioner completed the installation of a
third standard "A" earth station (Pinugay IV)to take
over the links in Pinugay I due to obsolescence. 3
By designation of the Republic of the Philippines,
the petitioner is also the sole signatory for the
Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating
Agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT) of 115 member nations, as well as in the
Convention and the Operating Agreement of the
International Maritime Satellite Organization
(INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two
global commercial telecommunications satellite
corporations were collectively established by
various states in line with the principles set forth in
Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the General Assembly of
the United Nations. llcd
Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its
satellite circuits to:
1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company;
2. Philippine Global Communications, Inc.;
3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.;
4. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and
5. Capitol Wireless, Inc.
or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services
thus provided by petitioner enable said
international carriers to serve the public with
indispensable communication services, such as
overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams,
high speed data, live television in full color, and
television standard conversion from European to
American or vice versa.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner
was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public
Service Commission, now respondent NTC.
However, pursuant to EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 196
issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed
under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of
respondent NTC, including all its facilities and
services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 196, respondents required
petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of
public convenience and necessity covering its
facilities and the services it renders, as well as the
corresponding authority to charge rates therefor.
prcd
Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987,
petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application
4 for authority to continue operating and
maintaining the same facilities it has been
continuously operating and maintaining since 1967,
to continue providing the international satellite
communications services it has likewise been
providing since 1967, and to charge the current
rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending
hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so
that it can continue to operate and maintain the
above mentioned facilities, provide the services
and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein
applied for.
On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a
provisional authority to continue operating its
existing facilities, to render the services it was then
offering, and to charge the rates it was then
charging. This authority was valid for six (6) months
from the date of said order. 5 When said provisional
authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was
extended for another six (6) months, or up to
September 16, 1988.
The NTC order now in controversy had further
extended the provisional authority of the petitioner
for another six (6) months, counted from September
16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to charge
modified reduced rates through a reduction of
fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized
rates. Respondent Commissioner ordered said
reduction on the following ground:
"The Commission in its on-going review of present
service rates takes note that after an initial
evaluation by the Rates Regulation Division of the
Common Carriers Authorization Department of the
financial statements of applicant, there is merit in a
REDUCTION in some of applicant's rates, subject to
further reductions, should the Commission finds (sic)
in its further evaluation that more reduction should
be effected either on the basis of a provisional
authorization or in the final consideration of the
case." 6
PHILCOMSAT assails the above-quoted order for the
following reasons:
1. The enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of
respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public
service communications does not provide the
35 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
necessary standards constitutionally required,
hence there is an undue delegation of legislative
power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC;
2. Assuming arguendo that the rate-fixing power
was properly and constitutionally conferred, the
same was exercised in an unconstitutional manner,
hence it is ultra vires, in that (a) the questioned
order violates procedural due process for having
been issued without prior notice and hearing; and
(b) the rate reduction it imposes is unjust,
unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of
a violation of substantive due process.
I. Petitioner asseverates that nowhere in the
provisions of Executive Order No. 546, providing for
the creation of respondent NTC and granting its
rate-fixing powers, nor of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of
respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent
NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its
rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. While
petitioner in its petition-in-chief raised the issue of
undue delegation of legislative power, it
subsequently clarified its said submission to mean
that the order mandating a reduction of certain
rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of
quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the
exercise of which allegedly requires an express
conferment by the legislative body.
Whichever way it is presented, petitioner is in effect
questioning the constitutionality of Executive Orders
Nos. 546 and 196 on the ground that the same do
not fix a standard for the exercise of the power
therein conferred.
We hold otherwise.
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of
legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in making the
delegation has prescribed the manner of the
exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when
the administrative agency concerned, respondent
NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both
be non-confiscatory and must have been
established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-
fixing power, the only standard which the legislature
is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be
reasonable and just. However, it has been held that
even in the absence of an express requirement as
to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. 7
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature
of the power delegated to respondent NTC and
the manner required by the statute for the lawful
exercise thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196,
respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to
determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the
operation of public service communications which
necessarily include the power to promulgate rules
and regulations in connection therewith. And,
under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546,
respondent NTC should be guided by the
requirements of public safety, public interest and
reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective
competition of private entities in communications
and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d)
thereof, which provides for the creation of the
Ministry of Transportation and Communications with
control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is
specifically provided that the national economic
viability of the entire network or components of the
communications systems contemplated therein
should be maintained at reasonable rates. We
need not go into an in-depth analysis of the
pertinent provisions of the law in order to conclude
that respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing
power, is limited by the requirements of public
safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and
reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy
the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
power.
II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the
questioned order violates procedural due process
because it was issued motu proprio, without notice
to petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing.
Petitioner laments that said order was based merely
on an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral
evaluation, but had petitioner been given an
opportunity to present its side before the order in
question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the
rate reduction and the consequent deterioration of
the public service could have been shown and
demonstrated to respondents. Petitioner argues
that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of
NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not
quasi-legislative; thus, notice and hearing are
necessary and the absence thereof results in a
violation of due process.
Respondents admit that the application of a policy
like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative
bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative:
that where the function of the administrative
agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not
required, but where an order applies to a named
person, as in the instant case, the function involved
is adjudicatory. 8 Nonetheless, they insist that under
the facts obtaining the order in question need not
be preceded by a hearing, not because it was
issued pursuant to respondent NTC's legislative
function but because the assailed order is merely
interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing
proceedings on petitioner's application for a
certificate of public convenience; and that
petitioner is not the only primary source of data or
information since respondent is currently engaged
in a continuing review of the rates charged.
We find merit in petitioner's contention.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service
Commission, 9 we made a categorical
classification as to when the rate-fixing power of
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is
legislative, thus:
36 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
"Moreover, although the rule-making power end
even the power to fix rates when such rules
and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of
a given kind throughout the Philippines may
partake of a legislative character, such is not the
nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the
same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What
is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact
based upon a report submitted by the General
Auditing Office that petitioner is making a profit
of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is
denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled
to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to
introduce evidence to disprove the contents
thereof and/or explain or complement the same,
as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom
by the respondent. In other words, in making said
finding of fact, respondent performed a function
partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid
exercise of which demands previous notice and
hearing."
This rule was further explained in the subsequent
case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs.
Cloribel, et al. 10 to wit:
"It is also clear from the authorities that where the
function of the administrative body is legislative,
notice of hearing is not required by due process of
law (See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md.
L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If the nature of
the administrative agency is essentially legislative,
the requirements of notice and hearing are not
necessary. The validity of a rule of future action
which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or
property are not involved, is not determined
according to the same rules which apply in the
case of the direct application of a policy to a
specific individual') . . . It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public
Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130,
pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from statute, the
necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative
proceeding depends on the character of the
proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so
far as generalization is possible in view of the great
variety of administrative proceedings, it may be
stated as a general rule that notice and hearing
are not essential to the validity of administrative
action where the administrative body acts in the
exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative
functions; but where a public administrative body
acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its
acts are particular and immediate rather than
general and prospective, the person whose rights or
property may be affected by the action is entitled
to notice and hearing." 11
The order in question which was issued by
respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the
attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost
is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on
a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that
there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates
charged based on an initial evaluation of
petitioner's financial statements without affording
petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what
particular aspect or aspects of the financial
statements warranted a corresponding rate
reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were
the attending contingencies, if any, discussed,
which prompted respondents to impose as much as
a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-
fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a
better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the
viability of its business requirements. The rates it
charges result from an exhaustive and detailed
study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies
attendant to a public service undertaking of such
nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined
to lend greater credence to petitioner's
ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its
rates would adversely affect its operations and the
quality of its service to the public considering the
maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to
undertake and the financial outlay involved.
Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who
issued the report on which respondent NTC based
its questioned order. LibLex
At any rate, there remains the categorical
admission made by respondent NTC that the
questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-
judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and
hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is
merely incidental to the entire proceedings and,
therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is
bereft of merit.
While respondents may fix a temporary rate
pending final determination of the application of
petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though
it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as
well as the requirement of reasonableness.
Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may
not exercise the same in an arbitrary and
confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as
temporary in nature does not perforce entail the
applicability of a different rule of statutory
procedure than would otherwise be applied to any
other order on the same matter unless otherwise
provided by the applicable law. In the case at bar,
the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of
the Public Service Act which provides:
"Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon
notice and hearing. The Commission shall have
power, upon proper notice and hearing in
accordance with the rules and provisions of this
Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions
mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, . . .
which shall be imposed, observed and followed
thereafter by any public service; . . . ."
There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid
provision does not apply to respondent NTC, there
being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to
the contrary in Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing,
respondent has no authority to make such order
37 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the
order be temporary or permanent, and it is
immaterial whether the same is made upon a
complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission's own motion as in the present case.
That such a hearing is required is evident in
respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in NTC
Case No. 8794 which granted PHILCOMSAT a
provisional authority "to continue operating its
existing facilities, to render the services it presently
offers, and to charge the rates as reduced by
them" under the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing
and the final consideration of the merit of this
application, the Commission may modify, revise or
amend the rates . . .." 12
While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing
respondents may have other sources of information
or data, still, since a hearing is essential, respondent
NTC should act solely on the basis of the evidence
before it and not on knowledge or information
otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered in
evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was
given no opportunity to controvert.
Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to
be made effective on a specified date. It becomes
a final legislative act as to the period during which
it has to remain in force pending the final
determination of the case. 13 An order of
respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for
a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable
or even confiscatory, especially if the rates are
unreasonably low, since the utility permanently
loses its just revenue during the prescribed period. In
fact, such order is in effect final insofar as the
revenue during the period covered by the order is
concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that the
order requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and
will unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return
upon its property, a declaration of its nullity
becomes inductible, which brings us to the issue on
substantive due process.
III. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is
confiscatory in that its implementation would
virtually result in a cessation of its operations and
eventual closure of business. On the other hand,
respondents assert that since petitioner is operating
its communications satellite facilities through a
legislative franchise, as such grantee it has no
vested right therein. What it has is merely a privilege
or license which may be revoked at will by the
State at any time without necessarily violating any
vested property right of herein petitioner. While
petitioner concedes this thesis of respondent, it
counters that the withdrawal of such privilege
should nevertheless be neither whimsical nor
arbitrary, but it must be fair and reasonable.
There is no question that petitioner is a mere
grantee of a legislative franchise which is subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress
when the common good so requires. 14
Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be
unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the
termination of the operation of said utility is required
by the common good.
The rule is that the power of the State to regulate
the conduct and business of public utilities is limited
by the consideration that it is not the owner of the
property of the utility, or clothed with the general
power of management incident to ownership, since
the private right of ownership to such property
remains and is not to be destroyed by the
regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the
power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises,
but is the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control with due regard for the
interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the
utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore,
which operates as an effective confiscation of
private property or constitutes an arbitrary or
unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional
guaranties of due process and equal protection of
the laws. 15
Hence, the inherent power and authority of the
State, or its authorized agent, to regulate the rates
charged by public utilities should be subject always
to the requirement that the rates so fixed shall be
reasonable and just. A commission has no power to
fix rates which are unreasonable or to regulate
them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of
reasonableness comprehends such rates which
must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too
high as to be oppressive. 16
What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question
of formula but of sound business judgment based
upon the evidence; 17 it is a question of fact calling
for the exercise of discretion, good sense, and a
fair, enlightened and independent judgment 18 In
determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is
essential also to consider the given situation,
requirements and opportunities of the utility. A
method often employed in determining
reasonableness is the fair return upon the value of
the property to the public utility. Competition is also
a very important factor in determining the
reasonableness of rates since a carrier is allowed to
make such rates as are necessary to meet
competition. 19
A cursory perusal of the assailed order reveals that
the rate reduction is solely and primarily based on
the initial evaluation made on the financial
statements of petitioner, contrary to respondent
NTC's allegation that it has several other sources of
information without, however, divulging such
sources. Furthermore, it did not as much as make
an attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the
prescribed rates. It just perfunctorily declared that
based on the financial statements, there is merit for
a rate reduction without any elucidation on what
implications and conclusions were necessarily
inferred by it from said statements. Nor did it deign
to explain how the data reflected in the financial
statements influenced its decision to impose a rate
reduction.
On the other hand, petitioner may likely suffer a
severe drawback, with the consequent detriment
38 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
to the public service, should the order of
respondent NTC turn out to be unreasonable and
improvident. The business in which petitioner is
engaged is unique in that its machinery and
equipment have always to be taken in relation to
the equipment on the other end of the transmission
arrangement. Any lack, aging, acquisition,
rehabilitation, or refurbishment of machinery and
equipment necessarily entails a major adjustment
or innovation on the business of petitioner. As
pointed out by petitioner, any change in the
sending end abroad has to be matched with the
corresponding change in the receiving end in the
Philippines. conversely, any change in the receiving
end abroad has to be matched with the
corresponding change in the sending end in the
Philippines. An inability on the part of petitioner to
meet the variegations demanded by technology
could result in a deterioration or total failure of the
service of satellite communications. cdll
At present, petitioner is engaged in several projects
aimed at refurbishing, rehabilitating, and renewing
its machinery and equipment in order to keep up
with the continuing changes of the times and to
maintain its facilities at a competitive level with the
technological advances abroad. These projected
undertakings were formulated on the premise that
rates are maintained at their present or at
reasonable levels. Hence, an undue reduction
thereof may practically lead to a cessation of its
business. While we concede the primacy of the
public interest in an adequate and efficient service,
the same is not necessarily to be equated with
reduced rates. Reasonableness in the rates assumes
that the same is fair to both the public utility and
the consumer. cdll
Consequently, we hold that the challenged order,
particularly on the issue of rates provided therein,
being violative of the due process clause is void
and should be nullified. Respondents should now
proceed, as they should heretofore have done,
with the hearing and determination of petitioner's
pending application for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity and in which
proceeding the subject of rates involved in the
present controversy, as well as other matters
involved in said application, may be duly
adjudicated with reasonable dispatch and with
due observance or our pronouncements herein.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and
the order of respondents, dated September 2, 1988,
in NTC Case No. 87-94 is hereby SET ASIDE. The
temporary restraining order issued under our
resolution of September 13, 1988, as specifically
directed against the aforesaid order of respondents
on the matter of existing rates on petitioner's
present authorized services, is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Corts, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
 (Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No.
46496, February 27, 1940)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 46496. February 27, 1940.]
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO,
manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS'
BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR
UNION, INC., respondents.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney
Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia; for National Labor Union.
Claro M. Recto; for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal; for National Workers' Brotherhood.
SYLLABUS
1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER. The
nature of the Court of Industrial Relations and of its
power is extensively discussed in the decision.
2. ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE
PROCESS OF LAW. The Court of Industrial Relations
is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103
requires it to act according to justice and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard
to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform
its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations
et al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact, however, that the
Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases
coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.
There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character.
The first of these rights is the right to a hearing,
which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. Not only must the
party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. While the duty to
deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot
be disregarded, namely, that of having something
to support its decision. Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be substantial. The decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of
Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of
Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
39 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
4. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.; CASE AT BAR ; NEW TRIAL
GRANTED. In the light of the foregoing
fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe
here that, except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers'
Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and
does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon
which to predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion
of law. This result, however, does not now preclude
the concession of a new trial prayed for by the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest
of justice would be better served if the movant is
given opportunity to present at the hearing the
documents referred to in his motion and such other
evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
involved. The legislation which created the Court of
Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved
is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a
new trial should be, and the same is hereby,
granted, and the entire record of this' case shall be
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it re-open the case, receive all such
evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set
forth in the decision.
DECISION
LAUREL, J p:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled
case has filed a motion for reconsideration and
moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we
reconsider the following legal conclusions of the
majority opinion of this Court:
"1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como
colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea
para una determinada, termina o bien por
voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez
que llega el plazo fijado para el pago de los
salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cuando
se termine la obra;
"2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han
celebrado contrato, ya individual ya
colectivamente, con ella, sin tiempo fijo, y que se
han visto obligados a cesar en sus trabajos por
haberse declarado paro forzoso en la fabrica en la
cual trabajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros
de la misma;
"3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado
un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus obreros
sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra
determinada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos
obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un
paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta ni
incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley
No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a
readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros
pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero,
puesto que tales ya han dejado de ser empleados
suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del
paro."
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the
other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgment
rendered by the majority of this Court and the
remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial
Relations for a new trial, and avers:
"1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September
26,1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG
TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay
off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is
entirely false and unsupported by the records of the
Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of
native dealers in leather.
"2. That the supposed lack of leather materials
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
adopted to systematically discharge all the
members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from
work.
"3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine
Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed
delay of leather soles from the States) was but a
scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of
this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with
the Philippine Army.
"4. That the National Workers' Brotherhood of ANG
TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated
by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of
which are illegal. (281 U. S., 548, petitioner's printed
memorandum, p. 25.)
"5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights
to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
representation are highly essential and
indispensable. ( Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth
Act No. 213.)
"6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code
which had been (the) principal source of
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot
and should not be made applicable in interpreting
and applying the salutary provisions of a modern
labor legislation of American origin where industrial
peace has always been the rule.
"7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of
unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the
National Workers' Brotherhood.
"8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
"9. That the attached documents and exhibits are
of such far-reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein."
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition
both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the
motion for new trial of the respondent National
Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be
herein- after stated with reference to the motion for
a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union,
Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to
pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the
Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of
the motion for new trial of the respondent labor
union. Before doing this, however, we deem it
necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in
cases of this nature, to make several observations
regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of
Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding
principles which should be observed in the trial of
cases brought before it. We have re-examined the
entire record of the proceedings had before the
40 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we
have found no substantial evidence to indicate
that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due
to their union affiliation or activity. The whole
transcript taken contains what transpired during the
hearing and is more of a record of contradictory
and conflicting statements of opposing counsel,
with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own
views. It is evident that these statements and
expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary
value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court
whose functions are specifically stated in the law of
its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more
an administrative board than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is
essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are
presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of
the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from
perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative
and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or
quasijudicial functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its
functions are far more comprehensive and
extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and
settle any question, matter controversy or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting, employers and
employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants
or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations
between them, subject to, and in accordance
with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
(section 1). It shall take cognizance for purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of
any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely
to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences
as regards wageshares or compensation, hours of
labor or conditions of tenancy or employment,
between employers and employees or laborers and
between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
provided that the number of employees, laborers or
tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty,
and such industrial or agricultural dispute is
submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or
by any or both of the parties to the controversy and
certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and
proper to be death with by the Court for the sake of
public interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall, before
hearing the dispute and in the course of such
hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and
induce them to settle the dispute by amicable
agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When
directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall
investigate and study all pertinent facts related to
the industry concerned or to the industries
established in a designated locality, with a view to
determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and
adopting for such industry or locality a minimum
wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum
"canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or
tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In
fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ
mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur
to the more effective system of official investigation
and compulsory arbitration in order to determine
specific controversies between labor and capital in
industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a
mingling of executive and judicial functions, which
is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the
separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial
Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out
that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
the Act requires it to "act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may
deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be
restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands
made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural
dispute, but may include in the award, order or
decision any matter or determination which may
be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose
of settling the dispute or of preventing further
industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13, ibid.)
And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to
this Court have been especially regulated by the
rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry
into effect the avowed legislative purpose. The
fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations
may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it
can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due Process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There
are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing
which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. In the language of
Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1,
58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed 1129, "the liberty and
property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play."
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity
to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but
the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U. S. 298 U. S.
468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed. 1288.) In the
language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22
Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without
the corresponding duty on the part of the board to
consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if
the person or persons to whom the evidence is
presented can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose
the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards
vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the
more fundamental principle that the genius of
constitutional government is contrary to the vesting
41 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant
and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs.
Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated November
29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must
be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia & Maryland
Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.
S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law ed 965.)
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor
Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National
Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir.,
97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-stillwater Knitting Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758,
760.) . . . The statute provides that 'the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall
not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards
from the compulsion of technical rules so that the
mere admission of matter which would be deemed
incompetent in judicial proceedings would not
invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24
S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R.
Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed.
431; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265
U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565, 569, 68 Law. ed. lola;
Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S.
420, 442, 50 S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go so far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or
rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
(Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4,
Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R.
Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.)Only
by confining the administrative tribunal to the
evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet the case
against them. It should not, however, detract from
their duty actively to see that the law is enforced,
and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself
of facts material and relevant to the controversy.
Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose
of investigating and determining the facts in any
given case, but their report and decision are only
advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.)
The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any
industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under
its consideration or advisement to a local board of
inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or
any public official in any part of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation, and
may delegate to such board or public official such
powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial
Relations may deem necessary, but such
delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court
itself of any of its powers (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its
judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be
that the volume of work is such that it is literally
impossible for the titular heads of the Court of
Industrial Relations personally to decide all
controversies coming before them. In the United
States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of
statutory authority authorizing examiners or other
subordinates to render final decision, with right to
appeal to board or commission, but in our case
there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for
the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles,
it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the
alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and
the National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A),
the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst
for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a
rational way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the
concession of a new trial prayed for by the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc. In the portion
of the petition hereinabove quoted of the National
Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed
lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro
was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharge all the members of the National Labor
Union, Inc., from work" and this averment is desired
to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of
the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts
of native dealers in leather"; that "the National
Workers' Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a
company or employer union dominated by Toribio
Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are
illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the
exhibits attached to the petition to prove his
substantial averments "are so inaccessible to the
respondents that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the
Court of Industrial Relations", and that the
documents attached to the petition "are of such far
reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification
and reversal of the judgment rendered therein." We
have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its
arguments against the petition. By and large, after
considerable discussion, we have come to the
conclusion that the interest of justice would be
better served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents referred to in
his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation
which created the Court of Industrial Relations and
under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the
fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by
the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
42 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
should be, and the same is hereby granted, and
the entire record of this case shall be remanded to
the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that
it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as
may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth
hereinabove. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz,
Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
(Ateneo De Manila University v. Capulong, G.R. No.
99327, May 27, 1993)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 99327. May 27, 1993.]
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER JOAQUIN
BERNAS, S.J., DEAN CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO,
JUDGE RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE VENICIO
ESCOLIN, FISCAL MIGUEL ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCOS
HERRAS, FERDINAND CASIS, JOSE CLARO TESORO,
RAMON CAGUIOA and RAMON ERENETA,
petitioners, vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG,
Presiding Judge of the RTC-Makati, Br. 134 ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, JR. ERNEST MONTECILLO, ADEL ABAS,
JOSEPH LLEDO AMADO SABBAN, DALMACIO LIM,
JR., MANUEL ESCALONA and JUDE FERNANDEZ,
respondents.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Benson
& Jimenez for petitioners.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los
Angeles for petitioner Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo.
Fabregas, Calida & Remollo for private
respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; REQUIREMENTS;
MINIMUM STANDARD TO BE SATISFIED IN IMPOSING
DISCIPLINARY SANCTION BY AN ACADEMIC
INSTITUTION. Corollary to respondent students'
contention of denial of due process is their
argument that it is the Ang Tibay case [69 Phil. 635
(1940)] and not the Guzman case [142 SCRA 699],
which is applicable in the case at bar. Though both
cases essentially deal with the requirements of due
process, the Guzman case is more apropos to the
instant case, since the latter deals specifically with
the minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
"(1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right
to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5)
the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the
case."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MINIMUM STANDARD SATISFIED IN
CASE AT BAR. In view of the death of Leonardo
Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the
Ateneo Law School, notified and required
respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit
within twenty-four hours their written statement on
the incident, the records show that instead of filing
a reply, respondent students requested through
their counsel, copies of the charges. While some of
the students mentioned in the February 11, 1991
notice duly submitted written statements, the others
failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an
extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their
statements. Indubitably, the nature and cause of
the accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991.
It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter
which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as
contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue
was addressed individually to respondent students.
Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11,
February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent
students were given ample opportunity to adduce
evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges
leveled against them. The requisite assistance of
counsel was met when, from the very start of the
investigations before the Joint Administration-
Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of
Gonzales Batiller and Bilog and Associates put in its
appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of
respondent students.
3. ID.; ID.; DISCIPLINARY CASES INVOLVING
STUDENTS, ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE; RIGHT TO
CROSS EXAMINE, NOT INVOLVED. Respondent
students may not use the argument that since they
were not accorded the opportunity to see and
examine the written statements which became the
basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they
were denied procedural due process. Granting that
they were denied such opportunity, the same may
not be said to detract from the observance of due
process, for disciplinary cases involving students
need not necessarily include the right to cross
examination. An administrative proceeding
conducted to investigate students' participation in
a hazing activity need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer
examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which
characterized the rules on the investigation as
being summary in nature and that respondent
students have no right to examine affiants-
neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our
previous ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA, Q.C. Branch, 161
SCRA 20.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT,
NOT REQUIRED. With regard to the charge of
hazing, respondent students fault petitioners for not
explicitly defining the word "hazing" and allege that
there is no proof that they were furnished copies of
the 1990-91 Ateneo Law School Catalogue which
prohibits hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not worthy
of students who aspire to be future members of the
Bar. It cannot be over-emphasized that the charge
filed before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Board
is not a criminal case requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in
character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous
requirements of criminal due process, particularly
with respect to the specification of the charge
involved. As we have had occasion to declare in
previous cases of a similar nature, due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings identical to those
43 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
justice. 34 Accordingly, disciplinary charges against
a student need not be drawn with the precision of
a criminal information or complaint. Having given
prior notice to the students involved that "hazing"
which is not defined in the School Catalogue shall
be defined in accordance with Senate Bill No. 3815,
the proposed bill on the subject of Sen. Jose Lina,
petitioners have said what needs to be said. We
deem this sufficient for purposes of the investigation
under scrutiny.
5. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, EXCEPTION; CASE AT
BAR. It is accepted legal doctrine that an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies
is when the case involves a question of law, as in
this case, where the issue is whether or not
respondent students have been afforded
procedural due process prior to their dismissal from
petitioner university.
6. ID.; ACADEMIC FREEDOM CONSTRUED; CASE AT
BAR. At this juncture, it would be meet to recall
the essential freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom" cited in
the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 37 thus: (1)
who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it
shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to
study. "Academic freedom", the term as it evolved
to describe the emerging rights related to
intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated
with freedom of thought, speech, expression and
the press; in other words, with the right of individuals
in university communities, such as professors,
researchers and administrators, to investigate,
pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of
Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it may
lead," free from internal and external interference
or pressure. But obviously, its optimum impact is best
realized where the freedom is exercised judiciously
and does not degenerate into unbridled license.
Early cases on this individual aspect of academic
freedom have stressed the need for assuring to
such individuals a measure of independence
through the guarantees of autonomy and security
of tenure. The components of this aspect of
academic freedom have been categorized under
the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to
teach. It is to be realized that this individual aspect
of academic freedom could have developed only
pari passu with its institutional counterpart. As
corporate entities, educational institutions of higher
learning are inherently endowed with the right to
establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered by external controls or pressure. In the
Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the
areas of: (1) what shall be taught, e.g., the
curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study.
In an attempt to give an explicit definition with an
expanded coverage, the Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 came up with
this formulation: "Academic freedom shall be
enjoyed by students, by teachers, and by
researchers." After protracted debate and ringing
speeches, the final version which was none too
different from the way it was couched in the
previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article
XIV, Section 5 (2) states: "Academic freedom shall
be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In
anticipation of the question as to whether and
what aspects of academic freedom are included
herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna
explained: "Since academic freedom is a dynamic
concept, we want to expand the frontiers of
freedom, especially in education, therefore, we
shall leave it to the courts to develop further the
parameters of academic freedom." While under
the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to
freely choose their field of study, subject to existing
curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to
the established academic and disciplinary
standards laid down by the academic institution.
[Section 9 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, effective
September 11, 1982]. "For private schools have the
right to establish reasonable rules and regulations
for the admission, discipline and promotion of
students. This right . . . extends as well to parents . . .
as parents are under a social and moral (if not
legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to
assist and cooperate with the schools." (Yap Chin
Fah v. Court of Appeals [Resolution], G.R. No. 90063,
December 12, 1989) Such rules are "incident to the
very object of incorporation and indispensable to
the successful management of the college. The
rules may include those governing student
discipline." Going a step further, the establishment
of rules governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student discipline,
may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth
and efficient operation of the institution, but to its
very survival.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES;
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; PROPER ISSUANCE
THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. respondent students
argue that we erred in issuing a Temporary
Restraining Order since petitioners do not stand to
suffer irreparable damage in the event that private
respondents are allowed to re-enroll. No one can
be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate
reinstatement of respondent students who have
been investigated and found by the Disciplinary
Board to have violated petitioner university's
disciplinary rules and standards will certainly
undermine the authority of the administration of the
school. This we would be most loathe to do.
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
In 1975, the Court was confronted with a
mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty
Admission Committee of the Loyola School of
Theology, a religious seminary which has a working
arrangement with the Ateneo de Manila University
regarding accreditation of common students, to
allow petitioner who had taken some courses
therein for credit during summer, to continue her
studies. 1 Squarely meeting the issue, we dismissed
the petition on the ground that students in the
position of petitioner possess, not a right, but a
privilege, to be admitted to the institution. Not
having satisfied the prime and indispensable
requisite of a mandamus proceeding since there is
no duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of the
respondent to admit the petitioner, the petition did
not prosper.
44 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
In support of its decision, the Court invoked
academic freedom of institutions of higher learning,
as recognized by the Constitution, the concept
encompassing the right of a school to choose its
students.
Eighteen (18) years later, the right of a University to
refuse admittance to its students, this time in
Ateneo de Manila University proper, is again
challenged.
Whereas, in the Garcia case referred to in the
opening paragraph, the individual concerned was
not a regular student, the respondents in the case
at bar, having been previously enrolled in the
University, seek re-admission. Moreover, in the
earlier case, the petitioner was refused admittance,
not on such considerations as personality traits and
character orientation, or even inability to meet the
institution's academic or intellectual standards, but
because of her behavior in the classroom. The
school pointedly informed her that ". . . it would
seem to be in your best interest to work with a
Faculty that is more compatible with your
orientations."
On the other hand, students who are now being
refused admission into petitioner University have
been found guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the
Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which
prohibits participation in hazing activities. The case
attracted much publicity due to the death of one
of the neophytes and serious physical injuries
inflicted on another.
Herein lies an opportunity for the Court to add
another dimension to the concept of academic
freedom of institutions of higher learning, this time a
case fraught with social and emotional overtones.
The facts which gave rise to this case which is far
from novel, are as follows:
As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a
fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School, held
its initiation rites on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, for
students interested in joining its ranks. As a result of
such initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first
year student of petitioner university, died of serious
physical injuries at the Chinese General Hospital on
February 10, 1991. He was not the lone victim,
though, for another freshman by the name of
Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the
Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure
occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted
upon him on the same occasion.
In a notice dated February 11, 1991, petitioner
Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee 2 which was tasked to investigate and
submit a report within 72 hours on the
circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie
Villa. Said notice also required respondent students
to submit their written statements within twenty-four
(24) hours from receipt. Although respondent
students received a copy of the written notice, they
failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were
placed on preventive suspension. 3 Through their
respective counsels, they requested copies of the
charges and pertinent documents or affidavits.
In a notice dated February 14, 1991, the Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee, after receiving the written statements
and hearing the testimonies of several witnesses,
found a prima facie case against respondent
students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School
Catalogue entitled "Discipline." 4
Respondent students were then required to file their
written answers to the formal charge on or before
February 18, 1991; otherwise, they would be
deemed to have waived their right to present their
defenses.
On February 20, 1991, petitioner Dean created a
Disciplinary Board composed of petitioners Judge
Ruperto Kapunan, Justice Venicio Escolin, Atty.
Marcos Herras, Fiscal Miguel Albar and Atty.
Ferdinand Casis, to hear the charges against
respondent students. Cdpr
In a letter dated February 20, 1991, respondent
students were informed that they had violated Rule
No. 3 of the Rules on Discipline contained in the
Law School Catalogue. Said letter also states: "The
complaint/charge against you arose from
participation in acts of hazing committed during
the Aquila Legis initiations held on February 8-10,
1991. The evidence against you consist of
testimonies of students, showing your participation
in acts prohibited by the School regulations." Finally,
it ordered respondent students to file their written
answers to the above charge on or before February
22, 1991, otherwise they would be deemed to have
waive their defense. 5
In a motion dated February 21, 1991, respondent
students, through counsel, requested that the
investigation against them be held in abeyance,
pending action on their request for copies of the
evidence against them. 6
Respondent students were then directed by the
Board to appear before it at a hearing on February
28, 1991 to clarify their answers with regard to the
charges filed by the investigating committee for
violation of Rule No. 3. However, in a letter to
petitioners dated February 27, 1991, counsel for
respondent students moved to postpone the
hearing from February 28, 1991 to March 1, 1991. 7
Subsequently, respondent students were directed
to appear on March 2, 1991 for clarificatory
questions. 8 They were also informed that:
a) The proceedings will be summary in nature in
accordance with the rules laid down in the case of
Guzman vs. National University; 9
b) Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the
affiants-neophytes;
c) Hazing which is not defined in the School
catalogue shall be defined in accordance with the
proposed bill of Sen. Jose Lina, Senate Bill No. 3815;
45 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
d) The Board will take into consideration the degree
of participation of the petitioners in the alleged
hazing incident in imposing the penalty;
e) The Decision of the Board shall be appealable to
the President of the University, i.e. Respondent
Joaquin Bernas S. J.
On March 5, 1991, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean del
Castillo that, "in cases where the Disciplinary Board
is not prepared to impose the penalty of dismissal, I
would prefer that the Board leave the decision on
the penalty to the Administration so that this case
be decided not just on the Law School level but
also on the University level." 10
In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Board
found respondent students guilty of violating Rule
No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline
which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The
Board found that respondent students acted as
master auxiliaries or "auxies" during the initiation rites
of Aquila Legis, and exercised the "auxies privilege,"
which allows them to participate in the physical
hazing. Although respondent students claim that
they were there to assist and attend to the needs of
the neophytes, actually they were assigned a
definite supportive role to play in the organized
activity. Their guilt was heightened by the fact that
they made no effort to prevent the infliction of
further physical punishment on the neophytes
under their care. The Board considered respondent
students part and parcel of the integral process of
hazing. In conclusion, the Board pronounced
respondents guilty of hazing, either by active
participation or through acquiescence. However, in
view of the lack of unanimity among the members
of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board
left the imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration. 11 Petitioner Dean del Castillo
waived her prerogative to review the decision of
the Board and left to the President of the University
the decision of whether to expel respondent
students or not.
Consequently, in a resolution dated March 10, 1991,
petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the
Ateneo de Manila University, accepted the factual
findings of the Board, thus: "that as Master Auxiliaries
they exercised the 'auxie's privilege;' that even
assuming that they did not lay hands on the
neophytes," respondent students are still guilty in
accordance with the principle that "where two or
more persons act together in the commission of a
crime, whether they act through the physical
volition of one or of all, proceeding severally or
collectively, each individual whose will contributes
to the wrongdoing is responsible for the whole." Fr.
Bernas, in describing the offense which led to the
death of Leonardo Villa, concluded that the
"offense of the respondents can be characterized
as grave and serious, subversive of the goals of
Christian education and contrary to civilized
behavior." Accordingly, he imposed the penalty of
dismissal on all respondent students. 12
In a resolution dated March 18, 1991 and
concurred in by petitioner Fr. Bernas, 13 the Board
excluded respondent students Abas and Mendoza
from the coverage of the resolution of March 10,
1991, inasmuch as at the time the latter resolution
was promulgated, neither had as yet submitted
their case to the Board. Said resolution also set the
investigation of the two students on March 21, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer
for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction 14 alleging that they were currently
enrolled as students for the second semester of
schoolyear 1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining
order is issued, they would be prevented from
taking their examinations. The petition principally
centered on the alleged lack of due process in their
dismissal.
On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining petitioners
from dismissing respondent students and stopping
the former from conducting hearings relative to the
hazing incident. 15
Hearings in connection with the issuance of the
temporary restraining order were then held. On
April 7, 1991, the temporary restraining order issued
on March 18, 1991 lapsed. Consequently, a day
after the expiration of the temporary restraining
order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board
composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro Tesoro, Ramon
Caguioa, and Ramon Ereeta to investigate the
charges of hazing against respondent students
Abas and Mendoza.
Respondent students reacted immediately by filing
a Supplemental Petition of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, to
include the aforesaid members of the Special
Board, as additional respondents to the original
petition. 16
Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplemental
Petition arguing that the creation of the Special
Board was totally unrelated to the original petition
which alleged lack of due process in the conduct
of investigations by the Disciplinary Board against
respondent students; that a supplemental petition
cannot be admitted without the same being set for
hearing and that the supplemental petition for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order will, in
effect, extend the previous restraining order
beyond its mandatory 20-day lifetime. 17 Acting on
the urgent motion to admit the supplemental
petition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order, Judge Amin, as pairing judge of respondent
Judge Capulong, granted respondent students'
prayer on April 10, 1991. 18
On May 17, 1991, respondent Judge ordered
petitioners to reinstate respondent students.
Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to
conduct special examinations in lieu of the final
examinations which allegedly the students were not
allowed to take, and enjoined them to maintain the
46 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
status quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas
and Zosimo Mendoza pending final determination
of the issues of the instant case. Lastly, it directed
respondent students to file a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00. 19
On the same date, May 17, 1991, the Special Board
investigating petitioners Abas and Mendoza
concluded its investigation. On May 20, 1991, it
imposed the penalty of dismissal on respondent
students Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza and
directed the dropping of their names from its roll of
students. 20
The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent
judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction upon
posting by respondent students of a bond dated
May 17, 1991 in the amount of P50,000.00.
Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order questioning the order of
respondent judge reinstating respondent students
dated May 17, 1991. On May 30, 1991, this Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
enforcement of the May 17, 1991 order of
respondent judge. 21
In the case at bar, we come to grips with two
relevant issues on academic freedom, namely: (1)
whether a school is within its rights in expelling
students from its academic community pursuant to
its disciplinary rules and moral standards; and (2)
whether or not the penalty imposed by the school
administration is proper under the circumstances.
Cdpr
We grant the petition and reverse the order of
respondent judge ordering readmission of
respondent students. Respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion when he ruled that
respondent students had been denied due process
in the investigation of the charges against them.
It is the threshold argument of respondent students
that the decision of petitioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.
J., then President of the Ateneo de Manila
University, to expel them was arrived at without
affording them their right to procedural due
process. We are constrained to disagree as we find
no indication that such right has been violated. On
the contrary, respondent students' rights in a school
disciplinary proceeding, as enunciated in the cases
of Guzman v. National University, 22 Alcuaz v PSBA,
Q.C. Branch 23 and Non v. Dames II 24 have been
meticulously respected by petitioners in the various
investigative proceedings held before they were
expelled.
Corollary to their contention of denial of due
process is their argument that it is the Ang Tibay
case 25 and not the Guzman case which is
applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases
essentially deal with the requirements of due
process, the Guzman case is more apropos to the
instant case, since the latter deals specifically with
the minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

"(1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right
to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5)
the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the
case." 26
It cannot seriously be asserted that the above
requirements were not met. When, in view of the
death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del
Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified
and required respondent students on February 11,
1991 to submit within twenty-four hours their written
statement on the incident, 27 the records show that
instead of filing a reply, respondent students
requested through their counsel, copies of the
charges. 28 While some of the students mentioned
in the February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted
written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus,
the latter were granted an extension of up to
February 18, 1991 to file their statements. 29
Indubitably, the nature and cause of the
accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991.
30 It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter
which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as
contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue
was addressed individually to respondent students.
Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11,
February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent
students were given ample opportunity to adduce
evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges
leveled against them.
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when,
from the very start of the investigations before the
Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Committee,
the law firm of Gonzales Batiller and Bilog and
Associates put in its appearance and filed
pleadings in behalf of respondent students.
Respondent students may not use the argument
that since they were not accorded the opportunity
to see and examine the written statements which
became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991
order, they were denied procedural due process.
31 Granting that they were denied such
opportunity, the same may not be said to detract
from the observance of due process, for disciplinary
cases involving students need not necessarily
include the right to cross examination. An
administrative proceeding conducted to
investigate students' participation in a hazing
activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a
judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the
March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the
rules on the investigation as being summary in
nature and that respondent students have no right
to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is
but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz. 32
47 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
Respondent students' contention that the
investigating committee failed to consider their
evidence is far from the truth because the February
14, 1992 order clearly states that it was reached
only after receiving the written statements and
hearing the testimonies of several witnesses. 33
Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated
March 10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing on
March 2, 1991 wherein respondent students were
summoned to answer clarificatory questions. prcd
With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent
students fault petitioners for not explicitly defining
the word "hazing" and allege that there is no proof
that they were furnished copies of the 1990-91
Ateneo Law School Catalogue which prohibits
hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not worthy of
students who aspire to be future members of the
Bar. It cannot be over-emphasized that the charge
filed before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Board
is not a criminal case requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in
character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous
requirements of criminal due process, particularly
with respect to the specification of the charge
involved. As we have had occasion to declare in
previous cases of a similar nature, due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings identical to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
justice. 34 Accordingly, disciplinary charges against
a student need not be drawn with the precision of
a criminal information or complaint. Having given
prior notice to the students involved that "hazing"
which is not defined in the School Catalogue shall
be defined in accordance with Senate Bill No. 3815,
the proposed bill on the subject of Sen. Jose Lina,
petitioners have said what needs to be said. We
deem this sufficient for purposes of the investigation
under scrutiny.
Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a student, to the
extent of dismissal or expulsion, finds its raison d' etre
in the increasing frequency of injury, even death,
inflicted upon the neophytes by their insensate
"masters." Assuredly, it passes the test of
reasonableness and absence of malice on the part
of the school authorities. Far from fostering
comradeship and esprit d' corps, it has merely fed
upon the cruel and baser instincts of those who
aspire to eventual leadership in our country.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not
in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65
considering that they failed to file a motion for
reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby
bypassing the latter and the Court of Appeals. 3 5
It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to
the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the
case involves a question of law, 36 as in this case,
where the issue is whether or not respondent
students have been afforded procedural due
process prior to their dismissal from petitioner
university.
Lastly, respondent students argue that we erred in
issuing a Temporary Restraining Order since
petitioners do not stand to suffer irreparable
damage in the event that private respondents are
allowed to re-enroll. No one can be so myopic as to
doubt that the immediate reinstatement of
respondent students who have been investigated
and found by the Disciplinary Board to have
violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and
standards will certainly undermine the authority of
the administration of the school. This we would be
most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner
university's academic freedom which has been
enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987
Constitutions.
At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the
essential freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom" cited in
the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 37 thus: (1)
who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it
shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to
study. LibLex
Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece,"
proud to claim the title "gadfly of the State," has
deservedly earned for himself a respected place in
the annals of history as a martyr to the cause of free
intellectual inquiry. To Plato, this great teacher of his
was the "best, the most sensible, and the most just
man of his age." In 399 B.C., he willingly quaffed the
goblet of hemlock as punishment for alleged
"corruption" of the youth of Athens. He describes in
his own words how this charge of "corruption," the
forerunner of the concept of academic freedom,
came about:
"Young men of the richer classes, who have not
much to do, come about me of their own accord:
they like to hear the pretenders examined, and
they often imitate me, and examine others
themselves; there are plenty of persons, as they
soon discover, who think that they know something,
but really know little or nothing; and then those who
are examined by them, instead of being angry with
themselves are angry with me. This confounded
Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth.
And then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil
does he practice or teach? they do not know, and
cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear
to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made
charges which are used against all philosophers
about teaching things up in the clouds and under
the earth, and having no gods, and making the
worse appear the better cause; for they do not like
to confess that their pretense of knowledge has
been detected which is the truth; and as they
are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and
are all in battle array and have persuasive tongues,
they have filled your ears with their loud and
inveterate calumnies." 38
Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same
heroic mold have similarly defied the stifling
strictures of authority, whether State, Church, or
various interest groups, to be able to give free rein
to their ideas. Particularly odious were the insidious
48 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
and blatant attempts at thought control during the
time of the Inquisition until even the Medieval
universities, renowned as intellectual centers in
Europe, gradually lost their autonomy.
In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian
encrustations along the way, were gradually
crystallized in the cluster of freedoms which
awaited the champions and martyrs of the
dawning modern age. This was exemplified by the
professors of the new German universities in the
16th and 17th centuries such as the Universities of
Leiden (1575), Helmstadt (1574) and Heidelberg
(1652). The movement back to freedom of inquiry
gained adherents among the exponents of
fundamental human rights of the 19th and 20th
centuries. "Academic freedom", the term as it
evolved to describe the emerging rights related to
intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated
with freedom of thought, speech, expression and
the press; in other words, with the right of individuals
in university communities, such as professors,
researchers and administrators, to investigate,
pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of
Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it may
lead," free from internal and external interference
or pressure.
But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized
where the freedom is exercised judiciously and
does not degenerate into unbridled license. Early
cases on this individual aspect of academic
freedom have stressed the need for assuring to
such individuals a measure of independence
through the guarantees of autonomy and security
of tenure. The components of this aspect of
academic freedom have been categorized under
the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to
teach.
It is to be realized that this individual aspect of
academic freedom could have developed only
pari passu with its institutional counterpart. As
corporate entities, educational institutions of higher
learning are inherently endowed with the right to
establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered by external controls or pressure. In the
Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the
areas of: (1) what shall be taught, e.g., the
curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study.
In the Philippines, the Acts which were passed with
the change of sovereignty from the Spanish to the
American government, namely, the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916
made no mention of the rights now subsumed
under the catch-all term of "academic freedom."
This is most especially true with respect to the
institutional aspect of the term. It had to await the
drafting of the Philippine Constitutions to be
recognized as deserving of legal protection.
The breakthrough for the concept itself was found
in Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution which stated:
"Universities established by the State shall enjoy
academic freedom." The only State university at
that time, being the University of the Philippines, the
Charter was perceived by some as exhibiting rank
favoritism for the said institution at the expense of
the rest. prcd
In an attempt to broaden the coverage of the
provision, the 1973 Constitution provided in its
Section 8 (2): "All institutions of higher learning shall
enjoy academic freedom." In his interpretation of
the provision, former U.P. President Vicente G.
Sinco, who was also a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, declared that it
"definitely grants the right of academic freedom to
the University as an institution as distinguished from
the academic freedom of a university professor." 39
Has the right been carried over to the present
Constitution? In an attempt to give an explicit
definition with an expanded coverage, the
Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of
1986 came up with this formulation: "Academic
freedom shall be enjoyed by students, by teachers,
and by researchers." After protracted debate and
ringing speeches, the final version which was none
too different from the way it was couched in the
previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article
XIV, Section 5 (2) states: "Academic freedom shall
be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In
anticipation of the question as to whether and
what aspects of academic freedom are included
herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna
explained: "Since academic freedom is a dynamic
concept, we want to expand the frontiers of
freedom, especially in education, therefore, we
shall leave it to the courts to develop further the
parameters of academic freedom." 40
More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C.
Gascon asked: "When we speak of the sentence
'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that
academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the
institution itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it
also includes . . ." Gascon finished off the broken
thought, "the faculty and the students." Azcuna
replied: "Yes."
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, 41 we
have consistently upheld the salutary proposition
that admission to an institution of higher learning is
discretionary upon a school, the same being a
privilege on the part of the student rather than a
right. While under the Education Act of 1982,
students have a right "to freely choose their field of
study, subject to existing curricula and to continue
their course therein up to graduation," such right is
subject, as all rights are, to the established
academic and disciplinary standards laid down by
the academic institution. 42
"For private schools have the right to establish
reasonable rules and regulations for the admission,
discipline and promotion of students. This right . . .
extends as well to parents . . . as parents are under
a social and moral (if not legal) obligation,
individually and collectively, to assist and
cooperate with the schools." 43
Such rules are "incident to the very object of
incorporation and indispensable to the successful
management of the college. The rules may include
49 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
those governing student discipline." 44 Going a step
further, the establishment of rules governing
university-student relations, particularly those
pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded
as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the
eruption of militancy in the academic groves as
collectively, the students demanded and plucked
for themselves from the panoply of academic
freedom their own rights encapsulized under the
rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in
Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty,
and that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid
down by the school.
Considering that respondent students are proud to
claim as their own a Christian school that includes
Theology as part of its curriculum and assiduously
strives to turn out individuals of unimpeachable
morals and integrity in the mold of the founder of
the order of the Society of Jesus, St. Ignatius of
Loyola, and their God-fearing forbears, their
barbaric and ruthless acts are the more
reprehensible. It must be borne in mind that
universities are established, not merely to develop
the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to
inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the
development, or flowering if you will, of the total
man.
In essence, education must ultimately be religious
not in the sense that the founders or charter
members of the institution are sectarian or profess a
religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as
the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead
said, is "an education which inculcates duty and
reverence." 45 It appears that the particular brand
of religious education offered by the Ateneo de
Manila University has been lost on the respondent
students.
Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a
venerable institution as the Ateneo de Manila
University as their own a minute longer, for they may
foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the
students currently enrolled, as well as those who
come after them. cdphil
Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement
in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals that: "The
maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly
educational environment will be seriously imperilled
if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace
Christian is forced to admit petitioner's children and
to reintegrate them to the student body." 46 Thus,
the decision of petitioner university to expel them is
but congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds.
That there must be such a congruence between
the offense committed and the sanction imposed
was stressed in Malabanan v. Ramento. 47
Having carefully reviewed the records and the
procedure followed by petitioner university, we see
no reason to reverse its decision founded on the
following undisputed facts: that on February 8, 9
and 10, 1991, the Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted
hazing activities; that respondent students were
present at the hazing as auxiliaries, and that as a
result of the hazing, Leonardo Villa died from serious
physical injuries, while Bienvenido Marquez was
hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of
respondent students upon those whom ironically
they would claim as "brothers" after the initiation
rites, how can we countenance the imposition of
such nominal penalties as reprimand or even
suspension? We, therefore, affirm petitioners'
imposition of the penalty of dismissal upon
respondent students. This finds authority and
justification in Section 146 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools. 48

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the

order of respondent Judge dated May 17, 1991
reinstating respondent students into petitioner
university is hereby REVERSED. The resolution of
petitioner Joaquin Bernas S. J., then President of
Ateneo de Manila University dated March 10, 1991,
is REINSTATED and the decision of the Special Board
DISMISSING respondent students ADEL ABAS and
ZOSIMO MENDOZA dated May 20, 1991 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,

Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ
., concur.

Grio Aquino, J ., is on leave.

Cruz, J ., concur in the result. I do not join in the

statements in the ponencia which seem to me to
be a prejudgment of the criminal cases against the
private respondents for the death of Lenny Villa.

50 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s