Ingraham vs. Wright (1977) U.

S Case

Facts of the Case:

James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews were enrolled in the Charles R. Drew Junior High School in
Dade County Florida. Ingraham and Andrews stated that they had been paddled in school an excessive
amount of times with an excessive force. They claimed that the act of paddling was in violation to their
rights under the Eighth Amendment because the paddling was excessive and also in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the authorities did not give them an opportunity to be heard before the
paddling took place. The defendants in this case were Principal Willie J Wright, assistant Principals
Lemmie Deliford and Solomon Barnes, and Superintendent Edward L Whigham. When the case was
brought to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the district court dismissed
all three counts before even hearing the evidence. The case was brought to a panel of the court of appeals
which voted to reverse the decision of the district court on the grounds that the punishment was severe
and oppressive and violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Upon rehearing, the
rejected the decision made the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court. Ingraham
then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Court Decision:
The Supreme Courts decision in Ingraham v. Wright affirmed the decision made the district court and
the en banc court of appeals. The Supreme Court ruled that the public schools were allowed to paddle
students without first giving a hearing.
Basis for Decision:
The decision of the Supreme Court was made based on the fact that cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment only applies to those convicted of a crime and not actions used for discipline
in a public school. The Court did not see any need to expand the Eighth Amendment to include disciplinary
actions taken by public schools to punish students. Also it was held that because the punishment inflicted
upon the students was physical punishment it was not covered under due process in the Fourteenth
Amendment. In making this decision the Supreme Court looked at cases such as
States v. Barnett, and Greene v. McElroy. These cases were looked upon because they shared a similar
ruling is letting tradition stand instead of adjusting the amendments to fit the case.

GUZMAN VS. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

 G.R. No. L-68288, July 11, 1986
FACTS:
Petitioners who are students of the National University were barred
from enrolment. The school claims that their scholastic standing is
poor and that they have been involved in activities that have
disrupted classes and had conducted mass actions without the
required permits.
HELD:
a. It is apparent that despite the accusations of alleged violations
hurled by the school against the petitioners, the fact is that it had
never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not
petitioners-students had indeed led or participated in activities within
the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school
authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein.
Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite any duly
published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or
refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.
b. Under the Education Act of 1982, students have the right to
freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation, EXCEPT in case of
academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.
The petitioner were denied of this right, and were being disciplined
without due process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools that no penalty shall be imposed
upon any student except for cause as defined in *** (the) Manuel
and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and
only after due investigation shall have been conducted. It has
already been held in Berina vs. Philippine Maritime Institute, 117
SCRA 581, that it is illegal of a school to impose sanctions on
students without conducting due investigation.
c. Of course, all schools have the power to adopt and enforce its
rules. In fact the maintenance of good school discipline is a duty
specifically enjoined on every private school. The Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools provides that:
* * The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding
sanctions therefor must be clearly specified and defined in writing
and made known to the students and/or their parents or guardians.
Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such
rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from time to time
effective as of the date of their promulgation unless otherwise
specified.
d. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of
procedural due process. Due process in disciplinary cases involving
students:
a. need not entail proceedings and hearing similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in court of justice;
b. the proceedings may be summary;
c. cross-examination is not an essential part thereof.
But the S.C. said that the following minimum standards must be met
to satisfy the demands of procedural due process:
1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause
of any accusation against them;
2. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them,
with the assistance of counsel;
3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf;
5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON.WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON
HIGHEREDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES,
JR., G.R. No. 127980, December 19, 2007
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE FACTS:
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung,
Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau
Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle
University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) [1][1] Joint
Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action
causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student
members of Domino Lux Fraternity.
On March 29, 1995, James Yap was eating his dinner alone in
Manangs Restaurant near La Salle, when he overheard two men
bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the
comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he
mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching
television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at
Manangs. Then, the three, together with four other persons went
back to Manangs and confronted the two who were still in the
restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony,
one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity.
There was no rumble or physical violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads
of the fraternity through the intercession of the Student Council. The
Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology. Kailangan
ng apology in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no apology was
made.
On March 25, 1995, Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m.,
James Yap went out of the campus using the Engineering Gate to
buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft
Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys
were running towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to
do. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with
something heavy in his hands parang knuckles. Respondents
Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him. Respondents
Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching
him. As he was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him.
People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left. Yap
could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked
him. With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said hindi ko nakita
ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya. What Mr. Yap saw
was a long haired guy also running with the group.
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims,
namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano,
and Michael Perez, are members of the Domino Lux Fraternity,
while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar,
James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr.
are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity, a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint [2]
[7]
with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private respondents
with direct assault. Similar complaints[3][8] were also filed by Dennis
Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private
respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled De La
Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-
BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert
R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325),
Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-
MGT/9251227) were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-
25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to
private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and
Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to
answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers. [4][9]
Said notices issued by De La Salle Discipline Board uniformly stated
as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had
been constituted to hear and deliberate the charge against you for
violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints of
James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on
April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your
witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in your behalf.
You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or
those of your witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the
Board, through the Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as
well as the sworn statement of their proposed testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to
submit the list of witnesses and the sworn statement of their
proposed testimony will be considered a waiver on your part to
present evidence and as an admission of the principal act
complained of.
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995,
private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. No full-
blown hearing was conducted nor the students allowed to cross-
examine the witnesses against them.
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a
Resolution finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the
supreme penalty of automatic expulsion, pursuant to CHED Order
No. 4.[7][20] The dispositive part of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds
respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250)
and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having
violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic
expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the
Board acquits him of the charge.
I SSUE
Were private respondents accorded due process of law because
there was no full-blown hearing nor were they allowed to cross-
examine the witnesses against them?
H E L D:
Private respondents right to due process of law was not violated.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found
violating school discipline, [t]here are withal minimum standards
which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in
writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2)
they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and
with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of
the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of
due process. Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due
process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be
respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[11][69] So long as the party is given the opportunity to
advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be
said that there was denial of due process.[12][70]
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances,
essential to due process it is enough that the parties are given a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of
the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair
decision can be based.[13][71] To be heard does not only mean
presentation of testimonial evidence in court one may also be
heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.[14][72]
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges
against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through
petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the
charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective
answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented
against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board.
Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce
evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board
considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties
before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process
when they were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against
them. This argument was already rejected inGuzman v. National
University[15][73] where this Court held that x x x the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due
process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary
cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be
summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential part
thereof.

ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. NO. L-49711 November 7, 1979

2nd Division Aquino

FACTS:

Zambales Chromite Mining Corp., Inc. (ZCM, Inc.) sought to be

declared the rightful and prior locators
and possessors of 69 mining claims in Zambales. ZCM filed their
claims with then Director of Mines
Benjamin Gozon. ZCM, Inc., were asserting their claim against the
mining claims of Martinez and
Pabilona. Director Gozon decided in favor of Martinez and Pabilona
and dismissed the claims of ZCM,
Inc., ruling that ZCM, Inc. did not discover any mineral nor located
any mining claims in accordance with
law. ZCM appealed the decision before the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources. During the
pendency of the appeal, Director gozon was appointed Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources.
Gozon in his capacity as Secretary affirmed his decision as Director
of Mines and dismissed the appeal of
ZCM, Inc.
ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed
the decision of Gozon.
RULING OF CFI:
The disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling
(Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does
not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the
Mining Law, disqualifying the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an
appeal from a case which he had
decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for
disqualification. ZCM appealed the case
to the CA.
RULING OF CA:
CA after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision
remanded the case to the Minister of
Natural Resources.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Gozon can review and validly affirm his earlier
decision w/o disturbing due process?
HELD:
Secretary Gozon cannot review his decision as Director of Mines. A
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a
mockery of administrative justice.
RATIO:
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might
not turn out to be a farce the
reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose
decision is under review; otherwise,
there could be no different view or there would be no real review of
the case. The decision of the
reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the
same view since being human, he
would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
SINGSON V NLRC

Miguel Singson was an employee of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL). In

1991, a Japanese national alleged that Singson extorted money from
her ($200.00) by accusing her of having excess baggage; and that to
settle the issue, she needs to pay said amount to him. Singson was
later investigated and the investigating committee found him guilty.
PAL then dismissed Singson from employment. Singson then filed a
case before NLRC against PAL for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter
Raul Aquino ruled in favor of Singson as he found PALs side
insufficient to dismiss Singson. PAL appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and his case was raffled to the
2nd Division thereof.
The 2nd Division, however, was composed of Commissioners
Victoriano Calaycay, Rogelio Rayala, and former Labor Arbiter Raul
Aquino same arbiter which decided Singsons case. The
commissioners deliberated on the case and thereafter reversed the
decision of Aquino.
Singson moved for reconsideration. This time, only Commissioners
Calaycay and Rayala deliberated on the motion. The motion was
denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singson was denied of due process.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Singson was denied due
process. The SC held that Singson was denied due process when
Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the 2nd Division of
the NLRC, in reviewing PALs appeal. He was reviewing his own
decision as a former labor arbiter.
Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, each Division shall consist of one member from the public
sector who shall act as the Presiding Commissioner and one
member each from the workers and employers sectors, respectively.
The composition of the Division guarantees equal representation and
impartiality among its members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a
review of three (3) commissioners who are impartial right from the
start of the process of review.
Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he
was the arbiter who decided the case under review. He should have
inhibited himself from any participation in this case. The infirmity of
the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for
reconsideration of Singson was denied by two commissioners and
without the participation of Aquino. The right of petitioner to an
impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal.
He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his
motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial
review of three commissioners. The denial of Singsons right to an
impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated
his right to due process.