Liceo University Law
Special Procedings
S.Y. 2016-2017
Rule 73
01
CUIZON v. RAMOLETE
GR No. L-51291
May 29, 1984
Topic: Probate Proceedings; Orders Of
Inclusion Or Exclusion Of Properties From
Administrators Inventory Are Provisional,
Not Final
Doctrine: Probate court cannot adjudicate
or determine title to properties claimed to
be part of the estate and equally claimed to
belong to outside parties.
Synopsis: In the instant case, the property
involved is not only claimed by outside
parties but it was sold seven years before
the death of the decedent and is duly titled
in the name of the vendees who are not
party to the proceedings.
Facts:
On 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied
for the registration of several parcels of
land in Mandaue City docketed as L.R. Case
No. N-179. In 1970, he distributed his
property between his two daughters, Rufina
and Irene, to whom the salt beds subject of
the controversy was given. In 1971, Irene
executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of
Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor
of petitioners Franciso et al.
Although the decision in L.R. Case
No. N-179 was rendered way back in 1972,
the decree of registration and the
corresponding O.C.T. was issued only in
1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In
that same year, T.C.T No. 10477 covering
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the property in question was issued to Irene.
The latter died in 1978.
During the extrajudicial settlement
of the estate, Rufina, the mother of
Francisco et al., adjudicated to herself all
the property of Irene including the salt beds
in question. She then executed a deed of
Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed
and ratified the 1971 deed of sale and
renounced and waived whatever rights and
interests and participation she may have in
the property in question in favor of the
petitioners. The deed was annotated in
T.C.T. No. 10477. Subsequently, T.C.T. No.
12665 was issued in favor of the petitioners.
On September 28, 1978, a petition
for letters of administrator was filed before
the CFI of Cebu by respondent Domingo
Antigua, allegedly selected by the heirs of
Irene to act administrator. The petition was
granted.
In Respondent Antigua as
administrator filed an inventory of the
estate of Irene. He included in the inventory
the property in question, which was being
administered by Juan Arche, one of the
petitioners. He filed a motion asking the
court for authority to sell the salt from the
property and praying that petitioner Arche
be ordered to deliver the salt to the
administrator. The motion was granted by
the court.
Issue:
Whether a probate court has
jurisdiction over parcels of land already
covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title
issued in favor of owners who are not
parties to the intestate proceedings if the
said parcels have been included in the
inventory of properties of the estate
prepared by the administrator.
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Ruling:
No. It is a well-settled rule that a
probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are equally claimed to belong to
outside parties. All said court could do is to
determine whether they should or should
not be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is dispute, then the
administrator and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims
of title because the probate court cannot do
so.
In the instant case, the property
involved is not only claimed by outside
parties but it was sold seven years before
the death of the decedent and is duly titled
in the name of the vendees who are not
party to the proceedings.
In Bolisay v. Alcid, the Court held
that if a property covered by Torrens Title
is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness
of such title should be given due weight,
and in the absence of strong compelling
evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof
should be considered as the owner of the
property in controversy until his title is
nullified or modified in an appropriate
ordinary action.
Having been apprised of the fact
that the property in question was covered
by a TCT issued in the name of third parties,
the respondent court should have denied
the motion of the respondent administrator
and excluded the property in question from
the inventory of the property of the estate.
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Case Digested by: Aura Villones
02
Mallari v. Mallari
GR No. L-4656
February 23, 1953
Topic: Probate Proceedings; Descent And
Distribution; Actions; Filing Of Ordinary
Action On Properties Under Administration.
Doctrine: The probate court can only
determine whether a subject property
should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there
is a dispute as to the ownership, then the
opposing parties and the administrator have
to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of
title because the probate court cannot do so.
Synopsis: A probate court or one in charge
of proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are equally claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that the said court could
do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should
not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the
administrator.
Facts:
Maria Mallari died on April 17, 1949
without issue but leaving nephews and at
least one niece. During her lifetime Maria
Mallari owned among other things three
parcel of land and one-half of another
parcel, in Macabebe, Pampanga.
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On July 12, 1938, she was supposed
to have donated the first parcel to her
nephew Domiciano C. Mallari, and the
second, third and one-half of the fourth
parcels of land to the same Domiciano C.
Mallari, her nephew Francisco Mallari and
her niece Catalina Mallari. The donees
accepted the donations in the same deed or
deeds and new certificates of title were
issued to them. Thereafter, the donees took
possession of the parcels donated to them.
In 1943 the donees Domiciano,
Francisco and Catalina executed an extra-
judicial partition of their joint properties. In
1946 this extra-judicial partition was
registered and the corresponding transfer
certificates of title were issued to them.
Maria left what purported to be a
will and in that instrument the four parcel
of land said to have been donated by her to
her nephews and niece were still listed as
part of her estate. On May 7, 1949,
defendant Augusto Mallari, another
nephew of Maria filed a petition for the
probate of the will of his aunt in the CFI of
Pampanga (Special Proceedings No. 450)
and Augusto was appointed special
administrator of the estate.
The heir of Domiciano who had
already died, and Francisco and Catalina
filed opposition to the probate of the will
based on statutory grounds and claiming
that the four parcels of land could no longer
be disposed of in the will because they had
previously been donated to them.
Augustus petitioned the probate
court to order the tenants of said four
parcel under penalty of contempt of court
to deliver to him that portion of the harvest
corresponding to the owner.
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On October 26, 1949, Francisco
Mallari and the four heirs of Domiciano
named Magdalena, Marcelo, Florentina and
Gorgonia, filed the present action, civil case
No. 261 in the CFI of Pampanga claiming
that the four parcel in question (1/2 of the
4th) belonged to them by virtue of the
donation made by Maria Mallari, and
alleging that Augusto claims or asserts to
have an interest in the said lands.
Instead of answering the complaint,
Augusto filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action and that the court had no jurisdiction
over the subject-matter. His principal
contention, however, was that the court
had no jurisdiction because the probate
court had already acquired exclusive
jurisdiction under special proceedings No.
450.
The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss on the ground that the parties and
the subject-matter involved in the probate
proceedings and in the ordinary action were
the same, and that the present action was
in effect a duplication of the probate
proceedings and that a final judgment in
the probate proceedings will amount to an
adjudication of the present action.
Issue:
Whether the trial court in the civil case
erred in dismissing the case on the ground
that the present case is similar to the
probate proceedings.
Ruling:
No. The present action is not a
duplication of the probate proceedings
although the parties and subject-matter
may be identical. It is a well-settled rule
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that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are equally claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that the said court could
do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should
not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well
and good; but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims
of title because the probate court cannot do
so. It is therefore evident that the
conflicting claims in the present action
cannot be adjudicated in the probate
proceedings.
Name of Digester: Aura Villones
03 1
PALMA v. CA
GR No. 101383
September 12, 1984
Topic: Provisional Determination of
Ownership
Doctrine: A probate court cannot adjudicate
or determine title to properties claimed to
be part of the estate and which are equally
claimed to belong to third parties.
Synopsis: Petitioners were sold properties
that belong to respondents deceased
estate subject for administration. It is
contended by respondents that such sale
was done without authority of the probate
court which was under its jurisdiction. Sales
transactions transpired in 1988 where
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special proceedings was filed in 1984 which
undoubtedly made the subject property
part of the estate of the deceased and
under the jurisdiction of the probate court
which has the authority to approve any
disposition regarding properties under
administration. The trial courts challenged
order of June 5, 1990 has become final and
executory, and subject property had been
sold to Amigo Realty Development
Corporation with authority from the trial
court.
Facts:
Subject property is house and lot
located at No. 65 Santo Tomas St., Galas,
Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 33181.
When respondent Yuseco took steps to pay
the real estate taxes on the property, she
discovered that it had already been sold on
May, 9, 1988 by Paulino Taningco, husband
of the deceased, to Ireneo B. Zialcita, Jr.,
and TCT No. 383664 was issued in his name.
In turn, the latter sold the property to
petitioners Gamaliel B. Palma and Eduardo
A. Beltran for P1,000,000.00 through a deed
of absolute sale dated 9 June 1988 for
which they were issued TCT No. 383686 and
Tax Declaration No. 826 in their names. On
8 November 1989, the property was again
sold, this time by petitioners, to the
Carmelite Theresian Missionaries, Inc., and
TCT No. PR-17857 and Tax Declaration No.
C-030-00730 were issued in its name.
On 2 April 1990, respondent Yuseco
filed before the trial court a motion to
declare void all the deeds of sale, tax
declarations and transfer certificates of title
covering the property where Carmelite
Theresian Missionaries, Inc. appeared but
petitioners did not. On June 5, 1990, the
trial court issued the disputed order
nullifying the documents with the bases
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that: (a) the property cannot be the subject
of any transaction without the approval of
the probate court; and (b) the deed of sale
dated May 9, 1988 is a clear forgery
because Paulino Taningco declared that he
died in February 1984. Zialcita, Jr. was able
to acquire the property and transfer its
ownership to petitioners following the
destruction of the surrendered owners
duplicate copy surrendered to the Register
of Deeds when fire razed the Quezon City
Hall on June 11, 1988.
On June 22, 1990, the trial court
denied the probate of the holographic will
of Basilia Zialcita Vda. De Taningco for
failure to establish the authenticity of the
handwriting of the testatrix by at least 3
witnesses and for lack of mental capacity,
having established that she was semi-invalid
and suffering from senile dementia as of the
time the holographic will was executed.
On September 24, 1990, petitioners
file a motion for intervention and petition
for relief. The court refused to take
cognizance of the motion and petition on
the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over
the case considering Zalciata, Jr. already
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with the Court of Appeals assailing the
order of the court.
The CA set aside the order of the
trial court on the basis that: (a) a probate
court cannot adjudicate or determine title
to properties claimed to be part of the
estate and equally claimed by outside
parties; and (b) Torrens titles cannot be
attacked collaterally.
Upon motion for reconsideration by
respondent Yuseco, CA amended and
reversed its decision.
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Issue:
Whether subject property was
under the jurisdiction of the probate court.
Held:
YES. The Supreme court affirmed
decision of the Court of Appeals upon the
motion for reconsideration of the
respondent on the basis that: (a) sales
transactions transpired in 1988 where
special proceedings was filed in 1984 which
undoubtedly made the subject property
part of the estate of the deceased and
under the jurisdiction of the probate court
which has the authority to approve any
disposition regarding properties under
administration; and (b) the trial courts
challenged order of June 5, 1990 has
become final and executory, and subject
property had been sold to Amigo Realty
Development Corporation with authority
from the trial court. Once a judgment has
been executed, it may no longer be
amended, modified or altered. The case is
deemed terminated once and for all. The
same ruling olds in the case of an order
which has been enforced.
Case Digested By: Merchadel O. Capadocia
04
Uy v. Capulong,
221 SCRA 87
April 7, 1993
Topic: Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons; Probate Court Without
Jurisdiction Over Question Of Ownership
Where Property Allegedly Belonging To
Estate Claimed By Another Person.
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Doctrine: Questions as to ownership of
property alleged to be part of the estate of
a deceased person, but claimed by some
other person to be his property, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate, cannot be
determined in the courts of administration
proceedings. The trial court, acting as
probate court, has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be
submitted to the trial court in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction. The failure of
respondent judge to apply this basic
principle indicates a manifest disregard of
well-known legal rules.
Synopsis: This case is about the charge filed
by Spouses Uy against Judge Capulong of
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela for
gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the
law and grave misconduct in a complaint
relative to Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88
for settlement of the estate of the late
Ambrocio C. Pingco. The judge ordered the
cancel of the titles issued on the grounds
that the signatures on the deed of sale were
forged. The probate court has no
jurisdiction over declaration of nullity of the
sale of a parcel of land under administration
and the consequent cancellation of the
certificate of title. An independent action
must be instituted in the proper court.
Facts:
On February 1978, two (2) parcels of
land belonging to the late Ambrocio C.
Pingco and his wife had been sold to
complainants, Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy
who registered the sale with the Register of
Deeds of Manila in February 1989. The
records show that in the petition for
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settlement of the estate of Ambrocio C.
Pingco, the counsel for the special
administratrix filed an urgent motion
requesting the court to direct the Register
of Deeds of Valenzuela to "freeze any
transaction without the signature of
Herminia Alvos" involving the several
properties formerly owned by Pingco. ROD
reported that the titles to the properties
subject of the "freeze order;" were under a
deed of absolute sale executed by the
spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz
Ramirez and that, by virtue of the deed of
sale, new transfer certificates of title were
issued in the name of complainants Jose P.
Uy and Rizalina C. Uy, except for TCTs
which were registered with ROD Caloocan.
Counsel for the special
administratrix then filed with the court an
urgent motion to cancel the titles issued on
the grounds that signatures of the vendors
in the deed of sale were forged. Judge
Capulong ordered the cancellation of the
titles in the name of complainant Jose P. Uy
and the reinstatement of the names of the
spouses Pingco and Ramirez or the issuance
of new titles in their name. Sps Uy elevated
the case to the CA, which reversed the
decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the RTC, acting as probate
court has jurisdiction over question of
ownership where property belonging to the
estate is claimed by another person?
Ruling:
No, a probate court has no
authority to decide questions of the
ownership of property, real or personal.
Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
simply provides that a person who is
suspected of having in his possession
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property belonging to an estate, may be
cited and the court may examine him under
oath on the matter. The only purpose of the
examination is to elicit information or to
secure evidence from the persons
suspected of having possession or
knowledge of the property of the deceased,
or of having concealed, embezzled, or
conveyed away any of the property of the
deceased. Said section nowhere gives the
court the power to determine the question
of ownership of such property. Furthermore,
the declaration of nullity of the sale of a
parcel of land under administration and the
consequent cancellation of the certificate of
title issued in favor of the vendee, cannot
be obtained through a mere motion in the
probate proceedings over the objection of
said vendee over whom the probate court
has no jurisdiction. To recover the property,
an independent action against the vendee
must be instituted in the proper court.
Caese Digested by: Willard Aperocho
05
TERESITA N. DE LEON v.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 128781
August 6, 2002
Topic: Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons; Probate Courts Power to Include
or Exclude Properties are Provisional
Doctrine: Probate court possess inherent
power to determine what properties, rights
and credits of the deceased should be
included in or excluded from the inventory.
Should an heir or person interested in the
properties of a deceased person duly call the
courts attention to the fact that certain
properties, rights or credits have been left
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out in the inventory, it is likewise the courts
duty to hear the observations, with power
to determine if such observations should be
attended to or not and if the properties
referred to therein belong prima facie to the
intestate, but no such determination is final
and ultimate in nature as to the ownership
of the said properties. A probate court,
whether in a testate or intestate proceeding,
can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally.
Synopsis: Respondent filed a motion for
collation on the ground that subject
properties should be part of the inventory
of properties in the estate of the deceased
by gratuitous title which the probate court
issued an order of collation on already
registered properties in favor of the
petitioners. A probate court has no
authority to decide questions of the
ownership of property, real or personal, but
only the determination of whether such
should be included in list of properties to be
administered.
Facts:
Petitioner Teresita N. de Leon was
appointed administratrix of the estate of
Rafael C. Nicolas. Deceased spouses Rafael
and Salud Nicolas were the parents of
petitioner Teresita N. de Leon, Estrellita N.
Vizconde, Antonio Nicolas (deceased
husband of petitioner Zenaida Nicolas and
predecessor of the petitioners Heirs of
Antonio Nicolas), Ramon Nicolas and
Roberto Nicolas. Private respondent Ramon
G. Nicolas, filed a "Motion for Collation,"
claiming that deceased Rafael Nicolas,
during his lifetime, had given real properties
to his children by gratuitous title and that
administratrix-petitioner Teresita failed to
include the same in the inventory of the
estate of the decedent.
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RTC then issued an Order directing
Ramon to submit pertinent documents
relative to the transfer of the properties
from the registered owners during their
lifetime for proper determination of the
court. An order of collation was issued
which included the properties of petitioner
de Leon. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that the properties
subject of the Order was already titled in
their names years ago but the RTC denied
said motion, ruling that it is within the
jurisdiction of the court to determine
whether titled properties should be collated.
The case was then elevated to the CA which
upheld the ruling of the RTC on the ground
that the decision had already become final
for failure of petitioners to appeal within
the required period.
Issue:
Whether the RTC, acting as probate
court can pass upon questions of title or
ownership in the intestate proceedings?
Ruling:
No, a probate court has no authority
to decide questions of the ownership of
property, real or personal. Probate court
could only determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory
or list of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is a dispute as to
the ownership, then the opposing parties
and the administrator have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so. CA likewise
committed an error in considering the order
of the court as final or binding upon the
heirs or third persons who dispute the
inclusion of certain properties. Said order is
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not a collation order but merely an order
including the subject properties in the
inventory of the estate of decedent. The
determination by the RTC is not conclusive
and is subject to final decision in a separate
action for final determination of the
conflicting claims of title.
Name Of Digester: Willard M. Aperocho
06
PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEV
INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS,
GR L-62431-33,
August 31, 1984
Topic: Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons; Approval of the Probate Court of
the Conditional Sale Is Not A Conclusive
Determination of the Intrinsic or extrinsic
Validity of the Conditional Sale.
Doctrine: This case involves the approval of
the sale by the probate court for the
purpose of obtaining the best terms of the
estate. The exercise of the probate courts
power could not be said to be an act of
broadening its jurisdiction but underscores
the limited character of its jurisdiction that
is it cannot determine the right to the
property left by the decedent which depends
on the contract. The probate court in
rescinding it contract with respondent and
approving the sale to petitioner merely
sought to enforce the contract executed
between the court and respondent, for the
purpose of the obtaining the best terms for
the estate.
Synopsis: The estate of the deceased was
saddled with claims from creditors where
satisfaction may only be achieved by
liquidation of the properties. Before his
death, a joint venture was entered into by
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the decedent with GM Management where
a balance was not paid by the latter. For
failure of GM to comply after several
demands, the court authorized the sale of
the property to other interested parties.
The court approved the sale of the
properties in favor of Pio Barretto Realty,
Inc. It is within the bounds of the courts
authority to order the sale being part of
administration.
Facts:
This case involves the settlement of
the estate of Nicolai Drepin (Drepin)
consisting of (3) parcels of land with an area
approximately eighty hectares and another
parcel with an area of eighty-one hectares.
The estate was saddled with claims of
creditors named in the Drepin will and
creditors who have filed within the
reglementary period. The only way to pay
their claims is to sell the Drepin lots, so that
the proceeds of the sale, the debts could be
paid, and any remaining balance distributed
to the Drepin heirs.
However, before his death, Drepin
entered into a joint venture agreement with
GM Management Philippines through its
President Moslares. A balance was however
not paid, thus GM requested the
administrator that he be permitted to pay
the balance on the sale. The said proposal
was approved by the court with the
condition that it had only up to February 28,
1979 to comply with its offer, and failure on
their part to comply shall result to the
contract with decedent deemed resolved
and ineffective. GM was not able to comply
with the condition imposed by the court.
GM was given an extension of time to
comply with the condition and was given
until April 25, 1980, with the caveat that the
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failure of GM to comply within the said
period, the administrator would be
permitted to accept other offers in the best
interest of the estate.
On July 2, 1980, the court issued the
assailed order and authorized the
administrator to enter into agreement with
any other interested parties on a first paid
first served basis without prejudice to GM
to continue with its offer and make good
the same as an ordinary buyer.
On October 1980, the probate court
approved the sale of the said properties in
favor of Pio Barretto Realty Inc. GM
elevated the case to the CA which issued a
temporary restraining order. Barretto filed a
motion for reconsideration which was
denied, thus, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the RTC, acted without
jurisdiction in approving the sale to Pio
Barretto?
Ruling:
No, probate court acted within its
authority. It is to be noted that the dealings
of the respondent with the court arose out
of latter bid to sell property under its
authority to sell, mortgage to pay or settle
against the estate. Thus, respondent bound
himself under the agreement with the
courts separate and distinct from which he
had with the decedent. In rescinding such
contract and approving the sale to Barretto,
the court merely seeks to enforce its right
to put an end to an agreement which had
ceased to be a working proposition. The
court cannot allow an absurd situation to
arise where the Drepin estate will never be
settled and liquidated because even if GM
cannot pay the agreed purchase price of the
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Drepin lands, still the probate court can no Facts:
longer sell the lands to other prospective The issue in this case stems from the
buyer. Though an order of the probate ruling of the probate court, in the intestate
court approving the sale of the decedents proceedings of the estate of Jose Valero,
property is final, the respondent may file a excluding the two lots owned by Mrs. Rustia,
complaint in the proper court for rescission and declaring further that the said
of the sale. properties can no longer be subject to
collation. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the
Name Of Digester: Willard M. Aperocho case to the CA contending that the 2 San
Lorenzo Village lots were really conveyed to

07
VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ V. CA
GR No. L-39532,
July 20, 1979
Topic: Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons; The exclusion of a property from
the inventory is merely interlocutory and
not final in character.
Doctrine: This case involves an appeal from
the decision of the probate court excluding
the properties from the inventory and
declaring that said properties were not
subject to collation. The order of exclusion is
interlocutory, however the ruling on
collation is not proper as the proceedings
have not reached the stage of partition and
distribution when the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs have to be determined.
Mrs. Rustia by way of donation because the
consideration for the sale was allegedly only
one-fifth of the true value of the lots. Mrs.
Rodriguez further contended that the order
was final in character. The CA affirmed the
RTC decision and held that the order of
exclusion was interlocutory and that it
could be changed or modified at any time
during the course of administration
proceedings. It further held that it is
immaterial whether the two lots were
donated or sold to Mrs. Rustia because only
compulsory heirs are required to make
collation for the determination of their
legitimes, and only heirs are involved in
questions as to advancement.
Issue:
Whether the RTC order of exclusion is final?
Whether the order of collation is proper?

Synopsis: The probate court ordered the Ruling:

exclusion of subject properties owned by
Mrs. Rustia in the estate of Jose Valero. The
CA affirmed the decision being interlocutory.
The issue of collation was not yet justiciable
at that early stage of the testate proceeding.
Whether collation may exist with respect to
the two lots and whether Mrs. Rustia's
Torrens titles thereto are indefeasible are
matters that may be raised later or may not
be raised at all.
1. No, the order of the RTC is not final and
merely interlocutory. The prevailing rule is
that for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should
not be included in the inventory, the
probate court may pass upon the title
thereto but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to the nal
decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be instituted by the
parties.

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 Liceo University Law
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2. No, the order of collation is not proper
and premature. The Court held that the
dictum of the Court of Appeals and the
probate court that the two disputed lots are
not subject to collation was a
supererogation and was not necessary to
the disposition of the case which merely
involved the issue of inclusion in, or
exclusion from, the inventory of the
testator's estate.
The issue of collation was not yet
justiciable at that early stage of the testate
proceeding. It is not necessary to mention
in the order of exclusion the controversial
matter of collation. Whether collation may
exist with respect to the two lots and
whether Mrs. Rustia's Torrens titles thereto
are indefeasible are matters that may be
raised later or may not be raised at all.
Name of Digester: Willard M. Aperocho
08
Victorio Reynoso v Vicente
Santiago
G.R. No. L-3039,
December 29, 1949
Topic: Conversion of an Intestate into
Testate Proceeding
Doctrine: Whether the intestate proceeding
already commenced should be discontinued
and a new proceeding under a separate
number and title should be constituted is
entirely a matter of form and lies within the
sound discretion of the court. In no manner
does it prejudice the substantial rights of
any heirs or creditors.
Synopsis: The creditors and other heirs of
the estate of Salvadora Obispo applied for
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the administration of the property of the
deceased in an intestate proceeding. The
surviving spouse and eldest son of Obispo
made an opposition to such application and
presented document purporting to be the
last will and testament of the deceased.
Facts:
On April 29, 1947, Leoncio Cadiz and
other heirs of Salvadora Obispo presented
an application in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon for the administration of the
property of the deceased, application which
was docketed as intestate proceeding no.
2914. Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso,
Salavadora Obispos surviving spouse and
eldest son respectively, opposed the
application and presented a document,
which purported to be the last will and
testament of Salvador Obispo. Upon trial
the court rejected the instrument as a
forgery, but on appeal the Court of Appeals
reversed the finding of the court and found
the will authentic and drawn with all the
formalities of law.
Thereafter, Victorio Reynoso and
Juan Reynoso filed two petitions, one in a
special proceeding no. 2914 to order special
administrator Meliton Palabrica to turn over
the properties of the deceased and another
under a separate and new docket number
for the appointment of Victorio as executor
of Salvadora Obispos last will and
testament.
Issue:
Whether or not the previous
intestate proceedings should be converted
into a testate one
Ruling:
No. Whether the intestate
proceeding already commenced should be
 Liceo University Law
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discontinued and and a new proceeding
under a separate number and title should
be constituted is entirely a matter of form
and lies in the sound discretion of the court.
In no manner, does it prejudice the
substantial rights of creditors and heirs.
Prepared by: Abdul Adap
09
Vicente Uriarte v CFI of
Negros Occidental
G.R. Nos L-21938-39
May 29, 1970
Topic: Rule on Precedence of Probate of
Will
Doctrine: In order to preclude different
courts which may properly assume
jurisdiction from doing so, and prevent
conflict among the different courts which
otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction
from doing so, the Rule specifies that the
court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts.
Synopsis: Vicente Uriarte filed a petition for
the settlement of the estate of the late Don
Juan Uriarte y Gaite claiming that he was a
natural son of the latter. Two private
respondents, one of which is the nephew of
the deceased, filed an opposition thereto
questioning the interest and capacity of
Vicente.
Facts:
Vicente Uriarte filed with the CFI of
Negros Occidental a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Don
Juan (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging
that, as a natural son of the latter, he was
his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of
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said decedent, Vicente had instituted a civil
case in the same Court for his compulsory
acknowledgment as such natural son.
Higinio Uriarte, nephew of the
deceased, filed an opposition to the petition
alleging that Don Juan had executed a Will
in Spain. He further questioned Vicente's
capacity and interest to commence the
intestate proceeding. Juan Uriarte
Zamacona, the other private respondent,
commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396
in the CFI of Manila for the probate of a
document alleged to be the last will of the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the
same date he filed in Special Proceeding No.
6344 of the Negros Court a motion to
dismiss the same on the following grounds:
(1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y
Goite had left a last will, there was no legal
basis to proceed with said intestate
proceedings, and (2) that Vicente Uriarte
had no legal personality and interest to
initiate said intestate proceedings, he not
being an acknowledged natural son of the
decedent.
Vicente Uriarte opposed the
aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that,
as the Negros Court was first to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same
pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court. The Negros Court sustained Juan
Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and
dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344
pending before it. Vicente Uriarte filed an
Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No.
51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking
for leave to intervene therein; for the
dismissal of the petition and the annulment
of the proceedings had in said special
proceeding. This motion was denied by said
court.
 Liceo University Law
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Issue:
Whether or not the Negros Court
erred in dismissing the Special Proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased.
Ruling:
No. While the jurisdiction of Courts
of First Instance over "all matters of
probate" is beyond question, the matter of
venue, or the particular Court of First
Instance where the special proceeding
should be commenced, is regulated by
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides that the estate of a
decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, shall be in the court of first
instance in the province in which he resided
at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of
first instance of any province in which he
had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to
be settled is that of a nonresident alien (like
the deceased) the Courts of First Instance in
provinces where the deceased left any
property have concurrent jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the proper special
proceeding for the settlement of his estate.
In this case, these Courts of First Instance
are the Negros and the Manila Courts -
province and city where the deceased left
considerable properties. In accordance with
settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction,
testate proceedings, for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person take
precedence over intestate proceedings for
the same purpose.
Thus it has been held repeatedly
that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first
instance it is found it that the decedent had
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left a last will, proceedings for the probate
of the of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that stage
an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to
render final account and turn over the
estate in his possession to the executor
subsequently appointed. This, however, is
understood to be without prejudice that
should the alleged last will be rejected or is
disapproved, the proceeding shall continue
as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this
is a clear indication that proceedings for the
probate of a will enjoy priority over
intestate proceedings.
Prepared by: Abdul Adap
10
Sps. Sandejas v Alex Lina
G.R. No. 151634
February 5, 2001
Topic: Powers and Duties of the Probate
Court
Doctrine: Where the Motion for approval of
sale was meant to settle the decedents
obligation to respondent; hence, that
obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction
of the settlement court. To require
respondent to file a separate action on
whether petitioners should convey the title
to Eliodoro Sr.s share of a disputed realty
will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of
the intestate estates of the deceases
spouses.
In settling the estate of the deceased,
a probate court has jurisdiction over
matters incidental and collateral to the
exercise of its recognized powers. Such
matters include selling, mortgaging or
 Liceo University Law
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otherwise encumbering realty belonging to
the estate.
Synopsis: Remedios Sandejas died leaving
her husband Eliodoro to administer her
estate. Alex Lina filed a motion to intervene
claiming that he and Eliodoro, in his
capacity as administrator, executed a
contract of conditional sale of properties
belonging to the estate. Alex wants the
probate court to recognize such sale.
Facts:
Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition
in the lower court praying that letters of
administration be issued in his favor for the
settlement of the estate of his wife,
Remedios Sandejas who died. On April
17,1955. Letters of Administration were
issued appointing Eliodoro Sr. as
administrator; and on the same date, he
took his oath as administrator.
However, when the 4th floor of the
City Hall of Manila burned, his records were
burned with it. As a result, he filed a Motion
for Reconstitution for the records of the
case. An Omnibus Pleading for Motion to
intervene and petition-in-intervention was
filed by Alex A. Lina alleging among other
movant and Administrator Eliodoro P.
Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, bound
and obligated himself, his heirs,
administrators, and assigns to sell forever
and absolutely the four (4) parcels of land
which formed part of the estate of the late
Remedios.
When Eliodoro died in Canada, his
son Sixto Sandejas later on became
administrator of the estate of their parents.
Alex Lina filed an omnibus petition to
approve the deed of conditional sale to
compel the heirs to execute a deed of
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absolute sale in favor of Alex which was
granted by the lower court.
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA
held that the contract between Eliodoro
Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a
contract to sell, not a perfected contract of
sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four
lots was to remain in the intestate estate of
Remedios until the approval of the sale was
obtained from the settlement court.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate court
has the power to approve the sale of the
property of the estate
Ruling:
Yes. The probate court covers all
matter relating to the settlement of the
estate and the probate of wills of deceased
persons, including the appointment and
removal of administrators and executors. It
also extends to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of a probate
courts recognized powers such as selling,
mortgaging, or otherwise encumbering
realty belonging to the estate. In the
present case, the Motion for Approval was
meant to settle the decedents obligation to
respondent; hence, the obligation falls
under the jurisdiction of the settlement
court.
Prepared by: Abdul Adap
11
Ruiz v CA
G.R. No. 118671 January 29
1996
Topic: Settlement of Estate
 Liceo University Law
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Doctrine: Grandchildren are not entitled to
provisional support from the funds of
the decedents estate. The law clearly limits
the allowance to widow and children and
does not extend it to the deceaseds
grandchildren, regardless of their minority
or incapacity.
Synopsis: The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and
management of the real and personal
properties of the deceased is not absolute
and can only be exercised so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration.
Facts:
Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic
will naming Edmond, his son, Maria, his
adopted daughter, and three
granddaughters, as heirs of his estate.
Edmond was named as executor.
When Hilario died, Edmond did not take any
action for the probate of his fathers
holographic will, hence, Maria filed before
the RTC a petition for the probate and
approval of the deceaseds will and for the
issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
Ruiz. It was found out that the house and
lot in which the testator bequeathed to the
3 granddaughters was leased out by
Edmond to third persons. The Probate court
admitted the will to probate conditioned
upon the filing of a bond. Edmond Ruiz, as
executor, then filed an Ex- Parte Motion
for release of funds. Maria opposed praying
that the release of rent payments be given
to the 3 granddaughters. The Probate court
granted Marias motion. It further ordered
the delivery of the titles to and possession
of the properties bequeathed to the three
granddaughters and respondent Maria
upon the filing of a bond. It also ordered the
release of funds to Edmond but only to such
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amount necessary for the administration of
the estate and for the allowance of the 3
granddaughters. CA sustained probate
courts order. Edmond now argues that the
CA erred in affirming the probate courts
decision in granting support to the
grandchildren and allows premature
partition of the estate. He also argued
that that the assailed order deprived him of
his right to take possession of all the real
and personal properties of the estate as the
executor.
Issues:
Whether or not the probate court,
after admitting the will to probate but
before payment of the estate's debts and
obligations, has the authority:
1) to grant an allowance from the funds of
the estate for the support of the testator's
grandchildren;
2) to order the release of the titles to
certain heirs;
3) to grant possession of all properties of
the estate to the executor of the will.
Ruling:
1) Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. -
The widow and minor or incapacitated
children of a deceased person, during the
settlement of the estate, shall
receive therefrom under the direction of
the court, such allowance as are provided
by law.
Grandchildren are not entitled to
provisional support from the funds of
the decedents estate. The law clearly limits
the allowance to widow and children and
does not extend it to
 Liceo University Law
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the deceaseds grandchildren, regardless of
their minority or incapacity.
2) In settlement of estate proceedings, as
provided in Rule 90, Sec 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made: (1) after all
the debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow,
and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before
payment of said obligations only if
the distributees or any of them gives a bond
in a sum fixed by the court conditioned
upon the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs, or when
provision is made to meet those obligations.
The estate tax is one of those
obligations that must be paid before
distribution of the estate. If not yet paid,
the rule requires that the distributees post
a bond or make such provisions as to meet
the said tax obligation in proportion to their
respective shares in the inheritance.
Notably, at the time the order to release
the titles was issued, the properties of the
estate had not yet been inventoried and
appraised.
3) Petitioner cannot correctly claim that the
assailed order deprived him of his right to
take possession of all the real and personal
properties of the estate. As provided
in Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules
of Court, the right of an executor
or administrator to the possession and
management of the real and personal
properties of the deceased is not absolute
and can only be exercised so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration.
Case Digested by: Paul W. Hembrador
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12
LACHENAL VS SALAS,
71 SCRA 202
Topic: SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; Jurisdiction
as to the Sale of Decedents Property and
the Complaint for Rescission of such sale
Doctrine:
An order of the probate court
approving the sale of the decedents
property is final. The heirs of the deceased
may file a complaint in another court for the
rescission of the sale. No judicial
interference by the court where the
complaint for rescission was file over the
action of a co-equal court is involved. The
probate courts province is the settlement of
estate only..
Facts:
Petitioner Filomena G. Pizarro, is the
surviving spouse of the late Aurelio Pizarro
Sr., while the other petitioners as well as
respondents Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P.
Gudani, are their children. Upon the death
Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., a Special Proceeding
was instituted by petitioners through Atty.
Regalado C. Salvador on September 21,
1965 in the CFI of Davao, Branch I. Listed
among the properties of the estate were
parcels of land situated in Agdao, J. Palma
Gil, and Claro M. Recto Streets, Davao City.
On December 23, 1965, the probate court,
upon agreement of the parties, appointed
Gaudencio A. Corias, Clerk of Court of said
Court, as Administrator of the estate.
The controversy esteemed
from the motion for Authority to sell the
properties located at Agdao and J. Palma Gil
Streets, Davao City, by the administrator,
 Liceo University Law
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through Atty. Salvador, to settle the debts
of the estate, including the inheritance and
estate taxes. Despite the heirs opposition
that the sale would be improvident and
greatly prejudicial to them as the claims
against the estate had not yet been
properly determined and on the ground
that the sale of Agdao lot would be more
than sufficient to cover the supposed
obligations of the estate were according to
them, a bit exaggerated, the court upon
hearing, authorized the said sale.
On the allegation that the
vendees in the previously authorized
conditional sale did not fully paid the
balance of the consideration, the heirs filed
their Motion for Cancellation or Rescission
of Conditional Contract of sale, which the
probate court denied ruling that the relief
for rescission of the sale is not within its
power to grant, the petitioners, without
awaiting the resolution of their motion for
reconsideration, filed on October 5, 1967 a
verified complaint for their rescission case
in the CFI Davao (raffled to Branch III). The
trial court however, dismissed the rescission
case on the ground that it could not review
the actuations of a coordinate Branch of the
Court besides the fact that a Motion for
Reconsideration was still pending before
the probate court. The appellate court
upheld the trial courts decision. Hence, the
present petition for Certiorari
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner-heirs
may file a complaint in another court for
the rescission of the sale despite the
pending resolution of its motion for
reconsideration in the Probate Court.
Ruling:
Yes. As a strict legal proposition, no
actuation of the Probate Court had to be
reviewed. There is no judicial interference
to speak of by one Court in the actuations
of another co-equal court. The order
authorizing the sale was issued on February
20, 1967, and on July 6, 1967, the Court
gave its stamp of approval to the final sale.
Title was issued in favor of the vendees on
July 10, 1967. To all intents and purposes,
therefore, that sale had been consummated;
the Order approving the sale is final. But,
what petitioners sought to achieve in filing
the Rescission Case was to rescind the sale
mainly for failure to pay full consideration
thereof, which is a valid ground for
rescission. The cause of action was within
the judicial competence and authority of
the trial court (Branch III) as a CFI which has
exclusive original jurisdiction over civil cases
the subject of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation. It was beyond the
jurisdictional bounds of the Probate Court
whose main province was the settlement of
the estate. As a matter of fact, the
Rescission Case was instituted after the
Probate Court itself had stated that
petitioners cause of action was not within
its authority to resolve but should filed with
the competent court. The cause of action in
one is different from that obtaining in the
other. It behooved the trial court, therefore,
to have taken cognizance of and to have
heard the Rescission Case on the merits and
it was reversible error for the CA to have
upheld its dismissal
Case digested by: Michael P. Bajao

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13
PIZARRO VS CA,
99 SCRA 72
Topic: SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; Jurisdiction
as to questions of Title of Property
Doctrine:
As a general rule, questions as to
title of property cannot be passed upon in
the intestate or testate proceeding; it
should be ventilated in a separate action.
Facts:
Victorio Lachenal died on November 20,
1969. His estate is pending settlement in
the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, Branch I (Special
Proceeding No. 5836). His son, Ildefonso
Lachenal, was named executor of his will.
Among the properties included in the
inventory of his estate is a fishing boat
called Lachenal VII. The executor filed in the
proceeding a motion to require the spouses
Lope L. Leonio and Flavian Lachenal-Leonio
to pay rentals for the lease of Lachenal VII
and to return the boat to Navotas, Rizal for
repair. Mrs Leonio, who was the daughter
of the testator, opposed claiming that she is
the owner because she purchased it from
her father. Instead of filing their respective
answer, the other children of the testator
including the executor filed an action for
the recovery of the motorboat in the
Caloocan City Branch of the CFI Rizal, with
the Civil Case No 3597
Issue:
Whether or not the probate court
should be allowed to continue the hearing
on the ownership of the fishing boat.
Ruling:
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No. The SC hold that the title to the fishing
boat should be determined in the ordinary
action (Civil Case No. 3597) in the Court of
Caloocan because it affect the lessee
thereof, Lope L. Leonio, the decedents son
in law, who, although married to his
daughter or compulsory heir, is
nevertheless a third person with respect to
his estate. The administrator may not pull
against his will, by motion, into the
administration proceedings. This case falls
under the general rule that questions as to
title of property cannot be passed upon in
the testate or intestate proceeding but
should be ventilated in a separate action.
Case digested by: Michael P. Bajao
14
RAMOS VS CA
180 SCRA 635
January 31, 1952
Topic: JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE
COURT
Doctrine: Approval of the probate court of
the conditional sale is not a conclusive
determination of the intrinsic or extrinsic
validity of the contract but a mere
recognition of the rights of private
respondent as an heir to dispose of her
rights and interests over her inheritance
even before partition.
Probate jurisdiction of the former CFI or the
present RTC relates only to matters having
to do with the settlement of the estate and
probate of wills of deceased persons, but
does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the
proceeding. A separate action may be the
appropriate remedy. Approval of the
conditional sale by the probate court was
without prejudice to the filing of the proper
 Liceo University Law
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action for consolidation of ownership Tarlac ruled in her favor and such ruling was
and/or reformation of instrument in the affirmed by the CA. Hence, the present
proper court within the prescriptive period. petition by petitioners
A probate court acting as a cadastral court Issue:
acts with limited competence and has no
Whether or not the CA erred in
jurisdiction over actions for consolidation of
holding that both the orders of the probate
ownership, and such must have been filed in
and cadastral courts are null and void for
the former CFI, now RTC in the exercise of its
lack of jurisdiction..
general jurisdiction..
Ruling:
Facts:
No. A reading of the order of the
Adelaida Ramos, private respondent,
probate court will show that it is merely an
secured a loan from her brother Oscar
approval of the deed of conditional sale
Ramos, the herein petitioner. As security for
executed by Adelaida in favor of petitioners.
said loan, the private respondent executed
There is nothing is said order providing for
in favor of the petitioner, 2 deeds of
the consolidation of ownership over the lots
conditional sale dated May 27, 1959 and
allegedly sold to petitioners nor was the
August 30, 1959, of her rights, shares,
issue of the validity of said contract
interests and participation respectively over
discussed or resolved therein. To give
Lot No. 4033 covered by OCT No. 5125
approval means in its essential and most
registered in the name of their parents,
obvious meaning, to confirm, ratify,
Valente Ramos and Margarita Denoga, now
sanction or consent to some act or thing
deceased; and Lot No. 4221 covered by TCT
done by another. The approval of the
No. 10788 then registered in the names of
probate court of the conditional sale is not
Socorro Ramos, Josefina Ramos and
a conclusive determination of the intrinsic
Adelaida Ramos, said properties being of
or extrinsic validity of the contract but a
the Cadastral Survey of Paniqui, Tarlac.
mere recognition of the right of the private
Upon the failure of Adelaida as vendor a
respondent Adelaida Ramos as an heir, to
retro to exercise her right of repurchase
dispose of her rights and interests over her
within the redemption period, Oscar filed a
inheritance even before partition. As held in
petition for consolidation & approval of the
Duran, et al vs Duran, the approval by the
conditional sale of the 2 lots in the special
settlement court of the assignment
proceedings entitled Intestate Estate of
pendente lite, made by one heir in favor of
late Margarita Denoga in the CFI of Tarlac
the other during the course of the
acting as well as a cadastral court. Both
settlement proceedings, is not deemed final
probate & cadastral court issued orders in
until the estate is closed and said order can
favor of Oscar. Adelaida for her part, then
still be vacated, hence the assigning heir
filed with the CFI Tarlac for the declaration
remains an interested person in the
of nullity of the orders and the reformation
proceeding even after said approval.
of the instrument, recovery of possession
with preliminary injunction and damages. The same jurisdictional flow obtains
Adelaida alleged that the deeds of in the order of consolidation issued by the
conditional sale are mere mortgages. CFI cadastral court. The CFI or the RTC, acting

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as cadastral courts, acts with limited
competence. It has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of an action for consolidation of
ownership, much less to issue an order to
that effect, such action must have been
filed in the CFI, now RTC, in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction
Case digested by: Michael P. Bajao
15
REYES VS MOSQUEDA,
187 SCRA 661
Topic:JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURT;
Inclusion/Exclusion of Properties
Doctrine:Provisional character of the
exclusion of the contested properties in the
inventory as stressed in the order is within
the jurisdiction of probate court.
Rule is well-settled that a
probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are equally claimed to belong to
outside parties.
For the purpose of
determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the
inventory, the probate court may pass upon
the title thereto but such determination is
not conclusive and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be constituted by the
parties
Facts:
This is a three (3) consolidated cases
involving one Dr. Emilio Pascual, who died
intestate and without issue on November
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18, 1972. On December 3, 1973, the heirs of
Dr. Pascual filed a Special Proceeding No.
73-30-M in the CFI of Pampanga for the
administration of his estate. Ursula Pascual,
the sister of the decedent and one of the
heirs filed a motion to exclude some
properties from the inventory of Dr.
Pascuals estate and to deliver the titles to
her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during
his lifetime executed a donation in her favor
covering properties which were included in
the estate of the latter and therefore
should be excluded from the inventory. The
probate court granted the exclusion of the
properties. One of the petitioners, Pedro
Dalusong questioned the jurisdiction of the
probate court to exclude the properties
allegedly donated to Ursula.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate court has
jurisdiction to exclude the properties
donated to Ursula
Ruling:
Yes. The questioned order of the CFI
Pampanga in S.P. No. 73-30-M categorically
stated that the exclusion from the inventory
of the estate of the deceased Dr. Pascual
was without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action. The
provisional character of the exclusion of the
contested properties in the inventory as
stressed in the order is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court. It is well-
settled rule that a probate court or one in
charge of proceedings whether estate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be part of the
estate and which are equally claimed to
belong to outside parties. All that the said
court could do as regards said properties is
to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or
 Liceo University Law
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list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well
and good; but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims
of title because the probate court cannot do
so.
Case digested by: Michael P. Bajao
16
Morales v. CFI of Cavite
146 SCRA 373
DECEMBER 29, 1986
Topic: Orders of Inclusion or Exclution of
Properties from Administrators Inventory
are Provisional, Not Final
Doctrine:
A probate court cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are equally
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that
the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there
is no dispute, well and good; but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so.
Facts:
The property is a saltbedfishpond
located at Dulongbayan, Bacoor, Cavite,
owned by one Simona Pamuti. On February
12, 1968, Simona Pamuti mortgaged the
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property in favor of petitioner Princesita
Santero Morales. On July 26, 1974, the
property, following extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, was sold at public auction to
Princesita. Simona Pamuti was the spouse
of Pascual Santero with whom she begot a
son named Pablo Santero. During the
lifetime of Pablo Santero, he cohabited and
had children with three women. Pablo had
a child with Adela, seven children with
Anselma and five with Feliberta. During the
pendency of the proceedings for the
settlement of the intestate estates of
Pascual and Pablo, Juanito Santero filed a
petition for guardianship over the
properties of Simona Pamuti. Simona
Pamuti died intestate. In the special
proceeding, Princesita Santero was allowed
to intervene not as heir but as "creditors of
the intestate estate, or as co-owners,
together with said intestate estates, of
certain properties as the interests of said
oppositors may appear
Issue:
Whether or not, a court handling the
intestate proceedings has jurisdiction over
parcels of land already covered by a TCT
issued in favor of owners who are not
parties to the intestate proceeding
Ruling:
No. Supreme Court held that in
determination of the question of title to the
subject properties in the probate court is
merely provisional. Petitioners are not
barred from instituting an appropriate
action. It is a well-settled rule that a
probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are equally claimed to belong to
outside parties. All the said court could do is
 Liceo University Law
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to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is dispute, then the
administrator and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims
of title because the probate court cannot do
so. Probate court cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be
part of the estate and equally claimed to
belong to outside parties
Case digested by: Fel Lino Amor Brillantes
17
Pereira v. Court of Appeals
174 SCRA 154
June 20, 1989
Topic: Extrajudicial Settlement by
agreement between heirs
Doctrine:
As a general rule, questions as to
title of property cannot be passed upon in
the intestate or testate proceeding; it
should be ventilated in a separate action.
Facts:
Andres Pereira died leaving his wife
Pereira and his sister Nagac as his only heirs.
Nagac then instituted special proceedings
to be appointed administrator of her
brothers estate to which the widow
opposed alleging to estate to be
administered and in the alternative she be
appointed administratix. The RTC appointed
Nagac as administratix which was upheld
the CA hence this petition
Issue:
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Whether or not there is a need for a
judicial administration and an appointment
of an Administrator.
Ruling:
NO. The general rule is that when a
person dies leaving property, the same
should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator. An exception to this rule is
sec. 1 of Rule 74 which provides that when
all the heirs are of lawful age and there are
no debts due from the estate, they may
agree in writing to partition the property
without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator. However,
this does not preclude them from instituting
administration proceedings, even if the
estate has no debts or obligations, if they
do not desire to resort FOR GOOD REASONS
to an ordinary action for partition. Now the
question is what constitutes good reason"?
The court has time and again refused to
sanction administration proceedings when
the issues to be resolved can be properly be
ventilated in an action for partition as
administration proceedings are always long
and costly.
In the case at bar, the reason why
Nagac instituted the spec. Proc. is because
she and the widow are not in good terms
and she wants to obtain possession of the
properties for her own purpose. This is not
a compelling reason which will necessitate a
judicial administration of the estate.
Case digested by: Fel Lino Amor Brillantes
 Liceo University Law
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18
Mcmicking vs Sy combieng
21 Phil. 211.
January 15, 1912
Topic: Liability of distributees and estate.
Doctrine:
At any time within two years after such
settlement and distribution of the estate,
that there are debts outstanding against the
estate which have not been paid, any
creditor may compel the settlement of the
estate in the courts in the manner
hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall
be paid, with interest; and the administrator
appointed by the court may recover the
assets of the estate from those who have
received them, for the purpose of paying the
debts
Facts:
One Engracio Palanca was appointed
administrator of the estate of Margarita
Jose. Mariano Ocampo became one of the
sureties of Palanca. After the bond, said
Palanca took possession of all the property
of Margarita Jose. Later on, Mariano
Ocampo died, testate. Doroteo Velasco was
appointed administrator of the estate of
Mariano Ocampo while Pio de la Guardia
Barretto (defendant) qualified as one of the
sureties of said Doroteo Velasco.
Doroteo Velasco, administrator, filed
with the court an inventory report of the
property of the deceased, with a statement
of all his debts and liabilities. The Court
affirmed and approved the partition. The
court approving the same, Doroteo Velasco,
delivered to the devisees and legatees of
Mariano Ocampo, all of the property of said
decedent leaving in the hands of said
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administrator no property or thing of value
whatever belonging to said estate.
Meanwhile, Engracio Palanca was
removed from office as administrator of the
estate of Margarita Jose, and Jose
McMicking (plaintiff) was appointed in his
stead. Said Palanca was removed from
office by reason of the fact that he failed
and refused to render an account of the
property and funds of the estate of the said
Margarita Jose. For the default of Engracio
Palanca, Mcmicking filed a claim in the
amount of 30,000 to the estate of Pio de la
Guardia Barretto as the surety of Doroteo
Velasco who is the administrator of the
estate of Mariano Ocampo who in turn is
the surety of said Engracio Palanca. The
lower court dismissed the case.
Issue:
Whether plaintiff may claim against
the defendant as the surety of Doroteo
Velasco
Ruling:
No. SC affirmed the lower courts
decision. The Court based their decision
upon the ground that Doroteo Velasco, for
whom the deceased Pio de la Guardia
Barretto was surety, would not have been
liable himself had this action been
commenced against him. If the principal is
not liable upon the obligation, the surety
cannot be.
At the head of the law of
administration of the Philippine Islands
stand sections 596 and 597 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. They are as follows:
"SEC. 596.Settlement of intestate
estates, without legal proceedings, in
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S.Y. 2016-2017
certain cases. Whenever all the heirs of a
deceased person are of lawful age and legal
capacity, and there are no debts due from
the intestate estate, or all the debts have
been paid by the heirs, the heirs may, by a
family council as known under Spanish law,
or by agreement between themselves, duly
executed in writing, apportion and divide
the estate among themselves, as they may
see fit, without proceedings in court.
"SEC. 597.In such case distributees
liable for debts. But if it shall appear, at
any time within two years after such
settlement and distribution of the estate,
that there are debts outstanding against the
estate which have not been paid, any
creditor may compel the settlement of the
estate in the courts in the manner
hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall
be paid, with interest; and the
administrator appointed by the court may
recover the assets of the estate from those
who have received them, for the purpose of
paying the debts; and the real estate
belonging to the deceased shall remain
charged with the liability to creditors for the
full period of two years after such
distribution, notwithstanding any transfers
thereof that may have been made."
These sections provide for the
voluntary division of the whole property of
the decedent without proceedings in court.
It is the undisputed policy of every people
which maintains the principle of private
ownership of property that he who owns a
thing shall not be deprived of its possession
or use except for the most urgent and
imperative reasons and then only so long as
is necessary to make the rights which
underlie those reasons effective. It is a
principle of universal acceptance which
declares that one has the instant right to
occupy and use that which he owns, and it
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is only in the presence of reasons of the
strongest and most urgent nature that
principle is prevented from accomplishing
the purpose which underlies it. The force
which gave birth to this stern and imperious
principle is the same force which destroyed
the feudal despotism and created the
democracy of private owners.
These provisions should, therefore,
be given the most liberal construction so
that the intent of the framers may be fully
carried out. They should not be straitened
or narrowed but should rather be given that
wideness and fullness of application
without which they cannot produce their
most beneficial effects.
Standing, as we have said, at the
head of the law of administration of these
Islands, they are the first provisions to
which our attention is directed in seeking a
legal method for the division and
distribution of the property of deceased
persons. They are thus made prominent.
And justly so. By permitting the partition
and division without proceedings in court
no time is lost and substantially all expense
and waste are saved. This is as it should be.
Where administration is necessary, it ought
to be accomplished quickly and at very
small expense; and a system which
consumes any considerable portion of the
property which it was designed to distribute
is a failure. It being undoubted that the
removal of property from the possession of
its owner and its deposit in the hands of
another for administration is a suspension
of some of his most important rights of
property and is attended with an expense
sometimes entirely useless and unnecessary,
such procedure should be avoided
whenever and wherever possible.
 Liceo University Law
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S.Y. 2016-2017
The liability of the principal precedes
that of the surety. If Velasco incurred no
liability, then his surety incurred none
Case digested by: Fel Lino Amor Brillantes
19
Gerona v. De Guzman
L-19060
May 29, 1964
Topic:Prescriptive Period to Annul
Settlement.
Doctrine: Although, as a general rule, an
action for partition among co-heirs does not
prescribe, this is true only as long as the
defendants do not hold the property in
question under an adverse title. The statute
of limitations operates, as in other cases,
from the moment such adverse title is
asserted by the possessor of the property
Facts:
Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco
and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, legitimate
children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de
Guzman. They alleged that their mother,
Placida de Guzman, was the legitimate
daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his
first wife, Teodora de la Cruz. Apparently,
when Teodora died, Marcelo remarried and
begot 7 children with Camila Ramos. After
his death, his 7 children from Camila
executed a deed of "extra-judicial
settlement of his estate, fraudulently
misrepresenting therein that they were the
only surviving heirs of the deceased
Marcelo de Guzman, despite knowing that
they werent. However, they succeeded in
fraudulently causing the transfer certificates
of title to 7 parcels of land, issued in the
name of their late father, to be canceled
and new ones issued in their own names. A
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year before the institution of the case, the
Gerona siblings found out about the de
Guzmans fraudulent scheme and
demanded their share of the properties.
However, the de Guzman siblings refused.
As result, the Gerona siblings fled a case in
court; praying that judgment be rendered
nullifying the deed of extra-judicial
settlement insofar as it deprives them of
their participation of 1/8th of the
properties in litigation; that it be ordered to
cancel the transfer certificates of titles
secured de Guzman siblings; that the de
Guzman siblings be ordered to render
accounts of the income of said properties
and to deliver to them their lawful shares
therein; that they pay damages and
attorneys fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the action to Annul
Extrajudicial Settlement made under
fraudulent means may, within four years
from the discovery, prosper
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that
the action to annul a deed of extrajudicial
settlement upon the ground of fraud may
be filed within four years from the discovery
of fraud. However, such discovery is
deemed to have taken place when said
instrument was filed with the Register of
Deeds and new certificates of title were
issued in the name of respondents
respectively. The Registration of the
extrajudicial settlement constitute
constructive notice to the whole world. In
the light of the foregoing it must, therefore,
be held that plaintiffs learned, at least
constructively, of the allege fraud
committed against them by defendants on
25 June 1948 when the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased
 Liceo University Law
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Marcelo de Guzman was registered in the knowledge of only one of the heirs
registry of deeds of Bulacan, Plaintiffs supposedly representing all other heirs.
complaint in this case was not filed until 4 Federico, one of the six heirs of Regino
November 1958, or more than 10 years Bautista, filed a petition for annulment of
thereafter. Plaintiff Ignacio Gerona became sale of the property sold to Plan, 16 days
of age on 3 March 1948. He is deemed to after the sale. This was denied by the
have discovered defendants fraud on 25 probate court due to filing out of time. He
June 1948 and had, therefore, only 4 years again filed relief from order 56 days after
from the said date within which to file this the approval of the sale contending
action. violation of Rule 89, Sec 7. Since there was
no movement in the case, it was archived.
Although, as a general rule, an
action for partition among co-heirs does not Few years after, at the time when
prescribe, this is true only as long as the Milagros, the new administrator, asked that
defendants do not hold the property in her bond be reduced, Federico filed a
question under an adverse title. The statute separate action for annulment of sale
of limitations operates, as in other cases, against Plan. This was dismissed without
from the moment such adverse title is prejudice, ruling that the nullity of sale as to
asserted by the possessor of the property. Federico's 1/16 share should be resolved in
Therefore, all costs against petitioners the intestate proceeding. He filed two more
herein. It is so ordered. separate actions with same allegations, and
these were all dismissed for the same
Case digested by: Fel Lino Amor Brillantes
reason. The decision for the third action
was appealed. The CA reversed the decision
of the RTC by declaring the sale void and

20
Plan v IAC ordering the reconveyance of the property.
G.R. No. L-65656 The reconveyance was based on Article
28 February 1985 1088 of the CC.
Issue:
Whether Federico Bautista could
Doctrine: The purchaser of the property
nullify in a separate action, instead of in the
under administration is a forced intervenor
intestate proceeding for his deceased
in the intestate proceeding and should
father's estate.
answer the amended petition for the
annulment of the sale. The probate court, Ruling:
having authorized and approved the sale,
No. Article 1088 of the Civil Code
should resolve the issue as to its validity.
does not justify legal redemption in this
Facts: case because it refers to sale of hereditary
rights, and not to specific properties, for the
With approval of the court, a
payment of the debts of the decedent's
property under administration was sold by
estate as to which there is no legal
Florencia to the administratrix for payment
redemption.
of intestate debts. The sale was with the

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 Liceo University Law
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In the administration and liquidation of
the estate of a deceased person, sales ordered
by the probate court for payment of debts are
final and not subject to legal redemption. Unlike
in ordinary execution sales, there is no legal
provision allowing redemption in the sale of
property for payment of debts of a deceased
person.
Federico's remedy is in the intestate
proceeding where his petition for relief has
been pending for nearly twenty years. He
should amend it by impleading the present
administratrix and Plan himself and serving
copies of the petition upon them. Plan, as
the purchaser of the disputed property, is a
forced intervenor in the intestate
proceeding. He should answer the amended
petition for the annulment of the sale. The
probate court has jurisdiction over him. The
probate court, having authorized and
approved the sale, should resolve the issue
as to its validity.
Case Digested by: Hazel M. Barbarona
21
Llamas v Moscoso
G.R. No. L-7524
31 July 1954
Doctrine: The allegation that the lease has
been breached and should therefore be
declared terminated is not within the
competence of the court in the exercise of
its probate jurisdiction.
Facts:
Two parcels of land was issued in
the name of the spouses Ciriaco and
Manuela Enriquez. These identified parcels
of land were leased to Gaspar Llamas, the
husband of Encarnacion, one of the heirs to
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the deceased. During the intestate
proceedings, Ciriaco as administrator, subm
itted for the approval of the court a project
of partial partition. The court approved the
partial partition.
Among the portions covered by the
order were the parcels of land leased to the
petitioner Gaspar Llamas where Lot No. 56
was assigned to Ciriaco. Ciriaco then, in his
capacity as administrator, filed a petition in
the intestate proceedings asking for the
rescission of the lease alleging that, by
virtue of the said order, he had become the
owner of lot 56 and entitled to the
possession thereof and that the lease had
been breached by lessee's failure to pay
rents. He also petitioned for writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain the
lessee from collecting rents. These
the probate court denied, holding that the
rescission of the lease should be the subject
of a separate action in his own behalf and
not as an administrator of the estate.
Ciriaco filed a separate ordinary civil
action against the lessee Llamas praying
that the lease be declared cancelled and
terminated and Llamas ousted from the
leased premises, alleging as a ground for his
action that, as sole and absolute owner of
lot 56 by virtue of the decree of partial
partition plaintiff had the right to terminate
the lease, or to receive the rents to the lot,
but that defendant had failed to pay those
rents and had also refused to vacate the
premises. He then filed a motion with the
probate court praying for the issuance of a
writ of execution to enforce the said part of
the order thereby ejecting Llamas and his
wife.
Issues:
 Liceo University Law
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1) Whether or not the order approving the
partial partition had the effect of
terminating the lease;
2) Whether the probate court is the
competent court to declare termination of
the lease.
Ruling:
1) No. The contention that the lease
on lot 56 must be deemed terminated by
the order approving the project of
preliminary partition which allocated the
said lot to Ciriaco Enriquez and authorized
him to take possession thereof "with all the
corresponding rights and privileges of
ownership," is without merit. The lessee
was not a party to that partition and the
court cannot, without any legal ground and
without proper proceedings for the purpose,
annul the lease.
2) No. The allegation that the lease
has been breached and should therefore be
declared terminated is a question that must
be ventilated in the civil action for the
purpose. The same is not within the
competence of the court in the exercise of
its probate jurisdiction.
Case Digested by: Hazel M. Barbarona
22
Timbol v Cano
G.R. No. L-15445
April 29, 1961
Doctrine: If the probate court has the right
to approve the lease, so may it order its
revocation, or the reduction of the subject of
the lease.
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Facts:
Jose Cano has been appointed as
court administrator of the intestate estate
of his deceased sister Mercedes. Mercedes
had a sole heir, the minor, Florante Timbol.
At the intestate proceedings, Jose Cano
petitioned the court that the agricultural
land under administration be leased to him
for payment of taxes, maintenance of the
minor, and other dues. This was approved
by the court. The rental was then reduced
from P4000 to P2500.
Later, when Florante was appointed
as the administrator of the properties, he
filed a motion, for the approval of the
court, alleging, among others, that the area
destined for the projected subdivision be
increased. The motions were approved but
the approval was immediately set aside to
give opportunity to the former
administrator and lessee Jose Cano to
formulate his objections to the motions.
One of Cano's objections was that
he is in possession under express authority
of the court, under a valid contract, and
may not be deprived of his leasehold
summarily upon a simple petition. The court
granted the motions of the administrator.
Its order stated that contract of lease is on
all forms illegal. Under article 1646 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, a new
provision, "the persons disqualified to
buy referred to in articles 1490 and 1491,
are also disqualified to become lessee of
the things mentioned therein".
Issues:
1) Whether a probate court, has jurisdiction
to annul or modify rights under the lease;
2) Whether the probate court has lost its
jurisdiction to appoint a new administrator
 Liceo University Law
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or to authorize enlargement of the land
when it approved the partition.
Ruling:
1) Yes.
In probate proceedings the court
orders the probate of the will of the
decedent (Rule 80, See. 5); grants letters of
administration to the party best entitled
thereto or to any qualified applicant (Id.,
Sec. 6); supervises and controls all acts of
administration; hears and approves claims
against the estate of the deceased (Rule 87,
See. 13); orders payment of lawful debts
(Rule 89, Sec. 14); authorizes sale, mortgage
or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90,
Sec.2 ); directs the delivery of the estate to
those entitled thereto (Rule 91, See. 1).
The contract of lease under which
the appellant holds the agricultural lands of
the intestate and which he now seeks to
protect, was obtained with the court's
approval. If the probate court has the right
to approve the lease, so may it order its
revocation, or the reduction of the subject
of the lease. The matter of giving the
property to a lessee is an act of
administration, also subject to the approval
of the court.
2) No.
The probate court loses jurisdiction
of an estate under administration only after
the payment of all the debts the remaining
estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same. In the case at bar, the
debts had not yet been paid, and the estate
had not yet been delivered to the heirs as
such heir.
Case Digested by: Hazel M. Barbarona
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23
Pereira v. Court of Appeals
174 SCRA 154
June 20, 1989
Topic: Extrajudicial Settlement by
agreement between heirs
Doctrine: A party may be estopped or
barred from raising a question in different
ways and for different reasons. Thus we
speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by
deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Facts:
On July 19, 1948 - the spouses
Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog
commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia
Baguio to recover from the sum of
P1,908.00, with legal interest, plus costs. A
writ of attachment was issued by the court
against defendants' properties, but the
same was soon dissolved upon the filing of
a counter-bond by defendants and the
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Court of First
Instance of Cebu rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs and issued a writ of
execution against the defendants. Surety
moved to quash the writ but the same was
denied. Surety appealed to the CA without
raising issue of lack of jurisdiction. Surety
then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground
 Liceo University Law
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of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in
view of the affectivity of Judiciary Act of
1948 a month before the filing of the
petition for recovery. Same Act placed
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts all civil actions for demands not
exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set
aside its earlier decision and referred the
case to SC
Issue:
WON Surety bond is estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu?.
Ruling:
Yes. A party may be estopped or
barred from raising a question in different
ways and for different reasons. Thus we
speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by
deed or by record, and of estoppel by
laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure
or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.
Furthermore, it has also been held
that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question
the jurisdiction or power of the court -
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting
his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it
for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
The facts of this case show that from
the time the Surety became a quasi-party
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on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the
question of the lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by reason
of the sum of money involved which,
according to the law then in force, was
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at
several stages of the proceedings in the
court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said
courts to obtain affirmative relief and
submitted its case for a final adjudication on
the merits. It was only after an adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of
Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the
question of jurisdiction. Were we to
sanction such conduct on its part, We would
in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it
was commenced on July 19, 1948 and
compel the judgment creditors to go up
their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but
revolting.
Case digested by: Danilo P. Lagbas
24
Cruz v Macias
G.R. No. L-28054
June 15, 1972
Doctrine: The court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estates of the
deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.
Facts:
Manuel Macias, in behalf of
Ricardo Cruz, filed a petition for issuance of
letters of administration of the estate
 Liceo University Law
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of Wolfson petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over the estate in
the Philippines of the late Rosina. This was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 63866.
The court granted the petition and
appointed Ricardo Cruz as Special
Administrator.
Meanwhile, in the State of California,
U.S.A., the will and codicils of Rosina were
presented for probate by the Wells Fargo
Bank which was named as executor in the
will. The Wells Fargo Bank appointed
lawyers in the Philippines, as its attorney-
infact, with authority among others to file
ancillary administration proceedings for the
estate of Rosina and to act as administrator
or administrators of the estate.
Consequently, Del Rosario, one of
the lawyers, appeared at Branch VIII CFI to
move for the conversion of the intestate
proceedings into a petition for the probate
of Rosina's will and codicils, contending that
the will and codicils had been duly probated
in the Superior Court of California.
On the other hand, petitioner-
appellant Macias, in his own behalf and
without informing his client Ricardo Cruz,
filed a similar but separate and independent
petition, which was docketed as
Spec Pro No. 67302 alleging that he has a
legal interest in Rosina's estate and praying
for the probate of Rosina's will and codicils
as well as for his (Macias') appointment as
special administrator. He was appointed as
Special Administrator.
When the proceedings were transferred
to Branch VIII, and dismissing his
petition, Macias filed motion for
reconsideration contending among other ,
that he is seeking his own appointment as
regular, not ancillary, administrator of
Rosina's estate, based simply on his interest
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in the estate, without need of any authority
from Wells Fargo Bank, which does not and
cannot possibly have anything to do with
these proceedings because its (WelIs Fargo
Bank) appointment by the California
Superior Court as executor of Rosina's
estate does not extend ex proprio vigore to
the Philippines, and that the other Special
Proceedings, which is an intestate
proceeding merely for the administration of
Rosina's estate, is not a probate proceeding.
Issue:
Whether transfer of special
proceedings to the first court, not
consolidation of proceedings, is proper.
Ruling:
Yes.
Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of
Court,'the court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estates of the
deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. Therefore all
questions concerning the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Wolfson should be
filed before Branch VIII of the Manila CFI,
where Special Proceedings No. 63866 for
the settlement of the testate estate of the
deceased Wolfson was filed and is still
pending.
The salutary purpose of the rule is to
prevent confusion and delay. Consequently,
every challenge to the validity of the will,
any objection to its authentication, every
demand or claim by any heir, legatee or
party in interest in intestate or testate
succession must be acted upon and decided
within the same special proceedings, not in
a separate action, and the same judge
having jurisdiction in the administration of
the estate should take cognizance of the
 Liceo University Law
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question raised, for he will be called upon
to distribute or adjudicate the property to
the interested parties.
Section 1 of Rule 73, speaking as it
does of "settlement of the estates of the
deceased," applies equally to both testate
and intestate proceedings. And the
conversion of an intestate proceedings into
a testate one is "entirely a matter of form
and lies within the sound discretion of the
court.
Case Digested by: Hazel M. Barbarona
Rule 74
25
Balbin v Medalla
G.R. No. L-46410
October 30, 1981
Topic: Summary Settlement of Estates
Doctrine: An action for reconveyance of real
property resulting from fraud may be barred
by the statute of limitations, which requires
that the action shall be filed within four (4)
years from the discovery of the fraud.
Facts:
Private respondents, on June 19,
1962, purchased from the heirs of Juan
Ladao, a large parcel of agricultural land.
Said respondents on June 14, 1963, filed an
application for registration of title of the
said parcel of land. They utilized as evidence
of ownership, the Deed of Sale executed in
their favor by the heirs of Juan Ladao the
Informacion Posesoria together with the tax
declarations and receipts and has been
paying the tax ever since up to the present.
The application for registration of title
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aforesaid was opposed by petitioners on
the ground that Petitioners herein were
given either free patent or homestead
patent, and original certificates of title in
their names issued to them, the latest On
October 14, 1959. Respondent filed an
action for reconveyance and annulment of
titles on August 30, 1973. Subsequently, the
lower court decided in favor of the
respondent, hence, the petition.
The petitioners argued that the
cause of action for reconveyance had
already prescribed because such action can
only be instituted within four (4) years after
discovery of the alleged fraud. Complaint
was filed only on August 30, 1973 which
should have been filed on or before
October 14, 1963 or four years from the
date of the issuance of the petitioners
respective titles which was on October 14,
1959.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for
reconveyance had prescribed.
Ruling:
Yes. An action for reconveyance of
real property resulting from fraud may be
barred by the statute of limitations, which
requires that the action shall be filed within
four (4) years from the discovery of the
fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have
taken place when the petitioners herein
were issued original certificate of title
through either homestead or free patent
grants, for the registration of said patents
constitute constructive notice to the whole
world. The complaint was filed by the
respondents only on August 30, 1973, or
more than 14 years had already elapsed
from the date of the issuance of the
respective titles of the petitioners.
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Case Digested by: Vanica Irish M. Bungco
26
Saludares v CA
G.R. No. 128254
January 16, 2004
Doctrine: Prescription cannot be invoked in
an action for reconveyance, that is, when
the plaintiff is in possession of the land to
be reconveyed.
Facts:
At the core of the present
controversy is a parcel of land, which
includes the conjugal properties of spouses
Juan Dator and Pomposa Saludares, known
as the Tanza estate. Pomposa died leaving
herein petitioners, as her compulsory heirs.
Heirs and their father Juan executed a deed
of extra-judicial partition of the share
of Pomposa in the Tanza estate.
Sometime in 1988, the Heirs were
informed by their tenant that private
respondents cut some 50 coconut trees
located within the subject lot. Thus, the
Heirs sent a letter to private respondents
demanding an explanation for their
intrusion into their property and
unauthorized felling of trees.
Private respondents retaliated by
filing an action for reconveyance against
petitioners. Lower court rendered a
decision dismissing the action primarily on
the ground of prescription of action. CA
reversed the lower courts decision on the
ground that the private respondents are
the actual possessor of the property in issue.
Hence, prescription should not run against
them even if they filed the action
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of reconveyance 11 years after, beyond the
prescriptive period.
Issue:
Whether or not the action of the
private respondents for reconveyance had
prescribed.
Ruling:
Yes. There is but one instance when
prescription cannot be invoked in an action
for reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff
is in possession of the land to
be reconveyed. In a series of cases, this
Court permitted the filing of an action
for reconveyance despite the lapse of ten
years and declared that said action, when
based on fraud, is imprescriptible as long as
the land has not passed to an innocent
purchaser for value. The exception was
based on the theory that registration
proceedings could not be used as a shield
for fraud or for enriching a person at the
expense of another.
In the case at bar, however, it is the
rule rather than the exception which should
apply because the private respondents who
filed an action for reconveyance, was never
in possession of the property in issue, hence,
their unexplained inaction for more than 11
years rendered their demand
for reconveyance as stale.
Case Digested by: Vanica Irish M. Bungco
27
Perez v Ong Chua
G.R. No. L-36850
September 23, 1982
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Doctrine: Extinctive prescription under the Whether or not the action

Court of Civil Procedure, the law in force at
the time, was only 10 years.
Facts:
To secure payment of a loan,
the Arcilla spouses mortgaged 23 parcels of
land registered in their names to
Mrs. NanonWorcester who later on
foreclosed the mortgage for violation of the
terms of the contract and acquired the said
properties in an execution sale. Mrs.
Worcester secured titles to the parcels of
land on November 24, 1930 and two days
later she sold the properties to
Enrique Ong Chua who obtained new
certificates of title thereto. Upon Enriques
demise the lands in question passed to his
heirs, herein defendants-appellees, who
have been in continuous, open and adverse
possession of the said properties to date.
On October 14, 1968, or 38 years
later, Plaintiffs-appellants filed an action
for reconveyance of the subject parcels of
land. The trial court dismissed the
for reconveyance had prescribed.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that
the continuous and public assertion of title
by appellees and their predecessors-in-
interest for 38 years was more than
sufficient to extinguish appellants action
since the period of extinctive prescription
under the Court of Civil Procedure, the law
in force at the time, was only 10 years; and
that appellants claim is also barred
by laches because of their passivity and
inaction for almost four decades. It is the
established principle in this jurisdiction that
inaction and neglect of a party to assert a
right can convert what otherwise could be a
valid claim into a stale demand.
Case Digested by: Vanica Irish M. Bungco
Rule 75

28
complaint on grounds of prescription
Baluyut v Pao
and laches. On appeal, appellants contend
G.R No. L- 42088
that the judgment rendered by the court in
May 7, 1976
the foreclosure proceedings in 1930 was
erroneous because no substitution was
made of one of the defendants who died Topic: Summary Settlement of Estates
during the pendency of the action; and
Doctrine: Probate of the will is mandatory.
since the certificates of title obtained by
Intestate case should be consolidated with
Mrs. Worcester under said judgment were
the Testate Proceedings and the judge
subject to an implied trust, which is
assigned to the Testate Proceeding should
continuing and subsisting, the appellants
continue hearing the two cases.
action for reconveyance cannot prescribe
because prescription does not run against Facts:
their predecessors title registered under
Act No. 496. Soltero Baluyot died on January 6,
1975 at the age of 86, leaving an estate
Issue: valued at not less than Php2M. A few
weeks later, his nephew Alfredo Baluyot

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filed a verified petition for the issuance of
letters of administration in his favor,
alleging that Encarnacion Lopez
Baluyot, Solteros widow, was mentally
incapable of acting as administratrix of the
decedents estate. Believing that
Soltero executed a will, Alfredo prayed that
he be appointed as special administrator in
the meantime. The CFI granted Alfredos
petition.
Mrs. Baluyot filed an opposition to
the appointment. She claimed that the
allegation as to her mental incapacity was
libelous, and that she was unaware that her
husband executed a will. Finding that Mrs.
Baluyot was mentally qualified, the CFI
cancelled Alfredos appointment. However,
upon filing of a motion for reconsideration,
Alfredos appointment was again appointed
as special administrator, together with
Jose Espino, an acknowledged natural child
of Soltero. Based on the testimony of Mrs.
Baluyot herself, the probate court
terminated the appointment of Jose and
Alfredo as administrators and ordered that
the former be appointed as administratrix,
due to her preferential right to be
appointed as such. Letters of administration
were issued in her favor after posting
a Php20,000.00 bond. During the course of
the proceedings, the alleged will of the
decedent was apparently discovered
and presented to the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the proceeding in
the lower court must be converted into a
testamentary proceeding after the alleged
will has been presented.
Ruling:
Yes.
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It is necessary to convert the
proceeding in the lower court into a
testamentary proceeding. The probate
of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a
matter of public policy. After the will is
probated, the prior letters of administration
should be revoked and proceedings for the
issuance of letters testamentary or
of administration under the will should be
conducted.
Case Digested by: Vanica Irish M. Bungco
29
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN
v. IAC
G.R. No. 72706
October 27, 1987
Topic: Principle Applicable Only Where
Instrinsic Invalidity On The Face Of Will
Doctrine: As stated by respondent Court,
the general rule is that the probate court's
authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testator's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.
The rule, however, is not inflexible and
absolute. Under exceptional circumstances,
the probate court is not powerless to do
what the situation constrains it to do and
pass upon certain provisions of the will.
Synopsis: Constantino filed a petition for
the probate of the will of the late Nemesio.
The will provided that all his shares from
properties he earned with his wife shall be
given to his brother Segundo (father of
Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such
property shall be given to Segundos
children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.
In order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must
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have an interest in the estate, or in the will,
or in the property to be affected by it.
Petitioner is not the appointed executor,
neither a devisee or a legatee there being
no mention in the testamentary disposition
of any gift of an individual item of personal
or real property he is called upon to receive.
Facts:
On May 1984, Constantino Acain
(petitioner hereinafter Acain) filed on the RTC of
Cebu City, a petition for the probate of the will of
the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to
Acain of letters testamentary. When Nemesio
died, he left a will in which Acain and his siblings
were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly
executed by Nemesio was submitted by
petitioner without objection raised by private
respondents. Segundo, the brother of Nemesio,
was initially instituted as the heir, in case
Segundo pre-deceases Nemesio, Segundos
children would then succeed.
After the petition was set for hearing, the re
spondents (Virginia Fernandez, legally adopt
ed daughter of Nemesio, and the latter's widow,
Rosa Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on the
following grounds: for the petitioner has no legal
capacity to institute these proceedings; he is
merely a universal heir and the Rosa and
Fernandez have been preterited. Motion was
denied.
After the denial, respondents filed w
ith the SC a petition for certiorari and prohi
bition with preliminary injunction which was
subsequently referred to the IAC. The IAC
granted the private respondents' petition and
ordered the Trail Court to dismiss the petition for
the probate of the will of Nemesio. His MR
having been denied, Acain filed this present
petition for the review of IACs decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the authority of the
probate courts is limited only to inquiring
into the extrinsic validity of the will sought
to be probated and it cannot pass upon the
intrinsic validity thereof before it is
admitted to probate?
2.Whether or not as an instituted heir,
petitioner has the legal interest and standing to
file the petition in special proceeding for probate
of the will of Nemesio Acain?
RULING:
1. No. Special Proceedings is for the
probate of a will. As stated by respondent
Court, the general rule is that the probate
court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the
testator's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will
normally comes only after the Court has
declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. The rule, however, is not
inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it
to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.
Where circumstances demand that intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions be passed
upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will
is resolved, the probate court should meet the
issue. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition
were properly availed of by private respondents.
The petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
2. In order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have
an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor
or as a claimant of the estate and an interested
party is one who would be benefited by the

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estate. Acain, at the outset, appears to have
an interest in the will as an heir, however,
intestacy having resulted from the preterition
of Fernandez and the universal institution of
heirs, Acain is in effect not an heir of the testator.
He has no legal standing to petition for the
probate of the will left by the deceased and must
then be dismissed.
Case Digested by: Larra Mae B. Castanares
30
NEPOMUCENO v. CA
G.R. No. L-62952
October 9, 1985
Topic: Exception When Probate Court May
Pass Upon Intrinsic Validity The Principle
Of Practical Considerations
Doctrine: Exception; when probate court
may pass upon intrinsic validity-The
Principle of Practical Considerations. In
Probate Proceedings, the courts area of
Inquiry is limited to an examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will.
The rule, however, is not inflexible and
absolute. When practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue head on. In
this case, a devise given by a married man
to his concubine is declared void even if the
will was not yet probated.
Synopsis: Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he
left a will wherein he instituted Sofia
Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor.
Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the
will but the legal wife and her children
opposed alleging that the will was procured
through improper and undue influence and
that there was an admission of concubinage
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with the petitioner. The general rule is that
the court's area of inquiry is limited to the
an examination and resolution of the
extrinsic validity of the will. This general
rule is however not inflexible and absolute.
Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what
the situation constrains it to do and may
pass upon certain provisions of the will. The
will itself admitted on its face the
relationship between the testator and the
petitioner.
Facts:
Martin Jugo left a duly executed
and notarized Last Will and Testament
before he died. Petitioner was named as
sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will
that he was legally married to a certain
Rufina Gomez by whom he had two
legitimate children, but he had been
estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the
testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner
were married despite the subsisting first
marriage. The testator devised the free
portion of his estate to petitioner. On
August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a
petition for probate. On May 13, 1975,
Rufina Gomez and her children filed an
opposition alleging undue and improper
influence on the part of the petitioner; that
at the time of the execution of the Will, the
testator was already very sick and that
petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator.
The lower court denied the probate
of the Will on the ground that as the
testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting
with the petitioner. The Wills admission to
probate will be idle exercise because on the
face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic
provision is evident. Petitioner appealed to
CA. On June 2, 1982, the respondent court
set aside the decision of the Court of First
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Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the
will. The respondent court declared the Will
to be valid except that the devise in favor of
the petitioner is null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent
court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when
after declaring the last Will and Testament
of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn,
it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity
of the testamentary provision in favor of
herein petitioner?
Held:
No. The respondent court acted
within its jurisdiction when after declaring
the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to
pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will
and declared the devise in favor of the
petitioner null and void. The general rule is
that in probate proceedings, the courts
area of inquiry is limited to an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the
Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and
absolute. Given exceptional circumstances,
the probate court is not powerless to do
what the situation constrains it to do and
pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
We see no useful purpose that
would be served if we remand the nullified
provision to the proper court in a separate
action for that purpose simply because, in
the probate of a will, the court does not
ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of
its provisions. The probate of a will might
become an idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid).
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The Will is void under Article 739.
The following donations shall be void: (1)
Those made between persons who were
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the
time of the donation; and Article 1028. The
prohibitions mentioned in Article 739,
concerning donations inter vivos shall apply
to testamentary provisions.
There is no question from the
records about the fact of a prior existing
marriage when Martin Jugo executed his
Will. The very wordings of the Will
invalidate the legacy because the testator
admitted he was disposing the properties to
a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
Case Digested by: Larra Mae B. Castanares
31
SAGUISIN V. LINDAYAG
G.R. No. L-17759
December 17, 1962
Topic: Executors And Administrators;
Appointment; Who May Be Appointed
Administrator; When Sister Of Decedent
May Not Be Appointed.
Doctrine: Where it is undisputed that the
decedent left a husband and three legally
adopted children, a petition for issuance of
letters of administration in favor of the
sister of said decedent was properly
dismissed for lack of interest in the estate,
she being neither an heir nor a creditor
thereof. An interest party has been defined
in this connection as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor.
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Whether or not the petitioner is an

Synopsis: Petitioner filed with the court a
petition for the issuance in her favor of
letters of administration over the estate of
the deceased which was opposed by
surviving spouse on the ground of lack of
interest in the estate as being neither a
creditor nor a creditor. An interested
person has been defined as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against the
estate, such as a creditor. The interest must
be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent. It is manifest that
she is not an heir of her deceased sister and,
therefore, has no material and direct
interest in her estate.
Facts:
Maria Lindayag died intestate. Her
sister, the petitioner herein, filed with the
court a petition for the issuance in her favor
of letters of administration over the estate
of the deceased. Later on, Dionisio, the
surviving spouse, in his behalf and
representation of their 3 legally adopted
minor children, filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the ground lack of interest in
the estate, she being neither heir nor a
creditor thereof alleging that the deceased
was survived by her husband and the three
children.
In her opposition, petitioner argued
the only the facts alleged in the petition
should be considered. The court ruled that
herein petitioner is not an heir, thus, no
interest in estate and allowed the
extrajudicial settlement as petitioned by
Dionisio. Filed a Motion for reconsideration
but was denied. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
interested person in the estate of the
deceased?
Ruling:
No. Petitioners interest in the
estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag
was disputed, through a motion to dismiss
her petition, by the surviving spouse on the
ground that said deceased was survived by
him and by three legally adopted
children thus excluding petitioner as an
heir. In the course of the hearing held in
connection with said motion, evidence was
introduced in support thereof which
according to the lower court, established
that said deceased was survived not only by
her husband but three legally adopted
children named Jesus, Concepcion, and
Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag.
Upon these facts which petitioner
does not dispute it is manifest that she is
not an heir of her deceased sister and,
therefore, has no material and direct
interest in her estate.
Petitioners view that when a
motion to dismiss a complaint or a petition
is filed, only the facts alleged in the
complaint or petition may be taken into
account is not entirely correct. To the
contrary, the rule is that at said hearing said
motion may be proved or disproved in
accordance with the rules of evidence, and
it has been held that, for that purpose, the
hearing should be conducted as an ordinary
hearing; and the parties should be allowed
to present evidence, except when the
motion is based on the failure of the
complaint or of the petition to state a cause
of action. In the present case, the motion to
dismiss the petition was grounded on

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petitioners lack of legal capacity to institute
the proceedings which, as already stated
heretofore, was fully substantiated by the
evidence presented during the hearing.
Case Digested by: Larra Mae B. Castanares
32
SPS. AJERO v. CA
G.R. No. 106720
September 15, 1994
Topic: Remedy of Certiorari Available
Doctrine: As a general rule, courts in
probate proceedings are limited to pass only
upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought
to be probated. However, in exceptional
instances, courts are not powerless to do
what the situation constrains them to do,
and pass upon certain provisions of the will.
In the case at bench, decedent herself
indubitably stated in her holographic will
that the Cabadbaran property is in the
name of her late father, John H. Sand (which
led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her
conveyance of the same in its entirety.).
Thus, as correctly held by respondent court,
she cannot validly dispose of the whole
property, which she shares with her fathers
other heirs.
Synopsis: Private respondent opposed the
petition on the grounds that: neither the
testaments body nor the signature therein
was in decedents handwriting; it contained
alterations and corrections which were not
duly signed by decedent; and, the will was
procured by petitioners through improper
pressure and undue influence. The petition
was also contested by Dr. Ajero with
respect to the disposition in the will of a
house and lot. He claimed that said
property could not be conveyed by
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decedent in its entirety, as she was not its
sole owner. The trial court held that since it
must decide only the question of the
identity of the will, its due execution and
the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, it
finds no reason for the disallowance of the
will for its failure to comply with the
formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of
testamentary capacity of the testatrix. A
reading of Article 813 shows that its
requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic
will, but not its probate. If the testator fails
to sign and date some of the dispositions,
the result is that these dispositions cannot
be effectuated. Such failure, however, does
not render the whole testament void.
Facts:
On January 20, 1983, petitioners
instituted for allowance of the late Annie
Sands holographic will. They alleged that at
the time of its execution, she was of sound
and disposing mind, not acting under duress,
fraud or undue influence, and was in every
respect capacitated to dispose of her estate
by will. This was opposed on the grounds
that: neither the testament's body nor the
signature therein was in decedent's
handwriting; it contained alterations and
corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and, the will was procured by
petitioners through improper pressure and
undue influence. The petition was likewise
opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the
disposition in the will of a house and lot
located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte.
He claimed that said property could not be
conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she
was not its sole owner.
The trial court having found that the
holographic will in question was written
entirely, dated and signed in the
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handwriting of the testatrix with three (3)
witnesses to have explicitly and
categorically identified the handwriting with
which the holographic will in question was
written to be the genuine handwriting and
signature of the testatrix admitted the
probate, however on appeal with CA this
was reversed and the petition for probate
was dismissed on the ground that it fails to
meet the requirements for its validity by not
complying articles 813 and 814 of the NCC
which read, as follows: Art. 813: When a
number of dispositions appearing in a
holographic will are signed without being
dated, and the last disposition has a
signature and date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the
time of prior dispositions. Art. 814: In case
of insertion, cancellation, erasure or
alteration in a holographic will, the testator
must authenticate the same by his full
signature. It alluded to certain dispositions
in the will which were either unsigned and
undated, or signed but not dated. It also
found that the erasures, alterations and
cancellations made thereon had not been
authenticated by decedent. Thus, this
appeal.
Issue:
Whether a holographic will can still
be admitted to probate, notwithstanding
non-compliance with the provisions of
Article 8113 and 814 of the NCC
Held:
Yes. A reading of Article 813 shows
that its requirement affects the validity of
the dispositions contained in the
holographic will, but not its probate. If the
testator fails to sign and date some of the
dispositions, the result is that these
dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such
failure, however, does not render the whole
testament void. Likewise, a holographic will
can still be admitted to probate
notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814.
Unless the authenticated alterations,
cancellations or insertions were made on
the date of the holographic will or on
testators signature, their presence does
not invalidate the will itself. The lack of
authentication will only result in
disallowance of such changes.
This separation and distinction adds
support to the interpretation that only the
requirements of Article 810 of the NCC
and not those found in Articles 813 and
814 are essential to the probate of a
holographic will.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court enumerate the grounds for
disallowance of wills:
(a) If not executed and attested as
required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or
otherwise mentally incapable to make a will,
at the time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or
the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence, on the
part of the beneficiary, or of some other
person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was
procured by fraud or trick, and he did not
intend that the instrument should be his
will at the time of fixing his signature
thereto;
These lists are exclusive; no other
grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in
a petition to admit a holographic will to

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probate, the only issues to be resolved are:
(1) whether the instrument submitted is,
indeed, the decedents last will and
testament; (2) whether said will was
executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law; (3) whether the
decedent had the necessary testamentary
capacity at the time the will was executed;
and, (4) whether the execution of the will
and its signing were the voluntary acts of
the decedents.
The object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud;
accordingly, laws on this subject should be
interpreted to attain these primordial ends.
In the case of holographic wills, what
assures authenticity is the requirement that
they be totally authographic or handwritten
by the testator himself. Failure to strictly
observe other formalities will not result in
the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionable handwritten by the testator.
Case Digested by: Larra Mae B. Castanares
33
TIBURCIA MANAHAN v.
ENGRACIA MANAHAN
G.R. No. 38050,
Topic: Probation of a Will
Doctrine: The decree of probate is
conclusive with respect to the due execution
thereof and it cannot impugned on any of
the grounds authorized by law, except that
of fraud, in any separate or independent
action or proceedings.
Synopsis: Petitioner is the niece of the
testatrix and was named the executrix of
the will. The date of the hearing was set
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with the necessary notices given and
published; since there was no opposition,
the will was admitted to probated. A year
after, appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration praying that the order of
the probabte to be vacated and the
authenticated will to be declared void.
Facts:
On August 29, 1930, Tiburcia Manahan
instituted special proceedings No. 4162, for
the probate of the will of the deceased
Donata Manahan, who died in Bulacan,
Province of Bulacan, on August 3, 1930. The
petitioner herein, niece of the testatrix, was
named the executrix in said will. The court
set the date for the hearing and the
necessary notice required by law was
accordingly published. On the day of the
hearing of the petition, no opposition
thereto was filed and, after the evidence
was presented, the court entered the
decree admitting the will to probate as
prayed for. The will was probated on
September 22, 1930. The trial court
appointed the herein petitioner executrix
with a bond of P1,000, and likewise
appointed the committed on claims and
appraisal, whereupon the testamentary
proceedings followed the usual course.
One year and seven months later, that
is, on My 11, 1932, to be exact, the
appellant herein filed a motion for
reconsideration and a new trial, praying
that the order admitting the will to probate
be vacated and the authenticated will
declared null and void ab initio. The
appellee herein, naturally filed her
opposition to the petition and, after the
corresponding hearing thereof, the trial
court erred its over of denial on July 1, 1932.
Engracia Manahan, under the pretext of
appealing from this last order, likewise
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appealed from the judgment admitting the
will to probate.
Issues:
Whether Engarcias contentions are
meritous.
Ruling:
The appellant's first contention is
obviously unfounded and untenable. She
was not entitled to notification of the
probate of the will and neither had she the
right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not
an interested party, not having filed an
opposition to the petition for the probate
thereof. Her allegation that she had the
status of an heir, being the deceased's sister,
did not confer on her the right to be
notified on the ground that the testatrix
died leaving a will in which the appellant
has not been instituted heir. Furthermore,
not being a forced heir, she did not acquire
any successional right.
Second contention is puerile. There is
no essential difference between the
authentication of the will and the probate
thereof. All the law requires is that the
competent court declared that in the
execution of the will the essential external
formalities have been complied with and
that, in view thereof, the document, as a
will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the
law.
The last contention of the appellant
may be refuted merely by stating that, once
a will has been authenticated and admitted
to probate, questions relative to the validity
thereof can no more be raised on appeal.
The decree of probate is conclusive with
respect to the due execution thereof and it
cannot impugned on any of the grounds
authorized by law, except that of fraud, in
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any separate or independent action or
proceedings.
It is not timely to discuss herein the
validity and sufficiency of the execution of
the will in question as this question can no
more be raised in this case on appeal. After
due hearing, the court found that the will in
question was valid and effective and the
order admitting it to probate, thus
promulgated, should be accepted and
respected by all. The probate of the will in
question now constitutes res judicata.
Case digested by: Michael L. Cutor
34
HEIRS OF LATE JESUS FRAN v.
BERNARDO SALAS
G.R. L-53546
June 25, 1992
Topic: Distinguish Incompetency of
Guardian from Incompetency of Person
Under Guardianship
Doctrine:
Failure to attach original of will to
petition not critical where will itself was
adduced in evidence. It is not necessary to
attach original will to petition for probate.
The annexing of the original will to the
petition is not a jurisdictional requirement is
clearly evident in Sec 1 Rule 76 which allows
the filing of a petition for probate by
persons named therein, regardless of
whether or not he is in possession of the will,
or the same is lost or destroyed.
Facts:
Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo died with
neither descendants nor ascendants. She
left real and personal properties wherein
she bequeathed to her collateral relatives
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(brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces) all
her properties, and designated Rosario Tan
or, upon the latter's death, Jesus Fran, as
executor. Jesus Fran filed a petition for the
probate of Remedios' last will and
testament. The petition alleged that Rosario
Tan is not physically well. The court
appointed petitioner Jesus Fran as special
administrator.
Private respondents, filed a
manifestation alleging that they needed
time to study the petition. However, private
respondents did not file any opposition.
Instead, they filed a "Withdrawal of
Opposition to the Allowance of Probate (sic)
of the Will" wherein they expressly
manifested that they have no objection to
the will.
The petition thus became uncontested.
During the initial hearing, petitioner
Fran introduced the requisite evidence to
establish the jurisdictional facts. The
probate court rendered a decision
admitting to probate the will of the testatrix
and appointing petitioner Fran as executor.
Subsequently, a Project of Partition
based on the dispositions made in the will
and signed by all the devisees and legatees
was submitted, with the exception of Luis
Fran, Remedios C. Mejia and respondent
Concepcion M. Espina. Said legatees and
devisees submitted certifications wherein
they admit receipt of a copy of the Project
of Partition together with the notice of
hearing. After the hearing on the Project of
Partition, the court ordered the
administrator to deliver to the said parties
their respective shares and decreeing the
proceedings closed.
Thereafter, the aforesaid Branch VIII of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu was
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converted to a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court. Branch XVII (Davao City) of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided
over by herein respondent Judge, was
transferred to Cebu City and renumbered as
Branch VIII. (so napalitan yung judge na
humahawak ng case then yung private
respondents biglang naisipang kontrahin
yung unang decision ng courtoppose to
the allowance of the will)
Private respondents filed with the new
Branch VIII an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration of the probate judgment
and asked the court to declare the
proceedings still open and admit their
opposition to the allowance of the will.
Notwithstanding petitioners' objections,
respondent Judge issued an Order setting
for hearing the said Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioners filed a Motion
to Dismiss the Omnibus and to Reconsider
the 26 February 1980 Order setting it for
hearing on 17 April 1980, but the
respondent Judge denied it for lack of merit
Petitioners filed a Supplemental
Petition asking this Court to restrain
respondent Judge from reopening the case.
Respondent Judge issued the impugned
order declaring the testamentary
dispositions of the will void, and converting
the same into an intestate proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary that the
original copy of the will be presented for
the court to acquire jurisdiction for the
allowance of the will
Ruling:
Respondent Judge committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of
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jurisdiction when he granted the Omnibus court having jurisdiction to have the will
Motion for Reconsideration and ordered allowed, whether the same be in his
the conversion of the testate proceedings possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
into one of intestacy.
Private respondents had lost their
private respondents filed on the day of the right to file a petition for relief from
initial hearing of the petition their judgment, it appearing that their omnibus
"Withdrawal of Opposition To Allowance of motion for reconsideration was filed exactly
Probate (sic) Will" wherein they six (6) years, ten (10) months and twenty-
unequivocally state that they have no two (22) days after the rendition of the
objection to the allowance of the will. decision, and six (6) years, one (1) month
and thirteen (13) days after the court issued
In testate proceedings, a decision logically
the order approving the Project of Partition,
precedes the project of partition, which is
to which they voluntarily expressed their
normally an implementation of the will and
conformity through their respective
is among the last operative acts to
certifications, and closing the testate
terminate the proceedings.
proceedings.
Pivate respondents claim that the
Private respondents' contention that
trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
the order approving the Project of Partition
the petition because only the English
and closing the proceedings is null and void
translation of the will and not a copy of
because the Project of Partition did not
the same was attached to the petition;
contain a notice of hearing and that they
the Court already ruled that it is not
were not notified of the hearing thereon. In
necessary that the original of the will be
truth, in her own certification 55 dated 5
attached to the petition. "The original of
September 1973, private respondent
said document [the will] must be presented
Concepcion M. Espina admitted that she
or sufficient reasons given to justify the
"received a copy of the Project of Partition
non-presentation of said original and the
and the Notice of Hearing in the above-
acceptance of the copy or duplicate
entitled proceeding, and that she has no
thereof."
objection to the approval of the said Project
The annexing of the original will to of Partition."
the petition is not a jurisdictional
the instant petition and supplemental
requirement is clearly evident in Section 1,
petitions are GRANTED
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which allows
the filing of a petition for probate by the Case digested by: Romeca Kate Pepito
person named therein regardless of
whether or not he is in possession of the
will, or the same is lost or destroyed.
Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance Rule 76
of will. Any executor, devisee, or legatee
named in a will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at any time
after the death of the testator, petition the

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35
LEVISTE v CA
G.R. No. L-29184,
January 30, 1989
Topic: One who is only indirectly interested
in a will may not interfere in its probate
Doctrine: The reason for the rule excluding
strangers from contesting the will, is not
that thereby the court maybe prevented
from learning facts which would justify or
necessitate a denial of probate, but rather
that the courts and the litigants should not
be molested by the intervention in the
proceedings of persons with no interest in
the estate which would entitle them to be
heard with relation thereto.
Synopsis: The petitioner lawyer entered
into a contingency contract with
respondent; wherein he will be recovering
the 35% of the property that the latter may
receive. Respondent sent a letter to Leviste
terminating his services for conflict of
interest. Thus, prompted the latter to file a
claim for attorneys fees. The contract for
contingent attorneys fees neither gives, nor
purports to give, to the lawyer any right
whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her
aforesaid share in the conjugal partnership.
FACTS:
On September 7, 1963, the petitioner, a
practicing attorney, entered into a written
agreement with the private respondent
Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in
a petition for probate of the holographic
will of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Under
the will, a piece of real property at Sales
Street, Quiapo, Manila, was bequeathed to
Del Rosario. It was agreed that petitioner's
contigent fee would be thirty-five per cent
(35%) of the property that Rosa may receive
upon the probate of the will.
On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a
letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him
that she was terminating his services as her
counsel due to "conflicting interest." On
September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a
"Motion to Intervene to Protect His Rights
to Fees for Professional Services.
The trial court denied his motion on the
ground that he had "not filed a claim for
attorney's fees nor recorded his attorney's
lien. Petitioner then filed a "Formal
Statement of Claim for Attorney's Fees and
Recording of Attorney's Lien,' which was
noted in the court's order of December 20,
1965.
Although the order denying his motion
to intervene had become final, petitioner
continued to receive copies of the court's
orders, as well the pleadings of the other
parties in the case. He also continued to file
pleadings. The case was submitted for
decision without the respondents' evidence.
On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario
and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-
legatee, filed a "Motion to Withdraw
Petition for Probate" alleging that Del
Rosario waived her rights to the devise in
her favor and agreed that the De Guzman
brothers and sisters who opposed her
petition for probate, shall inherit all the
properties left by the decedent. In an order
of April 13, 1967 the trial court denied the
motion to withdraw the petition for being
contrary to public .
Nonetheless, on August 28, 1967, the
court disallowed the will, holding that the
legal requirements for its validity were not
satisfied as only two witnesses testified that

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the will and the testatrix's signature were in
the handwriting of Maxima Reselva.
The petitioner filed an appeal bond,
notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The
private respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that
petitioner was not a party in interest.
The petitioner opposed the motion to
dismiss his appeal, claiming that he has a
direct and material interest in the decision
sought to be reviewed. He also asked that
he be substituted as party-petitioner, in lieu
of his former client, Ms. Del Rosario.
On March 28, 1968, the trial judge
dismissed the appeal and denied
petitioner's motion for substitution. The
petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a
petition for mandamus. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for being
insufficient in form and substance as the
petitioner did not appear to be the proper
party to appeal the decision in Special
Proceeding No. 58325. Upon the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, petitioner
appealed by certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner appears
not to be the proper party to appeal the
decision in Sp. Proc. No. 58325 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila.
RULING:
Under his first assignment of error,
petitioner argues that by virtue of his
contract of services with Del Rosario, he is a
creditor of the latter, and that under Article
1052 of the Civil Code which provides: ART.
1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance
to the prejudice of his own creditors, the
latter may petition the court to authorize
them to accept it in the name of the heir.
The acceptance shall benefit the
creditors only to an extent sufficient to
cover the amount of their credits. The
excess, should there be any, shall in no case
pertain to the renouncer, but shall be
adjudicated to the persons to whom, in
accordance with the rules established in this
Code, it may belong.
The argument is devoid of merit. Article
1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this
case. That legal provision protects the
creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is
not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The
payment of his fees is contingent and
dependent upon the successful probate of
the holographic will. Since the petition for
probate was dismissed by the lower court,
the contingency did not occur. Attorney
Leviste is not entitled to his fee.
Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes
that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario
is not a legal heir of the late Maxima C.
Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition
for probate of the decedent's will, she lost
her right to inherit any part of the latter's
estate. There is nothing for the petitioner to
accept in her name.
The Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the petition for mandamus, for
while it is true that, as contended by the
petitioner, public policy favors the probate
of a will, it does not necessarily follow that
every will that is presented for probate,
should be allowed. The law lays down
procedures which should be observed and
requisites that should be satisfied before a
will may be probated. Those procedures
and requirements were not followed in this
case resulting in the disallowance of the will.
There being no valid will, the motion to
withdraw the probate petition was
inconsequential.

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Petitioner was not a party to the
probate proceeding in the lower court. He
had no direct interest in the probate of the
will. His only interest in the estate is an
indirect interest as former counsel for a
prospective heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
denied for lack of merit.
Case digested by: Michael L. Cutor
appointed proves his qualifications, and the
oppositors contests it.
Facts:
Manolito de Guzman died intestate.
Elaine de Guzman (surviving spouse) filed
petition for settlement of intestate estate of
the decedent before RTC Makati, alleging
the following:
(1) Manolito died in Makati, as a
resident of Makati, left properties which

36
DE GUZMAN v ANGELES
G.R. No. 78590
June 20, 1988
Topic: Appointment of Executor or
Administrator
Doctrine: The requirement of a hearing and
the notification to all the known heirs and
other interested parties as to the date
thereof is essential to the validity of the
proceeding for the appointment of an
administrator "in order that no person may
be deprived of his right or property without
due process of law.
Synopsis: This is a dispute between the
surviving spouse as the appointed
adminstratrix and the father-in-law as to
the properties allegedly belonging to the
estate of the deceased but was being
claimed by, and was in the possession of,
the father in law. Father in law now assails
the appointment of daughter in law as
special administratrix, as well as the order
for writ of possession, even before notice
was given to him. Court held that notice is
needed, even for the appointment of a
special administrator, as it is a position of
trust and confidence which needs notice (to
inform interested parties) and hearing
where the petitioner who seeks to be
were acquired after the marriage of
Manolito and Elaine (thus Conjugal
property);
(2) The compulsory heirs are Elaine
(Surviving Spouse) and 2 minor Children;
(3) Manolito died intestate (w/o a will);
and
(4) Elaine isthe most preferred to be the
administrator.
The special administratrix filed a
motion for writ of possession over 5 of
Manolito's vehicles (who were in the
possession of Manolito's father - Pedro de
Guzman - the petitioner) and granted by the
probate court. The Petitioner made
appearance and sought for extension to file
opposition to the Motion for writ of
possession. Respondent filed Ex-Parte
Motion to be appointed as the Special
Administatrix. The motion was set for
hearing and all parties directed to be
notified but no notice was given to the
petitioner.
The RTC granted Elaine as the special
administratrix and the motion for assistance
of some military men and/or policemen to
assist Elaine in preserving the estate of
Manolito. Elaine tried to enforce order.
Pedro de Guzman (petitioner) resisted,

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resulting in a "near shoot-out between
members of the Makati Police and CAPCOM
soldiers which was diffused by the arrival of
Mayor Binay and the agreement that the
bulldozer sought to be taken be placed in
Mayor Binay's custody while the parties
sought for clarification.
The order only covers properties of the
estate, not those claimed by the petitioner.
Pedro then filed a motion, which he gave a
list of properties he claimed he owns and
also filed this petition to annul the orders
given by the court.
Issue:
Whether a probate court may appoint a
special administratrix and issue a writ of
possession of alleged properties of a
decedent for the preservation of the estate
in a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the said deceased person
even before the probate court causes
notice to be served upon all interested
parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Held:
The probate court, in accordance with
Rule 79 Section 3 enunciates that the
parties must first cause notice through
publication of petition. The purpose is to
bring all interested persons within the
court's jurisdiction so that the judgment
therein becomes binding on all the world. If
there is no notice, the proceeding for
settlement of estate is void and should be
annulled or else, it may deprive a person of
his property w/o due process of law. The
court orders affecting other persons
subsequent to the petition filed are void
and subject to annulment.
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In this case, there was no notice before
the court and it acted on the motion of
Elaine to be the Special Administratrix and
issued a writ of possession of alleged
properties of the deceased person. It also
granted the motion for assistance to
preserve the estate of Manolito.If notice
was given, then the creditors and other
interested persons could have participated
in the proceedings. Since Elaine
immediately filed a motion to have herself
appointed as administratrix, Pedro, the
biggest creditor of the estate who has the
largest interest in it, is prejudiced.
Case Digested by: Michael L. Cutor
37
DE ARANZ v THE HON.
NICOLAS GALING
G.R. No. 77047
May 28, 1988
Topic: Notice of probate proceedings
Doctrine: The requirement of the law for the
allowance of will was not satisfied by mere
publication of notice of hearing. Notice of
hearing to the designated heirs, legatees
and devisees are required. It is a
proceedings in rem and for the validity of
such proceedings personal notice or by
publication or both to all interested parties
must be made. The interested parties in the
case were known to reside in the Philippines.
The evidence shows that no such notice was
received by the interested parties residing in
the Philippines.
Synopsis: Respondent filed a petition for
the probate of the will of Monseratt Infante
Y Pola. Thereafter, the probate court issued
an order for the requisite hearing and the
judge complied with the mandatory three
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week publication of the order. Come
hearing date, no oppositor appeared and so
the judge reset the hearing date. No
oppositor made manifestation on the later
date, compelling the judge to request for
the submission of evidence ex-parte.
Respondent immediately presented
evidence that same day. Petitioners made
an appearance contesting the probate on
the ground that no notice was ever sent to
them and requested ten days to file an
opposition. Petitioners assert that failure to
notify the legatees/devisees deprives the
court of jurisdiction. Joaquin opposing,
garnered the affirmation of both the RTC
and CA
FACTS:
On 3 March 1986, private respondent
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 166, a petition for the probate and
allowance of the last will and testament of
the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola The
petition specified the names and ad-
dresses of herein petitioners as legatees
and devisees.
On 12 March 1986, the probate court
issued an order setting the petition for
hearing on 5 May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning. Said order was published in the
"Nueva Era" A newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of
the hearing, no oppositor appeared. There
being no opposition to this instant case, as
prayed for, the oner to-receive Branch Clerk
of Court is hereby designated Co evidence
ex-parte of the petitioner.
On the same day (12 May 1986),
private respondent presented his evidence
ex-parte and placed Arturo Arceo one of the
testamentary witnesses, on the witness
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stand. During the proceedings, private
respondent was appointed executor.
On 14 May 1986, petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order of
12 May 1986 alleging that, as named
legatees, no notices were sent to them as
required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court and they prayed that they be given a
period of ten (10) days within which to file
their opposition to the probate of the will.
On 30 May 1986, the probate court,
acting on the opposition of private
respondent and the reply thereto of
petitioners, issued an order denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition which was, however, referred to
the Court of Appeals. On 13 January 1987,
the Court of Appeals promulgated a
decision dismissing the petition. Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether probate may proceed despite
the failure of personal notice to the
legatees and devisees?
RULING:
No. The probate proceedings was mired
in procedural lapses which deprived the
court of jurisdiction. The pertinent rule
follows:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and
executors to be notified by mail or
personally. The court shall also cause
copies of the notice of the time and place
fixed for proving the will to be addressed to
the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines at their places of
 Liceo University Law
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residence, and deposited in the post office
with the postage thereon prepaid at least
twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such
places of residence be known. A copy of the
notice must in like manner be mailed to the
person named as executor, if he be not the
petitioner; also, to any person named as co-
executor not petitioning, if their places of
residence be known. Personal service of
copies of the notice at least ten (10) days
before the day of hearing shall be
equivalent to mailing.
The CAs ruling that notification was
merely a matter of convenience sits in stark
disregard of the law which makes notice
mandatory. Probate is a proceeding in rem
and for the validity of such proceedings
personal notice or by publication or both to
all interested parties must be made. The
will and the alleged probate thereof cannot
be said to have been done in accordance
with the accepted basic and fundamental
concepts and principles followed in the
probate and allowance of wills. The
Supreme Court remanded the case to the
RTC for further proceedings after nullifying
the CA.
Case digested by: Michael L. Cutor
38
Ethel Grimm Roberts v Judge
Ramos R. Leonida
G.R. No. L-55509
April 27, 1984
Topic: Separate wills may be probated
jointly
Doctrine: It is anomalous that the estate of
a person who died testate should be settled
in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the
intestate case should be consolidated with
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the testate proceeding and the judge
assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.
Synopsis: Edward M. Grimm, an American
resident of Manila, died living two wills
disposing his properties in California and in
the Philippines. His heirs, both in his
previous and subsequent marriage, are
having a common dispute as to the
distribution of properties of the deceased.
Facts:
Edward M. Grimm, an American
Resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati
Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He
was survived by his second wife, Maxine
Tate Grimm (Maxine) and their two children,
named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and
Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris
and Ethel Grimm Roberts (Ethel), his two
children by a first marriage which ended in
divorce.
He executed two wills in San
Francisco, California. One will disposed of
his Philippine estate and the second will
disposed of his estate outside of the
Philippines which he described as conjugal
property of himself and his second wife.
The two wills and a codicil were presented
for probate by Maxine in the Third Judicial
District Court of Utah. Maxine admitted that
she received notice of the intestate petition
in Manila by Ethel. Grimms second wife
and two children alleged that the intestate
proceeding in Manila is void.
Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge
of the intestate proceeding in Manila,
entered into a compromise agreement in
Utah regarding the estate. An intestate
proceeding was instituted by Ethel; and
Maxine filed an opposition and motion to
dismiss the intestate proceeding on the
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ground of pendency of the Utah probate
proceedings. She submitted to the court a
copy of Grimms will. Despite the
compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew
the opposition and the motion to dismiss.
The court ignored the will found in the
record and proceeded with the partition of
the estate.
Maxine then filed a petition praying
for the probate of the two wills (already
probated in Utah), that the partition
approved by the intestate court be set aside
and the letters of administration revoked,
that Maxine be appointed executrix and
Ethel be ordered to account for the
properties received by them and return the
same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they
were defrauded due to the machinations of
Ethel, that the compromise agreement was
illegal and the intestate proceeding was
void because Grimm died testate so
partition was contrary to the decedents
wills.
This prompted Ethel to file a motion
to dismiss the petition which was denied by
Judge Leonidas for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the testate
proceedings in Utah should be dismissed
Ruling:
A testate proceeding is proper in this
case because Grimm died with two wills and
No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved or allowed. The
probate of the will is mandatory. It is
anomalous that the estate of a person who
died testate should be settled in an
intestate proceeding. Therefore, the
intestate case should be consolidated with
the testate proceeding and the judge
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assigned to the intestate proceeding should
continue hearing the two case.
Prepared by: Abdul Adap
Rule 78
39
PCIB v. Hon. Venicio Escolin,
et. al.
G.R. NO. L- 27860 and L-27896
March 29, 1974
Topic: Joint Administration Preferred
Doctrine: In order that a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased
person may be deemed ready for final
closure, (1) there should have been issued
already an order of distribution or
assignment of the estate of the decedent
among or to those entitled thereto by will or
by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued
until after it is shown that the debts,
funeral expenses, expenses of
administration, allowances, taxes, etc.
chargeable to the estate have been paid,
which is but logical and proper. (3) Besides,
such an order is usually issued upon proper
and specific application for the purpose of
the interested party or parties, and not of
the court.
Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may
not be taken judicial notice of and have to
be proven like any other fact in dispute
between the parties in any proceeding.
Synopsis: Hodges, an American citizen from
Texas and domiciled in the Philippines made
a will, leaving her entire estate to her
 Liceo University Law
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husband. However it was also stated in her
will that should her husband die, all of the
estate will be turned over to her brother
and sister. When Mr. Hodges died Magno
was the appointed administratrix which was
later on replaced by PCIB. PCIB contending
that Mrs. Hodges will instituting her
siblings is not a valid substitution.
Facts:
The instant cases refer to the estate
left by the late Charles Newton Hodges (Mr.
Hodges) as well as that of his wife, Linnie
Jane Hodges (Mrs. Hodges), both citizens of
Texas, U.S.A. Mrs. Hodges predeceased Mr.
Hodges. In their respective wills which were
executed on different occasions, each one
of them provided mutually as follows: "I
give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder (after funeral and
administration expenses, taxes and debts)
of my estate, both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to my
beloved (spouse) to have and to hold unto
(him/her) during (his/her) natural
lifetime", subject to the condition that upon
the death of whoever of them survived the
other, the remainder of what he or she
would inherit from the other is "give(n),
devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the
brothers and sisters of the latter. Mr.
Hodges was appointed special administrator
of Mrs. Hodges estate. On December 25,
1962, Mr. Hodges died. Avelina A. Magno
(Avelina) was then appointed as
Administratrix for both Estate of Mr.
Hodges and Mrs. Hodges but eventually
replaced by PCIB for the estate of Mr.
Hodges.
PCIB contended that the estate of
Mrs. Hodges has already been in effect
closed with the virtual adjudication in the
previous orders of the court of her whole
estate to Mr. Hodges, and that, therefore,
Avelina had already ceased since then to
have any estate to administer and the
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no
interests whatsoever in the estate left by
Mr. Hodges. Additionally, PCIB maintains
that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will
instituting her brothers and sisters in the
manner therein specified is in the nature of
a testamentary substitution, but inasmuch
as the purported substitution is not, in its
view, in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective
and may not be enforced. It is further
contended that, in any event, inasmuch as
the Hodges spouses were both residents of
the Philippines, the estate left by Mrs.
Hodges could not be more than one-half of
her share of the conjugal partnership,
notwithstanding the fact that she was
citizen of Texas, U.S.A. Avelina claimed that
the applicable law to the will of Mrs.
Hodges is that of Texas under which there is
no system of legitime, hence, the estate of
Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than her share
or one-half of the conjugal partnership
properties.
Issues:
Whether or not the special
proceeding for settlement of Mrs. Hodges
estate should already be closed.
Whether or not the Texas law is
applicable.
Held:
No. The court orders furnish no basis
for the final adjudication to Mr. Hodges of
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and what is
more, at the time said orders were issued,
the proceedings had not yet reached the
point when a final distribution and
adjudication could be made. At best,

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therefore, said orders merely allowed Mr. party related to the effects of foreign laws,
Hodges to dispose of portions of his which have to be proven in our courts like
inheritance in advance of final adjudication, any other controverted fact, create
which is implicitly permitted under Section estoppel.
2 of Rule 109, there being no possible
prejudice to third parties. The provision in Case Digested by: Dafodille Dinero
the will of Mrs. Hodges made it imperative
that the conjugal partnership be promptly
liquidated, in order that the "rest, residue

40
and remainder" of Mrs. Hodges share De Parreno v. Aranzanso
thereof, as of the time of Mr. Hodges' death, G.R. No. L-27657
may be readily known and identified, August 5, 1986
however, no such liquidation was ever
undertaken.

The case is remanded for further
proceedings and resolution in the first
instance by the court a quo. The question of
what are the pertinent laws of Texas and
what would be the estate of Mrs. Hodges
under them is basically one of fact, and
considering the respective positions of the
parties in regard to said factual issue, it can
already be deemed as settled for the
purposes of these cases that, indeed, the
free portion of said estate that could
possibly descend to her brothers and sisters
by virtue of her will may not be less than
one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it
appearing that the difference in the stands
of the parties has reference solely to the
legitime of Mr. Hodges, PCIB being of the
view that under the laws of Texas, there is
such a legitime of one-fourth of said
conjugal estate and Avelina contending, on
the other hand, that there is none. In other
words, hereafter, whatever might
ultimately appear, at the subsequent
proceedings, to be actually the laws of
Texas on the matter would no longer be of
any consequence, since PCIB would anyway
be in estoppel already to claim that the
estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than
as contended by it now, for admissions by a
Topic: An administrator does not have to
be an heir. He can be a stranger to the
deceased.
Doctrine: In the estate of the deceased, an
administration need not be that of the heir
of the deceased. It may be a stranger to the
deceased. Any person may be an
administrator of the deceased estate insofar
as it is not contrary to Rule 78, Section 1.
Synopsis: During the intestate proceedings
of the decedent, the court appointed only
special administrators until a person
claiming to be her first cousin prayed that
she be appointed as the regular
administrator. Her appointment as
administrator was revoked; appointing
another person as administratrix.
Facts:
Juliana Reyes died in intestate. Her
substantial estate is still being settled in
Special Proceedings No. 34354 of the First
Court of Instance of Manila, Branch IV. The
estate had only special administrators until
Aranzanso who claims to be first cousin of
the decedent asked that she be appointed
regular administrator. CFI Manila issued an
order appointing Aranzanso as regular

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 Liceo University Law
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administrator relieving Arceli Pilapil as
special administrator. CA reversed the CFI
ruling revoking Aranzanso as regular
administrator and appointing the petitioner
Paulina R. Santos, adoptive daughter of the
decedent.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in removing the
appellant as regular administrarix of the
estate of Juliana Reyes.
Ruling:
Yes, it stands to reason that the
appellant having been appointed as regular
administrator can only be removed from
her office but only for a cause or caused
provided by law which is found on Rule 82,
Section 2. Aranzanso, may not have the
right to intervene in the settlement
proceedings as an heir of Juliana Reyes but
an administrator may be a stranger to the
estate of the decedent.
Case Digested by: Erniel Peter G. Dael
41
Gonzales v. Aguinaldo
G.R. No. 74769
September 28, 1990
Topic: Interest in Estate is the Principal
Consideration
Doctrine: While it is conceded that the court
is invested with ample discretion in the
removal of an administrator, it however
must have some fact legally before it in
order to justify a removal. There must be
evidence of an act or omission on the part of
the administrator not conformable to or in
disregard of the rules or the orders of the
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court, which it deems sufficient or
substantial to warrant the removal of the
administrator. In making such a
determination, the court must exercise good
judgment, guided by law and precedents.
Synopsis: Upon the death of the decedent,
the court appointed two administratrices,
however, Gonzales was removed as co-
administrator of the estate on the ground
that she had been absent from the country
because she was attending to her ailing
husband.
Facts:
Dona Ramona is survived by her four
children who are her only heirs namely,
Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa F.
Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-Gomez. On 25
October 1983, the court a quo appointed
petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and private
respondent Teresa Olbes as co-
administratices of the estate.
While petitioner was in the US
accompanying her ailing husband who was
receiving medical treatment in that country,
Private Respondent filed motion to remove
the Petitioner as co-adminstratrix, on the
ground that she is incapable or unsuitable
to discharge the trust and had committed
acts and ommisions detrimental to the
interest of the estate and the heirs.
Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed as
co-administratrix of the estate also on the
ground that she had been absent from the
country since October 1984 and had not
returned as of 15 January 1985, the date of
the questioned order, leaving respondent
Olbes alone to administer the estate. IN
here motion, it appears too that petitioner's
absence from the country was known to
respondent Olbes, and that the latter and
petitioner Gonzales had continually
 Liceo University Law
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maintained correspondence with each
other with respect to the administration of
the estate during the petitioner's absence
from the country; and while in the United
States, sent respondent Olbes a letter
addressed to the Land Bank of the
Philippines dated 14 November 1984, and
duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate in San Francisco, authorizing her
(Olbes) to receive, and collect the interests
accruing from the Land Bank bonds
belonging to the estate, and to use them for
the payment of accounts necessary for the
operation of the administration.
Issue:
Whether the removal of the co-
adminstrator is valid under Rule 82, Section
2 of ROC?
Ruling:
No. As the appointment of
petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and
no satisfactory cause for her removal was
shown, the court a quo gravely abused its
discretion in removing her. Stated
differently, petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales
was removed without just cause. Her
removal was therefore improper. The
petitioner had never abandoned her role as
co-administratrix of the estate nor had she
been remiss in the fullfilment of her duties.
Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the
state does not disqualify one to be an
administrator of the estate. A temporary
residence outside of the state, maintained
for the benefit of the health of the
executors' family, is not such a removal
from the state as to necessitate his removal
as executor.
Case Digested by: Erniel Peter G. Dael
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42
Capistrano v. Nadurata,
G.R. No. L-18754
September 26, 1992
Topic: Thirty-day Period May Be Waived
Doctrine: Just as the order of preference is
not absolute, and may be disregarded for a
valid cause despite the mandatory tenor in
the opening sentence of Rule 78 for its
observance, so may the 30-day period be
likewisee waived under the permissive tone
in the paragraph (b) of said rule which
merely provides that said letters as an
alternative, may be granted to one or more
of the principal creditors.
Synopsis: Upon appointment of the special
administrator, such was opposed by two
persons claiming to be the deceaseds
nearest relatives; the same was intervened
by Nadurata asserting to be the surviving
spouse of the latter and praying that the
letters of administration be issued to him.
The selection of an administrator of the
estate of the deceased lies within the
discretion of the court.
Facts:
The lower court appointed Justo
Buera as special administrator of the estate
of the deceased, Petra delos Santos. The
application was opposed by Pedro and Juan
de los Santos who prayed that they be
appointed as the administrators, which was
intervened by Leon Nadurata, asserting
himself to be the surviving spouse of the
Petra, also praying that the letters of
administration be issued in his favor.
After a hearing, it decided the
controversy, declaring Leon Nadurata not to
be the surviving spouse of Petra de los
Santos and that the latters nearest
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relatives are not the opponents Pedro de
los Santos and Juan de los Santos who
allege themselves to be, but are not,
brothers of the deceased; the applicants
Capistrano, who are her true brothers by
the same mother. Upon these findings, the
lower court confirmed the appointment of
Justo Buera as administrator of the estate.
Issue:
Whether Leon Nadurata is the
husband of the said deceased, and whether
the applicants, or the opponents Santos, are
her nearest relatives.
Ruling:
No.The selection of an administrator
of the estate of the deceased lies within the
discretion of the court and the record does
not contain anything tending to show an
abuse of discretion on the part of the lower
court, its ruling is right and just; for the
evidence shows that Nadurata is not the
surviving spouse of Petra de los Santos, and
the opponents Pedro de los Santos and Juan
de los Santos are not, as they pretend to be
brothers of the deceased.
However, the declarations of heirs
made by the lower court is premature,
although the evidence sufficiently shows
who are entitled to succeed the deceased.
The proceedings have not yet reached the
stage of distribution of the estate which
must come after the inheritance is
liquidated. Hence, the declaration of heirs is
still premature and must wait for that stage
of the proceedings that heirs may be
declared to succeed the deceased.
Case Digested by: Erniel Peter G. Dael
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43
Mendiola v. CA
G.R. No. 92999
October 11, 1990
Topic:Co-Administrators May Be
Appointed
Doctrine: The determination of a persons
suitability for the office of the judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the
sound judgement of the court exercising the
power of appointment and said judgment is
not to be interfered with on appeal unless
the said court is clearly in error.
Synopsis: This is a contest between two
brothers for the appointment as executor of
their fathers estate. The respondents
presented evidence against petitioner,
Reynaldo, contending that the latter failed
to render and accounting of the estate and
settle the same in according to law. The
petitioner assails the decision of the CA
removing him as an executor of the estate
of his late father and appointing his brother
in his stead.
Facts:
Carlos Mendiola died on December
28, 1984 and was survived by his spouse,
Florentina and his children namely,
Reynaldo, Redentor, Ernistina, Manuel,
Enrico, Ricardo, and Marilou all surnamed
Mendiola. A Petition for probate of the
decedents will was filed on March 30, 1987
with RTC-Pasig. Said court allowed the will
and issued letters of testamentary in favor
of the Petitioner who was declared
executor in the will. Later on, private
respondents moved for the removal of the
executor and subsequently moved for the
appointment of Redentor. Sufficient
evidence was adduced in the proceedings in
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the RTC, wherein petitioner failed to pay
the estate tax; and that petitioner failed to
render an accounting of the estate and
settle the same according to law. The
motion was granted and Petitioner was
removed. Redentor was declared executor
and a motion for reconsideration was filed
by the petitioner but was denied by the RTC.
On the CA, it affirmed the judgment of the
trial court.
Issue:
Was the removal of the Petitioner as
executor proper?
Ruling:
Yes, there was sufficient evidence to
support his removal namely, the failure to
pay the estate tax and to render an
accounting of the estate and settle the
same according to law, and has involved the
other heirs in a suit because of his own
deeds. Thus, his removal is valid under Rule
82, Section 2. Under this provision, the
court which appointed the executor has the
discretion to remove the same.
Case Digested by: Erniel Peter G. Dael
Rule 80
44
De Roxas v. Pecson, et. al.
G.R. NO. L- 2211
December 20, 1948
Topic: When Special Administrator may be
Appointed
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Doctrine: As the law does not say who
shall be appointed as special administrator
and the qualifications the appointee must
have, the judge or court has discretion in the
selection of the person to be appointed,
discretion which must be sound, that is, not
whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or
equity.
Synopsis: Maria Roxas was appointed as
special administratrix, however the
decedents widow filed a petition for
probate of an alleged will of her husband
and praying for her appointment as
executrix. The widow was appointed as
special administratrix of all conjugal
properties and Maria of the properties
belonging exclusively to the deceased. A
special administrator is but a temporary
administrator who is appointed to act in
lieu of the general administrator.
Facts:
Maria and Pedro Roxas, sister and
brother respectively of deceased Pablo M.
Roxas (Pablo), filed a petition for the
administration of the latter's estate where
Maria was appointed as special
administratrix. Natividad Vda. de Roxas
(Natividad), widow of Pablo, filed a petition
for the probate of an alleged will of her
deceased husband, and for her
appointment as executrix of his estate
designated in said will. Upon agreement of
both parties, the intestate proceeding was
dismissed and ordered closed by the court.
Natividad was appointed as special
administratrix and qualified as such over
the objection Maria and Pedro Roxas, who
sought the appointment of Maria as such.
Respondent judge, Potenciano Pecson,
rendered a decision denying the probate of
the will from which Natividad has appealed.
 Liceo University Law
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Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed their
petition for the appointment of Maria Roxas
as special administratrix or special co-
administratrix. Judge Pecson rendered his
resolution appointing Natividad as special
administratrix only of all the conjugal
properties of the deceased, and Maria
Roxas as special administratrix of all capital
or properties belonging exclusively to the
deceased Pablo.
Issues:
Whether or not the lower court has
the power to appoint two special
administrators of the estate of deceased
Pablo M. Roxas, one of the community
property and another of the exclusive
property of the decedent.
Held:
No. It is well settled that the
statutory provisions as to the prior or
preferred right of certain persons to the
appointment of administrator under section
1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory
provisions as to causes for removal of an
executor or administrator under section 653
of Act No. 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do
not apply to the selection or removal of
special administrator. There is nothing
wrong in that Judge Pecson, in exercising his
discretion and appointing Natividad as
special administratrix, had taken into
consideration the beneficial interest of
Natividad in the estate of the decedent and
her being designated in the will as executrix
thereof. However, Judge Pecsons
subsequent act of appointing her as special
administratrix only of the conjugal or
community property, and Maria Roxas as
special administratrix of the capital or
exclusive property of the decedent, does
not seem to be in conformity with logic or
reason. Natividad have, under the law, the
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right of usufruct over one-half of the
exclusive property of the decedent, besides
her share in the conjugal partnership. The
beneficial interest required as a
qualification for appointment as
administrator of the estate of a decedent is
the interest in the whole estate and not
only in some part thereof. Natividad being
entitled to one-half in usufruct of all the
exclusive properties of the decedent, she
would have as much if not more interest in
administering the entire estate correctly, in
order to reap the benefit of a wise, speedy,
economical administration of the state, and
not suffer the consequences of the waste,
improvidence or mismanagement thereof.
Under the law only one general
administrator may be appointed to
administer, liquidate and distribute the
estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly
follows that only one special administrator
may be appointed to administer
temporarily said estate, because a special
administrator is but a temporary
administrator who is appointed to act in
lieu of the general administrator.
Case Digested by: Dafodille Dinero
Rule 81
45
Luzon Surety Company, Inc. v.
Pastor T. Quebrar, et. al.
G.R. NO. L- 40517
January 31, 1984
Topics: Administrators Bond
Doctrine: Administrators bond does
not cease to be effective with the courts
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approval of the project of partition and
statement of accounts. The surety is liable
on the bond for as long as the estates
administrator/ executor has duties to do
and it appears that Pastor still has duties to
do as an administrator of the estate even
after the approval of the project of partition
and statement of accounts for there were
still debts and expenses to be paid. The term
of a bond does not expire until the
administration is closed.
Synopsis: Surety company entered into an
indemnity agreements wherein they agreed
to become sureties to 2 administrator's
bond in favor of Pastor Quebar, and the
latter agreed to pay them. Quebar
submitted a project of partition and
accounts which was approved by the court,
so Quebar argues that the bond should now
be cancelled (thus, not paying anything
more to the surety). Surety sues the
administrator for amounts due to it. Court
held that the administrators bond still exists,
coterminous with the probate proceedings.
And even if there's already a project of
partition, as long as not all of the debts are
paid, the administrator's job is not yet done,
thus, the bond still subsists and the
administrator is still liable to pay the surety.
Facts:
Luzon Surety Company, Inc. (Luzon
Surety) issued two administrators bond in
behalf of Pastor T. Quebrar (Pastor), as an
administrator in two special proceedings. In
consideration of the suretyship wherein
Luzon Surety was bound jointly and
severally with Pastor, the latter, together
with Francisco Kilayko (Francisco), executed
two indemnity agreements. For the first
year, from August 9, 1954 to August 9, 1955,
Pastor and Francisco paid the amount
agreed in the indemnity agreement.
On June 6, 1957, the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental approved the
amended Project of Partition and Accounts
of Pastor. On May 8, 1962, the Luzon Surety
demanded from Pastor and Francisco the
payment of the premiums and documentary
stamps from August 9,1955. Pastor and
Francisco filed a motion for cancellation
and/or reduction of executor's bonds which
the CFI of Negros Occidental granted and
ordered the cancellation of the bonds.
Luzon Surety demanded payment from
Pastor and Francisco for the period of
August 9, 1955 to October 20, 1962. Pastor
and Francisco contended that the
administrators bond ceased to be of legal
force and effect with the approval of the
project of partition and accounts on June 6,
1957. The CFI of Negros Occidental and the
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Luzon
Surety.
Issue:
Whether or not the administrators
bonds were in force and effect from and
after the year they were filed and approved
by the court up to 1962, when they were
cancelled.
Held:
Yes. Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules
of Court requires the
administrator/executor to put up a bond for
the purpose of indemnifying the creditors,
heirs, legatees and the estate. It is
conditioned upon the faithful performance
of the administrator's trust. Having in mind
the purpose and intent of the law, the
surety is then liable under the
administrator's bond, for as long as the
administrator has duties to do as such
administrator/executor. Since the liability of

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the sureties is co-extensive with that of the
administrator and embraces the
performance of every duty he is called upon
to perform in the course of administration,
it follows that the administrator is still duty
bound to respect the indemnity agreements
entered into by him in consideration of the
suretyship. It is shown that Pastor still had
something to do as an
administrator/executor even after the
approval of the amended project of
partition and accounts on June 6, 1957.
Pastor did not cease as administrator after
June 6, 1957, for administration is for the
purpose ofliquidation of the estate and
distribution of the residue among the heirs
and legatees. And liquidation means the
determination of all the assets of the estate
and payment of all the debts and expenses.
It appears that there were still debts and
expenses to be paid after June 6, 1957. The
term of a bond does not usually expire until
the administration has been closed and
terminated in the manner directed by law.
Thus, as long as the probate court retains
jurisdiction of the estate, the bond
contemplates a continuing liability
notwithstanding the non-renewal of the
bond by Pastor and Francisco.
Case Digested by: Dafodille Dinero
46
Sandejas vs Lina
GR No. 14634
Feb. 5, 2001
Topic: DISTRIBUTION OF PARTITION OF THE
ESTATE.
Synopsis/Doctrine:
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In settling the estate of the deceased, a
probate court has jurisdiction over matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of
its recognized powers. Such matters include
selling, mortgaging or otherwise
encumbering realty belonging to the estate.
Facts:
On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro
Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower
court praying that letters of administration
be issued in his favor for the settlement of
the estate of his wife, REMEDIOS R.
SANDEJAS. Letters of Administration were
issued by the lower court appointing
Eliodoro as administrator.
On November 19, 1981, the 4th
floor of Manila City Hall was burned and
among the records burned were the records
of the Court where Sandejas filed his
petition.
On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus
Pleading for motion to intervene and
petition-in-intervention was filed by Alex A.
Lina alleging that Sandejas, in his capacity as
seller, obligated to sell to Lina 4 parcels of
land.
Eliodoro died sometime in
November 1984 in Canada His counsel is
still waiting for official word on the fact of
the death of the administrator. He also
alleged that the matter of the claim of Alex
becomes a money claim to be filed in
Eliodoro's estate. the lower court issued an
order directing the other heirs of Sandejas
to move for the appointment of a new
administrator within 15 days from receipt of
the order.
On January 1986, Alex filed a Motion
for his appointment as a new administrator
of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R.
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Sandejas on the following reasons: that Alex
has not received any motion for the
appointment of an administrator in place of
Eliodoro; that his appointment would be
beneficial to the heirs; that he is willing to
give away his being an administrator as long
as the heirs has found one. The heirs chose
Sixto Sandejas as new administrator. They
were reasoning out that it was only at a
later date that Sixto accepted the
appointment. The lower court substituted
Alex Lina with Sixto Sandejas as
administrator.
On November 1993, Alex filed an
Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of
conditional sale executed between Alex A.
Lina and Elidioro and to compel the heirs to
execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Alex. The lower court granted Alex's motion.
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA
held that the contract between Eliodoro
Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a
contract to sell, not a perfected contract of
sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four
lots was to remain in the intestate estate of
Remedios until the approval of the sale was
obtained from the settlement court.
Issue:
What is the settlement court's
jurisdiction?
Ruling:
Court approval is required in any disposition
of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court. One can sell their rights,
custodia legis, but only with the court's
permission.
Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this
action to proceed. The factual differences
have no bearing on the intestate court's
jurisdiction over the approval of the subject
conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers
all matters relating to the settlement of
estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate
of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons,
including the appointment and the removal
of administrators and executors (Rules 78-
85). It also extends to matters incidental
and collateral to the exercise of a probate
court's recognized powers such as selling,
mortgaging or otherwise encumbering
realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the
rules on this point are intended to settle the
estate in a speedy manner, so that the
benefits that may flow from such
settlement may be immediately enjoyed by
the heirs and the beneficiaries.
In the present case, the Motion was
meant to settle the decedent's obligation to
Alex; hence, that obligation clearly falls
under the jurisdiction of the settlement
court. To require respondent to file a
separate action -- on whether petitioners
should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s
share of the disputed realty -- will
unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the
intestate estates of the deceased spouses
Case digested by: Iris Paola M. Tabimina

47
interests or participation in the property Spouses PASTOR Jr. v. CA
under administration. A stipulation G.R. No. L-56340,
requiring court approval does not affect the
validity and the effectivity of the sale as
regards the selling heirs. It merely implies
that the property may be taken out of

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Topic: DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I

THE ESTATE
Doctrine:
In a special proceeding for the
probate of a will, the issue by and large is
restricted to the extrinsic validity of a will,
i.e., whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law (Rules
of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section
9).
As a rule, the question of ownership
is an extraneous matter which the Probate
Court can not resolve with finality. Thus, for
the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should be included in the
inventory of estate properties, the Probate
Court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title
(Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of
Appeals. 91 SCRA 540
Facts:
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a
Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5,
1966, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia
Bossio (who also died on October 21, 1966),
their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor,
Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de
Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child,
not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito
Quemada QUEMADA PASTOR, JR. is a
Philippine citizen, having been naturalized
in 1936. SOFIA is a Spanish subject.
QUEMADA is a Filipino by his mother's
citizenship.
QUEMADA filed a petition for the
probate and allowance of an alleged
holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the
(PROBATE COURT). The will contained only
one testamentary disposition: a legacy in
favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of
PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by
Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some
mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.
The PROBATE COURT, upon motion
of QUEMADA and after an ex parte hearing,
appointed him special administrator of the
entire estate of PASTOR, SR..
QUEMADA as special administrator,
instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife
an action for reconveyance of alleged
properties of the estate, which included the
properties subject of the legacy and which
were in the names of the spouses PASTOR,
JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de
Pastor, who claimed to be the owners
thereof in their own rights, and not by
inheritance.
PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA
filed their opposition to the petition for
probate and the order appointing
QUEMADA as special administrator.
PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing
the will to probate.
On December 5, 1972, the PROBATE
COURT issued an order allowing the will to
probate. Appealed to the Court of Appeals,
the order was affirmed in a decision dated
May 9, 1977. On petition for review, the
Supreme Court dismissed the petition in a
minute resolution dated November 1, 1977
and remanded the same to the PROBATE
COURT after denying reconsideration on
January 11, 1978.
For two years after remand of the
case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA
filed pleading after pleading asking for

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 Liceo University Law
payment of his legacy and seizure of the
properties subject of said legacy. PASTOR,
JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on
the ground of pendency of the
reconveyance suit with another branch of
the Cebu Court of First Instance. All
pleadings remained unacted upon by the
PROBATE COURT.
The PROBATE COURT set the hearing
on the intrinsic validity of the will for March
25, 1980, but upon objection of PASTOR, JR.
and SOFIA on the e ground of pendency of
the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held
on March 25. Instead, the PROBATE COURT
required the parties to submit their
respective position papers as to how much
inheritance QUEMADA was entitled to
receive.
1. A. Pastor, Jr. ...................................40.5%
2. E. Pelaez, Sr. ...................................15.0%
3. B. Quemada ......................................4.5%
While the reconveyance suit was
still being litigated in Branch IX of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, the PROBATE
COURT issued the now assailed Order of
Execution and Garnishment, resolving the
question of ownership of the royalties
payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that
the legacy to QUEMADA was not inofficious.
The order being "immediately
executory", QUEMADA succeeded in
obtaining a Writ of Execution and
Garnishment, the oppositors sought
reconsideration thereof on the same date
primarily on the ground that the PROBATE
COURT gravely abused its discretion when it
resolved the question of ownership of the
royalties and ordered the payment of
QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely
passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will.
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Special Procedings
S.Y. 2016-2017
Issue:
Whether the Probate Order of
December 5, 1972 resolved with finality the
questions of ownership and intrinsic validity
of the will.
Ruling:
NO.In a special proceeding for the
probate of a will, the issue by and large is
restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will,
i.e., whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law.
(Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76,
Section 9.) As a rule, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which
the Probate Court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the
inventory of estate properties, the Probate
Court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title.
The rule is that execution of a
judgment must conform to that decreed in
the dispositive part of the decision
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is
there a declaration of ownership of specific
properties. On the contrary, it is manifest
therein that ownership was not resolved.
For it confined itself to the question of
extrinsic validity of the win, and the need
for and propriety of appointing a special
administrator. Thus it allowed and
approved the holographic win "with respect
to its extrinsic validity, the same having
been duly authenticated pursuant to the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law."
It declared that the intestate estate
administration aspect must proceed "
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subject to the outcome of the suit for
reconveyance of ownership and possession
of real and personal properties in Civil Case
274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu."
[Parenthetically, although the statement
refers only to the "intestate" aspect, it
defies understanding how ownership by the
estate of some properties could be deemed
finally resolved for purposes of testate
administration, but not so for intestate
purposes. Can the estate be the owner of a
property for testate but not for intestate
purposes?] Then again, the Probate Order
(while indeed it does not direct the
implementation of the legacy) conditionally
stated that the intestate administration
aspect must proceed "unless . . . it is
proven . . . that the legacy to be given and
delivered to the petitioner does not exceed
the free portion of the estate of the
testator," which clearly implies that the
issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect
of intrinsic validity) was in fact not resolved.
Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on
the propriety of allowing QUEMADA to
remain as special administrator of estate
properties not covered by the holographic
will, "considering that this (Probate) Order
should have been properly issued solely as a
resolution on the issue of whether or not to
allow and approve the aforestated will."
That the Probate Order did not
resolve the question of ownership of the
properties listed in the estate inventory was
appropriate, considering that the issue of
ownership was the very subject of
controversy in the reconveyance suit that
was still pending in Branch IX of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu. What, therefore, the
Court of Appeals and, in effect, the
Supreme Court affirmed en toto when they
reviewed the Probable Order were only the
matters properly adjudged in the said Order
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It was, therefore, error for the
assailed implementing Orders to conclude
that the Probate Order adjudged with
finality the question of ownership of the
mining properties and royalties, and that,
premised on this conclusion, the dispositive
portion of the said Probate Order directed
the special administrator to pay the legacy
in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed. The Order of
execution issued by the probate Court, as
well as all the Orders issued subsequent
thereto in alleged implementation of the
Probate Order dated December 5, 1972, are
hereby set aside; and this case is remanded
to the appropriate Regional Trial Court for
proper proceedings
Digested By: Iris Paola Tabimina
48
Jimoga-on v. Belmonte
84 Phil 545
Topic: DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF
THE ESTATE
Doctrine:
While the jurisdiction of the probate
court includes the power to entertain the
question of whether or not a person is a
natural hild acknowledged by the decedent,
it is only after, and not before, the payment
of all debts, funeral expenses, charges of
administration, allowances to the widow,
and inheritance tax shall have been effected
that the court should make declaration of
heirs or of such person as are entitled by law
to the residue
 Liceo University Law
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Facts:
This is an appeal from the order of
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
appointing Apolonia Jimoga-on as
administratix of the estate of Marcelino
Belmonte, and failing to adjudge the
movants-appellants Julita and Ulpiano
Belmonte to be acknowledged natural
children of Marceio Belmonte and to
appoint Julita Belmonte as administratix of
the properties acquired by the deceased
before his marriage to Apolonio Jimoga-on
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court
erred in not making an adjudication to the
effect that they are acknowledged natural
children of the deceased?
Ruling:
The petition does not hold merit.
First, the matter so far taken up by the
lower court was limited to the appointment
of the judicial administratix. In other words,
while no jurisdiction was made on the
status of the appellants, this fact does not
preclude future action on the point. And
second, while the jurisdiction of the probate
court includes the power to entertain the
acknowledged by the decedent, it is only
after, and not before, the payment of all
debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow,
and inheritance tax shall have been effected
that the court should make a declaration of
heirs or of such persons as are entitled by
law to the residue.
Case digested by: Iris Paola Tabimina
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Rule 82
49
Cobarubbias v Dizon
GR. No. L- 225
February 26 1946
Topic: Removal of Executors and
Administrators
Doctrine: The power of the CFI to render
ineffective the appointment of an
administrator, when the appointment has
been obtained through false or incorrect
representations, is indisputable. The
position of an administrator is one of trust.
As soon as you lose your confidence in the
integrity of the appointment, the court is
fully justified in revoking your appointment
as administrator.
Facts:
The petitioner Magdalena
Cobarrubias filed an urgent motion, alleging
that the funeral Pilar Leyba had deposited
sys alhajas Are worth P4,500 in security
section of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands; That said bank notified all
interested parties that they withdraw the
contents of their section within the shortest
possible time, so she asked to be appointed
special administrator and that she was
authorized to withdraw said jewelry from
the bank. In her application Magdalena
Cobarrubias stated that she was the only
forced heiress of the late Pilar
Leyba. Accepting as good these allegations,
the Honorable Judge Dizon on the same
date, July 5, 1945, appointed Magdalena
Cobarrubias special administrator on bail of
P200. On July 19, the petitioner filed a brief
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alleging that since the Court "has rescinded
its order dated 5 of said month and year,"
requested that the Court order the
cancellation of the bond of P200 and its
return to the lawyer of the applicant.
Issue:
Whether or not appointed special
administrator can be revoked.
Ruling:
Yes.
Revoking the appointment of the
appellant as special administrator and
revoking the order authorizing her to
withdraw the deposited jewels, the Court
does not abuse its discretion, nor work
outside its jurisdiction. The Court of First
Instance has the power to render
ineffective the appointment of an
administrator when the appointment has
been obtained through false or incorrect
representations, is indisputable. When the
Court appointed the appellant special
administrator with authorization to
withdraw from the bank jewels valued at
P4,500 under a P200 bond, it took into
account its essential claim that "it was the
sole forced heiress of the deceased." There
was no danger of possible
embezzlement; They could even name it
without bail. But upon receiving a report
that this allegation was inaccurate. Which
was confirmed by the motion of the same
petitioner who requested the "suspension
of publication and postponement of the
hearing" because he wished to "have time
to arrange an extrajudicial partition with his
co-heirs," the court had ample grounds to
revoke those orders even Without
notification to the administrator: the
intestate is not initiated for the benefit of
the administrators but of the heirs. The
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court should act immediately and not put in
danger. With his indifference, the jewels. If
he allowed a few hours to pass, without
taking drastic action, the jewels valued at
P4,500 could be withdrawn by the special
administrator who was only secured in P200
to the detriment of the interests of the
minors. The zeal shown by the court was
well founded. The position of special
administrator is one of trust. As soon as it
lost its confidence in the integrity of the
applicant, the Court was fully justified in
revoking its appointment as special
administrator and withdrawing its
authorization to remove the jewels from
the bank.
Case Digested by: Paul W. Hembrador
50
Advincula v. Teodoro
GR No. L-9282
May 31,1956
TOPIC: Revocation of Administration,
Death, Resignation, and Removal of
Executors and Administrators
Doctrine: The mere discover of a document
purporting to be the last will and testament
of the decedent after appointment of an
administrator and assumption that the
decedent died intestate does not, ipso facto
nullify the letters of administration already
issued or even authorized their revocation
until the will had been proved and allowed.
Synopsis: Brothers of the deceased wanted
to oust surviving spouse/brother in law as
administrator of their sister's estate, after
the surviving spouse was already appointed
as such and after the intestate proceedings
already commenced, by showing the will
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which allegedly appointed one of them as already issued or even authorized the
executor. The court held that until the will is revocation thereof, until the alleged will is
probated, the provision in the will making proved and allowed by the court.
one of them as the executor of the estate is
Furthermore, the lower court
not effective.
appears to have followed the argument of
Facts: the respondents that Emilio, being foreign
to the deceaseds estate is incapable of
Emilio Advincula was appointed as
being an administrator. This argument is
special administrator, then later regular
untenable because from the viewpoint of
administrator of his deceased wifes estate.
logic and experience, a stranger may be
After he qualified as administrator, his
competent, capable and fit to be
brothers-in-law submitted a document
administrator of the estate in the same way
purporting to be the deceaseds will. Emilio
that a family member can be incompetent,
opposed the probate of the will on the
incapable and unfit to do so. Besides, Emilio
ground that the signature was not his wifes
Advincula as the surviving spouse is a forced
and even if it was, the same was procured
heir of the deceased. He is entitled to of
by fraud. One of the brothers-in-law
all property apart from his share of the
Enrique Lacson, prayed that he, be
other half thereof as heir of the deceased
appointed as administrator in lieu of Emilio.
since all property of the marriage is
During the hearing, it was alleged that
presumed to belong to the conjugal
Emilio was incompetent, incapable and
partnership.
unsuitable to act as administrator because
Emilio is foreign to the estate. The court Lastly, Advincula has not been found
ruled in favor of Enriques motion. Emilio guilty of any specific act or omission
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the constituting one of the legal grounds,
same was denied so he instituted the enumerated in Rule 83, section 2, of the
present action for certiorari to annul the Rules of Court, for the removal of an
lower courts order. executor or administrator. Hence, it is clear
that Respondent Judge exceeded his
Issue:
jurisdiction in removing Advincula and
Whether the lower court acted with appointing Lacson as administrator of the
grave abuse of discretion in granting estate of the deceased Josefa Lacson
Lacsons motion. Advincula.
Held: Case Digested by: Sweet Ross Elumba
Yes. The appointment of Lacson as
administrator in lieu of Advincula is
predicated on the fact that Lacson was
named executor of the deceaseds will. This
provision, however, cannot be enforced
until said will is submitted to probate.
The discovery of the will does not
ipso facto nullify letters of administration

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51
LAO v. GENATO
G.R. No. L-56451,
June 19, 1985
TOPIC: Revocation of Administration,
Death, Resignation, and Removal of
Executors and Administrators
Doctrine: In the discharge of his functions,
the administrator should act with utmost
circumspection in order to preserve the
estate and guard against its dissipation so
as not to prejudice its editors and the heirs
of the decedents who are entitled to the net
residue thereof.
Synopsis: Petitioner spouses were
promised in a Mutual Agreement of
Promise to sell between them and private
respondent Sotero Dionisio, Jr., heir and
administrator of the intestate estate of
deceased mother Rosenda Abuton. The
promisor bound himself to sell the subject
property to the petitioners. Respondent
administrator Sotero DIonisio, Jr., with due
notice to all co-heirs, filed a Motion
for Authority to sell certain properties of
the deceased to settle the outstanding
obligations of the estate. The Probate
court authorized the administrator to sell.
The authorization was made to settle
outstanding obligations of the estate. But,
the sale to his very son for a grossly low
price was indubitable shown to be
fictitious. The consideration was never
accounted for in the probate court.
Facts:
On June 25, 1980, Sotero Jr., with
due notice to all his co-heirs, moved to sell
certain properties of the deceased to pay
off certain debts. The motion was granted.
So, Sotero Jr. sold to his son, Sotero III, the
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subject property which the latter sold to
William Go. Respondent-heir Florida Nuqui,
moved to annul the sale on the ground that
it was made in violation of the court's order
and that the consideration of the two sales
were grossly inadequate. Sotero Jr. opposed
Nuquis motion alleging that the actual
consideration of the sale was P200,000.00
and they agreed that preference will be
given to close family members to keep the
property within the family. Nuqui filed a
Reply, stating that the two sales were but a
single transaction simultaneously hatched
and consummated in one occasion. The
other heirs joined Nuquis motion.
Respondent Go moved to intervene
and manifested that he paid Sotero III
P225,000.00 and being a purchaser in good
faith and for value, his title to the property
is indefeasible pursuant to law.
On February 6, 1981, petitioner
spouses moved to intervene and alleged
that Sotero Jr, without revealing that the
property had already been sold to William
Go, entered into a Mutual Agreement of
Promise to Sell to them for P270,000 which
was reduced to P220,000.00; that they paid
earnest money of P70,000; that the balance
of P150,000 was to be paid upon the
production of the TCT and the execution of
the final Deed of Sale; that Sotero III the
was merely a nominal party because the
negotiation and transactions were between
the Sotero Jr. and petitioners; that the
contract of sale has been perfected because
earnest money was already paid; that the
sale in favor of Go was made to defraud the
estate and the other heirs.
At the hearing, petitioners
submitted a copy of the Contract of
mortgage executed by Sotero Jr in favor of
Juan Lao, one of the petitioners, whereby
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the former mortgaged "all his undivided
interest in the estate of his deceased
mother.
After several days of hearing,
respondent Judge allowed all the interested
parties to bid for the property. Go bid
P280,000.00. Petitioners bid P282,000.00,
spot cash. All the heirs, except the
administrator (Sotero Jr.), filed a Motion Ex
Parte stated that the offer of William Go
appears the highest obtainable price and
that of the petitioners was not been made
within a reasonable period. So, they
submitted an amicable settlement to which
the petitioners opposed because they
offered to buy the property for 300,000.
Despite said opposition, respondent Judge
approved the Amicable Settlement.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale entered into by
Sotero, the administrator is valid?
HELD:
Sotero Jr. as administrator occupies
a position of the highest trust and
confidence. In the case at bar, the sale was
made necessary "in order to settle other
existing obligations of the estate. In order to
guarantee faithful compliance with the
authority granted, respondent Judge
ordered him to submit to this Court for
approval the transactions made by him."
The sale to his son was for the
grossly low price of only P75,000,00.
Dionisio III has no income whatsoever and
still a dependent of Dionisio, Jr. On top of
that, not a single centavo, of the P75,000.00
was ever accounted for nor reported by
Dionisio, Jr. to the probate court. Neither
did he submit said transaction as mandated
by the order for its approval. This sale was
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confirmed and legalized by His HONOR's
approval of the assailed Amicable
Settlement. No doubt, respondent Judge's
questioned approval violates Article 1409 of
the New Civil Code and cannot work to
confirm nor serve to ratify a fictitious
contract which is non-existent and void
from the very beginning. The heirs assent
to such an illegal scheme does not legalize
the same.
The offer by the petitioner of
P300,000.00 for the purchase of the
property in question does not appear
seriously disputed on record. As against the
price stated in the assailed Compromise
Agreement the former amount is decidedly
more beneficial and advantageous not only
to the estate, the heirs of the descendants,
but more importantly to its creditors, for
whose account and benefit the sale was
made. No satisfactory and convincing
reason appeared given for the rejection
and/or non-acceptance of said offer thus
giving rise to a well-grounded suspicion that
a collusion of some sort exists between the
administrator and the heirs to defraud the
creditors and the government
Case Digested by: Sweet Ross Elumba
52
GONZALES V. AGUINALDO
G.R. No. 74769,
September 28, 1990
TOPIC: Revocation of Administration,
Death, Resignation, and Removal of
Executors and Administrators
Doctrine: The court is invested with ample
discretion in the removal of an
administrator. However, there must be
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evidence of an act or omission on the part of
the administrator not conformable to or in
disregard of the rules or the orders of the
court, which it deems sufficient or
substantial to warrant the removal of the
administrator. In making such a attending to her ailing husband. The Judge
determination, the court must exercise good
judgment, guided by law and precedents.
Synopsis: Olbes filed a motion to remove
the former as co-administratrix, on the
ground that she is incapable or unsuitable
to discharge the trust and had committed
acts and omissions detrimental to the
interest of the estate and the heirs. The
Judge cancelled the letters of
administration granted to Beatriz and
retained Olbes as the administratrix of the
estate. The court based the removal of
Gonzales on the fact that in the
administration of the estate, conflicts and
misunderstandings have existed between
Gonzales and Olbes which allegedly have
prejudiced the estate. A temporary absence
from the state on account of ill health, or on
account of business, or for purposes of
travel or pleasure is not such a removal
from the state as to necessitate his removal
as executor.
Facts:
This is an intestate proceeding of the
estate of Gonzales Vda. de Favis. The court
appointed Beatriz F. Gonzales and Teresa
Olbes as co-administratrices of the estate of
Gonzales Vda. de Favis.
While Beatriz was in the US, Olbes
filed a motion to remove the former as co-
administratrix, on the ground that she is
incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust and had committed acts and omissions
detrimental to the interest of the estate and
the heirs.
The court issued an Order requiring
Beatriz and the other parties to file their
opposition. Only Asterio Favia opposed the
removal of Beatriz as co-admistratrix, as the
latter was still in the United States
cancelled the letters of administration
granted to Beatriz and retained Olbes as the
administratrix of the estate. The court
reasoned that Beatriz has been absent from
the country as she is in the United States
and she has not returned even up to this
date and her removal is necessary so that
the estate will be administered in an orderly
and efficient manner.
Gonzales moved to reconsider the
order but was denied. Gonzales contends
that courts Order should be nullified on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her
removal was not shown by Olbes to be
anchored on any of the grounds provided
under Section 2, Rule 82.
ISSUE:
Whether the court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in the removal of Beatriz
as administrator.
HELD:
Yes. The court a quo did not base
the removal of Beatriz as co-administrratrix
on any of the causes specified in Olbes's
motion for relief of Beatriz. Neither did it
dwell on, nor determine the validity of the
charges brought against Beatriz by Olbes.
The court based the removal of
Gonzales on the fact that in the
administration of the estate, conflicts and
misunderstandings have existed between
Gonzales and Olbes which allegedly have
prejudiced the estate.

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The administration of the deceased's administration. These facts show that

estate be marked with harmonious
relations between co-administrators. But
for mere disagreements between such joint
fiduciaries, without misconduct, one's
removal is not favored. Conflicts of opinion
and judgment naturally, and, perhaps
inevitably, occur between persons with
different interests in the same estate. Such
conflicts, if unresolved by the co-
administrators, can be resolved by the
probate court to the best interest of the
estate and its heirs.
Further, the court a quo failed to
find hard facts showing that the conflict
were unjustly caused by Beatriz, or that
Beatriz was guilty of incompetence in the
fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the
management of the estate according to the
dictates of prudence, or any other act or
omission showing that her continuance as
co-administratrix of the estate materially
endangers the interests of the estate.
The court removed Gonzales also on
the ground that she had been absent from
the country. In her motion for
reconsideration, Beatriz explained that her
absence from the country was due to the
fact that she had to accompany her ailing
husband to the US. Also, Beatriz's absence
from the country was known to Olbes, and
that the latter and Beatriz had continually
maintained correspondence with each
other with respect to the administration of
the estate during Gonzales absence. As a
matter of fact, Beatriz, while in the US, sent
Olbes a letter addressed to the Land Bank
authorizing her (Olbes) to receive, and
collect the interests accruing from the Land
Bank bonds belonging to the estate, and to
use them for the payment of accounts
necessary for the operation of the
Gonzales had never abandoned her role as
co-administratrix of the estate nor had she
been remiss in the fulfillment of her duties.
Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the
state does not disqualify one to be an
administrator of the estate.
A temporary absence from the state
on account of ill health, or on account of
business, or for purposes of travel or
pleasure is not such a removal from the
state as to necessitate his removal as
executor.
Finally, it seems that the court
refuge in the fact that two (2) of the other
three (3) heirs of the estate of the deceased
have opposed the retention or re-
appointment of Beatriz as co-administratrix
of the estate. Suffice it to state that the
removal of an administrator does not lie on
the whims, caprices and dictates of the
heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on
the belief of the court that it would result in
orderly and efficient administration.
As the appointment of Gonzales was
valid, and no satisfactory cause for her
removal was shown, the court a quo gravely
abused its discretion in removing her.
Stated differently, Beatriz F. Gonzales was
removed without just cause. Beatriz is
ordered reinstated as co-administratrix of
said estate.
Case Digested by: Sweet Ross Elumba

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Luz Caro made an allegation in a

pleading that she acquired by purchase
from Benjamin Benito the aforesaid one-
third undivided share in each of the two
parcels of land. Basilia Lahorra Vda. De
Rule 84 Benito a written offer to redeem the said
one-third undivided share which was
ignored by Caro. Thus, Basilia sought for the
annulment of sale and mortgage involving

53
Luz Caro v CA
G.R. No. L-46001
March 25, 1982
Topic: General Powers and Duties of
Executors and Administrators
Doctrine: The administrator has the right to
the possession of the real and personal
estate of the deceased, so far as needed for
the payment of the expenses of
administration, and the administrator may
bring and defend action for the recovery or
protection of the property or right of the
deceased, such right of possession and
administration do not include the right of
legal redemption of the undivided share sold
to a stranger by one of the co-owners.
Facts:
Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and
Benjamin Benito were the original co-
owners of two parcels of land. Mario died
sometime in January, 1957. His surviving
wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father,
Saturnino Benito, were appointed joint
administrators of Mario's estate.
the same parcels of land. The main case was
dismissed. Basilia then filed the present
case as an independent one to prove that as
a joint administrator, she had not been
notified of the sale.
The trial court dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that: (a) private
respondent, as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Mario Benito, does not
have the power to exercise the right of legal
redemption, and (b) Benjamin Benito
substantially complied with his obligation of
furnishing written notice of the sale of his
one-third undivided portion to possible
redemptioners. CA ruled that since the right
of the co-owner to redeem in case his share
be sold to a stranger arose after the death
of Mario Benito, such right did not form
part of the hereditary estate of Mario but
instead was the personal right of the heirs,
one of whom is Mario's widow. Thus, it
behooved either the vendor, Benjamin, or
his vendee, Luz Caro, to have made a
written notice of the intended or
consummated sale under Article 1620 of
the Civil Code. CA reversed the appealed
judgment.

Benjamin Benito executed a deed of Issue:

absolute sale of his one-third undivided Whether Basilia, as administrator of
portion over said parcels of land in favor of Marios estate, could exercise the right of
herein petitioner, Luz Caro. Caro was issued redemption.
TCT over LOT I-C upon consent by Saturnino
and Alfredo Benito. Ruling:

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No. Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court,
the administrator has the right to the
possession of the real and personal estate
of the deceased, so far as needed for the
payment of the expenses of administration,
and the administrator may bring and
defend action for the recovery or protection
of the property or right of the deceased
(Sec. 2, Rule 88), such right of possession
and administration do not include the right
of legal redemption of the undivided share
sold to a stranger by one of the co-owners
after the death of another, because in such
case, the right of legal redemption only
came into existence when the sale to the
stranger was perfected and formed no part
of the estate of the deceased co-owner;
hence, that right cannot be transmitted to
the heir of the deceased co-owner. (Butte v.
Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526).
Even assuming that redemption
exists, private respondent as administratrix,
has no personality to exercise said right for
and in behalf of the intestate estate of
Mario Benito. She is on the same footing as
co-administrator Saturnino Benito. Hence, if
Saturnino's consent to the sale of the one-
third portion to petitioner cannot bind the
intestate estate of Mario Benito on the
ground that the right of redemption was
not within the powers of administration, in
the same manner, private respondent as co-
administrator has no power exercise the
right of redemption the very power
which the Court of Appeals ruled to be not
within the powers of administration.
Basilia cannot be considered to have
brought this action in her behalf and in
behalf of the heirs of Mario Benito because
the jurisdictional allegations of the
complaint specifically stated that she
brought the action in her capacity as
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administratrix of the intestate estate of
Mario Benito.
Case Digested by: Paul W. Hembrador
Rule 85
54
Intestate Estate of the Deceased
Honofre Leyson v. Pablo Silva
G.R. NO. L- 4090
January 31, 1952
Topics: Compensation of Administrator
Doctrine: The court may fix an
administrators or executors fee more than
the fees prescribed by Section 7, Rule 85 of
the Rules of Court where the estate is large,
and the settlement has been attended with
great difficulty, and has required a high
degree of capacity on the part of the
executor or administrator.
Synopsis: The intestate estate of the
decedent sues one of the previous
administrator for excessive compensation
for his services and for invalidly having the
administrator's bond cancelled when he
had a liability during his service as
administrator. As to the excessive
compensation, Court held that it is w/n the
discretion of the court to raise the
compensation if the estate is big and there's
difficulty in managing it, and it was shown
that the efforts exerted by the
administrator was commensurate to the
compensation given. As to the bond, it was
held that if ever he was liable for
misappropriating a land allegedly of the
estate, the bond would not cover it but it
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would instead be a personal liability of the Honofre Leyson. On August 19, 1949, the
administrator. lower court issued an order granting Pablos
motion and ordered the cancellation of his
Facts: bond and authorizing him to collect from
Pablo Silva (Pablo) resigned as a the estate the sum of six hindered pesos
joint administrator of the intestate estate of (Php600.00) as his administrators fees.
Honofre Leyson. On August 19, 1949, the Victor Rodriguez, co-administrator, and
lower court issued an order granting Pablos Margarita Laurente, heiress, questioned the
motion and ordered the cancellation of his said order of the lower court contending
bond and authorizing him to collect from that the latter erred in ordering the
the estate the sum of six hindered pesos cancellation of the bond and authorizing
(Php600.00) as his administrators fees. Pablo to collect six hindered pesos
Victor Rodriguez, co-administrator, and (Php600.00) as his fee, it being in excess of
Margarita Laurente, heiress, questioned the the fees prescribed by Section 7 of Rule 85.
said order of the lower court contending
that the latter erred in ordering the Issues
cancellation of the bond and authorizing Whether or not the court may fix an
Pablo to collect six hindered pesos administrators or executors fee in excess
(Php600.00) as his fee, it being in excess of of the fees prescribed by Section 7 of Rule
the fees prescribed by Section 7 of Rule 85. 85.

Facts: Whether or not the cancellation of

Pablo M. Silva (Silva), together with
Victorio Rodriguez, were appointed as
administrators of the intestate estate of
Honofre Leyson. Through Silva's initiative,
the holdings of the estate was earning
P1,300 from P900 a month and two parcels
of land located in San Juan, Rizal, were paid
for in full and the corresponding certificates
of title secured. He was instrumental in
gathering decedent's personal effects.
Silva then filed a motion whereby
appellant, Margarita Leyson Laurente was
not authorized to withdraw advance
payment of her share of the inheritance,
thereby able to stop an improvident
disbursement of a substantial amount
without having to employ legal help at an
additional expense.
the bond was proper.
Held:
Yes. It can be seen from Section 7,
Rule 85 of the Rules of Court that a greater
sum may be allowed "in any special case,
where the estate is large, and the
settlement has been attended with great
difficulty, and has required a high degree of
capacity on the part of the executor or
administrator." And so, it has been held
that "the amount of an executor's fee
allowed by the Court of first Instance in any
special case under the provisions of Section
680 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a
matter largely in the discretion of the
probate court, which will not be disturbed
on appeal, except for an abuse of
discretion."

Silva resigned as a joint Yes. In the cancellation of Pablo's

administrator of the intestate estate of bond, there is no showing that Pablo was

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guilty of misappropriation or any of the acts
of commission or omission for which his
bond could be held liable. The sole ground
for the insistence that the cancellation
should have been withheld is that Pablo is
in possession of a residential lot which
belonged to the deceased Honofre Leyson.
Pablo claims that the lot was sold to him by
Leyson on March 2, 1945. Certainly, it was
already in possession when he and Victor
Rodriguez took over the administration
from the special administratrix. The land
therefore did not come into Pablo's hands
in pursuance or in the course of his
administration and it was not included in
the inventory prepared by or in conjunction
with the administrator. Even granting then,
for the sake of argument, that Pablo has no
valid title to the lot, the sureties are not
chargeable for it on the bond. Pablo's
liability is personal and exclusive of the
sureties.
Case Digested by: Dafodille Dinero
55 Sulit v. Santos
Topic: Accountability and Compensation of
Executors and Administrators
Doctrine: Expenses incurred by the executor
or administrator to procure a bond are not
considered necessary expenses.
Facts:
the trial Judge refused to permit the
executor of the estate to secure
reimbursement from the estate the money
paid as premium on the bond filed by him
as special administrator, and for the
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preparation, filing and substitution of his
bond as such and as executor of the estate.
Issue:
WON the expenses incurred by an
executor or administrator to procure a bond
is a proper charge against the estate.
Ruling:
No. The expenses incurred by an
executor or administrator to procure a bond
is not a proper charge against the estate,
and that the code of civil procedure does
not authorize the executor or administrator
to charge against the estate the money
spent for the presentation, filing and
substitution of a bond.
Case Digested By: NUMIE ILLANA
56
Uy Tioco v. Imperial
Topic: Accountability and Compensation of
Executors and Administratorss
Doctrine: If judgment is rendered against
the administrator and he pays, she may
include the fees so paid in his account to the
court
Facts:
Respondent Panis was counsel for
the administration of the estate of Yangco,
before the final settlement of accounts, he
represented a motion in the probate
proceeding for the allowance of attorneys
fees. The respondent judge, over the
objections in writing presented by the
administrator (TIoco), granted the motion
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and allowed the fees claimed by Panis.

Tioco did not appeal, however, Yangco in
his capacity as guardian ad litem of the
minors Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco, the sons
and only heirs of the deceased, presented a
motion for reconsideration on the ground
that he was not notified. The motion was
denied, Tioco was ordered to pay but he
refused hence he filed a petition for a writ
of prohibition to restrain the respondent
judge from compelling him to pay the
attorneys fees.
Issue:
WON the estate is liable for the
payment of attorneys fees.
Ruling:
Yes. The attorney cannot hold the
estate directly liable for his fees; such fees
are allowed to the executor or
administrator and not to the attorney. The
liability for the payment rests on the
executor or administrator, but if the fees
paid are beneficial to the estate and
reasonable, he is entitled to the
reimbursement from the estate. Such
payment should be included in his accounts
and the reimbursement therefore settled
upon the notice prescribed by the law. For
the reasons stated, the respondent judge is
hereby prohibited from enforcing the
payment of the attorney's fees until the
appeal taken by Jacinto Yangco, as guardian
ad litem for the minor Pedro Uy Tioco, has
been passed upon by this court or dismissed
Case Digested By: NUMIE ILLANA
57
Aldamiz v. Judge of the
Court of First Instance of
Mindoro
Topic: Accountability and Compensation of
Executors and Administrators
Doctrine: The attorney also may, instead of
bringing such an action file a petition in the
testate or intestate proceeding asking that
the court, after notice to all persons
interested, allow his claim and direct the
administrator to pay it as an expense of
administration.
Facts:
Gavino Aldamiz was appointed
administrator of the estate of Santiago and
as such was represented by respondent
Atty. Juan Luna. After 10 years from the
date of his appointment, he through his
attorney submitted his accounts and also a
project of partition with a view to closing
the proceedings. The court refused to
approve the project of partition unless all
debts including attorneys fees be first paid.
Atty. Luna, to cimply with the wishes of the
court, without previously preparing and
filing a written petition to have his
professional fees fixed, and without
previous notice to all the interested parties,
submitted evidence of his services and
professional standing so that the court
might fix the amount of his compensation
and the administrator may make payment
thereof. At the time Atty. Lunas evidence
was submitted to the court, no written
claim had ever been notified thereof nor of
the hearing, not even Aldamiz who did not
know when he was called to testify. The
court ordered for the payment of Attorneys
fees and upon Aldamiz failure to pay, Atty.

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Luna filed an ex-parte motion for execution
which was granted by the respondent court
Issue:
WON the order of the court is void.
Ruling:
Yes. The correct procedure for the
collection of attorneys fees is for the
counsel to request the administrator to
make payment and file an action against
him in his personal capacity and not as an
administrator should he fail to pay. If the
judgment is rendered against the
administrator and he pays, he may include
the fees so paid in his account to the court.
The attorney also may, instead of bringing
such action, file a petition in the testate or
intestate proceeding asking that the court,
after notice to all persons interested, allow
his claim and direct the administrator to pay
it as an expense of administration. And
execution may issue only where the
devisees, legatees or heirs have entered
into possession of their respective portions
in the estate prior to settlement and
payment of the debts and expenses of the
administration and it is later ascertained
that there are such debts and expenses to
be paid, in which case the court having
jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for
that purpose, after hearing, settle the
amount of their several liabilities and order
how much and in what manner each person
shall contribute, and may issue execution if
the circumstances require. And this is not
the instant case.
Case Digested By: NUMIE ILLANA
Topic: Accountability and Compensation of
Executors and Administrators
Doctrine:
A creditor cannot sue the surviving
spouse of a decedent in an ordinary
proceeding for the collection of sum of
money chargeable against the conjugal
partnership. The proper remedy for him is to
file a claim in the settlement of the estate of
the deceased.
Facts:
Respondent Romeo Jaring subleased
a fishpond, for the remaining period of his
lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita
Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and
Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount
of rent was P485,600.00, payable in two
installments ofP300,000.00 and
P185,600.00. However, both the sub lessees
failed to pay the second installment. Hence,
on October 13, 1989, private respondent
sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the
collection of the said amount. Petitioner
Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio,
had passed away on December 1, 1988.[2]
She based her action on Rule 3, 21 of the
1964 Rules of Court which then provided
that "when the action is for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon, and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the
Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed
to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in these rules." This provision has
been amended so that now Rule 3, 20 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
When the action is for the recovery of
money arising from contract, express or

58
ALIPIO VS CA
implied, and the defendant dies before
GR NO. 134100 entry of final judgment in the court in which
the action was pending at the time of such

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death, it shall not be dismissed but shall de facto administrator such that
instead be allowed to continue until entry conveyances made by him of any property
of final judgment. The trial court denied belonging to the partnership prior to the
petitioner's motion. The CA affirmed trial liquidation of the mass of conjugal
courts ruling. Partnership Property Is Void.
Issue: Case Digested By: Numie Illana
WON a creditor can sue the
surviving spouse of a decedent in an

59
ordinary proceeding for the collection of a FELICISIMO C. JOSON v.
sum of money chargeable against the EDUARDO JOSON
conjugal partnership G.R. No. L-9686
Ruling: May 30, 1961

When petitioner's husband died,

their conjugal partnership was Topic: EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR;
automatically dissolved and debts EXTENT AND SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITIES
chargeable against it are to be paid in the ENUMERATED
settlement of estate proceedings in
Doctrine: Section 1 of Rule 86 categorically
accordance with Rule 73, 2 which states:
charges an administrator "with the whole of
Where estate settled upon dissolution of
the estate of the deceased which has come
marriage. When the marriage is dissolved
into his possession at the value of
by the death of the husband or wife, the
appraisement contained in the inventory;
community property shall be inventoried,
with all the proceeds of so much of the
administered, and liquidated, and the debts
estate as is sold by him, at third price at
thereof paid, in the testate or intestate
which sold." Section 8 of the same rule
proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both
imposes upon him the duty to render an
spouses have died, the conjugal partnership
account of his administration within one
shall be liquidated in the testate or
year from his appointment, unless the court
intestate proceedings of either. As held in
otherwise directs, as well as to render such
Calma v. Taedo, after the death of either of
further accounts as the court may require
the spouses, no complaint for the collection
until the estate is fully, settled. Section 10
of indebtedness chargeable against the
likewise provides that before an account of
conjugal partnership can be brought against
the administrator is allowed notice shall be
the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim
given to all persons interested of the time
must be made in the proceedings for the
and place of examining and allowing the
liquidation and settlement of the conjugal
same. And finally section 9 expressly directs
property. The reason for this is that upon
that the court shall examine the
the death of one spouse, the powers of
administrator upon oath with respect to
administration of the surviving spouse
every matter relating to his account except
ceases and is passed to the administrator
when no objection is made to the allowance
appointed by the court having jurisdiction
of the account and its correctness is
over the settlement of estate proceedings.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a

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satisfactorily established by the competent
testimony
Facts:
Tomas Joson died on July 5, 1945 in
Quezon, Nueva Ecija leaving behind heirs
and properties. He married three times and
was survived by nine (9) heirs: two (2)
children and grandchildren by his first wife
Eufemia de la Cruz; two (2) daughters by his
second wife Pomposa Miguel; and his third
wife and surviving widow Dominga M. Joson.
Upon his death, his will was presented to
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija by
his son Felicisimo Joson for probate. In
August, 1945, said will having been duly
probated, Felicisimo Joson was appointed
administrator of the estate and, accordingly,
he filed an inventory of the properties left
by the deceased.
On April 15, 1948, the administrator
filed his first account for the year 1945-
1946. This was ordered by the court to be
examined by the clerk of court but the same
has never been approved. On July 19, 1948,
he filed his second account for the year
1946-1947 which was also referred to the
clerk of court for examination. The same
has never been also approved by the court.
On November 11, 1948, the administrator
filed another account for the year 1947-
1948 and, upon motion of the heirs, he was
ordered to file an accounting covering the
properties under his administration. On
September 7, 1954, Eduardo Joson, one of
the heirs, filed an opposition to all the
accounts filed by the administrator wherein
he alleged that the administrator
diminished the shares of the heirs in the
yearly produce of the properties and had
padded his expenses of administration, and
on September 29, 1954, the same heir filed
another motion praying the court to order
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the administrator to post a bond in the
amount of P50,000 for the reason that from
the accounts represented by him to be the
true income of the estate from 1947 to
1953 there was a big difference of P132,600
which the administrator should account for
to the heirs. On October 14, 1954, the
administrator submitted an amended
statement of accounts for the same years
which were objected by two more heirs on
the ground that the administrator had
reported for the years 1947-1952 an
income short of what was actually received
and expenses much bigger than those
actually incurred by him.
In the meantime, or on December
30, 1952, the heirs were able to
compromise their differences and entered
into an extrajudicial settlement and
partition of the entire estate under the
provisions of Section 1, Rule 74, of the Rules
of Court which provides for the settlement
of the estate without court intervention.
This settlement was contained in two
documents executed on the same date
wherein they manifested that they are
entering into it because of their desire to
put an end to the judicial proceeding and
administration. But, as the court was never
informed of this extrajudicial settlement
either by the administrator or by the heirs,
it issued on May 19, 1954 an order requiring
the administrator to file an accounting of
his administration from 1949 to 1954,
which accordingly the administrator
complied with by submitting an amended
statement of his accounts as already
mentioned above
Issue:
Whether or not that the duty of an
administrator to make an accounting of his
 Liceo University Law
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administration a mere incident which can
be avoided once the estate has been settled
Ruling:
We find merit in this contention. To
begin with, Section 1 of Rule 86
categorically charges an administrator "with
the whole of the estate of the deceased
which has come into his possession at the
value of appraisement contained in the
inventory; with all the interest, profit, and
income of such a estate; and with the
proceeds of so much of the estate as is sold
by him, at the price at which sold." Section
8 of the same rule imposes upon him the
duty to render an account of his
administration within one year from his
appointment, unless the court otherwise
directs, as well as to render such further
accounts as the courts may require until the
estate is fully settled. Section 10 likewise
provides that before an account of the
administrator is allowed notice shall be
given to all persons interested of the time
and place of examining and allowing the
same. And finally Section 9 expressly directs
that the court shall examine the
administrator upon oath with respect to
every matter relating to his account except
when no objection is made to the allowance
of the account and its correctness is
satisfactorily established by competent
testimony.
It thus appears that the duty of an
administrator to render an account is not a
mere incident of an administration
proceeding which can be waived or
disregarded when the same is terminated,
but that it is a duty that has to be
performed and duly acted upon by the
court before the administration is finally
ordered closed and terminated. Here the
administrator has submitted his accounts
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for several years not only motu proprio but
upon requirement of the court, to which
accounts the heirs have seasonably
submitted their opposition. And when the
administrator moved the court to close the
proceedings and relieve him of his
administration and of his accounts, the
heirs who objected thereto objected
likewise to the closing of the proceedings
invoking their right to be heard but the
court ignored their opposition and granted
the motion setting forth as reasons
therefore what we quoted in the early part
of this decision. Verily, the trial court erred
in acceding to the motion for in doing so it
disregarded the express provisions of our
rules relative to the settlement of accounts
of a judicial administrator.
The fact that all the heirs of the
estate have entered into an extrajudicial
settlement and partition in order to put an
end to their differences cannot in any way
be interpreted as a waiver of the objections
of the heirs to the accounts submitted by
the administrator not only because to so
hold would be a derogation of the pertinent
provisions of our rules but also because
there is nothing provided in said partition
that the aforesaid accounts shall be deemed
waived or condoned. While the attitude of
the heirs in concluding said extrajudicial
settlement is plausible and has contributed
to the early settlement of the estate, the
same cannot however be considered as a
release of the obligation of the
administrator to prove his accounts. This is
more so when, according to the oppositors,
the administrator has committed in his
accounts a shortage in the amount of
P132,600.00 which certainly cannot just be
brushed aside by a mere technicality
Case digested by: Danilo Lagbas
 Liceo University Law
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Rule 86
60
Estate of Olave v Rey
G.R. No. L- 29407
July 29, 1983
Topic: Claims against Estate
Doctrine: The purpose of presentation of
claims against decedents of the estate in the
probate court is to protect the estate of
deceased persons. That way, the executor or
administrator will be able to examine each
claim determine whether it is a proper one
which should be allowed.
Facts:
The estate of Amadeo Matute Olave
is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land
covered by an OCT. Private respondent
Southwest Agricultural Marketing
Corporation (SAMCO) filed a case with the
respondent CFI against Respondents
Matute, in their capacities as co-
administrators of the estate of Amadeo
Matute Olave, for the collection of an
alleged indebtedness. Defendants Matute
denied the allegations and questioned the
legality of the claim of SAMCO. CFI ordered
the administrators to secure first the
approval of the probate court before
entering into any transaction involving the
17 titles of the estate, of which the property
described in OCT is one of them. The parties
submitted for Amicable Settlement
whereby the property of the estate covered
by the OCT was ceded to SAMCO as
payment. However, the said settlement was
not submitted to and approved by the
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probate court nor was there notice given to
the beneficiaries of the estate. Despite the
opposition of the other parties, the court
approved the settlement. The respondents
contended that the Amicable Settlement
need not be approved by the probate court.
Issue:
Whether the Amicable Settlement
made by the parties need not be approved
by the probate court.
Ruling:
No. The purpose of presentation of
claims against decedents of the estate in
the probate court is to protect the estate of
deceased persons. That way, the executor
or administrator will be able to examine
each claim and determine whether it is a
proper one which should be allowed.
Further, the primary object of the
provisions requiring presentation is to
appraise the administrator and the probate
court of the existence of the claim so that a
proper and timely arrangement may be
made for its payment in full or by pro-rata
portion in the due course of the
administration, inasmuch as upon the death
of a person, his entire estate is burdened
with the payment of all of his debts and no
creditor shall enjoy any preference or
priority; all of them shag share pro-rata in
the liquidation of the estate of the
deceased.
It is clear that the main purpose of
private respondent SAMCO in filing Civil
Case No. 4623 in the then Court of First
Instance of Davao was to secure a money
judgment against the estate which
eventually ended in the conveyance to
SAMCO of more than twenty-nine (29)
hectares of land belonging to the estate of
the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave in
 Liceo University Law
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payment of its claim, without prior Whether the petition for the
authority of the probate court of Manila, in execution of the claim of the Government
Sp. Proc. No. 25876, which has the exclusive against the estate proper.
jurisdiction over the estate of Amadeo
Matute Olave. It was a mistake on the part Ruling:
of respondent court to have given due No. The ordinary procedure by
course to Civil Case No. 4623, much less which to settle claims of indebtedness
issue the questioned Order, dated against the estate of a deceased person, as
November 10, 1967, approving the an inheritance tax, is for the claimant to
Amicable Settlement. present a claim before the probate court so
Case Digested by: Paul W. Hembrador that said court may order the administrator
to pay the amount thereof.

61
Domingo v Garlitos
GR No L-18994
June 29, 1963
Doctrine: The ordinary procedure by which
to settle claims of indebtedness against the
estate of a deceased person, as an
inheritance tax, is for the claimant to
present a claim before the probate court so
that said court may order the administrator
to pay the amount thereof.
Facts:
It appears that in Domingo v.
Moscoso, the Court declared as final and
executory the order for the payment by the
estate of the estate and inheritance taxes,
charges and penalties, amounting to P40,
058.55, issued by the Court of First Instance
of Leyte. In order to enforce the claims
against the estate, the fiscal presented a
petition to the court for the execution of
the judgment. The petition was, however,
denied by the court which held that the
execution is not justifiable as the
Government is indebted to the estate under
administration in the amount of P262, 200.
Issue:
A writ of execution is not the proper
procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for
the payment of debts and expenses of
administration. The proper procedure is for
the court to order the sale of personal
estate or the sale or mortgage of real
property of the deceased and all debts or
expenses of administrator and with the
written notice to all the heirs legatees and
devisees residing in the Philippines,
according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90,
section 2. And when sale or mortgage of
real estate is to be made, the regulations
contained in Rule 90, section 7, should be
complied with.
Another ground for denying the
petition of the provincial fiscal is the fact
that the court having jurisdiction of the
estate had found that the claim of the
estate against the Government has been
recognized and an amount of P262,200 has
already been appropriated for the purpose
by a corresponding law (Rep. Act No. 2700).
Case Digested by: Norhanifah M. Mambuay

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62
De Bautista v De Guzman
G.R. No. L-28298
November 25, 1983
Doctrine: The termination of the intestate
proceedings and the distribution of the
estate to the heirs did not alter the fact that
plaintiffs-appellees' claim was a money
claim which should have been presented
before the probate court. The liability of the
deceased arose from the breach of his
obligations under the contract of carriage
between him and the unfortunate
passenger. The obligations are spelled out
by law but the liability arose from a breach
of contractual obligations. The resulting
claim is a money claim.
Facts:
Numeriano Bautista was a passenger
of jeepney owned and operated by Rosendo
de Guzman. Eugenio Medrano y Torres was
employed by said Rosendo de Guzman as
the driver of said jeepney. Said driver drove
and managed said in a negligent and
reckless manner and, as a result, the
jeepney turned turtle and, consequently,
passenger Numeriano Bautista sustained
physical injuries which caused his death.
Eugenio Medrano, the driver, was accused
and convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence by the trial court. A writ of
execution was issued against said driver,
Eugenio but the same was returned to the
Court unsatisfied. On May 12, 1952,
Rosendo de Guzman died.
Because of their failure to collect
from the driver Eugenio Medrano filed a
complaint against the heirs of Rosendo de
Guzman for the payment but they refused
to pay the same. The heirs through counsel
filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the
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suit was for a money claim against the
supposed debtor who was already dead and
as such it should be filed in testate or
intestate proceedings. However, instead of
presenting their claims before the intestate
proceedings, the plaintiiffs filed another
complaint after said intestate proceedings
were closed.
Issue:
Whether or not the claim of the
plaintiffs is already barred for failure on
their part to file their claim in the intestate
proceedings of the deceased Rosendo de
Guzman.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court is mandatory. The requirement
therein is for the purpose of protecting the
estate of the deceased. The executor or
administrator is informed of the claims
against it, thus enabling him to examine
each claim and to determine whether it is a
proper one which should be allowed.
Therefore, upon the dismissal of the first
complaint of herein plaintiffs, they should
have presented their claims before the
intestate proceedings filed in the same.
Instead of doing so, plaintiffs slept on their
right. They allowed said proceedings to
terminate and the properties to be
distributed to the heirs pursuant to a
project of partition before instituting this
separate action. With the exception
provided for in the above rule, the failure of
herein plaintiffs-appellees to present their
claims before the intestate proceedings of
the estate of Rosendo de Guzman within
the prescribed period constituted a bar to a
subsequent claim against the estate or a
similar action of the same import.
 Liceo University Law
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Case Digested by: Norhanifah M. Mambuay
63
E. Gaskell & Co., Inc. v Tan Sit
G.R. No. 18405
September 23, 1922
Doctrine: There can be no question that the
claim of Gaskell & Co. against Dy Poco is
properly designated as a contingent claim,
which may be defined as a claim in which
liability depends on some future event that
may or may not happen, and which makes it
uncertain whether there will ever be any
liability. The expression" is used in
contradistinction to the absolute claim,
which is subject to no contingency and may
be proved and allowed as a debt by the
committee on claims. The absolute claim is
such a claim as, if contested between living
persons, would be proper subject of
immediate legal action and would supply a
basis of a judgment for a sum certain.
Facts:
On June 23, 1919, Dy Poco was
declared bankrupt in a proceeding
instituted by some of his creditors, and
shortly thereafter Dy Poco died.
Nevertheless, the insolvency proceedings
continued their course and in the end an
order was made discharging the debtoror
his estatefrom all liability upon provable
claims, as contemplated in section 69 of the
Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956). Meanwhile,
Tan Sit, the widow of Dy Poco, had qualified
as his administratrix, for the purpose chiefly,
of realizing upon a policy of insurance for
P25,000 in force upon the life of Dy Poco at
the time of his death. As a result, two
distinct parallel proceedings with reference
to the estate of Dy Poco were
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contemporaneously conducted- the
proceedings over the estate in insolvency
and the proceedings over the estate in
administration.
Prior to the institution of the
bankruptcy proceeding above alluded to,
Gaskell & Co., the plaintiff joined with the
latter in a written application to the
Philippine Guaranty Co., requesting said
company to become surety on a bond
which the Insular Collector of Customs had
required Dy Poco to give in order to secure
the delivery of certain merchandise arriving
from abroad for which Dy Poco was at that
time unable to produce the proper bill of
lading. Pursuant to said application the
Philippine Guaranty Company executed a
bond and merchandise was delivered to Dy
Poco by the Collector of Customs. At a later
date Dy Poco defaulted in his undertaking
to produce the bill of lading corresponding
to the merchandise which had been
delivered to him, and said document was
produced by the Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation, an innocent holder
thereof for value; and demand was made by
this bank upon the Insular Collector of
Customs for the delivery of the same
merchandise that had previously been
delivered to Dy Poco. When this occurred,
the Collector at once made demand upon
the Philippine Guaranty Company for
payment of the value of the goods for the
benefit of the aforesaid bank. In response
to this demand, the Guaranty Company
paid the amount required, and in turn
demanded reimbursement from the
present plaintiff, Gaskell & Co. Up to the
time when this action was brought, Gaskell
& Co. had not complied with this demand of
the Guaranty Company, but no question is
made as to Gaskell & Company's ultimate
liability. Dy Poco was contingently liable to
 Liceo University Law
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exonerate Gaskell & Co. in the event that demonstrable, by reference to section 56 of
the latter should be compelled to pay out the Insolvency Law, which reads in part as
anything to the Philippine Guaranty follows:
Company; for it is undisputed that Dy Poco
Any person liable as bail, surety, or
was primarily responsible. No steps were
guarantor, or otherwise, for the debtor,
taken, however, towards proving this
who * * * has not paid the whole of said
contingent claim on the part of Gaskell & Co.
debt, but is still liable for the same, or any
against Dy Poco in the insolvency
part thereof, may, if the creditor shall fail or
proceedings.
omit to prove such debt, prove the same in
At a later date, however, Gaskell & the name of the creditor.
Co. caused said claim to be presented to the
From this it will be seen that the claim in
commissioners appointed to pass on claims
question could have been proved by Gaskell
against the estate of Dy Poco in
& Co. in the bankruptcy proceedings in the
administration; and the same having been
name of the creditor, if the latter had failed
rejected by the commissioners, the matter
to present the credit. But, as already stated,
was brought before the Court of First
the creditor in fact proved in the insolvency
Instance upon appeal, where the claim was
proceeding for the very claim for which the
again disallowed. Upon this Gaskell & Co.
present plaintiff is contingently liable; with
appealed to the Supreme Court.
the result that the present plaintiff will be
Issue: exonerated to the extent of any amount
which the creditor may recover from the
Whether or not trial court
insolvent.
committed error in disallowing the claim of
Gaskell & Co. against the administratrix of It necessarily follows that, the claim
Dy Poco. in question having been discharged in
bankruptcy; it cannot serve as the basis of
Ruling:
recovery against the estate of Dy Poco in
There can be no question that the administration. When it happens, as here,
claim of Gaskell & Co. against Dy Poco is that both bankruptcy proceedings and
properly designated as a contingent claim, administration proceedings are
which may be defined as a claim in which simultaneously conducted over the estate
liability depends on some future event that of a deceased bankrupt, no claim can be
may or may not happen, and which makes it proved against the administrator which is
uncertain whether there will ever be any provable in bankruptcy.
liability. But, although it is thus evident that
Case Digested by: Norhanifah M. Mambuay
this claim in favor of Gaskell & Co. against
Dy Poco is a contingent claim, it by no

64
means follows that said claim can now be PNB v IPAI
allowed against Dy Poco's estate in G.R. No. L-28046
administration; for a contingent claim is May 16, 1983
effected by a discharge in bankruptcy the
same as an absolute claim, and that this
claim has in fact been so barred is easily

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Doctrine: The creditor has the right to
proceed against anyone of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The choice is undoubtedly
left to the solidary creditor to determine
against whom he will enforce collection. In
case of the death of one of the solidary
debtors, he may, if he so chooses, proceed
against the surviving solidary debtors
without necessity of filing a claim in the
estate of the deceased debtors. It is not
mandatory for him to have the case
dismissed against the surviving debtors and
file its claim in the estate of the deceased
solidary debtor.
Facts:
Appeal by the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) from the Order of the defunct
Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XX)
in its Civil Case No. 46741 dismissing PNB's
complaint against several solidary debtors
for the collection of a sum of money on the
ground that one of the defendants, Ceferino
Valencia, died during the pendency of the
case and therefore the complaint, being a
money claim based on contract, should be
prosecuted in the testate or intestate
proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased defendant pursuant to
Section 6 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
The appellant assails the order of
dismissal, invoking its right of recourse
against one, some or all of its solidary
debtors under Article 1216 of the Civil
Code-
ART. 1216. The creditor may
proceed against any one of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The demand made against
one of them shall not be an obstacle to
those which may subsequently be directed
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against the others, so long as the debt has
not been fully collected.
Issue:
Whether or not in an action for
collection of a sum of money based on
contract against all the solidary debtors, the
death of one defendant deprives the court
of jurisdiction to proceed with the case
against the surviving defendants.
Ruling:
No. It is now settled that the quoted
Article 1216 grants the creditor the
substantive right to seek satisfaction of his
credit from one, some or all of his solidary
debtors, as he deems fit or convenient for
the protection of his interests; and if, after
instituting a collection suit based on
contract against some or all of them and,
during its pendency, one of the defendants
dies, the court retains jurisdiction to
continue the proceedings and decide the
case in respect of the surviving defendants.
Another ground for denying the
petition of the provincial fiscal is the fact
that the court having jurisdiction of the
estate had found that the claim of the
estate against the Government has been
recognized and an amount of P262,200 has
already been appropriated for the purpose
by a corresponding law (Rep. Act No. 2700).
Case Digested by: Norhanifah M. Mambuay
65
SANTOS v MANARANG
GR No. L-8235
March 19, 1914
Topic: Statute of Non-claims
 Liceo University Law
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1.Whether the probate court erred

Doctrine: This is the so-called Statute of
non-claims. The rule requires certain
creditors of a deceased person to
present their claims for examination and
allowance within a specified period, the
purpose thereof being to settle the estate
with dispatch, so that the residue may be
delivered to the persons entitled thereto
without their being afterwards called
upon to respond in actions for claims,
which, under the ordinary statute of
limitations, have not yet prescribed.
Synopsis: Upon probate of the decents will,
notices were sent out to his creditors in
order for them to file their claims. Santos,
being one of his creditors, presented his
claim to recover the sums due him beyond
the period provided for by law.
Facts:
Don Lucas de Ocampo died testate,
leaving his three children as his heirs.
Herein plaintiff- appellant is one of the
decedents creditor, by which is
acknowledged in the decedents last will
and testament. Upon the probate of the
said will, notices were sent to the creditors
in order for them to file their claims.
However, Santos, being complaisant as his
claim was acknowledged in the decedents
will, filed his belated claim, by which the
committee on claims was not able to
consider, requiring further that the
committee reconvene in order to pass upon
his claim. This was denied by the court. He
thereafter resorted to filing a claim against
the administrator for the recovery of the
sums mentioned in the will, but once again,
to no avail. Hence this appeal.
Issues:
in denying refusing to reconvene the
committee in order to pass his claim.
2.Whether the probate court erred
in denying his complaint for recovery of
sum of money against the administrator of
the decedents estate
Ruling:
1.Yes. As to the first assignment of
error, the Supreme Court ruled that the
probate court was correct in denying
petitioners request to reconvene the
committee in order to pass his claim.
Although his claim was acknowledged by
the testator in his will, he is not deemed
exempted to file his claim after due notice
from the court. This is a procedure by which
any claimant should observe in order to
prevent from being barred of his claims. As
to his filing of his belated claim, the
Supreme Court ruled that the committee
cannot anymore consider such claim
because the notice sent to the creditors set
forth a limited time for which the claims
must be filed in order to be considered.
Such already barred herein appellant from
having his claim considered and allowed in
the probate proceeding.
2.Yes. Regarding his second
assignment of error, Section 1 of Rule 87
provides that there can be no action upon
a claim for the recovery of money or debt or
interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator; but
to recover real or personal property, or an
interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to
recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him. Clearly, the claim
filed by Isidro is one in a nature of recovery
of money, by which is expressly prohibited

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by law. Hence, the probate courts denial of
his claim for recovery of sum of money is
correct.
Case Digested by: Aiza Belle Manla Ramos
66
SISON v. TEODORO
GR No. L-9271
March 29, 1957
Topic: Section 7, Rule 86
Doctrine: Expense incurred by an executor
or administrator to produce a bond is not a
proper charge against the estate. Herein
appellant, having waived compensation,
cannot be heard to complain of the
expenses he has incurred incident to his
qualification as the administrator.
Synopsis: Petitioner was appointed as the
judicial administrator without
compensation. When he filed an accounting
of his administration, two premiums issued
for the bonds foe being an administrator
were included; such was opposed by the
heir stating that expense incurred by an
executor or administrator to produce a
bond is not a proper charge against the
estate.
Facts:
Carlos Moran Sison was appointed
by the probate court as the judicial
administrator of the estate of the late
Margarita David. The issued appointment of
the court states that Sison is appointed as
the judicial administrator, without
compensation. Sison then filed a bond of
Php 5,000.
When Sison filed an accounting of
his administration, he included two
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premiums issued by Visayan Surety &
Insurance Corporation for the bonds of
Sison for his being a judicial administrator
herein. The same was opposed by Narcisa
Teodoro, stating that expense incurred by
an executor or administrator to produce a
bond is not a proper charge against the
estate. The lower court approved the
report of administration of Sision, but
disallowed the two objected claims. Hence,
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether a judicial administrator,
serving without compensation, is entitled to
charge as an expense of administration the
premiums paid on his bond.
Ruling:
No. The premiums paid by an
executor or administrator serving without a
compensation for his bond cannot be
charged against the estate. Court ruled that
the "expense incurred by an executor or
administrator to produce a bond is not a
proper charge agains the estate. The
Supreme Court ruled that an executor or
administrator, having in mind that being
appointed to such position would have him
incur expenses, may accept compensation
for such as allowed by the law. However,
such executor or administrator may choose
to waive compensation, as in this case.
Therefore, when an executor or
administrator files a bond and waives
compensation upon his appointment, he
cannot anymore claim compensation
against the estate for such expenses he has
incurred.
Case Digested by: Aiza Belle Manla Ramos
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67
CERNA v CA
G.R. No. L-48359
March 30, 1993 FACTS:

On or about October 16, 1972,

Celerino Delgado (Delgado) and Conrad
Topic: Mortgage Debt Due From Estate;
Leviste (Leviste) entered into a loan
Options Given To Creditors Under Sec. 7,
agreement which was evidenced by a
Rule 86, New Rules Of Court
promissory note. On the same date,
Delgado executed a chattel mortgage over
Doctrine: A creditor holding a claim against
a Willy's jeep owned by him. And acting as
the deceased secured by mortgaged or
the attorney-in-fact of herein petitioner,
other collateral security, may abandon the
Manolo P. Cerna (petitioner), he also
security and prosecute his claim in the
mortgage a "Taunus' car owned by the
manner provided in this rule, and share in
latter.
the general distribution of the assets of the
estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or
The period lapsed without Delgado
realize upon his security, by action in court,
paying the loan. This prompted Leviste to a
making the executor or administrator a
file a collection suit with the Court of First
party defendant, and if there is a judgment
Instance of Rizal, against Delgado and
for a deficiency, after the sale of the
petitioner as solidary debtors. Herein
mortgaged premises, or the property
petitioner filed Motion to Dismiss on
pledged, in the foreclosure or the other
grounds of lack of cause of action against
proceeding to realize upon security, he may
petitioner and the death of Delgado.
claim his deficiency judgment in the manner
Petitioner claimed that the claim should be
provided in the preceding section; or he may
filed in the proceedings for the settlement
upon his mortgage or other security alone,
of Delgado's estate as the action did not
and foreclosure the same at any time within
survive Delgado's death. Moreover, he also
the period of the statue of limitations, and
stated that since Leviste already opted to
in that event he shall not be admitted as a
collect on the note, he could no longer
creditor, and shall receive no share in the
foreclose the mortgage. This Motion to
distribution of the other assets of the estate.
Dismiss was denied.
Synopsis: A debtor used the property of a
ISSUE:
third person to secure his loan. The period
lapsed without payment of the loan, the
Whether or not the filing of a
creditor sued for collection against the
collection suit is deemed an abandonment
owner of the security alleging that the
of the security of the chattel mortgage.
mortgage created a solidary relationship
between the debtor and the owner of the RULING:
security.
The contract of loan, as evidenced
by the promissory note, was signed by
Delgado only. Petitioner had no part in the

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said contract. Nowhere could it be seen
from the agreement that petitioner was
solidarily bound with Delgado for the
payment of the loan.
Hence, Leviste, having chosen to file
the collection suit, he could not now run
after petitioner for the satisfaction of the
debt. This is even truer in this case because
of the death of the principal debtor,
Delgado. Leviste was pursuing a money
claim against a deceased person. Section 7,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court Provides:
"Sec. 7. Mortgage debt due from
estate. A creditor holding a claim against
the deceased secured by mortgaged or
other collateral security, may abandon the
security and prosecute his claim in the
manner provided in this rule, and share in
the general distribution of the assets of the
estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or
realize upon his security, by action in court,
making the executor or administrator a
party defendant, and if there is a judgment
for a deficiency, after the sale of the
mortgaged premises, or the property
pledged, in the foreclosure or the other
proceeding to realize upon security, he may
claim his deficiency judgment in the manner
provided in the preceding section; or he
may upon his mortgage or other security
alone, and foreclosure the same at any time
within the period of the statue of
limitations, and in that event he shall not be
admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no
share in the distribution of the other assets
of the estate; . . ."
"It is clear by the provisions quoted
section that a person holding a mortgage
against the estate of a deceased person
may abandon such security and prosecute
his claim before the committee, and share
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in the distribution of the general assets of
the estate. It provides also that he may, at
his own election, foreclose the mortgage
and realize upon his security. But the law
does not provide that he may have both
remedies. If he elects one he must abandon
the other. If he fails in one he fails utterly."
Case Digested by: James Marfori
68
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB v. CA
GR No. 88602
April 6, 1990
Topic: Mortgage Debt Due From Estate,
Options Given to Creditors under SEC. 7,
RULE 86
Doctrine: The right of the mortgagee bank
to extra judicially foreclose the mortgage
after the death of the mortgagor, acting
through his attorney-in-fact, did not depend
on the authority in the deed of mortgage
executed by the latter. The right existed
independently of said stipulation.
Synopsis: Dr. Jacob, the owner of the lot
asked Centenera, the appointed
administrator to negotiate for a loan due to
problems in paying realty taxes, internal
revenue taxes and unpaid wages of farm
laborers of the hacienda. Centenera failed
to pay the loan due which prompted to the
foreclosure of the parcel of land. The
surviving spouse, who was subsequently
named the administratrix alleged that the
documents were forged, thus making the
mortgage null and void.
 Liceo University Law
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FACTS:
Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob was the
registered owner of a parcel of
land. Because of the problem of paying
realty taxes, internal revenue taxes and
unpaid wages of farm laborers of the
hacienda, Dr. Jacob asked Centenera to
negotiate for a loan. For this purpose, a
special power of attorney was executed and
acknowledged before notary public.
Consequently, Centenera secured a
loan in the amount of P18,000.00 from the
Bicol Savings & Loan Association sometime
in September 1972. Centenera signed and
executed the real estate mortgage and
promissory note as attorney-in-fact of Dr.
Jacob. When the loan fell due in 1975
Centenera failed to pay the same but was
able to arrange a restructuring of the loan
using the same special power of attorney
and property as security. Another set of
loan documents, namely: an amended real
estate mortgage and promissory note dated
November 27, 1975 was executed by
Centenera as attorney-in-fact of Dr.
Jacob. Again, Centenera failed to pay the
loan when it fell due and so he arranged for
another restructuring of the loan with the
bank on November 23, 1976. The
corresponding promissory note was again
executed by Centenera on behalf of Jacob
under the special power of attorney.
Centenera again failed to pay the
loan upon the maturity date. Thus, the bank
foreclosed the real estate mortgage and the
corresponding provisional sale of the
mortgaged property to the respondent
bank was effected. On November 5, 1982 a
definite deed of sale of the property was
executed in favor of the respondent bank as
the sole and highest bidder.
Tomasa Vda. de Jacob who was
subsequently named administratrix of the
estate of Dr. Jacob and who claimed to be
an heir of the latter, conducted her own
investigation and therefore she filed a
complaint in the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Sur alleging that the special
power of attorney and the documents
therein indicated are forged and therefore
the loan and/or real estate mortgages and
promissory notes are null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an extrajudicial
foreclosure of a mortgage may proceed
even after the death of the mortgagor.
RULING:
Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court provides as follows:
Sec. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. A
creditor holding a claim against the
deceased secured by mortgage or other
collateral security, may abandon the
security and prosecute claim in the manner
provided in this rule, and share in the
general distribution of the assets of the
estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or
realize upon his security, by action in court,
making the executor or administrator a
party defendant, and if there is a judgment
for a deficiency, after the sale of the
mortgaged premises, or the property
pledged, in the foreclosure or other
proceeding to realize upon the security, he
may claim his deficiency judgment in the
manner provided in the preceding section;
or he may rely upon his mortgage or other

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security alone, and foreclose the same at
any time within the period of the statute of
limitations, and in that event he shall not be
admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no
share in the distribution of the other assets
of the estate; but nothing herein contained
shall prohibit the executor or administrator
from redeeming the property mortgaged or
pledged, by paying the debt for which it is
held as security, under the direction of the
court, if the court shall adjudge it to be for
the best interest of the estate that such
redemption shall be made
From the foregoing provision of the
Rules it is clearly recognized that a
mortgagee has three remedies that may be
alternately availed of in case the mortgagor
dies, to wit:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the
entire debt from the estate of the
mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and
prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim;
and;
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, or
other security and foreclose the same at
anytime, before it is barred by prescription,
without the right to file a claim for any
deficiency.
It is clear that the mortgagee does
not lose its light to extrajudicially foreclose
the mortgage even after the death of the
mortgagor as a third alternative under
Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
The power to foreclose a mortgage
is not an ordinary agency that
contemplated exclusively the
representation of the principal by the agent
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but is primarily an authority conferred upon
the mortgagee for the latter's own
protection. That power survives the death
of the mortgagor.
The right of the mortgagee bank to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage after
the death of the mortgagor, acting through
his attorney-in-fact, did not depend on the
authority in the deed of mortgage executed
by the latter. That right existed
independently of said stipulation and is
clearly recognized in Section 7, Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court aforecited.
Case Digested by: James Marfori
AMPARO G. PEREZ v. PNB
69
G.R. No. L-21813
July 30, 1966
Topic: No right to claim deficiency
judgment under the third option.
Doctrine: A judicial foreclosure virtually
wipes out the third alternative conceded by
the Rules to the mortgagee creditor, and
which would precisely include extra-judicial
foreclosures by contrast with the second
alternative.
Synopsis: The decedent mortgaged the lot
in controversy to mortgagee bank. The
mortgagor died intestate. Survived by his
heirs, they filed an intestate proceedings
and notice was given to creditors. However,
mortgagee bank failed to file a claim; but
foreclosed the mortgage property extra
judicially. The widow and the heirs seek to
annul the extrajudicial foreclosure claiming
that the bank acted in bad faith.
 Liceo University Law
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Three months later, on August 15,

FACTS:
On August 29, 1939, Vicente Perez
mortgaged Lot No. 286-E of the Kabankalan
Cadastre to the appellant Philippine
National Bank, in order to secure payment
of a loan of P2,500. On October 7, 1942,
Vicente Perez, mortgagor, died intestate,
survived by his widow and children
(appellees herein). At that time, there was
an outstanding balance of P1,917.00.
On October 18, 1956, the widow of
Perez instituted Special Proceedings No.
512 of the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros for the settlement of the
estate of Vicente Perez. The widow was
appointed Administratrix and notice to
creditors was duly published. The Bank did
not file a claim. The project of partition was
submitted on July 18, 1956; it was approved
and the properties distributed accordingly.
Special Proceedings No. 512 was then
closed.
On January 2, 1963, the Bank,
pursuant to authority granted it in the
mortgage deed, caused the mortgaged
properties to be extrajudicially foreclosed.
The Provincial Sheriff accordingly sold Lot
No. 286-E at auction, and it was purchased
by the Bank. In the ordinary course after the
lapse of the year of redemption, Certificate
of Title No. T-29530 in the name of Vicente
Perez was cancelled, and Certificate T-
32066, dated May 11, 1962, was issued in
the name of the Bank. The widow and heirs
were not notified.
1962, the widow and heirs of Vicente Perez
instituted this case against the Bank in the
court below, seeking to annul the extra-
judicial foreclosure sale and the transfer of
the Certificate of Title as well as to recover
damages, claiming that the Bank had acted
illegally and in bad faith.
Issue:
Whether or not a judicial foreclosure
or extra judicial foreclosure bars a right to
file claim for deficiency.
Ruling:
No. The opinion of the Court refers
to section 708 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as determining the proposition
that, after the death of the mortgagor,
foreclosure can be effected only by an
ordinary action in court; but if this section
be attentively examined, it will be seen that
the bringing of an action to foreclose is
necessary only when the mortgagee wishes
to obtain a judgment over for the deficiency
remaining unpaid after foreclosure is
effected. In fact this section gives to the
mortgagee three distinct alternatives, which
are first, to waive his security and prove his
credit as an ordinary debt against the estate
of the deceased; secondly to foreclose the
mortgage by ordinary action in court and
recover any deficiency against the estate in
administration; and, thirdly, to foreclose
without action at any time within the period
allowed by the statute of limitations.
The third mode of procedure is
indicated in that part of section 708 which is
expressed in these words:

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"Or he may rely upon his mortgage
or other security alone, and foreclose the
same at any time, within the period of the
statute of limitations, and in that event he
shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall
receive no share in the distribution of the
other assets of the estate."
The alternative here contemplated is,
evidently, foreclosure under power of sale
contained in the mortgage. It must be so,
since there are no other modes of
foreclosure known to the law than by
ordinary action and foreclosure under
power, and the procedure by action is
covered in that part of section 708 which
immediately precedes the words which we
have quoted above. It will be noted that the
result of adopting the last mode of
foreclosure is that the creditor waives his
right to recover any deficiency from the
estate
Case Digested by: James Marfori
70
ECHAUS, v BLANCO
G.R. No. L-30453
December 4, 1989
Topic: Liability of distributees and estate.
Doctrine:
Upon the death of the defendant, all
money claims should be filed in the estate or
intestate proceedings to avoid useless
duplicity of procedure. The Rules of Court
allows a creditor to file his claim after the
period set by the court in the notice to
creditors, provided the conditions stated in
the rules are present. The period prescribed
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in the notice to creditors is not exclusive;
that money claims against the estate may
be allowed any time before an order of
distribution is entered, at the discretion of
the court for.
Facts:
Petitioner Angelina Echaus instituted
Civil case No. 6628 against Charles Newton
Hodges praying for the recovery of her
share in the profits covering the Ba-Ta
subdivision plus damages. During its
pendency and before a decision could be
rendered by the Regional Trial Court
hearing the case, C. N. Hodges died. Upon
his death, he was substituted by PCIB as
administrator of his estate. A petition for
the settlement of the estate of C. N. Hodges
was instituted before and docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 1672. A notice to
creditors was published in "Yuhum" a
newspaper of general circulation. A
judgment was rendered by the trial court in
favor of Echaus and a writ of execution was
subsequently issued against PCIB. However,
the writ was not enforced as plaintiff opted
to file a motion in Special Proceedings No.
1672 for the payment of the judgment.
Respondents opposed the motion
contending that the judgment rendered in
Civil Case No. 6628 is null and void for
having been rendered without jurisdiction.
It was alleged that money claims against a
defendant who dies without a judgment
having been rendered in the RTC shall be
dismissed and prosecuted as a claim in the
estate proceedings as laid down under
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This
procedure was not followed in Civil Case No.
6628.
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Issue:
Whether judgment in Civil Case No.
6628 is valid and may be satisfied in the
special proceedings for the settlement of
estate.
Ruling:
YES, the judgment is valid and its
satisfaction may be obtained in the special
proceeding.
Being a money claim, Civil Case No. 6628
should have been dismissed and instituted
as a money claim in the intestate estate of C.
N. Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1627) in
accordance with Section 21 of Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
"Sec. 21.Where claim does not
survive. When the action is for recovery
of money, debt or interest thereon, and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the
Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed
to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in these rules."
However, this is not to suggest that
because the claim of petitioner was pursued
to its conclusion in Civil Case No. 6682
instead of being dismissed and filed as a
money claim in Special Proceedings No.
1672, the judgment rendered therein is null
and void. The case of Ignacio v. Pampanga
Bus Co., Inc., L-18936, May 23, 1967, 20
SCRA 126, is in point. "2. . . . Now that the
judgment has become final, the estate
cannot be heard to say that said
judgment reached after a full dress trial
on the merits will now go for naught. The
estate has thus waived its right to have
Pambusco's claim re-litigated in the estate
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proceedings. For, though presentment of
probate claims is imperative, it is generally
understood that it may be waived by the
estate's representative. And, waiver is to be
determined from the administrator's 'acts
and conduct.' Certainly, the administrator's
failure to plead the statute of non-claims,
his active participation, and resistance to
plaintiff's claim, in the civil suit, amount to
such waiver. "3. Courts are loathe to
overturn a final judgment. Judicial
proceedings are entitled to respect. Non
quieta movere. Plaintiffs claim has passed
the test in three courts of justice: the Court
of First Instance, the Court of Appeals and
this Court. The judgment in plaintiff's favor
should be enforced. Appellant's technical
objection - after judgment had become final
in the civil case that plaintiff's claim
should have been litigated in the probate
court does not impair the validity of said
judgment. For, such objection does not go
into the court's jurisdiction over the subject
matter."
When PCIB as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges was ordered to be
substituted as defendant, it registered no
objection to the order. Thus, even if We
admit for the sake of argument that the trial
court, after the death of C. N. Hodges has
no jurisdiction to render a judgment therein,
the argument must fail. PCIB, participated
actively in the said case. It did not appeal
the decision rendered therein, neither did it
raise the issue of jurisdiction at any stage. It
has been consistently held by this court that
while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at
any stage, a party's active participation in
the proceedings before the court without
jurisdiction will estop such party from
assailing such lack of jurisdiction
Case digested by: Danilo P. Lagbas
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71
Gerona v. De Guzman
L-19060
May 29, 1964
Topic:Prescriptive Period to Annul
Settlement.
Doctrine: When questions arise as to the
ownership of property, alleged to be part of
the estate of a deceased person, but
claimed by some other person to be his
property, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased, but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate, such questions cannot be
determined in the course of administration
proceedings. The CFI acting as probate court,
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such
contentions, which must be submitted to
the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions
which must be submitted to the curt in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction as a CFI to
try and determine ordinary action. A
probate courts jurisdiction is limited and
special. But by taking cognizance of civil
case, the court does not assume general
jurisdiction over the case but merely makes
of record its existence because of the close
interrelation of the two cases.
Facts:
Rafael Dingsalan et al. filed a civil
case to recover ownership and possession
of a parcel of land against Ang Chia and her
two sons. The counsel of for the defendants
objected on the ground that there was a
pending case in the same court concerning
the intestate estate of Lee Liong. The
plaintiffs withdrew the motion and filed an
amended complaint seeking the inclusion as
party-defendant of the administratix of the
estate, who is the widow Ang Chia. The
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plaintiffs also filed in the intestate
proceedings a verified claim in the
intervention and a motion praying that a co-
administraor of the estate be appointed and
the bond of the administratix be increased.
The plaintiffs made record the pendency of
the civil case and prayed that the intestate
proceedings be not closed until said civil
case shall have been terminated. Thereafter,
the administratix filed a motion to dismiss
the claim in the intervention and objected
to the abovementioned motions made by
the plaintiffs. On august 4, 1948, the trial
court: (a) issued an order denying the
petition for co-administrator but increasing
the bond to P5,000; (b) stated that it would
act thereon if a motion to close the
intestate proceedings is presented in due
time and is objevted to by petitioners; and
(c) took cognizance of the pendency of said
civil case no. v-331. On July 15, 1949, the
CFI of Capiz issued in the intestate
proceedings an order holding in abeyance
the approval of their petition for an extra-
judicial partition the closing of said
proceedings until after the final termination
of the said civil case.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in
holding in abeyance the closing of the
intestate proceedings pending the
termination of the separate civil action filed
by the petitioners-appellees
Ruling:
The act of the lower court in taking-
cognizance of civil case no. v-331 is not
tantamount to assuming jurisdiction over
said case nor does it violate the ruling of
this court in Guzaman vs Anong which says
that when questions arise as to the
ownership of property, alleged to be part of
the estate of a deceased person, but
 Liceo University Law
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claimed by some other person to be his is but corollary to the ruling when declares
property, not by virtue of any right of that questions concerning ownership of
inheritance from the deceased, but by title property allege to be part of the estate but
adverse to that of the deceased and his claimed by another person should be
estate, such questions cannot be determined in a separate action and should
determined in the course of administration be submitted to the court in the exercise of
proceedings. The CFI acting as probate its general jurisdiction. A probate courts
court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such jurisdiction is limited and special. But by
contentions, which must be submitted to taking cognizance of civil case, the court
the court in the exercise of its general does not assume general jurisdiction over
jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions the case but merely makes of record its
which must be submitted to the curt in the existence because of the close interrelation
exercise of its general jurisdiction as a CFI to of the two cases.
try and determine ordinary actions.
Case digested by: Danilo P. Lagbas
The court is justified in taking
cognizance of said civil case because of the
unavoidable fact that whatever is
determined in said civil case will necessarily
reflect and have a far reaching consequence
in the determination and distribution of the
estate. In so taking cognizance of the case Rule 87
no. v-331 the court does not assume
general jurisdiction over the case but
merely makes of record its existence

because of the close interrelation of the
two cases and cannot therefore be branded
as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Appellants claim that the lower
court erred in holding abeyance the closing
of the intestate proceedings pending
determination of the separate civil action
for the reason that there is no rule or
authority justifying the extension of
administration proceedings until after the
separate action pertaining to its general
jurisdiction has been terminated. Sec. 1,
Rule 88 of the Rules of Court, expressly
provides that action to recover real or
personal property from the estate or to
enforce lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property,
the real or personal, may be commenced
against executor or administrator. This rule
72
Borromeo vs Borromeo
G.R. No. L-41171
July 23, 1987
Doctrine: The heirs acquire a right to
succession from the moment of the death of
the deceased, by principles established in
article 657 and applied by article 661 of the
civil Code, according to which the heirs
succeed the deceased by the mere fact of
death
Facts:
Vito Borromeo, a widower and
permanent resident of Cebu, died on March
13, 1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of

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88, without forced heirs but leaving
extensive properties in Cebu.
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera
filed with CFI of Cebu a petition for the
probate of one page document as the last
will and testament left by the said deceased,
devising all his properties his properties to
Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed
Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares ,
and designating Junquera as executor
thereof. The document, drafted in Spanish
was allegedly signed and thumbmark by the
deceased in the presence of Cornelio
Gandionco, Eusibio Cabiluna, and Felixberto
who acted as witnesses.
Oppositions to the probate of the
will were filed. On may28, 1960, after due
trial, the probate court held that the
document presented as the will of the
deceased was forgery.
On April 10, 1969, the trial, invoking
Art. 972 of the Civil Code, issued an order
declaring nine heirs as the intestate heirs of
the deceased Vito Borromeo. The order
excluded Fortunato.
On August 25, 1972, Fortunato
Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir
under the forged will, filed a motion before
the trial court praying that he be declared
as one of the deceased and that un the
declaration of heirs made by the trial court,
he was omitted, in disregard of the law
making him a forced heir entitled to receive
a legitimate like all other forced heirs. As an
acknowledged illegitimate child, stated that
he was entitled to a legitimate equal in
every case to 4/5 of the legitimate of an
acknowledged natural child. The court
dismissed his motion.
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion
for reconsideration. In the memorandum he
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submitted to support his motion foe
reconsideration, Fortunato changed the
basis for his claim to a portion of the estate.
He asserted and incorporated a Waiver if
Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967,
supposedly singed by the heirs. In the
waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished
to Fortunato their shares in the disputed
estate. The motion was opposed on the
ground that the trial court, acting as a
probate court, had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the claim; that respondent
Fortunato is estopped from asserting the
waiver agreement; the waiver agreement is
void as it was executed before the
distribution of the estate and before the
acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is
void ab initio and inexistent for lack of
subject matter.
It is argued by the petitioner that
the document entitled waiver of
Hereditary Rights executed on July 31,
1967, aside from having been cancelled and
revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L.
Borromeo, Fortunato and Amelia, is without
force and effect because there can be no
effective waiver of hereditary rights before
there has been valid acceptance of the
inheritance to the heirs intend to transfer.
Pursuant to Art. 1043 of the Civil Code, to
make acceptance or repudiation of
inheritance valid, the person must be
certain of the death of the one from whom
he is to inherit and of his right to the
inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-
heirs were not certain of their and of his
right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner
and her co-heirs were not certain of their
right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner
and her co-heirs were not certain of their
right to the inheritance until they were
declared heirs, their rights were, therefore ,
uncertain. This view, according to the
 Liceo University Law
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petitioner, is also supported by Art. 1057 of
the same code which directs heirs, devises,
and legatees to signify their acceptance or
repudiation within thirty days after the
court has issued an order has issued for the
distribution of the estate.
Fortunato Borromeo on the other
hand, contends that under Art. 1043 of the
Civill Code there is no need for a person to
be first declared as heir before he can
accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is
required is that he must first be certain of
the death of the person from whom he is to
inherit and that he must be certain of his
right to the inheritance. He puts out that at
the time of the signing of the waiver
document on July 31, 1967, the signatories
to the waiver were certain that Vito
Borromeo was already dead as wel as of
their rights to the inheritance as shown in
the waiver document itself
Issue:
WON Fortunato Borromeo os entitled to
5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo under
the waiver agreement.
Ruling:
No. The prevailing jurisprudence on
waiver of hereditary rights is that the the
properties included in an existing
inheritance cannot be considered as
belonging to third person with respect to
the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the
personality of the former. Nor do such
properties have the character of future
property, because the heirs acquire a right
to succession from the moment of the
death of the deceased, by principle
established in Art. 657 and 661 of the Civil
Code, according to which the heirs succeed
the deceased by the mere fact of death.
More or less, time may elapse from the
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moment of the death of the deceased until
the heirs enter into possession of the
hereditary property, but the acceptance in
any event retroacts to the moment of the
death, in accordance of the corresponding
hereditary portion. The heirs, therefore,
could waive their hereditary rights in 1967
even if the order to partition the estate was
issued only on 1969.
In this case, however , the purported
Waiver Of Hereditary Rights cannot
considered to be effective. For a waiver to
exist, three elements are essential: (1) the
existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of
the existence therefore; and (3) an
intention to relinquish such right. The
intention to waive a right or advantage
must be shown clearly and convincingly,
and when the only proof of intention rests
in what a party does, his act should be so
manifest consistent with, and indicative of
an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the
particular right or advantage that no other
reasonable explanation of his conduct is
possible.
The circumstances of this case show
that the signatories to the waiver document
did not have the clear and convincing
intention to relinquish their rights. The
supposed waiver of hereditary rights cannot
be validated. The essential elements of a
waiver, especially the clear and convincing
intention to relinquish hereditary rights, are
not found in this case..
Case Digested by: Rhino Perez
73
DELA CRUZ v EMILIO CAMON
G.R. No. L-21034
April 30, 1966
 Liceo University Law
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Topic: Actions by and against executors
and administrators
Doctrine: Claims against the administrator
may be presented in the administration
proceeding but not against third person.
Synopsis: The deceased was the owner of
2/4 pro-indiviso share of Hacienda Rosario
which was leased to here in appellee. The
administrator of the estate moved the court
for an order to direct Camon to pay the
estates 2/4 share of the rentals. The latter
challenged the courts jurisdiction over his
person.
Facts:
Whether the claim against third persons by
the administrator maybe presented in the
administration proceedings.
Ruling:
The demand is for money due allegedly for
rentals. Camon is a third person. Hence, the
administrator may not pull him against his
will, by motion, into the administration
proceedings. "When the demand is in favor
of the administrator and the party against
whom it is enforced is a third party, not
under the court's jurisdiction, the demand
can not be by mere motion by the
administrator, but by an independent
action against the third person."

The estate of Thomas Fallon and Case Digested by: James Marfori
Anne Fallon Murphy was owner of two-
fourths (2/4) share pro-indiviso of Hacienda
Rosario. That whole hacienda was held in
lease by Emilio Camon since long before the
present intestate proceedings were
commenced.

The administrator of the estate

moved the court for an order to direct
Emilio Camon to pay the estate's two-forths
share of the rentals on Hacienda Rosario for
the crop years 1948-1949 through 1960-
1961, viz: on the sugar land, P62,065.00;
and on the rice land, P2,100.00. Emilio
Camon challenged the probate court's
jurisdiction over his person. The court ruled
that the demand for rentals cannot be
made "by mere motion by the administrator
but by independent action."

Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

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74
DAMASO CABUYAO vs DOMINGO
CAGBAY
GR NO. L-6636
August 02, 1954
Topic: Right to Assert a Cause of Action as
Alleged Heir
Doctrine: If the decedent left no debts and
the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial
guardians, the parties may, without
securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the register of deeds, and should
they disagree, they may do as in an ordinary
action of partition. If there is only one heir
or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself
the entire estate by means of an affidavit
filed in the office of the register of deeds. It
shall be presumed that the decedent left no
debts if no creditor files a petition for letters
of administration within two years after the
death of the decedent
Facts:
Damaso Cabuyao alleged that he is
the lone compulsory heir of the spouses
Prudencio Cabuyao and Dominga Caagbay,
who died leaving the eleven (11) parcels of
land therein described, and that, although
plaintiff had adjudicated said properties to
himself pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court, the corresponding
transfer certificates of title could not be
issued in his name because the original
owners duplicate certificates were being
withheld by the defendants, Domingo
Caagbay and Eugenio Caagbay, who had
also taken possession of said parcels of land,
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and would continue unlawfully using the
same and committing acts of dispossession
thereof, unless enjoined by the court.
The lower court ruled in favor of the
defendants. Court has arrived at the
conclusion that said motion should be, as it
is hereby, denied for lack of merit. As stated
in the order of the reconsideration of which
is prayed, it is impossible for plaintiff to
maintain the action in this case because he
and the party defendants alleged to be the
heir of the same decedents and there has
been no showing that they have been
judicially declared as heir of the deceased.
Once the question of who are the heirs is
determined, it may not be necessary for the
plaintiff to file the complaint in this case
Issue:
WON a sole compulsory heir may
inherit notwithstanding the absence of a
previous declaration of heirship in favor of
the heir?
Ruling:
Yes. There is no legal precept or
established rule which imposes the
necessity of a previous legal declaration
regarding their status as heirs to an
intestate estate on those who, being of age
and with legal capacity, consider
themselves the legal heirs of a person, in
order that they may maintain an action
arising out of a right which belonged to
their ancestor.
If the decedent left no debts and the
heirs and legatees are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial
guardians, the parties may, without
securing letters of administration, divide
the estate among themselves as they see fit
by means of a public instrument filed in the
 Liceo University Law
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office of the register of deeds, and should 1949, rendered In the testate proceedings
they disagree, they may do as in an ordinary of the deceased, approving the sale of
action of partition. If there is only one heir certain real property in favor of Francisco
or one legatee, he may adjudicate to Dee, and for the annulment of the sale Itself.
himself the entire estate by means of an The complaint was filed against Francisco
affidavit filed in the office of the register of Dee as vendee and Maria Lao, a co-special
deeds. It shall be presumed that the administratrix of the estate, also an heir, in
decedent left no debts if no creditor files a her individual capacity. The lower court
petition for letters of administration within denied said complaint. Hence this petition.
two years after the death of the decedent.
Issue:
Case Digested by: Rhino Perez
WON the sale to Defendants were invalid..
Ruling:

75
LAO vs DEO
GR NO. L-389 The sale was made by express
June 23, 1952 authority of the court on the strength of the
petition of the heirs themselves. Including
the now appellant Ignacla Lao. The sale was
made by the two administratrices of the
Topic: Heir May Not Sue When
estate. The terms of the sale were more
Administrator Appointed Until Share
than what the heirs expected. The authority
Assigned
was to sell the property for P250,000, and
Doctrine: An executor or administrator who yet Francisco Dee paid P260,000. The heirs,
assumes the trust, takes possession of the therefore, have no reason to complain. In
property left by the decedent for the any event, under the rule, only the two
purpose of paying debts. While his debts are administratrices of the estate can Impugn
undetermined and unpaid, no residue may the validity of the sale, and we doubt if this
be settled for distribution among the heirs can be done, for the court would not
and devisees. Consequently, before sanction the undoing of what it has been
distribution is made or before any residue is accomplished through its own express
known, the heirs, or devisees have no cause authority. This is not, therefore, a case
of action against the executor or which comes under the exception of the
administrator for recovery of the property rule that when the executor or
left by the deceased administrator is unwilling or fails or refuses
to act, in which event the heirs may act in
Facts: his place.
Ignacia Lao, In her capacity as An executor or administrator who
special administratrix of the estate of the assumes the trust, takes possession of the
late Albina de los Santos, as well as heir of property left by the decedent for the
said deceased, and Domingo Lao, also as purpose of paying debts. While his debts
heir of the deceased, filed a complaint for are undetermined and unpaid, no residue
the annulment of an order of the Court of may be settled for distribution among the
First Instance of Manila dated January 38, heirs and devisees. Consequently, before

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distribution is made or before any residue is
known, the heirs, or devisees have no cause
of action against the executor or
administrator for recovery of the property
left by the deceased..
Case Digested by: Rhino Perez
76
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS DE LA RAMA
(124 PHIL. 1493)
Topic: Notices to be sent to Estates
Administrator.
Doctrine: When an estate is under
administration, notice must be sent to the
administrator of the estate, since it is the
said administrator, as representative of the
estate, who has the legal obligation to pay
and discharge all debts of the estate and to
perform all orders of the court.
Facts:
The executor-administrator, Eliseo
Hervas, filed on March 12, 1951, income tax
returns of the estate corresponding to the
taxable year 1950. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue later claimed that it had found out
that there had been received by the estate
in 1950 from the De la Rama Steamship
Company, Inc. cash dividends amounting to
P86,800.00, which amount was not
declared in the income tax return of the
estate for the year 1950. The Bureau of
Internal Revenue then, on March 7, 1956,
made an assessment as deficiency income
tax against the estate.
The Collector of Internal Revenue
wrote a letter to Mrs. Lourdes de la Rama-
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Osmea informing her of the deficiency
income tax and asking payment thereof.
The latter's counsel wrote to the Collector
acknowledging receipt of the assessment
but contended that Lourdes de la Rama-
Osmea had no authority to represent the
estate, and that the assessment should be
sent to Leonor de la Rama who was pointed
to by said counsel as the administratrix of
the estate of her late father. A letter to
Leonor de la Rama as administratrix of the
estate was sent asking for payment. The
deficiency income tax not having been paid,
the Republic of the Philippines filed a
complaint against the heirs of Esteban de la
Rama, seeking to collect from each heir
his/her proportionate share in the income
tax liability of the estate
Issue:
Whether the letter sent to Leonor
de la Rama as administratrix was proper.
Ruling:
No. The estate was still under the
administration of Eliseo Hervas as regards
the collection of said dividends. The
administrator was the representative of the
estate, whose duty it was to pay and
discharge all debts and charges on the
estate and to perform all orders of the court
by him to be performed (Rule 71, Section 1),
and to pay the taxes and assessments due
to the Government or any branch or
subdivision thereof (Section 7, Rule 89, Old
Rules of Court). The tax must be collected
from the estate of the deceased, and it is
the administrator who is under obligation to
pay such claim (Estate of Claude E.
Haygood.). The notice of assessment,
therefore, should have been sent to the
administrator. In this case, notice was first
sent to Lourdes de la Rama-Osmea on and
 Liceo University Law
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later to Leonor de la Rama, neither of
whom had authority to represent the estate
Case digested by: Dais Elisa Leonore C.
Omisol
77
MELGAR v BUENAVIAJE
(179 SCRA 196)
Topic: Notices to be sent to Estates
Administrator and Actions which survive
Doctrine: An action for damages may be
brought against an executor or
administrator
Facts:
In the early morning of January 11,
1980 a vehicular accident happened along
the National Highway of Barangay Agos,
Polangui, Albay, whereby a passenger bus
owned and operated by the late Felicidad
Balla swerved to the left lane and came into
head-on-collision with a Ford Fiera owned
by Mateo Lim Relucio coming from the
opposite direction. It then swerved further
to the left this time colliding head-on-with a
passenger bus, FUSO driven by Fabian
Prades. As a result of the accident, Felicidad
Balla, owner and operator of the passenger,
and mother of herein petitioners together
with Domingo Casin, driver of the bus, died
on the spot. Ruben Lim Relucio, driver of
the service jeep and Fabian Prades, driver of
the other passenger bus died in the same
accident.
On July 4, 1980 the spouses Oscar
Prades and Victoria Prades private
respondents herein as the only surviving
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forced heirs of the deceased Fabian Prades,
filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur against the
children of deceased Felicidad Balla,
petitioners herein for damages. The
defendants in the complaint, petitioners
herein, moved for the dismissal of the case
on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action against them, arguing that it
is entirely incorrect to hold the children
liable for the alleged negligence of their
deceased mother and to consider suing the
heirs of a deceased person the same as
suing the estate of said deceased person.
Respondent court denied the motion to
dismiss in its order of September 23, 1980
for lack of merit. Plaintiff spouses, private
respondents herein, filed their comment
and motion to admit amended complaint
together with an amended complaint,
amending the title of the case naming as
defendants the Estate of the late Felicidad
Balla as represented by the children named
in the original complaint. Respondent court
issued its order denying the motion for
reconsideration and admitting the amended
complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First
Instance has the power to entertain a suit
for damages arising from the death of a
person, filed against the estate of another
deceased person as represented by the
heirs
Ruling:
While petitioners may have correctly
moved for the dismissal of the case and
private respondents have forthwith
corrected the deficiency by filing an
amended complaint, even before the lower
court could act on petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the denial of their
 Liceo University Law
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motion to dismiss, the action which allows
the suit against the legal representative of
the deceased, that is, the executor or
administrator of his estate, would still be
futile, for the same reason that there
appears to be no steps taken towards the
settlement of the estate of the late
Felicidad Balla, nor has an executor or
administrator of the estate been appointed.
From the statement made by the
petitioners that "many persons die without
leaving any asset at all" which insinuates
that the deceased left no assets, it is
reasonable to believe that the petitioners
will not take any step to expedite the early
settlement of the estate, judicially or extra-
judicially if only to defeat the damage suit
against the estate. Under the circumstances
the absence of an estate proceeding may be
avoided by requiring the heirs to take the
place of the deceased.
Case digested by: Dais Elisa Leonore C.
Omisol
78
ROMUALDEZ VS TIGLAO
(105 SCRA 762)
Topic: Notices to be sent to Estates
Administrator
Doctrine:
The judgment creditor could not file
a claim against the testate estate for the
amount of the unsatisfied judgment. The
judgment creditors had no alternative but to
file an action for revival of judgment to
prevent its extinguishment by prescription
Facts:
Paz G. Romualdez and others sued
Antonio Tiglao for the payment of unpaid
rentals for the lease of a hacienda and its
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sugar quota. Included in the suit were Felisa
Tiglao and others who had guaranteed the
payment of the rents jointly and severally
with Antonio Tiglao.
The judgment was not satisfied
notwithstanding a writ of execution to
enforce it. Accordingly, Paz G. Romualdez,
et al. filed another civil case in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal against Antonio Tiglao
and his sureties in order to revive the
judgment above quoted.
It should be stated that when the
suit to revive judgment was filed, Felisa F.
Tiglao had died and her estate was being
settled. Accordingly, the one who was made
defendant was her estate represented by
the Special Administratrix Maningning
Tiglao-Naguiat, The administratrix
questioned the jurisdiction of the court a
quo to entertain the suit to revive judgment.
She invoked Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court that, "No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the
executor or administrator; ... ". Brushing
aside the posture of the administratrix, the
court a quo rendered a decision
Issue:
Whether the present action is one
for the recovery of a sum of money and that
it is barred by Sec. I of Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court
Ruling:
The original judgment which was
rendered has become stale because of its
non-execution after the lapse of five years.
(Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.)
Accordingly, it cannot be presented against
the Estate of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first
revived by action. This is precisely why the
 Liceo University Law
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appellees have instituted the second suit
whose object is not to make the Estate of
Felisa Tiglao pay the sums of money
adjudged in the first judgment but merely
to keep alive said judgment so that the
sums therein awarded can be presented as
claims against the estate in Special Proc. No.
Q-10731 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal
Case digested by: Dais Elisa Leonore C.
Omisol
79
ABIERA VS ORIN
(8 PHIL. 193).
Topic: Actions which survive
Doctrine: The administrator has only the
right to institute such actions as pertain to
the estate he is administering, and no action
dealing with obligations contracted in favor
of third persons or others from whom he
does not derive such right, can be brought
by him as such administrator
Facts:
Now, the plaintiff, has filed this
complaint as special administrator of his
deceased father, Juan Abiera, alleging that
the defendant has not complied with the
said contract and agreement and prays the
court to compel the compliance of the
defendant therewith."
The tenor of this contract, according
to the judgment referred to, is as follows:
We, having knowledge and
information of the inventory of the
properties acquired during the married
state and life of Miguel Orin and the said
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Vicenta Cacao, by our contract have agreed,
that Miguel Orin, The widower, obligates
himself to deliver to his brothers-in-law, as
guardians and fathers of the heirs of Petra
Cacao, the value of one thousand pesos to
each of them. The period within which to
comply with this contract is until August 15,
next; this is the just amount of our
inheritance.
Issue:
Whether the administrator has right of
action against the defendant.
Ruling:
It is not necessary, it being too trivial,
to refer to the right of Juan Abiera to
represent his children as father or guardian
of the same, and that he has not
transferred nor could he transfer to the
administrator of his estate such right from
the mere fact that he was such
administrator. As has been stated, the said
right attached to parental authority or
guardianship was extinguished with the
death of Abiera, together with the parental
right or the said guardianship this in fact
and law. This was an exclusively personal
right that could not survive the person who
had such right.
Consequently by reason of the
considerations expressed above the court
below incurred error in taking into
consideration the propriety of the
complaint herein. This could not have been
done legally, the plaintiff not having the
right of action and was without such right of
action in the suit brought by him, and this is
the basis of the exception taken by the
appellant and now before this court. It is
true that this exception on this point was
not brought forward in the Court of First
Instance, but it is also true that the

exception based on the lack of right of
action can be submitted during any stage or
state of the case, as provided in section 93
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Case by: Dais Elisa Leonore C. Omisol
Rule 87
80
SINFOROSO PASCUAL v.
PONCIANO PASCUAL, ET AL
Topic: Administrators sole right and
prerogative to file action in behalf of the estate;
exception.
Doctrine: Upon the commencement of the
testate or intestate proceedings the heirs
have no standing in court in actions of the
above character, except when the executor
or administrator is unwilling or fails or
refuses to act, in which event to heirs may
act in his place.
Facts:
Plaintiff Sinforoso Pascual instituted
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
against Ponciano S. Pascual and others, an
action for the annulment of a contract of
sale of a fishpond situated in Lubao,
Pampanga. He supposedly executed
without consideration by the deceased in
her lifetime in favor of the defendants. One
of defendants, Miguel S. Pascual, was the
executor appointed by the probate court.
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The complaint alleges that plaintiff
and defendants are all residents of Malabon,
Rizal, and are legitimate children of the
testratix, Eduarda de los Santos. Defendants
filed of a motion to dismiss, alleging want of
cause of action limitation of action, wrong
venue and pendency of another action.
The trial court granted the motion
on the ground that the action should have
been brought by the executor or
administrator of the estate left by the
deceased. The amended complaint was still
dismissed due to insufficiency
Issue:
Whether or not the action can be
brought by the heirs despite presence of
appointed administrator
Ruling:
Under Rule 86, section 1, of the new
Rules of Court, actions for the recovery or
protection of the property or rights of the
deceased for causes which survive may be
prosecuted or defended by his executor or
administrator. Upon the commencement of
the testate or intestate proceedings the
heirs have no standing in court in actions of
the above character, except when the
executor or administrator is unwilling or
fails or refuses to act, in which event to
heirs may act in his place.
The fictitious sale is alleged to have
been made to the defendants, one of them,
Miguel S. Pascual, being the executor
appointed by the probate court. Such
executor naturally would not bring an
action against himself for recovery of the
fishpond. His refusal to act may, therefore,
be implied. And this brings the case under
the exception
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 Liceo University Law
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Case digested by: Gregor Alfonsin Pondoyo
81
MARIA VELASQUEZ, ET AL.,
v. WILLIAM GEORGE ET AL
Topic: Administrators sole right and
prerogative to file action in behalf of the
estate; exception
Doctrine:
In Ramirez v. Baltazar we ruled that
since the ground for the present action to
annul the aforesaid foreclosure proceedings
is the fraud resulting from such insidious
machinations and collusion in which the
administrator has allegedly participated, it
would be far-fetched to expect the said
administrator himself to file the action in
behalf of the estate.
Since the Administrator is a party to
the fraud, the heirs may bring an action to
annul as an exception to the rule that
pending proceedings for the settlement of
the estate, the heir have no right to
commence an action arising out of the
rights belonging to the deceased
Facts:
Maria Velasquez Vda. De George
and her children appealed from the decision
of the CFI of Bulacan, which dismissed their
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs
are the widow and legitimate children of
the late Benjamin George whose estate is
under intestate proceedings. In their
complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the 5
defendant-mortgagors (D-Mors) are officers
of the Islan Associates Inc. Andres Munoz,
aside from being the treasurer-director of
said corp., was also appointed and qualified
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as administrator of the estate of Benjamin
George in the above special proceedings. In
life, the latter owned 64.8% or 636 shares
out of 980 shares of stock in the corp.
Without prior approval from the probate
court and without notice to the heirs and
their counsel, the D-Mors executed a Deed
of First Real Estate Mortgage (DFREM) in
favor of the defendant-mortgagee (D-Mee)
Erlinda Villanueva, covering 3 parcels of
land owned by Island Assoc. In said Deed,
the D-Mors also expressly waived their right
to redeem the said parcels. Subsequently, a
power of atty (POA) was executed by the D-
Mors in favor of Villanueva whereby the
latter was given full power and authority to
cede, transfer and convey the parcels of
land within the reglementary period
provided by law for redemption. A
certificate of sale (CS) was executed in favor
of Villanueva after she submitted the
highest bids at the public Auction. This led
to the execution of a Deed of Sale and
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership
(ACO) by virtue of which TCTs covering the
3 parcels were cancelled and new TCTs
were issued in favor of Villanueva.
Plaintiffs therefore filed a complaint
for the annulment of the DFREM, POA, CS,
ACO and the new TCTs. Villanueva contends
that the plaintiffs-appellants have no
capacity to file the complaint because the
general rule laid down in R87, sec3 of the
Rules of Court states that only the
administrator or executor of the estate may
bring actions of such nature as the one in
the case at bar. The only exception is when
the executor or administrator is unwilling or
fails or refuses to act, which exception does
not apply in the present case. TC dismissed
the complaint.
Issue:
 Liceo University Law
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Whether or not the plaintiffs-
appellants have the capacity to file the
complaint?
Ruling:
Yes. The contention that the proper
party to file the complaint is the
administrator of the estate of Benjamin
George is without merit. The administrator,
Andres Munoz, is the same person charged
by the plaintiffs-appellants to have voted in
the Board of Directors without securing the
proper authority from the Probate Court to
which he is accountable as administrator. In
Ramirez v. Baltazar we ruled that since the
ground for the present action to annul the
aforesaid foreclosure proceedings is the
fraud resulting from such insidious
machinations and collusion in which the
administrator has allegedly participated, it
would be far-fetched to expect the said
administrator himself to file the action in
behalf of the estate. Who else but the heirs
who have an interest to assert and protect
would bring the action? Inevitably this case
falls under the EXCEPTION [emphasis mine]
rather than the general rule that pending
proceedings for the settlement of the estate,
the heirs have no right to commence an
action arising out of the rights belonging to
the deceased. This case falls under the
exception.
Case digested by: Gregor Alfonsin Pondoyo
82
AGUSTIN REGALA v. COURT OF
APPEALS and ORVILLE ODICTA
Topic: Recovery of a sum of money dies
when defendant dies; testate or intestate
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court becomes the proper court for
recovery
Doctrine: The reason for the dismissal of the
case is that upon the death of the defendant
a testate or intestate proceeding shall be
instituted in the proper court wherein all his
creditors must appear and file their claims
which shall be paid proportionately out of
the property left by the deceased. The
purpose of the rule is to avoid useless
duplicity of procedure the ordinary action
must be wiped out from the ordinary court
Facts:
On 23 November 1988, private
respondent Orville Odicta filed against
Agustin Regala in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila a complaint for recovery of the sum
of P503,048.00, representing the balance of
the purchase price of assorted knocked-
down motor vehicles and spare parts. The
court granted the motion of the plaintiff for
the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment. Regala died on 1989 during the
proceedings. Te court was informed of his
death but continued the proceedings and
required the plaintiff to comment within 5
days on the defendant's Urgent Motion to
Discharge Attachment. On 19 June 1989 the
defense filed an Omnibus Motion for
reconsideration of the said order and for
the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to
the above cited rule. This motion was
denied.
Teresita F. Regala, in representation
of her deceased father, then went to the
Court of Appeals in a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary injunction to question the said
orders of the trial court. Her petition was
dismissed
Issue:
 Liceo University Law
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83
Whether the recovery (collection) of PAULA v. ECSAY ET AL.
sum of money be dismissed upon the death
of Agustin Regala 97 Phil. 617, 619-620 (1955)

Ruling:
It is already a settled rule that an
action for recovery of money for collection
of a debt is one that does not survive and
upon the death of the defendant the case
should be dismissed to be presented in the
manner especially provided in the Rules of
Court (Villegas and Santos v. Zapanta and
Zorilla, 104 Phil. 1973). This is explicitly
provided in Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court which states that:
Sec. 21. Where claim does not
survive. Then the action is for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon, and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the
Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed
to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in these rules.
Topic: Claim of a sum of money; testate
and intestate proceedings
Synopsis/Doctrine: The practice has been
for demands against administrators to be
presented in the court of first instance
where the special proceeding of
administration is pending, if the demand
has relation to an act of administration and
in the ordinary course thereof.
The mere fact that the court in passing upon
the claim may order the administratrix to
pay the full amount of the demand, does
not mean that the total amount which she is
compelled to pay could be chargeable
against the said estate under administration

The reason for the dismissal of the Facts:

case is that upon the death of the
defendant a testate or intestate proceeding
shall be instituted in the proper court
wherein all his creditors must appear and
file their claims which shall be paid
proportionately out of the property left by
the deceased. The purpose of the rule is to
avoid useless duplicity of procedure the
ordinary action must be wiped out from the
ordinary court. In the present case, the
money claim arose out of a pure and simple
debt, which as aforementioned, under the
provisions of Rule 3, Sec. 21 of the Rules of
Court shall be dismissed and must be
brought before the probate court.
Jose Ecsay and Rufina de Paula,
administratrix of the estate of the late
Victor Gaston, entered into a contract of
lease over Hacienda Puyas No. 1. Escay
stood as the lessee and Paula, the lessor.
The contract of lease was executed with the
courts approval.
Under the contract of lease the
administratrix was obliged to deliver to
Ecsay 10% of the sugar, rice and corn
produced from the Hacienda from 1943
until the full sum of P7,000 - the estimated
cost of the property transferred to the
estate - was fully covered.

Case digested by: Gregor Alfonsin Pondoyo Ecsay filed his claim averring that
the administratrix was indebted to him for
P5,418.31 as principal and P2,682.06 as
interest. The administratrix opposed the

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 Liceo University Law
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claim contending that: the court sitting in
probate has no jurisdiction to entertain the
claim, especially the same is being
controverted; the claim is not chargeable
against the estate but against the
administratrix in her personal capacity since
there was an overpayment of rentals; and
she was not given the opportunity to
contest the claims correctness. The lower
court ruled in favor of Ecsay.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the court has the
jurisdiction to consider the claim in the
administration proceedings.
(2) Whether or not the claim should be
chargeable against the administratrix in her
personal capacity.
(3) Whether or not the amounts in the claim
may still be controverted
Ruling:
(1) YES. The claim is an ordinary
demand for the payment of the balance of
an account due under a contract of lease
entered into by the administratrix under the
courts approval.
In our judicial system, there is only
one grade of court of general jurisdiction
invested with power to take cognizance of
all kinds of cases. There are no probate
courts dedicated to the trial of probate
cases alone.
The practice has been for demands
against administrators to be presented in
the court of first instance where the special
proceeding of administration is pending, if
the demand has relation to an act of
administration and in the ordinary course
thereof.
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It can be seen in this case that as the
lease contract was entered into by the
administratrix with the approval of the
court in the ordinary course of
administration and with the courts
approval in the administration proceedings,
to consider the claim in the same
proceedings may not be denied for the
claim purpose to make the administratrix
comply with the obligations contracted in
the course of administration with the
courts consent and approval.
The claimant is not prohibited from
filing an independent action to recover the
claim, but the existence of such a remedy is
not a bar to the remedy that he had
pursued in this case
(2) YES. The consideration of the
claim in the administration proceedings,
however, does not necessarily mean that
the administratrix may not be held
personally liable for the excess.
The mere fact that the court in
passing upon the claim may order the
administratrix to pay the full amount of the
demand, does not mean that the total
amount which she is compelled to pay
could be chargeable against the said estate
under administration.
The court in ordering payment of
the excess amount over the rentals would
hold the administratrix personally
responsible therefor. This however do not
deprive the court of power to consider the
claim; and the administratrix is estopped
from denying that the amounts received in
excess of the true rentals were received by
her in such capacity.
One who contracts with another in a
representative capacity cannot claim that
amounts received by her in said
 Liceo University Law
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representative capacity are due from her in
another capacity.
(3) NO. As to the correctness of the
amounts stated in the claim, the
administratrix never offered to disprove
them. The administratrix should have
indicated the items the correctness of
which she wanted to deny. Thus all the
items were deemed admitted.
Case by: Gregor AlfonsinC. Pondoyo
Rule 88
84
GOVERNMENT v. PAMINTUAN
GR No. L-33139
October 11, 1930
Topic: Types of claims required to be filed.
Doctrine: Claims for taxes due and
assessed after the death of the decedent
need not be presented in the form of a
claim. The court in the exercise of its
administrative control over the executor
or administrator may direct him to pay
such taxes. And the heirs even after
distribution are liable for such taxes.
Synopsis: Decedent died intestate, and
after the partition of the properties, the
delivery of the shares and inheritance to the
heirs were ordered. During the pendency
of the proceedings, it was discovered that
some tax returns were not paid.
Facts:
Florentino Pamintuan, died intestate,
leaving herein defendants as his heirs.
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During the intestate proceedings, a
committee on claims and appraisals was
established, appointing two commissioners
for appraisal of the decedents properties.
The said committee submitted their report
before the court, indicating the valid claims
that were to be paid during the proceedings.
After which, the partition of the properties
of the decedent took place, with the court
ordering the delivery of the shares and
inheritance of the decedents heirs. During
the pendency of the proceedings, the
administrator of the estate of the deceased
filed income-tax returns, and it was
discovered that there were certain income
tax returns which the decedent was not
able to pay during his lifetime. However,
the proceedings were already closed by the
court, and due to which, the heirs, herein
defendants, refused to pay the income tax
returns which were not settled by the
decedent. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in
holding that the failure of the plaintiff to file
its claim with the committee on claims and
appraisals barred it from collecting the tax
in questions in this action, and of absolving
the defendants from the complaint.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that
claims for income taxes need not be filed
with the committee on claims and
appraisals appointed in the course of
testate proceedings and may be collected
even after the distribution of the decedent's
estate among his heirs, who shall be liable
therefor in proportion to their share in the
inheritance. Income taxes may be collected
even after the distribution of the estate,
and the heirs of the decedent are liable for
the payment of it.
 Liceo University Law
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on the said title the liens on the property
Case Digested by: Aiza Belle Manla Ramos covered by said certificate, consisting of a
mortgage in favor of Gonzalo Puyat and the
lease affecting the portion of the lot.

Rule 89 The parcels of land covered by

transfer certificate of title No. 5377 of the
office of the register of deeds of Pampanga

85
ROD of Pampanga v PNB
GR No. L-1781
September 27, 1949
Topic: Authority of the Court to Approve
Sale of Property by Prospective Heir
Doctrine: The probate court has no
jurisdiction to make pronouncement
regarding the existence or non-existence of
encumbrances or to cancel a mortgage on
real property in its order approving the sale
of the estate under administration.
Synopsis: A petition was filed by the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga to correct
an error covering a mortgage in favor of
Gonzalo Puyat. The above petition was
opposed by the Philippine National Bank on
the ground that it will adversely affect the
interest of the mortgagee bank. the probate
court had no jurisdiction to cancel the
mortgage, the order given by it approving
the sales of the properties of the estate of
Martin Gonzales to appellant Pedro B. Cruz
did not and does not, in any manner, affect
the existence of the mortgaged executed by
Gonzales in favor of Gonzalo Puyat.
Facts:
This is a petition filed by Rodolfo R.
Dimzon as Register of Deeds of Pampanga,
whereby he seeks to correct "the error,
omission or mistake made in transfer
certificate of title No. 16342 by transferring
were registered in the name of Martin
Gonzales. Among those parcels, there was a
lot 1-J which is a portion of lot No. 1 located
in the municipality of Lubao. All the parcels
of land described in the said certificate No.
5377, as well as those described in
certificate No. 5379, original certificate, of
title No. 11578 and original certificate of
title No. 17261 and other parcels of land
located in Bataan, were mortgaged in favor
of Gonzalo Puyat. Those parcels of land
were leased to one Romualdo Rivera for a
period of six agricultural years.
The above-mentioned mortgage was
registered in the office of the register of
deeds of Pampanga, and the corresponding
annotation made on the back of the
respective certificate of title (5377).
Lot No. 1-J was sold by Jose
Gonzales Carrion, as administrator of the
estate of Martin Gonzales, to private
respondent Pedro B. Cruz.
On October 17, 1944, Romualdo
Rivera sold his rights on the lease over the
2,000,000 square meters of lot No. 1-J to
Pedro B. Cruz.
By virtue of such sales, transfer
certificate of title No. 5377 was partially
cancelled as to the whole lot No. 1-J, and
transfer certificate of title No. 16342 was
issued in the name of Pedro B. Cruz, and the
only lien appearing thereon is the milling
contract executed in favor of Pampanga
Sugar Mills.

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Pedro B. Cruz mortgaged the whole Issue:

of lot No. 1-J described in transfer
Whether the probate court erred in
certificate of title No. 16342 to PNB.
approving the sale of the subject parcel of
It is contended by the register of land.
deeds that Luis Panaguition, then acting
Ruling:
provincial fiscal and ex-officio register of
deeds of Pampanga, "overlooked or failed Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of
to transfer in the title." the liens referring to First Instance, whether original or appellate,
the mortgage in favor of Gonzalo Puyat. is provided in the Organic Law of the
Judiciary. Formerly, it was the Court of Land
The above petition was opposed by
Registration that had exclusive jurisdiction
the Philippine National Bank on the ground
over land matters and proceedings. That
that it will adversely affect the interest of
court was, however, abolished and its
the mortgagee bank.
jurisdiction and functions were transferred
During the pendency of the case, to the Court of First Instance.
PNB executed a release of the mortgage in
The special mention made therein of
favor of Pedro Cruz after the later paid his
the original jurisdiction given the Court of
loan.
First Instance in "all matters of probate,
Pedro B. Cruz also filed his both testate and intestate estates," is a
opposition to the petition of the register of clear expression of the legislative intent
deeds. He alleges that the probate court of that when a Court of First Instance is sitting
Pampanga authorized the sale of 104 as a probate court it cannot in the same
additional hectares of the Hacienda of the proceeding deal with or adjudicate a matter
late Martin Gonzales, over the objection of which has no reference or bearing on the
Gonzalo Puyat, and notwithstanding a case under its consideration.
subsequent motion for reconsideration of
Gonzalo Puyat was not a party in the
the order approving the sale, which was
proceedings of the Estate of Martin
denied, it stated that the land was free from
Gonzales, and when the Court of First
all liens and encumbrances. Accordingly, the
Instance of Pampanga, as probate court
deeds of sale covering the 200 hectares and
not as land registration court authorized
the additional 104 hectares show that they
the sale to appellant Pedro B. Cruz of a lot
were all free from all liens and
belonging to the estate of Martin Gonzales,
encumbrances of whatsoever nature, and,
it acted as such probate court, in
therefore, the register of deeds of
accordance with paragraph (e) of section 44
Pampanga acted correctly in registering the
of the Judiciary Act, but its pronouncement
two deeds of sale in the name of Pedro B.
regarding the existence or non-existence of
Cruz, free from all liens and encumbrances
encumbrances regarding the lot it
of whatsoever nature.
authorized to be sold to Pedro B. Cruz, was
It is contended by appellant Pedro B. beyond its jurisdiction as probate court.
Cruz that the order of the probate court in
It is, therefore, undeniable that since
approving the sale of the land is res judicata
the probate court had no jurisdiction to
in the present case.

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cancel the mortgage, the order given by it
approving the sales of the properties of the
estate of Martin Gonzales to appellant
Pedro B. Cruz did not and does not, in any
manner, affect the existence of the
mortgaged executed by Gonzales in favor of
Gonzalo Puyat. Any inasmuch as said
mortgage was still in force when Pedro B.
Cruz purchased from the estate of Martin
Gonzales the property covered by transfer
certificate of title No. 5377, which was
subsequently replaced by transfer
certificate No. 16342, the conclusion is
inevitable that the mortgage in favor of
Gonzalo Puyat being prior in date than the
date of the mortgage executed by Pedro B.
Cruz in favor of the Philippine National Bank,
in the absence of any showing that the
former mortgage of Gonzalo Puyat had
been cancelled, the existence thereof
cannot be questioned, and it becomes the
duty of the register of deeds to annotate
that mortgage on transfer certificate of Cruz,
in lieu of transfer certificate of title No.
5377. Potior est in tempore, potior est in
jeru. (He who is first in time, is preferred in
right.)
Case Digested by: Aura Villones
86
CARPIZO v. FLORANZA
GR No. 4069
December 5, 1908
Topic: Liability of Heirs and DIstributees
Doctrine: A Court of First Instance, in the
exercise of its probate jurisdiction, has no
power to allow the sale of a specific piece of
real estate for the purpose of paying off a
mortgage lien thereon.
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An order made by a Court of First Instance
in probate proceedings, for the sale of real
property belonging to the estate of a
deceased person, is void when no notice of
the hearing upon the petition for such sale is
given, as required by section 722 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Section 1, Rule 89).
Synopsis: A claim against the estate of the
decedent was secured by a mortgage on a
real property. The administrator presented
such claim upon the court and the latter
made an order directing the administrator
to sell the mortgage property; that the
mortgage debt be paid from the proceeds
of the sale, and that what remained be
distributed among the other creditors.
Facts:
A certain Balbino Jaucian filed for a
claim against the estate of the decedent,
Luis Gamboa Carpizo, and upon the
committee on claims report, such claim of
Jaucian is secured by a mortgage on a real
property. The same claim was allowed by
the court. However, the administrator of
the decedents estate presented a petition
before the probate court, stating the other
creditors of the estate were mortgage
creditors, and asked for a hearing in order
to determine the preference of which the
creditors are enjoined. Without such
hearing requested by the administrator, the
court ordered the sale of the mortgage
property in favor of Jaucian, and the
remaining proceeds thereof be distributed
to the other creditors. When the
administrator filed the report of the sale for
confirmation before the court, it was found
that the mortgaged property did not belong
to the decedents estate, but to his widow.
Hence, this appeal.
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Issue: the intestate proceedings of the late

Whether the probate court erred in
issuing an order to sell the mortgaged
property in favor of Jaucian.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that
the probate court entirely failed to observe
the procedures laid by the law. The law
provides that upon the submission of the
petition by the administrator pertaining to
the sale of real estate, the court shall
appoint a time and place for the hear it and
shall require notice of the petition and of
the time and place of such hearing to be
given in a newspaper of general circulation,
and that the court may order such further
notice given as it deems proper. None of
these were done by the court, rendering
the order of the lower court to be void.
Hence, the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the probate court for further
proceedings.
Vicente Montilla, as the only legitimate and
universal heirs of the said decedent. By
virtue of such declaration, they then held all
the properties of the deceased as legitimate
and absolute owners. Allegedly, some of
these properties were illegally mortgaged
by the administratrix of the estate for the
exclusive benefit of the Maao Sugar Central
Company, Inc. without the consent of the
heirs, causing serious prejudice to their
interests. The ROD was requested by the
heirs to cancel the said illegal
encumbrances but it refused to do so. On
the other hand, PNB refuses to deliver the
the original certificate of title of deeds to
the registrar of deeds for their proper
conveyance to the owners. In the main, PNB
alleges that it acquired the registration of
the mortgages executed in its favor in good
faith and for valuable consideration
Issue:

Case Digested by: Aiza Belle Manla Ramos Whether the heirs can rightfully demand
the conveyance of the subject properties

87
Ernestina Ortaliz, et al., v. The
Register of Deeds of the Province
of Occidental Negros, Philippine
National Bank, et a1961.
Topic: EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR;
EXTENT AND SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITIES
ENUMERATED
Doctrine: The reason for the mandatory
requirement of notice to the heirs before a
sale or encumbrance is allowed is that the
heirs are the presumptive owners
Facts:
On October 27, 1923, the plaintiffs were
declared by the CFI of Negros Occidental, in
Ruling:
Yes. The convenience or benefit to be
derived from the sale or mortgage is not the
only thing to be considered before a court
authorizes a sale or mortgage; the principal
requirement is that the heirs give their
written consent and approval, for they are
the owners of the property to be sold or
mortgaged, and cannot be deprived thereof
without due process of law.
In the case before us, the plaintiffs did not
give their consent nor approval to the
mortgage in question. Nor does the record
show that said mortgage was necessary to
pay off the debts and expenses of
administration. Neither is there evidence

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that the mortgage has been beneficial to
the heirs.
Case digested by: Lea Aurora Samaco
88
Adelaida Maneclang, in her capacity as
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
the late Margarita Suri Santos v. Juan
Baun and Amparo Baun, et a
Topic: Extrajudicial Settlement by
agreement between heirs
Doctrine: The requirement of notice is not
satisfied where only the surviving spouse
was notified of the sale or encumbrance and
the other heirs, both of legal age and minors,
were not notified.
Facts:
The deceased, Margarita Suri Santos,
died intestate and was survived by her
husband, Severo Maneclang, and nine
children. Margarita left several parcels of
land and in the intestate proceedings of her
estate, the administrator prayed for a letter
of authority to dispose some of the
properties necessary to meet the debts
enumerated in the petition. While notice
thereof was given to Severo Maneclang,
through his counsel, no such notice was
sent to the heirs of Margarita. It should also
be noted at this point that no
representatives were assigned for the minor
children.
Despite the absence of such notice,
an authority was issued by the court and
some of the properties were sold to the City
of Dagupan, which immediately took
possession of the lots and constructed
thereon a public market. When herein
plaintiff took over as the new administrator
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of the estate, she filed an action for
annulment of sales made by the previous
administrator. The trial court ruled in favor
of the heirs mainly for the reason that no
notice of such sale was given to the heirs of
the decedent thus, making the sale void
Issue:
Whether there was sufficient notice
of the disputed sale.
Ruling:
No, there was none. There can be no
dispute that if the heirs were duly
represented by counsel or by the guardian
ad litem in the case of minors, the notice
may be given to such counsel or guardian
ad litem. In this case, however, only the
surviving spouses, Severo Maneclang, was
notified through his counsel. Two of the
heirs, Hector Maneclang and Oscar
Maneclang, who were then of legal age,
were not represented by counsel. The
remaining seven children were still minors
having no guardian ad litem. Obviously then,
the requirement of notice was not satisfied.
The requisite set forth in Rule 89 are
mandatory and essential. Without them,
the authority to sell, the sale itself and the
order approving it would be null and void
ab initio.
The reason behind this is requirement is
that the heirs, as the presumptive owners
since they succeed to the all the rights and
obligations of the deceased from the
moment of the latters death, are the
persons directly affected by the sale or
mortgage and therefore cannot be deprived
of the property except in the manner
provided by law.
Case digested by: Lea Aurora Samaco
 Liceo University Law
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89
Francisca Garcia v.
Martin Rivera
Topic: Liability of distributees and estate.
Doctrine: Where a party did not object to
the order of the court decreeing the sale of
a property belonging to the estate but
actively participated therein, said party is
estopped from subsequently questioning the
regularity of the sale to the highest bidder
Facts:
In the proceedings for the intestate
estate of the deceased Martin Rivera, the
probate court appointed her widow,
Francisca Garcia, as the administratrix.
Subsequently, Francisca petitioned the
court to allow her to sell some of the
properties of the estate to be able to pay its
debts. This was granted by the probate
court. In the public auction, Francisca asked
Ruling:
No. The Rules of Court provides that
the court may authorize the executor or
administrator to sell property of the estate
in a public or private sale, as would be most
beneficial to all parties concerned. On this
matter the court is given ample discretion.
If the court can order the property sold at a
private sale it could also order that sealed
bids be submitted, this, in order to attain
the highest offer. Appellant did not object
to this procedure. In facts, she approved of
it and even took part in the bidding and
submitted her own sealed bid. It was only
after she failed to buy the property because
her bid was lower that she thought of
annulling the sale. We believe that she is
now estopped from questioning the
regularity of the sale. This apart from the
fact that she could not have bought the lot
because she was disqualified by the law
Case digested by: Lea Aurora Samaco

90
the court to allow her to purchase the
Gerona v. De Guzman
property for which she actively submitted
sealed bids. Upon opening the bids, L-19060.
however, the highest bidder was Rodolfo May 29, 1964
Rivera. Francisca negotiated with Rodolfo to
sell the property to her and refused to sign
the deed of sale pending such negotiation.
The court gave her an order to sign the Topic: Prescriptive Period to Annul
deed within 48 hours or else she will be Settlement.
relieved as administratrix, Hence, she
questioned the regularity of the sale of the Doctrine: A purported sale which has not been
approved by the probate court and which varies
subject property..
materially from the authority granted cannot be
Issue: made on the basis of an action by the purchaser
for specific performance..
Whether Francisca Garcia, under the
facts, could validly question the sale.. Facts:

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Six parcels of land subject of the
present action were owned pro-indiviso by
Maria Lloret and the estate of Francisco
Gonzales, which Ricardo Gonzales Lloret is
the judicial administrator. By authority of
the court, Ricardo negotiated with the legal
representative of the petitioner for the sale
of the parcels of land as funds were
serve as basis for an action for specific
performance, as now pretended by the
plaintiff, in the absence of such judicial
approval.
Case digested by: Leau Auora Samaco

necessary to pay the debts of the estate.
Thus, both parties agreed that petitioner
would buy the land for P200,000, the first
check of P100,000 to be paid to Maria
Lloret, and the other P100,000 to be paid to
Ricardo Lloret. Many other terms were
agreed upon which were not included in the
authority granted by the court order. The
payment to Ricardo, however, was ordered
to be stopped. This prompted him to refuse
to deliver the deed of sale of the properties.
Fortunato Halili, therefore, brought an
action for specific performance.
Issue:
Whether petitioner has a cause of
action for specific performance against the
respondents
Ruling:
No. Both plaintiff and defendants
knew well that the properties were subject
to judicial administration and that the sale
could have no valid effect until it merits the
approval of the court, so much so that
before the lands were opened for
negotiation the judicial administrator, with
the conformity of the heirs, secured from
the court an authorization to that effect,
and yet, as will be stated elsewhere, the
terms of the agreement between plaintiff
and defendant differ substantially from the
conditions prescribed by the court, which
indicates that said document cannot have
any binding effect upon the parties nor
91
Acebedo v Abesamis,
G.R. No. 102380
January 18, 1993
Topic: Sales, mortgage, and other
encumbrances of property of decedent.
Doctrine: A conditional sale made by the
heirs without court approval was later on
approved by the probate court. The
administrator opposed on the ground that
the probate court has no jurisdiction to
approve such conditional sale.
The authority to approve the sale of
immovable properties belonging to the
estate of the decedent, in a special
proceeding, should be made with the
approval of the court; this authority is
necessarily included in its capacity as a
probate court
Facts:
The late Felix Acebedo left an estate
consisting of several real estate properties
located in Quezon City and Caloocan City.
Petitioner is an heir and
administrator of the estate left by the
decedent. The properties are commonly
owned by 7 other heirs. Because the case
was pending for 16 years with the probate
court, some of the heirs, respondents
herein, filed a motion for approval of the

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conditional sale of the real properties
located in Quezon City for an amount of 12
million. They have already a buyer who paid
6 million as earnest money. Hence, they
prayed that the court orders the
administrator, petitioner herein, to sell the
said property.
Petitioner assailed the approval of
the sale claiming that the price is quite low.
The court ordered to find a higher bidder
but still no other buyer could provide better
terms. Finally, it was agreed by the parties
that respondents sell their share to the
price already agreed upon with the buyer
and that petitioner can negotiate his price
with the same buyer. But petitioner still
filed a Supplemental Opposition against the
approval of the conditional sale.
Subsequently, the conditional sale
was approved by the court. It also ordered
the administrator to sell the remaining
portion with the same price. The
administrator opposed the sale arguing that
it is beyond the jurisdiction of the probate
court to approve the said sale
Issue:
Whether or not the it within the jurisdiction
of the lower court, acting as a probate court,
to issue an Order approving the Deed of
Conditional Sale executed by respondents-
heirs without prior court approval and to
order herein Administrator to sell the
remaining portion of said properties?.
Ruling:
Yes. The position maintained by
herein petitioners that said conditional sale
is null and void for lack of prior court
approval is without merit. The sale precisely
was made conditional, the condition being
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that the same should first be approved by
the probate court.
The Court further elaborated that
although the Rules of Court do not
specifically state that the sale of an
immovable property belonging to an estate
of a decedent, in a special proceeding,
should be made with the approval of the
court, this authority is necessarily included
in its capacity as a probate court. Therefore,
it is clear that the probate court in the case
at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing
the Order approving the Deed of
Conditional Sale.
Private respondents having secured
the approval of the probate court, a matter
which is unquestionably within its
jurisdiction, and having established private
respondents' right to alienate the
decedent's property subject of
administration, this Petition should be
dismissed for lack of merit.
Case Digested by: Rheaphil Suralta
92
Dolores Vda. de Gil v. Agustin
Cancio,
G.R. No. L-21472,
July 30, 19651990
Topic: Sales, mortgage, and other
encumbrances of property of decedent
Doctrine: An heir can sell whatever right,
interest, of participation he may have in the
property under administration, a matter
which comes under the jurisdiction of the
probate court
Facts:
 Liceo University Law
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The decedent left a will appointing
his widow, Isabel, as administrator of the
estate. The will was probated. The widow
and the adopted son secured a loan from
Cancio and they agreed that the payment
thereof is the two parcel of land included in
the estate. Subsequently, the adopted son
died, so the widow filed a motion in the
testate proceedings praying for an order to
authorize her to execute the necessary
deed of transfer of the two lots to Agustin
Cancio or his heirs. This was approved by
the probate court on condition that the
original of the deed of transfer should be
submitted to the court for approval. Before
the deed of transfer was executed, Isabel
died, hence, Dolores, the co-administrator
and appellee in this case, executed the deed
of transfer and asked the court for its
approval through a motion. The court asked
the payment of taxes due on the two lots
before passing upon the motion.
Apparently, nothing was done on
the matter by Dolores, and so on April 1,
1959, Cancio filed a motion in probate
proceedings reiterating the petition of the
co-administratrix requesting for the
approval of the deed of sale. To the surprise
of Cancio, Dolores opposed on the ground
that the sale was without authority of the
probate court. The probate court denied
the petition and setting aside its order
which requires the submission of the deed
of sale for the approval of the court upon
the theory that since the obligation for
which the properties were sold was
personal in character and has no connection
with said obligation should be threshed out
in a separate action
Issue:
Whether or not the probate court is
correct in denying the petition and the
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obligation should be threshed out in a
separate action
Ruling:
No. the SC ruled that the widow and
children of the deceased are entitled to
certain allowances for their support out of
the estate pending its liquidation and until
their shares have been delivered to them.
The objection, therefore, of the present
administratrix on the ground that the
original agreement between the late
administratrix Isabel and Cancio was
without authority of the court has no actual
basis. As a matter of fact, Dolores, co-
administratrix of the estate, is now
estopped from disputing the sale because
she herself in her capacity as co-
administratrix filed the petition in court
asking for the approval of the same sale
which she now disputes for reasons that do
not appear in the record. And there is no
doubt that an heir can sell whatever right,
interest, of participation he may have in the
property under administration, a matter
which comes under the jurisdiction of the
probate court. It is, therefore, error for the
court a quo to say that this matter should
be threshed out in a separate action.
Case Digested by: Rheaphil Suralta
93
Picardal v Lladas
G.R. No. L-21309,
December 29, 1967
Topic: Thirty-day Period May Be Waived
 Liceo University Law
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Doctrine: The intestate estate before
partition is owned in common by all the
heirs. A co-ownership should not suffer the
consequences of the unlawful act of any of
the co-owners. Hence the estate should not
suffer from the consequences of the
dispossession perpetrated by only two of
the many heirs of the estate.
Facts:
Petitioner Bernardo Picardal
entrusted to respondent Cenon Lladas a
piece of land with an area of about seven
hectares, planted to some 812 fruit-bearing
coconut trees. The said land formed part of
the properties belonging to the conjugal
partnership between petitioner Bernardo
Picardal and his wife, Aurea Burgos, who
died in 1941, and was under judicial
administration in a Special Proceedings and
an administrator was appointed.
Subsequently, the relationship of Bernardo
and Cenon, the tenant, became unwell and
the former evicted the latter. This
prompted Cenon to file before the Court of
Agrarian Relations a petition against
Bernardo Picardal, Sebastian Picardal, the
son of Bernardo, and the administrator of
the estate for evicting him which caused
him to suffer damages. The Court of
Agrarian Relations decided in favor of
Cenon, hence, the petition. The petitioners
Bernardo and Sebastian Picardal alleged
that the said land forms part of the estate
of the deceased wife and is under
administration, hence, they could not have
ejected Cenon, much less should they be
held exclusively liable for the damages since
they were only two of the heirs to the
estate and they turned the proceeds of the
landholding in question to the estate. They
claim that the estate should be the one
liable for the damages.
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Issue:
Whether or not the estate should be
held liable for damages and not the
petitioners herein.
Ruling:
No. The SC held that the Petitioners'
responsibility for the damages cannot be
shifted to the intestate estate for various
reasons, namely:
First, petitioners' act of
dispossessing the tenant was not the act of
the estate, for they did not represent the
estate. Its representative was the special
administrator and it was not the special
administrator who perpetrated the
ejectment.
Second, the fact that the proceeds
of the landholding in question, as claimed
by petitioners, were turned over to the
estate, would neither render the estate
liable, because the intestate estate did not
really benefit from the dispossession.
Third, the intestate estate before
partition is owned in common by all the
heirs. A co-ownership should not suffer the
consequences of the unlawful act of any of
the co-owners. Hence the estate should not
suffer from the consequences of the
dispossession perpetrated by only two of
the many heirs of the estate.
Fourth, Article 18 of the Civil Code,
the application of which to the instant case
is authorized both by Section 55 of the
Agricultural Tenancy Act and Article 20 of
the Civil Code, provides that "every person
who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same." Hence, herein
petitioners themselves, and not the
intestate estate, should indemnify the
 Liceo University Law
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respondent for the damages suffered by the
latter on account of the unlawful
dispossession.
Petition is dismissed.
Case Digested by: Rheaphil Suralta
94
Cea v CA,
G.R. No. L-1776, October
27, 1949
Topic: Sales, mortgages, and other
encumbrances of property of decedent
Doctrine: There is no provision of law which
prohibits a coheir from selling to a stranger
his share of an estate held in common
before the partition of the property is
approved by the Court
Facts:
The spouses Gregorio Natividad and
Benedicta, joint owners of a tract of land
known as "Hacienda Cabasay," willed their
respective half interests therein to their
grandson, Alfredo Natividad. After the
death of Gregorio Natividad his estate was
placed under administration including the
Hacienda Cabasay. Subsequently, Alfredo
Natividad sold the hacienda to Gerardo Cea.
On learning of the sale, the judicial
administrator brought suit to have it
annulled, but the suit ended in a settlement
with Alfredo Natividad ceding half of the
hacienda to the heirs of Gregorio Natividad.
Gerardo Cea, not being a party to
the settlement, sold the whole hacienda to
Paz M. Cea, which the latter, in turn, sold
one-half of it to Sebastian Moll. Both then
initiated proceedings for the registration in
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their name of their respective half interests
in the hacienda which was opposed by the
heirs. The CA granted the application but
only as to the half interest which came from
Benedicta and denying the applications as
to the other half, which came from Gregorio
Natividad on the theory that the sale
thereof by Alfredo Natividad without
judicial sanction was null and void for the
reason that the property was in custodia
legis. No appeal was taken from this
decision of the Court of Appeals.
On March 19, 1941, in the
proceedings for the administration of the
estate of Gregorio Natividad, two sons and
seven grandchildren of the deceased
petitioned the court that they be declared
his heirs and that one-half of the hacienda
in question, representing the interest which
was devised by the deceased to Alfredo
Natividad, be adjudicated to them as such
heirs. Paz M. Cea and Sebastian Moll
opposed and reasserted their claim to the
said half and asked that the same be
adjudicated to them instead. The CFI
granted the petition and denied the
oppositors claim based on the CAs decision
in the previous registration cases which it
held that the sale made by Alfredo
Natividad was null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale made by
Alfredo Natividad was null and void.
Ruling:
No. The Court of Appeals could not
have declared void the sale of Alfredo
Natividads interest as an heir or legatee in
the estate of Gregorio Natividad as there is
no provision of law which prohibits a coheir
from selling to a stranger his share of an
estate held in common before the partition
 Liceo University Law
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of the property is approved by the Court.
The said decision does, indeed, declare that
the sale by Alfredo Natividad of the half
interest bequeathed to him by the
deceased Gregorio Natividad was void as a
conveyance of property in the custody of
the law. But the decision does not declare
the said sale void as an assignment of
Alfredo Natividads interest in the property
as a legatee pending the settlement of the
estate. The decision leaves the question of
title to the contested half of the hacienda
for future determination in connection with
the final distribution of the estate of the
deceased Gregorio Natividad. The case is
ordered remanded to the CFI.
Case Digested by: Rheaphil Suralta
Rule 90
951
Guilas vs CFI Pampanga
GR No. L-26692
January 31, 1972
Topic: Prohibition Against Interference By
Other Courts: General Rule
Doctrine : In the interest of orderly
procedure and to avoid confusing and
conflicting dispositions of a decedents
estate, a court should not interfere with
probate proceedings pending in a co-equal
court. The probate court loses jurisdiction of
an estate under administration only after
the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs
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entitled to receive the same. The finality of
the approval of the project of partition by
itself alone does not terminate the probate
proceeding. Judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heir
from bringing an action to obtain his share,
provided the prescriptive period therefor
has not elapsed. Section 1 of Rule 90 of the
Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded,
which secures for the heirs or legatees the
right to "demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having
the same in his possession".
Synopsis: Jacinta Lopez, executed a will
instituting her husband as the sole heir and
executor. Spouses Lopez declare legally
adopted Juanita which makes her their legal
heir. After her adoption, Jacinta did not
execute another will or codicil. Upon
probate, Juanita filed a separate action
annulling the partition on the ground of
lesion, perpetration and fraud, praying that
Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver to
her the actual possession of said lots and its
produce
Facts :
Jacinta Limson de Lopez was married
to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. They had no
children. On April 28, 1936, Jacinta
executed a will instituting her husband
Alejandro as her sole heir and executor.
Juanita Lopez, married to Federico Guilas,
was declared legally adopted daughter and
legal heir of the spouses Jacinta and
Alejandro. After adoption the testatrix Doa
 Liceo University Law
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Jacinta did not execute another will or
codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one
of her heirs.
On March 5, 1959 in Testate
Proceedings, the will was admitted to
probate and the surviving husband,
Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed
executor without bond by the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga. Neverthless, both
Alejandro and Juanita executed a project
partition, approved by the lower court and
directed that the records of the case be
sent to the archives, upon payment of the
estate and inheritance taxes.
On April 10, 1964, Juanita Lopez-
Guilas filed a separate ordinary action to set
aside and annul the project of partition, on
the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud,
and pray further that Alejandro Lopez be
ordered to submit a statement of accounts
of all the crops and to deliver immediately
to Juanita the lots allocated to her. in the
Testate Proceedings, Juanita filed a petition
praying that Alejandro Lopez be directed to
deliver to her the actual possession of said
lots and its produce. Alejandro opposed the
separate petition alleging the testate
proceedings had already been closed and
terminated and that he ceased as a
consequence to be the executor of the
estate of the deceased and that Juanita
Lopez is guilty of laches and negligence in
filing the petition of the delivery of her
share 4 years after such closure of the
estate. The parties have agreed to suspend
action upon the petition for the delivery of
shares until; after the civil action
aforementioned has been finally settled and
decided. TC denied Juanita's petition on the
ground that the parties themselves agreed
to suspend resolution of her petition for the
delivery of her shares until after the civil
action for annulment of the project of
partition has been finally settled and
decided. Hence this petition for certiorari
and mandamus.
Issue :
Whether the project partition
approved by the trial court ordering it
closed and terminated, terminated the
Probate proceeding.
Ruling :
No. The probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all
the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. The finality of the approval of the
project of partition by itself alone does not
terminate the probate proceeding. As long
as the order of the distribution of the estate
has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated, because a judicial partition is
not final and conclusive and does not
prevent the heir from bringing an action to
obtain his share, provided the prescriptive
period has not elapsed. The remedy for the
heir who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper motion
in the same probate or administration

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proceedings, or for re-opening of the
probate or administrative proceedings if it
had already been closed, and not through
an independent action, which would be
tried by another court or Judge which may
thus reverse a decision or order of the
probate on intestate court already final and
executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of. Sec. 1 of Rule
90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as,
which secures for the heirs or legatees the
right to "demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having
the same in his possession". In the case at
bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the
delivery of her share was filed on July 20,
1964, which is just more than 3 years from
August 28, 1961 when the amended project
of partition was approve and within 5 years
from April 23, 1960 when the original
project of partition was approved. Clearly,
her right to claim the two lots allocated to
her under the project of partition had not
yet expired. The position of Juanita should
be sustained and the writs prayed for
granted.
Case Digested by: Jaynard D. Velarmino
Doctrine: There is no merit in appellant's
claim that the intestate proceedings could
no longer be reopened after the expiration
of the two-year period fixed in section 597
and 598 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It
suffices to state that this is an action by the
heirs of the deceased by his second
marriage whose dominion over their share
in the inheritance was automatically and by
operation of law vested in them upon the
death of said deceased, subject only to the
lien of the latter's creditors, for the purpose
of obtaining relief on the ground of fraud,
which action may be brought within four
years after the discovery of the fraud, in
accordance with section 43 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
Synopsis: In an intestate proceedings of a
deceased, prosecuted by appellants, the
latter knowingly concealed the fact that
said deceased left a second wife with whom
he had two children, namely herein
appellees.
Facts:
In an intestate proceedings of a
deceased, prosecuted by appellants, the
latter knowingly concealed the fact that
said deceased left a second wife with whom

961
QUION v. CLARIDAD
he had two children, namely herein
G.R. No. L-48541
January 30, 1943 appellees.

Issues:

Whether intestate proceedings

Topic: Action For Relief On The Ground Of
could be re-opened after the expiration of
Fraud Distinguished From Reopening Of
Intestate Proceedings.

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the two-year perios fixed in sections 597 determining distributive share of heirs
and 598 of the Code of Civil Procedure. appealable.

Ruling: The order closing it was already final and

Yes. There is no merit in appellants
claim that the intestate proceedings could
no longer be reopened after the expiration
of the two-year period fixed by sections 597
and 598 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It
suffices to state that this is an action by the
heirs of the deceased by his second
marriage whose dominion over their share
in the inheritance was automatically and by
operation of law vested in them upon the
death of said deceased, subject only to the
lien of the latters creditors, for the purpose
of obtaining relief on the ground of fraud,
which action may be brought within four
years after the discovery of the fraud, in
accordance with section 43 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
Case Digested by: Jaynard Velarmino
executory. The motion to reopen (so as to
allow a spurious child to present evidence
on his filiation and to claim his share in the
decedents estate) was not filed within the
thirty-day reglementary period counted
from the date the order of closure was
served on the administratrix. The closure
could not be distributed anymore.
Synopsis: Petition for review on certiorari of
the order of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, presided by respondent Judge,
Hon. Emmanuel M. Muoz, setting aside its
order in a Special Proceedings case entitled
"Intestate Estate of Fermina Bello Santos",
approving the Amended Project of Partition,
and adjudicating the properties left by the
decedent to her forced heirs, Luis U. Santos,
as surviving spouse, and Purificacion Santos
Imperial, as adopted daughter, in the
sharing proportion of 5/8 and 3/8,

97
Imperial v Munoz respectively.
GR. No. L-30787
August 29, 1974 Facts:

1 Luis U. Santos, as surviving spouse of

Topic: Separate Action not Allowed
Doctrine: Under Rule 109, section 1, a
person may appeal in special proceedings
from an order of the Court of First Instance
where such order "determines ... the
distributive share of the estate to which
such person is entitled. Order of court
the deceased Fermina Bello Santos, who
died intestate, filed and instituted Special
Proceeding entitled Intestate Estate of
Fermina Bello Santos. He was appointed as
the regular Administrator as there was no
opposition filed by the only other heir,
petitioner Purificacion Santos-Imperial.
When petitioner Imperial entered her
appearance of intestate proceedings as

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Oppositor, and filed a motion to require the
regular administrator to render an
accounting which resulted in the approval
by the Court a quo of the project of
partition where Santos and Imperial were
awarded and adjudicated an undivided
share of 5/8 and 3/8 respectively, of the
properties which have come to the
knowledge of the administrator.
Both Santos and Imperial entered
into a Compromise-Agreement where
Santos former agreed to give in full
settlement of her 3/8 share in the income
of the estate. Santos as administrator-heir
of the intestate estate filed a Motion for
Correction of both the Amended Project of
Partition and the Final Partial Project of
Partition, both approved by the court,
claiming that the partition submitted to the
Court was erroneous, contending that when
intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse
concurring with only one legitimate child of
the deceased is entitled to one-half of the
estate of the deceased spouse under Article
996 of the Civil Code. Therefore,
administrator-respondent Santos should get
of the properties partitioned while
Imperial, the only child, should get only the
remaining of the estate.
The the Court a quo granted the
motion for correction. However, Imperial
filed a Motion to Set Aside the order of
February 18, 1969, which was denied by the
Court because said order is merely
interlocutory. So, the court has not lost
jurisdiction to entertain any and all
corrections of the division; considering,
further, that in order to put an end to the
litigation between the parties, a correct and
legal partition of the property of the estate
is necessary
Issues:
1. Whether an order of a probate
court in testate or intestate proceedings
approving a project of partition which
clearly fixed the distributive share to which
each heir is entitled is merely interlocutory
in nature so that the probate court can
correct and set aside the same anytime; or
is final and, therefore, appealable within
the 30 day period for appeal; and
2.Whether a court can order the
correction of an erroneous final decision
after it had become final and executory.
Held:
1. The contention of the petitioner
to the effect that the orders of the court a
quo , are final as the same have determined
the distributive shares of the known forced
heirs. The Court held: Appeal in special
proceedings; Order of court determining
distributive share of heirs appealable. An
order of the Court of First Instance which
determines the distributive shares of the
heirs of a deceased-person is appealable." It
is clear that the order of the lower court is
final and, therefore, appealable to this
Court.
Under Rule 109, section 1, a person
may appeal in special proceedings from an

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order of the Court of First Instance where administratix's inventory and accounting,
such order "determines ... the distributive distributing the residue of the estate to the
share of the estate to which such person is heir, and terminating the proceedings. It is
entitled." the order of distribution directing the
delivery of the residue of the estate to the
The two (2) questioned orders, persons entitled thereto that brings to a
being final in character, should have been close the intestate proceedings, puts an end
appealed by the party adversely affected to the administration and thus far relieves
within the 30-day reglementary period the administrator from his duties.
provided for appeal. This was not done.
Synopsis: This involves a case of a late
2. Yes. The contention of the novelist who died a bachelor survived by
petitioner that an order which has already her maternal aunt, the spinster half-sister of
become final and, therefore, executory is her mother, Celedonia Solivio and paternal
not subject to correction. It was held that aunt, the sister of his late father, Concordia
an erroneous decree or judgment although Villanueva. Both aunts decided to place his
granted without legal authority and estate in a foundation. Celedonia,filed a
contrary to the express provision of the petition praying that she be declared sole
statute, is not void. Here, as no appeal was heir of the deceased. After due publication,
taken, the decree must be conceded to the latter sold the properties of the estate
have full force and effect. An erroneous to pay the taxes and began to set up the
decree is not a void decree. foundation. Concordia filed a motion for
reconsideration of the appointment stating
Case Digested by: Jaynard D. Velarmino
that she too was an heir of the deceased.

Facts:

981
Solivio v CA
The estate of the late Esteban
GR. No. 83484
February 12,1990 Javellana, Jr, who died a bachelor without
descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces. His only surviving
relatives are: 1 his maternal aunt, petitioner
Topic: When Estate Proceedings May be
Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of
Reopened
his mother, Salustia Solivio; and the
Doctrine: Filing on another civil case does respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva,
not terminate the proceeding for the sister of his deceased father, Esteban
settlement of estate that is pending court, Javellana, Sr.During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr.
there being as yet no orders for the had, more than once, expressed to his aunt
submission and approval of the Celedonia and some close friends his plan

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to place his estate in a foundation to honor
his mother and to help poor but deserving
students obtain a college education. He
died of a heart attack without having set up
the foundation. Concordia and Celedonia
talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties they agreement that Celedonia
would take care of the proceedings leading
to the formation of the foundation,
Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice
of her counsel, filed a Special Proceeding No.
2540 for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr.. Later, she filed an amended
petition praying that letters of
administration be issued to her that she be
declared sole heir of the deceased and that
after payment of all claims and rendition of
inventory and accounting, the estate be
adjudicated to her.
After due publication and hearing of
her petition, as well as her amended
petition, she was declared sole heir of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. Thereafter,
she sold properties of the estate to pay the
taxes and other obligations of the deceased
and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA
SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION"
which she caused to be registered in the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Four
months later, Concordia Javellana
Villanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order
declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of
Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of
the deceased. Her motion was denied by
the court for tardiness. Instead of appealing
the denial, Concordia filed a civil case in the
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RTC of Iloilo for partition, recovery of
possession, ownership and damages.
Issue:
Whether the RTC of Iloilo had
jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case for
partition and recovery of Concordia
Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. even while the probate
proceedings were still pending in the same
court;
Held:
No. The Regional Trial Court, lacked
jurisdiction to entertain Concordia
Villanueva's action for partition and
recovery of her share of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate
proceedings Spl, Proc. No. 2540 for the
settlement of said estate are still pending in
the same court, there being as yet no
orders for the submission and approval of
the administratix's inventory and
accounting, distributing the residue of the
estate to the heir, and terminating the
proceedings.
It is the order of distribution
directing the delivery of the residue of the
estate to the persons entitled thereto that
brings to a close the intestate proceedings,
puts an end to the administration and thus
far relieves the administrator from his
duties.
The probate court loses jurisdiction
of an estate under administration only after
the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs
 Liceo University Law
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entitled to receive the same. The finality of
the approval of the project of The probate
court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to
make distribution, has power to determine
the proportion or parts to which each
distributed is entitled. The power to
determine the legality or illegality of the
testamentary provision is inherent in the
jurisdiction of the court making a just and
legal distribution of the inheritance. To
hold that a separate and independent
action is necessary to that effect, would be
contrary to the general tendency of the
jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of
suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and
impractical.
Case Digested by: Jaynard D. Velarmino
99
AUSTRIA v. VENTENILLA
G.R. No. L-6620
January 11, 1912
Topic: Separate Action to Annul Project of
Partition Allowed
Doctrine: Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised
Rules of Court of 1964 as worded, which
secures for the heirs or legatees the right to
"demand and recover their respective
shares from the executor or administrator,
or any other person having the same in his
possession," re-states the aforecited
doctrines.
Facts:
Antonio Ventenilla died on the 13th of
March, 1909, leaving a will which, after due
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notice, was duly admitted to probate on the
14th of April, 1909, and the said Doa
Alejandra Austria was appointed
administratrix of his estate, by order of the
Honorable James C. Jenkins, judge of the
Court of First Instance of the Province of
Pangasinan.
On the 30th day of July, 1909, the
said administratrix with will annexed,
presented a report of her administration of
said estate, petitioned the court, after due
notification to all of the parties interested,
to distribute the estate in accordance with
the will and the law. So far as the record
show no action was taken upon said
petition until the 5th day of October, 1910.
On the 6th day of August, 1910, the
said opponents, through their attorney, A. B.
Ritchey, presented the following petition,
asking that the will of the said Antonio
Ventenilla be annulled on the following
grounds:
1.That before his death the
deceased always intended to distribute his
property in equal shares among his wife and
his brothers and their representatives;
2.That the deceased could not read
or write Spanish and that therefore on the
date of executing said instrument he did not
know what the same contained except
through translation;
3.That the said instrument was not
translated to the testator, or if so, it was not
correctly translated, and that said deceased
never intended to execute it as his last will
and testament in the manner and form of
the instrument herein submitted, and that
at the time of his death he thought that the
instrument executed clearly ordered the
distribution in the manner aforesaid;
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4.That by reason of the fraud and
deceit practiced upon the testator and a
lack of a good translation, the herein
submitted is null and void;
5.That the tenth paragraph of said
instrument is null because of its obscurity
and ambiguity and is in plain contradiction
to the proceeding paragraphs, and that the
other paragraph have more force and
weight;
It will be noted that the opponents
made no effort to question the legality of
he will, even though legal notice had been
given until more than fifteen months had
expired from the date on which the lower
court duly admitted said will to probate.
Issue:
Whether or not the will, after being
probated, may be annulled
Ruling:
Section 625 of the Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions provides that: No
will shall either the real or personal estate
unless it is proved and allowed in the Court
of First Instance or by appeal to the
Supreme Court; and the allowance by the
court of a will of real and personal estate
shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
This court has held, under the
provision of this section, that "the probate
of a will is conclusive as to its due execution,
and as to the testamentary capacity of the
testator."
When no appeal is taken from an
order probating a will, the heirs can not, in
subsequent litigation in the same
proceedings, raise question relating to its
due execution.
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The opponents not having appealed
from the order admitting the will to probate,
as they had a right to do, that order is final
and conclusive, unless some fraud sufficient
to vitiate the proceedings is discovered. In
the present case, however, the alleged
fraud, in view of all the facts contained in
the record, in our opinion, is not sufficiently
proved to justify a reopening of the probate
of the will in question, especially in view of
the long delay of the parties interested.
The said section 625 was evidently
taken from section 2356 of the Statutes of
Vermont. In most of the states of the
United States certain number of months is
given to the interested parties to appeal
from an order of the court admitting to
probate a will.
Under said section 625 and the
decisions of the court, it seems that the
only time given the parties who are
displeased with the order admitting a will to
probate, is the time given for appeals in
ordinary actions. Without deciding whether
or not the order admitting a will to probate
can be open for fraud, after the time
allowed for an appeal has expired, we hold
in the present case simply that the showing
as to fraud is not sufficient to justify a
reopening of the proceedings. The
judgment of the lower court is, therefore,
hereby affirmed with costs
Case digested by: Romeca Kate Pepito
100
VDA. DE BALUYOT v.
LUCIANO
G.R. No. 153883
January 13, 2004
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Topic: Distinguish Incompetency of incompetent on the basis of a report of a

Guardian from Incompetency of Person
Under Guardianship
Doctrine: Incompetency to act as executor
or administrator cannot be equated with
the incompetency that justifies the placing
of a person under guardianship. From the
fact that a person may be incompetent to
act as executor or administrator, it does not
follow that he could be placed under
guardianship. But if a person is incompetent
to act as executor or administrator, then he
is not the incompetent person envisaged in
the law of guardianship.
Facts:
psychiatrist who was not cross-examined,
and without hearing the evidence of the
parties, particularly Mrs. Baluyut. The court
denied a motion for reconsideration of the
order making such declaration. Hence, this
petition
Issue:
1. Whether the resolution in the
guardianship proceeding of the question as
to Mrs. Baluyut's alleged incompetency
should await the adjudication in the
administration proceeding (pending in the
probate court) of the issue as to her
competency to act as administratrix.

In the Court of First Instance of 2. Whether Mrs. Baluyot was denied

Quezon City, probate proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased
Sotero Baluyut was instituted by his alleged
nephew, Alfredo Baluyut claiming mental
incapacity of the surviving widow,
Encarnacion vda. de Baluyut, to administer
her affairs and that of the decedent's estate.
He prayed for appointment as administrator.
However, upon a counter petition, the
widow was appointed administratrix and
qualified as such. This appointment, was set
aside by the Supreme Court in Baluyut v.
Judge Pao, etc., G.R. L-42088, May 7, 1976,
because the persons contesting her capacity
to act were not given an adequate
opportunity to be heard and to present
evidence. Meantime, in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City,
two successive petitions were filed to
declare Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent and to
place her under guardianship. The first
petition, which was filed by Alfredo Baluyut,
was dismissed. The second, which was filed
by her sisters, were given due course.
Acting on the latter petition, the court
summarily declared the widow as
due process of law when the guardianship
court summarily announced its verdict on
her incompetency notwithstanding that her
lawyer had not cross-examined the
psychiatrist.
Ruling:
Yes. In consonance with the last
sentence of section 29-A of the Charter of
Quezon City which divests the Juvenile and
Domestic Relation Court of jurisdiction or
authority to resolve questions already in
issue as an incident in any case pending in
the ordinary court, the guardianship
proceeding should be suspended and
shouldawait the jurisdiction of the issue of
petitioner's competency to act as
administratrix pending with the probate
court.
2. Yes. A finding that a person is
incompetent should be anchored on clear,
positive and definite evidence (Yangco v.
Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil.
183, 190). That kind of proof has not yet
been presented to the guardianship court

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to justify its precipitate conclusion that Mrs.
Baluyut is an incompetent. In the nature of
things, the guardianship court should have
first set for hearing the psychiatrist's report
and examined Mrs. Baluyut before
prematurely adjudging that she is an
incompetent. Its hasty and premature
pronouncement, with its derogatory
implications, was not the offspring of
fundamental fairness which is the essence
of due process. Moreover, the lower court
should have adhered strictly to the
procedure laid down in Rule 93 of the Rules
of Court for appointment of guardians. Rule
93 provides that after the filing of the
petition, the court should fix a time and
place for hearing and give the proper
notices. At the hearing, "the alleged
incompetent must be present if able to
attend, and it must be shown that the
required notice has been given. Thereupon,
the court shall hear the evidence of the
parties in support of their respective
allegations" (Sec. 5, Rule 93).
Case digested by: Oliveros
101
IN RE: GUARDIAN OF JOSEFA
PONCE v. JOSE PONCE
G.R. No. L-8488
November 21, 1995
Topic: Next of kin
Doctrine: Next of Kin Defined. "Next of kin"
is denned to mean not the next of kindred
but those relatives who share in the estate
according to the statute of distribution,
including those claiming per stripes or by
representation.
Facts:
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Ignacia Zabate was the step-grandmother
(the second wife of the great grandfather)
of the minor Jose Ponce. There was an
ongoing guardianship proceeding of the
minor Jose Ponce. No notice was given to
Ignacia Zabate, she thus filed a motion for
annulment of previous orders: Authorizing
the mortgage of minor's interests in 2 lots
and the sale of the minor's interests in the 2
lots on the ground of lack of notice to
Zabate, the trial court denied the motion,
the reason being that the movant is merely
the step-grandmother, hence not a relative
therefore not entitled to notice of the
guardianship proceedings
Issue:
Whether or not a step-grand-grandmother
is entitled to receive notice in a
guardianship proceeding?
Ruling:
No. only the next of kin of the ward are
entitled to notice of the guardianship
proceedings. As held in Lopez vs Teodoro ,
the next of kin are those relatives whose
relationship is such that they are entitled to
share in the minor's estate as distributees,
Ignacia Zabate is the second wife of the
minor's great grandfather thus she
absolutely has no interest, not even a
remote heir in case of the minor's death
being not related by blood to the minor.
Even if true that the properties mortgaged
and sold belonged to her and her children,
she should have filed a separate action in
the court of proper jurisdiction
Case digested by: Oliveros
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102
NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO
VDA. DE ALBERTO v. CA
G.R. No. L-29759
May 18, 1989
Topic: DISTRIBUTION OF PARTITION OF THE
ESTATE.
Synopsis: Presentation for rescission of the
agreement of partition among petitioners
already barred by prescription. Minority
does not stop the running of the prescriptive
period for minors who have parents,
guardians or legal representatives. The
negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it. This case falls within one of the
recognized exceptions to the rule..
Facts:
The case originated from a
complaint for acknowledgment and
partition filed on September 8, 1960 with
the then Court of First Instance of Manila by
the herein private respondent, a minor, 18
years of age, assisted by his mother, Andrea
Jongco, as his natural guardian, against the
herein petitioners (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-
8). In the said Complaint, private
respondent alleged, in substance, that in
1941 his alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto,
and his mother, Andrea Jongco, lived
together as husband and wife and as a
result of which, he was born on September
10, 1942; that during the time that his
alleged father and mother lived together as
husband and wife and up to the time of his
birth, both were single and had no legal
impediment to marry each other; that after
his birth, his father and mother continued
living together as husband and wife, his
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father supporting them and introducing him
to the public as his natural child; that even
the family of his father recognized him as
such; that on or about the year 1944, his
father and mother separated, and
subsequently, his father married herein
petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a
result of the marriage, two (2) children
were bornherein petitioners Lourdes
Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.; that
although his father was separated from his
mother, he continued to support him and
recognized him as his own child; that on
July 3, 1949, his father died, and without
notice to him, petitioner Natividad del
Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on July 17, 1949,
instituted before the then Court of First
Instance of Manila an intestate proceedings
for the estate of his deceased father,
docketed therein as Special Proceedings No.
9092; that in the said intestate proceedings,
petitioners deliberately omitted him as one
of the heirs and for this reason they
succeeded in having the properties of his
deceased father adjudicated and
partitioned among themselves; that the
said intestate proceedings were terminated
on November 9, 1953; that his father left
properties valued at P74,963.81, and
accordingly, as a natural child of his father,
he is entitled to at least P18,000.00; and
that he had absolutely no previous
knowledge of the intestate proceedings and
came to know about it only recently and
thereupon made a demand from the
petitioners who refused to give him his
share. Accordingly, he prays that the
petitioners be ordered to acknowledge him
as the natural child of Antonio C. Alberto;
that his one-fourth share be turned over to
him; and that petitioners be sentenced to
pay him the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys
fee and the cost of suit (Record on Appeals,
pp. 2-9).
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The Court orders the dismissal of the
complaint without pronouncement as to
the costs. The counterclaim is also
dismissed.
Private respondent, not satisfied
with the decision, appealed to respondent
Court, and in a Decision promulgated on
August 31, 1968 (Ibid, pp. 61-75),
respondent Court reversed the decision of
the trial court
Issue:
Whether The Court of Appeals erred
in reversing the decision of the Lower Court?
Ruling:
Yes, the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby Reversed and the
decision of the trial court is Reinstated.
This Court has already ruled that the
question of jurisdiction not raised in the
trial court cannot be raised on appeal
(Dalman v. City Court of Dipolog City,
Branch II, 134 SCRA 243 [1985]). Besides, a
party who had voluntarily participated in
the trial, like the herein petitioners, cannot
later on raise the issue of the courts lack of
jurisdiction (Philippine National Bank v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 299
[1986].
Petitioners alleged that the intestate
proceedings for the settlement of estate of
the deceased Antonio C. Alberto (Special
Proceedings No. 9092) had already been
terminated on November 9, 1953 by the
order of distribution directing the delivery
of the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled thereto and that in said
proceedings the court also declared who
are the heirs of the deceased. Consequently,
the instant case which seeks to secure the
recognition of Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. as an
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acknowledged natural child of the deceased
in order to establish his rights to the
inheritance is already barred by prior
judgment (Petitioners Brief, p. 47) despite
private respondents insistence that he had
no knowledge or notice of the intestate
proceedings of his alleged natural father
(Record on Appeal, p. 21).
his Court has invariably ruled that
insolvency proceedings and settlement of a
decedents estate are both proceedings in
rem which are binding against the whole
world. All persons having interest in the
subject matter involved, whether they were
notified or not, are equally bound
(Philippine Savings Bank v. Lantin, 124 SCRA
483 [1983]). The court acquires jurisdiction
over all persons interested, through the
publication of the notice prescribed . . . and
any order that may be entered therein is
binding against all of them (Ramon v.
Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 741 [1951] citing in re
Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). It was ruled
further that a final order of distribution of
the estate of a deceased person vests the
title to the land of the estate in the
distributees; and that the only instance
where a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set
aside is when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence.
As to the issue of prescription, the
Civil Code of the Philippines clearly provides:
"Art. 1100. The action for
rescission on account of lesion shall
prescribe after four years from the time the
partition was made."
This Court has consistently declared
that laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of
 Liceo University Law
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time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done
earlier. The negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.
Finally on the merits of this case,
petitioners would have this Court review
and reverse the conclusions of fact of the
Court of Appeals. As a general rule, this is a
function this Court does not undertake. The
established principle is that the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are final
and may not be reviewed on appeal to this
Court; except: (1) when the conclusion is
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
and conjectures; (2) when the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible;
(3) where there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
Court in making its findings went beyond
the issues of the case, and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (6) when the
findings of the Appellate Court are contrary
to those of the trial court; (7) when the
findings are without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based
(Manlapaz v. C.A., 147 SCRA 238-239 [1987];
Guita v. C.A., 139 SCRA 576 [1985]; Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 147 SCRA 593 [1986]).
It is readily evident that this case
falls within one of the recognized
exceptions to the rule, specifically that the
findings of the Appellate Court are contrary
to those of the trial court.
In any event, it is a fundamental rule
that conclusions and findings of fact by the
trial court are entitled to great weight on
appeal and should not be disturbed unless
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for strong and cogent reasons because the
trial court is in a better position to examine
real evidence, as well as to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying
in the case (People v. Pimentel, 147 SCRA
29, 30 [1987]; People v. Grefiel, 125 SCRA
108 [1983]; Chase v. Buencamino, 136 SCRA
381 [1985]; People v. Fernandez, 124 SCRA
248 [1983]; Olangco v. C.F.I. of Misamis
Oriental, 121 SCRA 338 [1983]; Minuchechi
v. C.A., 129 SCRA 479 [1984]).
Case digested by: Emily B. Unson
103
MARCELA DE BORJA VDA. DE
TORRES v. THE HONORABLE
DEMETRIO B. ENCARNACION
G.R. No. L-4681 , July 31, 1951
1990
Topic: DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF
THE ESTATE
Synopsis/Doctrine: A party can not, in law
and in good conscience, be allowed to reap
the fruits of a partition, agreement or
judgment, and repudiate what does not suit
him. Where a piece of land has been
included in a partition, and there is no
allegation that the inclusion was effected
through improper means or without the
claimants knowledge, the partition barred
any further litigation on the title to said land,
and operated to bring the property under
the control and jurisdiction of the court for
proper disposition according to the tenor of
the partition. To all intents and purposes,
the property was in custodia legis.
Facts:
The petitioners contest the
jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to issue
the order herein sought to be reviewed
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directing them to deliver to the
administrator of the intestate estate of
Marcelo de Borja, (Special Proceeding No.
R-2414 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal)
a certain parcel of land which is in
petitioners' possession and to which they
assert exclusive ownership. They contend
that the administrator's remedy to recover
that property is an action at law and not by
motion in the intestate proceeding.
It appears that in the above-entitled
intestate estate, the commissioners
appointed by the court submitted on
February 8, 1944, a project of partition, in
which the land in question, which is and
was then in the possession of the herein
petitioners, was included as property of the
estate and assigned to one Miguel B. Dayco,
one of Marcelo de Borja's heirs. Over the
objection of the petitioners, surviving
children of Quintin de Borja who was one of
Marcelo's children, the proposed partition
was approved in February, 1946, and the
order of approval on appeal was affirmed
by this Court in 1949. Although the
administratrix of Quintin de Borja's estate
was the party named in the partition in
behalf of the estate, the proceeding for the
reason that they had been declared their
father's sole heirs in the settlement of their
father's estate. Moreover, one of these
children was herself the duly appointed
administratrix of the last named intestate
estate.
Issue:
Ruling:
No distribution shall be allowed until
the payment of the obligation above
mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributes, or any of them, give a
bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said
obligations such time as the court directs.
The court had only the partition to
examine, to see if the questioned land was
included therein. The inclusion being shown,
and there being no allegation that the
inclusion was effected through improper
means or without the petitioners'
knowledge, the partition barred any further
litigation on said title and operated to bring
the property under the control and
jurisdiction of the court for proper
disposition according to the tenor of the
partition. To all intents and purposes, the
property was in custodia legis. What the
petitioners could have done was to ask for a
reconsideration or modification of the
partition on the grounds of fraud, excusable
mistake, inadvertence, etc. if they could
substantiate such allegations. They can not
attack the partition collaterally, as they are
trying to do in this case.
The petition is denied with costs
against the petitioners.
Case digested by: Emily B. Unson

104
Whether or not If there is a RALLA V. UNTALAN
controversy before the court as to who are G.R. Nos. 63253-54,
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or April 27, 1989
as to distributive share to which each
person is entitled under the law, the
testimony as to such controversy shall be
taken in writing by the judge, under oath.?

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Topic: DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF
THE ESTATE
Synopsis/Doctrine: After a Partition has
become a judgment of the court, and
distribution thereof fully carried out, with
the heirs receiving the properties assigned
to them, the latter are precluded from
attacking the validity of said partition or any
part there.
Facts:
This petition seeks to nullify the
Order of respondent Judge Romulo P.
Untalan, excluding from the probate
proceedings 63 parcels of land, as well as
the Orders issued by respondent Judge
Domingo Coronel Reyes, denying the
petitioner's motions for reconsideration of
the same Order of Judge Untalan.
On January 27, 1959, when Rosendo
Ralla filed a petition for the probate of his
own will in CFI of Albay docketed as SP No.
564. In his will he left his entire estate to his
son, Pablo leaving nothing to his other son,
Pedro.
In the same year, Pedro filed an
action for the partition of the estate of their
mother, Paz Escarella; docketed as Civil
Case No. 2023.
In the course of the hearing of the
probate case (SP No. 564), Pablo Ralla filed
a motion to dismiss the petition for probate
on the ground that he was no longer
interested in the allowance of the will of his
late father, Rosendo for its probate would
no longer be beneficial and advantageous
to him. The motion was denied, and the
denial was denied by the Court of Appeals.
(The latter court agreed with the lower
court's conclusion that, indeed, the
petitioner stood to gain if the testate
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proceedings were to be dismissed because
then he would not be compelled to submit
for inclusion in the inventory of the estate
of Rosendo 149 parcels of land from which
he alone had been collecting rentals and
receiving income, to the exclusion and
prejudice of his brother, Pedro who was
deprived of his successional rights over the
said properties. The denial of this motion to
dismiss was likewise affirmed by SC (in G.R.
No. L-26253). On November 3, 1966, the
petitioner reiterated his lack of interest in
the probate of the subject will.
Consequently, the court, through Judge
Perfecto Quicho, declared Pedro and Pablo
Ralla the only heirs of Rosendo who should
share equally upon the division of the
latter's estate, and thereupon converted
the testate proceedings into one of
intestacy.
Meanwhile, the brothers agreed to
partition the 63 parcel of land forming the
estate of their deceased mother, Paz
Escarella, which were amicably divided
between the two of them. This project of
partition was approved by Judge Grageda.
On November 3, 1966, the probate
judge converted SP 564 into an intestate
proceeding. Eleven years later, On February
28, 1978, a creditor of the deceased filed a
petition for the probate of Rosendo's will in
SP 1106, which was heard jointly with SP
564. On August 3, 1979, the order of
November 3, 1966, was set aside.
On June 11, 1981, the private
respondents filed a "Petition To Submit
Anew For Consideration Of The Court The
Exclusion Of 63 Parcels of Land Subject Of
The Project Of Partition In Civil Case No.
2023." 5 In his Order of July 16,1981, Judge
Untalan reconsidered his earlier Order, to
wit: The Project of Partition should,
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therefore, be respected and upheld. Hence,
the sixty-three (63) parcels referred to
therein should be excluded from the
probate proceedings and, likewise from the
administration of Special Administrator
Teodorico Almine, Jr.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
order but the same was denied by
respondent Judge Reyes, to whose sala
Special Proceedings No. 564 and No. 1 1 06
were apparently transferred. Still, a second
motion for reconsideration was filed.
Issue:
WON the extrajudicial partition of
the 63 parcels made after the filing of the
petition for the probate of the Will, and
before said Will was probated, is a NULL
considering that such was already decided
by this Court in the case of Ernesto M.
Guevara, v. Rosario Guevara et al., Vol. 74
Phil. Reports, there can be no valid partition
among the heirs till after the Will had been
probated.
Ruling:
The above argument is obviously
flawed and misleading for the simple reason
that the aforementioned partition was
made in the civil case for partition of the
estate of Paz Escarella, which is distinct
from, and independent of, the special
proceedings for the probate of the will of
Rosendo Ralla.
Verily, the rule is that there can be
no valid partition among the heirs till after
the will has been probated. This, of course,
presupposes that the properties to be
partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the win. Thus the rule invoked
is inapplicable in this instance where there
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are two separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023
for partition, and Special Proceedings No.
564 originally for the probate of a will), each
involving the estate of a different person
(Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla,
respectively) comprising dissimilar
properties.
Case digested by: Emily B. Unson.
105
DY CAY V. CROSSFIELD
& O'BRIEN
G.R. No. L-12375 August
30, 1918
Topic: DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF
THE ESTATE
Synopsis/Doctrine: If a Judge fails to act
within a reasonable period after the filing
of a timely and proper motion to set aside a
judgment and grant a new trial, and after
the thirty days named by the law have
expired, his silence must be taken as
tantamount to a denial of justice;
mandamus would undoubtedly lie, not to
interfere with the exercise of his judicial
discretion, but to compel him to exercise his
discretion..
Facts:
A Chinaman by the name of Dy Cay
was appointed administrator of the estate
of the Chinaman Dy Kiu, deceased. The
administrator desired to prosecute an
action against the firm of Dy Buncio & Co.
for the liquidation of the partnership
business in which the deceased had been
interested. To initiate and push the
 Liceo University Law
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necessary legal proceedings, the
administrator, apparently under authority
from the court, entered into a contract with
Attorneys Crossfield & O'Brien with the
agreement that they will give 10% of what
can be collected from the company, as
payment, to the firm. Crossfield and OBrien
contracted with a certain Macleod to
determine the share of Dy Kiu in the
company. Their contract, which was signed
by the other partners, also stated that each
will be bound by the findings of Macleod
and that the other partners were to be
given the opportunity to purchased the
shares of Dy Kiu in order to prevent
liquidation. The contract was signed by
Crossfield and OBrien in behalf of the
estate. Macleods findings revealed that
the deceased owned 40,636 of the
partnership. After this was released, the
administrator said that he was not bound
by the contract because The contract
executed by the administrator and
Attorneys Crossfield & O'Brien was valid
and reasonable. The attorneys, having
performed the task assigned to them,
should receive the payment expressly
authorized. The order of the Court of First
Instance of August 17, 1916, is affirmed,
with costs against appellant.
Issue:
Whether section 145 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
2347, relating to new trials, should be
construed as fixing a time limit within which
a judge of first instance can set aside a
judgment and grant a new trial?
(2) whether the law firm of
Crossfield & O'Brien should be paid for their
professional services in certain intestate
proceedings on a quantum meruit basis or
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on the basis of the terms of the contract
with their client?
Ruling:
Judgment and grant a new trial," as
these words are used in code section 145,
as amended. The precise question is,
therefore, whether, on a motion made in
time, a judgment, setting aside a former
judgment but not filed for more than four
months after notice of the first judgment, is
valid.
On the other hand, the right of a
defeated party to have an error in a
judgment corrected should not be taken
away from him by a mere delay on the part
of the judge in deciding the motion, a delay
for which the defeated party would in no
way be responsible. (See Santos v.
Villafuerte [1906], 5 Phil., 739.) The time
during which a court considers a motion to
set aside a judgment or for a new trial
should not be counted in determining the
statutory period. To say that all motions of
this character must be decided within thirty
days after notice of a decision, regardless of
their importance or difficulty, or of the time
of submission, would be subversive of
justice. If the provision of law is to be held
rigid and mandatory, the effect will be to
require many motions to be decided
without due consideration, a result which
will defeat the spirit of the code. (See
Gomer v. Chaffe [1880], 5 Colo., 383.)
Actually applying these views to our present
facts, since the motion was presented in
time, the court even after the expiration of
the thirty day period had jurisdiction to
consider the motion and to modify or set
aside its judgment.
2. Compensation of Attorneys. The
second and third assignments of error assail
the action of the Court in allowing
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Crossfield & O'Brien the full amount the deceased acquired properties during
provided for in the contract, as attorney's the union and that they have a claim on the
fees. one half of such properties as it belongs to
their father. Marcosa Rivera counters the
The contract executed by the
petition alleging that those properties
administrator and Attorneys Crossfield &
acquired by their father is her paraphernal
O'Brien was valid and reasonable. The
property she also prays that Arminio Rivera
attorneys, having performed the task
be the administrator of the estate of the
assigned to them, should receive the
deceased. The Lower court decided in favor
payment expressly authorized.
of Marcosa and declared her as the only
The order of the Court of First heir of the deceased despite the pendency
Instance of August 17, 1916, is affirmed, of the Special Proceedings for the
with costs against appellant. settlement of the estate the Rafael Litam
because there was still no partition.
Case digested by: Emily B. Unson
Issue:
Did the Lower Court erred in

106
Litam vs Rivera, declaring Marcosa as the only heir in the
civil case filed despite the pending special
100 Phil 354
proceedings of the estate of the deceased?
Ruling:
Yes. The lower court should not
Topic: Authority of Probate Court Is Exclusive have declared that Marcosa Rivera is the
only heir of the decedent, for such
Doctrine: A court should not interfere with
declaration is improper in Civil Case it being
the probate proceeding pending in a co-
within the exclusive competence of the
equal court. The pronouncement of another
court in Special Proceeding, in which it is
court despite the pendency of the special
not as yet, in issue, and, will not be,
proceeding is improper, it being within the
ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of
exclusive competence of the court in the
the project of partition.
special proceeding.
Case digested by: Ivy B. Villanueva
Facts:
A civil case was filed in connection
with the pending probate proceedings for

107
the administration and settlement of the
estate of Rafael Litam who died intestate. Siguion vs Tecson,
His son Gregorio among with his other 89 Phil 28-30
siblings claims that they are the children of
the deceased by a marriage celebrated in
China in 1911. When their father died, they
came to know that he was married to
Marcosa Rivera in the Philippines and that

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Topic: Separate Action to Annul Project of as administrator because the administration

Partition Allowed proceedings had already been closed..

Doctrine: As long as the order of the Issue:

distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings
cannot be deemed closed and terminated
because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an
estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining
estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same. The finality of the
approval of the project of partition by itself
alone does not terminate the probate
proceeding
Facts:
On October 1, 1927, Paulino P.
Gochecho mortgaged to Paz E. Siguion a
piece of registered real property in the City
of Manila to secure a debt of P30,000. Some
ten years later, he constituted a second
mortgage on the same property in favor of
Paz E. Siguions son, Alberto Maximo Torres,
to secure a debt of P20,000. Both
Is the administrative proceedings
already closed despite the fact that the
distribution of the estate has not yet been
complied with
Ruling:
No. As long as the distribution of the
estate has yet been complied with the
administrative proceedings cannot be
considered as closed. It appeared from the
certificate of the Clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Manila that the order for the
distribution of the estate among the heirs
has not as yet been complied with thus it
cannot be claimed that the probate
proceedings are closed. In fact, counsel for
appellant even admitted in his brief that,
technically speaking; the administration
proceedings are still pending.
Digested By: Ivy B. Villanueva.

mortgages were duly registered.
Gochecho died in 1943 without
having discharged either mortgage. The
following year, proceedings for the
settlement of his estate were instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, and
Go Tecson was appointed judicial
administrator. On February 3, 1949, the
present actions were filed against the
administrator Go Tecson for the foreclosure
of the two mortgages, and judgment having
been rendered against him in both, he has
elevated the cases here by way of appeal,
contending that the lower court erred in
not holding that he could no longer be sued
108
Mari vs Bonilla
83 Phil 137
Topic: Separate Action to Annul Project of
Partition Allowed
Doctrine: A judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heir
from bringing an action to obtain his share
provided the prescriptive period therefor
has not elapsed The better practice for the
heir who has not received his share is to
demand his share in a proper motion in the

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same probate or administrative proceedings
or for reopening of the probate proceedings
if it had already been closed and not
through an independent action.
Facts:
Casimiro Evangelista is a registered
owner of a parcel of land (homestead) as
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No.
4905, of the register of deeds of Nueva Ecija,
consisting of 7.0652 hectares, more or less
situated at Valdefuente, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija. He was married to Leonida Mari,
plaintiff herein on February 7, 1920 at Rizal,
Nueva Ecija, and during their marriage and
while living together as spouses, they begot
two children, Caridad and Deogracias
Evangelista. He died intestate. On January
10, 1944, Deogracias Evangelista alleging to
be the only heir of Casimiro Evangelista,
executed a declaration of heirship. For the
sum of P2,400, Deogracias Evangelista sold
on the same date, the property in question
to the defendants, spouses, Isaac Bonilla
and Silvina Ordafiez. Original certificate of
title No. 4905 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof transfer certificate of title No.
19991 was issued to the spouses. An
independent action was brought to recover
Leonida Mari and Caridad Evangelistas
combined 3/4, share in the parcel of land
sold by Deogracias.
Issue:
Whether the judicial partition in
favor of Deogracias bound Leonida Mari
and Caridad Evangelista..
Ruling:
No. If the defendants relied on the
court's order adjudicating to Deogracias
Evangelista the entire estate in the
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distribution held under Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court, their innocence avails them less as
against the true owners of the land for that
was a summary settlement made on the
faith and strength of the distributors self-
serving affidavit and section 4 of the above-
mentioned rule provides that, "If it shall
appear at any time within two years after
the settlement and distribution of an estate
* * * that an heir or other person has been
unduly deprived of his lawful participation
in the estate, such heir or other person may
compel the settlement of the estate in the
court in the manner herein provided for the
purpose of satisfying such participation."
Far from shielding defendants against loss,
the adjudication and the rule under which it
was made gave them a clear warning that
they were acting at their peril. "A judicial
partition in probate proceedings does not
bind the heirs who were not parties thereto.
No partition, judicial or extrajudicial, could
add one iota or particle to the interest
which the partitioners had during the joint
possession. Partition is of the nature of a
conveyance of ownership, and certainly
none of the co-owners may convey to the
others more than his own true right. A
judicial partition in probate proceedings is
not final and conclusive, and not being of
such definitive character as to stop all
means of redress for a co-heir who has
been deprived of his lawful share, such co-
heir may still, within the prescriptive period,
bring an action for reivindicacion in the
province where any of the real property of
the deceased may be situated. Broad
perspectives of public policy are set out in
the opinion of the court in support of the
wisdom of allowing a co-heir the benefits of
the law of prescription even after a
partition, judicial or extrajudicial, has been
had.
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Digested By: Ivy B. Villanueva. deceased, together with some nephews and
nieces, opposed the probate of the will.
However, on February 8, 1935 oppositors
withdrew their opposition and as a result

109
Roman Catholic vs
Agustines
107 Phil 455, 460-461
Topic: Separate Action to Annul Project of
Partition Allowed
Doctrine: The heirs or legatees have the
right to demand and recover their
respective shares of the estate from the
executor or administrator or any other
person having the same in his possession.
The better practice, however, for the heir
who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper motion
in the same probate or administration
proceedings, or for reopening of the probate
or administrative proceedings if it had
already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by
another court or Judge which may thus
reverse a decision or order of the probate on
intestate court already final and executed
and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of
they executed with the surviving spouse an
agreement to give 1 hectare of the land to
the Roman Catholic Church as a legacy.
Severo Valenzuela, the universal heir, failed
to carry out the mandate and the
oppositors filed a civil case in court. The
Roman Catholic Church, on learning of the
legacy in its favor, filed a complaint alleging
that the deceased, in instituting her
husband as universal heir, charged him with
the obligation of donating to it a portion of
her land not exceeding nine hectares but
that said husband failed to execute the
necessary deed of donation. Repentant of
what he has done, Severo then executed a
motion to donate the entire 9 hectares of
land to the Church and was approved by the
court. The oppositors opposed contending
that it is absurd to donate the whole 9
hectares of land instead of only 1 hectare.
Meanwhile, the Roman catholic Church
already registered the land in is name.
Issue:
Is the donation to the Roman
Catholic Church of the property as a legacy
proper?

Facts: Ruling:

The land herein involved consists of
nine hectares belonging to Generosa
Agustines who inherited it from her father
Lucino Agustines. When Generosa died in
1934, she left a will instituting her surviving
spouse Severo Valenzuela as her universal
heir because she does not have any child or
descendant. The will was admitted to
probate at the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan. Josefa Agustines, sister of the
Yes. As mandated, the church has been
instituted as a legacy and thus is entitled to
have its share from the estate of the
deceased. It has the right to claim such
share from the administrator or any person
having the possession of the same. As in the
case, the oppositors cannot anymore validly
oppose since aside from being a legacy to
the estate, there was already a deed of
donation issued by Severo in favor of the
Roman Catholic Church. This donation was

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accepted, and the document was registered
in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan.
Digested by Ivy B. Villanueva
110
DIVINAGRACIA v.
ROVIRA
72 scra 307
August 10, 1976
Topic: Separate Action Not Allowed.
Doctrine: The probate court erred in
reopening the intestate proceeding, a
proceeding in rem of which the petitioner is
deemed to have constructive notice.52 The
order closing it was already final and
executory.
Facts:
Feliciano Divinagracia died in Iloilo
City on February 1, 1964. He was survived
by his wife, Salud and their four daughters
named Emilia, Dolores, Rosario, and Juanita.
The notice of his death was published in
two local periodicals and in the Manila
times. Two days after his death, a petition
was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo for the settlement of his estate the
order setting the petition for hearing was
published. Emilia Divinagracia qualified as
administratrix on May 22, 1964. She
administered the estate for seven years.
She paid the estate and inheritance taxes.
In April, 1971 she submitted to the court a
final accounting and project of partition
with a prayer for the closure of the
proceeding. Judge Castrense C. Velosoin his
order of April 17, 1971 approved the final
accounting and project of partition and
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declared the proceeding "closed and
terminated, subject to the condition that
the heirs shall assume all the outstanding
obligations of the estate". The partition was
duly registered.
On June 8, 1971 or after the order
closing the intestate proceeding had
become final Camilo Divinagracia filed a
motion to reopen it and to set aside the
order of closure. He alleged that he was an
illegitimate child of the decedent; that he
was born on November 9, 1930, and that he
came to know of the intestate proceeding
only when he was transferred as a
government employee from Masbate to
Iloilo a few days before June 8. He prayed
for the determination of his share in the
decedent's estate.
The administratrix in her opposition
to the motion contended that the
proceeding could no longer be reopened;
that its expediente had already been
archived; that there is no allegation in the
motion that Camilo's filiation was
acknowledged by the decedent. The motion
remained unresolved for more than four
years. Judge Veloso did not act on it before
he retired in the early part of 1975. The
case was re-raffled to respondent Judge
Valerie V. Rovira who issued the questioned
order dated October 18, 1975 reopening
the intestate proceeding.
The probate court set aside its prior
order of closure because it assumed that
there was no liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Feliciano
Divinagracia and Salud Bretaa that there
was no declaration of heirs, and that an
interested party, who was left out in the
partition, should be allowed to secure relief
in the intestate proceeding by filing the
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proper motion within the reglementary
period.
Issue:
Whether or not an intestate
proceeding, which had already been closed,
can still be reopened so as to allow a
spurious child to present evidence on his
filiation and to claim his share in the
decedent's estate
Ruling:
No. The probate court erred in
reopening the intestate proceeding, a
proceeding in rem of which Camilo
Divinagracia is deemed to have had
constructive notice. The order closing it was
already final and executory. The motion to
reopen it was not filed within the thirty-day
reglementary period counted from the date
the order of closure was served on the
administratrix. The closure order could not
be disturbed anymore. Moreover, the order
for the reopening of the intestate
proceeding was predicated on the false
assumption that there had been no
liquidation of the conjugal partnership and
no declaration of heirs. The truth is that the
project of partition and distribution, with
final accounting, which was submitted by
the administratrix and approved by the
probate court, contained a liquidation of
the conjugal partnership and a statement as
to who were the decedent's heirs and what
were their respective hereditary shares.
The probate court further erred in
entertaining Camilo Divinagracia's motion
to reopen the intestate proceeding. It erred
because that motion involved the
determination of his status as the
decedent's spurious child. That question
falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
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Court of Iloilo. The rule prohibiting the
splitting of a cause of action (Sec. 4, Rule 2,
Rules of Court) is not violated by the
holding that the action to establish
plaintiff's filiation as an illegitimate child
should be filed in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and cannot be joined to the
action of the illegitimate child for partition
and recovery of his hereditary share in his
putative father's estate, which is cognizable
by the Court of First Instance.
In view of the foregoing
considerations, the probate court's order of
October 18, 1975, reopening the intestate
proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of Feliciano Divinagracia, is set aside.
Case Digested by: Ancheden J. Pacamalan
111
VALERA v. VILLANUEVA
June 29, 1954
95 Phil 248
Topic: DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF
THE ESTATE
Doctrine: Judgments; Annulment on ground
of fraud must be extrinsic or collateral;
Penalty, not ground for assailing judgment
unless fraud refers to jurisdiction; when-
fraud considered extrinsic.-- An action to
annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud,
will not lie unless the fraud be extrinsic or
collateral and the facts upon which it is
based have not been controverted or
resolved in the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled was rendered: and
false testimony or perjury is not a ground
for assailing said judgment, unless the fraud
refers to jurisdiction. Fraud is regarded as
extrinsic or collateral, where it has
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prevented a party from having a trial or
from presenting all of his case to the court.
Facts:
Mariano R. Valera died in Batangas
on Sept. 5, 1940. Intestate proceedings
were instituted in the CFI of Batangas on
Sept. 16, 1940 by his first cousin, Jose
Villanueva. The petition alleged that
Mariano Valera was single at the time of his
death and left as the sole heir his brother,
Andres Valera y Villanueva, who had been
absent from the Philippines since many
years ago and last resided at No. 1343,
122nd St, New York City, USA. Efforts were
immediately exerted by Jose Villanueva,
through Rafael Villanueva, and by Marcelo P.
Alay, a servant and protg of the deceased,
to contact Andre, enlisting the aid and good
offices of Francisco Varona, then attached
to the Philippine Resident Commissioner in
Washington, D.C. & other govt agencies
connected with both the US & Philippine
Govt. The whereabouts of Andres however,
remained unknown. In the meantime, the
petition in the intestate proceeding having
been duly published, various collateral
relatives of the deceased had entered their
appearances. A compromise agreement was
later executed by some of the
aforementioned collateral relatives. On Mar.
25, 1941, a motion was filed by one
Carmelo Bautista, praying that he be
declared the sole heir of the deceased,
entitled to inherit all his properties, on the
basis of the compromise agreement
executed between the so-called collateral
relatives. On Oct. 29, 1942, the
administrator filed a petition for the
delivery of the properties to Carmelo
Bautista and for the closing of the intestate
proceedings, which the probate court
approved on Feb. 1, 1943 and ordering
Bautista to file a bond to secure the
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payment under the compromise. However,
on Jan. 2, 1946, Andres A. Valera appeared
and filed a complaint in the CFI Batangas
against Jose Villanueva & others, praying in
the main the annulment of the
aforementioned intestate proceeding & be
declare as sole heir of the deceased brother.
Plaintiffs theory is that all the mentioned
collateral relatives conspired together in
fraudulently causing the probate court to
order the intestate proceedings decision in
their favor. The trial court ruled in favor of
the herein defendants. Hence, the present
petition
Issue:
WON fraud existed in the intestate
proceedings which would justify the
plaintiffs action for annulment of
judgement
Ruling:
No. To start with, we may state that
the present action was filed 3 years after
the final closing of the intestate
proceedings of Mariano Valera, and that the
rule is that an action to annul a judgment,
upon the ground of fraud, will not lie unless
the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the
facts upon which it is based have not been
controverted or resolved in the case where
the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered, and that false testimony or
perjury is not ground for assailing said
judgment, unless the fraud refers to
jurisdiction; that fraud has been regarded as
extrinsic or collateral, where it has
prevented a party from having a trial or
from presenting all of his case to the court.
Suffice it to say, that plaintiff-appellant
failed to demonstrate, notwithstanding his
elaborate efforts, that there was such
extrinsic or collateral fraud as would justify
the setting aside of the order. As noted, he
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cannot be said to have been prevented
from having a fair trial. On the contrary, it
may be said that plaintiff was rather
indifferent to his interest, because,
although he had been absent from the
Philippines since 1910, he never took the
trouble or precaution of informing his
brother of his whereabouts from time to
time, and likewise failed to give any
instructions to anybody who could protect
his rights, knowing that, as early as 1933, he
was, as regard his brother Mariano, the
nearest kin who might succeed in his estate
in case of death. The implication that
follows is that the plaintiff in effect had
abandoned his hereditary rights in the
Philippines. In addition, as already stated, at
the start of the intestate proceedings, a
thorough search for his whereabouts was
made, and all available agencies were asked
to lend their assistance in locating him, to
no avail.
Case Digested by: Lalaine Delima
112
DE JESUS v. DAZA
August 31, 1946
77 Phil 152
Topic: Thirty-day Period May Be Waived
Doctrine: Descent and Distribution; Sale or
assignment of share of inheritance by heirs;
Power of probate court to order delivery of
possession to purchaser in testate
proceeding.-- The probate court has
jurisdiction, within the testate proceeding,
to order the delivery of the possession of a
portion of the inheritance to the person who
has bought it from the heirs entitled thereto,
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after approval of the sale by the probate
court within the same estate proceeding
upon petition of the buyer and notice to the
other interested parties
Facts:
Petitioners are some of the
testamentary heirs of the late Gavino de
Jesus whose estate is the subject matter of
the special proceeding No. 3174.
Respondent Justina S. Vda de Manglapus
purchased from Sixto de Jesus and Natalia
Alfonga, co-heirs of the petitioners, the
rights, interest and participation of the said
Sixto & Natalia, in the said testate estate, 2
parcels of land assigned to them as their
shares in the project of partition which was
already submitted to the probate court for
approval. On Sept. 4, 1945, when the
project of partition was approved,
respondent filed a petition for approval by
the probate court the sale to her of the
rights, interests and participation of Sixto &
Natalia of the said 2 parcels of land which
the probate court approved. After learning
of the aforesaid sale, petitioners instituted
an action in the CFI of Batangas against
respondent for legal redemption under Art.
1067 of the Civil Code. While the case for
legal redemption is still pending,
respondent petitioned the probate court to
order the provincial sheriff of the province
of Batangas to take immediate possession
of the parcels of land in question and to
deliver them to her afterwards through her
authorized representative Gregorio Leynes.
The said court approved the respondents
petition. Hence, the present issue
Issue:
WON the respondent judge,
presiding the probate court, had jurisdiction
to order the delivery of the possession of
the aforesaid parcels of land to respondent
 Liceo University Law
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Manglapus, represented by her authorized
representative, within the same estate
proceeding and not in an independent
ordinary action.
Ruling:
Yes. The SC concurred with the
probate courts decision and provided
several reasons supporting its conclusion, to
wit:
1. The very interposition of the
action for legal redemption necessarily
implies admission of the validity of the sale;
2. Article 1067 of the Civil Code,
rather than justifying the withholding of the
possession from the purchaser, clearly
sanctions his taking possession of what he
has purchased, as his rights are absolute
until and unless resolved by the timely and
valid exercise of the right of redemption;
3. The sale to respondent of the 2
parcels of land in question by Sixto &
Natalia took place after the project of
partition had been approved by the court,
on account of which Art. 1067 of the Civil
Code cannot support petitioners claim, said
article referring to a sale by any of the heirs
of his hereditary right to a stranger before
partition. But even supposing that the
approval of the project of partition by the
court was made after the sale to
respondent of the parcels of land, still that
approval related back to the date of the
project of partition.
In addition, if, even the action for
compulsory recognition of a natural child
may be instituted and decided w/n the
proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased, it would be absurd were
We to declare now that for the mere object
of ordering the delivery of possession of a
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portion of the inheritance which has already
been assigned to a certain person w/n the
estate proceeding, the probate court lacks
jurisdiction to make the order w/n the same
proceeding, but should require the
institution of an independent ordinary
action.
Case Digested by: Lalaine Delima
Rule 96
113
Cui v Piccio
G.R. No. L-5131
July 31, 1952
Doctrine: The purpose of the provision is to
secure evidence from persons suspected of
embezzling, concealing or conveying away
any property of the ward or of the deceased
so as to enable said guardian or
administrator to institute the appropriate
action to obtain the possession of and
secure title to said property, all for the
protection of the interests of the wards and
the estate of the deceased.
Facts:
Don Mariano Cui, widower, sold
three lots to three of his children named
Rosario C. de Encarnacion, Mercedes C. de
Ramas and Antonio Ma. Cui, pro indiviso.
Rosario was unable to pay her share of the
purchase price so her share was concealed
and one-third of the property
corresponding to her returned to the
vendor. Because of the sale of these lots
pro indiviso and because of the cancellation
of the sale to one of the three original
vendees, Don Mariano and his children
 Liceo University Law
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Mercedes and Antonio became co-owners
of the whole mass in equal portions.
Mercedes and Antonio borrowed money
from Rehabilitation Finance Corporation,
subject to mortgage of the land. Mariano
allowed the mortgage, with the condition
that all the rentals will go to him. The two
other children of Don Mariano named Jesus
and Jorge brought an action in the CFI for
the purpose of annulling the deed of sale of
the three lots in question on the ground
that they belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Don Mariano and his
deceased wife. This petition was denied.
Rosario filed a petition to declare her father
incompetent and to have a guardian
appointed for his property. The petition was
granted and Victorino Reynes was
appointed as guardian of the property.
Reynes filed a motion seeking authority to
collect the rentals from the three lots in
question. Judge Piccio denied the motion.
He filed another motion asking for the
delivery of the rentals of the commercial
building. Judge Piccio granted the second
motion. Antonio and Mercedes filed a
Motion to Reconsider but was denied in an
order. Hence, this petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether Judge Piccio acted in grave
abuse of discretion in allowing such delivery
of rental payments to the ward.
Ruling:
Yes.
The respondent Judge had no
jurisdiction to issue his order in the
guardianship proceedings requiring the
petitioners to deliver the rentals collected
by them to the guardian and authorizing the
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latter to collect rentals in the future, for the
reason that the jurisdiction of the court
guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to
cite persons suspected of having embezzled,
concealed or conveyed property belonging
to the ward for the purpose of obtaining
information which may be used in an action
later to be instituted by the guardian to
protect the right of the ward; and that only
in extreme cases, where property clearly
belongs to the ward or where his title
thereto has already been judicially decided,
may the court direct its delivery to the
guardian.
Case Digested by: Sheba D. Arancon
114
Zubeldia v. Hermanos
GR No. 45380
July 19, 1940
Topic: Personal Management of the Estate
Doctrine: The Guardian must give his
personal care and attention to the
maintenance of the wards estate and to
keep the funds and property of the ward
under his own control. If he attempts to
delegate his duties to another, he is
responsible for the others actions in the
premises and for any resulting loss,
although he may employ clerks and servants
to assist him in his duties without liability
for their acts provided he has used
reasonable care and discretion in the
manner of selecting those whom he
employs.
Digested by: Sheba D. Arancon
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FACTS:

Vicente Ribaya died intestate on

September 29, 1935, leaving as his only
legal heirs his minor son Luis and his widow
Adela Carbonell. No intestate proceeding
Rule 97 has been instituted for the settlement of
the estate. Adela Carbonell applied for her

115
CARBONELL v DE RIBAYA
G.R. No. L-48895
July 16, 1943
TOPIC: General Guardians and
Guardianship: termination of Guardianship;
Conflict of Interest
Doctrine: When the deceased left
considerable properties and assets and
some debts, and that without instituting
intestate proceedings his widow appears to
have assigned to herself the usufruct of
some properties belonging to the deceased,
leaving the rest of the decedent's assets
with the liabilities to his only son, the minor
in question. For the guidance of the parties
and of the trial court, we declare such
extrajudicial settlement void and of the no
legal effect. The widow, as legal heir of her
deceased husband, could not validly enter
into an agreement with herself as natural
guardian of her minor son for the
determination and apportionment of their
respective shares in the inheritance.
Synopsis: The decedent died intestate
leaving as legal heirs his son and widow.
The widow was appointed as the minors
legal guardian, however, it was opposed by
the paternal grandmother; alleging that her
management had been wasteful and
extravagant.
appointment as guardian of the person and
property of her minor son Luis Ribaya,
stating in her application that said minor
had property worth about P10,000. The
court appointed her guardian of the person
and property of said minor. Agustina R. Vda.
de Ribaya, the paternal grandmother of the
minor filed a motion for the removal of
Adela Carbonell as guardian of the property
of the minor, on the grounds that her
management and administration had been
wasteful and extravagant, and that she had
refused to obey the order of the court to
deposit the sum of P1,574.30 with the
Philippine National Bank. The court granted
the removal and substitution of said
guardian. With respect, however, to the
usufructuary right of the widow, the court
declared that the same should be resolved
in an interstate proceeding in accordance
with articles 834-839 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the widow, as legal
heir of her deceased husband, could validly
enter into an agreement with herself as
natural guardian of her minor son for the
determination and apportionment of their
respective shares in the inheritance.
RULING:
No. Deduced from the record that
the deceased Vicente Ribaya left
considerable properties and assets and
some debts, and that without instituting

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intestate proceedings his widow Adela
Carbonell appears to have assigned to
herself the usufruct of some sixty hectares
of coconut land belonging to the deceased,
leaving the rest of the decedent's assets
with the liabilities to his only son, the minor
in question. For the guidance of the parties
and of the trial court, we declare such
extrajudicial settlement void and of the no
legal effect. The widow, as legal heir of her
deceased husband, could not validly enter
into an agreement with herself as natural
guardian of her minor son for the
determination and apportionment of their
respective shares in the inheritance.
Moreover, the widow's usufructuary
share cannot be determined until after the
debts of the estate are liquidated. It is
imperative that she institute intestate
proceedings in court so that the debts may
be paid and the net assets distributed to the
heirs in accordance with law. The right of
the widow is governed by the second
paragraph of article 834 of the Civil Code,
which reads as follows:
If only one legitimate child or
descendant survives, the widower or widow
shall have the usufruct of the third available
for betterment, such child or descendant to
have the naked ownership until, on the
death of the surviving spouse, the whole
title is merged in him.
The record of this case evinces a
conflict of interests between the appellant
and the minor as heirs of the deceased. This
fact alone, independently of the five
grounds specified by the trial court in its
order substituting the appellant as guardian
of the property of the minor, suggests the
property and advisability of relieving
appellant as such guardian.
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Case Digested by: ALBERTO C. BANGHAL
Adoption
116
CANG v CA
G.R. No. 105308,
September 25, 1998
Topic: Adoption: Meaning Of
Abandonment
Doctrine: The liberality with which this
Court treats matters leading to adoption
insofar as it carries out the beneficent
purposes of the law to ensure the rights and
privileges of the adopted child arising
therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount
consideration is the overall benefit and
interest of the adopted child, should be
understood in its proper context and
perspective. The Courts position should not
be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to
extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
The discretion to approve adoption
proceedings is not to be anchored solely on
best interests of the child but likewise, with
due regard to the natural rights of the
parents over the child.
Synopsis: The brother and sister-in-law of
Anna Marie sought to adopt her three
minor children without the written consent
of the father. The father, contested the
adoption but was granted by the court.
However, the consent of the parent who
abandons his children is not necessary.
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Facts: his parental duties and relinquish all

Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation upon learning of her husband's
extramarital affairs, which the trial court
approved the petition. Herbert sought a
divorce from Anna Marie in the United
States. The court granted sole custody of
the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the
rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of
Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor
children. Herbert contests the adoption,
but the petition was already granted by the
court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption,
holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the
written consent of the natural parents of
the children to be adopted, but the consent
parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment. Physical
abandonment alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to
abandonment. While Herbert was physically
absent, he was not remiss in his natural and
legal obligations of love, care and support
for his children. The Court find pieces of
documentary evidence that he maintained
regular communications with his wife and
children through letters and telephone, and
send them packages catered to their whims.
Case Digested By: Gayle S. Bulawan

117
of the parent who has abandoned the child RP v. VALENCIA
is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed G.R. No. L-32181,
to pay monthly support to his children. March 5, 1986
Herbert elevated the case to the Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the 3 minor children
be legally adopted without the written
consent of a natural parent on the ground
of abandonment.
Topic: Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry: Appropriate Adversary
Proceedings

Ruling: Doctrine: If the subject matter of a petition

In reference to abandonment of a
child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports "any conduct of the parent which
evinces a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child." It means "neglect or
refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which
parents owe their children."
In this case, however, Herbert did
not manifest any conduct that would forego
is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one
involving nationality or citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be
granted in a proceeding summary in nature.
This Court adheres to the principle that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding.

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Synopsis: This is a petition filed by a mother
in behalf of her children for the
cancellation/correction of entries of their
births; admitting that what she seeks to
change is the nationality or citizenship of
her children from Chinese to Filipino and
their statuses from legitimate to illegitimate.
The Local Registrar of Cebu filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the
corrections sought are not merely clerical
but substantial, as it involves the citizenship
and status of the petitioning minors and the
status of their mother.
Facts:
Respondent Leonor Valencia filed a
petition for the cancellation and/or
correction of entries of birth of her two
minor children as well the correction of her
civil status. The Solicitor General filed an
opposition to the petition alleging that the
petition for correction of entry in the Civil
Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New
Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court,
contemplates a summary proceeding and
correction of mere clerical errors and not
changes or corrections involving civil status,
nationality, or citizenship which are
substantial and controversial.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that
since the petition seeks to change the
nationality or citizenship from Chinese to
Filipino and their statuses from legitimate
to illegitimate as weel as the changing of
the status of the mother from married to
single, the corrections sought are not
merely clerical but substantial, involving as
they do the citizenship and status of the
petitioning minors and the status of their
mother.
After trial on the merits, the lower
court rendered a decision in favor of the
respondent. Hence the Republic appealed
as oppositor-appellant by way of petition
for review on Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the Lower Court
erred in ordering the correction of
citizenship and civil status using Article 412
of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court which the
petitioner contemplates as a summary
proceeding.
Ruling:
The pertinent sections of Rule 108
provide:

The petition being sufficient in form SEC. 3. Parties When cancellation or

and substance, the trial court issued an
order directing the publication of the
petition and the date of hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation in the city
and province of Cebu, once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks, and notice
thereof, duly served on the Solicitor General,
the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and Go
Eng.
correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the
filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
orde, fix the time and place for the hearing
of the same, and cause reasonable notice

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thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once in a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province.
SEC, 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and
any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto.
If all these procedural requirements
have been followed, a petition for
correction and/or cancellation of entries in
the record of birth even if filed and
conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court can no longer be described
as "summary". There can be no doubt that
when an opposition to the petition is filed
either by the Civil Registrar or any person
having or claiming any interest in the
entries sought to be cancelled and/or
corrected and the opposition is actively
prosecuted, the proceedings thereon
become adversary proceedings.
We are of the opinion that the
petition filed by the respondent in the
lower court by way of a special proceeding
for cancellation and/or correction of entries
in the civil register with the requisite notice
and publication and the recorded
proceedings that actually took place
thereafter could very well be regarded as
that proper suit or appropriate action.
Case Digested by: Gayle S. Bulawan
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118
RP vs TOLEDANO
G.R. No. 94147
June 8, 1994
Topic: Requirement Of Joint Adoption by
Husband And Wife
Doctrine: Article 185 requires a joint
adoption by the husband and wife, a
condition that must be read along together
with Article 184. Joint adoption by husband
and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority
over the child, which is the ideal situation.
Synopsis: Spouses sought to adopt the
younger brother of respondent Evelyn
Clouse following the requisites for a valid
adoption; stating that they are financially,
mentally, physically and emotionally
capable of adopting the minor. Despite
finding all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications, Presidential Decree No.
603, had thus made it mandatory for both
the spouses to jointly adopt when one of
them was an alien. The law was silent when
both spouses were of the same nationality.
FACTS:
Private respondents spouses Clouse
sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph
Alcala, the younger brother of private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order
issued on March 12, 1990, the petition was
set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The said
Order was published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province of
Zambales and City of Olongapo for three (3)
consecutive weeks. The principal evidence
disclose that private respondent Alvin A.
 Liceo University Law
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Clouse is a natural born citizen of the
United States of America. He married
Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at
Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn
became a naturalized citizen of the United
States of America in Guam. They are
physically, mentally, morally, and financially
capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12)
year old minor. Finding that private
respondents have all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided by
law and that the adoption will redound to
the best interest and welfare of the minor,
respondent judge rendered a decision in
favor of the spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court
erred in granting the petition for adoption
of Alvin and Evelyn Clouse because they are
not qualified to adopt under Philippine Law.
RULING:
No. Under Articles 184 and 185 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as "The Family Code of the
Philippines", private respondents spouses
Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Joseph Alcala.
There can be no question that
private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not
qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala
under any of the exceptional cases in the
aforequoted provision. In the first place, he
is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural
born citizen of the United States of America.
In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala
is neither his relative by consanguinity nor
the legitimate child of his spouse. In the
third place, when private respondents
spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to
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adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February
21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A.
Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She
lost her Filipino citizenship when she was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States
in 1988. Private respondent Evelyn A.
Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to
qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article
184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino
citizen. She sought to adopt her younger
brother. Unfortunately, the petition for
adoption cannot be granted in her favor
alone without violating Article 185 which
mandates a joint adoption by the husband
and wife. Article 185 requires a joint
adoption by the husband and wife, a
condition that must be read along together
with Article 184. As amended by Executive
Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had
thus made it mandatory for both the
spouses to jointly adopt when one of them
was an alien. The law was silent when both
spouses were of the same nationality.
Case Digested by: ALBERTO BANGHAL
Habeas Corpus
119
Sombong v CA
G.R. No. 111876
31 January 1996
Doctrine: It has been held that in custody
cases involving minors, the question of
illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is
not the underlying rationale for the
availability of the writ as a remedy; rather
the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for
 Liceo University Law
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the purpose of determining the right of
custody over the child. The controversy does
not involve personal freedom, because an
infant is presumed to be in custody of
someone until he attains majority age,
rather the welfare of the child is the
supreme consideration.
Facts:
Petitioner was the mother
of Arabella O. Sombong. Arabella, then only
six months old, was brought to the Sir John
Clinic, owned by Ty for treatment.
Petitioner did not have enough money to
pay the hospital bill in the balance of
P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged
as a result.
Petitioner said that she paid 1,700
for the release even if the bill was only 300.
The spouses Ty, who had custody of the
daughter, would not give Arabella to her.
Petitioner filed a petition with the
RTC for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged
that Arabella was being unlawfully detained
and imprisoned at the Ty residence.
The petition was denied on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction given that the
detention was in Caloocan.
Ty claimed that Arabella was with
them for some time, but given to someone
who claimed to be their guardian.
The Office of the City Prosecutor
of Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioners
complaint, filed information against the
spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal
Detention of a Minor before the Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then
revealed that the child may be found in
Quezon City. When Sombong reached the
residence, a small girl named Christina
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Grace Neri was found. Sombong claimed
the child to be hers even if she wasnt
entirely sure that it was Arabella.
Petitioner then filed a petition for
the issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus with the RTC. The court ruled
in Sombongs favor and ordered the
respondents to deliver the child.
Issue:
Whether habeas corpus is the
proper legal remedy for taking
back Arabella.
Ruling:
No.
The evidence in this case does not
support a finding that the child, Cristina, is
in truth and in fact her child, Arabella;
neither is there sufficient evidence to
support the finding that private
respondents custody of Cristina is so illegal
as to warrant the grant of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus.
To justify the grant of the writ of
habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must
be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. This is the
basic requisite under the first part of
Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides that except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty.
However, Habeas Corpus may be
resorted to in cases where the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto. Thus, although the
Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be
issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have
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held time and again that the said writ is the
proper legal remedy to enable parents to
regain the custody of a minor child even if
the latter be in the custody of a third person
of her own free will.
The foregoing principles considered,
the grant of the writ in the instant case will
all depend on the concurrence of the
following requisites:
(1) That the petitioner has the right of
custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful
custody of the minor is being withheld from
the petitioner by the respondent; and (3)
that it is to the best interest of the minor
concerned to be in the custody of petitioner
and not that of the respondent. Not all of
these requisites exist in this case.
Case Digested by: Muaminah O. Camama
120
Galvez v CA
G.R. No. 114046
October 24, 1994
Topic: The writ does not lie where there is
remedy of appeal.
Doctrine: In a case, what has to be resolved
is the corollary issue of whether the petition
for habeas corpus was properly filed
together with their present petition for
certiorari and mandamus. The Court held
the writs of habeas corpus and certiorari
may be ancillary to each other where
necessary to give effect to the supervisory
powers of the higher courts. A writ of
habeas corpus reaches the body and the
jurisdictional matters, but not the record. A
writ of certiorari reaches the record but not
the body. Hence, a writ of habeas corpus
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may be used with the writ of certiorari for
the purpose of review.
Synopsis: The petitioners were charged of
frustrated homicide. The petition for Habeas
corpus is predicated mainly on petitioners
asservation that the court which issued the
warrant for their arrest had no jurisdiction
over the case, hence their detention should
be deemed illegal.
Facts:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners
Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of
San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo
Diego were charged in three separate
information with homicide and two counts
of frustrated homicide for allegedly
shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado
and seriously wounding Levi Calma
Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.
On December 15, 1993, before
petitioners could be arraigned, respondent
prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to
Withdraw Information of the original
information. This motion was granted by
Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993
and the cases were considered withdrawn
from the docket of the court. On the same
day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new
information against herein petitioners for
murder, two counts of frustrated murder,
and violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 for illegal possession of firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the
new information for lack of jurisdiction was
filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos
on January 3, 1994. At the court session set
for the arraignment of petitioners on
January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an
order denying the motion to quash.
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In the meantime, and prior to the
arraignment of herein petitioners before
Judge Pornillos, an order was issued on
January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting
the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of
the original information, and setting the
arraignment of the accused therein for
February 8, 1994. On said date, however,
the arraignment was suspended and, in the
meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the
order dated January 24, 1994 issued by
Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners
motion to quash filed for the new
information. As earlier stated, respondent
court dismissed the petition in its
questioned resolution of February 18, 1994,
hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the writ of habeas corpus
is proper in the instant case.
Held:
No. This petition is predicated
mainly on petitioners' asseveration that the
court which issued the warrant for their
arrest had no jurisdiction over the case,
hence their detention should be deemed
illegal.
We have earlier declared that
Branch 10 of the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the new set of information.
Consequently, the warrant of arrest issued
on the bases of said information filed
therein and the subsequent detention of
herein petitioners pursuant thereto are
valid. What instead has to be resolved is the
corollary issue of whether the petition for
habeas corpus was properly filed together
with their present petition for certiorari and
mandamus.
The writs of habeas corpus and
certiorari may be ancillary to each other
where necessary to give effect to the
supervisory powers of the higher courts. A
writ of habeas corpus reaches the body and
the jurisdictional matters, but not the
record. A writ of certiorari reaches the
record but not the body. Hence, a writ of
habeas corpus may be used with the writ of
certiorari for the purpose of review.
However, habeas corpus does not lie where
the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or
certiorari because it will not be permitted to
perform the functions of a writ of error or
appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere
errors or irregularities in the proceedings of
a court having jurisdiction over the person
and the subject matter.
A writ of habeas corpus is not
intended as a substitute for the functions of
the trial court. In the absence of exceptional
circumstances, the orderly course of trial
should be pursued and the usual remedies
exhausted before the writ may be invoked.
Habeas corpus is not ordinarily available in
advance of trial to determine jurisdictional
questions that may arise. It has to be an
exceptional case for the writ of habeas
corpus to be available to an accused before
trial. In the absence of special
circumstances requiring immediate action,
a court will not grant the writ and discharge
the prisoner in advance of a determination
of his case in court. 58 In the case under
consideration, petitioners have dismally
failed to adduce any justification or
exceptional circumstance which would
warrant the grant of the writ, hence their
petition therefor has to be denied.
Case Digested by: Merchadel O. Capadocia

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 Liceo University Law
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favor to me, the net result and effect of
management action would be a punitive
Habeas Data one. She asked for deferment thereafter.
Since the company didnt respond, she filed
for a writ of habeas data in the Bulacan RTC

1211
Meralco v. Gopez Lim due to Meralcos omission of providing her
GR No 184769 with details about the report of the letter.
October 5,2010 To her, this constituted a violation of her
liberty and security. She asked for
disclosure of the data and measures for
keeping the confidentiality of the data.

Topic: Applicability of Habeas Data
Doctrine: Habeas data is designated to
protect by means of judicial complaint the
image, privacy, honor, information and
freedom of information of an individual. It is
meant to provide a forum to enforce ones
right to the truth and to informational
privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a persons right
to life, liberty and security against abuse in
this age of information technology. There is
no showing from the facts presented that
petitioners committed any unjustifiable or
unlawful violation of respondents right to
privacy, life, liberty or security.
Facts:
A letter was sent to the Meralco
admin department in Bulacan denouncing
Lim, an administrative clerk. She was
ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to
concerns over her safety. She complained
under the premise that the transfer was a
denial of her due process. She wrote a
letter stating that:
It appears that the veracity of these
accusations and threats to be [sic] highly
suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if
they existed at all. She added, instead of
the management supposedly extending
Meralco filed a reply saying that the
jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the
petition wasnt in order.
Trial court ruled in her favor.
In the SC, Meralco petitioned that
Habeas Data applies to entities engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding an aggrieved
partys person, family or home
Issue:
Whether Habeas Data the right
remedy for Lim.
Held:
No, petition dismissed. In Section 1.
Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a
remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee or
of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. Its a forum for enforcing ones right
to the truth. Like Amparo, habeas data was
a response to killings and enforced
disappearances.

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In Castillo v Cruz-habeas data will NOT issue
to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in
support of the petitions therefor are vague
or doubtful.
Employment is a property right in
the due process clause. Lim was concerned
with her employment, one that can be
solved in the NLRC.
There was no violation of
respondents right to privacy. Respondent
even said that the letters were mere jokes
and even conceded the fact that the issue
was labor related due to references to real
intent of management.
Case Digested By: Merchadel O. Capadocia
Rule 103
1221
Republic v Wong
G.R. No. 97906
21 May 1992
Topic: Change of Name
Doctrine: Section 1 of Rule 103, in specifying
the parties who may avail of said remedy,
uses the generic term "persons" to signify all
natural persons regardless of status. If a
legitimate person may, under certain
judicially accepted exceptional
circumstances, petition the court for a
change of name, we do not see any legal
basis or logic in discriminating against the
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availment of such a remedy by an adopted
child. In other words, Article 365 is not an
exception, much less can it bar resort, to
Rule 103.
Facts:
Private respondent Maximo Wong is
the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and
Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was two and
a half years old and then known as Maximo
Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala,
they were, with the consent of their natural
parents and by order of the court adopted
by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty
Wong, both naturalized Filipinos.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-
two, herein private respondent, filed a
petition to change his name to Maximo
Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the
surname Wong embarrassed and isolated
him from his relatives and friends, as the
same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in
truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino
residing in a Muslim community, and he
wants to erase any implication whatsoever
of alien nationality; This also hampers his
business and social life; and that his
adoptive mother does not oppose his desire
to revert to his former surname.
The matter was resolved in favor of
private respondent, the trial court
decreeing that, the jurisdictional
requirements having been fully complied
with, petitioner's prayer to change his name
from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr.
was granted. CA affirmed RTCs decision.
The Solicitor General contends that
private respondent's allegations of ridicule
and/or isolation from family and friends
were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the
 Liceo University Law
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petition for change of name. He claims that
for private respondent to cast aside the
name of his adoptive father is crass
ingratitude to the memory of the latter and
to his adoptive mother who is still alive,
despite her consent to the petition for
change of name. Further, the Solicitor
General posits that the reversion of Maximo
Wong to his old name violates Articles 341
and 365 of the Civil Code, which requires an
adopted child to use the surname of the
adopter, and would identify him with his
parents by nature, thus giving the
impression that he has severed his
relationship with his adoptive parents.
Issue:
Whether the reasons given by
Maximo Wong in his petition for change of
name are valid, sufficient and proper to
warrant the granting of said petition.
Ruling:
Yes.
Maximo Wong may legally change
his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. His reasons
are valid, sufficient and proper.
The State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for
the purpose of identification, and a change
of name is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in
the light of reasons adduced and the
consequences that will likely follow; It is a
privilege, which may be granted only upon a
showing of a proper or reasonable cause or
compelling reason therefor.
Among the grounds for change of
name which have been held valid are: (a)
When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) When the change results as a legal
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consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When
the change will avoid confusion; (d) Having
continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of
her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to
adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) When
the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change
of name was for a fraudulent purpose or
that the change of name would prejudice
public interest.
While it is true that the statutory fiat
under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the
effect that an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter, it must
nevertheless be borne in mind that the
change of the surname of the adopted child
is more an incident rather than the object
of adoption proceedings.
Change of name does not define or
effect a change in one's existing family
relations or in the rights and duties flowing
therefrom. It does not alter one's legal
capacity, civil status or citizenship; what is
altered is only the name.
Case Digested by: Muaminah O. Camama
123
Republic v Zosa
G.R. No. L-48762
September 12,1988
Doctrine: This is a proceeding for a change
of name. Since this is a proceeding in rem,
jurisdiction to hear and determine the
petition for a change of name is acquired
after due publication of the order containing
certain data, hence, jurisdictional
 Liceo University Law
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requirements in publication of order must
be valid and effective.
Facts:
Respondent Lee King Sing filed a
petition with the CFI for change of name.
The lower court issued an order setting the
petition for hearing. Said order was
subsequently published.
Herein petitioner, through the
Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss
the petition on the ground that the name
sought to be adopted by respondent and
other names by which he is known are not
indicated in the title of the petition.
Respondent filed an opposition to
the motion to dismiss. The lower court
denied the motion. After the trial and
hearing, the court granted the petition.
Issue:
Whether petition for Change of
Name be granted despite substantial defect
in the petition and publication of the notice
of hearing.
Ruling:
No.
Considering that the title of the
petition in this case and the order setting it
for hearing are defective, the lower court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the
proceeding.
In the present case, the petition
itself, as well as the order published, carries
the following title In Re : Petition for
Change of Name Lee King Sing, Petitioner.
It does not contain the name (Antonio C.
Lee) sought to be adopted and the names
by which petitioner was known to his
friends and associates. The title should have
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read In the matter of the Change of Name
of Lee King Sing, otherwise known as
Antonio or Tony to Antonio C. Lee, Lee King
Sing, Petitioner. The petition does not
indicate in its title or caption that herein
respondent desires to change his name to
Antonio C. Lee. The published order setting
his petition for hearing reproduced that
defective title. The failure to include the
name sought to be adopted in the title of
the petition nor in the title or caption of the
notices published in the newspapers
renders the trial court without jurisdiction
to hear and determine the petition.
The rule requires the inclusion of the
name sought to be adopted by and the
other names or aliases of the applicant in
the title of the petition or in the caption of
the published order is that the ordinary
reader only glances fleetingly at the caption
of the published order or the title of the
petition in a special proceeding. Only if the
caption or the title strikes him does he
proceed to read the contents of the order.
And the probability is great that he does not
at all notice the other names or aliases of
the applicant in the caption of the order or
in the title of the petition defeats the very
purpose of the required publication.
Case Digested by: Mamonie M. Natangcop
1241
Laperal v. Republic
G.R. No. L-18008
October 30, 1962
Doctrine: The fact of legal separation alone
is not sufficient ground to justify change of
name of petitioner, for to hold otherwise
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would be to provide an easy circumvention
of the mandatory provisions of Art. 372.
Facts:
Elisea Laperal filed in CFI a petition
for change of name. She prayed that since
she has been legally separated from Mr.
Enrique Santamaria, it is desirable that she
be allowed to change her name and/or be
permitted to resume using her maiden
name of Elisea Laperal.
The petition was opposed by the city
attorney on the ground that the same
violates the provisions of Art. 372 of the
Civil Code and that it is not sanctioned by
the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether the change of name by
reason of legal separation is a valid ground.
Ruling:
No.
Art. 372 of the Civil Code provides
that when legal separation has been
granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before the
legal separation.
This is so because her married status
is unaffected by the separation, there being
no severance of vinculum.
The procedure prescribed in Rule
103 of the Rules of Court for change of
name has been observed. But from the
petition quoted in full at the beginning of
these opinion, the only reason relied upon
for the change of name is the fact that
petitioner is legally separated from her
husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with
him for many years. Even, however,
applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of
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legal separation alone is not a sufficient
ground to justify a change of name of
herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise
would be to provide an easy circumvention
of the mandatory provisions of Art. 372.
Case Digested by: Ziur D. Ruiz
1251
CHIU HAP CHIU v
REPUBLIC
GR No. L-20018
April 30, 1966
Topic: Change of Name; No Proof of
Prejudice by Use of Official Name
Doctrine: CHANGE OF NAME; NATURE.
The state has an interest in the names
borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification, and a change of
name is a privilege and not a matter of right.
REQUISITES OR GROUNDS FOR GRANT OF
PETITION. Before a person can be
authorized to change the name given to him
either in his certificate of birth or in the civil
registry, he must show proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason
which may justify. such change. Otherwise,
the request should be denied. The following
may be considered, among others, as
proper and reasonable causes that may
warrant the grant of a petition for change of
name: (1) when the name is ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor, or is extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the
request for change is a consequence of a
change of status, such as when a natural
child is acknowledged or legitimized; and (3)
when the change is necessary to avoid
confusion.
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Synopsis: Chiu Hap Chui, a Chinese citizen,
petitioned for a change of his name to Lo
Hap Chiu, stating that from elementary to
college he has been called by his classmates
as Lo Hap Chiu; for which he desires to
adopt the same to avoid confusion.
Facts:
Chiu Hap Chiu, 30 years old, single, a
doctor of medicine and a resident of Davao
City seeks to change his name to Lo Hap
Chiu. He claimed that the name Lo Hap Chiu
was given him at birth and that during his
school days, elementary to college, he was
called by his classmates as such; for which
reason he desires to adopt said name to
avoid confusion.
At the reception of evidence, the
court a quo granted the petition. It was
found out that he was born on February 1,
1930 at Fuken, China; that he is a Chinese
citizen holding an alien certificate of
residence, that he is a physician by
profession of no criminal record; that he
has paid all his taxes to the government;
and that he desires to change his name
from Chiu Hap Chiu to Lo Hap Chiu for the
reason that the latter is the name he used
while studying in the school and because his
present name and surname are the same.
The government opposed the
petition in view of its failure to find
sufficient justification for the change of
name. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the ground stated by
Petitioner is sufficient for the change of
name.
Ruling:
No. State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification and that a change
of name is a privilege and not a matter of
right. So that before a person can be
authorized to change the name given him
either in his certificate of birth or in the civil
registry he must show proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason which may
justify such change. Otherwise, the request
should be denied. The following may be
considered, among others, as proper and
reasonable causes that may warrant the
grant of petition for change of name: (1)
when the name is ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (2) when the request for change
is a consequence of a change of status, such
as when a natural child is acknowledged or
legitimized; and (3) when the change is
necessary to avoid confusion.
Petitioner has not shown any proper
or compelling reason that may justify the
request for change of name other than his
desire to use the name Lo Hap Chiu on the
alleged reason that that is the name given
him in his birth certificate and in the schools
he attended, but this claim was not
satisfactorily proven, for aside from his own
testimony and a photostatic copy of a
certification issued in his favor as Doctor of
Medicine by the University of Santo Tomas
wherein it appears that his name is Lo Hap
Chiu, there is nothing in the record to show
that he used said name from grade school
to college for he failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove it. He has
not shown that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name, and as a
matter of fact he was referred to as Dr. Chiu
Hap Chiu. Since the State has an interest in
the name borne by an individual, especially

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an alien, and the latters identity as a rule is
established by the name appearing in his
alien certificate of registration, thus, finding
no plausible reason for authorizing the
change of name desired by petitioner.
Case Digested by: Paula Marie Pacana
1261
Del Prado v Republic
G.R.No.L18127
April 5, 1967
Doctrine: A petition to change the surname
of a child out of a bigamous
marriage should be granted only where to
do so is clearly for the best interest of the
child.
A change of name as authorized
under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or
affect a change in, one's existing family
relations, or in the rights and duties flowing
therefrom; nor does it create new family
rights and duties where none before was
existing. It does not alter one's legal
capacity, civil status, or citizenship. What is
altered is only the name, which is that word
or combination of words by which a person
is distinguished from others and which he
bears as a label or appellation for the
convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing
with him.
Facts:
Josefina del Prado, a minor, through
her mother and natural guardian, Corazon
Adolfo Calderdon, filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance of Davao, praying
that her name "Gertrudes Josefina del
Prado" be changed to "Getrudes Josefina
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Calderon." It is alleged in the petition that
the petitioner is an illegitimate child, out of
a bigamous marriage contracted by Manuel
del Prado with Corazon Adolfo; that the
surname "Del Prado" which the petitioner
carries is a stigma of illegitimacy, by reason
of which she has become the subject of
unfair comments; that the surname which
the petitioner carries would constitute a
handicap in her life in later years, and would
give cause for constant irritation in her
social relations with other people; that
petitioner is living with her mother who is
now married to Engineer Romeo C.
Calderon; and that it is the desire of the
petitioner to have her surname changed
from "Del Prado" to "Calderon "which is the
surname of her foster father, the husband
of her mother. After hearing the court a
quo issued an order, granting the petition
and ordering the change of the name of the
petitioner from
"Gertrudes Josefina, del Prado," to
"Gertrudes Josefina Calderon." The
dispositive portion of the order of the court
further states: "This order, however, shall
not operate to deprive the petitioner of her
status, rights and obligations as recognized
by law.
Issue:
Whether the change of the surname
of the petitioner by reason that present
surname carries the stigma of illegitimacy is
a proper and reasonable ground.
Ruling:
Yes.
A petition to change the name of an
infant, as in this case, should be granted
only where to do so is clearly for the best
interest of the child. When the mother of
the petitioner filed the instant petition she
 Liceo University Law
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had in mind what she believed was for the
best interest of her child considering that
her husband Romeo C. Calderon is the one
supporting the child and that he is
agreeable to the child's using his surname.
The mother had considered the generous
attitude of her husband as an opportunity
for her to promote the personality, and
enhance the dignity, of her daughter, by
eliminating what constitutes a stigma of
illegitimacy which her child would continue
to bear if her surname is that of her
illegitimate father.
Case Digested by: Khay Joyce Oliverio
1271
Republic v. Marcos
G.R. No. L-31065
February 15, 1990
Doctrine: The caption must include the
name sought to be adopted and the other
names or aliases of the applicant in the title
of the petition, or in the caption of the
published order. Failure to comply with the
requisite is a jurisdictional defect.
The petition for change of name must be
filed by the person desiring to change
his/her name as provided in Sections 1 and
2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, even if it
may be signed and verified by some other
person in his behalf.
Facts:
Pang Cha Quen was previously
married to Sia Bian, both citizens of China.
They have a daughter named May Sia born
in the City of Manila. Subsequently, Sia Bian
abandoned Pang Cha Quen and her
daughter which caused her to register May
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Sia, alias Manman Huang, as an alien under
the name of Mary Pang, using her maternal
surname Pang.
On August 16, 1966, Pang Cha Quen
married Alfredo De la Cruz. Because Mary
Pang has grown to love and recognize her
stepfather, she wanted to adopt and use his
surname De la Cruz. Hence, Pang Cha
Quen filed a petition before the CFI of
Baguio and Benguet and prayed that her
daughter be allowed to change her name
from May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to
Mary Pang De la Cruz. Respondent Judge
issued an order setting the hearing of the
petition and also directed that it be
published in a newspaper of general
circulation in Baguio City and Mountain
Province.
The respondent judge, after
publication and hearing, granted the
petition. However, the Solicitor General
opposed on the ground that the court's
order is contrary to law on the ground that
the respondent judge did not acquire
jurisdiction and the petition failed to
adduce proper and reasonable cause for the
change of name.
Issues:
1. Whether the court had acquired
jurisdiction over the case; and
2. Whether or not the respondent
Judge erred in granting the petition
although private respondent Pang Cha
Quen failed to adduce proper and
reasonable cause for changing the name of
the minor "May Sia" alias Manman Huang.
Ruling:
1. No.
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The court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the petition on the ground that the
captions of the petition and of the
published order of the court did not include
the name "Mary Pang" as one of the names
that the minor has allegedly been using,
hence, the petition and the published order
contain a fatal jurisdictional defect. The
reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of
the name sought to be adopted and the
other names or aliases of the applicant in
the title of the petition, or in the caption of
the published order is that the ordinary
reader only glances fleetingly at the caption
of the published order or the title of the
petition in a special proceeding for a change
of name. Only if the caption or the title
strikes him because one or all of the names
mentioned are familiar to him, does he
proceed to read the contents of the order.
The probability is great that he will not
notice the other names or aliases of the
applicant if they are mentioned only in the
body of the order or petition. The omission
of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the
captions of the court's order and of the
petition defeats the purpose of the
publication. In view of that defect, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
subject of the proceedings.
2. Yes.
The petitioner failed to offer valid
reason for the change of name of May Sia.
The following have been considered valid
grounds for a change of name:
1) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce;
2) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation;
3) when the change will avoid confusion;
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4) having continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name,
unaware of his alien parentage; or
5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name
to erase signs of former alienage all in good
faith and not to prejudice anybody.
However, petitioner, for the change
of name of May Sia, offered only the
following reasons:
1) That her "her daughter grew up with, and
learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la
Cruz as her own father";
2) To afford her daughter a feeling of
security; and
3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this
petition, and has signified his conformity at
the foot of this pleading".
Clearly, these are not valid reasons
for a change of name.
Another reason for disallowing the
petition for change of name is that it was
not filed by the proper party. As provided in
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court, the petition for change of name must
be filed by the person desiring to change
his/her name, even if it may be signed and
verified by some other person in his behalf.
In this case, however, the petition was filed
by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia. Hence,
only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang,
alias Mary Pang, when she shall have
reached the age of majority, may file the
petition to change her name. Wherefore,
the Petition for Change of Name of May Sia
is denied.
Case Digested by: Ray Marvin A. Palma
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128
Wang v Cebu City
Civil Registrar
GR No 159966
March 30, 2005
Doctrine: The State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification, and that a
change of name is a privilege and not a
right.
Facts:
Julian is the son of Anna Lisa Wang
and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet
married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married on September 22,
1998, they executed a deed of legitimation
of their son so that the childs name was
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in
Singapore where Julian will study together
with a sister who was born in Singapore,
Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the
RTC seeking to drop his middle name and
have his registered name in the Civil
Registry changed from Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The
reason given for the change of name sought
in the petition is that Julian may be
discriminated against when he studies in
Singapore because of his middle name since
in Singapore middle names or the maiden
surname of the mother is not carried in a
person's name.
RTC denied the petition because the
reason given did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since
the State has an interest in the name of a
person it cannot just be changed to suit the
convenience of the bearer of the name. The
RTC said that legitimate children have the
right to bear the surnames of the father and
the mother, and there is no reason why this
right should be taken from Julio considering
that he was still a minor. When he reaches
majority age he could then decide whether
to change his name by dropping his middle
name, added the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the court is correct in
denying the petition.
Ruling:
Yes. Middle names serve to identify
the maternal lineage or filiation of a person
as well as further distinguish him from
others who may have the same given name
and surname as he has. When an
illegitimate child is legitimated by
subsequent marriage of his parents or
acknowledged by the father in a public
instrument or private handwritten
instrument, he then bears both his mother's
surname as his middle name and his
father's surname as his surname, reflecting
his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged natural child. The registered
name of a legitimate, legitimated and
recognized illegitimate child thus contains a
given name, a middle name and a surname.
The State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification, and that a
change of name is a privilege and not a right,
so that before a person can be authorized
to change his name given him either in his
certificate of birth or civil registry, he must
show proper or reasonable cause, or any
compelling reason which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be
denied.

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To justify a request for change of
name, petitioner must show not only some
proper or compelling reason therefore but
also that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have
been held valid are: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously
used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there
is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name would prejudice public
interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason
advanced by petitioner for the dropping his
middle name is convenience. However,
how such change of name would make his
integration into Singaporean society easier
and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his
middle name would cause confusion and
difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from his
registered complete name.
Case Digested by: Queenie Joy Faelnar
129
Silverio v Republic
G.R. No. 174689
October 22, 2007
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Doctrine: No law allows the change of entry
in the birth certificate as to sex on the
ground of sex reassignment.
Facts:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio filed
a petition for the change of his first name
Rommel Jacinto to Mely and his sex
from male to female in his birth certificate
in the RTC for reason of his sex
reassignment. He alleged that he is a male
transsexual, he is anatomically male but
thinks and acts like a female. The Regional
Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining
that it is consonance with the principle of
justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed
a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals alleging that there is no law
allowing change of name by reason of sex
alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration
but was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the change in name and
sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason
of sex reassignment.
Ruling:
No. A change of name is a privilege
and not a right. It may be allowed in cases
where the name is ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or
write; a nickname is habitually used; or if
the change will avoid confusion. The
petitioners basis of the change of his name
is that he intends his first name compatible
with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into thru surgery. The Court says
that his true name does not prejudice him
at all, and no law allows the change of entry
 Liceo University Law
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in the birth certificate as to sex on the
ground of sex reassignment.
Before a person can legally change
his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change. In addition, he must
show that he will be prejudiced by the use
of his true and official name. In this case, he
failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his
true and official name.
Case Digested by: Queenie Joy Faelnar
130
In Re: Jesus Ng Yao
Siong v. RP
GR No. L-20306
March 31, 1996
Topic: Name in Civil Register is Official
Doctine: Failure in the heading of the
application to give the true name sought to
be changed is fundamental; such failure is
non-compliance with the strict requirements
of publication; it is fatal; and the court did
not acquire jurisdiction to hear the case.
Synopsis: For purposes of an application for
change of name under Article 376 of the Civil
Code, the only name that may be changed is the
true or official name recorded in the civil
register. actual publication thereof, the title of
this case was printed as follows: In the matter
of the change of name of Jesus Ng Yao Siong,
Jesus Ng Yao Siong, petitioner, But Jesus Ng Yao
Siong the name appearing in the petition, the
order of publication, and the publication itself,
which is merely "Jesus Ng" not Jesus Ng Yap
Siong, thus result that there is no name to be
changed in the petition.
FACTS:
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Petitioner, a Chinese resident of
Dumaguete City, bears a number of
names: (1) Jesus Ng, in his birth certificate
and certificate of residence, (2) Jesus Uy,
Keng Lee, in his school records, (3) Uy Keng
Lee Jesus, also in his school records, (4)
Keng Lee Uy, to his friends and to the
general public, (5) Uy Keng Lee, in his
income tax returns, and (6) Jesus Ng Yao
Siong, in his alien certificate of registration.
These diverse names, so his petition avers,
"had caused much confusion in his school
records and unnecessary delay and
embarrassment to him in his dealing with
the public". To obviate all these, petitioner
would want to be known only by one
name Keng Lee Uy and accordingly
petitioned that the Negros Oriental court
authorize the change of all the other names
to Keng Lee Uy. The city attorney of
Dumaguete opposed the petition, alleged
that there is no necessity for the change of
name and that petitioner is guilty of a
violation of the laws regarding the use of
names and surnames. The judgment
after hearing went for petitioner. The
Republic appealed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there was valid
publication
2. Whether there is a reasonable
ground for the change of name.
RULING:
1. NO. The court held that for
purposes of an application for change of
name under Article 376 of the Civil Code,
the only name that may be changed is the
true or official name recorded in the civil
register. Change of name is a judicial
proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to hear and
 Liceo University Law
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determine a petition therefor, by law, is
acquired after publication of the "order
reciting the purpose of the petition" and the
"date and place for the hearing thereof"
for three (3) successive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation. But, for
that publication to be effective, it must give
a correct information. To inform, the
publication should recite, amongst others,
the following facts: (1) the name or names
of the applicant, (2) the cause for which the
change of name is sought, and (3) the new
name asked for. By Article 408 of the Civil
Code, a person's birth must be entered in
the civil register. So it is, that the civil
register records his name. That name in the
civil register, for legal purposes, is his real
name. And correctly so, because the civil
register is an official record of the civil
status of persons. A name given to a person
in the church records or elsewhere or by
which he is known in the community
when at variance with that entered in the
civil register is unofficial and cannot be
recognized as his real name. The title of
this case was there printed as follows: "In
the matter of the change of name of Jesus
Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Ng Yao Siong,
petitioner." But Jesus Ng Yao Siong the
name appearing in the petition, the order of
publication, and the publication itself, is not
the true name of petitioner. As heretofore
stated, his name appearing in the civil
register is merely "Jesus Ng" without
the Yao Siong. The name is to be changed, if
any, Jesus Ng not Jesus Ng Yao Siong. It
thus results that there is no name to be
changed in the petition. It is our view that
this failure in the heading of the application
to give the true name sought to be changed
is fundamental; such failure is non-
compliance with the strict requirements of
publication; it is fatal; and the court did not
acquire jurisdiction to hear the case.
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2. No. The touchstone for the grant
of a change of name is that there be
"proper and reasonable cause" for which
the change is sought. The petition and
petitioner's testimony are one in the claim
that his various names caused much
confusion in the school records and
unnecessary delay and embarrassment to
him in his dealings with the public. This
does not constitute proper and reasonable
justification to legally authorize a change of
name for him. For indeed he had been using
these names all along. And that use
naturally facilitates his transactions with
others who knew him by the one name or
the other. Again we say that the petition
not being supported by weighty reasons,
the condition for the grant thereof is non-
existent; and, nothing is left for the court
but to dismiss the petition.
Case Digested by: Maongco
131
In Re: Emmanuel Yu
Nam v. RP
GR No. L-20016
April 29, 1966
Topic: Purpose of Publication
Doctrine: Proper publication of the petition
being a primordial step in proceedings of
this nature. The purpose of the requirement
of publication is "to apprise the public of the
pendency of the petition so that those who
may know of any legal objection to it might
come forward with the information in order
to determine the fitness of petitioner.
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Synopsis: If petitioner's true name is
Emmanuel Yu Nam, while the notices published
give his name as Emmanuel Ong, persons who
might have derogatory information against
Emmanuel Yu Nam might not come forward
with it in the belief that Emmanuel Yu Nam, the
applicant, is someone else. The purpose of the
publication would thus be defeated, and the
road would be laid open to fraudulent
subterfuges through the use of aliases.
FACTS:
The Republic challenges the
correctness of the decision of the Cebu
Court of First Instance granting the petition
for naturalization of Emmanuel Yu Nam.
Several errors are assigned in its printed
brief the most important of which refers to
petitioner's use of aliases without judicial
authority. The petition alleges that
applicant's full name is Emmanuel Yu Nam;
and such petition was published under such
name. However, his birth certificate shows
that he is Emmanuel Ong, and his school
records listed him as Manuel Ong y Lim.
These other names were not mentioned in
his petition.
ISSUE:
WON failure to mention the use of
aliases is fatal to the application of change
of name.
RULING:
YES. The omission taints the whole
proceeding, to such extent as practically to
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
matter. The purpose of the requirement of
publication is "to apprise the public of the
pendency of the petition so that those who
may know of any legal objection to it might
come forward with the information in order
to determine the fitness of petitioner for
Philippine citizenship. The purpose of the
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publication would thus be defeated, and
the road would be laid open to fraudulent
subterfuges through the use of aliases.
Case Digested by: Maongco
132
Yu v. Republic
GR No. L-20874
May 25, 1966
Topic: Change of Name
Doctrine: Rule 103 does not say that only
citizens of the Philippines may petition for a
change of name. The word "person" is a
generic term which is not limited to Filipino
citizens, but embraces all natural persons.
Synopsis: Joselito Yu, a Chinese citizen,
filed a petition for change of name. It was
denied on the ground that Rule 103 may
not be invoked by aliens. However, on
appeal, the SC held that a petition for
change of name under Rule 103 can be
invoked aliens there being no Filipino
citizenship requirement under the said rule.
Facts:
In the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, Joselito Yu, represented by
his guardian ad litem Juan S. Barrera, filed a
petition to have his name changed to
Ricardo Sy. Petitioner avers in his petition
that he is a minor of 13 years, and a Chinese
citizen who has been a resident of Manila
for more than three years prior to the filing
of the petition. As grounds for the change
of name he alleges that as far as he can
remember has been using the name
"Ricardo Sy," that he grew up under the
care and custody of Juan Sy Barrera, his
 Liceo University Law
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guardian ad litem; that he is enrolled in
school under the said name and that he was
baptized "Ricardo Sy with his real name also
stated."
Without a hearing being had, the
court motu propio dismissed the petition on
the ground that Rule 103 of the Revised
Rules of Court may not be invoked by aliens.
Issue:
Whether an alien can avail himself
of the provisions of the rules of court
relating to change of name.
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 103 does not say that only
citizens of the Philippines may petition for a
change of name. Section 1 provides that "a
person desiring to change his name shall
present the petition to the Court of First
Instance of the province in which he resides,
or, in the City of Manila to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court." Here the word
"person" is a generic term which is not
limited to Filipino citizens, but embraces all
natural persons. The rule does not even
require that the citizenship of the petitioner
be stated in his petition. It is enough that
the petition be verified, signed by the
petitioner or some other person in his
behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner
has been a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition is filed for at
least three (3) years prior to the date of
filing; (b) the cause for which the change of
name is sought; and (c) the name asked for
(Section 2). The rule is clear and affords no
room for interpretation. It sets forth all the
requirements, and Filipino citizenship is not
one of them.
The Court a quo ruled that since the
use of surnames is based on family rights,
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and since under Article 15 of the Civil Code
laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines even though living abroad, the
converse of the principle must be
recognized, that is to say, the same matters
in respect of an alien must be governed by
the laws of his own country. But a change of
name as authorized under Rule 103 does
not by itself define, or effect a change in,
one's existing family relations, or in the
rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor
does it create new family rights and duties
where none before were existing. It does
not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or
citizenship. What is altered is only the name,
which is that word or combination of words
by which a person is distinguished from
others and which he bears as the label of
appellation for the convenience of the
world at large in addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur.
596). The situation is no different whether
the person whose name is changed be a
citizen or an alien.
Case Digested by: Aura Villones
133
Ong Huan Tin v.
Republic
GR No. L-20997
April 27,1967
Topic: Change of Name
Doctrine: Philippine citizenship of the
applicant is not a prerequisite for a petition
to change name; and, that, accordingly an
alien may petition for a change of name.
Synopsis: Ong Huan Tin, an alien, filed a
petition to change her name. It was denied
on the ground that she is an alien. SC held
 Liceo University Law
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that, as a rule, aliens may file a petition for
change of name since citizenship is not a
requirement. However, such rule applies
only to aliens domiciled in the Philippines.
Facts:
Ong Huan Tin filed a petition to
change her name to Teresita Tan before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. The
petition was set for hearing. But, before the
petition could be heard on the merits, the
court, motu proprio, in its order expressed
the opinion "that an alien cannot avail
himself of the provisions of our Rules of
Court relating to change of name" and
thereupon denied the petition.
Issue:
1.Whether an alien may petition for
a change of name under Rule 103.
2.Whether every alien in this
country may petition for a change of name.
Ruling:
1. Yes. As held in the case of In the
Petition for the Change of Name of
JOSELITO YU, the SC held that Philippine
citizenship of the applicant is not a
prerequisite for a petition to change name;
and, that, accordingly, an alien may petition
for a change of name.
Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of
the Philippines may petition for a change of
name. [Neither does Public Act No. 1386 of
the Philippine Commission (enacted
September 1, 1905) from which the Rule
has been adopted.] Section 1 provides that
"a person desiring to change his name shall
present the petition to the Court of First
Instance of the province in which he resides,
or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court." Here the word
"person" is a generic term which is not
limited to Filipino citizens, but embraces all
natural persons. The rule does not even
require that the citizenship of the petitioner
be stated in his petition. It is enough that
the petition be verified, signed by the
petitioner or some other person in his
behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner
has been a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition is filed for at
least three (3) years prior to the date of
filing; (b) the cause for which the change of
name is sought; and (c) the name asked for
(Section 2). The rule is clear and affords no
room for interpretation. It sets forth all the
requirements, and Filipino citizenship is not
one of them.
2. No. Change of name under our
own law is a special proceeding to
establish the status of a person involving his
relations with others, that is, his legal
position in, or with regard to, the rest of the
community. The petition therefor is
directed against all. It is in rem. So it is, that
under Section 3 of Rule 103, publication of
the petition is required.
The broad general doctrine is that
the status of an alien individual is governed
and controlled by the lex domicilii. Implicit
in this precept is that an alien may be
allowed to change his name here only if he
be domiciled in the Philippines. And
"domicile" means "permanent home, the
place to which, whenever absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances, in
the sense that they disclose intent."
An alien who temporarily stays in
the Philippines may not there avail of the
right to change his name. It would not be of
much benefit to him; court proceedings for
the purpose could yet be a useless

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ceremony; that salutary effects flowing
from a change of his social relation and
condition may not thus be achieved. And
then, stock should be taken of the fact that
in a change of name, third persons and the
State are concerned.
Thus, the SC lays down the rule that
only alien domiciled in the Philippines may
apply for change of name in the courts
thereof.
Case Digested by: Aura Villones
Writ of Amparo
134
CASTILLO, ET AL. v.
CRUZ
G.R. No. 182165,
November 25, 2009
Topic: Petition for issuance of Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data
Doctrine: The petition for a writ of amparo
is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated
or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The writ of habeas data is a remedy
available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated
or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee or
of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.
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Facts:
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda)
who, along with her husband Francisco G.
Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land
situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the
property), refused to vacate the property,
despite demands by the lessor Provincial
Government of Bulacan (the Province)
which intended to utilize it for local projects.
Several cases were filed by both parties
to enforce their rights over the property.
The pertinent case among the filed cases
was the issuance by the MTC an alias Writ
of Demolition in favor of the Province.
Respondents filed a motion for TRO in the
RTC, which was granted. However, the
demolition was already implemented
before the TRO issuance.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners
Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et
al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in
compliance with a memorandum issued by
Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing
him to protect, secure and maintain the
possession of the property, entered the
property.
Amanda and her co-respondents
refused to turn over the property, however.
Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent
Injunction enjoined the Province from
repossessing it, they shoved petitioners,
forcing the latter to arrest them and cause
their indictment for direct assault,
trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Thus, respondents filed a Motion for
Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Issue:
a.Whether or not the petition for the Writ
of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to
property rights; and,
 Liceo University Law
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b.Whether or not the petition for the Writ
of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when
there is a criminal case already filed.
Ruling:
On the 1st issue: No.
Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo
and Habeas Data provides that the coverage
of the writs is limited to the protection of
rights to life, liberty and security, and the
writs cover not only actual but also threats
of unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
teaches: As the Amparo Rule was intended
to address the intractable problem of
extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. Tapuz v. Del Rosario also
teaches: What it is not is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall
issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds.
To thus be covered by the privilege of the
writs, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with
an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the
present controversy arose out of a property
dispute between the Provincial Government
and respondents. Absent any considerable
nexus between the acts complained of and
its effect on respondents right to life,
liberty and security, the Court will not delve
on the propriety of petitioners entry into
the property.
It bears emphasis that respondents petition
did not show any actual violation, imminent
or continuing threat to their life, liberty and
security. Bare allegations of petitioners will
not suffice to prove entitlement to the
remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue
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confinement or detention was present. In
fact, respondents were even able to post
bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.
On the 2nd issue: No.
Respondents filing of the petitions for writs
of amparo and habeas data should have
been barred, for criminal proceedings
against them had commenced after they
were arrested in flagrante delicto and
proceeded against in accordance with
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Validity of the arrest or the proceedings
conducted thereafter is a defense that may
be set up by respondents during trial and
not before a petition for writs of amparo
and habeas data.
Case digested by: Sherrie U. Cutab
135
SEC. OF NATIONAL
SECURITY v. MANALO
G.R. No. 180906
October 7, 2008
Topic: Supreme Courts First Writ of
Amparo Case
Doctrine: On October 24, 2007, the Court
promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the
prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced
disappearances.It was an exercise for the
first time of the Courts expanded power to
promulgate rules to protect our peoples
constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in
response to the Filipino experience of the
martial law regime.] As the Amparo Rule
was intended to address the intractable
problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, its coverage, in its present
form, is confined to these two instances or
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to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are
killings committed without due process of
law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings.On the other hand, enforced
disappearances are attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or
indirect acquiescence of the government;
the refusal of the State to disclose the fate
or whereabouts of the person concerned or
a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such persons outside
the protection of law.
Facts:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo were abducted by military men
belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion
that they were members and supporters of
the NPA. After 18 months of detention and
torture, the brothers escaped on August 13,
2007.
Ten days after their escape, they
filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction,
and Temporary Restraining Order to stop
the military officers and agents from
depriving them of their right to liberty and
other basic rights. While the said case was
pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
took effect on October 24, 2007. The
Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation
and omnibus motion to treat their existing
petition as amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of
Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of
amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of
the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the
court with all official and unofficial
investigation reports as to the Manalos
custody, confirm the present places of
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official assignment of two military officials
involved, and produce all medical reports
and records of the Manalo brothers while
under military custody. The Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of
the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to
reverse and set aside the decision
promulgated by the CA
Issue:
Whether or not the right to freedom
from fear is or can be protected by the Writ
of Amparo
Ruling:
Yes. The right to the security of
person is not merely a textual hook in
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. At
its core is the immunity of ones person
against government intrusion. The right to
security of person is freedom from fear, a
guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity and security.
In upholding the CA decision, the
Supreme Court ruled that there is a
continuing violation of the Manalos right to
security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most
potent remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty, and security has
been violated or is threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission by
public officials or employees and by private
individuals or entities. xxx Understandably,
since their escape, the Manalos have been
under concealment and protection by
private citizens because of the threat to
their life, liberty, and security. The
circumstances of respondents abduction,
detention, torture and escape reasonably
support a conclusion that there is an
apparent threat that they will again be
abducted, tortured, and this time, even
executed. These constitute threats to their
 Liceo University Law
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liberty, security, and life, actionable through
a petition for a writ of amparo, the Court
explained.
Case digested by: Sherrie U. Cutab
136
SEC. DE LIMA v.
GATDULA,
G.R. No. 204528
February 19, 2013
Topic: WRIT OF AMPARO.
Doctrine: The remedy of Writ of Amparo is
an equitable and extraordinary remedy to
safeguard the right of the people to life,
liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution. It was issued as an exercise of
the Supreme Courts power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of Constitutional rights. It aims
to address concerns such as, among
otehrsm extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
Facts:
Gatdula filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of
Manila directed against Sec De Lima, et al.
"to cease and desist from framing up
Gatdula for the fake ambush incident.
Instead of deciding on the writ, judge
summons De Lima, et al. to Answer and set
for hearing for determining whether a
temporary protection order may be issued.
During that hearing, De Lima, et al.
manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is
appropriate for Amparo cases. The judge
insisted that "[s]ince no writ has been
issued, return is not the required pleading
but answer"; that Rules of Court apply
suppletorily in Amparo cases and; that the
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Revised Rules of Summary Procedure
applied and thus required an Answer. The
Writ of Amparo was issued. Thus,
petitioners came to this Court assailing the
RTC decision via Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Amparo
can be executed?.
Ruling:
No. the RTC committed procedural
erros in issuing the writ. The granting of the
writ is not the judgment or final order
contemplated under the rules thus, Petition
for Review under Rule 45 is not the proper
remedy. The remedy of the Writ
of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary
remedy to safeguard the right of the people
to life, liberty and security as enshrined in
the 1987 Constitution. The Rule on the Writ
of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the
Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights. It aims to address
concerns such as, among others,
extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
PROCESS OF ISSUANCE:
1. It is initiated through a petition to be filed
in RTC, SB, CA, or SC, the judge or justice
then makes an "immediate" evaluation of
the facts as alleged, after, the judge decides
on the issuance or dismissal. Dismissal is
proper if the petition do not show that the
petitioner's right to life, liberty or security is
under threat or the acts complained of are
not unlawful.
2. Return is filed after to serve as the
responsive pleading. If the respondents are
 Liceo University Law
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public officials or employees, they are claims of the party litigants and is a final
required to state the actions they had taken pleading usually required before the case is
to: verify the identity of the aggrieved party; submitted for decision. One cannot
recover and preserve evidence related to substitute for the other; (4) in the
the death or disappearance of the person "Decision" which stated:"Accordingly this
identified in the petition; identify witnesses court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and
and obtain statements concerning the the interim reliefs prayed for by the
death or disappearance; determine the petitioner.", this gives the impression that
cause, manner, location, and time of death the decision was the judgment since the
or disappearance as well as any pattern or phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the
practice that may have brought about the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
death or disappearance; and bring the
The procedural irregularities in the
suspected offenders before a competent
RTC affected the mode of appeal that
court.
petitioners used in elevating the matter to
3. Summary hearing is done after the this Court. When it is the judge himself who
Return is filed. If not filed, the hearing will disregards the rules of procedure, delay and
be done ex parte. The court will render confusion result.
the judgment if the allegations are proven
Digested by: Janirah A. Sangulingan
with substantial evidence. It is this
judgment that could be subject to appeal to
the Supreme Court via Rule 45.

137
The confusion of the parties arose NAVIA v. PARDICO
due to the procedural irregularities in the G.R. No. 184467
RTC: (1) the insistence on filing of an June 19, 2012
Answer was inappropriate as it is the Return
that serves as the proper responsive
pleading. Filing of Answer is contrary to the
Doctrine: Enforced or involuntary
intention speedy remedy. This type of
disappearance of persons means the arrest,
summary procedure only applies to
detention, or abduction of persons by, or
MTC/MTCC/MCTCs, not to RTC. Also, the
with authorization, support or acquiescence
application of summary procedure is limited
of a State or a political organization
to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
of Amparo is a special proceeding, (2) the
deprivation of freedom or to give
holding of a hearing on the main
information on the fate or whereabouts of
case prior to the issuance of the writ and
those persons, with the intention of
the filing of a Return, without which, the
removing from the protection of the law for
issues could not have been properly joined;
a prolonged period of time.
(3) it required a memorandum in lieu of a
responsive pleading when a Return Facts:
in Amparo cases allows the respondents to
Two uniformed guards disembarking
frame the issues subject to a hearing thus
from the vehicle of Asian Land Strategies
should be done prior to the hearing, not
Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the
after. A memorandum is a synthesis of the

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house of Lolita M. Lapore. One of them told
Bong that he and Ben should go with them
to the security office of Asian Land because
a complaint was lodged against them for
theft of electric wires and lamps in the
subdivision
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and
Ben were in the office of the security
department of Asian Land also located in
Grand Royale Subdivision.
Exasperated with the mysterious
disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed
a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the
RTC. A Writ of Amparo was accordingly
issued and served on the petitioners. The
trial court issued the challenged Decision
granting the petition. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the trial court.
Petitioners contend that the writ of amparo
is available only in cases where the factual
and legal bases of the violation or
threatened violation of the aggrieved
partys right to life, liberty and security are
clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at
bench, Virginia miserably failed to establish
all these.
This petition for review on certiorari
challenges the decision of the RTC. The
petition does not contain any allegation of
State complicity, and none of the evidence
presented tend to show that the
government or any of its agents
orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact,
none of its agents, officials or employees
were impleaded or implicated in Virginias
amparo petition whether as a responsible
or accountable persons.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of A Writ of
Amparo is proper.
Ruling:
No.
SC pointed out that in an amparo
petition, proof of disappearance alone is
not enough. It is likewise essential to
establish that such disappearance was
carried out with the direct authorization,
support or acquiescence or threats thereof.
This indispensable element of State
participation is not present in this case. The
petition does not contain any allegation of
State complicity, and none of the evidence
presented tend to show that the
government or any of its agents
orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact,
none of its agents, officials, or employees
were impleaded or implicated in Virginia's
amparo petition whether as responsible or
accountable persons. Thus, in the absence
of an allegation or proof that the
government or its agents had a hand in
Bens disappearance or that they failed to
exercise extraordinary diligence in
investigating his case, the Court will
definitely not hold the government or its
agents either as responsible or accountable
persons.
Here, petitioners are mere security
guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy.
Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the
Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not
work for the government and nothing has
been presented that would link or connect
them to some covert police, military or
governmental operation. To fall within the
ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to
RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be
attended by some governmental
involvement. This hallmark of State

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participation differentiates an enforced that the heirs of Antonio Tapuz Reported
disappearance case from an ordinary case acts of terrorism committed against them
of a missing person. by armed men who executed the
demolition. It is alleged that the armed men
Case Digested by: Drusilla L. Dalapu
torched two houses of the petitioners to
ashes.

138
Tapuz v Del Rosario
G.R. No. 182484 Issue:
June 17, 2008
Whether the issuance of a Writ of
Amparo is proper
Ruling:
Doctrine: The Court sees no point in
separately and directly intervening through No.
a Writ of Amparo in the absence of any
Writ of Amparo is intended to
clear prima facie showing that the right to
address violations of or threats to the right
life, liberty or security- the personal concern
to life, liberty, or security, as an
that the writ is intended to protect- is
extraordinary and independent remedy
immediately in danger or threatened, or
beyond those available under the prevailing
that the danger or threat is continuing.
Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to
Facts: these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or
Private respondents Gregorio commercial.
Sanson and Ma. Lourdes Sanson filed with
the MCTC an action for forcible entry The issuance of the Writ of Amparo
against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay in the present case is anchored on the
Tapuz, et al. regarding a parcel of land factual allegations brought about in the
located in a certain Sitio in Boracay, Aklan. petition. Notably, none of the supporting
That they are both claiming. In their affidavits compellingly show that the threat
complaint, they made the following to the right to life, and security of the
allegations: 1) that they are the registered petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
owners of the land and 2) that they were
If the petitioners wish to seek
the disputed lands prior possessors when
redress and hold the alleged perpetrators
Tapuz, et al. entered the land with force
criminally liable, the remedy may lie more
and intimidation without their permission.
in the realm of ordinary criminal
The MCTC ruled in their favor. Upon prosecution rather than on the use of the
appeal, the RTC affirmed this decision and extraordinary remedy of the Writ of
even issued a writ of demolition. The Amparo.
petitioners thereafter appealed to the CA.
Case Digested by: Drusilla L. Dalapu
A Notice to Vacate and for
Demolition was issued. Petitioners thus
filed the present petition praying for the
remedy of Writ of Amparo on the ground

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139
Reyes v CA
G.R. No. 182161
Deceber 3, 2009
Doctrine: Restriction on right to travel as a
result of a pending criminal case is not
unlawful and thus not a valid ground to
invoke issuance of writ of amparo.
Facts:
Petitioner was among those
arrested, in the Manila Peninsula Hotel
siege on November 30, 2007, and was
detained awaiting inquest proceeding.
Upon the request of DILG, respondent DOJ
Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold
Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering
respondent Commissioner of Immigration
to include in the Hold Departure List of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others
relative to the aforementioned case in the
interest of national security and public
safety.
DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an
Information of Rebellion against petitioner.
The RTC dismissed the charge for Rebellion
against petitioner and 17 others for lack of
probable cause. Petitioners requested the
DOJ for lifting the HDO No. 45, but the
request was denied. Petitioner then filed
the instant petition for issuance of writ of
amparo before the CA claiming that despite
the dismissal of the rebellion case against
petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists. The CA
dismissed the petition.
Petitioner maintains that the writ of
amparo does not only exclusively apply to
situations of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances but encompasses
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the whole gamut of liberties protected by
the Constitution. Part of the right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution is the right
of a person to travel. Petitioner invokes this
extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo
for the protection of his right to travel. He
insists that he is entitled to the protection
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
because the HDO is a continuing actual
restraint on his right to travel. Respondent
argued that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is
premature in view of public respondents
pending Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the respondents of the Order of the RTC
dismissing Criminal Case for Rebellion for
lack of probable cause.
Issue:
Whether the right to travel is
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Ruling:
No.
The rights that fall within the
protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo
under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are
the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to
liberty; and (3) right to security.
The right to travel refers to the right
to move from one place to another. As we
have stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, a
persons right to travel is subject to the
usual constraints imposed by the very
necessity of safeguarding the system of
justice. In such cases, whether the accused
should be permitted to leave the
jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a
matter of the courts sound discretion.
Here, the restriction on petitioners
right to travel as a consequence of the
pendency of the criminal case filed against
him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also
 Liceo University Law
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failed to establish that his right to travel
was impaired in the manner and to the
extent that it amounted to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and
security, for which there exists no readily
available legal recourse or remedy.
Case Digested by: Aljalil E. Diego
140
Rubrico v Arroyo
G.R. No. 183871
February 18, 2010
Doctrine: It may plausibly be contended
that command responsibility, as legal basis
to hold military/police commanders liable
for extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances or threats, may be made
applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory
that the command responsibility doctrine
now constitutes a principle of international
law or customary international law in
accordance with the incorporation clause of
the Constitution. Still, it would be
inappropriate to apply to these proceedings
the doctrine of command responsibility, as
the CA seemed to have any, is beyond the
reach of amparo. In other words, the Court
does not rule in such proceedings on any
issue of criminal culpability, even if
incidentally a crime or an infarction of an
administrative rule may have been
committed.
Facts:
On April 3, 2007, armed men
abducted Lourdes and brought to, and
detained at, the air base without charges.
Following a week of relentless interrogation
- conducted alternately by hooded
individuals - and what amounts to verbal
abuse and mental harassment, Lourdes,
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was released at Dasmarias, Cavite, her
hometown, but only after being made to
sign a statement that she would be a
military asset. After Lourdes release, the
harassment, coming in the form of being
tailed on at least two occasions at different
places. Lourdes two daughters were also
allegedly subjected to harassment.
Lourdes filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a criminal complaint for
kidnapping and arbitrary detention and
administrative complaint for gross abuse of
authority and grave misconduct against
Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, Ruben Alfaro,
Jimmy Santana and a certain Jonathan, but
nothing has happened; and the threats and
harassment incidents have been reported
to the Dasmarias municipal and Cavite
provincial police stations, but nothing
eventful resulted from their respective
investigations. Karapatan conducted an
investigation on the incidents. The
investigation would indicate that those men
belonging to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP). The AFP denied that those
men belong to AFP/PAF.
Petitioner Rubrico filed petition for
issuance of writ of amparo, ordering the
individual respondents to desist from
performing any threatening act against the
security of the petitioners and for the Office
of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately
file information for kidnapping qualified
with the aggravating circumstance of
gender of the offended party. The CA
rendered partial judgment DISMISSING the
instant petition with respect to respondent
Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino
Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, P/Sr. Insp.
Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of
the Ombudsman. Petitioner questioned the
CAs decision. Petitioner argued that Gen.
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141
Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were IN THE MATTER OF THE
included in the case on the theory that they, PETITION FOR CHANGE OF
as commanders, were responsible for the NAME. MARIO PABELLAR
G.R. No. 153883.
unlawful acts allegedly committed by their January 13, 2004
subordinates against petitioners.
Issue: Topic: Need for Publication for Court to
Whether the privilege of the writ of Obtain Jurisdiction
amparo is available to petitioner as against Doctrine: CONTINUED USE OF NAME;
respondents Gen. Hermogenes Esperon JUDICIAL AUTHORITY NOT NECESSARY
and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon based on WHEN PETITIONER HAS BEEN USING IT
command responsibility doctrine. SINCE CHILDHOOD; ALLOWED BY
Ruling: COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 142.

No. The proceeding for a change of name is

It may plausibly be contended that
command responsibility, as legal basis to
hold military/police commanders liable for
extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances,
or threats, may be made applicable to this
jurisdiction on the theory that the
command responsibility doctrine now
constitutes a principle of international law
or customary international law in
accordance with the incorporation clause of
the Constitution. Still, it would be
inappropriate to apply to these proceedings
the doctrine of command responsibility, as
the CA seemed to have done, as a form of
criminal complicity through omission, for
individual respondents criminal liability, if
there be any, is beyond the reach of
amparo. In other words, the Court does not
rule in such proceedings on any issue of
criminal culpability, even if incidentally a
crime or an infraction of an administrative
rule may have been committed.
Case Digested by: Aljalil E. Diego
RULE 103 CHANGE OF NAME
PUBLICATION AND CONTENTS OF PETITION
a proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to hear and
determine the petition for change of name
is acquired after due publication of the
order containing certain data, among which
is the name sought to be adopted, a matter
which should be indicated in the title of the
petition
Facts:
Petitioner Mario Pabellar was born
on November 11, 1937 at Lucena, Tayabas.
Presumably, no record of his birth in the
civil register is available for none was
presented in evidence. His record at the
Lucena Catholic Church shows that when he
was baptized on May 27, 1938 as the
illegitimate child of Teofila Pabellar with an
unknown father and paternal grandparents,
he was given the name Mario Pabellar. He
testified that his father is Esteban
Carandang who is married to Rufina
Marasigan. They were separated. She lived
in Batangas. Esteban Carandang took
Teofila Pabellar as his common-law wife
and lived with her in Lucena. The petitioner
has lived with his parents in Lucena since
birth. He has always used the name Mario
Carandang. Mario has always used the
surname Carandang in his official record

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and dealings and with other public
documents. His father urged him to see a
lawyer so that he could change his surname
from Pabellar to Carandang. On February 28,
1966 the petitioner filed the instant petition
for change of name. He used in the petition
the name, Mario Pabellar. The City Fiscal
opposed the petition on the grounds that
the change of name was not justified and
that since the petitioner is an illegitimate
child he has no right to use his fathers
surname. the petitioner merely indicated
therein his name, Mario Pabellar, but he did
not specify his supposed alias, Mario
Carandang, and the name which he sought
to adopt. And in the lower courts order
setting the petition for hearing, which order
was published, the cause for which the
change of name was sought was not stated.
The lower courts finding that the
petitioners name in the civil register of
Lucena is Mario Pabellar is unfounded
because, as above stated, no certified copy
of the entry in the civil register as to
petitioners name was presented in
evidence,It erroneously assumed that the
petitioners name in the civil register at
Lucena is Mario Pabellar although that
factum probandum was not established by
any factum probans. The Solicitor General
in this appeal contends that the petitioner
failed to show any reasonable justification
for the change of name and that there was
no compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements
Issue:
1. Whether or not the change of
name is proper
Ruling:
The change of name is devoid of
factual and legal justification. In the petition
for change of name, the only name that
maybe changed is the true and official
name recorded in the civil registry, a name
that was not proven by the petitioner. In
reality what the petitioner seeks is not the
change of name but the judicial authority
for his continued used of the surname
Carandang which use is allowed in
Commonwealth Act No. 142. A change of
name is a proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to
hear and determine is acquired after due
publication and the order containing certain
data.
In a petition for change of name
the title of the petition should include: (1)
the applicants real name, (2) his aliases or
other names, if any, and (3) the name
sought to be adopted even if these data are
found in the body of the petition. For the
publication to be valid and effective, the
published order should reproduce the title
of the petition containing the data already
stated and should contain correct
information as to (1) the name or names of
the applicant, (2) the cause for the change
of name, and (3) the new name asked for
In this case, the petition does not
contain the alias/es of the petitioner and
the name sought to be adopted. Thus, the
order of the court was defective and
deficient. The lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the proceeding.
Case digested by: Winona Mae M. Naive

142
2. Whether or not failure to include REPUBLIC v. REYES
aliases and the name to be adopted in the G.R. No. L-29850
title pf the petition for change of name is a June 30, 1972
fatal defect.

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Topic: Contents of petition
Doctrine: In a petition for change of name
the title of the petition should include: (1)
the applicant's real name, (2) his aliases or
other names, if any, and (3) the name
sought to be adopted even if these data are
found in the body of the petition. For the
publication to be valid and effective, the
published order should reproduce the title of
the petition containing the data already
stated and should contain correct
information as to: (1) the name or names of
the applicant; (2) the cause for the change
name; and (3) the new name asked for
Facts:
On October 18, 1967 petitioner-respondent
filed a verified petition for change of name
in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and
San Pablo City. Hermogenes Diangkinay
(petitioner-respondent) sought to change
his name to Rolando Deangkinay. The
evidence discloses that the name registered
in the local civil registrar of San Pablo City is
Hermogenes Diangkinay, however the
petitioner-respondent has since his
boyhood used Rolando Deangkinay on the
belief that it is his true name; the same
name which he has used in his official
record and dealings. The lower court
granted his petition. The fiscal in
representation of the Solicitor General
opposes the petition on the ground that the
same is not justified. The name which
appears in the registry is Hermogenes
Diangkinay; it is his official records and
Baptismal Certificate that should be the
ones corrected, in this regard the trial court
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
It is also noted that the name Rolando
Deangkinay did not appear in the title of the
petition, hence the failure to include such is
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non-compliance with the strict
requirements of publication that renders
the petition fatally defective and the court
has no jurisdiction to try the case.
Respondent argues that since the name
Rolando Deangkinay is not an alias, he was
therefore not obliged to place the same in
the title or caption of his petition
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is
correct in his argument that Rolando
Deangkinay having been not an alias should
not be necessarily included in the title of
the petition.
Ruling:
The name Rolando Deangkinay is
not an alias within the purview of
Commonwealth Act No. 142 known as the
Anti-Alias Law, it being the name by which
respondent was baptized and known since
childhood, but this of no moment. Such
name being admittedly the name sought to
be adopted, the same must be included in
the title of the p ti on. It is indeed a pity that
this flaw of jurisdiction exists, for its seems
quite fair and reasonable that the confusion
resulting from the variance between the
name used by respondent in all his activities
and transactions since childhood, including
many public records related thereto, in the
one hand, and the one appearing in his
record of birth, on the other, should be
avoided by allowing respondent to legalize
the name by which he has been known
since his infancy. We have stressed that
petitions for change of name being
proceedings in rem, strict compliance with
the requirements of publication is essential,
for it s by such means that the court
acquires jurisdiction. .
Case digested by: Winona Mae N. Naive
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143
HEIRS OF JESUS FRAN v.
HON. BERNARDO SALAS
G.R. No. L-53546
June25, 1992
Topic: Change of Name Not a Matter of
Right
Doctrine: The change is not a matter of
right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced
and the consequences that will likely follow.
Facts:
Elaine A. Moore filed a petition
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
praying that her child by a former marriage,
William Michael Velarde, be permitted to
change his name so as to read William
Michael Velarde Moore.
Petitioner is an American citizen
formerly married to Joseph P. Velarde, also
an American citizen, out of whose wedlock
a child by the name of William Michael
Velarde was born. The child was born on
January 19, 1947 at Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A.
The marriage of petitioner to
Velarde was subsequently dissolved by a
decree of divorce issued by the Superior
Court of the State of California on May 31,
1949. After said decree became final,
petitioner contracted a second marriage
with Don C. Moore on September 29, 1956
at Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and
thereafter the minor lived continuously
with the spouses up to the present time. He
was supported by Moore who has always
treated him with love and affection as if he
were his true father. In view of this
harmonious relation it is petitioner's desire
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that the minor be able to use the name
Moore after his family name Velarde
Issue:
1) Whether or not a minor may be
permitted to adopt and use the surname of
the second husband of his mother under
our laws;
2) Whether or not there are
justifiable reasons exist to allow such
change of name; and whether petitioner, as
mother of the minor, has the authority or
personality to ask for such a change.
Ruling:
1) No. The government provides that
the reason that our laws do not authorize a
legitimate child to use the surname of a
person who is not his father is because
Article 364 of Civil Code specifically provides
that legitimate children shall principally use
the surname of their father. Also, Article
369 of the same Code provides that in case
of annulment of avoidable marriage the
children conceived before the annulment
she principally use the surname of the
father, and considering by analogy the
effect of a decree of divorce, it concluded
that the children who are conceived before
such a decree should also be understood as
carrying the surname of the real father,
which, in this case, is Velarde.
Indeed, if a child born out of a lawful
wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of
the second husband of the mother, should
the first husband die or be separated by a
decree of divorce, there may result a
confusion to his real paternity. In the long
run the change may redound to the
prejudice of the child in the community.
Another factor to be reckoned with
is the fact that the child concerned is still a
 Liceo University Law
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minor who for the present cannot fathom
what would be his feeling when he comes
to mature age. If the time comes, he may
decide the matter for himself and take such
action as our law may permit. For the
present we deem the action taken by
petitioner premature.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed
from is affirmed. No costs
Case digested by: Ma. Alyssa D. Roa
144
PADILLA v. REPUBLIC
113 SCRA 789
Topic:The Rule in Changing the Name of
Minors
Doctrine: Our laws do not authorize
legitimate children to adopt the surname of
a person who is not their father. Article 364
of the Civil Code explicitly provides that
"legitimate children ... shall principally use
the surname of their father." To allow said
minors to adopt the surname of their
mother's second husband, who is not their
father, could result in confusion in their
paternity.
Facts:
Dolores Gemora and Vincent Co
were married in 1954. The union begot 5
children, namely: Michael, Abigail, Rafael,
Gabriel, and Annabelle. In 1960, Vincent left
the conjugal home and has since never
returned or visited his family. Because of his
continued absence, Dolores filed a petition
declaring Vincent an absentee, which was
granted by the court. In 1965, Dolores
contracted a second marriage with Edward
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Padilla. The five minor children, who had
been living with said spouses, were
generously supported by Padilla and were
treated by him with affection as if they
were his own children. This harmonious
relation existing between said minors and
their stepfather prompted Dolores Gemora
to file the instant petition for change of the
minors' surname from "Copuaco" or "Co" to
"Padilla", which petition was granted by the
lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not the 5 children
should be allowed to use the surname of
Padilla
Ruling:
No. Our laws do not authorize
legitimate children to adopt the surname of
a person who is not their father. Said
minors are the legitimate children of
Vincent Co and thus, Article 364 of the Civil
Code explicitly provides that "legitimate
children ... shall principally use the surname
of their father."
To allow said minors to adopt the
surname of their mother's second husband,
who is not their father, could result in
confusion in their paternity. It could
also create the suspicion that said minors,
who were born during the coverture of
their mother with her first husband, were in
fact sired by Edward Padilla, thus bringing
their legitimate status into discredit.
If a child born out of a lawful
wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of
the second husband of the mother, should
the first husband die or be separated by a
decree of divorce, there may result a
confusion as to his real paternity. In the
long run the change may redound to the
 Liceo University Law
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prejudice of the child in the
community. While the purpose which may
have animated petitioner, the minor's
mother, is plausible and may run along the
feeling of cordiality and spiritual
relationship that pervades among the
members of the family of her second
husband, there is a legal barrier which
cannot at present be overlooked or brushed
aside.
Apart from the legal obstacles
discussed above, We consider the instant
action taken by petitioner in behalf of her
minor children to be premature. Indeed, the
matter of change of their surname should
better be left to the judgment and
discretion of the children themselves when
they reach the age of maturity. If in their
adulthood they want to change their
surname, then they themselves or any of
them may take such appropriate action as
the law may permit. Petition dismissed
Case digested by: Ma. Alyssa D. Roa
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF
ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
Doctrine: The doctrine that disallows such
change of name as would give the false
impression of family relationship remains
valid but only to the extent that the
proposed change of name would in great
probability cause prejudice or future
mischief to the family whose surname it is
that is involved or to the community in
general
Facts:
This petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court stemmed from a petition for
correction of entries under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court filed by respondent Chule Y.
Lim with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao
del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 4933.
Respondent claimed that she was born on
October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City.
She alleged that both her Kauswagan and
Iligan City records of birth have four
erroneous entries, and prays that they be
corrected.
First, she claims that her surname Yu
was misspelled as Yo. She has been using Yu
in all her school records and in her marriage
certificate. Second, she claims that her
fathers name in her birth record was
written as Yo Diu To (Co Tian) when it
should have been Yu Dio To (Co Tian).

145
REPUBLIC v. Third, her nationality was entered as
CHULE Y. LIM Chinese when it should have been Filipino
G.R. No. 153883 considering that her father and mother
January 13, 2004 never got married. Only her deceased
father was Chinese, while her mother is
Topic: SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; Jurisdiction Filipina. She claims that her being a
as to the Sale of Decedents Property and registered voter attests to the fact that she
the Complaint for Rescission of such sale is a Filipino citizen. Finally, it was
erroneously indicated in her birth certificate

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that she was a legitimate child when she
should have been described as illegitimate
considering that her parents were never
married because the latter had a prior
subsisting marriage contracted in China.
On February 22, 2000, the trial court
granted respondents petition. So, The
Republic of the Philippines appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial courts decision
Issue:
W/N CA erred in ordering the
correction of Respondents citizenship from
Chinese to Filipino even though the
respondent never demonstrated any
compliance with the legal requirements for
election of citizenship.
W/N CA erred in allowing
respondent to continue using her fathers
surname even though she is an illegitimate
child.
Ruling:
1.To the first issue, the court ruled in
the negative. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry. The proceedings under said
rule may either be summary or adversary in
nature. If the correction sought to be made
in the civil register is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to
be adopted is adversary.
Republic failed to cite this error
amounts to a recognition that this case
properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court considering that the
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proceeding can be appropriately classified
as adversarial.
Moreover, the republic erred in its first
assignment of error in relying with the
constitutional requirement of electing
Filipino citizenship when she reached the
age of majority as this applies only
to legitimate children. Hence, it does not
apply in this case since the respondent was
concededly an illegitimate child. By being
an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino
upon birth.
To the second issue, the court ruled in
the negative. The Court of Appeals did not
allow respondent to use her fathers
surname. What it did allow was the
correction of her fathers misspelled
surname which she has been using ever
since she can remember. In this regard,
respondent does not need a court
pronouncement for her to use her fathers
surname. Moreover, while judicial
authority is required for a change of name
or surname, there is no such requirement
for the continued use of a surname which a
person has already been using since
childhood.
Case digested by: Angela N. Honor
146
SISON v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-58087
December 27, 1982
Doctrine: The proceedings were not
summary, considering the publication of the
petition made by order of the court in order
to give notice to any person that might be
interested, including direct service on the
Solicitor General himself.
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Facts: on the Solicitor General. However, the state,

This Petition for Review on
certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXIV, dismissing an Amended
Petition (Sp. Procs Case No. 8934) for
correction of surname in records of birth.
Antonio eloped and married Gloria
Ibarra, he used the surname "de la Cruz" in
the Marriage Contract. The couple begot
two children, herein petitioner. Their births
were recorded under the family name "de
la Cruz". However, when they were
baptized their surnames were stated to be
"Sison". They became known to relatives
and friends by such names. Their mother
Gloria, now works as a nurse in Detroit,
Michigan, U.S.A. It appears that when the
minors were to go to the States to join their
mother it was discovered during the
processing of their travel papers, that their
surname in their birth registry was "de la
Cruz".
Antonio, the petitioners late father
was one of the two children of Gertrudes
Reyes with her first husband Aurelio Sison,
whom she married in 1931. Antonio was
born on May 10, 1935. Gertrudes was
married thrice. She married her second
husband Laurencio de la Cruz in 1942. Her
third husband is now Jose Delgado
On February 6, 1979, petitioners,
assisted by their grandmother, Gertrudes
Reyes, as they were minors, submitted an
Amended Petition to respondent Court for
correction of their surnames from "de la
Cruz", as entered in their respective Birth
Certificates, to "Sison".
The Trial Court issued an Order
setting the case for hearing. Copy of this
Order was served on the Civil Registrar and
through the Solicitor General, filed an
Opposition alleging that the corrections
requested were substantial or controversial
in nature and that the summary procedure
for correction of entry in the Civil Registry
under Art. 412 of the Civil Code in relation
to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined
to mere clerical errors or harmless or
innocuous changes.
Trial Court denied the Petition on
the grounds raised in the Government's
opposition. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration was similarly denied.
Hence, the instant recourse
Issue:
W/N The trial court erred in denying
herein petition because the corrections
requested were substantial or controversial
in nature and that the summary procedure
for correction of entry in the Civil Registry
under Art. 412 of the Civil Code in relation
to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined
to mere clerical errors or harmless or
innocuous changes.
Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative.
Petitioners have proved that their correct
surname is "Sison". It was error for their
father, Antonio, to have entered "de la
Cruz" as his surname in his marriage
contract and in the Birth Certificates of his
children, for, at the time of Antonio's birth
on May 10, 1935, his mother was then the
wife of Aurelio Sison, whom she had
married in 1931. Antonio's father was
Aurelio Sison. Although at the time of his
marriage in 1962, Antonio's mother was
then the wife of Laurencio de la Cruz, whom
she married in 1942, our laws do not
authorize legitimate children to adopt the

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surname of a person who is not their father.
It could be that Antonio used "de la Cruz" to
hide his real Identity abuse of his
elopement. That has given rise to the
confusion which is now being sought to be
clarified.
Procedurally, the only way by which
a name can be changed legally is by
appropriate proceeding under Rule 103;
that is, through a petition for Change of
Name, since a person's legal name is what
appears in the civil register, not the name
by which he was baptized or by which he
has been known in the community.
However, as in San Roque v. Republic, 23
SCRA 444 (1968) the petition in this case
may well be one for judicial authority to
change names, for the petition prays for
"correction of names" 3 and more
specifically for an order "to make the
necessary corrections in the respective
certificates of birth of petitioners by
registering their names therein as Danilo
Sison y Ibarra and Josephine Sison y Ibarra."
In this case, the proceedings below
were not summary pursuant to the rulings
in the Matias, which case has also been
invoked by petitioners. Therein, we ruled:
The proceedings were not summary,
considering the publication of the petition
made by order of the court in order to give
notice to any person that might be
interested, including direct service on the
Solicitor General himself.
Therefore, the sates contention is
not applicable in this case. .
Case digested by: Angela N. Honor

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