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Stultitia and Diatribe:
Erasmus' Praise of Prudence
VICTORIA KAHN
349
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Erasmus' Praise of Prudence 350
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Erasmus' Praise of Prudence 351
Thus while Erasmus writes that it would be harmful to assert the ab-
sence of free will, Luther claims that this assertion "is not irreverent,
inquisitive, or superfluous, but essentially salutary and necessary for a
Christian" (p. 116). For the skeptic who is uncertain, it may be possible
to argue on both sides of a question and to suspend one's judgment (p.
105), but "the Holy Spirit is no skeptic" (p. 109). Furthermore, if as-
sertions are necessarily part of Christianity, then any assertion to the
contrary will also be an assertion. Thus when Erasmus argues that it is
not necessary to know that which it is impossible to know (whether or
not we have free will), Luther points up the assertion consequent upon
Erasmus' skepticism: "contrary to your natural bent, and with an asser-
tion unprecedented for you, you declare that those things are not neces-
sary; whereas, unless they are necessary and known with certainty, then
neither God, nor Christ, nor gospel, nor faith, nor anything is left, not
even of Judaism, much less of Christianity" (p. 114).9
But Luther does not simply object that skepticism about free will is
itself a kind of assertion. He also argues against Erasmus' attempt to
separate pedagogical exhortation from the act of cognition, or the per-
suasive from the cognitive function of language, on the grounds that the
impossibility of persuasion is undermined by the skeptical assertion of
the impossibility of knowledge:
But when you tell Christians themselves to become
reckless workers, and order them not to be inquisitive
about what they can and cannot do in the matter of ob-
taining eternal salvation, this is beyond question the
truly unforgiveable sin. For as long as they are ignorant
of what and how much they can do, they will not know
what they should do; and being ignorant of what they
should do, they cannot repent if they do wrong; and
impenitence is the unforgiveable sin. This is what your
moderate Skeptical Theology leads to. (p. 116)10
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352 VICTORIA KAHN
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Erasmus' Praise of Prudence 353
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354 VICTORIA KAHN
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Erasmus' Praise of Prudence 355
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356 VICTORIA KAHN
II
Most readers of the Encomium agree that the work falls roughly into
three parts of uneven length. Each of these sections has something to tell
us about prudence; the problem for the reader is to determine the rela-
tionship of these sections to each other. In the first Folly appears as an
amiable goddess and rhetorician who praises her followers and the natu-
ral and social forms of accommodation which constitute society. It is at
the end of this part that she humorously redefines the prudent man as
"the fool, who is never restrained from any undertaking whatsoever,
neither by modesty (because he has none), nor by danger (to which he
pays no attention)" (p. 42). As most critics have noted, this redefinition
gains a kind of seriousness when Folly proceeds to criticize the common
definition of prudence as good judgment. At first the famous description
of human affairs in terms of the Sileni of Alcibiades (pp. 42-43) suggests
that a single reversal of terms will enable us to determine the contents
of the box, the truth of the figure, or the true form of prudence. It sug-
gests, in short, that it is possible to read the Encomium as Enchiridion.
But Folly's concept of figuration or indirection is complicated both by
the subject of accommodation and by the further analogy she introduces
to clarify her point:
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Erasmus' Praise of Prudence 357
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358 VICTORIA KAHN
In recalling us to the natural folly of the first section, the analogy be-
tween the Christian and the simpleton suggests momentarily another
principle of structural and semantic unity: if not prudence then the natu-
ral and supernatural rejection of prudence. But a few pages later even
this analogy between Christian folly and natural folly is revealed to be
merely apparent. The natural fool, at least as he is portrayed in the first
part of the Encomium, is a slave of his bodily needs and passions, while
the pious man "flees from whatever is related to the body and is car-
ried away in the pursuit of the eternal and invisible things of the spirit.
Hence, since these two groups are in such utter disagreement on all mat-
ters, the result is that each thinks the other is insane-though that word
applies more properly to the pious man than to ordinary men, if you
want my opinion" (p. 136).1' The madness of the Christian fool, who
strives to contemplate and enjoy "things as they really are" (p. 133),
sounds remarkable like the umcompromising position of the (Lutheran)
critic of prudence whom Folly describes as a "raving lunatic" (p. 44).
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Erasmus' Praise of Prudence 359
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360 VICTORIA KAHN
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Erasmus' Praise of Prudence 361
III
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362 VICTORIA KAHN
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Erasmus' Praise of Prudence 363
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364 VICTORIA KAHN
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Erasmus' Praise of Prudence 365
This is what the Louvain theologian Dorp accuses Erasmus of. See Erasmus' reply,
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366 VICTORIA KAHN
? See Alfons Auer, Die vollkommene Frommigkeit des Christen, nach dem "Enchiridio
militis Christiani" des Erasmus von Rotterdam (Dusseldorf, 1954), p. 83.
" Deus est, cuius voluntatis nulla est causa nec ratio, quae illi ceu regula et mensu
praescribitur, cum nihil sit illi aequale aut superius, sed ipsa est regula omnium (WA
p. 712).
' Et quis tibi fecit potestatem aut ius dedit, doctrinae Christianae locis, personis, tempo-
ribus, causis, alligandae, cum Christus eam velit liberrimam in orbe vulgari et regnare.
Non est enim verbum Dei alligatum, ait Paulus, et Erasmus verbum alligabit? (WA,
p. 628)
6 Prudenter sane definitio a te nuda ponitur, nec ulla eius particula (ut mos est aliorum)
declaratur, quod naufragium non unum forte veritus sis (WA, p. 662).
? Sic loqui deberet, qui Deum vivum imaginaretur nihil esse nisi levem et imprudentem
aliquem rabulam in aliquo suggesto declamantem, cuius verba liceat, si velis, quorsum
libuerit, interpretari, acceptare, refutare, secundum quod viderit impios homines illis
moveri vel affici (WA, p. 631).
8 Neque difficile est, ut, homo cum sis, scripturas aut patrum dicta, quibus ducibus te
credis scopum tenere, neque recte intelligas, neque diligenter satis observes, quod satis
monet illud, quod nihil asserere, sed contulisse te scribis. Sic non scribit, qui rem penitus
perspicit et recte intelligit. Ego vero hoc libro NON CONTULI, SED ASSERVI, ET
ASSERO, ac penes nullum volo esse iudicium, sed omnibus suadeo, ut praestent
obsequium (WA, p. 787). This pun is pointed out by the editors of LE, p. 28.
9... contra ingenium tuum assertione inaudita iudicas, ea non esse necessaria, quae
nisi necessaria et cognita certo fuerint, nec quicquam reliquum est, ne ludaismi quidem,
multo minus Christianismi (WA, p. 610).
'o At cum Christianos ipsos iubeas temerarios operarios fieri, et in salute aeterna paranda
incuriosos esse mandas, quid possint et non possint, hoc plane peccatum est vere irre-
missibile. Nescient enim, quid faciant, dum ignorant, quid et quantum possunt, Igno-
rantes autem, quid faciant, penitere (si errent) non possunt. Impenitentia autem pecca-
tum irremisibile est, atque hoc ducit nos tua illa moderata Sceptica Theologia (WA,
p. 613).
" WA, vol. 7.97.23. See LE, p. 110 (WA, pp. 606ff.).
" Si enim causam liberi arbitrii non necessariam scitu, nec ad Christum pertinere arbitra-
ris, recte loqueris, At impie tamen arbitaris. Si vero necessarium arbitraris, impie
loqueris, et recte arbitraris (WA, p. 604).
3 Irreligiosum (inquis), curiosum et supervacaneum est nosse velle, an voluntas nostra
aliquid aget in iis, quae pertinent ad aeternam salutem, an tantum patiatur ab agente
gratia. At hic dicis contra, Esse pietatem Christianam, Eniti totis viribus, et sine
misericordia Dei voluntatem non efficacem esse. Hic plane asseris voluntatem aliquid
agere in iis, quae pertinent ad aeternam salutem, dum eam fingis enitentem, At
rursus patientem, dum sine misericordia dicis inefficacem, licet non definias, quatenus
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Erasmus' Praise of Prudence 367
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368 VICTORIA KAHN
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Erasmus' Praise of Prudence 369
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