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Monist
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MATHEMATICAL EPISTEMOLOGY: WHAT IS THE QUESTION?*
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MATHEMATICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 47
... for X to know that S is true requires some causal relation between X and the
referents of the names, predicates and quantifiers of S. ([141, p. 671 )5
... it is a crime against the intellect to try to mask the problem of naturalizing the
epistemology of mathematics with philosophical razzle-dazzle. Superficial wor
ries about the intellectual hygiene of causal theories of knowledge are irrelevant
to and misleading from this problem... ([14], pp. 125-126)
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48 PENELOPE MADDY
denial of the first premise. Yet, speaking for myself, I think work of this sort
is of value regardless of the ultimate fate of the causal theory of knowledge. I
share Hart's deep and undiagnosed uneasiness, the feeling that there is an im
portant epistemologica! problem for the Platonist which is independent of the
usual argument for UT.
Clearly the question needs reformulation. There is an important
epistemological problem for the Platonist which is closely related to the pur
ported causal inertness of mathematical entities, but which is not adequately
captured by the usual defense of UT. I will approach the reformulation of the
question from two angles: first, by the examing the developments in
epistemology since the introduction of the causal theory to see why it was dis
carded and what has taken its place, so that the requirements of general
epistemology can be assessed, and second, by reexamining the positions of
Benacerraf and Hart in hope of isolating the source of the aforementioned
uneasiness.
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MATHEMATICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 49
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50 PENELOPE MADDY
... an account of our knowledge of medium-sized objects ... will involve, causal
ly, some direct reference to the facts known, and through that, reference to the
objects themselves... other cases of knowledge can be explained as being based
on inferences based on cases such as these . . . this is meant to include our
knowledge of general laws and theories, and, through them, our knowledge of the
future and much of the past. ([ 1 ], p. 672)
Still, in the base clause, he is requiring both causality and object participa
tion. In his discussion of Godei, he may back off a bit from the first of these,
but not from the second:
. . . what is missing is ... an account of the link between our cognitive faculties
and the objects known. In physical science we have at least a start on such an ac
count, and it is causal. ([11, p. 674)
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MATHEMATICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 51
Granted just conservation of energy . . . you must not deny that when you learn
something about an object, there is a change in you . . . such a change can be ac
counted for only by some sort of transmission of energy from, ultimately, your
environment to, at least proximately, your brain. And I do not see how what you
learned about that object can be about that object (rather than some other) unless
at least part of the energy that changed your state came from that object... this .
. . leaves unexplained how our beliefs could be about energetically inert objects.
(?141, p. 125)
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52 PENELOPE MADDY
sort, but they are not likely to appeal to the Platonist. A common formula
tion of Platonism is that mathematics is the science of mathematical entities
just as physical science is the science of physical objects. Here the feeling is
that mathematics and physical science are similar structures, interrelated in
various important ways without one being subservient to the other. This
science/mathematics analogy is of central importance to Godei, who traces
it in turn to Russell. (See [8], pp. 212-13.) It is a profound assumption about
the nature of mathematics.
I suggest that the source of Benacerraf and Hart's two additional re
quirements, the source of the oft-mentioned uneasiness about Platonistic
epistemology, is not a general epistemological principle descended from the
causal theory, but this underlying assumption about the nature of
mathematics itself: the science/mathematics analogy. If mathematics is
parallel to, not a theoretical adjunct to, physical science, then not all its
claims are inferentially justified; some must fall, as some do in physical
science, under the base clause. Furthermore, in physical science the reliable
mechanism of the base clause is ordinary perception. Though reliabilism does
not require it, this is the paradigm case in which the object of belief par
ticipates in the production of that belief. Thus, if mathematics is to be the
science of mathematical entities, the reliable mechanism of the mathematical
base clause should involve the object of belief (perhaps causally); it should be
"perception-like." Here is the second additional requirement.
The situation could be described like this: the epistemological challenge
to Platonism comes not from Goldman, but from Grice. A new argument for
the UT might be defended along the following lines:
(1) mathematical entieies are causally inert
(2) the causal theory of perception
(3) Platonism involves the science/mathematics analogy
Therefore,
(4) Platonism is untenable.
(Note that this is not the old argument for the UT because it is not claimed
that the conclusion follows from general epistemology and (1) alone.) This
new argument has several weaknesses. First, as the Quine/Putnam position
shows, (3) is false. Second, even if science and mathematics are analogous
structures, even if both enjoy both "perception-like" and theoretical justifica
tions, it is not pre-determined how far this analogy must extend. Perhaps, as
Benacerraf hinted in a passage cited earlier, the mathematical base clause
mechanism could be "perception-like" without being causal. And finally, as
with the old argument, premise (1) is debatable.
These considerations indicate that arguments for the UT based on the
purported causal inertness of mathematical entities need more defense than
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MATHEMATICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 53
they have yet been given, even if the inertness premise is granted. A more in
teresting and important suggestion, though, is that the underlying source of
the persistent uneasiness about Platonistic epistemology comes not from
general epistemological considerations, but from a strong assumption about
the nature of mathematics: the science/mathematics analogy. Platonism?
the view that mathematical entities are the subject of mathematics and that
its statements are true or false depending on their properties?can be main
tained ? la Quine/Putnam without assuming this analogy. Even if the argu
ments for the UT are defused once and for all, the task of describing a
perception-like base clause mechanism remains for any Platonist making this
assumption.
It might well seem that the best course for the mathematical Platonist
would be to jettison the scienceTmathematics analogy. Some reasons against
this have already been mentioned: the desire to remain true to mathematical
practice and to avoid calls for mathematical reform. I personally would
recommend retaining the assumption of a science/mathematics analogy for
two further reasons. First, a Quine/Putnam style dependence on the in
dispensibility of mathematical entities for science leaves the Platonist
vulnerable to arguments to the effect that few (see [3]) or even no (see [5|)
mathematical entities actually must be postulated for scientific purposes.
And second, I agree with Godei; I think the assumption is true.
Penelope Niaddy
University of Illinois
at Chicago
NOTES
* I have benefited from conversations with Richard Foley, Aron Edidin, and Paul
Benacerraf. (Naturally this should not be taken to mean that they, especially the last
mentioned, agree with my way of putting things.) This paper grew from comments on
Kim [15] and Resnik [ 19), and an abstract appeared as my [16]. Versions have been
read at the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, the University of Notre Dame,
and the 1982 Western Division APA meeting in Columbus, Ohio. I have Miss Stein to
thank for my title.
1. The term "PfeUonism" is often used in the philosophy of mathematics for any
position which holds that the subject matter of mathematics is a realm of
mathematical entities existing independently of human thought, and that
mathematical statements are true or false depending on the properties of these en
tities. Lumping all such positions together masks a myraid of differences concerning
the nature of those entities, but I will bow to common parlance here and use the
blanket term.
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54 PENELOPE MADDY
2. For example, Field |5|. See especially p. 98. The references cited there give
further supporters of this position.
3. See, for example, Steiner |20|, especially chapter 4, and Kim 115|. I have also
contributed to this side of the debate in ( I7|.
4. I should emphasize that Benacerraf s conclusion is only that Platonism is not
compatible with the current best epistemological theories. Many philosophers have
taken this as an argument against Platonism (see those cited in n2), though it is oc
casionally taken to count against the current epistemological theory (see Burgess |2|,
pp. 100?01). I will be considering the argument presupposed by the first group.
5. Benacerraf has suggested (in conversation) that the talk of semantic machinery
in this quotation is irrelevant. He now agrees with Goldman's version which takes the
required connection to be between the believer and the fact that makes S true. The ob
jects of belief become involved when one further assumes that the fact that makes S
true is determined by the referential structure of S.
6. I'm assuming here that perceptual beliefs about medium-sized physical objects
are not inferential. In doing so, I don't mind assuming that they are not inferred from
sense-data statements, or some such thing, but I don't want to rule out the view that
perception is a sort of "inference to the best explanation." (See 113|, chapter II.) But
even if perceptual beliefs are inferred in this way, they are not inferred from other
beliefs, but from states of our sensory apparatus. This is a special kind of inference; I
will use the word exclusively for inferences from beliefs to beliefs.
7. For example, even in a straightforward perceptual case, Fido's being a dog
doesn't cause light rays to be reflected into my eyes in such a way as to bring about my
belief that Fido is a dog, rather, it is various structural features of Fido that are
causally efficacious. (See [ 101, P- 785, 14). Whether or not this kind of consideration
should release Fido himself from his causal responsibilities is unclear. For the sake of
argument, let me assume that it would, that is, that in a reliabilist account of
knowledge, the extra knower genesis of the belief must be reliable, period. (See also
n8.)
8. Some newer versions of reliabilism suggest that processes can only be reliable if
they involve some sort of participation in a causal nexus closed to mathematical en
tities if they are indeed causally inert. The point remains that while the causal clause in
the original causal theory has come under considerable fire and is debatably absent
from its direct descendents, this seems not to have eliminated our worries about
Platonistic epistemology. I think an uneasiness about Platonistic epistemology re
mains if causal considerations are dropped from general epistemology entirely. But
even if they are eventually reinstated, I would contend that it is not they, but the
somewhat different considerations discussed in the next section, that make
philosophers of mathematics worry so much about the epistemological status of
Platonism.
9. A greater epistemological consensus could probably be reached if the
reliabilist's requirements were replaced by a more general one to the effect that beliefs
which amount to knowledge should not be arrived at "accidentally." Naturally there
are radical epistemologists who would even reject the extremely general "nonac
cidental" requirement. See |7|. I will stick to the formulation given in the text for the
sake of definiteness.
10. This line of thinking originated with Quine, but received its most Platonistic
formulation from Putnam in [18). Of course, Putnam's current views are somewhat
different.
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MATHEMATICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 55
REFERENCES
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