G.R. No.

L-64731 October 26, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, FIRST 'JUDICIAL REGION,
BRANCH XLV, URDANETA, PANGASINAN, and RODOLFO VALDEZ, JR., respondents.
Topic: Nature and Cause of Action

Facts:
Private respondent Rodolfo Valdez, Jr. is charged in Criminal Case No. U-3439 with murder.
After his arraignment, Rodolfo Valdez, Jr., thru his counsel, manifested orally in open court that
he was waiving his right to be present during the trial. The prosecuting fiscal moved that
respondent Rodolfo Valdez, Jr. be compelled to appear and be present at the trial so that he could
be identified by prosecution witnesses.
Hence, this petition for certiorari with prayer, among others, (1) that pending the resolution of
this case on the merits, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain respondent judge
from enforcing his Order dated April 15, 1983; (2) that said Order dated April 15, 1983 of
respondent judge be annulled and set aside and (3) that private respondent Rodolfo Valdez, Jr. be
compelled to appear during the trial of Criminal Case No. U-3439 whenever required to do so by
the trial court.

Issue:
Can he compelled by the trial court to be present during the trial?

Held:
Yes.
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, Section 19 thereof provides
SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.
It is the submission of private respondent that the above constitutional provision grants him
absolute right to absent himself from the trial of the case filed against him despite the condition
of his bail bond that he "will at all times hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of the
Court.
However, in Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2, et al., 63 SCRA 546, the late Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, clearly stated that "the
accused may waive his presence in the criminal proceedings except at the stages where
Identification of his person by the prosecution witnesses is necessary.
if allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceedings without giving the People's witnesses
the opportunity to Identify him in court, he may in his defense say that he was never Identified as
the person charged in the information and, therefore, is entitled to an acquittal.

G.R. Nos. 101216-18 June 4, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REDENTOR DICHOSO y DAGDAG,
SONIA DICHOSO y VINERABLE and JAIME PAGTAKHAN y BICOMONG, accused.
Topic: Nature and Cause of Action

Facts:
Accused Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag appeals from the 11 June 1991 Decision of Branch 30 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City in Criminal Case No. 6711-SP (91) and
Criminal Case No. 6712-SP (91) finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
15, Article III and Section 4, Article II, respectively, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A.
No. 6425). According to the accused-appellant Redentor Dichoso, the said accusation of illegal
possessionof dangerous has been framed up or planted evidence. Aside from that, he contends
that the searchwarrant is a general warrant which does not satisfy the particular offense which he
violated, and thesearch conducted was unconstitutional and the items obtained inadmissible.

Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is valid

Held:
Yes. The articles seized by virtue of its execution may be admitted in evidence.
In Olaes vs. People:
We have examined the search warrant issued in the instant case and find it does
not come under the strictures of the Stonehill doctrine. In the case cited, there was
a bare reference to the laws in general, without any specification of the particular
sections thereof that were alleged to have been violated out of the hundreds of
prohibitions contained in such codifications. There is no similar ambiguity in the
instant case.

While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection
with "Violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972," it is clearly recited in the text thereof that 'There is probable cause to
believe that Adolfo Olaes alias "Debie" and alias "Baby" of No. 628 Comia St.,
Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their possession and control and
custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other
regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the
offense stated above." Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act
is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have
been committed as a basis for the finding for probable cause. The search warrant
also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the
description to be made of the "place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized."

A.C. No. 407 August 15, 1967

IN RE ATTORNEY JOSE AVANCEA, respondent.
Topic: Nature and Cause of Action

Facts:
Jose Avancea, a member of the Bar, was charged with falsification of public document before
the Court of First Instance of Manila. The trial court also found that he took advantage of the law
profession in committing the crime of falsification of public document to defraud his clients.

Issue:
Is Avancena guilty of falsification of public document?

Held:
Jose Avancea has committed the crime of falsification of public document against his clients
with grave abuse of confidence, having been found guilty thereof by final judgment of competent
jurisdiction. His acts amount to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office as an attorney, which
constitute grounds for removal from office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, not
to mention conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude.

G.R. No. L-45667 June 20, 1977

MANUEL BORJA, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (Branch VI) and HON. ROMULO R. SENINING, Judge of the City Court of
Cebu (Branch I), respondents.
Topic: Nature and Cause of Action

Facts:
Manuel Borja, who was accused of slight physical injuries, was not arraigned. This
notwithstanding respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in abssentia and thereafter,
in a decision promulgated on August 18, 1976, found him guilty of such offense and sentenced
him to suffer imprisonment for a period of twenty days of arresto menor. It was alleged that the
failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned.

Held:
Yes.
The plea of petitioner to nullify the proceedings had in the criminal case against him finds
support in the procedural due process mandate of the Constitution. It requires that the accused be
arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to
face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full
opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. Moreover, the sentence to be imposed in such
a case is to be in accordance with a valid law.
Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly arraigned. As noted,
it is at that stage where in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first
time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative
that he is thus made fully aware of Possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the
nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the
prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that purpose.

G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO PRIETO (alias
EDDIE VALENCIA), defendant-appellant.
Topic: Nature and Cause of Action

Facts:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After pleading not
guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to
counts 4, 5, and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with
reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. Two
witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any single detail. The
court found him guilty to all counts except 5 and 6 of treason complexed by murder and
physical injuries.

Issue:
Whether the two-witness rule was sufficiently complied.

Held:
NO, it was not sufficiently complied.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed to corroborate
each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it.

G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006

MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO, Respondents.
Topic: Nature and Cause of Action

Facts:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 presents the core issue whether there was
a valid substituted service of summons on petitioner for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction.
Petitioner Manotoc claims the court a quo should have annulled the proceedings in the trial court
for want of jurisdiction due to irregular and ineffective service of summons. On July 15, 1993,
the Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz,
an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit mentioned earlier.
On October 19, 1993, petitioner, by special appearance of counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted
service of summons. The grounds to support the motion were: (1) the address of defendant
indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place
of business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz),
who was found in the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; (3)
the procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted service of summons was
ignored; (4) defendant was a resident of Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this
case would be ineffective and futile.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners constitutional right to travel was violated.
Held:
No. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendants voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to
the courts jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, "any judgment of the court
which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void." In an action strictly
in personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by
handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable reasons,
cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be
resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, "it is extraordinary in character
and in derogation of the usual method of service." Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply
with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, "compliance
with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due process
as of jurisdiction."

G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN
PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE
PONCE, Respondents.
Topic: Nature and Cause of Action

Facts:
Petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash
the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment
for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

Issue:
Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings

Held:
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information. It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not."
Petitioners conviction in the case of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries
bars his prosecution in criminal reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property.

G.R. No. L-12990 January 21, 1918

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LAZARO JAVIER, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.
Topic: Right of Confrontation

Facts:
Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of October 22, 1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in
his corral situated in the barrio of Trapiche municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas. On
the following morning when he went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral
open and that the carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a
patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa, now deceased, on the 20th of
November following, encountered the accused Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido
de Chavez leading the carabao. When the ladrones saw the Constabulary, that scattered in all
directions. On the following day, the Constabulary found this carabao tied in front of the house
of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The carabao was
identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken from his corral on the night of
October 22, 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of the accused.
The foregoing statement of the facts and the law disposes of all but one assignment of error,
namely, that the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit B of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit
B is the sworn statement of sergeant Presa, now deceased, whose signature was identified, before
the justice of the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. Appellant's
argument is predicated on the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says, "That in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face,"
and the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), which says that "In all
criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial by and to
cross-examine the witnesses against him."

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners right to have the opportunity cross-examine the witness has been
violated.

Held:
Yes. The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under circumstances
which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The proviso of the Code of
Criminal Procedure as to confrontation is therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not
the testimony of a witness deceased, given in a former action between the same parties relating
to the same matter.
With such a resolution of this question, we could, as has been done in other cases, further find
this to be reversible error and remand the case for a new trial. We are convinced, however, that
this would gain the accused nothing except delay for the testimony of the owner of the carabao
and of the two Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on behalf of the
accused, is deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. L-59318 May 16, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN,
defendant-appellant.
Topic: Right of Confrontation

Facts:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the
accused Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan in Criminal Case No. 61029 guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 2(i), Article I of the Republic Act No.
6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44 and further amended by P.D. No. 1675, and imposing upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of May 3. 1981, while P/Lt. E. Mediavillo and P/Sgt. A.
Linga were on routine patrol along Taft Avenue, they had seen and observed one MALCON
OLEVERE y NAPA, acting suspiciously near the corner of Estrada Street. The police officers,
after identifying themselves, stopped and frisked the suspect and found in his possession dried
marijuana leaves. The police officers thereafter placed Malcon Olevere under arrest. Upon
investigation, suspect Olevere declared that he bought the recovered marijuana leaves from one
ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN, alias "Balanchoy"
During the custodial investigation, suspect Malcon Olevere executed a written sworn statement
implicating the accused-appellant Rogelio Ramos as the source of the marijuana leaves. The
accused, after having been duly apprised of his constitutional rights, verbally admitted before Lt.
E. Mediavillo and Sgt. A. Linga the commission of the offense charged. He likewise admitted
that he sold to Malcon Olevere the marijuana leaves for P10.00.

Issue:
Whether there is competent and/or admissible evidence in the record to justify the conviction of
the accused-appellant Ramos

Held:
We find petitioner's case meritorious. The lower court erred in admitting as evidence the written
sworn affidavit of Malcon Olevere. It can be gleaned from the records that Malcon Olevere
executed the written sworn statement declaring that appellant Ramos sold to him the marijuana
leaves for P10.00. This piece of evidence is a mere scrap of paper because Malcon Olevere was
not produced in court for cross-examination. An affidavit being taken ex-parte is often
incomplete and inaccurate. Such kind of evidence is considered hearsay. The constitutional right
to meet witnesses face to face in order not to deprive persons of their lives and properties without
due process of law is well-protected in our jurisprudence.
The oral testimonies given by the witnesses for the prosecution prove nothing material and
culpable against the accused. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General not anyone of the
three witnesses presented testified on the basis of their personal knowledge that the appellant
sold the marijuana leaves to Malcon Olevere.
G.R. No. L-68566 April 15, 1985
ALEX COMBATE, petitioner, vs. THE HON. GERONIMO R. SAN JOSE, JR., Municipal Trial
Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Magarao-Canaman, Camarines Sur, respondent.
Topic: Right of Confrontation

Facts:
In this Petition for Certiorari, filed with the assistance of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office
(Naga City), petitioner-accused seeks to annul respondent Judge's Decision in Criminal Case No.
1915 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Magarao-Canaman, Camarines Sur, convicting him
of Theft, on the ground that it was rendered in violation of his constitutional rights.
The records disclose that petitioner was charged before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Magarao-Canaman, Camarines Sur, presided by respondent Judge, with the crime of Theft of
"one (1) Rooster [Fighting Cock] color red, belonging to Romeo Posada worth P200.00."
On June 5, 1984, petitioner was subpoenaed to appear before respondent Judge and was
arraigned without the assistance of counsel.

Issue:
Whether or not petioners constitutional rights have been violated

Held:
The Petition is highly meritorious. The Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases applies
only to criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged does not
exceed six (6) months imprisonment or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both.
In the case at bar, since petitioner-accused had pleaded not guilty, trial should have proceeded
immediately. But not only was petitioner unrepresented by counsel upon arraignment; he was
neither accorded the benefit of trial. Respondent Judge based his judgment of conviction merely
on the affidavits submitted, without the petitioner having been even given the chance to confront
or cross-examine the affiants. There being a clear deprivation of petitioner's fundamental right to
due process of law, the assailed Decision should be set aside. When judgment is rendered in
complete disregard of all norms of procedure, the whole proceeding in question is completely
void, and the case should be remanded for trial and proceedings strictly in accordance with law.
Considering that the judgment is void, it is as if there were no judgment at all and no double
jeopardy attaches.

G.R. No. 120468. August 15, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOPE LIWANAG y
BUENAVENTURA, SANDY SIMBULAN y GARCIA and RAMIL VENDIBIL y CASTRO,
accused.
Topic: Right of Confrontation

Facts:
Accused-appellant Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura, and his co-accused Randy Simbulan and
Ramil Vendibil, were charged with the crime of highway robbery with multiple rape. the above-
named accused, armed with an icepick, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, rob and divest from
the complainant, Corazon Hernandez y Delfin the amount of P60.00; That on the occasion
thereof, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and each of them
mutually helping and aiding one another and by means of force and intimidation, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously one at a time have carnal knowledge of the said
complainant, inside the Levitown Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, against her will and
consent; that accused Randy Simbulan y Garcia, who is allegedly 14 years old, has acted with
discernment in the commission of the offense; and that the aggravating circumstance of that
means employed or circumstance brought about which add ignominy to the natural effect of the
act where one of the accused, by means of force and intimidation, caused the victim to suck his
penis made the effect of the crime more humiliating to the victim, attended the commission of
the offense.
During the arraignment, all of them pleaded not guilty to the charge. Accused Randy Simbulan
and Ramil Vendibil were earlier released on recognizance, and were later ordered rearrested for
their failure to appear at the scheduled hearings. However, the warrants for their arrest were not
implemented. The trial court found appellant to be guilty. Aggrieved by the trial courts decision,
accused-appellant interposed the instant appeal assigning as an error to the trial court erred in
convicting accused-appellant notwithstanding the fact that he was deprived of his constitutional
right to effective and competent counsel, and, consequently, other constitutional rights afforded
an accused. As a consequence, accused-appellant claims that from the time he was arrested up to
the time of his conviction, he was deprived of his other constitutional rights, particularly his right
to be secure in his person against unreasonable searches and seizures, his right to preliminary
investigation, and his right to bail.

Issue:
Whether accused-appellant was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard by
himself and counsel.
Held:
No. The records show that at the start of the proceedings before the trial court, accused-appellant
was represented by counsel de officio, Atty. William T. Uy of the Public Attorneys Office. In the
middle of the trial, accused-appellant retained the services of counsel de parte Atty. Bienvenido
R. Brioso, replacing Atty. Uy. After the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction, Atty.
Brioso filed the Notice of Appeal on behalf of accused-appellant. Atty. Brioso, however, failed to
file the appellants brief because of the refusal of accused-appellants mother to transmit the entire
records of the case to him. Thus, accused-appellant was required to manifest whether he still
desired to be represented by Atty. Brioso in this appeal. Upon accused-appellants failure to reply,
Atty. Francis Ed. Lim was appointed counsel de officio.
There is no dispute that accused-appellant was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted
him during the arraignment and conducted the cross examination of all prosecution witnesses as
well as his direct examination. Thereafter, from the time he was cross-examined up to the
presentation of other defense witnesses, he was assisted by a counsel of his choice.

G.R. Nos. L-75511-14 March 16, 1987

AGUSTIN V. TALINO, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Topic: Right of Confrontation
Facts:
The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate informations with estafa
through falsification of public documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud the
government in the total amount of P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs claimed to have
been undertaken, but actually not needed and never made, on four government vehicles, through
falsification of the supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments. These cases were tried
jointly for all the accused until after the prosecution had rested, when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro
Macadangdang and petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were allowed. They then
presented their evidence at such trials, while the other accused continued defending themselves
in the original proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat gave damaging testimony against the
petitioner, relating in detail his participation in the questioned transactions. In due time, the
Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang
Ulat and Renato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while absolving
the other defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is now challenged by the petitioner
on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution.

Issue:
Was the petitioners right to confrontation violated?

Held:
No. The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to
the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and
must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be
made against his back or in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made
anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must
shroud their spite in secrecy. We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that
the respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting the petitioner.
The part of that decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all but confined itself
to the petitioner's own acts in approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the
plot to swindle the government.
The petitioner makes much of the statement in the Comment that the petitioner's guilt could be
deduced "from the evidence for the prosecution and from the testimony of Pio Ulat," but that was
not the respondent court speaking. That was the Solicitor General's analysis. As far as the
Sandiganbayan was concerned, the said testimony was inadmissible against the petitioner
because he "did not cross examine Ulat and was not even required to be present when the latter
was testifying. In fact, the respondent court even expressed the wish that Ulat had been presented
as rebuttal witness in the separate trial of the petitioner as there would then have been "no
impediment to the use of his testimony against the other accused. As it was not done, the trial
court could not and did not consider Ulat's testimony in determining the petitioner's part in the
offenses.