Set E (marriage) case digests

1. Delgado Vs. Rustia

Facts:
Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio had a son named Luis Delgado. The marriage
between the two is contested. Later on, Felisa met Lucio Ocampo and lived together
without marriage and had 5 children, one of which is Josefa Delgado. Luis Degado, half-
brother of Josefa married and had children. The Petitioners contested that Ramon and
Felisa never married, while the respondents posit that there was marriage between the
two. Because if they were married, Luis could not inherit from his half-sister being a
legitimate child, while his sister is illegitimate.

Meanwhile, Josefa met Guillermo and lived together. The fact of their marriage is also
contested on this case. Guillermo had an illegitimate child named Guillerma, and the
Josefa and Guillermo had an de facto adopted child (anak-anakan) named Guillermina,
but no legitimate child. After Josefas demise, Guillermo filed a petition to adopt
Guillermina but he died pending such.

After the death of both, the daughter of Luis filed for administration of the estates of the
spouses, being an heir. This was opposed by the sisters, and heirs of the brother of
Guillermo, further, also by Guillermina.

A petition was also filed by Guillerma contending that she is the sole living descendant
of Guillermo.

Ruling:
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its
absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. 40 Once the presumption
of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence
need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to
strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa
Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, 41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, 42
the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to
Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia
married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of
marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered
by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations
and statements contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Senorita")
civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact
married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they
hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common
rules of law and propriety. Semperpraesumiturpro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate
children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between
 them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another
illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be
allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this,
however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only
of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions
between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under
consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between
illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are
illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all
stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood
relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers
and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters
should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either
of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood,
except Luis Delgado, her halfbrother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they
may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa
Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil
Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be
exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. 54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives
of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers
and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September
8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child 58 of Guillermo
Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an
admission or recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an
acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on
February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is
compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more
or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or
mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. 63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition
through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and
second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child
from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did
not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled
acknowledgment through the courts. 64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory
acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the
putative parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no
 longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma's right to claim compulsory
acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma's second ground) must likewise fail. An
authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or
indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public
instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his. 67 Did intervenor's report
card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado's obituary prepared by
Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately
not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo
Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor's parent/guardian holds no
weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses
testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa
Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that
published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could
have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in
the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper
clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to
intervenor's claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was
never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by
Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter's death.
We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal
stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab
intestato.
Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the
remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews

2. Anonuevo vs. Jalandoni

- Rodolfo Jalandoni died without issue and the letters of administration was given to his
brother.
- The petitioners herein can be traced as follows:

Isabel & John

Sylvia (predeceased Isabel)

Petitioners
- Petitioners contend that Isabel and Rodolfo were married showing marriage certificate
between the two
- Respondent contends that if there was a marriage between Rodolfo and Isabel, such
marriage is void because it is bigamous as Isabel was married with John whom they
had Sylvia as evidenced by Birth certificate of Sylvia that she is legitimate daughter of
the married couple.
- Petitioners contend that such was only a practice to hide disgrace. And no marriage
certificate between the two
Ruling:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. 47 Jurisprudence teaches
that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate.48 Hence, even a person's birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.49
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent
evidence of marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it
contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married"
and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child. 50 In clear and categorical language, Sylvia's
birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws,51 the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They
are presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they
can, and will, stand as proof of the facts attested. 52 In the case at bench, the petitioners
and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.
The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvia's birth certificate
as untruthful statements made only in order to "save face."53 I hey urge this Court to
take note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of
marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court
cannot countenance.
The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other
evidence, do not diminish the probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the
petitioners would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and
conclude therefrom that the usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the
petitioners would themselves argue that the document on which they based their
interest in intervention contains untruthful statements in its vital entries.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves
which, properly appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously
married to John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such marriage
had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that
Isabel's prior marriage was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has
interest in the estate of Rodolfo
3. Van Dorn vs Romillo
Facts:
- Petitioner and Respondent (US Citizen) were married in Hongkong and had 2 children.
- They filed divorce in Nevada
- Petitioner remarried in Nevada
- Respondent filed that the Shop in Manila (petitioners business) is conjugal
- Petitioner contended that during their divorce in Nevada, he acknowledged that they
had no community property
Ruling:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States
of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American
citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any
State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and
binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage
The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband
without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party,
as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.

4. Garcia vs Recio
Facts:
- Recio was married to Editha, an Australian Citizen.
- The marriage was divorced in asutralia
- Recio Became an Australian citizen.
- Petitioner married Recio, and the certificate contained that Recio was single and Filipino
- they separated without a prior dissolution of marriage and conjugal assets were divided
in Australia
- Petitioner filed for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy and claimed
that she had just learned of the prior marriage between Recio and Editha
- Recio claims that Petitioner had known since 1993 of the previous marriage
- Recio filed for divorce in Australia

Ruling:
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee[20] petitioner argues that the divorce
decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only
upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the
alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish
these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of
the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was performed
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document -- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no
further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidenced30! A
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence
of a judgment is the judgment itself.!31! The decree purports to be a written act or record
of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested!33! by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court. [35]- However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to
the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. [36]-
The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification.!37! Hence,
it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners
failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the
Family Court of Sydney, Australia.!38!
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.Australian marital laws
are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
 In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The
first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in
full force.[45] There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured
by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or

provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes
and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may
be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground
of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage
only after proof of good behavior.
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court,
which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on
the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court.
A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to
marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license

5. Amor-Catalan vs CA
Facts:
- Petitioner and Respondent Orlando married and became US Citizens
- Their marriage was divorced.
- Orlando then married Merope in 2 months
- Petitioner filed against the 2 contending that Merope has a prior subsisting marriag with
one Eusebio
- She also filed declaration of nullity of marriage against the 2

Ruling: , the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to
refute or contest the allegation in respondents' brief, that she and respondent Orlando
were American citizens at the time they secured their divorce in April 1988, as sufficient
to establish the fact of naturalization and divorce. 17 We note that it was the petitioner
who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that
respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. 18 It is settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 19
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage.
But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a
vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves
the bond in full force.20 A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner.21 However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws.22
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on
the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the
divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law
may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute
However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the
national law of Orlando, does notrestrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be
correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any
interest nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other
might subsequently contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no
existing interest in Orlando's subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any
defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of
Orlando and Felicitas. x x x26
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest27 and must be based on a cause of action
6. Bayot vs Bayot
Facts:
- Vicente and Rebecca (amercan Citizen) were married
- They had a child named Alix
- A divorce decree was obtained in Dominican Republic
- Rebecca filed for Nullity of marriage and for support in the RTC
- Rebecca claims that she is a Filipino citizen and that she was issued a certificate
(spurious) and a Philippine passport

Ruling:
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from
the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at
least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22,
1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United
States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of
Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through [381
their Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was
rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on
March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding inGarcia v. Recio that a foreign
divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven
[39]
as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the
fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and
that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the [401
Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the
foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by
force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6,
1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate
the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996.
For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured
abroad would come within the pale of the countrys policy against absolute divorce, the
reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained
the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 ofhere is a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
1. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebeccas underlying petition before the RTC,
Vicentes motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition thereof, with the documentary
evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that
the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
 [50]
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. With the valid foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine
no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
7. Remo vs Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Facts:
- Petitioner is a married woman who has a passport.
- Upon application for renewal, she wants to have her passport named in her maiden
name
- The secretary of foreign affairs denied the request as her circumstances does not fall
under the law on issuance of passports when a married woman may be allowed to
revert her name back to her maiden name.
Ruling:
Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the
husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of
[13]
the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided
in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from
continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman
marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this
interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames
indicate descent/444
In the present case, petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting and who opted to use
her husbands surname in her old passport, requested to resume her maiden name in
the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from using her maiden
name.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
argues that the highlighted proviso in Section 5(d) of RA 8239 limits the instances when
a married woman may be allowed to revert to the use of her maiden name in her
passport. These instances are death of husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of
marriage.
The Court notes that petitioner would not have encountered any problems in the
replacement passport had she opted to continuously and consistently use her maiden
name from the moment she was married and from the time she first applied for a
Philippine passport. However, petitioner consciously chose to use her husbands
surname before, in her previous passport application, and now desires to resume her
maiden name. If we allow petitioners present request, definitely nothing prevents her in
the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husbands surname. Such
unjustified changes in ones name and identity in a passport, which is considered
superior to all
[22]
other official documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and
inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. Thus, for passport issuance
purposes, a married woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage subsists, may not
change her family name at will.
THE ACQUISITION OF A PHILIPPINE PASSPORT IS A PRIVILEGE. THE LAW
RECOGNIZES THE PASSPORT APPLICANTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
TRAVEL. HOWEVER, THE STATE IS ALSO MANDATED TO PROTECT AND
MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE PASSPORT AND TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS
PROCEEDING FROM IT1231 AS A PHILIPPINE PASSPORT REMAINS AT ALL TIMES
THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE HOLDER IS MERELY A POSSESSOR
OF THE PASSPORT AS LONG AS IT IS VALID AND THE SAME MAY NOT BE
SURRENDERED TO ANY PERSON OR ENTITY OTHER THAN THE
GOVERNMENT OR ITS REPRESENTATIVE
[T]he issuance of passports is impressed with public interest. A passport is an official
document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries. It is issued by the Philippine government to its citizens requesting
other governments to allow its holder to pass safely and freely, and in case of need, to
give him/her aid and protection
8. Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas
Facts:
- Petitioner was a Filipino citizen and became a Canadian citizen
- Petitioner married respondent and later left the Philippines
- Upon return, he found out that his wife was having an affair
- He obtained a divorce decree in Canada
- He wanted to have a second marriage and registered the divorce decree, but was
denied by the registrar saying that the decree must first be acknowledged before the
Philippine courts to be binding here.
Issue: whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.
Ruling:
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer
[23]
married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or
I241
her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
[251
severing the marital bond
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only
the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code;
the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that
this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In
other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments
rendered by a tribunal of another country.[28] This means that the foreign judgment and
its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.
 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his
claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not
kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the
registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of
persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices
the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also
divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law
and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees
registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign
divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and
without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert.
The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as
MU
the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment
can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
9. Carlos vs Sandoval
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages
solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to
March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment
Facts:
-Spouses felix and Felipa died intestate and was survived by their children Teofilo and
petitioner
- prior to their deaths, parcels of land were transferred by felic to teofilo in order not to
pay estate taxes.
- And the intention was for Teofilo to transfer thereafter 3 of the parcels to petitioner
- Teofilo died and was survued by his wife, felicidad and Teofilo II. On whos names the
land was registered.
- There were then partitions of the land.
- In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo
and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor
the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Ruling:
- The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of
judgment disallowed.
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful
right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated
by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties.
The State should have been given the opportunity to present
[15]
controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.
. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of
the Civil Code.
General Rule: Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.Such petition
cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.
Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of
the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.[17] (Underscoring
supplied)
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in
a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
[19]
spouse filed in the regular courts.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the
Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective
on March 15, 2003[20] is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in
[21]
Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, ' viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of [24]

its celebration. ' But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be
construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such
person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or

[25]

injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Elsewise
stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes
collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased

[32]

precludes succession by collateral relatives. ' Conversely, if there are no descendants,

ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral

[33]

relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.

 If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek
the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This i s so,
considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire successional right
over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and without

ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other
siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate
of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the
New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the
subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.

We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect
the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
(Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is

the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of

the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her

child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.

10. Ablaza vs Republic

Facts:

-Petioner filed a declaration of absolute nullity of the marriage of his late brother
Crescencio and Leonila for being executed without a marriage license

Ruling

, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but
is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the
Family Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a
stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage
remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force
[81
 at the time of the marriage ceremony.

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15,
2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil 91
Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages
covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a
procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only
101
to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC;
and

2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and,
those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties
to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances, the effect
of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is
as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage
may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any
time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and
upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as
non-existent by the courts. It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that
on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment
to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of
either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the
same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. Here, the petitioner
alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir. Assuming that
the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the
estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit.
Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of
succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the
conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.

Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a

surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate

children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like
r 18i
the petitioner from succeeding to the deceaseds estate. Necessarily,
therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination
of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or
illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresencianos surviving heir.
Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon
involves questions of fact.
 As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in
this case. We reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if
any, may not be prejudiced.

Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila,

who, as the late Cresencianos surviving wife, [19] stood to be benefited or prejudiced by
the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all
marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required
a marriage license for their validity; [20 hence, her participation in this action is made all the
more necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a
marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined
herein.

11. Bolos vs. Bolos

Facts:
- Cynthia filed for petition for annulment of marriage against Danilo based on the ground
of psychological incapacity
- RTC granted on the ground of psychological incapacity of BOTH Cynthia and Danilo
- Upon certiorari to the CA, the CA granted his motion, stating that the motion for
reconsideration as a pre-requisite to an appeal under A.M No. 02-11-10-SC did not
apply in this case as the marriage was solemnized on Feb 14, 1980, before the family
code took effect

Ruling:
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. 7 The rule sets a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil
Code.8
 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner's interpretation that the phrase
"under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather
than to the word "marriages."
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner's motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the
said motion for reconsideration is nonextendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co.,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13

The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible. The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises
vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.

12. Dino vs Dino

Facts:
- Alain and Maria Caridad were childhood sweethearts and lived together from 1984 to
1994. And back again on 1996, and were married
- Petitioner filed for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity that the failed to give love and support to her family, and instead go on
shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted their family assets.
- Futher, was violent and would hurt him
- He later found out that respondent had filed a divorce against him in the US and married
alcantara
- A psychologist found that she was suffering from narcissistic personality disorder and is
incurable.
- Trial court granted the motion and held that their marriage null and voud and dissolved
their property regimes

Issue: The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties' properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Rulling:
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties'
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment

of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
 The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage,
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. 7 Article
147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the coownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture
shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. 9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in
Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio
or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. 10

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common
children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement
judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.

The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice
the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both
of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of
annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only
to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not
apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code,
which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the
parties.
 Article 40, "Ttlhe absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on thebasis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void." Thus we ruled:

x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for

purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a
previous marriage void.11

Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning,
marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court
in an action for annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages
are governed either by absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of
gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a
need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment
could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 15 of
the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-
ownership

we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court's decision
without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties
under Article 147 of the Family Codeo

13. Weigel vs. simpio-dy

Facts:
- Karl asked for the declaration of nullity of his marriage against lilia due to the ground
that lilia had a prior existing marriage against Eduardo maxion
- Lilia admitted the existence of such prior marriage but claimed that the prior marriage
was void due to force.
- Trial court granted the motion and denied lilia to present evidence in her favor

Ruling:
 There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be
void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since
no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was
still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is
VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of
her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though
void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time
she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
14. Enrico vs. heirs of sps. Medinacelli
Facts:
- Eulogio and trinidad were married on 1962 and begot 7 children (respondents).
- On May 2004 trinidad died.
- On august 2005, eulogo married lolita
- Eulogo died on February 2005
- The respondents filed for nullity of marriage of Eulogo and lolita because of the absence
of the marriage license, that Lolita dn eulogo could not have been mbeen living together
as husband and wife for 5 years since Trinidad dried just 3 months before the marriage
of Lolita to eulogo.
- Lolita contended that they have been living as husband and wife for 21 years openly
and publicly.
- Trial court dismissed case for lack of cause of action stating that only the husband and
wife can file for nullity of their marriage by virtue of AM np. 02-11-10-SC promulgated on
march 15, 2003
- The decision was reversed based on the ruling thatwhere either or both of the parties
are deceased, heirs may file a petition.

Ruling:
While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition
for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the
death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the
impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. The Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine the
validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in
[23]
effect at the time of their celebration. What we have before us belongs to a different
milieu, i.e, the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to
Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:

Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines.
 Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is
not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in
the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in
a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.

15. Republic vs. CA and Molina

Facts:
- Roridel filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Reynaldo on the ground of
psychological incapacity
- After a year, they had a son and reynald showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility
as a husband and father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and
friends where he squandered his money, depended for his parents for aid and
assistance, and that they were incompatible from the start.
- Trial court and ca granted the motion
- Solicitor general intervened contending that the appealed decision tends to establish in
effect the most liberal divorce procedures.

Ruling:
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity .
. . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability

Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise

constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must
be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
 The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could
nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem;
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being
"conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation
is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation."
It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert
evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,
such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation
of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
 difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and
apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal
of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

16. Republic vs. Nolasco

Facts:
- Nolasco was a seaman and he met parker in England
- They married upon reaching antique
- Nolasco left for work as a seaman, leaving parker with his parents
- He received a letter on 1983 from his mother that parker gave birth to a son, and that
 she left antique.
- Nolasco sent letters to the place where he met parker but was returned.
- He also asked with their friends but was unfruitful
- He filed for petition to declare presumptive death on 1988
Ruling:
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing
wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple
hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there which is in effect what
Nolasco says he did can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any
information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent 17 too
convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the
loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were
all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under
unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had
inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not
identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the
prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of
evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not
synonymous with credibility
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for
maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to
satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary
contract.