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Philosophy 144 Logic and Philosophy

Spring Semester, 2016


Topics of the Course

Through the development of symbolic logic in the early part of this century, it was shown
that all known mathematics can be framed in rigorously described axiomatic systems, in
which the principles of deduction are laid out formally. Such axiomatic systems can then be
studied in a mathematical way as systems of signs, in order to yield results about
mathematics-as-a-whole. This study is called metamathematics, and forms the central
subject matter of the course.

We start by looking at some background to the formalization of mathematics, and at basic


notions about formal systems. We then examine in detail a particular axiom system called
Peano Arithmetic (PA), which formalizes all the basic laws of number theory, using just
seven axioms beyond those of general logic. We use PA as our primary example in proving
Gdel's First Incompleteness Theorem:

No consistent axiom system can capture all the truths of arithmetic.

That is, we show first that PA, if consistent, cannot capture all the truths of arithmetic. But
Gdels method for proving this is generally applicable: it also shows that no way of
strengthening PA can, if consistent, capture all the truths of arithmetic. This most
important result shows limitations of formalization. It is the crux of the course. Gdels
method of proof is subtle, powerful, and fertile. (For example, it is a core idea of theoretical
computer science.) Remarkably enough, his method is also constructive: it gives a procedure
for finding, given the specification of an axiom system, an arithmetical truth that cannot be
proved in that system, if that system is consistent. We shall go carefully through the
Gdels proof, analyzing it closely in order to frame different ways of conceptualizing the
central argument. We then go on to prove further results about provability in formal
systems, the most important of which is Gdel's Second Incompleteness Theorem:

No consistent formal system can prove that it is consistent

That is, no matter how many principles you assume, you can never establish by those
principles that those principles do not lead to contradiction (unless, of course, they do lead
to contradiction, in which case they can prove anything).

From issues of provability we move to issues of truth, examining the results of Alfred
Tarski. We prove his negative result: the notion of truth for a formal language cannot be
defined by the means available in that language. This result can be easily obtained using
Gdels method. We also examine his positive result, which shows how truth for a formal
language can be defined, but in a stronger formal language. The relations between truth
and provability will also be considered.

Our final technical topic will be the notion of computability. We shall examine two ways in
which that notion can be made mathematically precise, due to Alan Turing and to Gdel
(Turing machines and recursive functions). We apply these precise definitions, along with
Gdel's method, to show undecidability results, such as:

Church's Theorem: there is no computational procedure that determines,


given any formula of arithmetic, whether that formula is provable from
the usual axioms; and there is no computational procedure that
determines, given any formula of arithmetic, whether that formula is
true.

Church-Turing Theorem: there is no computational procedure that


determines, given any schema of first-order logic, whether that schema is
valid.

Further undecidability results concerning computational procedures themselves will also be


proved, such as the Unsolvability of the Halting Problem for Turing Machines: there is no
computational procedure that determines, given any Turing Machine program and any
input, whether the machine produces an answer on that input..

These results and methods have philosophical consequences, especially about the nature of
mathematics and our knowledge of mathematics. We shall discuss these philosophical
issues as we go along. It has also been claimed that they have broader philosophical
implications for epistemology and philosophy of mind. We conclude the course by surveying
such more expansive claims and attempting to assess them.

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