, Radical Pailrepl, a. + (Spry 1173) Richard Turner ‘The concept ‘dialectical reasan', a8 used by snaraist! theorists, contains buried vithin it 3 sunber of theoretical problems, probiees whieh have Significance for where why and how we may use dialect eal reason. There ave thcen issues, in particular, on which reflective clarity is both always needed ana Often lacking. Firstly, what precisely distinguishes "dialectical reason’ fon" ‘analytical reason’? Secondiy, how dots one Legitivise the use of dialect eal reason = that in, are there ‘lave’ of dialectical Feason, Row are they discovered, and eo what way they be applied? “Tnirdly, given that the central concept of dialectics 43 that S€ "totality" and that tt is therefore assumed that the observer’ ig always part of the totality being observed, how, if at all, does one escape fron historical Felativise? It is these problens thar Sartre is dealing wies in The Critique of Dialectical Reason." This inportant contribution co the understanding of dialectic has not been widely aiscussed in EngtisnsLanguage circles, and there are certainly many ‘dialecticians’ who have’ nor yet internalised it.” So it seens to me to be Useful fo give a brief accourt of che Introduction to the Cretique, in shich he formulaees the problen of the limits and the applicability of dialectical reason This involves a critical discussion of orthodox sarnism, and in partitolar of its epistemological basis, and of the "dogeatic metaphysics’ of the dialectics of nature. Sartre poines aut that the concept of 3 Gnified and overarching dialectic of nature with its deterministic and/or veieological taglications, tends to destroy the specificity of hunaz Nistory, and leads fo Engels showing us. ‘sen being produced by the svsvez Without making us see the system being produced by wen, dnd reducing intermanan one tise ta being no more chan S'fynbolic expression of the contradictions of the sconony! (situations ¥IT p.l5) Tf human nistory 4s to be wade the result of the working of a universal lav of process, it becomes impossible to justify, in the materialist philosophy, one's clain fo know that this tz in fact the case. For since ay thoughts are a part of the world ay clais to know gust itself be a result of the process, just Like any other ides, Unless T can show some way in hich my statenent could be independently verified, by pointing to sone sort of ausonoay Econ external Ristorical geterainisa, Cesnnot claim chat st is true. Hence the importance of the ‘methodological principle which makes certainty begin with reflection." (GD-@4 $0). T have to start off from the veflectively Aiscovered fact that it is I who am doing vhe thinking, nd trying £0 discover the truth, and that any theory which In’ principle denier me this sutonony contradicts [ts om basis. The abfficulty wich thls aethodo logical principle {# that it sometimes gets confused with an Geological principle to the effect that aind or idea (i'tnore real! than matter, and so results in an idealist philosophy in which onty se€lective knowledge Finds a place, and the breakthrough into the “outside world’ never gets wade. So Sartre stresses that such Whethodologieal principle 'in no way contradicts the Sachropological principle which defines the concrete person by BiB materiality’. (RD-GM 30) Considering the dialectic of nature on a practical + Wenceforth referred to as AD. The First part: The Question of Method, will be referred fo as ROOM. 30 DIALECTICAL REASON level teads to an analogous recognition of some sort of individual autonomy. for a materialist dialectic the Future is real and personal and urgent. The individual {2 involved tn it through hts choices, and zo, even if it cold be shown that inorganic nazure Wolke daiectically, s¢ would still be necessary €0 Show independent ly the way in which the projects of individuals interlock co create the historical dialectic. Ie 45 this that Sarcre is trying to do in the seieique, Briefly, he does it by showing that 4 free Sctivity is by nature dialectical, and that in the world of scarcity this dialectic loses itself in the phenonena of ‘alienation’ and of ‘serial praxis, and So becones subject to a wecessity of wich it ts Htselr the origin. It Ls thus possible to speat of patterns of nistarical development without postulating that these patterns are the expression of lars external tovand independent of hugan behaviour, oF that they derive fos sone hasan essence Mistorieally speaking, Marx and Enges's material - sm began as a theory abalt the relations Between the Individeal, the world in shich he produces his weans OF subsistense, mis felloes, with show Re enters into Specific relationships in Ais productive activities. Gnd the social, political and ideological forms which Grise on the basis of enese relationships. This theury was then sel ay an interpretative Cool for the study of social forns and historical changes, ané ust Very fruitfully. However, at some point it seems €o have ocurred to then that they had only staced this theory, and had sot gcoved st by showing, from an account OF the mature of the intividuals whe he 1 elated fo the world in this particular vay. "so they Sor, rather, essentially Engels, 15 the "Anté-OUhring’ Sn in Isdwig Fevertack and the ond of classical Geraan philosophy ~ tacked on the theory of the "Gialectic of nature’ to fill in the gap. Sartre argues (a) that the implications of this theory are such chat it contradicts rather than comple~ iments che first theory; (b) that Marx and Engels Jo. not Social analysis; and (@) that Bs om account of "weing human’ 10 fact does provide an ale quate Foundation for their historical «tear The Introguetion t0 the critsque of Dialectical Reason is Giviced ists Pare A's ‘Dageatic Olalectic and Eriticat Dialectic! and Pare B- ‘Critique of Critica? Experience’. p these to sections Sartre attacks the Inadequate theoretical Foundations of the dogeatic Gialeceie ane shetches out the form which the attempt to provide sore adequate foundations must take. "is vo! major criticisms are: (1) that a philosophical theory aust at the very least justify its om existence, lana this Mistoricat aateriatin has failed to Jo "This totalising thought has founded everyching except Ht5 own existence™ (AD 112); (2) that the necessity of the Ines of the dialectic 12 either téken for granted of else ‘proves’ enpirienty, both of which are in adequate approaches; and that no attempt is made to explain why the Ines of the dialectic are as thev are (2) knowledge is universal, fe alvays involves an excape from the partiqilar, fom the immediate given This raises a problen: "Thought is both Deing and Knowledge of being.” (RO 122). true statement 13 Both a thing in the world, a gateieutar face, and als9 a truth about the world. Ne have to account’ for this dual status, and in partiouiar ve have to sake surethat any theory we are putting forvard does not deny one or the other of these aspects of thaughe. lege) reduces being co thought, Marx establishes against Hegel that "being Feaains irreducible to knowing" (ho 121). "due he appears to fail to establish that autonomy of Enowitg. which is Recessa¥y-t5 Justify Ms Sun eTais ts ErowTedpe? "Oaistless “dlalectical {aIisa has, in regard to contenporary ideologies, tical superiority of being the ideology of the Fising clase, aut Lf Le was only the siaple inert Expression of this ascension, or even of revolutionary praxis, if if gid not turn round on it ro illusinate ty how could one_speak of a progress in becoming, conscious? Wow guid the dialectic be, presented as the FeaT aiveneht of History revealing itself." (RO 123) ‘he enue paterialist of contenporary marsists sens fo accepe that their theory is "the simple inert expression of ehis ascension". Out at the sane tine they claim their theory to be universally true, This is dogmatic idealism ~ "an idealist materialism which ty basteally nothing wore than a discourse on the (dea of aatter®. (RO 126). This type of theory ends up “giving wan a constituted reason, that 13, making of thought a fora of behaviour rigorously conditioned by the world (which it is), while omitting to tell us that IUAg also knowledge of the vorié™. (RD 127) (2) Sartre quotes Engels' account of the “nost general Tavs of natural and social history": "They can be reduced essentially to three: The Law of the transform ation of quantity into quality and vice-versa The Law of the interpenetration of opposites The Law of the negation of the negation AIL three are developed by Hegel. in his idealist aanner 4% sinple lavs of thought... The mistake consists in Tnposing these aes on Nature and Mistory ar lavs of Sought, rather than deducing the las fron Nature and Nistory." (RD 127, Engels" words) He points cut hat these laut, if they are to be necessary, cannot be ‘deduced’ or ‘induced’ From ature by observation = "We know since Kant that experience Elves the fact but not necessity." (RD 150). further EF they are to be understood, rather than simply Stated, if is necessary that the relation between thea Shauld'be explained, which Engels does not even try 0 a. Before giving an account of Sartre's om solution so these problens I shall give a Srief schematic outline of what understand by the concept ‘dialectic Im our ordinary common-sense thinking we think of objects as separate, independent entities: Az Hegel pot it, the central logical category of this form of Enought is the category of identity. The thing is whac it is. it is distinct from other things. However. Further analysis reveals that the thing is in fact in relation with the rest of the universe: The desk that Tam writing on is only where ir is and what it is, because the rest of the universe has a certain configur- ation. If, say, the sun were suddenly to disappear the desk would cease to exist, as a dest, for one of the Factors which keeps it in'Sts present position and in ts present shape is the fact that it cocrises with the sun in a particular field of force. {f che sun were t2 be annihilated the nature of the field of Force would change. In a very iaportant sense the desk is its colations sith the rest of the universe. It is a specific, determinate, way of not being the rest of the universe. The Language aay be rather odd, Dut the thought is act. For what is seing implied is that to understand any particular thing we have £0 unravel the ways ia which wt is related to other things Ne have to treat it as an interdependent part of totality, rather than yr v self-sufficient Identity n Let me now attempt to state this with a little ‘nore rigour.” To speak of ialectical logic is to imply ‘that the *laws' of the dalectic are formal, rather than substantive laws. They are what. fant tems categories. "The statement "AIl events aust have a cause" is a formal law, in that it makes no attempt to specify the cause of any particular event. "Germs cause disease” is a subscantive lav, in that (t specifies the cause for a particular class of events If dialectical laws are laws of logic, they are of the first type. And only Lf they are formal laws can i be claimed ‘that they are also necessary. For expiric= ally discovered laws can never be necessary. TRey Must always be held open for possible falsification ‘The Laws of the dialectic are, then, an attempted formulation of those categories which necessarily have to be used in describing any totality or ole. Justifying the: application of these Laws theregore always involves two steps, (a) showing chat these categories are logically iaplied by the concept ‘total ty! and (b) showing that the phengmenon to which they are being applied 1s in fact a toality. For something to be experienced by ae it aust enter into sone relationship with we, and thereby also directly or indirectedly into soae relationship with all the other ‘things which I'pay or do experience, If there was something in this room which had no effect fon ae or on any other thing in the roos, then it would fot be meaningful to say that it was in'the room. Tt would be in a different universe.” fo say that something is'in the room is to say that it is in interaction with every other thing in the Foom. That is, for something to be experienced by at, it aust be part of a totality of which Tam myself 2 part. And the first lay of this Coralsty is the law of interconnectedness, oF what Engels here calls "The law of interpenstration of opposites. There are no polar opposites within a totality, no entities which can be understood other thin in cerns of their relations to other entities ut this interdependence is not undifferentiated 1€ every thing in the universe affected me in the Sane way a5 every ether thing affected ne then experience ‘ould collapse into total uniformity. The concept of nterconnectedness of things implies chat different things are connected in aifferent ways - that is chat Ghat is snvoived ta an interconnectedness of differant things, rather than a sinple Oneness. The totaitey Ts structured. To say it is structured is to sey that it Ey'aade up of substructures. “This fact Is formated in terns of a law of change. A substructure has a Felative independence, in that certain changes can Occur vithin se without affecting Its relationship to other substructures. llovever, if changes within it go beyond.a certain point, chen changes in its relations with'other parts can ensue, If changes have sceur res within these relations then the nature of the totality has changed. “It has becone a qualitatively different entity. “This is formulated in'the "lav of the trans: Formation of quantity into quality", Quantitative changes are changes within a substructure, changes whieh can occur Independently, but which if they go behond a certain Liste, change the qualitative nature of the structure ar a vhole So far ve have stem shat che individual is necessarily a part of 1 vovality of interconnected Sustructures." Our experience (s temporal ana therefore the totality of which ve are a pare 1s self topporal as well at spatiaiy dlachfonie-s well ae"Symehrontesiere'we anccunter 4 probleny te Stracture of a totality fa'a structure of Toeer” dependence. Causal relat iorships within a otaity fe. ticars egveay, father thon undinectionai. iy ‘hat sense, then, can the past and the future be pire Ea cotallty? For we usually soe the tonporl ‘ Sequence as'an uniairectionaleusal process» what happened in the past ts the cause of Ehat Cs happening font What is happening now Se the cause of whateille | farpen in the facure: foniy if we can shoe thae ene itive affects the present can oe Seaningteliy speak Sf 3 tenporal eorstiee mIt is here that we can Grau on Sartre's phenoneno- logical account of being human in Being and vorhingness,| where he shows chat human feality is temporally three Unensional.” Conseigusness is a project. The specific Sayin whlciarhiman reality interacts vith the whole Of which it is a part is by projecting a future and acting in teras of that future. That iz, consciousness snakes. temporality into a totality. "My present is ‘articular way in which ay past 1 oFgantaed in FeTstion to ay-futuce, The for“itself {3 ies past in tnevmode oF fot Geing it, In Vegelian terms, the for~ itself is the determinate negation of its pact. The tenoral law of totality ts the "Law of the negation of the negation". In dialectical temas 1 hRegation of a negation 15 an affirmation, and the Law fof the negation of the negation asserts (a) that change Occurs through a process of successive. ‘negations and (B) that the end Fesule 1s. an ‘affirmation’; oF poritive develoment in relation to the initial state. This only makes sense if the initial state is 4 tconselousness-worid’ totality. In such # totality change occurs chrough action, which is the negation of the given in terms of a projected future, Each action is inconplete and its result {2 inadequate in terms of the goal. It therefore has to be negated once more by a further action which gets a little closer to the goal Each negation is an affirmation in that it integrates, what is being negated into a new totality. Thus the Concept of the megation of the negation” it an attempt St a formal description of the aubiguous relationship which human reality has to its past and to tre natural Norid. "AS Marx wrote in the 1#th Srumaize of Louis Bonaparee: ‘Men nake thelr ovm history, but they do not aake it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by thenselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transaitted from the past.” (fucker, 437): That 15 they are both conditioned by their history and free to make somezhing few of their condition. They are both ina situation dnd free to give shat situation their own meaning. In the cricique Sartre describes this as "the perpetually resolved and perpetually renewed Contradiction of aan the producer and man he product” (0 158). Each new hunan’ transcendence dialect ically supercedes the previous historical given. ‘Thus the totality of which the experiencing (and hence acting) consciousness it a part is a structure of interdependent sunsystens in which develoment cakes place as a result of the ‘negating’ character of the experiencing consciousness itself: 1 began the analysis of the concept dialectic by pointing out that in the application of dialectical Togic ve had t0 know whether the class of events to which ie sas being applied vas in fact @ totality. ou Our explication of the concept has itself revealed one lence which aust be present in any process for it t2 be dialectical ~ the elewent of negation. Negation 53 part of the structure of the experiencing consciousness. Nature’, considerely completely independent o€ himan reality, is sot a diachronic totality. Me cannot s3Y that there is developaent in Nature, for nature is always simply what If 1s. States succeed one another: Only’ consciousness can relate thea to one another and evaluate them. te is therefore possible and legitinate to treat certain elements sf the totality “human reality ~ Nature" non-dialectically, “The changes of state inside a 'diseant star cannot of theaselves be subjected to dialectical analysis. It is only insofar as they ae experienced and integrated info an individual's con- sciousness that they becoae a pare of the process of development by changing both the ideas and eventually ‘the actions of a person in the world. Ie is important to notice here that the ‘categories’ of the dislectic donot have exactly the same Seacus a3 Kantian categories. For ant, the categories are applied to phenonena frou outsige by a ‘ngumenai' consciousness which does not seen £0 be itself in any way sart of the process, Here, however, the knoving consciausness {a itseif an integra! part of the dlatectical process.” Consciousness fs essentially creative action, rather than sinply observation, “me ave Sreterred frou dotng to knowing and Frew knowing £0 doing in the unity of a process ehich Cis) ies Gatectheats” GO 155) The intelligibility VF the di the fact that "the so-called ‘laws’ of dialectical Reason are each ali the dialectic: it could not be otherwise, oF else dialectical Reason would cease to be itself a dialectical process, and thought, a9 the praxis of the theoretician, vould necessarily be dis~ Continuous. ‘Thus the fundamental intelligibility of Aialecticai Reason - if st 4s to exist 19 that of a fotalisation. Or, to Feturn to the distinction between being and knowing, there is a dislectic if there crists, at least. in one ontological sector, a totalis- ation which totalises itself ceaselessly im its very Comprehension of the rotalisation from which Le Geanates and which sakes itself its ebject." (RO 137) lectic cones fron ‘Thus fully dialectical relations occur only in the husan world. Bit ve still need to. ask in precisely shat regions of the Minan world they occur. And this. is'Sarere's essential problem in the critique. The praxis of the individual is necessarily dialectical, Gnd each individual's personal history 45 4 dialectical whole. ‘40bevond this? Can we, as Marx does, treat secety. dnd the history of society a3 ‘dialectical wholes? ee Each individual consciousness is a totalising process. ut history 1s made up of millions of indi- Viduais totalising separately. If Marx's application of the dislectic t@ society is to be shown ta be valid, Me must be able to show that history 13, in sone sense tne single totalising process. Sartre formulates the problen as follows: Ie Se not a question of rewriting che tuman adventure, Dit rather of carrying Out the Grltical experience of connections of interiority, Gry in other terms, Of grasping in fespect of are, in the husan adventure, the respective roles Of ineeriority and of exterioriey? 1 in this total expetience, which is, if sum, that of ay “hole 1ife insofar as ie is dissolved in ail Ristocy, and of all Aistory insotar ax it 15 gathered 1p within a life, we show that the Felation of exteriority (analytical and positivist Fearon) is itself interiorised by practieal multiplications and that it only acts on them (ag an historical force) to the ereent that it Decomes internal negation of interiority, we shall Find ourselves aitsated by this research at the very heare of 4 totalisation in progress (RO 146-7) That is "we have seen that the universe vanishes ina drean if aan subeits to the dialectic fron outside as his unconéitional law; but if we imagine thar each Individual follows his ov vhins and thar these solecilar collisions produce collective Tevult, ve Shall find average or statistical results, but not & historical development.” (8D 131) If we are to understand history as a dialectical process, rather than az a mere succession of states, wemist, starting from individual prasis "follow with Care the thread of Ariadne which, frow this praxis, SII Lead us to the various forms of human ensenbles: tie must seek, in each case, the structure of these Ghrenbles, their real modes of formation fram their Glements, and then their tocalising action on the elements which have formed thea.” {80 153) ren ve describe social events are we doing any- thing other than describing the sun of a collection of atone behaviours?” When Marx speaks of ‘classes’ and Selaes-struggles* what does he mean? What does it sean to say of an individual that he or she belongs toa class, to speak of classes ‘struggling’, and co speak Se history ar the resule of the clare stroggle? One could trest the tera ‘class', of afy similar tem, in fone of three ways, (8) Te ie a mere mane - 2 word which can be used to classify people in a particular way, without Saying anything about tie felations between the people. This is the nominalist or "sardine-tin' Use = sardines in a tin have no relationship to fone another other than the fact of being inthe Sane tin, They are related externally, rather, than ineernaliy. It ia a real entity, and the individuals who wake up the class aze sieple by-products of the class ~ secondary and derived beings. ‘The class is not a real entity, but neither is it aaere nane. "Iz is ¢ set of Internal relatiots Between people, Marx, following Hegel, distin guished between a class-in-itself and 3 class- Fog-itself. The latter is a class in which che embers are reflectively conscicus of theaselves as" belonging to a class- In this case the Felations between then are necessarily internal Got if Marx's use of the term is to be justified we aust also be able to show that the relations between menbers of a elass-in-itself are internal. We must be able to show that even in this case the praxis of each aegber involves the totalisa~ flon'of his or herself as aenber of the class. Similarly, if ve are to speak of History, we must be able to shou that the totalising activity of each Individual praxis includes within itself a totalisation of all other praxes. Can ve steer between the ideas of Fistary as a super-human process, on the one hand, and history a6 3 meaningless and secidental succession of events on the other hand” In bath these cases. People re mere proaicts of the historical process, shether ie'pe super-husan or sushuaan. If we can steer between them, we coh show Row history sight become a completely self-conscious husan process, in which humans ean take control. Freedom is a cultural proaset, and unless this ean happen we shall have to Conclude that freedom only emerges by accident ve can clarify this problen ty looking at Sartre's concepts of inceiiigibiity and neceasiey.. "If dislect- {ea1"Reason exists, it must define eself as the absolute intelligibility of an irreducible novelty Insofar as this is irredicibly new. Tt is the opposite of the positivist attenpt 0 illuminate new facts by Feducing. them to. old facts.” (RO 147)-— For ‘analytical Fearon’ explanation consists in showing that sone new Shrerved event is an example of some previous ly hserved Class 1f events,” when Newton explained the, fal of the apple he merely pointed out that its fa Nas one parcitilar example of the way in which bodies ove in Felation to one asather, That isy in the Positive serences to explain an event is <0 show that fe'ts an exenplification of a particular descriptive generalisation. What do ve do if we find something Stevi "The tendency of the positive sciences 1s to Fe- Formulate the descriptive generalisation to show that ie'Ts noe gow in itself, that it-is noe qualitatively disterene fron what vas previously observed. AS a fesult of the Micnslaonslorlay experinest Einstein Fe- Eomulated Newton's generalssation fo include the Schavisur of bosiet approaching the speed. of Light, and Showed thereby that the resuit af the experiment was not soething radically nex, bus a phevonenan of 2 Class of which the phenawena which fot in accordance Sith Noweon's generalisation are also members: However, Sartre, apd all diaiectscal theorists, are arguing that Matorical ‘novelties’ are not of this Kind. As he shoved in Being and Nothingness, consciovsnes# Ts fFee, ahd this mean that it can ‘sew weaning: Co Situations in ita projection of Covande the Tutte. woran pricis is a continuous Envention of new aeanings, but these meanings are nevertheless intelligible to the actor. "This sive self B diatectical inceliigibility rests on the incelligi- bility of each new determination of practical totality, insofar as this determination 1s nothing other than the aaintenance and the Eotalising transcendence of all the anterior determinations , insofar as this transcendence and waintenance are illuminated by # totality to be reulised.” (RD 150) As Turite these words I'am creating something irreducibly new which 1s nevertheless only intelligible in tens of what 1 have already written Wy present weiting Bothasintains and Cranscends what Vhave already written. My present act enbodies the intelligibility (tome) of my past. Thar is, it is the determinate negation of ay past Sartre formlates this as follows: If the dialectic exists, ve must submit to it as the inmurmouncable rigour of the cotalisation thich totalises us, and grasp st in its free practical spontaneity az the tocalising praris hich we acer at each degree Of our experiment, we mist find, in the sntaliigipte unity of the Tooenetic movanent, the contradiction and the Todtstoluble link of necessity and freedon -s necessity as the apodictic structure of the Hidlectical experience 1ies neisher in tho trea Geveloment of interiorisy nor in the inert Glapereion of erteriority. Ie imposes ieselt, an inevitable and. iesedsceable moment, in che Ineeriorisation of the avterior and the 0 157) ‘Tne concept of ‘determinate negation* forsalises the guneral gelationship between freedon and necessity Surese's problen now ts'to spell out what is implied br this in the field of social felations. fo follow his srgoactt closely any further is inpossible within the TiSits of an articie, so I shall Just refer to ene central concept which he develops £0 handle the Tons betecen internal and external relations in Soclecy: this is the concept of she series. To say that history is purely sade up of internal relations {2 to imply that history is a ‘ovpercorganisn “ith a consciousness of {ts on. To say that history is'the arithaetical sims of purely external relations 35 to make it unintelligible. The concept of che deries, and of serial prasis, 15 designed to describe the "ay in which eeternal relations betreen people become interalised. To do this it ts necessary £0 Show that { always act in terns of any relacionships of externality which exist between ayself and other people, and that these relationships then become Uneernal relations of special kind = relatigns of inyotency. The market is of course the paradige of the serial relationship. ‘The market’ is tie serial summation of the acts of each individual producer, cofsumer or vorker, and each indivicual inteynalises Teas Mis /her relationship to all the others, and at ‘He Sune tine as the japotence of all of then to SFFect the outcone. “However, in the necessity to fniemalise externalTey before it becomes @ historical Egctor Lies the possibility of aoving beyond the {npotence of serial pratis to selé-conseious group praxis Nothing prevents us, therefore, from starting our criticise vith eriticisn of politics, with taking sides in polities, hence with actual struggles, and identifying ourselves with-thes Then we do fet face the vorld in doctrinaire fashion with & hhew principle, declaring, ‘Here ts truth, kneel here! Me develop new prineipies for che world ‘out of the principles of the world, we 42 not cell the world, ‘Cease your struggles, they are stupiai Ae lwant to give vou the true wachword of the “Enggies' Me serely show the worid way ie Setusily struggles.