conceptualizations have been evident in recent years—fairness heuristic theory, and uncertainty management theory. Fairness Heuristic Theory. Fairness heuristic theory (FHT) grew out of tests of the relational model, which conceived of justice as a key determinant of the legitimacy of authority figures (Tyler & Lind, 1992). In a study of litigants’ reactions to an arbitration case, Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, and de Vera Park (1993) suggested that people use fairness perceptions to make decisions about whether to accept the directives of an authority. Specifically, they argued that people rely on a “fairness heuristic” to make such judgments, with that heuristic defined as “a psychological shortcut used to decide whether to accept or reject the directives of people in positions of authority” (p. 225). The results of two studies showed that the fairness heuristic (operationalized in this study as global perceptions of procedural fairness) was positively related to the acceptance of an arbitration award (Lind et al., 1993). That fairness heuristic concept was then developed further in unpublished work by Lind (1992, 1994). Four years later, Vat den Bos, Vermunt, and Wike (1997) described and tested the first core proposition of FHT—that fairness heuristics are formed quickly, using whatever information is available, so that the heuristic can be used to guide subsequent decisions. In particular, Van den Bos et al. (1997) proposed that there would be a primacy effect, such that information available first would have a greater effect on fairness judgments than information made available later in time. The authors tested their propositions in two laboratory studies in which a series of assessments determined the selection of reward outcome. These studies manipulated procedural justice by making the process either accurate or inaccurate, and also varied outcome favorability, as well as the order in which procedural and outcome information was experienced. When outcome information was presented first, it had a stronger effect on satisfaction and fairness judgments, as well as intentions to protest. The reverse was true when procedural information was presented first. In this case, the procedural information became the key driver of these attitudes and behavioral intentions. A subsequent study by Van den Bos, Wilke, and Lind (1998) described and tested the second core proposition of FHT—that fairness heuristics are used as a proxy for trust. It was reasoned that the trustworthiness of authorities is a critical concern in organizations, but trustworthiness is more difficult to judge than fairness. In two lab studies, Van den Bos et al. (1998) tested their proposition by varying whether participants received information about an authority's trustworthiness. Both studies revealed that availability of trust information moderated the effects of procedural justice (manipulated here in terms of process control). Specifically, when either positive or negative trust information was present, the effects of procedural justice on satisfaction and fairness ratings were neutralized. The first full explications of fairness heuristic theory appeared three years later in a series of chapters (Lind, 2001; Van den Bos, 2001a; Van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2001). Drawing on some of the concepts in the relational model, Lind (2001) framed the use of fairness heuristics in the “fundamental social dilemma.” That fundamental dilemma is two-sided: On the one hand, there are valued outcomes that can be obtained by identifying with and complying with authority requests; on the other, complying with such requests leaves one vulnerable to exploitation. Concerns about this dilemma could be alleviated if the authori: known to be trustworthy, but that knowledge take: