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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 2 Case Digest


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reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a
THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS RELATION WITH THE COURTS wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he
can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
[415 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 160261; 10 Nov 2003] sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.

Facts: At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that
Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the
justiciable controversy poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he
Issue: claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested
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Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. by the Constitution in his office.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
crisis. proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to
Held: delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding
but rather the filing of a complaint does.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the
issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary
not departure from, the Constitution. to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the proceeding."
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive
or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of
discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-
third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House,
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a
given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis one year period.
for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset
the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the
"one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute dominance over the other two great branches of the government.
must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act
is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of
appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal
equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications
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through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture.
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine
Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of
anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life. being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA
Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
PEOPLE VS. POMAR
M ANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [46 Phil 126; G.R. No. L-22008; 3 Nov 1924]
[267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997]
Facts:
Facts:
Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobacco factory. She was granted a
th
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant vacation leave, by reason of her pregnancy, which commenced on the 16 of July 1923. According
to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 to Fajardo, during that time, she was not given the salary due her in violation of the provisions of
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding Act No. 3071. Fajardo filed a criminal complaint based on Section 13 and 15 of said Act against
shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 the manager of the tobacco Factory, Julio Pomar, herein defendant. The latter, on the other hand,
only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, claims that the facts in the complaint did not constitute an offense and further alleges that the
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong aforementioned provisions of Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional. Section 13, Act No. 3071
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number provides that, Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of
of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer who may
be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty days after confinement:
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such laborer without just cause, under the penalty
execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by of being required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two months counting from the day
Renong Berhad. of her discharge. Section 15 of the same Act provides for the penalty of any violation of section
13. The latter was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its supposed Police Power with the
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor
the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. before and one month after their delivery. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff,
sentencing the defendant to pay the fine of fifty pesos and in case of insolvency, to suffer
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits subsidiary imprisonment. Hence, the case was raised to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a former decision.
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud
legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of Issue:
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all
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intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.
since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned provision was a valid exercise of Police Power.
business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the
national economy. Held:

Issue: The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to be unconstitutional for being violative
or restrictive of the right of the people to freely enter into contracts for their affairs. It has been
Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional decided several times, that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the
provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void. individual, protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution. The contracting parties
may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are
Held: not contrary to law, morals or public policy

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding power. The police power may
highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to encompass every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the public
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peace, health, and morals. But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present
state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the constitution. The Police Power is petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution
subject to and is controlled by the paramount authority of the constitution of the state, and will not before complying with RA 6735
be permitted to violate rights secured or guaranteed by the latter.
Petition is dismissed.
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006] SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC
[270 SCRA 106; G.R. No.127325; 19 Mar 1997]
Facts:
Facts:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization
their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits
6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the
1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly
the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order direc ting
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing.
initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest
implement the initiative petitions. Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator
Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the
Issue: COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed
this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative. on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.
proposals to amend the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Groups petition. Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

Held: Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the
According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conduct of such initiative.
conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of
discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment
of the Constitution.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People Held:
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time
of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the
renders the initiative void. same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule
revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The
propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules
a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision. and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary


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The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of
the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal "The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of constituent units thereof."
whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
GONZALES VS. COMELEC
[21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967] . . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all
the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
Facts: separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention
for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution
The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction. when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following resolutions: From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the
electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of SANIDAD VS. COMELEC
180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number [78 SCRA 333; G.R. No. 90878; 29 Jan 1990]
of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member;
Facts:
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention
to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution
the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression
and of the press. On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into
as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of
the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera
Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of
became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989. The Commission on Elections, by virtue
aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A.
elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct
of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition dated
Issue: November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist
of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the
Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec
Constitution. Resolution No. 2167, which provides:

Held: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers.


During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall
H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the
are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to plebiscite Issue.
costs. It is so ordered.
It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press
contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be enshrined in the Constitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent
questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it who merely reports the news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column
would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any
the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned. issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner likewise maintains that if media
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practitioners were to express their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1
a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and desire to disseminate member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over
information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue. Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman
Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
Issue:
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura
Whether or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional. received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to
organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in
Held: Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the
Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the
The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional. It is LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of
clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power Congressman Camasura to the HRET.
to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for
the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to Issue:
the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal
rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party
evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a
give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein
This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a
candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the Held:
campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or
commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence. independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be
construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions
exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political
Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid
franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from
Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House
Plebiscite Issue are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the
and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and
unabridged discussion of the Issue, including the forum. The people affected by the Issue void.
presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the
right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole
concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the
television times. Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET
may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the members
The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he
void and unconstitutional. represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short
BONDOC VS. PINEDA of proof that he has formally affiliated with another
[201 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 97710; 26 Sep 1991]
MIRASOL VS CA
Facts: [351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448; 1 Feb 2001]

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the Facts:
NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga.
Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the
Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The
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Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there
sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it. must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the
question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have
(PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to mota of the case.
the government. Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations,
petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to DUMLAO VS. COMELEC
avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said [95 SCRA 392; G.R. No.L-52245; 22 Jan 1980]
bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners,
conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB Facts:
proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provincial or municipal official who has received payments
that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government. office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local
office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52,
against PNB. which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for
Issue: any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that
a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of
Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
the Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.
Whether or Not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus, should
Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review. be declared null and void
Held:
Whether or not the requisites of judicial review are complied with
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the Held:
power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all No constitutional question will be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with
Regional Trial Courts. the requisites of a judicial inquiry, which are: 1) There must be an actual case or controversy; 2)
The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; 3) The constitutional question
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and 4) The decision of the constitutional
decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his
day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement As to (1), Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of the provision. His question
is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides is posed merely in the abstract, and without the benefit of a detailed factual record. As to (2),
that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where neither Igot nor Salapantan has been charged with acts of loyalty to the State, nor disqualified
there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all from being candidates for local elective positions. They have no personal nor substantial interest
actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice at stake. Igot and Salapantan have institute the case as a taxpayers suit, but the institution of a
to the Solicitor General is mandatory. taxpayers suit per se is no assurance of judicial review. As to (4), there is no cause of action in
this particular case. Therefore, the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent.
Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due
process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional
compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review. and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
Page 7
classification. One class can be treated differently from another clas s. In this case, employees 65 hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts
years of age are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.
satisfy the need for new blood in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it
should be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused. SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
[421 SCRA 656; G.R. No. 159085; 3 Feb 2004]

LACSON VS. PEREZ Facts:


[357 SCRA 756; G.R. No. 147780 ;10 May 2001]
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the
Facts: AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized
the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the
as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article
NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,
thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers
an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both t he
Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation
virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information of the State of Rebellion was issued.
against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved.
They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them. MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of
the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that
Issue: there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive
Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report
orders allegedly effected by the same. to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has
Held: not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-
Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v.
instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion Issue:
in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not
based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Ru les
of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?
for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial
authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. Held:
If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary
detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed
relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may
have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to. grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or
adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the
Page 8
legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued immediately our resolution
rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief denying the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that
President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers proper parties had not been impleaded.
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since
any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of
under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present. $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case Issue:
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase
constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS "cultural treasure of the nation".
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen.
Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on which can be
its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress.
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutory requirements
for the exportation and sale of the subject items.

JOYA VS. PCGG Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether the above Issue
[225 SCRA 568; G.R. No. 96541; 24 Aug 1993] warrant resolution from this Court.

Facts: Held:

On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be
C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having
Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as
concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two) Old Masters Paintings and plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by
antique silverware seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing"
part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. On 14 August means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
1990, then President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term
authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
to auction off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. On 15 distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover,
August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government of the Republic of the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
the Philippines, signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York. According to the constitutional right of some third and related party.
agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the eighty-two Old
Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverware There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal
contained in seventy-one cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public
other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer
subject to the provisions of the agreement. questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. The ownership of
submitted to President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although
Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that: the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were
to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; the contract was highly placed on exhibit.
disadvantageous to the government; PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in
the U.S.; and, the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance,
hence, their disposal was prohibited by law. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be
understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the
government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and
Page 9
just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The
or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of
proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are
not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and,
properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
acquired from private sources and not with public money. executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that this case should be maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory
resolved by this Court as an exception to the rule on moot and academic cases; that although the and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
sale of the paintings and silver has long been consummated and the possibility of retrieving the
treasure trove is nil, yet the novelty and importance of the Issue raised by the petition deserve this On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
Court's attention. They submit that the resolution by the Court of the Issue in this case will dismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause
establish future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of the nation's priceless of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further
artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the public as a whole. ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.
purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for
prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
particular date 11 January 1991 which is long past, the Issue raised in the petition have contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19,
become moot and academic. 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
The cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection of the state are classified Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
as the "important cultural properties" and the "national cultural treasures." On the other hand, a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
"national cultural treasures" is a unique object found locally, possessing outstanding historical, concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural
cultural, artistic and/or scientific value which is highly significant and important to this country and law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No.
nation. This Court takes note of the certification issued by the Director of the Museum that the 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
Italian paintings and silverware subject of this petition do not constitute protected cultural
properties and are not among those listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion
Museum. in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is
available involves a judicial question.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR. settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
[224 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 101083; 30 Jul 1993]
Issue:
Facts:
Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.
non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted
action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant Whether or not the TLAs can be out rightly cancelled.
was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.
Page 10
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources,
Held: including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the
licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised
nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other
the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to
requirements of due process. the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.

The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of the
are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate
Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but to protect and advance the said right.
an incident to the former.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced
concerned. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful renewed or granted.
ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint
come. fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does
be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of
not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing
but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply
with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract
as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder
development and utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their
Page 11
complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements. Facts:

Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994 and
Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a
confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws,
rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following
malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum,
former President authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of the
AGAN JR. VS. PIATCO petitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential
[402 SCRA 612; G.R. No. 155001; 5 May 2003] Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Petitioner was duly informed
of the charges against him. And was directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of
Facts: Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set
on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his
Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored the possibility of investing in the new NAIA required answer. After evaluating the evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of
airport terminal, so they formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp. They submitted proposals to the September 23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges
government for the development of NAIA Intl. Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then
approved the NAIA IPT III project. Bidders were invited, and among the proposal Peoples Air President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service, with
Cargo (Paircargo) was chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preference was given to Paircargo, forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.
but still the project was awarded to Paircargo. Because of that, it incorporated into, Phil. Intl.
Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession agreement in Issue:
1997 to franchise and operate the said terminal for 21years. In Nov. 1998 it was amended in the
matters of pertaining to the definition of the obligations given to the concessionaire, development Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure.
of facilities and proceeds, fees and charges, and the termination of contract. Since MIAA is
charged with the maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II, it has a contract with Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law
several service providers. The workers filed the petition for prohibition claiming that they would
lose their job, and the service providers joined them, filed a motion for intervention. Likewise Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency and whether the petitioner
several employees of the MIAA filed a petition assailing the legality of arrangements. A group of can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts
congressmen filed similar petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared in her speech that she will not honor decision.
PIATCO contracts which the Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and void.
Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the petitioner is still
Issue: basis for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152

Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void, together with its amendments for being Held:
contrary to the constitution.
Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be removed for cause
Held: and under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of the legal causes or
grounds for removal. Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence
The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public policy. The amendments have violated his right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After a careful study, we are of the
the effect of changing it into and entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon. The irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three Issue. To be sure,
amendments present new terms and conditions which provide financial benefit to PIATCO which petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the PCAGC. Records show that the
may have the altered the technical and financial parameters of other bidders had they know that petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal
such terms were available. The 1997 concession agreement, the amendments and supplements revenue laws and regulations, and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body. It is
thereto are set aside for being null and void. thus decisively clear that his protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of any
factual or legal basis. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as
The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by the concession agreement as their his security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal
livelihood is to be taken away from them. Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESO
eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO
eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do so
UMALI VS. GUINGONA is fatal. As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in
[305 SCRA 533; G.R. No. 131124; 21 Mar 1999] his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to
Page 12
raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings. As to last issue, It is worthy to note
that in the case under consideration, the administrative action against the petitioner was taken Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
prior to the institution of the criminal case. The charges included in Administrative Order No. 152
were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal
charges before the Ombudsman. In sum, the petition is dismissable on the ground that the Issue REPUBLIC ACT 6735, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT
posited by the petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and
conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into account the antecedent facts R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to
and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The
consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct and former was prepared by the committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of Representatives on
unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, which dealt with the initiative
is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the Solicitor General, that and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill
there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening No. 988, which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and
events that cannot be overlooked. referendum under Section 3 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 solely, dealt with
initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The
Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a
IN RE CUNANAN draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of
[94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954] Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.

Facts:

Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953.
In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were
still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also
others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the
law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

Issue:

Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Held:

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have
been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system
from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Page 13
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
[101 Phil 1117; G.R. No. L-7995; 31 May 1957]
THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF
THE STATE Facts:

THE POLICE POWER Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was passed.
The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by
foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in
AGUSTIN VS. EDU this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines
[88 SCRA 195; G.R. No. L-49112; 2 Feb 1979] therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China
was violated according to him.
Facts:
Issue:
President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which states that all owners, users or
drivers shall have at all times one pair of early warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.
any source depending on the owners choice. The Letter of Instruction was assailed by petitioner
Leovillo Agustin to have violated the constitution guarantee of due process against Hon Edu, Land Held:
Transportation Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon. Juinio,
Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister of Public According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that
Highways. Because of such contentions, the Implementing Rules and Regulation was ordered to police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court
be suspended for a period of 6 months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessary because also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy
vehicles already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can be use as a warning device. Also posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is
petitioner contest that the letter of instruction violates the delegation of police power because it is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never
deemed harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists and those dealers of EWD will curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.
become instant millionaires because of such law.

Issue: LUTZ VS. ARANETA


[98 Phil 148; G.R. No. L-7859; 22 Dec 1955]
Whether or not Petitioners contentions possess merit.
Facts:
Held:
Walter Lutz, as the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma,
Petitioners contentions are without merit because the exercise of police power may interfere with seeks to recover from J. Antonio Araneta, the Collector of Internal Revenue, the sum of money
personal liberty or property to ensure and promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State. paid by the estate as taxes, pursuant to the Sugar Adjustment Act. Under Section 3 of said Act,
Also, such letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is indeed a rare taxes are levied on the owners or persons in control of the lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar
occurrence that such contention was alleged in a instruction with such noble purpose. Petitioner cane. Furthermore, Section 6 states all the collections made under said Act shall be for aid and
also failed to present the factual foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter of support of the sugar industry exclusively. Lutz contends that such purpose is not a matter of
instruction. In cases where there is absence in the factual foundation, it should be presumed that public concern hence making the tax levied for that cause unconstitutional and void. The Court of
constitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Marcos on the other hand possesses vital statistics that will First Instance dismissed his petition, thus this appeal before the Supreme Court.
justify the need for the implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna
Conventions on Road Signs and Signals, our country must abide with the standards given as Issue:
stated in our Constitution that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
International Law as part of the law of the land. In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention also Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act ( Commonwealth Act 567) is
requires the use of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an EDW. They can personally unconstitutional.
create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the specifications provided by law. Petitioners
allegation against the manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is deemed to be an unfounded
speculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order regarding the
implementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the said law immediately executory. Held:

The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The tax under said Act is levied
with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the
threatened sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, its
Page 14
promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the
Hence, said objectives of the Act is a public concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows that movie industry.
the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and
expedient for its promotion. If objectives and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is Issue:
seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment.
Taxation may be made with the implement of the states police power. In addition, it is only rational Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it. Therefore, the tax levied
under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional. Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional .

Held:
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
[151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987] Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for
a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
Facts: particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights,
and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the
The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad
powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential
Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its
Revenue Code provided that: enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the
moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in
processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the
annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and
blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax." municipal license fees are required to engage in business."

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect
a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case
may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a ASSO . OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC. OF DAR
reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. [175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. L-78742; 14 JUL 1989]

Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the Facts:
province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality
where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax Several petitions are the root of the case:
shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission. a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA
6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers
videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the
variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such legislatures power.
unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victorias Mill Negros Occidental
percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of
and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
government revenues. c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn
and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby lands not exceeding seven hectares.
depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.
Issue:

Page 15
Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional. and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong,
hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be
Held: outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its
police power.
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and
eminent domain.
KWONG SING VS. CITY OF M ANILA
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct 1920]
under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise
of Police Power and Eminent Domain. Facts:

RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same
deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered
required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by
rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer. the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting
in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar
A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also
subject and the method. contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In
view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.
Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the
method employed to achieve it. Issue:

Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power
LOZANO VS. M ARTINEZ
[146 SCRA 323; G.R. No. L-63419; 18 Dec 1986] Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.

Facts:
Held:
A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made,
contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police
denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section
Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744,
Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:
intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx
Issue: xxxxxlaundries xxxx.

Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State. (ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of
Held: the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of
the city and its inhabitants.
The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between
laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that Chinese characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila
is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)
the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an
The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor
Page 16
unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they "Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who
belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense
every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection for involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a
the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance
Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of
ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal
mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit
cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other
even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.
ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police
power is the control of private interests for the public welfare. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and
dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for
injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants. admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This
Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an
instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and
its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the
TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the
[152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987] Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges.
The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently
Facts: called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate
of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of
Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and Issue:
(f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23
August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The
trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as Held:
previously scheduled.
Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner: imposition.

"SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and
the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs in a
for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of word, the public order of the general community. An important component of that public order is
the practice of medicine in the Philippines." the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can
deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of
in Section 5 of the statute include the following: passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the
securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is
"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all
recognized college of medicine; its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety
x x x of the public.
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical
school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of
said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality
the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education; of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by
selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools: admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
Page 17
standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power. Section 9 cannot
stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such
is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practiced in the City.
objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing]
the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three
That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1)
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.
disease or trauma.
The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 that reads as
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court follows:
denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may
be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. ERICTA provide for the health and safety, , and for the protection of property therein;
[122 SCRA 759; G.R. No. L-34915; 24 Jun 1983] and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City
Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.
Facts:
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The Establishment, include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits
Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within The the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation
Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof" provides: of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction
thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled. The
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park
shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and cemetery.
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to
be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by
immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely
months from the date of approval of the application. regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright,
it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare.
For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced but seven years
after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to request the It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a
City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property
Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
paupers burial.

The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village
9 of the ordinance would be enforced. [328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000]

Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and Facts:
mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question.
Respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency
Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA),
respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-
Issue: Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and
convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was
Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was
appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be
Held: demolished.

Page 18
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil
preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had Code
no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed
the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional
public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of and void.
basic services in Metro Manila.

Held:
Issue:
The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of
Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal
regulatory and police powers. Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a
valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be
Held: unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of
is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.
government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit.
Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is
not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power.

It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various
national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area.

TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC


[207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992]

Facts:

Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints
were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the
abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the
municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the
warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the
neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said
warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According
to respondent municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance
No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in
the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block
of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner
contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.

Issue:

Page 19
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN the property interests in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership.

In the instant case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public
REPUBLIC VS. TAGLE interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of eminent domain. In exercising this power,
[299 SCRA 549; G.R. No. 129079; 2 Dec 1998] petitioner intended to acquire not only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and
ultimately to own the subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry and occupation of the
Facts: property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an
owner over the subject property.
Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land located in
Barangay Salawag, Dasmarias, Cavite containing an area of 483,331 square meters more or
less.

The Philippine Government, through the Philippine Human Resources Development Center
(PHRDC), negotiated with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey Team
on the technicalities of the establishment of the ASEAN Human Resources Development Project CITY OF M ANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY
in the Philippines. Among the five (5) main programs of the proposed project was Program III [40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919]
(Construction Manpower Development) which involved the establishment of a Construction
Manpower Development Center (CMDC). PHRDC and private respondent Helena Z. Benitez, Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private
signed a Memorandum of Agreement which provides, among others, that Benitez undertakes to cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary
lease within the period of twenty (20) years and/or sell a portion of that property (which is no less that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said
than ten-hectares) in favor of PHRDC which likewise agrees to lease within a period of twenty (20) lands are within their jurisdiction.
years and/or buy said property site.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes
The Philippine Womens University (PWU) and Benitez granted a permit to PHRDC to occupy and were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create
use the land in question and to undertake land development, electrical and road network irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and
installations and other related works necessary to attain its objectives. Pursuant thereto, the monuments that would have to be destroyed.
CMDC took possession of the property and erected buildings and other related facilities necessary
for its operations. A deposit made by the plaintiff with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of
amount of P708,490.00 which is equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject matter land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent
hereof based on defendants 1990 tax declaration, was made. domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the
expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.
In view of the agreement on the sale of the land in question, PHRDC prepared a Deed of Absolute
Sale with Benitez, as vendor, and PHRDC and CMDC, as vendees, duly represented by then Issue:
Undersecretary Gloria M. Arroyo, for the signature of Benitez. Benitez in her own capacity did not
sign the deed of absolute sale. Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.
Failing to acquire the property involved through negotiated sale, petitioner, through the
Department of Trade and Industry, to which CMDC is attached, instituted a complaint for Eminent Held:
Domain, pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 1035, dated June 25, 1985.
The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable
A Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession was granted by the court but quashed it subsequently. necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the
Issue: conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal
corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the
Whether or Not the respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
expropriating government agency is already occupying the property sought to be expropriated. particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts
have the right to inquire to.
Held:

No. Under Section 7 of EO 1035, when the government or its authorized agent makes the required REPUBLIC VS. PLDT
deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. The expropriation of real [26 SCRA 320; G.R. No. L-18841; 27 Jan 1969]
property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land. Although eminent domain
usually involves a taking of title, there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of Facts:
Page 20
The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government powers through No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in
one of its branches, the Bureau of Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a public service that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it
corporation holding a franchise to install operates and maintains a telephone system. After its oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just
creation, the BOT set up its own government telephone system by utilizing its own appropriations compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of
and other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the govt offices to call neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents.
privately. BOT entered into an agreement with the RCA communications for joint overseas
telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local residents. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its
PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of their agreement since the own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with
BOT had used trunk lines only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let
or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the plaintiff their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in
commenced suit against PLDT asking the court judgment be rendered ordering the PLDT to character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation
execute a contract with the plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT's and an opportunity to be heard.
telephone system throughout the country under such conditions as the court may consider
reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT to enter into such
agreement. Hence this petition. CITY OF BAGUIO V. NAWASA
[106 Phil; G.R. No. L-12032; 31 Aug 1959]
Issue:
Facts:
Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such agreement.
Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint against defendant a public corporation, created
Held: under Act.1383. It contends that the said act does not include within its purview the Baguio Water
Works system, assuming that it does, is unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff
Yes, the state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public ownership upon ownership, control and operation of said water works without just compensation and due process
payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state ma not require a public utility to of law. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss ion the ground that it is not a proper exercise of
render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid. police power and eminent domain. The court denied the motion and ordered the defendants to file
an answer. The court holds that the water works system of Baguio belongs to private property and
cannot be expropriated without just compensation. Sec. 8 of R.A.1383 provides for the exchange
of the NAWASA assets for the value of the water works system of Baguio is unconstitutional for
PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO this is not just compensation. Defendants motion for reconsideration was denied hence this
[104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958] appeal.

Facts: Issue:

The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that construction of a building, Whether or Not there is a valid exercise of police power of eminent domain.
which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the
expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the Held:
incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on
a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated R.A. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise of police power. The act does not confiscate,
from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the destroy or appropriate property belonging to a municipal corporation. It merely directs that all
proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their water works belonging to cities, municipalities and municipal districts in the Philippines to be
request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, transferred to the NAWASA. The purpose is placing them under the control and supervision of an
appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed agency with a view to promoting their efficient management, but in so doing does not confiscate
a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and them because it directs that they be paid with equal value of the assets of NAWASA.
hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation
of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal. The Baguio water works system is not like a public road, the park, street other public property held
in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public. But it is a property of a municipal
Issue: corporation, water works cannot be taken away except for public use and upon payment of just
compensation. Judgment affirmed.
Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: NATIONAL POWER CORP. VS. GUTIERREZ


Page 21
[193 SCRA 1; G.R. No. 60077; 18 Jan 1991] be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no
basis to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to
Facts: permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was
the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a
Petitioner filed an action to acquire a right of way over the land of Respondents for the demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the
construction of transmission lines. Petitioner was adjudged to pay the full market value of land New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation
traversed by the transmission lines. Petitioner argued that it was only asking for a right of way. because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of contract.

Issue:
EPZA VS. DULAY
Whether or Not the acquisition of the right of way constitutes "taking" and such the case will be [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]
entitled just compensation.
Facts:
Held:
The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Proc essing
The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually deprives Respondents of their Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development
proprietary rights. No plant higher than three meters is allowed below the transmission lines. Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the
Because of high tension current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life and limbs lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the
cannot be discounted. The owner of the property is entitled to just compensation. compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the
commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the
government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter
REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the
[58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974] fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the
assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were
Facts: denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this
petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease
agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease Issue:
in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959,
however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question. Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533
is unconstitutional.
Issue:
Held:
Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.
The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is
Held: unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial
compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is
reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding
The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the
be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the
affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just
of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the
with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing justness of the decreed compensation.
of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in
possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA
Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, [43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972]
Page 22
upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just
Facts: compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec
Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard
of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot
for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigables counsel wrote the Issue:
President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by
th
the Auditor General in his 9 Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of
Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the
defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor
General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already Held:
prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no
cause of action against the defendants. The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media
companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal property without
payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of
Issue: necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the
newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public
Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government. use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also
Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the
Held: case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of
newspaper or magazine publishers.
In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government
takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit REYES VS. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without [395 SCRA 494; GR NO. 147511; 20 JAN 2003]
its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back
of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the
lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to Facts:
recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane
purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensationprice or value of lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the
the lot at the time of the taking. expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were
relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the
expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC judgment of the lower court.
[244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995]
A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose
for the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters
Facts: from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court
which showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the
Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and construction of low cost housing units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in
candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights
candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their and interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties should now
platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for be returned to herein petitioners.
dissemination of vital election information.
Issue:
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of respondent
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.
Page 23
Held: Facts:

The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on Several petitions are the root of the case:
a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the
contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine e. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA
that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by
has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers
"public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the
satisfies the requirement of public use." legislatures power.
f. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victorias Mill Negros Occidental
In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of
public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution g. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of
itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private Operation Land Transfer.
sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost h. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn
decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and lands not exceeding seven hectares.
resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for
the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice. Issue:

Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional.


MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE VS. VM REALTY CORPORATION
[292 SCRA 676; G. R. NO. 127820; 20 JUL 1998] Held:

Facts: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and
eminent domain.
Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on a resolution by the municipal
council. Petitioner cites a previous case wherein a resolution gave authority to exercise eminent The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized
domain. Petitioner also relies on the Implementing Rules, which provides that a resolution under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise
authorizes a Local Government Unit to exercise eminent domain. of Police Power and Eminent Domain.

Issue: RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to
deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
law-making body. imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial
Held: rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.

Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful
requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by subject and the method.
its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the
former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the
involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in method employed to achieve it.
effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the
latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
ESLABAN VS. ONORIO
[360 SCRA 230; G.R. NO. 146062; 28 JUN 2001]

Facts:

ASLP VS. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM Clarita Vda. De Onorio is the owner of the land in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato.
[175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. 78742; 14 JUL 1989] Such land is the subject for the construction of an irrigation canal of the N ational Irrigation
Page 24
Administration (NIA). Mr. Santiago Eslaban Jr. is the project manager of NIA. The parties agreed Facts:
to the construction of the canal provided that the government will pay for the area that has been
taken. A right-of-way agreement was entered into by the parties in which respondent was paid the The instant case is an unending sequel to several suits commenced almost twenty years ago
amount of P4, 180.00 as right of way damages. Subsequently, respondent executed an Affidavit of involving a parcel of land located at the corner of the south end of EDSA and F.B. Harrison in
Waiver of Rights and Fees which waives her rights for the damage to the crops due to Pasay City. The land was owned by petitioners Cristina de Knecht and her son, Rene Knecht. On
construction of the right of way. After which, respondent demands that petitioner pay P111, 299.55 the land, the Knechts constructed eight houses, leased out the seven and occupied one of them
for taking her property but the petitioner refused. Petitioner states that the government had not as their residence. In 1979, the government filed for the expropriation of Knechts property. The
consented to be sued and that the respondent is not entitled for compensation by virtue of the government wanted to use the land for the completion of the Manila Flood Control and Drainage
homestead patent under CA no. 141. The RTC held that the NIA should pay respondent the Project and the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. In 1982, the City Treasurer of
amount of P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq meters that have been used for Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to
the construction of the canal. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the RTC. 1982. As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer sold the property at public auction
for the same amount of their deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were respondent Spouses
Issue: Anastacio and Felisa Babiera (the Babieras) and respondent Spouses Alejandro and Flor
Sangalang (the Sangalangs). Subsequently, Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent
Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC. Salem Investment Corporation. On February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg.
340 authorizing the national government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the
Held: EDSA Extension. The property of the Knechts was part of those expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340.
The government gave out just compensation for the lands expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340.
The CA is correct in affirming the decision of the RTC but modifications shall be made regarding Salem was included and received partial payment. Seven of the eight houses of the Knechts were
the value of the just compensation. The following are the points to be considered in arriving in this demolished and the government took possession of the portion of land on which the houses stood.
decision. Since the Knechts refused to vacate their one remaining house, Salem filed a case against them
for unlawful detainer. As defense, the Knechts claimed ownership of the land and building. The
First, Rule 7 par 5 of the Rule of Civil Procedure provides that the certification against forum Municipal Trial Court however ordered the Knechts' ejectment thus their residence was
shopping should only be executed by the plaintiff or the principal. The petition for review was filed demolished.
by Mr. Eslaban jr. while the verification or certification were signed by Mr. Cesar Gonzales, an
administrator of the agency. Neither of the two has the authority to sign such certificate for they The Knechts continuously claimed ownership of the property and allege that they must be given
are not the plaintiff or principal. Such case is a sufficient ground for dismissing this petition. just compensation.

Second, PD NO. 1529 provides that the owner is required to recognize in favor of the government Issue:
the easement of a public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government canal
where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined. Whether or not Knechts are the lawful owners of the land at subject.
In the case at bar, the irrigation canal was constructed on Oct 1981 after the property had been
registered in May of 1976. In this case, prior expropriation proceedings must be filed and just Held:
compensation shall be paid to the owner before the land could be taken for public use.
The Supreme Court held that the Knechts were not the owners anymore of the said land. The
Third, In this case, just compensation is defined as not only the correct amount to be paid but the Knechts' right to the land had been foreclosed after they failed to redeem it one year after the sale
reasonable time for the Government to pay the owner. The CA erred in this point by stating that at public auction. Since the petitions questioning the order of dismissal were likewise dismissed by
the market value (just compensation) of the land is determined in the filing of the complaint in the Court of Appeals and this Court, the order of dismissal became final and res judicata on the
1991.The determination of such value should be from the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981. issue of ownership of the land. Petitioners contended that they did not receive notice of their tax
delinquency. Neither did they receive notice of the auction sale. However, this question has been
Lastly, the petitioner cannot argue that the Affidavit of waiver of rights and fees executed by the previously raised in the cases which have been already set aside. The court is not a trier of facts.
respondent pertains to the payment of the value of the land therefore exempting NIA to pay the Res judicata has already set it. The Knechts therefore are not the lawful owners of the land and
value of the land taken. Such waiver pertains only to the crops and improvements that were are not any longer accountable for just compensation given by the government.
damage due to the construction of the right-of-way not the value of the land.
Note: Res judicata is a ground for dismissal of an action. It is a rule that precludes parties from
Wherefore, decision of CA affirmed with modification regarding the just compensation in the relitigating Issue actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It pervades every
amount of P16, 047.61 per hectare. well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is based upon two grounds embodied in various
maxims of the common law one, public policy and necessity, that there should be a limit to
litigation; and another, the individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause. When a right
KNECHT VS. COURT OF APPEALS of fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
[290 SCRA 223; G.R. NO. 108015, 20 MAY 1998] opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
Page 25
To follow a contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of that the expropriation was not for a public purpose.
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition of the parties to the preservation
of the public tranquility. Issue:

Res judicata applies when: (1) the former judgment or order is final; (2) the judgment or order is Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be granted.
one on the merits; (3) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (4) there is between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and Held:
of cause of action.
Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a public use because of
the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture and history of the Philippines.
REPUBLIC VS. KER
[383 SCRA 584; G.R. NO. 136171, 2 JULY 2002]

Facts:

Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City a petition for expropriation of portions
of two parcels of land owned by respondent. Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the widening
of the road component of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Interchange in Davao City. The Regional trial court
rendered decision of a fair just compensation for defendant Ker Corporation. However, it was
challenged by Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public
Works and Highways alleging that just compensation for site must be reduced. Petitioner alleged
that when the petition for expropriation was filed, the tax declaration of the property indicated its
assessed value at a lower price.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Ker Company was given a decision for fair just compensation.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the valuation for the lot Sites are excessive and unreasonable. Just
compensation cannot be measured by the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax
declaration and schedule of market values. For the purpose of appraisal, the fair market value of
the property is taken into account and such value refers to the highest price in terms of money
which a property will bring if exposed for sale in the public market.

In computing just compensation for expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time
of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint not at the time of the rendition of judgment
which should be taken into consideration. 4 Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking or the
filing of the complaint whichever came first. On this matter, the appellate court is correct in
disregarding petitioner's claim.

M ANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS


[252 SCRA 412; G.R. NO. 106440, 29 JAN. 1996]

Facts:

The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned by Petitioners as a national
historical landmark, because it was the site of the birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni
Cristo. The Republic of the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land. Petitioners argued
Page 26
Facts:

THE POWER OF TAXATION Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together with the law
authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes a
municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-
PASCUAL VS. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS payment of the same. The law authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the
[110 PHIL 331; G.R. NO.L-10405; 29 DEC 1960] city to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various professions. Petitioners,
having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
Facts: paid the tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared the
ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it.
Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for declaratory relief with injunction
on the ground that RA 920, Act appropriating funds for public works, providing P85,000 for the Issue:
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals,
were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision. Antonio Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and authorize
Subdivision is owned by the respondent, Jose Zulueta, a member of the Senate of the Philippines. what amounts to double taxation.
Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig and the offer was
accepted by the council, subject to a condition that the donor would submit plan of the roads and Held:
an agreement to change the names of two of the street. However, the donation was not executed,
which prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of RA The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its discretion
920. The district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the letter that inasmuch the feeder may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not for the
roads in question were private property at the time of passage and approval of RA 920, the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes
appropriation for the construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio. Petitioner, prayed for RA aside from that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within the domain of political
920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed of donation be declared unconstitutional. departments. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is imposed by
Lower court dismissed the case and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing
inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation by
Issue: both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is reversed with
regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.
Whether or Not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds stipulated in RA 920 are
constitutional.
OSMEA VS. ORBOS
Held: [220 SCRA 703; G.R. NO. 99886; 31 MAR 1993]

The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for Facts:
anything but public purpose. The taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only and the
money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of On October 10, 1984, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General
private individuals. Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to
reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting
In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend upon whether the from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil.
said roads were public or private property when the bill was passed by congress or when it
became effective. The land which was owned by Zulueta, the appropriation sought a private Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024, and
purpose and hence, null and void. The donation did not cure the nullity of the appropriation; ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy.
therefore a judicial nullification of a said donation need not precede the declaration of
unconstitutionality of the said appropriation. Pres. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on February 27,
1987, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost underrecovery
The decision appealed from is reversed. incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the
underrecovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance.

The petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates
29(3), Article VI of the Constitution, reading as follows:
PUNSALAN VS. M UNICIPAL BOARD OF M ANILA
[95 PHIL 46; NO.L-4817; 26 MAY 1954] (3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated
as a special fund and paid out for such purposes only. If the purpose for which
Page 27
a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of
any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. government corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in
consultation with the Board of Energy;
The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be
treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the
collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special resources of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of
fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government Energy requiring payment of persons or companies engaged in the business of
objective." Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products;
through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is
limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created." d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil
companies in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso
He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28 (2). Article VI costs computed using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of
of the Constitution, viz.: Energy.

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it
or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains
Government; subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply
with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.
and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of taxation, "the limits,
limitations and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not only specify how to tax, With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision
who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also impose a specific limit on how much to tax." conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products
12
provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general
policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates,
Issue: 8(c) of P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the
resources of the Fund.
Whether or Not the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT" in the books of account of the Ministry of
Energy (now, the Office of Energy Affairs), created pursuant to 8, paragraph 1, of P.D. No. 1956, What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit
as amended, "said creation of a trust fund being contrary to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the on how much to tax." The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the premise that
Constitution. what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not the case. What
is here involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although the provision
Whether or Not the unconstitutionality of 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1956, as amended by authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of
Executive Order No. 137, for "being an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to the taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to act
Energy Regulatory Board. with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by the police power
of the State.

The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the determination of the
Held: price of oil and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or exhaust
the Fund, do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid parameters in the law as proposed
The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established "for the purpose of minimizing the frequent by the petitioner. To do so would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to mitigate or
price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustment and/or changes in world market prices avoid the undesirable consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is expressed
of crude oil and imported petroleum products." Under P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive suffices to guide the delegate in the exercise of the delegated power, taking account of the
Order No. 137 dated 27 February 1987, this Trust Account may be funded from any of the circumstances under which it is to be exercised.
following sources:

a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on
petroleum products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate
adjustment, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
Board of Energy; [14 SCRA 292; NO.L-19201; 16 JUN 1965]

Facts:
Page 28
The Spanish Govt. by virtue of a royal decree granted the plaintiff certain mines. The plaintiff is
Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. now the owner of those mines. The Collector of Internal Revenue imposed tax on the properties,
Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for contending that they were valid perfected mine concessions and it falls within the provisions of
the construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for such sec.134 of Act No. 1189 known as Internal Revenue Act. The plaintiff paid under protest. He
purpose. brought an action against the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue to recover the sum of Php.
9, 600 paid by him as taxes. Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant, so the plaintiff
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, appealed.
1960. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the
Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest. Issue:

Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 164 is void or valid.

Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at Held:
the time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical personality as the
constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid. The deed constituted a contract between the Spanish Government and the plaintiff. The obligation
of which contract was impaired by the enactment of sec. 134 of the Internal Revenue Law
Held: infringing sec. 5 of the Act of Congress which provides that no law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be enacted. Sec. 134 of the Internal Revenue Law of 1904 is void because it
Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution impairs the obligation of contracts contained in the concessions of mine made by the Spanish
contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as Property Government. Judgment reversed.
taxes contra distinguished from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the property used for
religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by way of gift
inter vivos.

The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of
the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose.

CASSANOVAS VS. HORD


[8 Phil 125; No. 3473; 22 Mar 1907]

Facts:

Page 29
THE BILL
OF RIGHTS

Page 30
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not
Art 3, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of
law O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. where the American Supreme Court through
Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned
deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void
ERMITA-M ALATE HOTEL AND M OTEL OPERATORS ASSO. VS. M AYOR OF M ANILA on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence
[20 SCRA 849; G.R. NO.L-24693; 31 JULY 1967] deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in
Facts: the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual
foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its members, Hotel the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the
del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the second petitioner, filed a ordinance set aside.
petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the City of
Manila who was sued in his capacity as such charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the execution and VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG
enforcement of such ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is [86 SCRA 270; NO.L-29646; 10 NOV 1978]
dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels
and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city Facts:
authorities and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board
of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February
City Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against the 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a
ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any
Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the ground that in kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment
the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels. it also permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.
being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be
open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of
representatives. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.
respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, therefore, null and Constitution.
void.
Held:
Held:
It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens
A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.
the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision
cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the accepted standards of While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from
constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects. the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval
or disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human
elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. W hile it is true that the
nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he
and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or
being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is denial of an alien employment permit fee.
not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
Page 31
According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that
NAMIL VS. COMELEC police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court
[414 SCRA 553; G.R. NO. 150540; 28 OCT 2003] also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is
Facts: always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never
curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.
On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat proclaimed
the petitioners as winning candidates for their Sangguniang Bayan. The following day, herein
private respondents were proclaimed winners as well. Private respondents claimed that they PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. VS. TORRES
should be recognized as the winners, and not the petitioners. Upon receipt of such letter, the [231 SCRA 335; G.R. NO.98050; 17 MAR 1994]
Commissioner-in-charge for Region XII asked the Law Department, the Regional Election
Registrar and the Provincial Elections Supervisor to submit their reports on the matter. All of them Facts:
found the second proclamation valid. Hence, the COMELEC issued a Resolution ordering the
immediate installation of the private respondents as the newly elected members of the Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor and
Sangguniang Bayan, even though petitioners herein have already taken their oath and have Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner,
assumed office. Petitioners contend that such Resolution is null and void because they were not alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment
accorded due notice and hearing, hence constituting a violation of the due process principle. it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer
Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of a
Issue: certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the
superintendents and the professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI filed an
Whether or Not due the COMELEC has the power to suspend a proclamation or the effects amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory
thereof without notice and hearing. employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential employees. The parties
therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the amended petition
Held: submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued
an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification election among the
No. The COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.),
effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing. The proclamation on May 20, 2001 enjoys technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor
the presumption of regularity and validity since no contest or protest was even filed assailing the and Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma
same. The petitioners cannot be removed from office without due process of law. Due process in dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence,
quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires due notice and hearing. Furthermore, the instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-
the proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of any arbiter was under.
motion to set aside his proclamation. Hence, as ruled in Farias vs. COMELEC, Reyes vs.
COMELEC and Gallardo vs. COMELEC, the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally Issue:
annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ Whether or Not there was denial of due process.
[101 PHIL 1155; L-7995; 31 MAY 1957]
Held:
Facts:
There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was passed. heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS
foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for
this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance
therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present
was violated according to him. its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and
examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its position paper
Issue: with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its
appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF M INDORO


[39 PHIL 660; G.R. NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]
Page 32
Facts: The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be read, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only
Mindoro. successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent
settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which states that provincial governor protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized
of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is authorized, customs among the Manguianes.
when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
and approved by the provincial board. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But
Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is
the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They
homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that
recommended by the provincial governor. due process of law has not been followed.

Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2, which says that the None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. To constitute
provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where
Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular
east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, cases.
were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any
Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may
exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. approach the highest conception of nationality. The public policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they said, for their own good and the good of the country.
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the can, therefore, not issue.
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial KWONG SING VS. CITY OF M ANILA
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation [41 PHIL 103; G.R. NO. 15972; 11 OCT 1920]
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation. Facts:

Issue: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same
interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of
Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty without enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be
due process of law. in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered
by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by
Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting
in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar
Held: circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also
contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In
The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.
liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and
that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and Issue:
involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative
Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power
United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Page 33
Whether or not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights. petition against the fiscal, or prosecuting attorney of Manila, and the collector of internal revenue
engaged in the prosecution, and against the judge presiding.
Held:
Issue:
Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police
power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section Whether or Not Act 2972 is unconstitutional.
2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744,
authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:
Held:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx
xxxxxlaundries xxxx. Yes. The Philippine government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to keep
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and proper records of their business transactions in English or Spanish or Filipino dialect by which an
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good adequate measure of what is due from them in meeting the cost of government can be had. But
order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. we are clearly of opinion that it is not within the police power of the Philippine Legislature, because
it would be oppressive and arbitrary, to prohibit all Chinese merchants from maintaining a set of
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between books in the Chinese language, and in the Chinese characters, and thus prevent them from
laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher keeping advised of the status of their business and directing its conduct.
Chinese characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila
are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)
ANIAG VS. COMELEC
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no [237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994]
fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an
attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor Facts:
unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they
belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution
every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection for No. 2323, Gun Ban, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of
the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by
Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of
ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing
mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of
cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the Gun
even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient Ban, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for
ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner then
power is the control of private interests for the public welfare. instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioners house and return them to
Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and
injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants. detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was
only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later,
COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and
YU CONG ENG VS. TRINIDAD Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he
[47 PHIL 385; G.R. NO. 20479; 6 FEB 1925] should not be disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the
constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms
Facts: or similar weapons and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional.
The petitioner, Yu Cong Eng, was charged by information in the court of first instance of Manila, The issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot
with a violation of Act 2972, which provides that (Section 1) it shall be unlawful for any person, when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.
company, or partnership or corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other activity for the
purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its account Issue:
books in any language other than English, Spanish or any local dialect. He was arrested, his
books were seized, and the trial was about to proceed, when he and the other petitioner, Co Liam, Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearms
on their own behalf, and on behalf of all the other Chinese merchants in the Philippines, filed the issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car

Page 34
Held:

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as
Held: the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assuranc e to
A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should
However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of
merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellanos waist fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no
nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the
car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal
could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless search justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a
cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone
had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated
among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement
informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed that h e established facts and the pertinent law.
was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is
declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any
proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set YNOT VS. IAC
aside. [148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987]

Facts:
JAVIER VS. COMELEC
[144 SCRA 194; G.R. NOS. L-68379-81; 22 SEPT 1986] Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one
province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order
Facts: No 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No.
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa 626-A was issued in the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for
in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had farm work or breeding.
the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984,
the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers Issue:
of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects,
including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what he claimed Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process.
were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the
Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were Held:
dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said
body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably
because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting
the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his the transfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing.
oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the
transfer of carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either.

Issue: PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ


[180 SCRA 218; G.R. NO.84818; 18 DEC 1989]
Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its
decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election. Facts:

Page 35
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging
rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Held:
Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be
reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence of a
power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing. hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in administrative
proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635).
Issue: The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast station may be closed. The Ang
Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:
Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present ones case and submit
Held: evidence presented.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by (3) The decision must have something to support itself.
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondents contention (4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to
that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire support conclusion)
proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, (5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a (6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law
Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the and facts and not simply accept subordinates views
exceptions, limitations or saving provisions. (7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can
know the various issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order
without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives
immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life,
commission's own motion as in the present case. liberty and property is valid.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of
ASIDE. speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast
are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be protected
against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR. freedom of expression is the clear and present danger rule. If in the circumstances that the
[137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 JUL 1985] media is used in such nature as to create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has
the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or
Facts: signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the
vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues to have the right to be informed on
A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was summarily closed on grounds public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence to the people being
of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, the most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special
DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There was no hearing to establish factual protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of
evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates freedom of the Constitution.
expression. Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner,
through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the
station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR)
case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because there are no longer interested [69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940]
parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a
RESOLUTION for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in matters as this Facts:
case.
There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU
Issue: alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is
Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE. desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a
Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an
Expression.
Page 36
illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction
trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion. that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.
Issue:

Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted. ATENEO DE M ANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG
[222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993]
Held:
Facts:
To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court
whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries
No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also
nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious
which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only c ases physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo
that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to
its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi- investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of
judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements
functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the
to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive
between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the
farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case
provisions of CA 103. against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled
"Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal
As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent
not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of
of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable. the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left
the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the
penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a
TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining
requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the
an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original
proceedings of this character: petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students
was ordered.
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause
and submit evidence in support thereof; Issue:
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself; Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; Held:
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on
accept the views of a subordinate; the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners'
decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.
various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court,
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an
Page 37
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear
as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded at scheduled hearings on the petition. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process
procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University. and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.
A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental
institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus: fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a
accusation against them; history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances.
assistance of counsel, if desired: In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them the peculiar facts of each case.
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

US GOVERNMENT VS. JUDGE PURUNGAN


[389 SCRA 623; G.R. NO. 148571, 24 SEPT 2002]

Facts:

The United States of America, pursuant to the existing RP-US extradition treaty, requested the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez. Upon receipt of the request, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action. In such event, the RTC
held that Jimenez shell be deprived of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the extradition process. Thereafter the US government, through DOJ, filed Petition for
Extradition and Jimenezs immediate arrest, to avoid flight. Before the RTC could render its
decision, Jimenez filed an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," praying that his application for
an arrest warrant be set for hearing, which was granted. During which, the lower court issued its
questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for
his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After Jimenez had surrendered his passport and
posted the required cash bond, he was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated
July 4, 2001. Thus, Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and
the taking of Jimenez into legal custody.

Issue:

Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be
issued.

Whether or not he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending.

Held:

By nature, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence
is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the
accused are necessarily available. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state,
the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if given the
opportunity. Hence, if the judge is convinced that a prima facie case exists, he immediately Issue a
Page 38
[163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]

EQUAL PROTECTION Facts:

Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of
Art 3, Sec. 1. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity
of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of
Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only
[68 PHIL 12; G.R. NO. 45987; 5 MAY 1939] to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it
also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of
Facts: the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on
Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of
drink, any intoxicating liquors of any kind. The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some
native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take. states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism
providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of
said law. Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1.

Held: Held:

No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female
under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions. domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which
their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract
The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat
the members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all
degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers to a geographical area and men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:
more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended 1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian tribes 2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in 4. They apply equally to al members of the same class
and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby
hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.
not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to
apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has
class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by reason on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things,
of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the to the requirements of public safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female
reasonableness of the classification thus established. domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes
an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

DUMLAO VS. COMELEC


[95 SCRA 392; L-52245; 22 JAN 1980]
PASEI VS. DRILON
Page 39
Facts: Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print
space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and
and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. television stations to provide free air time.

Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already received Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pes os in providing COMELEC
retirement benefits and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the same local elective Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it
office from which he has retired. stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the
primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers
Issue: and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private
property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one
Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal protection and due hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs
process rights. requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Held: Issue:

No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification based on reasonable and Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the
real differentiations. In the present case, employees 65 years of age have been classified equal protection of the laws.
differently from younger employees. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the
latter are not. Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of
law and without just compensation.
Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials because there can be
retirees who are even younger and a 65 year old retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official
who is not a retiree. But there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to Held:
run for office because there is the need for new blood to assume relevance. When an official has
retired he has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work. Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is
licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television
valid. broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate
[289 SCRA 337; G.R. NO. 132922; 21 APR 1998] broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable
public funds in licensing and supervising them.
Facts:
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print
organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires
without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast
was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by
enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881. the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
be known as the Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and [301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 128096; 20 JAN 1999]
impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and
television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting Facts:
and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or
television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign. Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime
syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Page 40
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner and intervenors argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
petitioner-intervenors. Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the
Sandiganbayan but also in any court.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive
the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is
panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and
police operation. However, a review board modified the panels finding and recommended the establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment.
indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural
as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one
Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
charged only as an accessory. administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be
challenged as unconstitutional.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting
that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the
Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the principal accused are government officals performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information
with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon
they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting
was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official
from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975. duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said
accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate
provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not
begun as of the approval hereof. established.

Issue: Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due process and the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive
equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.

Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute. INT 'L. SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS. QUISUMBING
[333 SCRA 13; G.R. NO. 128845; 1 JUN 2000]
Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the Facts:
determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts
jurisdiction. Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent
School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their
Held: colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be
given equal pay for work of equal value.
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential
argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign
presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out
The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree
substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to authorizes the School to
existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from
are present in this case. Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and
regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials protection of employees.
and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to
Page 41
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY VS. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY
the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. [22 SCRA 603; L-23794; 17 FEB 1968]

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, Facts:
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid
a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964,
on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company,
"dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United
States of America and other foreign countries." Payments for said tax were made, under protest,
Issue: by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7, 087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,
000, or a total of P12, 087.50.
Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires
discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause. On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as
Held: its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution)
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution).
truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill,
effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to
to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding. enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited
constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the
to that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local
employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one
employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the Issue:
others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against
that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. Whether or Not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause
under Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution.
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as
an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign- Whether or not it was violative of the rule of uniformity of taxation under the Bill of Rights, Sec.
hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the 22[1], Art. VI, Constitution.
"dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the
distinction in salary rates. Held:

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," "to The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal
afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection
between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based
common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of
will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions
which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the who belong to the same class.
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is
no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for
it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and
Wherefore, the petition is given due course. The petition is hereby granted in part. The orders of none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is
the secretary of labor and employment dated June 10, 1996 and march 19, 1997, are hereby true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable,
reversed and set aside insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent school of according should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be
foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires. singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same
class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up,

Page 42
it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar
Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily
6
collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). At the time of collection, the ordinance
provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional
until declared otherwise.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared
unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50
plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.
PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSO. VS. PRADO
[227 SCRA 703; G.R. NO. 105371; 11 NOV 1993]

Facts:

The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354
withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration
Commission and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory
becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the
President & Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The
respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection clause.

Issue:

Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

Held:

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied
in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore specific
guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in
general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is
the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What
the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside insofar

Page 43
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant
validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been
violated. Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's
Art 3, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and constitutional rights, be invoked against the State. In the absence of governmental interference,
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. It was Mr. Job
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages.
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of
searched and the persons or things to be seized. Posts. Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to
Art 3, Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.
prescribed by law. No. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their
for any purpose in any proceeding. testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary.
No. Appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the
presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are
PEOPLE VS. M ARTI owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim
[193 SCRA 57; G.R. NO. 81561; 18 JAN 1991] otherwise.

Facts:
WATEROUS DRUG VS. NLRC
Accused-appellant went to a forwarding agency to send four packages to a friend in Zurich. [280 SCRA 735 ; G.R.NO. 113271; 16 OCT 1997]
Initially, the accused was asked by the proprietress if the packages can be examined. However,
he refused. Before delivering said packages to the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Posts, Facts:
the husband of the proprietress opened said boxes for final inspection. From that inspection,
included in the standard operating procedure and out of curiosity, he took several grams of its Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation on 15 August 1988.
contents. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-General
Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the
He brought a letter and the said sample to the National Bureau of Investigation. When the NBI was latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued
informed that the rest of the shipment was still in his office, three agents went back with him. In another memorandum to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without
their presence, the husband totally opened the packages. Afterwards, the NBI took custody of said consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases
packages. The contents , after examination by forensic chemists, were found to be marijuana and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.
flowering tops.
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her
The appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the agents for act was "due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad
questioning. Later on, the trial court found him guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the
Admitting Dept." Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven.
Issue:
In a memorandum dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro
Whether or Not the items admitted in the searched illegally searched and seized. warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents." On 29
January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an
Whether or Not custodial investigation properly applied. irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 37 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within
Whether or Not the trial court not give credence to the explanation of the appellant on how said twenty-four hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give
packages came to his possession. her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However,
on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would
be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company.
Held:
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice
No. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was No. 266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the Saldaa's invasion of her privacy when Saldaa opened an envelope addressed to Catolico.
Page 44
indication in the contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines.
In a letter to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right to privacy
she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that and communication; hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it was inadmissible in evidence.
the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and
Co's secretary, Irene Soliven. Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised
of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires.
Catolico of her termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee
complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. In his decision of 10 to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. In the case at
May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the
petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter
alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were joined through said
the dismissal was without just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and letters.
suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just
Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because and valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in
the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was
cause to terminate her services. based on hearsay information. Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere
In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the suspicion, which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid
ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment; and even the dismissal of
employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the
YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a
But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) managerial employee, to which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted.
of Article III of the Constitution. It concluded: As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, that the Bill of
Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against
by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants, respondents' such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both
case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal criminal and civil liabilities.
basis for complainant's dismissal.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation
appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every year of service. In this
in the computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86. case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half month's salary for
every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the
award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
Issue:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and
Whether or Not the dismissal of the private respondent is in violation of the Constitution, under the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2
Bill of Rights. December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its
reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against private
Held: respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of
privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set
As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving aside.
"commissions" from YSP, or probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9
November 1989 was not the first or the last. They also maintained that Catolico occupied a
confidential position and that Catolico's receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by her "propensity to STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO
violate company rules," constituted breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC, [20 SCRA 383; L-19550; 19 JUN 1967]
Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her side of the controversy.
Facts:
In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal.
1
The check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin hereinafter referred to
2
Company rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients, and there is no as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges
Page 45
3 4
issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
5
corporations of which they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using
and take possession of the following personal property to wit: them in evidence against petitioners herein.
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
Petitioners contentions are: existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy,
deportation cases filed against them; of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
__________________________
the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law
1
Respondents-prosecutors contentions Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as
(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I.
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes, City of Manila.
2
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures. Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Judge of the Court of First
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Hon. Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City)
may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the Court of Quezon City.
3
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the res idences of petitioners Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.
4
herein. Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.
5
U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far East
Issue: Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business Management
Corporation, General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment
Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations are Management Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and Business
obtained legally. Management Corporation, United Housing Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and
Redrying Corporation, Republic Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.
Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are obtained legally.

Held: BURGOS, SR. V. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP


[133 SCRA 800; G.R. NO. 64261; 26 DEC 1984]
The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their Facts:
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless
of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent
whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under which the premises known as
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers,
parties. respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor
vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers,
Page 46
as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the 1. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners
possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had
newspaper, were seized. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers 2. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants
were discontinued. Respondents contend that petitioners should have filed a motion to quash said were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct
warrants in the court that issued them before impugning the validity of the same before this Court. premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two
Respondents also assail the petition on ground of laches (Failure or negligence for an warrants intended for one and the same place.
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could 3. Section 2, Rule 126, of the Rules of Court, does not require that the property to be
or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or may or may not be owned by him.
declined to assert it). Respondents further state that since petitioner had already used as 4. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
evidence some of the documents seized in a prior criminal case, he is stopped from challenging machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact
the validity of the search warrants. bolted to the ground, remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
Petitioners submit the following reasons to nullify the questioned warrants: 5. The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere conclusions of law
1. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Deficient of such particulars as
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve
as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent
2. The search warrants pinpointed only one address which would be the former judge to have done so. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the
abovementioned address. oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
3. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners were also seized although the warrants were only petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
4. Real properties were seized. warrant, of the existence of probable cause." Another factor which makes the search
5. The application along with a joint affidavit, upon which the warrants were issued, from warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature
the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group could not have provided sufficient basis of general warrants. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the
for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may be validly issued in search warrants in question are too general.
accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
With regard to the respondents invoking PD 885, there is an absence of any implementing rules
Respondents justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense. Furthermore, President Marcos
been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes himself denies the request of military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners.
sequestration of the property of any person engaged in subversive activities against the The closure of the premises subjected to search and seizure is contrary to the freedom of the
government in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the press as guaranteed in our fundamental law. The search warrants are declared null and void.
Secretary of National Defense.

Issue:

Whether or Not the 2 search warrants were validly issued and executed.

Held: TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE


[246 SCRA 184; G.R. NO. 89103; 14 JUL 1995]
In regard to the quashal of warrants that petitioners should have initially filed to the lower court,
this Court takes cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the Facts:
constitutional Issue raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We
Forum" offices which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. In August 1988, P/Sgt. Natuel applied for issuance of search warrant alleging that he received
The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to information that Petitioner had in his possession at his house M-16 Armalite rifles, hand
suspend its rules. With the contention pertaining to laches, the petitioners gave an explanation grenades, .45 Cal. pistols, dynamite sticks and subversive documents, which were used or
evidencing that they have exhausted other extra-judicial efforts to remedy the situation, negating intended to be used for illegal purposes. The application was granted.
the presumption that they have abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property.
In September, a police team, searched the house of petitioner and seized 2 envelopes containing
On the enumerated reasons: P14000, handset with antennae, transceiver with antennae, regulator supply, academy notebook
and assorted papers and handset battery pack. In October, petitioner moved that the search and
seizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. In December, MTCC, in
Page 47
its order, directed Lt. Col. Torres to return the money seized to petitioner ruling that any seizure the fiscals certification and require submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving
should be limited to the specified items covered thereby. SolGen petitioned with the RTC for the at the conclusion as to existence of probable cause.
annulment of the order of MTCC citing that pending the determination of legality of seizure of the
articles, they should remain in custogia legis. RTC granted the petition. Petition dismissed.

Issue:
SOLIVEN VS. M AKASIAR
Whether or Not the seizure of the articles which were not mentioned in the search warrant was [167 SCRA 393; G.R. NO. 82585; 14 NOV 1988]
legal.
Facts:
Held:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were
Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the
describe the things to be seized. The police acts beyond the parameters of their authority if they existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
seize articles not described in the search warrants. The evident purpose and intent of the subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
requirement is to limit the things to be seized, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion; violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining
that unreasonable search and seizure may not be made and that abuses may not be committed. the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have
rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied
Petition granted. People of the Philippines is ordered to return the money seized. petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice
sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988.
PLACER VS. JUDGE VILLANUEVA On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
[126 SCRA 463; G.R. NOS. L-60349-62; 29 DEC 1983] Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been
Facts: denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

Petitioners filed informations in the city court and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and Issue:
Examination had been conducted and that prima facie cases have been found. Upon receipt of
said informations, respondent judge set the hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety of Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against
issuance of warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent issued an order requiring petitioners them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
to submit to the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President.
support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings
of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge
respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscals certification in the issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if
informations of the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to any, to determine probable cause
issue warrants of arrest.
Held:
Issue:
With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary
Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a
the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing
presented during the preliminary investigation. counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case
actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that
Held: is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so
minded.
Judge may rely upon the fiscals certification for the existence of probable cause and on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the judge to come out with
the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of
judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
of arrest. If on the face of the information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard

Page 48
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return
personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of Issue:
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor)
the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
Held:
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge
to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
as to the existence of probable cause. through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor
Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The power of the President to order the arrest
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the
deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The
from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be
finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be seized.
sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts,
gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari
and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials
the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the
Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
M ORANO VS. VIVO
SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO [20 SCRA 562; G.R. L-22196; 30 JUN 1967]
[183 SCRA 145; G.R. NO. 81510; 14 MAR 1990]
Facts:
Facts:
Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines on November
Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left China and her children by a first marriage:
illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China. Chan Sau
him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing wah arrived in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage. Chan Sau
that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary
Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there visitor's visa for two months and after they posted a cash bond of 4,000 pesos. On January 1962,
will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this union on
means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license September 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah
or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962.
overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and
Page 49
her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected
upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters
bond. and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.

Issue: Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17
February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the
Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is unconstitutional. arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not
for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proc eedings.
Held: On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable
aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code.
Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. She is a non-
immigrant. Under Section 13 just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46
and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9. Therefore, of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special
first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign country; second, she must procure from the Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not
appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter undergo examination by the granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of
officials of the Bureau of Immigration at the port of entry for determination of her admissibility in Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
accordance with the requirements of the immigration Act. This Court in a number of cases has
ruled, and consistently too, that an alien admitted as a temporary visitor cannot change his or her
status without first departing from the country and complying with the requirements of Section 9 of
the Immigration Act. The gravamen of petitioners' argument is that Chan Sau Wah has, since her
entry, married in Manila a native-born Filipino, Esteban Morano. It will not particularly help analysis Issue:
for petitioners to appeal to family solidarity in an effort to thwart her deportation. Chan Sau Wah,
seemingly is not one who has a high regard for such solidarity. Proof: She left two of her children Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending
by the first marriage, both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China.Then, the wording of determination of existence of probable cause.
the statute heretofore adverted to is a forbidding obstacle which will prevent this Court from writing
into the law an additional provision that marriage of a temporary alien visitor to a Filipino would Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.
ipso facto make her a permanent resident in his country. This is a field closed to judicial action. No
breadth of discretion is allowed. We cannot insulate her from the State's power of deportation. it Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.
would be an easy matter for an alien woman to enter the Philippines as a temporary visitor, go
through a mock marriage, but actually live with another man as husband and wife, and thereby Held:
skirt the provisions of our immigration law. Also, a woman of undesirable character may enter this
country, ply a pernicious trade, marry a Filipino, and again throw overboard Sections 9 and 13 of While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the
the Act. Such a flanking movement, we are confident, is impermissible.Recently we confirmed the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The
rule that an alien wife of a Filipino may not stay permanently without first departing from the arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3
Philippines. Reason: Discourage entry under false pretenses. months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the
offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are
admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).
HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
[162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988] The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute
rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.)
Facts: Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the
search done was incidental to the arrest.
This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew
Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their
Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the
the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a
residences. The Operation Report read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal,
boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout although such confinement was illegal at the beginning.
in the after Mission Report read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and
subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now. The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with
Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised
Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon
Page 50
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of The proper procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation was not followed because of the
Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation following reasons. Firstly, the preliminary investigation was conducted by 3 different investigators,
proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive none of whom completed the preliminary investigation There was not one continuous proceeding
measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court but rather, cases of passing the buck, the last one being the OMB throwing the buck to the
proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended Sandiganbayan. Secondly, the charge of murder is a non bailable offense. The gravity of the
to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if offense alone should have merited a deeper and more thorough preliminary investigation. The
desired. OMB did nothing of the sort but wallowed the resolution of the graft investigator. He did a worse
job than the judge, by actually adopting the resolution of the graft investigator without doing
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the anything and threw everything to the Sandiganbayan for evaluation. Thirdly, a person under
sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in preliminary investigation by the OMB is entitled to a motion for reconsideration, as maintained by
the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people. the Rules of Procedure by the OMB. The filing of the motion for reconsideration is an integral part
of the preliminary investigation proper. The denial thereof is tantamount to the denial of the right
itself to a preliminary investigation. This fact alone renders preliminary investigation conducted in
this case incomplete. And lastly, it was patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on
SALES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN the OMBs certification of probable cause given the prevailing facts of the case much more so in
[369 SCRA 293 G.R. NO. 143802; 16 NOV 2001] the face of the latters flawed report and one side factual findings.

Facts: The court cannot accept the Sandiganbayans assertion of having found probable cause on its
own, considering the OMBs defective report and findings, which merely rekied on the testimonies
The petitioner, the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud Ilocos Norte, shot the former mayor and his of the witnesses for the prosecution and disregarded the evidence for the defense.
political rival Atty. Benemerito. After the shooting, he surrendered himself and hence the police
inspector and wife of the victim filed a criminal complaint for murder against him. The judge after Judgment is rendered setting aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, ordering the
conducting the preliminary examination (p.e. for brevity) found probable cause and issued a Sandiganbayan to quash the warrant of arrest and remanding the OMB for completion of the
warrant of arrest. Also after conducting the preliminary investigation (p.i. for brevity), he issued a preliminary investigation.
resolution forwarding the case to the prosecutor for appropriate action. Petitioner received a
subpoena directing him to file his counter affidavit, affidavit of witnesses and other supporting
documents. He did it the following day. While proceedings are ongoing, he filed a petition for SILVA VS. PRESIDING JUDGE
habeas corpus with the C.A alleging that: the warrant was null and void because the judge who [203 SCRA 140; G.R. No. 81756; 21 Oct 1991]
issued it was a relative by affinity of the private respondent and the p.e. and the p.i. were illegal
and irregular as the judge doesnt have jurisdiction on the case. The C.A. granted the petition Facts:
rd
holding that the judge was a relative by affinity by 3 degree to the private respondent and the p.i.
he conducted has 2 stages, the p.e. and the p.i. proper. The proceeding now consists only of one Sgt. Villamor, chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City filed an "application for
stage. He conducted the requisite investigation prior to the issuance of warrant of arrest. Moreover search warrant" and "Deposition of witness" against petitioner Nicomedes Silva and Martin Silva.
he did not complete it. He only examined the witness of the complainant. But the prosecution Judge Nickarter Ontal, then the presiding judge of RTC of Dumaguete issued Search Warrant
instead of conducting p.i. of his own forwarded the records to the Ombudsman (OMB for brevity) No.1 pursuant to the said applications for violation of RA 6425 Dangerous Drugs ACT of 1972.
for the latter to conduct the same. The OMB directed the petitioner to submit his counter affidavit, Such warrant states that there is a probable cause to believe that Mr. Tama Silva has the
but he did not comply with it finding the same superfluous. The graft investigator recommended possession and control of marijuana dried leaves, cigarette and joint. The warrant authorizes Sgt.
the filing of information for murder which the OMB approved. Petitioner received a copy of the Villamor to make an immediate search at any time of the room of Mr. Tama Silva at the residence
resolution but prevented seeking reconsideration thereof he filed a motion to defer issuance of of his father Comedes Silva and to open aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartons and containers to
warrant of arrest pending the determination of probable cause. The Sandiganbayan denied the look for said illegal drugs. In the course of the search, the officers seized money belonging to
motion. This is now a petition for review on the decision of the Sandiganbayan, Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40. Petitioner filed a motion to quash Search Warrant
No.1 on the ground that 1) it was issued on the sole basis of mimeographed 2) the judge failed to
Issue: personally examine the complainant and witness by searching questions and answers.

Whether or Not the OMB followed the procedure in conducting preliminary investigation. Issue:

Whether or Not petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to submit controverting Whether or Not Search Warrant No.1 is invalid. WON the officers abused their authority in seizing
evidence. the money of Antonieta Silva.

Held: Held:

Search Warrant No. 1 is invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness in the form of
Page 51
searching questions and answers. The questions asked were leading as they are answerable by The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house of herein petitioners in
mere yes or no. Such questions are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The Skyline Village to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa
questions were already mimeographed and all the witness had to do was fill in their answers on Veroy. The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard, and using the key entrusted to Edna
the blanks provided. Judge Ontal is guilty of grave abuse of discretion when he rejected the Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. However, a locksmith by the name of
motion of Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her money. George Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to the children's
room. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted the
The officers who implemented the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized search. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing seven (7) live
the money of Antonieta Silva. The warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only for bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing
marijuana leaves, cigarettes..etc. Search Warrant No. 1 is declared null and void. printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the children's room. A search of the children's
recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted polo shirts, men's brief,
*** Sec 4 Rule 126 Rules of Court two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve striped gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs men's
Examination of the complainant, record -the judge before issuing the warrant, personally examine socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a book
in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope,
any witness he may produce the facts personally known to them and attach to the record their a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the master's
sworn statements together with their affidavits. bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was instructed by Capt. Obrero to make an inventory and receipt of
the articles seized, in the house.

The case was referred for preliminary investigation to Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo
Ponferrada who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City. In a resolution dated
August 6, 1990, Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing of an information against herein
petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). No bail was recommended.

VEROY VS. LAYAGUE Issue:


[210 SCRA 97; G.R. No. 95630; 18 Jun 1992]
Whether or Not Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the third paragraph of Section 1 thereof,
Facts: is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.
Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. 13 Isidro St., Skyline
Village. Catalunan Grande, Davao City. When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the Held:
position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System sometime in June, 1988, he and
his family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East Kamias, Quezon City, where they are presently The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been laid to rest in the case of
residing. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to two (2) houseboys, Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court held that
Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The the declaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soguilon for the salary of the said houseboys and 1866 is wanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a possibility of
other expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of the a double jeopardy.
house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna
Soguilon to give her access in case of an emergency. Hence, since 1988, the key to the master's Petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential Decree No. 1866 is bereft
bedroom as well as the keys to the children's rooms were retained by herein Petitioners so that of merit. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute
neither Edna Soguilon nor the caretakers could enter the house. are not obscure or ambiguous. its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined
from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for
Police Officers had an information that the petitioners residence was being used as a safehouse construction. Petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is couched in
of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter general or vague terms. The terms "deal in", "acquire", "dispose" or "possess" are capable of
the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner Ma. various interpretations such that there is no definiteness as to whether or not the definition
Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to ask includes "constructive possession" or how the concept of constructive possession should be
permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and applied. Petitioners were not found in actual possession of the firearm and ammunitions. They
recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to were in Quezon City while the prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Yet they were being
Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole circumstance that the house wherein
presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long time family the items were found belongs to them.
friend of the Veroys.

Page 52
Petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Petitioners aver that while they Issue:
concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their
residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper.
soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once
inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their Held:
constitutional rights As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them.
No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized that the warrant
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalias therein. The seizure of the
Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant firearms was unconstitutional.
is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an
arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.
Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]).

None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of
herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel
soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because
he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself
recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but PEOPLE VS. GESMUNDO
rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted [219 SCRA 743; G.R. NO. 89373; 19 MAR 1993]
by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under
the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a search Facts:
warrant but did not.
According to the prosecution, in the morning of Nov. 17, 1986, PO Jos e Luciano gave money and
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow instructed his civilian informer to buy marijuana from the accused at the Cocoland Hotel. He
that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the actually saw the accused selling marijuana to his civilian informer and that same day Luciano
subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A applied for a search warrant.
search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being
applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the About 2pm that day, a police raiding team armed with a search warrant went to the Brgy captain
exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal for them to be accompanied in serving the said warrant at the residence of the accused. The
action against them for illegal possession of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 police was allowed to enter the house upon the strength of the warrant shown to the accused. The
[1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while accused begged the police not to search and to leave the house. The police still searched the
there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the house and was led to the kitchen. She pointed a metal basin on top of a table as the hiding place
knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime. of died marijuana flowering tops contained in a plastic bag marked ISETANN. The police also
recovered from a native uway cabinet dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in 3 pieces of
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal case against the petitioners komiks paper.
for illegal possession of firearms is DISMISSED.
According to the accused, when the police arrived at her house, she saw Sgt. Yte and PFC Jose
Luciano. She invited Sgt. Yte to enter her house while Luciano was left in the jeep that was parked
near the house. While inside the house Yte showed the accused something he claimed as a
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO search warrant, when someone coming from the kitchen uttered eto na They proceeded to the
[234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994] kitchen and saw Luciano holding a plastic bag with four other companions. They confronted the
accused and insisted that the bags belonged to her. Accused denied the accusation and told them
Facts: that she doesnt know anything about it. She was made to sign a prepared document. She was
brought to the police station and was detained.
Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal
possession and sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the The court renders judgment finding the accused guilty.
search warrant, which authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of
methamphetamine and its paraphernalias, an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Issue:
Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalias and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live
ammunition. Whether or Not the evidence was properly obtained by the police.
Page 53
Issue:
Held:
Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.
In the investigation report prepared by Luciano stated that during the search they discovered a
hole at the backyard of the house of the suspect, there was a big biscuit can inside the hole and Held:
on top of the cover a flower pot was placed wherein the marijuana was kept. However, there was
no mention of any marijuana obtained from a flower pot in any of their testimonies. There were Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization.
inconsistencies insofar the prosecution is concerned, as to what was recovered and where, the Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that
trial court concluded that these inconsistencies are trivial. There must sufficient evidence that the he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
marijuana was actually surrendered by the accused. As held in PP vs. Remorosa, Irreconcilable proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in
and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing
guilt of appellant and his culpability to the crime charged. crimes.

The claim that the marijuana was planted was strengthen as the police violated sec 7, rule 126
rules of the court provides no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made except PEOPLE VS. SUCRO
in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the [195 SCRA 388; G.R. No. 93239; 18 Mar 1991]
latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. Facts:
Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.
Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalados house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison
SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from
Regalados house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times.
The document (PAGPAPATUNAY) was inadmissible to the court as the accused was not informed These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with
of her right not to sign the document neither was she informed that she has the right to the appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment,
assistance of a counsel and the fact that it may be used as evidence against her. It was not P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in
proved that the marijuana belonged to her. Not only does the law require the presence of Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and
witnesses when the search is conducted, but it also imposes upon the person making the search Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea
the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the property seized. He is likewise required to deliver the bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of
property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true and accurate inventory the chapel.
thereof duly verified under oath. Again, these duties are mandatory and are required to preclude
substitution of the items seized by interested parties. The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans.
Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another
The guilt of the accused was has not been established. Judgment is reversed. teabag from Macabante.

UMIL VS. RAMOS Issue:


[187 SCRA 311; G.R. NO. 81567; 3 OCT 1991]
Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.
Facts:
Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible.
On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about Held:
a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot
wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec
murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense,
wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant
(22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna however it was disclosed later stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill
that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando requirements for its issuance. However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as
Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual
While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers
the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols. were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of
their duties.
Page 54
Exh. "B" Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds
contained inside a white colored plastic labelled "Robertson".
PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZA Exh. "C" Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana
[205 SCRA 791; G.R. No. 95902; 4 Feb 1992] fruiting tops having a total weight of seven grams then further wrapped
with a piece of aluminum foil.
Facts: Exh. "D" Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected
dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seventeen grams.
NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there was an ongoing Exh. "E" One plastic syringe.
illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given money
treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a certain Don. Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up
Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and a certain object wrapped in a plastic later raid in the house of Rodriguezas father. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of
identified as marijuana was given in exchange for P200. The agent went back to headquarters and the marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this
made a report, based on which, a team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained
the house of the father of the accused. During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved
confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There was no authorization with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
by any search warrant. The accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower court, Conviction is reversed and set aside and accused is acquitted.
considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty of
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE VS. SY CHUA
Issue: [396 SCRA 657; G.R. No.136066-67; 4 Feb 2003]

Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its judgment. Facts:

Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A.
6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal
Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations.
Held:
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-
The NARCOM agents procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City.
that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned themselves across
person posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual exchange. Said raid McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their
also violated accused right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not fall back up.
in the circumstances wherein a search may be validly made even without a search warrant, i.e.
when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view. Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and
The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a
the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced
already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent
raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2
time. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm
marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box,
appellant: he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small
transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters
advanced therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.
evidence against the appellant were the following items:
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following: of the incident.

Exh. "A"Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to
contained inside a transparent plastic bag. Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped
in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store,
Page 55
he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he called the attention of prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer
raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officers companions
arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car. him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a search and
seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not
Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and
minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative
reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellants business in the vicinity or the contents of
pictures were being taken. the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced
themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant.
The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him
for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court. In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk principles is applicable to
justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on
Issue: accused-appellant.

Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and (2) WON the search of his person Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted.
and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and
valid manner.
GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Held: [206 SCRA 138; G.R. NO. 101837; 11 FEB 1992]

The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will distribute Facts:
illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act
quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with
a stop and frisk. another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and
drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioners plate number and
The trial court confused the concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a search incidental to a lawful reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after
arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the
before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted
bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested
as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985
before a search can be madethe process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of
apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Issue:
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not act
in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.
accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
Reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause
that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Held:

With regard to the concept of stop-and frisk: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop- Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the
and-frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. however constituted continuing crimes, i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization,
Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the
Page 56
arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge
and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7,
Rule 112, does not apply. POSADAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
[188 SCRA 288; G.R. NO. 89139; 2 AUG 1990]

Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed Facts:
surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was
filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the
probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along
investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat. Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spot ted
Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached
case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his
upon posting a bail bond. attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where
they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds of
live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions
CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In
[77 SCRA 377; G.R. NOS. 24646 & L-24674; 20 JUN 1977] the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to
possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then
Facts: taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were
indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of
Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. The City Judge of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
Dagupan City, Felipe Villanueva, denied the motions to quash the complaints. Thus, petitioner
Callanta brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petitioner questions the validity of Issue:
the issuance of warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal should have
conducted the preliminary investigation. According to petitioners counsel, there was jurisdictional Whether or Not the warantless search is valid.
infirmity. After the issuance of the warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600, petitioner posted
the bail bond, thus obtaining her provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree Held:
with the judges investigation, and agreed with the complaints filed.
In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that under
Issue: Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be s earched for
dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search
Whether or Not petitioners contentions are to be given merit. warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the
circumstances.
Held:
in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was
Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, where the accused has filed bail and effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
waived the preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest. In the case at concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to
bar, it is futile for the petitioner to question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, inspect the same.
because she posted the bail bond. Petitioner also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can
conduct a preliminary investigation. According to the Charter of the City of Dagupan, the City It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the
Court of Dagupan City may also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without regard petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise
to the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind over any person charged with may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court. Petition for certiorari is denied.
Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted and set aside. Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed,
and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not
been violated.

Page 57
PEOPLE V. M ENGOTE
[210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992] Facts:

Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando
Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a
The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they
suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further
A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw investigations. The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the
two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They approached the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to
escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of Issue:
them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his
companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant.
police headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the
accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among the Held;
articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part,
Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest a
but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is
convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he attempting to commit an offense.
pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally
seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree. In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana and
can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that this case
Issue: poses urgency on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an informer pointed
to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The police officers
Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal. had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a search warrant.

Held:
PEOPLE VS. M ALMSTEDT
An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding [198 SCRA 401; G.R. No. 91107; 19 Jun 1991]
for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of
Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is Facts:
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged before the
committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a place RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. Then in the
committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their presence. 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada.
Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on
unexplained suspicion. At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted. ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to
establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was
received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM
PEOPLE VS. TANGLIBEN officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at
[184 SCRA 220; G.R. No.L-63630; 6 Apr 1990] about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
Page 58
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made
bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof. pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is
in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the arrested has committed it; and
bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
passport.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of
and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM
hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal
Laboratory for chemical analysis. effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
ACCUSEDS DEFENSE reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Warrantless
issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of
NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by
10 11
but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were
no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs against the
charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station. accused-appellant.

The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable
doubt. PEOPLE VS. AMMINUDIN
[163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869; 6 Jul 1988]

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, Facts:
accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a
search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from
search are not admissible as evidence against him. the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact
waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag
Issue: and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation.
The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore the RTC ruling be reversed. laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous
Held: Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y
Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both
were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the
Page 59
charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a Issue:
'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-
appellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, Whether or Not the warrantless search was valid.
averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs
of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was Held:
confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to
admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest The warrantless search was valid, as the accused was a passenger of a motor vehicle. There was
and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even probable cause to believe that the accused was carrying prohibited drugs. Three weeks earlier,
know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes agents of the Narcotics Command bought methamine hydrochloride from him. An agent of the
cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during Narcotics Command reported that the accused would be arriving on board the vessel and carrying
that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained. methamphetamine hydrochloride with him. Drug couriers do not go about their trade with some
external sign indicating that they are transporting prohibited drugs. This must be taken into
Issue: account in determining probable cause.

Whether or not search of defendants bag is legal.


PEOPLE VS. M USA
Held: [217 SCRA 597; G.,R. NO. 96177; 27 JAN 1993]

The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow Facts:
warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was
he about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct
appreciated as evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house and gave
charged. the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.

The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully buys
PEOPLE VS. SAYCON marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves
[236 SCRA 325; G.R. NO. 110995; 5 SEPT 1994] about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa
came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and
Facts: gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two
newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right
On or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the morning, the Coastguard personnel received hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside
information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a suspected "shabu" courier by the name the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to
of Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV Doa Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a
Dumaguete City. Upon receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin, cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa
instructed them to intercept the suspect. A combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana
Coastguard personnel consisting of CPO Tolin, a certain Miagme, and Senior Police Officers leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.
Ruben Laddaran and Winifredo Noble of NARCOM posted themselves at the gate of Pier 1. The
MV Doa Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1 in Dumaguete City. Alvaro Issue:
Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint manned by
the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by police officer Winifredo Noble of NARCOM. Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence,
Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area. He willingly went with inadmissible as evidence.
them. At the headquarters, the coastguard asked Saycon to open his bag, and the latter willingly
obliged. In it were personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was a Held:
Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu". When police officer Winifredo Noble asked
Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon merely Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence.
bowed his head. Then Saycon, his bag and the suspected "shabu" were brought to the NARCOM The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspects lawful arrest, may extend
office for booking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM agents did not have a beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
warrant of arrest. The PNP's Forensic Analyst declared in court that she had conducted an immediate control. Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to
examination of the specimens and found out that the specimens weighed 4.2 grams in total, have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine
consisted of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more widely known as "shabu." is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the
Page 60
object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the plain view of the 1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their
object. opinion an obscenity seizure is in order;
2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police. They arrested the obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant
accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences where they State interference and action;
found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately 3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is
apparent from the plain view of said object. to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judges sound discretion;
4. If in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it shall issue the search warrant
Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be prayed for;
presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. 5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the RPC (Obscene
publications).
PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the
[178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO. 80806; 5 OCT 1989] properties seized are indeed obscene.

Facts:
GUANZON VS. DE VILLA
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of [181 SCRA 623; G.R. 80508; 30 JAN 1990]
Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services
Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and Facts:
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted
indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target
Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the
student organizations. policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents
were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip
co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that
they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported
against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered
the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations. The respondents said
magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to
decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in
protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements
filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, coddled by the communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have
confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign
for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for media joined the operation to witness and record such event.
trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights.
Whether or Not the seizure was illegal.
Held:
Held:
It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the
The Court ruled that the government authorities have not shown the required proof to justify a ban methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it
and to warrant confiscation of the literature. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any
order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that
search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court provides the following guidelines to be the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights
observed: of the squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should not be
brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly
charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom
Page 61
the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given. 7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and
restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC seizure can be lawfully conducted.
of Manila.
The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and
was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime.
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accuseds bag, there was no
[288 SCRA 626; G.R. NO. 120515; 13 APR 1998] probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.

Facts: The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The seized
marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.
On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain Aling Rosa will be
arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next day,
at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the informer RULE 113, RULES OF COURT
pointed out who Aling Rosa was, the team approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents. When Abello asked aling Rosa about the contents of her bag, the latter Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without
handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked a warrant, arrest a person:
cash katutak.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
of the search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie Balweg. While about to cross the road an based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested by the arrested has committed it; and
police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman was nowhere to be (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
found. Also, no search warrant was presented. establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972 confinement to another.

Issue: In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused. accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

Held:
RULE 126, RULES OF COURT
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule warrant shall be filed with the following:
8
126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where
present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
must be immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search; However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's court where the criminal action is pending.
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to
cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any
4. Consented warrantless search; outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the
5. Customs search; warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
6. Stop and Frisk;
Page 62
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon.

(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if
the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant
was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been
made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained
with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see
to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book
on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other
actions of the judge.

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.

Page 63
[142 SCRA 149; G.R. NO. L-62100; 30 MAY 1986]

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL Facts:

Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a
Art 3, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same.
provided by law. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals
seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove,
respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ
[82 PHIL 851; NO.L-2690; 1 JAN 1949] commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Facts:
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which
This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment
agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, Issue:
which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was
restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.
transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed
to leave. Held:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
Issue: necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon
petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates
Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
returning the advance payment it gave? Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner
has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business
Held: transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.

An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or


maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force M ARCOS VS. M ANGLAPUS
has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989]
deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another,
freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to Facts:
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an
impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos
psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to
duress or physical coercion. return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They
contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
M ANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Page 64
Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) Held:
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued by
Held: reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the right to
travel, it is imposed that the accused must make himself available whenever the court requires his
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the presence. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p.
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a
country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where
travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a par. ]).
state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct
rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of
the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or
movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can
including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas,
country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987
limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime
liberty of abode and the right to travel. when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon
application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International
Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure
from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People
that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and
interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to
return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Court Orders and processes
Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ
[217 SCRA 633; G.R. NOS. 99289-90; 27 JAN 1993]

Facts:

SILVERIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft
[195 SCRA 760 ; G.R. 94284; 8 APR 1991] and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000
so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan
Facts: issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount
of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act. Respondent and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The
filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure order. The RTC ordered Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement
the DFA to cancel petitioners passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not been she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant
arraigned and there was evidence to show that the accused has left the country with out the motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is impaired.
knowledge and the permission of the court.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or Not the petitioners right to travel is impaired.
Page 65
latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings (3) said that there was no
Held: necessity to get medical treatment abroad.

The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement, that she he Held:
every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds the
course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go No. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid to contact a third party asking the latter to give
abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings was erroneous. Respondent court had to
respondent courts inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction over seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician. The
the case and the person of the accused. court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving her
request for permission to travel. What would be objectionable would be if respondent court
Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself amenable obtained information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in deciding a case
at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the against them.
country during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)
In disregarding the medical reports, the petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. It
should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in
M ARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending
[247 SCRA 127; G.R. NO. 115132-34; 9 AUG 1995] reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was
on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek
Facts: medical treatment in foreign countries.

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and in grave abuse of discretion resolutions On the third issue, the Court ordered petitioner to undergo several tests which summarily states
of the Sandiganbayan's First Division denying petitioner's motion for leave to travel abroad for that the required medical treatment was available here in the Philippines and that the expertise
medical treatment. and facilities here were more than adequate to cater to her medical treatment. The heart ailments
of the petitioner were not as severe as that was reported by Dr. Anastacio.
The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan of
violating 3 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction she filed a "Motion for Wherefore, the petitioner is Dismissed without prejudice to the filling of another motion for leave to
Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of oriental travel abroad, should petitioner still desire, based on her heart condition. In such an event the
medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical condition" requiring determination of her medical condition should be made by joint panel of medical specialists
facilities not available in the Philippines that was denied. Then she again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte recommended by both the accused and the prosecution.
Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. This was
supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto Anastacio.
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF M INDORO
Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US and Europe for treatment of several [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]
Heart diseases alleging that the tests were not available here.
Facts:
The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the
Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter, asking for "expert opinion on coronary The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants
medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners motion to leave and denied all of (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It
the motions. is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the
sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said
Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report and letters of Vice homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.
President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of
twenty four members of the House of Representatives requesting the court to allow petitioner to In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the
travel abroad. This was also denied by the Court also stating their express disapproval of the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
involvement of the VP and the Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions, decisions or districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the
orders or any judicial action of respondent court. site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order
shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of
Issue: the revised Administrative Code.

Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in disallowing the Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad
because it (1) disregarded the medical findings (2) it motu propio contacted a third party asking the
Page 66
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Issue:

Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode.
Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Held:

The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his
liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate
exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people
of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige
them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the
necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines.

Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and
for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do
exactly as he pleases.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus
can, therefore, not issue.

Page 67
Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of
April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the
Art 3, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through
the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, the selling of tickets and cash donations.
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the
for the exercise of civil or political rights. caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in
his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would
be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saints feast
AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ day.
[64 PHIL 201; G.R. NO. 45459; 13 MAR 1937]
These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The
Facts: image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a
mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it
Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from was the churchs property since church funds were used in its acquisition.
rd
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33 International Eucharistic Congress.
Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against
funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a
provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said
avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that
1 2
their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, Sec. 8 Article IV and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) of the constitution was violated.
providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage
stamps as would be advantageous to the government. Issue:

Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion. Held:

Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring
What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity
however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal.
human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to Practically, the image was placed in a laymans custody so that it could easily be made available
his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the
its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 advantageous to councils funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the
the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no
not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity which
sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and
with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress. The focus of the stamps was not banning the use of public money or property.
the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to to
advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS. CITY OF M ANILA
considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably [101P HIL 386; G.R. NO. 9637; 30 APR 1957]
linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it
was no the aim or purpose of the Government. Facts:

GARCES VS. ESTENZO New Yorks Education Law requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge
[104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25 MAY 1981] to all students in grade 7 to 12, including those in private schools. The Board of Education
contended that said statute was invalid and violative of the State and Federal Constitutions. An
Facts: order barring the Commissioner of Education (Allen) from removing appellants members from
office for failure to comply with the requirement and an order preventing the use of state funds for
Page 68
the purchase of textbooks to be lent to parochial schools were sought for. The trial court held the
statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint Whether or Not there was a violation of the constitutional freedom.
since the appellant have no standing. The New York Court of Appeals, ruled that the appellants
have standing but the law is not unconstitutional. Held:

Issue: Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to conduct an anti-
government demonstration since they wore yellow T-shirts, raised their clenched fists and shouted
Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free anti- government slogans. While every citizen has the right to religious freedom, the exercise must
exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant). be done in good faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was designed to protect the
lives of the President and his family, government officials and diplomatic and foreign guests
Held: transacting business with Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to secure the executive
offices within the Malacanang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. (Minority
Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that: opinion) The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of the freedom of
religion is the existence of a grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right to prevent. The
exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger lies on the officials who would
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be restrain petitioners. Respondents were in full control and had the capability to stop any untoward
required for the exercise of civil or political rights. move. There was no clear and present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the security of
Malacanang.
The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU
[219 SCRA 256 ; G.R. NO. 95770; 1 MAR 1993]
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets
was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that Facts:
appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For
this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated for
amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and raising same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents acted without or in excess of
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and
beliefs. GS students of Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Caracar, Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Public school
authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge recite the Panatang Makabayan required by RA1265. They are Jehovahs Witnesses believing
upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They
practices. contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official
control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v.
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, Secretary of Education. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the
however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesnt involve any religious
2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to ceremony. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not mean
license or tax the business of plaintiff Society. exception from non-discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag and singing national anthem. This
WHEREFORE, defendant shall return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it. exemption disrupts school discipline and demoralizes the teachings of civic consciousness and
duties of citizenship.

GERMAN VS. BARANGAN Issue:


[135 SCRA 514; G.R. NO. 68828; 27 MAR 1985]
Whether or Not religious freedom has been violated.
Facts:
Held:
Petitioners converged at J.P. Laurel Street to hear Mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which adjoined
Malacaang. Respondent barred them for security reasons. Petitioners filed a petition for Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to religious
mandamus. worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought. 2.)
Freedom to act on ones belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation to
Issue: religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and
Page 69
interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from the school is not adopts the majority rule then the majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence to duly constituted
justified. authorities within the congregation, then that should be followed.

The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and teachers who
refuse to obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and religious profession and PAMIL VS. TELECOM
worship. Jehovahs Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right [86 SCRA 413; G.R. 34854; 20 NOV 1978]
does not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students expelled
were only standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesnt Facts:
present any danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioners request is
exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools. The expulsion of the Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected as Municipal Mayor in Alburquerque, Bohol. Petitioner, also an
students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizens right to free education. aspirant for said office, then filed a suit for quo warranto for Gonzagas disqualification based on
The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of patriotism and the Administrative Code provision: In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal
civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes, civic consciousness and office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from
form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore, expulsion due to religious beliefs is provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." The respondent
unjustified. Judge, in sustaiing Fr. Gonzagas right to the office, ruled that the provision had already been
impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. Petitioner on the other hand argues that there
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. Expulsion is ANNULLED. was no implied repeal.

Issue:
FONACIER VS. COURT OF APPEALS
[96 PHIL 417; G.R. L-5917; 28 JAN 1955] Whether or Not Fr. Gonzaga is eligible for the position of municipal mayor, according to law.

Facts:
Whether or Not the prohibition regarding elected or appointed ecclesiastics is constitutional.
Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI), represented by its supreme bishop Gerardo
Bayaca, against Bishop Fonacier seeking to render an accounting of his administration of all the Held:
temporal properties and to recover the same on the ground that he ceased to be the supreme
bishop of IFI. Isabelo De los Reyes Jr. had been elected as the Supreme Bishop. The court was divided. Five voted that the prohibition was not unconstitutional. Seven others voted
that the provision was impliedly repealed. However, the minority vote overruled the seven.
Petitioner claims that he was not properly removed as Supreme Bishop and his legal successor According to the dissenting seven, there are three reasons for the said provision to be inoperative.
was Juan Jamias. He claims that the there was an accounting of his administration and was First, the 1935 Constitution stated, No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
turned over to bishop Jamias. Also, that Isabelo De los Reyes and Bayaca have abandoned their political rights. Second, said section 2175 is superseded by the Constitution. Third, section 2175
faith and formally joined the Prostestant Episcopal Church of America. has been repealed by Sec. 23 of the Election Code (1971): Appointive public office holders and
active members of the Armed Forces are no longer disqualified from running for an elective office.
CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme Ecclesiastics were no longer included in the enumeration of persons ineligible under the said
Bishop of IFI and ordered Fonacier to render an accounting of his admistration Election Code. On the other hand, the controlling five argued: Section 2175 of the Administrative
CA affirmed the decision of the CFI Code deals with a matter different from that of section 23 of the Election Code. Also, section 2175
of the Administrative Code did not violate the right to freedom of religion because it did not give
Issue: any requirement for a religious test.

Whether or not the petitioner should still be regarded as the legitimate supreme bishop of IFI. The view of the dissenting seven failed to obtain a vote of eight members, so it was not controlling.
The provision of the Administrative Code remained operative.
Held:

Supreme Court affirmed CAs decision. The legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI is Isabelo De los ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR
Reyes, Jr. The Supreme Court affirms the validity of the election of Bishop Delos Reyes as the [492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-02-1651; 22 JUN 2006]
Supreme Bishop based on their internal laws
Facts:
To finally dispose of the property issue, the Court, citing Watson v. Jones,368 declared that the
rule in property controversies within religious congregations strictly independent of any other Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
superior ecclesiastical association (such as the Philippine Independent Church) is that the rules for Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him
resolving such controversies should be those of any voluntary association. If the congregation
Page 70
as well. Respondents husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal certifications in
still legally married to another woman. the Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient
manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if Petitioner alleges that, the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food
the court allows such act. producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the
Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe Jehovahs certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a Declaration products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct
of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office.
when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
On 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the Philippine
Issue: Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under
the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement. related regulatory activities.

Issue:

Held: Whether or Not EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. Held:
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal
States interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only
or her partner. Thus the States interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein
unenforced prohibition. respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function like certifying qualified food
products as halal. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal
This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it food.
does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a
compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on
legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA
an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion. the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim
Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government
agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human
ISLAMIC DA' WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the
[405 SCRA 497;GR 153888; 9 JUL 2003] religious freedom of Muslims.

Facts:

Petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) is a corporation that operates
under Department of Social Welfare and Development, a non-governmental organization that
extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be
a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international organizations
such as the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The
Page 71
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The reason for the enactment, as the state court has said, is that prosecutions to enforce penal
statutes for libel do not result in 'efficient repression or suppression of the evils of scandal.' In the
Art 3, Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of present instance, the proof was that nine editions of the newspaper or periodical in question were
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for published on successive dates, and that they were chiefly devoted to charges against public
redress of grievances. officers and in relation to the prevalence and protection of crime. In such a case, these officers are
not left to their ordinary remedy in a suit for libel, or the authorities to a prosecution for criminal
Art 3, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be libel. The statute not only operates to suppress the offending newspaper or periodical, but to put
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, the publisher under an effective censorship.
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to
forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper,
Art 3, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity.
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged. The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in case
of its abuse.' Public officers, whose character and conduct remain open to debate and free
Art 3, Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and discussion in the press, find their remedies for false accusations in actions under libel laws
aspirations. providing for redress and punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain the publication of
newspapers and periodicals.

NEAR VS. MINNESOTA Characterizing the publication as a business, and the business as a nuisance, does not permit an
[283 US 697] invasion of the constitutional immunity against restraint. Nor can it be said that the constitutional
freedom from previous restraint is lost because charges are made of derelictions which constitute
Facts: crimes.

A complaint alleged that the defendants, on September 24, 1927, and on eight subsequent dates The preliminary freedom, by virtue of the very reason for its existence, does not depend, as this
in October and November, 1927, published and circulated editions of The Saturday court has said, on proof of truth.
Press(published in Minneapolis) which were 'largely devoted to malicious, scandalous and
defamatory articles'(based on Session Laws of Minnesota). The articles charged, in substance,
provides that a Jewish gangster was in control of gambling, bootlegging, and racketeering in GROSJEAN VS. AMERICAN PRESS CO.
Minneapolis, and that law enforcing officers and agencies were not energetically performing their [297 US 233]
duties. Most of the charges were directed against the chief of police; he was charged with gross
neglect of duty, illicit relations with gangsters, and with participation in graft. The county attorney Facts:
was charged with knowing the existing conditions and with failure to take adequate measures to
remedy them. The mayor was accused of inefficiency and dereliction. One member of the grand The nine publishers(corporations) who brought the suit publish thirteen newspapers and these
jury was stated to be in sympathy with the gangsters. A special grand jury and a special thirteen publications are the only ones within the state of Louisiana having each a circulation of
1
prosecutor were demanded to deal with the situation in general, and, in particular, to investigate more than 20,000 copies per week. The suit assailed Act No. 23 of the Louisiana Legislature, as
an attempt to assassinate one Guilford, one of the original defendants, who, it appears from the their freedom of the press was abridged in contravention to the due process clause.
articles, was shot by gangsters after the first issue of the periodical had been published. Now
defendants challenged the Minnesota statute which provides for the abatement, as a public Issue:
nuisance, of a malicious, scandalous and defamatory news paper, magazine or other periodical.
The District Court ruled against defendants. Hence the appeal. Whether or Not Act 23 unconstitutional.

Issue: Held:

Whether or Not the proceeding authorized by the statute herein constitutes an infringement of the Yes. Freedom of speech and of the press are rights of the same fundamental character,
freedom of the press. safeguarded by the due process of law clause. The word 'liberty' contained in that amendment
embraces not only the right of a person to be free from physical restraint, but the right to be free in
Held: the enjoyment of all his faculties as well.
The Act operates as a restraint in a double sense. First, its effect is to curtail the amount of
Yes. The insistence that the statute is designed to prevent the circulation of scandal which tends revenue realized from advertising; and, second, its direct tendency is to restrict circulation. This is
to disturb the public peace and to provoke assaults and the commission of crime is unavailing.
Page 72
plain enough when we consider that, if it were increased to a high degree, as it could be if valid it government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign
well might result in destroying both advertising and circulation. fevers and foreign shot and shell.

Judge Cooley has laid down the test to be applied: The evils to be prevented wer e not the
censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might GONZALES VS. COMELEC
prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to [27 SCRA 835; G.R. L-27833; 18 APR 1969]
prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.
Facts:
The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money from the pockets of the appellees. It is
bad because, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates
circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. A and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on
free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people. constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom
of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at
The form in which the tax is imposed is in itself suspicious. It is not measured or limited by the the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the
volume of advertisements. It is measured alone by the extent of the circulation of the publication in Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently
which the advertisements are carried, with the plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a
curtailing the circulation of a selected group of newspapers. registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the
further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign
are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or
NEW YORK TIMES VS. UNITED STATES curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and
[403 US 713] that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the
absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of
Facts: petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as
amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on
The court granted certiorari in the cases in which the United States seeks to enjoin the New York the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its
Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled "History enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil
of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." Said articles reveal the workings of of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted
government that led to the Vietnam war. The Government argues that "the authority of the campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of
Executive Department to protect the nation against publication of information whose disclosure efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties
would endanger the national security stems from two interrelated sources: the constitutional power Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their
of the President over the conduct of foreign affairs and his authority as Commander-in-Chief. In opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.
such case the Executive Branch seeks judicial aid in preventing publication. The court ruled in
favor of the newspaper companies hence the appeal.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.
Whether or not the freedom of the press was abridged.
Held:

Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable
criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the clear and present
Yes. To find that the President has "inherent power" to halt the publication of news by resort to the danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the
courts would wipe out the First Amendment (Bill of Rights) and destroy the fundamental liberty and comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
security of the very people the Government hopes to make "secure." before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil'
sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a
No branch of government could abridge the people's rights granted by the Constitution including definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly
the freedom of the press. The language of the First Amendment support the view that the press established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words uttered create a dangerous
must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not
restraints. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated.
people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language
paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is

Page 73
sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of
religious exercise and expression.
The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more
precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the Held:
clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Taada clearly explained, such provisions were
deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden
not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of
invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTCs ruling clearly suppresses
petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. attack is
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet different from offend any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however,
in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are
often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion.
or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it
publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our
whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by
against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command. encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to
prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that
infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to
avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about
especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive
[259 SCRA 529; G.R. NO. 119673; 26 JUL 1996] and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar
because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech.
Facts: Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal
connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The
Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls
Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which
religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior
Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.
VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series
as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the ADIONG VS. COMELEC
Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter [207 SCRA 712; G.R. NO. 103956; 31 MAR 1992]
of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez
reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected Facts:
by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode
poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which provides that decals and stickers may be
respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner posted only in any of the authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile" plac es, public or
to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series private. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now
Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. assails the Resolution. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and
1
1986 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave
literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be and irreparable injury with this prohibition.
condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic
and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this Issue:
petition.
Whether or Not the COMELECs prohibition unconstitutional.
Issue:
Page 74
Held: and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b)
abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign
The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. The preferred or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on
freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so- quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby
called balancing of interests individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
the other is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also
gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, Issue:
and orderly elections. When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a
candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.
intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should
lean in favor of freedom. The regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of Held:
validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts
one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom
the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with
with the constitutionally sanctioned objective. Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited
period i.e., "during the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at
endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional
activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free s peech and rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall
expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may
and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a be defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or
clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or
of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during an election
agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media
it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the
own and not of anybody else. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of
is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.
privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time
to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by
The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates,
except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship. their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does
not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or
editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact
[201 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653; 5 MAR 1992] advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read
as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by
Facts: candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political
advertisements of particular candidates.
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from
selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is
candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 not unduly repressive or unreasonable.
elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and
of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that
1
Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees US VS. BUSTOS
comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 [37 PHIL. 731; G.R. L-12592; 8 MAR 1918]
(b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with
criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or Facts:
political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in
derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information
Page 75
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and Facts:
prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the
law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of
Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services
and asking for his removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace include the Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and
solicitation of money from persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks,
alleged that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and
libelous against him. indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto
Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various
Issue: student organizations.

Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and
and free press. co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.

Held:
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of
The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a
the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is
suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure,
dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition
the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for
trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet Issue:
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.
for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume
responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient Held:
administration of justice and of public affairs.
Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say,
and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial
administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the
sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or
pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the
their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or
apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided
person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The government
authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding
presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure,
discover grounds of malice or falsity. by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of
a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;

PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are
[178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989] obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant
State interference and action;
Page 76
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that
to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judges sound discretion; petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were
held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy.

AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional
[160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988] freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a
requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
Facts: presentation of events.

Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions,
envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, LOPEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The [34 SCRA 116; L-26549; 31 JUL 1970]
Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted.
Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. Facts:

It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" In the early part of January, 1956, there appeared on the front page of The Manila Chronicle, of
style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual which petitioner Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story of a sanitary
documentary footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz, sending a distress signal to a passing
Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. An American Army
script. plane dropping on the beach of an island an emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other
things, a two-way radio set. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his were living in terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1955. Losing no time,
name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or the Philippines defense establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers. Upon
other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and arriving Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man named Fidel
the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the Cruz who merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major Encarnacion
projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. branded as a "hoax," the report of respondent.
RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or
his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial article
on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal. to it in its issue of January 15, 1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz story turned out to
be false it brought attention to the government that people in that most people in the area are sick
Issue: sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce.

Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated. The magazine carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the
pictures that were published were that of private respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman
contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the photographs of respondent Cruz and
that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file in the library of the Manila Chronicle but when
the news quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were in advertently switched. However a
Held: correction was published immediately.

Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion Respondent sued petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of damages
pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of his picture. Defense interposed that
Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity they are beating the deadline. The court ruled in his favor. Hence the appeal.
expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of
expression. Issue:

The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Whether or Not petitioners abused the freedom of the press.
Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would
precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of Held:
any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates
to a highly critical stage in the history of the country. No. The SC, quoting Quisumbing v. Lopez, found for plaintiff, but with reduced damages, since the
error in this case could have been checked considering that this was a weekly magazine and not a
daily. The ruling: "there is no evidence in the record to prove that the publication of the news item
Page 77
under consideration was prompted by personal ill will or spite, or that there was intention to do be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national
harm,' and that on the other hand there was 'an honest and high sense of duty to serve the best emergency.
interests of the public, without self-seeking motive and with malice towards none.' Every citizen of
course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of
respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational
of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious
courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be
good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in
honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of
serious injury to the state.
No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what
otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory
imputation resulting from the publication of respondent's picture with the offensive caption as in the Z ALDIVAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
case here complained of. This is merely to underscore the primacy that freedom of the press [170 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 79690-707; 1 FEB 1989]
enjoys.
Facts:

PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from
[80 PHIL 71; L-1800; 27 JAN 1948] investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondents powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded by
Facts: the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the
State, and can only conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the
An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included
to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That he had
alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go slow on
ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from
the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will
tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned respondent was called
constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against two
order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SCs order '"heightens the
Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have
misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free was publicized in
or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or leading newspapers.
disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec.
1
1119, Free use of Public Place. Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be
punished for contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the media.
Issue: Respondent then sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution
of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the
Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated. whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on
responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that
Held: respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of
judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court and
Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his
constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible
refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt
the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to charges."
reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view
to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by Issue:
others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court
favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression.
the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may
Page 78
Held: been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions.
There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
tendency," it was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court rights, and liberties of citizens.
which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice." With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could be
shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.
that the statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a
manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will
evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public
destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to
of the courts, which has some implications to the society. its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification
REYES VS. BAGATSING that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to
[125 SCRA 553; L-65366; 9 NOV 1983] applicants for the denial.

Facts: BAYAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA


[488 SCRA 226; G.R. NO. 169838; 25 APR 2006]
Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October
26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United Facts:
States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be
held. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. That Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYANs rally was violently
would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they
session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful
exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of Calibrated Preemptive
taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied. Reference Response (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a
was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them
infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of
attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also
or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the UST and going
may be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them
ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them.
evil that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is Three other rallyists were arrested.
violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a
radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in
Hence the Court resolves. toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They
seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy
Issue: announced on Sept. 21, 2005.

Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated. Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
Held: Philippines is a signatory.

Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless
that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and
places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly
dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be form part of the message for which the expression is sought.
no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the
choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it
Page 79
puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet
a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere complied with Section 15 of the law.
regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra
vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being
void for being vague and for lack of publication. FERNANDO VS. ESTORNINOS
[G.R. NO 159751; 6 DEC 2006]
KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P.
No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the Facts:
legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the
Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of the PNP Criminal
comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital Region conducted police surveillance on
events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to the store Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair) in Quiapo. A Search Warrant for
the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the violation of Article 201 of RPC against petitioner and a certain Warren Tingchuy and the seizure of
rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy. the following items:
Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the
Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably a. Copies of New Rave Magazines with nude obscene pictures;
assemble. b. Copies of IOU Penthouse Magazine with nude obscene pictures;
c. Copies of Hustler International Magazine with nude obscene pictures; and
Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent d. Copies of VHS tapes containing pornographic shows.
grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and
trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. The police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five VHS tapes(among of which is
According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. Kahit sa Pangarap Lang with Myra Manibog as actress who is naked) and ten different
880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that magazines(Dalaga, Penthouse, Swank, Erotic, Rave, Playhouse, Gallery, QUI), which they
B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies. deemed pornographic. Petitioners were charged and convicted. CA affirmed the decision hence
this appeal.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.
Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming RTCs decision.
Held:
Held:
No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise
the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. No. As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in
880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, pursuing its mandate to protect the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must
place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use justify the regulation or limitation. (Kottinger Rule Applied).
public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and
1
entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is M ALABANAN VS. RAMENTO
independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, [129 SCRA 359; G.R. NO.62270; 21 MAY 1984]
since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
Facts:
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must
be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought
by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00
maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void. P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general
assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby.
for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day,
municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area
giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain
on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on
Page 80
September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under preventive suspension for their unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or
failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students,
petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents and before therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline.
the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the
charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting Issue:
in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic
year. Hence this petition. Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed.

Issue: Held:

Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution
there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech. is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations.
The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school
Held: presupposes that conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it
stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not
Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking
place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public
disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, IN RE: TULFO
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." [A.M. NO. 90-4-1545-0; 17 APR 1990]

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational Facts:
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public
interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a In Oct. 13, 1989, Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On Target' stating that the Supreme
showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. Court rendered an idiotic decision in legalizing checkpoints, and again on Oct. 16, 1989, where he
As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or called the Supreme Court stupid and "sangkatutak na mga bobo justices of the Philippine
utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an Supreme Court". Tulfo was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being Tulfo said that he was just reacting emotionally because he had been a victim of harassment in
susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school the checkpoints, and "idiotic" meant illogical and unwise, and "bobo" was just quoted from other
premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny attorneys, and since the case had been decided and terminated, there was not contempts. Lastly,
such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the the article does not pose any clear and present danger to the Supreme court.
time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-
academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should Issue:
not be disproportionate to the offense.
Whether or Not Tulfo is in contempt.

NON VS. DAMES


[185 SCRA 523; G.R. NO. 89317; 20 MAY 1990] Held:

Facts: Yes. At the time Tulfo wrote the article, the checkpoints case had not yet been decided upon, and
the Supreme Court was still acting on an MR filed from the CA. The power to punish is inherent as
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were it is essential for self-preservation. Contempt of court is defiance of the authority, justice and
not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating dignity of the courts. It brings disrepute to the court. There are two kinds of publications which can
in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests be punished for contempt:
is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.
a. those whose object is to affect the decision in a pending case.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but b. those whose object is to bring courts to discredit. Tulfo's article constituted both.
the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs.
1
PSBA , which was also applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege to It should have been okay to criticize if respectful language was used, but if its object is only to
be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its degrade and ridicule, then it is clearly an obstruction of justice. Nothing constructive can be gained
enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini from them. Being emotional is no excuse for being insulting. Quoting is not an excuse also,
College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are because at the end of his article, Tulfo said, "So you bobo justices, watch out!" Also, he said he
Page 81
was not sorry for having written the articles. employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they
believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in
Tulfo is found in contempt of court and is gravely censured. which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally
affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and
PBM EMPLOYEES VS. PBM brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the
[51 SCRA 189; G.R. NO. L-31195; 5 JUN 1993] primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration
Facts: against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining
and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective
union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as
petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly
Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are
Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is
Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the
cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial
the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged
dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel police persecution.
manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed
by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because
such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not
be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts
should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge
against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic
Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'
Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.

Held:

Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm
to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to
work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not
even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their
freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of
local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for
their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2
o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The
Page 82
THE IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
Facts:

Art 3, Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly
the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA. On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto
Padilla and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on
RUTTER VS. ESTEBAN installments over two parcels of land of the Subdivision. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees
[93 PHIL 68; NO.L-3708; 18 MAY 1953] transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon
completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of
Facts: sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale
contained the stipulations or restrictions that:
On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the Manila for P9,600 of
which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or 1. The parcel of land shall be used exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall not
before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7 be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to
percent per annum. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has been the Seller.
constituted in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as 2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed at
well as the interest that had accrued and so Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due, any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly painted, (b) provided
the interest due and the attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the with modern sanitary installations connected either to the public sewer or to an
properties mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2) meters from
contracted and that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage its boundary lines.
Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under
section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law), payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. Lot 5 directly from Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic
lapse of eight years. The complaint was dismissed. A motion for recon was made which assails Flour Mills by deed of exchange, with same restrictions. Plaintiff claims that restriction is for the
the constitutionality of RA 342. beautification of the subdivision. Defendant claimed of the commercialization of western part of
EDSA. Defendant began constructing a commercial bank building. Plaintiff demand to stop it,
Issue: which forced him to file a case, which was later dismissed, upholding police power. Motion for
recon was denied, hence the appeal.
Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment clause grounds.
Issue:
Held:
Whether or Not non-impairment clause violated.
Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the
medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of police power. The Held:
economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective
power notwithstanding interference with contracts. The question is not whether the legislative No. Resolution is a valid exercise of police power. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through
action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic
addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare
end. of the residents in its route. Health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in
the locality are justifications for this. It should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts
However based on the Presidents general SONA and consistent with what the Court believes to is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the
be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, declared that the continued legitimate exercise of police power.
operation and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and
should not be prolonged should be declared null and void and without effect. This holds true as
regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and reason considering that said
Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the
enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations. LOZANO VS. M ARTINEZ
[146 SCRA 323; NO.L-63419; 18 DEC 1986]

Facts:

ORTIGAS VS. FEATI BANK A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made,
[94 SCRA 533; NO.L-24670; 14 DEC 1979] contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was
Page 83
denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The
Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme
Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to
intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.

Issue:

Whether or Not BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. Whether or not BP 22 transgresses the


constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

Held:

The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful"
contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Checks can not be categorized
as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a
convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free
from the regulatory power of the state.

The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that
is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which
the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation.

Page 84
persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder
relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
EX POST FACTO LAWS
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies
Art 3, Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors.
The Acts focus is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was
PEOPLE VS. FERRER acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element
[48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC 1972] of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a members
direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement
Facts: to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti- Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after
Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act
against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8.
Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for made.
being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the
Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine
Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the
Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of Freedom
of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP of Expression and Association in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements
regardless of voluntariness. in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that
whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of
similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the DEMOCRACY.
Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow
the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to
means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:
Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable.
Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be 1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization
made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a
evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done
death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. by overt acts.
Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if 2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is
thought, assembly and association. willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

Issue: The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme
Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held:

The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the
substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be
measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
[128 SCRA 383; NO.L-61776 TO NO.L-61861; 23 MAR 1984]
Page 85
to Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976 of a free patent title for a lot
Facts: in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. He misrepresented to a
Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the lands subject herein are disposable lands,
Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru thereby inducing said inspector to recommend approval of his application for free patent. On
falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his August 10, 1989 an information for violation of RA 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was
alleged involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry then filed in the Sandiganbayan after an ex parte preliminary investigation. A motion to quash the
of education and culture, with some other employees from the said ministry. The bureau of information was filed by the private respondent contending among others that he is charged for an
treasury and the teachers camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious offence which has prescribed. Said motion was granted. The crime was committed on January 21,
TCAA checks for the nom-existent obligations of the teachers camp resulting in damage to the 1976, period of prescription was 10 years, therefore it has prescribed in 1986. Now the motion to
st
government of several millions. The 1 32 cases were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for quash was being assailed.
municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980. but on May 1980
Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together with his other co-accused Issue:
in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against them.
Whether or Not the motion to quash validly granted.
On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019.
Held:
Issue:
Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the computation of the period for the prescription of the crime is
Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto law. governed by Sec. 29 of Act No. 3326, which begins to run from the day of the commission of the
crime and not the discovery of it. Additionally, BP 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982,
Held: amending Sec. 11 of RA 3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of the period for the prescription or
extinguishment of a violation of RA 3019 may not be given retroactive application to the crime
The court finds no merit in the petitioners contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas which was committed by Paredes, as it is prejudicial to the accused. To apply BP 195 to Paredes
1
Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents would make it an ex post facto law for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making
as among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it
office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition was committed.
against the enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and
public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a
result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to
reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And
does not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law.

The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a
position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision
clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public
funds or property or whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended
from office. The use of the word office applies to any office which the officer charged may be
holding and not only the particular office under which he was charged.

PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN


[211 SCRA 241; G.R. NO. 101724; 3 JUL 1992]

Facts:

Two letter complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio on October 28,1986 and
December 9, 1986, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of Congressman Democrito
Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as
OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del Sur on March 1986 The complaint questioned the issuance
Page 86
NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State.

Held:
Art 3, Sec. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG
[67 SCRA 166; ADM. MATTER. NO. 297-MJ; 30 SEPT 1975] The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a chec k that
is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which
Facts: the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.

Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was filed against her. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
Complainant admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a case against respondent Judge for not and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong,
dismissing the case and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be
indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not present. Further she contended that no person outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its
should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money. Two months after respondent police power.
dismissed plaintiffs case. (Judge here committed gross ignorance of law. Even if complainant
desisted case was pursued.)

Issue:

Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the imprisonment of
plaintiff for non-payment of debt?

Held:

Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan granted by
her friends to her. There is no collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of the
spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of demand she promised to pay
them and said that if she failed to keep her promise, they could get her valuable things at her
home. Under the Constitution she is protected. Judge therefore in admitting such a "criminal
complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the complaint and the "evidence"
presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding
"that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent grossly failed to perform his
duties properly.

LOZANO VS. M ARTINEZ


[146 SCRA 323; NO.L-63419; 18 DEC 1986]

Facts:

A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made,
contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was
denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The
Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme
Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to
intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.

Issue:

Page 87
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

Art 3, Sec. 18. (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR


[82 PHIL 851; NO.L-2690; 1 JAN 1949]

Facts:

This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita
Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar,
respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment
agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence,
which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was
restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her
transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed
to leave.

Issue:

Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without
returning the advance payment it gave?

Held:

An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or


maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force
has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the
deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another,
freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an
impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail
the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such
psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the
protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion.

Page 88
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur for
the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion,
Art 3, Sec. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the
of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it. suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed
forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved
LANSANG VS. GARCIA inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.
[42 SCRA 448; L-33964; 11 Dec 1971]
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20
Facts: barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents
in the Greater Manila Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine
In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was major labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations; about thirt y
holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP.
general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the
platform where said candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more
injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas
corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize
political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been
arrested without a warrant.

It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons
caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the
word actually staging. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27
provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13
provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces
and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended.
Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion
insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since
it was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of
proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the
suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that
no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after
August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-
existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and
weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.

A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it
may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations.
Now the Court resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority.

Issue:

Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and
conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons.

Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.

Held:
Page 89
Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was
charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without
notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due
Art 3, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition.
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must Issue:
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due process violated.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar Held:
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled,
inadmissible in evidence against him. at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be
Art 3, Sec. 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure
to appear is unjustifiable.
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON
Art 3, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance [175 SCRA 216; G.R. NO. 85215; 7 JUL 1989]
shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Facts:
Art 3, Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City
station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL
Art 3, Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in
accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
Art 3, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos.
prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and
conditions shall be dealt with by law. statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being
represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not
Art 3, Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Issue:
GAMBOA VS. CRUZ
[162 SCRA 642;L-56291; 27 JUN 1988] Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission
and statement of accused.
Facts:
Page 90
Held:
Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the Sinumpaan Salaysay is admissible as
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to evidence.
witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not
present in case at bar). Held:

This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear violation of the
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to constitutional rights of the accused. First, he was not informed of his right to remain silent and his
be a witness against himself. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions right to counsel. Second, he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. At the time of
and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any
does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a
the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should case had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so.
know. He must claim it and could be waived.
The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to such rights anymore because
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused the information has been filed and a warrant of arrest has been issued already, is untenable. The
include: exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section
12(1) of the Bill of Rights are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will commission of an offense."
shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extra-judicial admission is
inadmissible as evidence.
The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial
the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove
the truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. Maqueda
voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in
PEOPLE VS. M AQUEDA connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission
[242 SCRA 565; G.R. NO.112983; 22 MAR 1994] (Salvosa), it was given to a private person therefore admissible.

Facts: Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been made by the SC:
Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be
British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his house in Tuba, Benguet given in evidence against him.
while his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a
robbery. Two household helpers of the victims identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of
victims) and Maqueda as the robbers. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw the two accused a any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
kilometer away from the house of the victims that same morning, when the two accused asked
them for directions.
PEOPLE VS. BANDULA
Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken to Calauag, Quezon where [232 SCRA 566; G.R. NO. 89223; 27 MAY 1994]
he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. According to
SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he signed such document. Facts:
Afterwards he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail. While he was under detention,
Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a Six armed men barged into the compound of Polo Coconut Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental.
State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused The armed men were identified by Security Guard, including accused. Salva and Pastrano,
in this case." security guards were hogtied and accused proceeded to the Atty. Garay, counsel of plantation.
They ransacked the place and took with them money and other valuables. Atty. Garay was killed.
Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to Prosecutor Zarate Accused-appellant is charged with robbery with homicide along with 3 others who were acquitted
and to Salvosa. for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant was convicted.

Issue: Now, appellant argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed
Page 91
suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, in due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta conf erred with
extracted under duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later by the municipal Lucero. He apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He observed no reaction from Lucero.
attorney who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice.
their choice. Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without
sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged. When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the
wake of his friend. The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's
Issue: house. The extrajudicial statement of Lucero was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed
by Lucero.
Whether or Not extrajudicial confessions of appellant is admissible as evidence against him.
The three accused denied complicity in the crime charged.
Held:
Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that he was at his house in Caloocan City.
No. When accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after
their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking
investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep.
Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the He was blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he was taken. The men turned out to
Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against be police officers.
the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was not
Sec. 12, Art. III. Irregularities present include: informed of the offense for which he was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of
the complainant.
1. The investigators did not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of their own choice, even before Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this case. He
attempting to elicit statements that would incriminate them. said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was made to line-up
2. Investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests of the accused for medical four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.
assistance. Reason for Accused Sedigos "black eye" which even
Pat. Baldejera admitted is not established, as well as Bandulas fractured rib. Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession under duress. He denied engaging the
3. Counsel must be independent. He cannot be a special counsel, public or private services of Atty, Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present during his actual
prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly custodial interrogation.
adverse to the accused.
After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial court,
however, convicted accused Lucero GUILTY as principal by direct participation of Robbery with
PEOPLE VS. LUCERO Homicide and sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
[244 SCRA 425; G.R. NO.97936; 29 MAY 1995]
Issue:
Facts:
Whether or Not the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant.
Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe
were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. Held:

The prosecution: Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession.

Accused-appellant (alighted from a gray-reddish car), armed with handgun, blocked the way of the Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be
said complainant who was on board a Mercedes Benz passing along Road 14, Mindanao Avenue, provided with counsel. The Court have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of hostility
Pag-asa, QC, rob and carry away cash money; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat; one against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect.
gold Rolex watch; one 3 karat gold ring; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style; one solid gold Force and fraud tarnish confessions can render them inadmissible.
bracelet; all worth P363,600.00, belonging to DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID. Accused shot
LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him The records show that Atty. Peralta, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant. Atty. Peralta
mortal wounds, which resulted to the instantaneous death of ALERIA. himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his impression was that
appellant understood him. More so, it was during his absence that appellant gave an uncounselled
Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. confession.

Page 92
Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to read or decipher its contents. The
vigilant counsel. The circumstances clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective appellant, therefore was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution.
counseling from Atty. Peralta. Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights. The appellant was not explicitly told of
his right to have a competent and independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had
Whereof, Decision convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel is hereby reversed. in mind any such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could
not, whether he would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not
categorically informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this
PEOPLE VS. AGUSTIN waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in fact, waived his right to
[240 SCRA 541; G.R. NO. 110290; 25 JAN 1995] remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such right appears in the
transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to prove its existence. In short, after the
Facts: appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal, through suggestive
language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him. Moreso said
Dr. Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa; his counsel is not independent since he is an associate of the private prosecutor.
daughter, Dominic; and Danny, a family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the
doctor's residence at Malvar Street, Baguio City. While they were cruising along Malvar Street and
nearing the Baptist church, a man came out from the right side of a car parked about two meters PEOPLE VS. BOLANOS
to the church. The man approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and [211 SCRA 262; G.R. NO. 101808; 3 JUL 1992]
fired at the passengers. The Brasilia swerved and hit a fence. The gunman immediately returned
to the parked car which then sped away. All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Facts:
Theresa died on the spot. Dominic was bale to get out of the Brasilia to run to the Alabanza store
where she telephoned her mother. Later, she and her mother brought her father and Anthony to Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan. According to Pat. Rolando
the hospital. Danny went home and was then brought to the Hospital for treatment. Alcantara and Francisco Dayao, deceased was with two companions on the previous night, one of
whom the accused who had a drinking spree with the deceased. When they apprehended the
Accused Quiao, an alleged former military agent who had been picked up by the police accused they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly
authorities, confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia seated. They boarded accused along with Magtibay, other accused on the police vehicle and
in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to kill Dr. brought them to the police station. While in the vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the
Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the deceased. RTC convicted him hence the appeal.
investigation, Wilfredo Quiao was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the
proceedings during the investigation as transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiao was Issue:
signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. The
following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded the privileges Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.
like that of Quijano. Agustins defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at
gunpoint in the Kennon Road. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Cajucom Held:
(a law partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin,
and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way
Ilocano, the dialect he understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have
push through since Quijano escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution,
established. Hence the appeal. more particularly par. 1 and par. 3.

Issue:
PEOPLE VS. M ACAM
Whether or Not accused-appellants extrajudicial statements admissible as evidence. [238 SCRA 306; G.R. NOS. 91011-12; 24 NOV 1994]

Held: Facts:

No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. In a confession, there is an Prosecutions version:
acknowledgment of guilt of the accused, while an admission is a statement direct or implied of
facts pertinent to the issue. The rule on inadmissibility, however expressly includes admissions, On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque and
not just confessions.The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in twenty-two pages Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43
appear to be signed by him and Atty. Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the records, the Ferma Road QC. Upon the arrival of the accused, Benito invited the former to have lunch. Benito
transcript of the notes which consists of twelve pages was not signed by the appellant. Since the asked his maid Salvacion Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting in a tricycle
court cannot even read or decipher the stenographic notes it cannot be expected that appellant, outside the house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered the house while E. Roque
Page 93
remained in the tricycle. After all the accused had taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed the Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque is guilty of the
clutch bag of Benito Macam and pulled out his uncles gun then declared a hold-up. They tied up crime of robbery with homicide as co-conspirators of the other accused to suffer reclusion
the wife (Leticia Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and brought them to the perpetua.
room upstairs. After a while Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she screamed she was
stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was also stabbed but survived. The Things taken: 2 toygun, airgun riffle, CO2 refiller, TV, betamax tapes, betamax rewinder,
total value of the items taken was P536, 700.00. Samsonite attache case, typewriter, chessboard, TOYOTA Crown Car Plate No. CAS-997,
assorted jewelry. .22 gun and money.
Defenses version:

Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to Benitos house for a fee PEOPLE VS. DY
of P50.00. Instead of paying him, he was given a calling card by Eduardo Macam so that he can [158 SCRA 111; G.R. 74517; 23 FEB 1988]
be paid the following day. Upon arriving, he went with the accused inside the house to have lunch.
Thereafter he washed the dishes and swept the floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun and Facts:
announced the hold-up, he was asked to gather some things and which he abided out of fear.
While putting the said thins inside the car of Benito (victim) he heard the accused saying Pat. Padilla reported along with Benny Dy, with caliber .38 as suspect to the shooting incident at
kailangan patayin ang mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan. Upon hearing such phrase he "Benny's Bar," at Sitio Angol, Manoc-Manoc Malay, Aklan (Boracay) situated on the Island which
escaped and went home using his tricycle. He also testified that his brother Ernesto Roque has caused the death of Christian Langel Philippe, tourist, 24 years old and a Swiss nationale. He was
just arrived from the province and in no way can be involved in the case at bar. On the following charged with the Murder With the Use of Unlicensed firearms. Appellant alleges that he carried the
day, together with his brother, they went to the factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the father of victim to the shore to be brought to the hospital to save the latter, and who facilitated the surrender
Eduardo Macam) for him to get his payment (50.00) . He and his brother was suddenly to Pat. Padilla a gun which his helper found the following morning while cleaning the bar. Accused
apprehended by the security guards and brought to the police headquarters in Q.C. They were posted bail which was granted. The accused denied having made any oral confession alleging that
also forced to admit certain things. he went to Pat. Padilla not to report the incident but to state that a boy helper in the bar had found
a gun on the sand floor while cleaning and that Pat. Padilla picked up the gun from the bar at his
After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore contusions on their faces request. The Accused argues that even if he did make such a confession, the same would be
caused by blows inflicted in their faces during investigation, was brought to the QC General inadmissible in evidence. He was found guilty in the RTC. Hence the appeal.
Hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up for identification. Eugenio Cawilan was
also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in the said case. Issue:

Issue: Whether or Not the lower court correct in saying that the constitutional procedure on custodial
interrogation is not applicable in the instant case.
Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the arrest was valid. WON the
evidence from the line-up is admissible. Held:

Held: YES. Appellant's assertion that the gun he had surrendered was merely found by a boy helper
while cleaning the bar deserves no credence for, if it were so, it would have been absurd for him to
It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before trial. have placed himself under police custody in the early morning after the incident. Sworn Complaint
A police line-up is considered a critical stage of the proceedings. Any identification of an for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed by the Chief of Police also attests to
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER, the prosecution did Appellant's oral confession. That Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings before the
not present evidence regarding appellants identification at the line-up. The witnesses identified Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is prima facie evidence of the facts therein
the accused again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the in-court identification as being stated. Appellant's voluntary surrender implies no violation as "no warrant of arrest is issued for
tainted by illegal line-up. the apprehension of the accused for the reason that he is already under police custody before the
filing of the complaint." What was told by the Accused to Pat, Padilla was a spontaneous
The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they are estopped from statement not elicited through questioning, but given in ordinary manner. No written confession
questioning the legality of such arrest because they have not moved to quash the said information was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation.
and therefore voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a
plea of not guilty and participating in trial.

The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while remaining outside the NAVALLO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
house served as a looked out. [234 SCRA 177; G.R. NO. 97214; 18 JUL 1994]

Facts:

Page 94
Accused was the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School, Facts:
which school is also located at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. His duties included the collection of
tuition fees, preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees, and remittance of Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor, four
collections exceeding P500.00 to the National Treasury. An information for malversation of public years of age, choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after appellant drank liquor.
funds was filed. A warrant of arrest was issued, but accused-petitioner could not be found. on 10 A neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the victims body and the parents and police were informed.
December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from Penecilla's house. Appellant
conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the
embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up
arrested. He was released on provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond. When interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's
arraigned by the RTC on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not guilty. Upon motion of the prosecution, the green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which
RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor were presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was arraigned with the assistance of Atty.
Luz L. Quiones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him. Hence an
was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. automatic review for the imposition of death penalty.
The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information
was then docketed with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by the Issue:
Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the
accused had posted a bail bond. Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the Whether or Not the death penalty proper.
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the accused and (2) that
since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before Held:
the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. However this was denied and trial ensued
and he was found guilty. No. The records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the language
or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the English language. It
Issue: is unknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is
understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English was
Whether or Not the constitutional right against double jeopardy and in custodial investigations in translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a)
favor of the accused violated. of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to
Held: due process of law. It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was
regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. There
No. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites: could be no presumption. The court must be sure.

(1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant.
substance to sustain a conviction; Said section requires that the court shall conduct a searching inquiry the voluntariness and full
(2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case; comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
(3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The trial
(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant
consent. when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was
medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover
The RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which b y late body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.
then had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there
terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed. Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a pillow with
bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored white with bloodstains on its
No. Appellant is not in custodial investigation. A person under a normal audit examination is not bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate the
under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped.These are inadmissible evidence for they
enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation
"pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime (examined cash, as ordered by where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel.
Espino, the provincial auditor) appears to be belied by his own testimony.

PEOPLE VS. DE GUZMAN


PEOPLE VS. ALICANDO [224 SCRA 93; G.R. NOS. 98321-24; 30 JUN 1993]
[251 SCRA 293; G.R. NO. 117487; 2 DEC 1995]
Facts:
Page 95
All the accused were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu with three counts of murder
and one count of frustrated murder in four Informations. The victim Jose Bantug was found with PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO
gunshots in the head, body, and skull. The other three informations charged them with the murder [198 SCRA 130; G.R. NO.79269; 5 JUN 1991]
of Francisco Carteciano y Sorilla and Antonio S. Carteciano, and the frustrated murder of Lorna V.
Carteciano. The other 8 accused were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, while Victor Facts:
Nuez was found guilty. The facts shown by evidence are: One morning, Major Antonio
Carteciano was driving his private jeep Camp General Arcadio Maxilom in Lahug, Cebu City Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts
where he was stationed as medical officer of the PC/INP Provincial Command. In the front seat committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash
with him is his wife Lorna, and at the backseat are his mother in law, son, brother Francisco, alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction
neighbor Bantug, and Bantugs son. Near the intersection, gunshots were heard from the left side over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and
of the street. Major Carteciano took his .45 cal pistol and fired. However, gunshots were fired in (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987
succession, and Major Carteciano, his brother Francisco, Jose Bantug, and his wife Lorna were Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail
hit. When the jeep stopped, several gunmen approached them. Nuez demanded Lorna to give anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART.
Nuez her husbands pistol. Lorna asked to take her valuables instead. Then, Nuez shot Major 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among
Cartecianos head point blank. Then the gunmen hijacked another jeep and took off. Lorna, her others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the
mother Juanita Ricaplaza, and her son Reiser Carteciano positively identified the accused. Lorna Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the
identified Nuez as the one who shot her husband. Nuez claimed that his arrest was illegal and bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once
that he was deprived of his right to counsel when he was subjected to a paraffin test without the every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental
assistance of counsel. motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present
evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply
Issue: with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that:

Whether or not the accused Nuezs constitutional right was violated 1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from
detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
Held: 3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
No. Nuez pleaded not guilty at the arraignment. Therefore, he is estopped from questioning the 4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
validity of his arrest. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting 5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The identity and address were also found to be false;
witnesses also positively identified the accused, so he cannot question the credibility of the 6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00
witnesses. Regarding his right to counsel, the Supreme Court held that-- the right to counsel was offered and paid for his arrest.
attaches only upon the start of an investigation, that is, when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. At such point or This however was denied. Hence the appeal.
stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice
of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing Issue:
interrogation. In the case at bar, when accused was subjected to a paraffin test, he was not then
under custodial investigation. Accused-appellant also argued that since his co-accused were Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.
acquitted, then their acquittal negates conspiracy among them, and he should not be convicted
with the charges filed. However, the Court held that conspiracy was still proven by the evidence, Held:
and the other co-accused were acquitted only because there was reasonable doubt. Therefore,
accused-appellant is still convicted of the four charges against him. Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital
offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital
We, therefore, find that the conviction of accused-appellant for the crimes charged has been offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the
established beyond reasonable doubt and the penalty imposed is in accordance with law. amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.
However, the civil indemnity imposed by the trial court should be increased to P50,000 in
conformity with our recent rulings on the matter. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to
the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, except for the modification that the civil indemnity to be paid by accused-appellant
Victor Nuez, Jr. to the heirs of each victim who died is hereby increased to P50,000, the Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements
appealed decision is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against accused-appellant were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz
Page 96
and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit
themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security No. The order granting bail had been rendered moot not only by the fact that he had been
given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule released from NBI custody, but also because Escao jumped bail and did not appear on the date
that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is set for his arraignment. Notwithstanding, the Court resolved the issue of the legality of the order
personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public granting bail to Escao. Although the right to bail is principally for the benefit of the accused, in the
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. judicial determination of the availability of said right, the prosecution should be afforded procedural
due process. Thus, in the summary proceeding on a motion praying for admission to bail, the
prosecution should be given the opportunity to present evidence and, thereafter, the court should
CARPIO VS. M AGLALANG spell out at least a resume of the evidence on which its order granting or denying bail is based.
[196 SCRA 41; G.R. NO. 78162; 19 APR 1991] Otherwise, the order is defective and voidable. In the case at bar the RTC erred in not
summarizing the factual basis of its order granting bail, the court merely stated the number of
Facts: prosecution witnesses but not their respective testimonies, and concluded that the evidence
presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to Escao.
On January 8, 1987, information for the murder of Mayor Jose Payumo of Dinalupihan Bataan was
filed against Escao and ten other unindentified persons by the provincial fiscal in the RTC of The facts, however, that Mayor Payumo was killed on August 20, 1986 when the 1973
Bataan at Balanga. Four days later, the Acting Executive Judge of said court issued an order of Constitution allowing the death penalty was still in force and that the application for bail was made
arrest against Escao recommending no bail for his provisional liberty. Pat. Cesar Diego who on March 5, 1987 during the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution which abolished the death penalty,
acted on the warrant returned to the court with a certification issued by NBI agent Gonzales, should not have gotten in the way of resolving the application for bail in accordance with the
stating therein that accused was still under investigation. Constitution and procedural rules. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides that
"(a)ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
Through counsel Rolando T. Cainoy, Escao filed in court an urgent ex-parte motion for his evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
commitment at the provincial jail of Bataan on the ground that he wanted to be where his family on recognizance as may be provided by law." As the phrase "capital offenses" has been replaced
and counsel could have easy access to him. He alleged therein that his detention at the NBI by the phrase "offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, 25 crimes punishable by reclusion
headquarters in Manila was irregular and in defiance of the warrant of arrest issued by the court. perpetua instead of those punishable by the death penalty, when evidence of guilt is strong, are
This was granted. the exceptions to the rule that the right to bail should be made available to all accused. As the
court itself acknowledged in its order of April 2, 1987 that "capital punishment" in Section 4, Rule
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Director Carpio stating that the NBI needed physical 114 has been amended to reclusion perpetua, the court should have proceeded accordingly: i.e.,
custody of Escao for the identification of the other accused in the case who were still the objects resolved the application for bail pursuant to Section 13, Article III of the Constitution. It did not
of a manhunt by NBI agents; that in view of the finding of NBI agents that the other accused and have to invoke the abolition of the death penalty and the lack of legislative enactment restoring it in
suspects in the case were subversive elements or members of the New People's Army, it was for justifying the grant of bail. All it had to do was to determine whether evidence of guilt is strong in
the best interest of Escao that he be detained at the NBI lock-up cell where security measures the light of the provision of Section 13, Article III.
were adequate; and that the NBI would produce the person of Escao before the court whenever
required and every time that there would be a hearing on the case. However another motion was The RTC has the discretion in the consideration of the strength of the evidence at hand. However,
executed by Escao stating that he now wants to be detained in the NBI, alleging that he did not in the exercise of said discretion, the court is controlled by the following: first, the applicable
authorize his counsel to execute the first motion. Also, Escao's counsel Rolando T. Cainoy filed provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which this Court may
an application for bail stating that Escao was arrested by NBI agents on December 7, 1986 promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the
without a warrant having been presented to him and that since then he had been detained in the laws of the land. 27 The lower court not only failed to properly apply the pertinent provisions of the
lock-up cell of the NBI; that said agents, also without a warrant, searched his house when he was Constitution and the Rules but it also disregarded equity and justice by its failure to take into
arrested; that he was subjected to inhuman torture and forced to admit participation in the killing of account the factual milieu surrounding the detention of Escao
Mayor Payumo and to implicate other persons, and that during the custodial investigation, he was
not represented by counsel. In opposing said application, the public prosecutor averred that the
accused was charged with a capital offense for which no bail may be availed of, that the reasons PEOPLE VS. FORTES
advanced in said application would be overcome by strong and sufficient evidence; and that during [223 SCRA 619; G.R. NO. 90643; 25 JUN 1993]
the custodial investigation, he was represented by counsel. The court granted the application for
bail fixing the same at P30,000, having found no sufficient evidence against accused. Director Facts:
Carpio was ordered to justify his actions and so as not to be considered in contempt.
Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon,
Issue: accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to
report a rape committed against the latter by the accused. Following this, the accused was
Whether or Not the order granting right to bail was proper. apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for accuseds provisional release. The
MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond was denied.
Held:
Page 97
Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the
his constitutional right to bail. pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the
denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit
Issue: their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which
they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that
Whether or Not the accuseds right to bail violated. "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to
submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to
Held: challenge validity of members of G/SCM)

No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and
discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial
reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions
reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for
strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. habeas corpus and quo warranto.
But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of
right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is
the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The
the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.
[200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991] The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only
after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the
Facts: failed coup.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the
in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of
December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the
charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private
for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process. respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was
denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer M ANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the [142 SCRA 149; G.R. NO. L-62100; 30 MAY 1986]
provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even
military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail. Facts:

The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a
ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire
to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The
more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release. prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals
Issue: seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove,
respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Whether or Not there was a denial of due process. denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ
commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command
Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail. (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which
Held: granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Page 98
Issue:

Whether or Not the right to bail a matter of right. TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
[159 SCRA 70; G.R. NOS. L-72335-39; 21 MAR 1988]
Held:
Facts:
The right to bail is a matter of right if the charge is not a capital offense or punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal
Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S.
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it
became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the
complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command,
placed beyond the reach of the courts. for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan,
recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad
Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case
business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a
resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e)
CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted
[77 SCRA 377; G.R. NOS. 24646 & L-24674; 20 JUN 1977] benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section
3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General
Facts: Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00
to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in
Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. The City Judge of 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets
Dagupan City, Felipe Villanueva, denied the motions to quash the complaints. Thus, petitioner and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was
Callanta brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petitioner questions the validity of made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a
the issuance of warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal should have speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.
conducted the preliminary investigation. According to petitioners counsel, there was jurisdictional
infirmity. After the issuance of the warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600, petitioner posted Issue:
the bail bond, thus obtaining her provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree
with the judges investigation, and agreed with the complaints filed. Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Issue:

Whether or Not petitioners contentions are to be given merit. Held:

Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the
complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President
Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, where the accused has filed bail and Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
waived the preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant
preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest. In the case at and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential
bar, it is futile for the petitioner to question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-
because she posted the bail bond. Petitioner also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its
conduct a preliminary investigation. According to the Charter of the City of Dagupan, the City termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely
Court of Dagupan City may also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without regard "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute
to the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind over any person charged with impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the
such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court. Petition for certiorari is denied. light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted and set aside.
Page 99
justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of
GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN the Philippines to due process of law.
[144 SCRA 43; G.R. NO.72670; 12 SEP 1986]
Issue:
Facts:
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had
just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three
hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then suppos ed to be unknown and was Held:
revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the
military escorts gunned him down in turn. Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases
which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of due process.
people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and
freedom. Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no
longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to
that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a
the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a
the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by
is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice
the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner
nineteen of them. room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with
the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer. meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see
the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos
two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents'
separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84- The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and
page memorandum for the prosecution. from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the
Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which
petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of
decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres.
receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not
served on them). by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder
that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of
legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better
people are entitled to due process. arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may
claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents
submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The
and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera,
lack of merit. "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment
of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The
respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The
monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel.
Page 100
The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery
the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the case where he is an accused. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was
Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of returning from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby. Only Dramayo and Ecubin
the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored were convicted in the RTC for murder. Hence the appeal
and disregarded.
Issue:
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government
and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino- Whether or not the accuseds criminal liability proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code
penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority Held:
with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be,
justice." according to the Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on
and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction
revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent be in existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. What is required then is moral
Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they certainty. "By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubt
were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let
suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the law
the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. to convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to
every proposition of proof regular to constitute the offense."
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having
been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two
legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than
acts and all claims flowing out of it are void. amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more
than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. The principal
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced
reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the for the first time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold
required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty
order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its having arisen as to their capability.
decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts
of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner. DUMLAO VS. COMELEC
[95 SCRA 392; L-52245; 22 JAN 1980]
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial
court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes Facts:
charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.
Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provicial or municipal official who has received payments
constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local
honor. office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation.
Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52,
which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those
PEOPLE VS. DRAMAYO amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for
[42 SCRA 60; G.R. L-21325; 29 OCT 1971] any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that
a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of
Facts: charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.

Page 101
Issue: PEOPLE VS. ALCANTARA
[240 SCRA 122; G.R. NO. 91283; 17 JAN 1995]
Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus, should
be declared null and void Facts:

Held: On July 19, 1988, Venancio Patricio, accompanied by Larry Salvador, drove a ten-wheeler truck a
Coca-Cola plant in Antipolo to load cases of softdrinks. They were about to leave the plant at
In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional 10:00pm when several men approached them to hitch for a ride. Ascertaining that Salvador knew
and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational appellant, Venancio accommodated appellant's request. Appellant had four companions. At
classification. One class can be treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65 Ortigas Ave., one of them poked a gun at Venancio and grabbed the steering wheel. At the North
years of age are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to Diversion Road, Venancio and Salvador(helper) were brought down from the vehicle and tied to
satisfy the need for new blood in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it the fence of the expressway, thereafter they were stabbed and left bleeding to death. Venancio
should be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence survived but Salvador did not.Appellant was arrested in the vicinity of Otis Street in Pandacan,
guaranteed to an accused. Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, Manila. A few days later, he was turned over to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group. Sgt.
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be Alberto Awanan brought the appellant to the MCU hospital and was presented to Venancio for
heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according identification. Appellant was brought to the Headquarters at Camp Crame where he confessed.
to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public Appelants Defense: Denial and alibi. He said that he was just applying to be a driver and stayed
office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military there even if he was told that no work was available, to confirm with the truck drivers. While he
tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, was applying for CONCEPCION TRUCKING located across Otis street from the Coca-cola plant.
no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom He was arrested. He denied any knowledge of the "hit" on the Coca-cola delivery truck. He
charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A remained in the custody of the police for two days and two nights. On the third day of his
person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him detention, he was turned over to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group. Appellant was the
is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty brought to the MCU hospital. He was made to confront Venancio whom he saw for the first time.
of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office CHPG Sgt. Awanan asked Venancio twice if appellant was among those who hijacked the truck he
during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code). was driving. On both times, Venancio did not respond. Undaunted, Sgt. Awanan, called to a
photographer present, forced appellant to stand about a foot from Venancio, and told the latter to
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may just point at the suspect. "Basta ituro mo lang," Sgt. Awanan directed. Venancio obeyed, and
be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, pictures of him pointing to the suspect were taken. From the hospital, appellant was brought to the
time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to Constabulary Highway Patrol Group headquarters at Camp Crame. Without being apprised of his
overcome the prima facie evidence against him. rights nor provided with counsel, he was interrogated and urged to confess his guilt. He balked. At
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts ten o'clock that night, hours after questioning began, appellant's interrogators started boxing him
rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of and kicking him. He was also hit on the back with a chair, and electrocuted. Still, he refused to
findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will admit to the crime. In the midst of his ordeal, appellant heard someone say, "Tubigan na iyan." He
thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be was then blindfolded and brought to another room where he was made to lie down. Water was
allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. slowly and continuously poured on his face, over his mouth. Appellant could no longer bear the
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable pain caused by the water treatment. Finally, he confessed to being one of the hijackers. He was
portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of led to another room, where he was handcuffed and left until the following day. Later, he was made
Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself. to sign prepared statements containing his full confession.

Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid Alcantara was arraigned under an information charging him and four others (at large) with the
and that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby crime of robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide.
declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused. The trial court convicted the accused despite the following inconsistency between Venancios
affidavit and testimony:

Affidavit Testimony
1. mentioned 5 assailants - only Alcantara was identified
2. stabbing was preceded by a - only 3 assailants had a
3. conference by all assailants - conference
4. claimed to have allowed assailants - failed to identify Alcantara
5. to hitch a ride because Alcantara - at the hospital and in open
Page 102
6. was familiar to them - court (pointed to another person) after such encashments. Also, Corpuz claim that he was absent when Paymaster Diosdado
Pineda through 1 of 4 separate checks (PNB) issued and encashed such checks, was not proven.
Issue:
Post-Audit is not a preliminary requirement to filing a malversation case. The failure of the public
Whether or not the rights of the accused was violated. officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by an
authorized officer shall be a prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal
use.

Held: The equipoise rule(balancing test) which is the presumption of innocence is applicable only where
the evidence of the parties is evenly balance, in which case the scale of justice should be tilt in
YES. The peoples evidence failed to meet the quantum required to overcome the presumption. favor of the accused. There is no such balance in the case at bar. The evidence of the prosecution
The second identification which correctly pointed to accused by Venancio should not be credited. is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his claims. The presumed
There is no reason for him to err as they know each other for 3 years. It was also incorrect to give innocence must yield to the positive finding that he is guilty of malversation.
too much weight to Police Sgt. Awanans testimony as to the previous identification at the
hospital. The testimony of Sgt. Awanan was not corroborated by Venancio. Wherefore his petition is denied. He is guilty as principal of Malversation of Public Funds.

The identification procedure was irregular. Due process demands that the identification procedure
of criminal suspects must be free from impermissible suggestions as the influence of improper PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO
suggestion probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor. [85 P HIL 752; G.R.L-2809; 22 MAR 1950]
Conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of the defense.
There was blatant violation of the constitutional rights of appellant as an accused. Appellant Facts:
belongs to the economically deprived in our society. He is nearly illiterate(third grade education).
Our Constitution and our laws strictly ordain their protection following the Magsaysay desideratum Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
that those who have less in life should have more in law. detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and
without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado
for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded
CORPUZ VS. REPUBLIC guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence
[194 SCRA 73; G.R. NO. 74259; 14 FEB 1991] was presented to indict the latter.

Facts: Issue:

Generoso Corpuz is the Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.
Nueva Viscaya. He was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said office. In this capacity,
he received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to Held:
government accounts. On April 13, 1981 his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was
terminated and a transfer of accountabilities was effected between him and his successor. The Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be
Certificate of turnover revealed a shortage of P72,823.00. He was able to pay only P10,159.50. informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he
After a final demand letter for the total of P50,596.07 which was not met, a case of malversation desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable
was filed against him. Corpuz did not deny such facts but he insists that the shortage was time must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our
malversed by other persons. He alleged that Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through 1 of 4 separate Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
checks (PNB) issued and encashed such checks while he was of leave. Also, Acting Deputy law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal
Provincial Treasurer Bernardo Aluning made to post the amount on his cashbook although he had cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by
not received the said amount. He was convicted in Sandiganbayan. counsel.

Issue: The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record
does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had
Whether or Not Corpuz is guilty of malversation. reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation
was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of
Held: determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of
the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had
It is a subtle way of camouflaging the embezzlement of the money equivalent when 1 of the 4 investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude
checks issued and encashed in the same day was entered in the accuseds cash book 3 months of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient
Page 103
to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to
the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the investigate. In the course of the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for
seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court. dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up an entrapment. Tan was given a
Php.2000, marked bill, and he had supplied the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an
information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision
PEOPLE VS. M AGSI finding the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
[124 SCRA 64; G.R. NO.L-32888; 12 AUG 1983] (R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this instant
petition.
Facts:
Issue:
Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled before
the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set and rescheduled Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as contract or
for six (6) times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that date, despite appointment by the transaction within the purview of .RA.3019.
court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was re-set to September
8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of accused desire to be Held:
represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de
officio counsel and it was favorably acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At the second R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to acts or omissions of public
hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte counsels to appear, officers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and the court appointed public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx b. Directly or indirectly requesting or
Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third hearing date, neither the receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for other person, in
de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de connection with any contract or transaction between the Govt. and any other party wherein the
officio counsel for arraignment purposes only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi
and the other coaccused. Appellant was found guilty of murder and made to suffer the death The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC and
penalty. not a violation of R.A. 3019 sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not the offense charged and
is not included in the offense charged which is violation of R.A.3019 sec.3 (b).
Issue:
The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to commercial or business
Whether or not there was a violation of the rights of the accused. transaction, but includes all kinds of transaction whether commercial, civil, or administrative in
nature.
Held:
The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner
YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the was neither a contract nor transaction. A transaction like a contract is one which involves some
basic rights of the accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55 SCRA 243-244): the trial courts should consideration as in credit transactions. And this element is absent in the investigation conducted
exercise solicitous care before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital by the petitioner.
offenses by first insuring that the accused fully understands the gravity of the offense, the severity
of the consequences attached thereto as well as the meaning and significance of his plea of guilty; Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC.
and that the prudent and proper thing to do in capital cases is to take testimony, to assure the
court that the accused has not misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of guilty. Mere pro-
forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the
accused, resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was
conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges
and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance.
BORJA VS. M ENDOZA
[77 SCRA 422; G.R. NO.L-45667; 20 JUN 1977]

Facts:
SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
[131 SCRA 184; G.R. NO.L-65952; 31 JUL 1984] Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not arraigned.
That not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and
Facts: rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. T he case was appealed to the
Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the
Page 104
failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any
notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the Issue:
appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented that the decision should be
annulled because there was no arraignment. Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.

Issue: Held:

Whether or Not petitioners constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned. Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons,
Held: has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived
of that right in defiance of law. We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,
Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond
as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to
showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained
evidence against him. It is also not just due process that requires an arraignment. It is required in of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge
that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom,
even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL
must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. Being [244 SCRA 202; G.R. NO. 102485; 22 MAY 1995]
arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent Judge
Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With the violation of Facts:
the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the
Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel Padumon, Pablito Suco, Dario Suco
being null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements and Galvino Cadling were charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical injuries
of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial. in the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding judge.
However, only private respondents, Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, and
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R. Samuel Padumon were arrested, while the others remained at large.
Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo
dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set Guantero moved for postponement due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. The case
aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight was reset without any objection from the defense counsel. The case was called on September 20,
physical injuries, with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting 1991 but the prosecutor was not present. The respondent judge considered the absence of the
with the arraignment of petitioner. prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute. The prosecution
filed a motion for reconsidereation, claiming that his absence was because such date was a
Muslim holiday and the office of the Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The motion was
denied by respondent judge.

Issue:

Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition
of their cases.
CONDE VS. RIVERA
[45 PHIL 650; G.R. NO. 21741; 25 JAN 1924] Whether or Not the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement of the case.

Facts: Held:

Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition of their case, courts should do more
no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of
witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause the case. What are violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified
postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. In the facts above, there
the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far was no showing that there was an unjust delay caused by the prosecution, hence, the respondent
away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged. judge should have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case.
Page 105
that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. In several cases it was themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.
held that dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would
bar another prosecution for the same offense, but in this case, this does not apply, considering The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
that the rights of the accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State. Therefore, the order information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and
of dismissal is annulled and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public. Nevertheless, within the
courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process
which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493 THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

The arraignment of an accused shall be held within 30 days from filing of the information, or from PEOPLE VS. SALAS
the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is [143 SCRA 163; G.R. NO. L-66469; 29 JUL 1986]
pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused
shall have at least 15 days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within 30 days from Facts:
arraignment as fixed by the court. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed 180 days from the
st
1 day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992, a 60 year old woman, identified as Virginia
Talens was found lying dead in a canal at Bo. San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga; she was last seen
alive at about 3:00 o'clock early morning of March 6, 1992 by Orlando Pangan and Richard
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE TV OF TRIAL OF JOSEPH ESTRADA Pangan who were with her going home coming from the wake of one Leonardo Flores; both
[360 SCRA 248; A.M. NO 01-4-03-SC; 29 JUN 2001] Orlando and Richard Pangan testified that accused was with them in going home at about 3:00
o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992; Orlando and Richard Pangan reached first their house
Facts: and left the two on the way and that was the last time Virginia was seen alive; just a few minutes
after reaching his house and while inside his house, Orlando Pangan heard a shout; another
The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the Court to allow woman, one Serafia Gutierrez, testified that she likewise was awakened by a shout at about 3:00
live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against in the morning; Dr. Aguda who autopsied the victim found hematoma on the head and chest, an
former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full abrasion on the left chin and stabwound on the neck which stabwound, the doctor claims, was the
transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was cause of death of the victim; Police Investigator Gonzales who immediately responded upon
seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney report, recovered at the scene a pin, the victim's wristwatch, earring, a ring and P135.00 money;
Ricardo Romulo. he likewise found on March 9, 1992 when he continued his investigation bloodstain on the front
door of the house of the accused which bloodstain when submitted for examination was found to
Issue: be of human blood; one Resultay was with Virginia Talens at about 5:00 afternoon of March 5,
1992 in going to the wake, who claims that Virginia had money on a purse as while they were on
Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed the way Virginia bet on a jueteng she saw Virginia got money from her purse a P500.00 bill but as
against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be permitted by the court. she had no change she instead took P8.00 from her other pocket; one Ramil Talens, a son of the
victim corroborated the claim of Resultay that Virginia had with her at that time money worth
Held: P2,000.00 as in the morning of March 5, 1992 he gave her mother for safekeeping the sum of
P1,500.00 which he claims his mother placed in her purse and claims further that at the wake, he
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the asked and was given P50.00 by his mother as he also participated in the gambling thereat,
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the other however, the purse of Virginia containing about P2,000.00 was no longer to be found when she
hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and was found dead; Orlando Pangan saw the accused gambled in the wake; Virginia likewise
impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of gambled at the wake; accused had been working for three days before March 6 at Sta. Ana,
the accused must be preferred to win. Pampanga and up to March 5, 1992, but the following day, he did not anymore report for work at
Sta. Ana, Pampanga, was no longer to be found and was last seen at about 3:00 morning together
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a with Virginia Talens on their way home coming from the wake; the parents of [the] accused were
trial that is not lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of publics attention and where informed by Investigator Gonzales that their son was the suspect and adviced them to surrender
the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only be evidence him, but since March 6, 1992 when accused left Mexico, Pampanga, he returned only on
and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. September 19, 1992 at Arayat, Pampanga, not at Mexico, Pampanga where he was ultimately
apprehended by the Mexico Police on September 22, 1992 after chancing on a radio message by
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, the police of Arayat to their Provincial commander that a vehicular incident occurred at Arayat,
where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is Pampanga where one Elmer Salas was the victim and was hospitalized at the district hospital at
fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in Arayat, Pampanga where he used the name of Rommel Salas and not Elmer Salas. The trial court
secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial, it only implies rendered convicting Salas for Robbery with Homicide
Page 106
The absence of evidence showing any improper motive on the part of the principal witness for the
Issue: prosecution to falsely testify against the appellant strongly tends to buttress the conclusion that no
such improper motive exists and that the testimony of said witnesses deserve full faith and credit.
Whether or Not there is evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of the appellant of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up
and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or
Whether or Not the appellants crime homicide or robbery with homicide. he wants to save the State the trouble of having to effect his arrest. Spontaneity and intent to give
one's self up are absent where the accused went into hiding for six months after the incident and
Held: had to resort to an alias when he was involved in an accident being investigated by the police
authorities.
There was no eyewitness or direct evidence; either to the robbery or to the homicide and none of
the things allegedly stolen were ever recovered. However, direct evidence is not the only matrix Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime against property. Homicide is incidental to the
from which the trial court may draw its findings and conclusion of culpability. Resort to robbery which is the main purpose of the criminal. In charging Robbery with Homicide, the onus
circumstantial evidence is essential when to insist on direct testimony would result in setting felons probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation
free. against a person; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus
lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be is used in the generic sense, was committed." Although there was no witness as to the actual
consistent with each other, consistent with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense robbing of the victim, there is testimony that the victim had more or less P2,000.00; and wore gold
charged, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every earrings valued at P750.00. These were never recovered.
other possible, rational hypothesis excepting that of guilt. All the circumstances established must
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one and fair and reasonable conclusion pointing While there is indeed no direct proof that Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was killed, we
solely to the accused, to the exclusion of all other persons, as the author of the crime. The facts may conclude from four circumstances that the robbery occasioned her killing: (1) Both appellant
and circumstances consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence can and victim gambled at the wake. (2) The appellant knew that victim was winning. (3) The victim
constitute evidence which, in weight and probative value, may be deemed to surpass even direct was last seen alive with appellant. (4) The victim's purse containing her money and earrings were
evidence in its effect on the court. missing from her body when found.

The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at around 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant The decision of the regional trial court is affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered.
hastily abandoned his house in Barrio San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since
childhood, on that very date. Appellant was nowhere when his co-worker and barrio mate,
Eduardo Bagtas, came to appellant's house to fetch him for work at around 6:30 to 7:00 a.m. of PEOPLE VS. M AGPALAO
March 6, 1992. Appellant also abandoned his job as a painter in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on March 6, [197 SCRA 79; G.R. NO. 92415; 14 MAY 1991]
1992, the date of the crime, leaving behind an unfinished painting project. He was not seen again
from said date. Police investigators found human bloodstains on the front door of appellant's Facts:
house, on his clothing, and on his yellow slippers after the victim was killed. Despite efforts of the
police to find appellant as the principal suspect, a fact known to appellant's family and neighbors, Eleven (11) people rode in a Ford Fiera going to Baguio. Namely they are: Felizardo Galvez,
appellant did not present himself to the authorities. Appellant was apprehended only a full six Jimmy Jetwani, Simeon Calama, Rene Salonga, Eduardo Lopez, Adolfo Quiambao, Aliman Bara-
months after the date of the crime, following his confinement in a hospital in Arayat, Pampanga akal, Anwar Hadji Edris, Gumanak Ompa and defendant-appelants in this case, Omar Magpalao
because he was sideswiped by a Victory Liner bus in Arayat. When hospitalized, appellant used and Rex Magumnang.
the alias Rommel Salas, instead of his true name Elmer Salas. These circumstances denote flight,
which when unexplained, has always been considered by the courts as indicative of guilt. After an hour of driving, the car stopped so that one of the passengers could urinate. While the car
was stopped the Bara-akal, Edris, Ompa, Magpalao and Magumnang pointed guns and knives at
Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake they attended. The victim was, in fact, enjoying a the other passengers and divested them of their properties.
winning streak when her son, Ramil Talens, came to fetch her but which he failed to do becaus e
his mother was winning, and she refused to leave. The purse of Talens containing cash was gone On of the robbers then ordered Galvez to drive the car towards the precipice (bangin). When the
when her corpse was found in the canal with a stab wound and bruises. What was left was a car was near the precipice, Galvez then stepped to the brakes. The other passengers jumped out
safety pin which victim used to fasten the missing purse to her clothes. of the car and went to different directions to escape. Galvez however, was left in side the car and
was stabbed by one of the robbers. The robbers then escaped. Quiambao, who owned the car
Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non- helped Galvez to get to a hospital. Galvez died in the hospital. The robbers were then
culpability to merit credibility. Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater apprehended with the exception of Edris who remain at large. Mangumnang however escaped
evidentiary weight over the testimonies of credible witnesses who positively testified that appellant while being in detention and Bara-akal died inside the jail. Since Mangumnang was not arrested,
was at the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the victim alive. the trial in absentia continued as to him. Ompa, Magpalao, and Magumnang were all held guilty as
principal by direct participation of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Page 107
The decision of the trial court, per Judge Pacifico S. Bulado, dated 31 October 1991 but
Issue: promulgated on 20 December 1991, contained no specific dispositive portion. Its rulings are found
in the last two paragraphs which read as follows:
Whether or Not the lower court erred in failing to apply the Constitutional mandate on the
presumption of innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt when it allowed the trial in absentia "The elements of murder in this case, Criminal Case No. 4585 for the killing of Rizalina Apatan-
to push through on the part of defendant-appellant Magumnang. Silvano having been proved by the prosecution beyond doubt, the accused JUANITO
RISMUNDO, MACARIO ACABAL and ABUNDIO NAHID, considering the attendant qualifying
Held: aggravating circumstances of nighttime, use of fire by burning the house of victim Rizalina Apatan-
Silvano in order to forcibly drive her out of her house and hack her to death, the abuse of superior
The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The reason is that the lower court has strength, the penalty impossable [sic] here will be in its maximum degree, that is reclusion
jurisdiction over Magumnang the moment the latter was in custody. Jurisdiction once acquired is perpetua taking into account Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty now for murder is
not lost upon the instance of parties but until the case is terminated. Since all the requisites of trial Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua, and for all the accused to indemnify the heirs of the
in absentia are complete, the court has jurisdiction over Magumnang. victim the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos since this case occurred [sic] in 1980. For
the wounding of the victim Wilson A. Silvano, this Court believes that simple frustrated homicide
In addition, Magumnang was presumed innocent during his trial in absentia. The prosecution had only is committed by the accused Engracio Valeriano only.
strong evidence against him as proof beyond reasonable doubt that he is a principal by direct
participation in the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Thus, the Constitutional mandate was not But since the person who actually inflicted the injuries of victim Wilson Silvano, accused Engracio
violated. Valeriano only is nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive
or at large, no penalty could be imposed on him since he is beyond the jurisdiction of this court to
reach. All the other two (2) accused, JUANITO RISMUNDO and ABUNDIO NAHID are hereby
PEOPLE VS. ACABAL ordered and declared absolved from any criminal responsibility from frustrated homicide.
[226 SCRA 694 ; G.R. NO. 103604, 23 SEP 1993]
The bail bond put up by the three accused, namely: Juanito Rismundo, Macario Acabal and
Facts: Abundio Nahid are hereby ordered cancelled and let a warrant of arrest be issued for their
immediate confinement."
The accusatory portion in the information for murder. Facts are as follows:
Issue:
"That sometime in the evening of the 28th of January, 1980, at Nagbinlod, Municipality of Sta.
Catalina, Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Whether or not the judgment complied with the Rules of Court.
Court, the accused, including several 'John Does', conspiring and confederating with one another,
with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation and being then armed with bolos Whether or not the cancellation of the bail bonds of the accused is valid.
and 'pinuti', did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal
violence on the person of one Rizalina Apatan Silvano while the latter was about to leave her Whether or not the accused may be tried in absentia.
house and inflicting upon her injuries, to wit: 'right leg amputated below the knee; left leg hacked
behind the knee; abdomen hacked with viscerae evacerated,' and did then and there set the Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of frustrated murder.
house on fire while the aforementioned Rizalina Apatan Silvano was inside said house trying to
escape therefrom, and allowing her to be burned inside said house which was burned to the Held:
ground, thereby causing upon said Rizalina Apatan Silvano her death and burning her beyond
recognition. We find that the decision substantially complies with the Rules of Court on judgments as it did
sentence the accused-appellants to reclusion perpetua. A judgment of conviction shall state (a)
But on 16 May 1987, a fire gutted the building where Branch 37 was located and the records of the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the
these two cases were burned. The records were subsequently reconstituted upon petition of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission, if there are any; (b) the
prosecuting fiscal. The testimonies of the witnesses were retaken, however, before it could participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice or
commence, accused Engracio Valeriano jumped bail and the warrant for his arrest issued on 16 accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or
November 1987 was returned unserved because he could not be found. An alias warrant for his damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if
arrest was issued on 26 June 1989, but he remains at large up to the present. there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or
waived.
After the completion of the re-taking of the testimonies of the witnesses in Branch 37, Criminal
Cases Nos. 4584 and 4585 were re-raffled to Branch 33 of the trial court, then presided over by It is obvious that they clearly understood that they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Judge Pacifico S. Bulado. the crime of murder and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal
Case No. 4585. Were it otherwise, they would not have declared in open court their intention to

Page 108
appeal immediately after the promulgation of the decision and would not have subsequently filed the latter. The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was
their written notice of appeal. taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination.

Accused-appellants contend that the trial court did not impose any sentence and so cannot cancel Issue:
anymore their bail bonds and direct their arrest and immediate commitment because it already lost
jurisdiction over their persons when they perfected their appeal. Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendants rights
against self-incrimination.
The decision did impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the order cancelling their bail
bonds and directing their arrest is contained in the decision itself, it is apparent that their Held:
abovementioned contention is highly illogical. At the time the order in question was made, the trial
court still had jurisdiction over the persons of the accused-appellants. The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He
was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was
The trial court further erred in holding that no penalty could be imposed on accused Engracio taken from his body without his objection and was examined by competent medical authority.
Valeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584 because he "is nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to
the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large." The court ignored the fact that Engracio jumped The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or
bail after he had been arraigned, just before the retaking of evidence commenced. Paragraph (2), moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as
Section 14, Article III of the Constitution permits trial in absentia after the accused has been evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a
arraigned provided he has been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against him.
unjustified. One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his non-appearance during
the trial.
VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS
Accordingly, after the trial in absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and promulgation [41 P HIL 62; G.R. NO. 16444; 8 SEP 1920]
may be made by simply recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served
upon his counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation is Facts:
served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel.
Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to
In conclusion, because of reasonable doubt as to their guilt, the accused-appellants must be subject herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the
acquitted. Every accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved; that presumption is determine the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical
solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The contrary requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, examination interposing the defense that such examination was a violation of her constitutional
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Short of this, it is not rights against self-incrimination.
only the right of the accused to be freed; it is even the constitutional duty of the court to acquit him.
Issue:

US VS. TAN TENG Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioners constitutional rights
[23 PHIL 145; G.R. NO. 7081; 7 SEP 1912] against self-incrimination.

Facts: Held:

The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no
the house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a
floor and place his private parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is
disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and reported it to the that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
police.

Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then BELTRAN VS. SAMSON
stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same [53 P HIL 570; G.R. NO. 32025; 23 SEPT 1929]
symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of
the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant Facts:
was suffering from gonorrhea.
Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting
The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would
the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would
Page 109
give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the
He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself. first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge
for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing
the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the Self-
falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional Incrimination Clause.
provision under examination.
Held:
Held:
The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for
The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-
forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his
submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the
hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to
intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer
furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The
fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to
producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a
constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand
and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if
permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for
unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the
supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic
complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is
constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the res pect a
justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN


PASCUAL VS. BME [17 SCRA 1119; G.R. NO. L-26376; 31 AUG 1966]
[28 SCRA 345; G.R. NO. 25018; 26 MAY 1969]
Facts:
Facts:
Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being arraigned, he
Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y counsel. At his counsel de officio, he
Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged was allowed to present evidence and consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-
immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the defense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On
petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the the basis of the testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that
to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of Issue:
grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to
the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only Held:
when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged
that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing. The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an essential requisite to
double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of guilty but however testified that he acted
in complete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court
Page 110
a quo should have required him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not
guilty be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has been no standing of plea during A complaint grave threats was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was
the judgment of acquittal, so there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. dismissed by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the
dismissal was reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed for certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief
of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for lack of
PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA merit and for being a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence,
[23 SCRA 1249; G.R. L-24447; 29 JUN 1968] this instant petition.

Issue:
Facts:
Whether or Not the dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of acquittal.
The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao,
Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioners right against double jeopardy by dismissing CEB-
allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the 9207.
prosecution appealed.
Held:
Issue:
For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of
Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy. the accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the
accused, he has deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at
Held: bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach.

In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always based on merit
in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to that shows that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the case
the charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or at bar, terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of
otherwise terminated without his express consent. the petitioners.

In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of
motion to dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy as enunciated in P.vs. Salico further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely
applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the
dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in presentation of its evidence. The rule on summary procedure was correctly applied.
having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for
the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and
rendering a judgment of conviction against him. PEOPLE VS. COURT OF SILAY
[74 SCRA 248; G.R. NO. L-43790; 9 DEC 1976]
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of
the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. Facts:
9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.
That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico
who were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686
PAULIN VS. GIMENEZ and 1022 loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report cards),
[217 SCRA 386; G.R. NO. 103323; 21 JAN 1993] Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was padding of the weight of the sugar canes and
that the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be heavier than its actual
Facts: weight. The three accused then were charged with Falsification by private individuals and use of
falsified document. After the prosecution had presented, the respondent moved to dismiss the
Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when they were charge against them on the ground that the evidences presented were not sufficient to establish
overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo followed the their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion, respondent court issued its order
vehicle until the latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not constituted the
for the identity of the owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the revised penal code defining the crime of
allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police falsification which was charged earlier and that their case be dismissed. People asserts that the
and block road to prevent the petitioners escape. Upon the arrival of the police, petitioners put plea of double jeopardy is not tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed because according to
their guns down and were immediately apprehended. them, it was done with the consent of the accused therefore waiving there defense of double
Page 111
jeopardy. The accused on the other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due to lack of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on
merits of the prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal which will bar the the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscals claim is that it is not double jeopardy
prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and unconstitutional for the accused because the first offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of electrical
due to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff. devices without the approval and necessary authority from the City Government which was
punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense
Issue: which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different
st
crime charged against the 1 complaint against Mr.Opulencia.
Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused Sensio, Millan and
Jochico in double jeopardy Issue:

Held: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second
offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity
Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code.
case has been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of
falsification was dismissed on a motion of the accused however this was a motion filed after the Held:
prosecution had rested its case, calling for the evidence beyond reasonable ground which the
prosecution had not been able to do which would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as
prosecution of another case. As it was stated on the requirements of a valid defense of double tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of
jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid complaint, second would be that such complaint be double jeopardy. The first would be that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
filed before a competent court and to which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was for the same offense and the second sentence states that If an act is punishable by a law or an
previously acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise terminated without express consent of ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act. In the
nd
the accused in which were all present in the case at bar. There was indeed a valid, legitimate case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2 kind
complaint and concern against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico which was filed at a or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the
competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also mentioned that the accused same act. It further explains that even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the
pleaded not guilty and during the time of trial, it was proven that the case used against the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was a violation against
accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same act of
case which translates to acquittal. It explained further that there are two instances when we can conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other
conclude that there is jeopardy when first is that the ground for the dismissal of the case was due thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on
nd
to insufficiency of evidence and second, when the proceedings have been reasonably prolonged the first offense should bar the 2 complaint against him coming from the same identity as that of
st
as to violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites given, it was the first on the 1 offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.
that is very much applicable to our case at bar where there was dismissal of the case due to
insufficiency of evidence which will bar the approval of the petition in the case at bar for it will
constitute double jeopardy on the part of the accused which the law despises. ESMENA VS. POGOY
[102 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-54110; 20 FEB 1981]

PEOPLE VS. RELOVA Facts:


[149 SCRA 292; G.R. NO.L-45129; 6 MAR 1987]
Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for
FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to
the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. be given to them because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners
Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioners motion for pleaded Not Guilty. No trial came in after the arraignment due to the priests request to move it
reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of Batangas Electric on another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but
Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and the fiscal informed the court that it received a telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The
examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case because the
discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city government trial was already dragging the accused and that the priests telegram did not have a medical
and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said devices are designed certificate attached to it in order for the court to recognize the complainants reason to be valid in
purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the plants electric order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the
meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the priest was indeed
months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a light sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case
felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed against on the ground of double jeopardy.
Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance
regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Issue:
Page 112
she was below eighteen years old when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial court
Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to should have been imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. 7659. .
complainants failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy
Issue:
Held:
Whether or Not the Court erred in penalizing the appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the
Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case four indictments of rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A.
has been dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an 7659.
acquittal on the case filed. The dismissal was due to complainants incapability to present its
evidence due to non appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar Held:
further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these
three requisites should be present, that one, there is a valid complaint or information filed second, Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a
that it is done before a court of competent jurisdiction and third, that the accused has been judgment or final order unless the accused will be put in double jeopardy. In People vs. Leones, it
arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. In the case at bar, all three conditions declared that:
were present, as the case filed was grave coercion, filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to
where the coercion took place and last the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the while it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort, there are allegations
complaint or the information. When these three conditions are present then the acquittal, of error committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into to uphold
conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his express the right of the accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution
consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. In the seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul
case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for of the right of the accused against double jeopardyWhen the accused after
the trial of the case and not its termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed conviction by the trial court did not appeal his decision, an appeal by the
consent to the dismissal of the case which would make the case filed res judicata and has been government seeking to increase the penalty imposed by the trial court places
dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to the accused in double jeopardy and should therefore be dismissed.
speedy trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further
prosecution. The ban on double jeopardy primarily prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an
instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials.
It also serves as a deterrent from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a
PEOPLE VS. DE LA TORRE conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant
[380 SCRA 586; G.R. NOS. 137953-58; 11 MAR 2002] again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.

Facts: Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the appeal of the prosecution cannot prosper.

Wilfredo dela Torre, appellee, has three children from a common-law relationship, the eldest of
which is Mary Rose. When Mary Rose was 7 yearsold, her mother left them together with her
youngest brother so she and her other brother were left to the care of her father.

Mary Rose was the brightest in her class despite their poverty. However, in January 1997, a
sudden change in Mary Roses behavior behavior was noticed. She was twelve years old at that
time. She appeared sleepy, snobbish and she also urinated on her panty. When confronted by
her head teacher, Mary Rose admitted that she was abused repeatedly by her father. Her father,
however, denied vehemently the charges being imputed to him by her daughter.

The RTC convicted appellee of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of murder.
However, the RTC refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained that
there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses such as the absence of any
actual physical violence or intimidation on the commission of the acts, that after the mother of
Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five years, Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her brother
were living together as a family and Mary Rose was never molested by her father.

The prosecution seeks to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of death of
the accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that

Page 113
CITIZENSHIP

Page 114
CITIZENSHIP election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the
Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the
private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable
Art. 4 because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the
proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution; Issue:
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Held:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural- officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the
born citizens. specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
Sec. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a
Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status.
law. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983
per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC Francisco, California, U.S.A.
[174 SCRA 245; G.R. NO. 87193; 23 JUN 1989]
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos
Facts: dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into
embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the r esult of
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities,
Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country
capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The f act that he was elected by the people of
proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack
unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total
returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized
American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of
argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive
continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant
alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of
Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization his loyalty and love.
as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His
Page 115
Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice- resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
M ERCADO VS. M ANZANO On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with
[307 SCRA 630; G.R. NO. 135083; 26 MAY 1999] the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
Facts: election of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the TECSON VS. COMELEC
winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto [424 SCRA 277; G.R. No. 161434; 3 Mar 2004]
Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private
respondent is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the Facts:
petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local
Government code that provides that persons who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to
running any public position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen
COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen,
the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati. he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of
an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two
Issue: assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor. married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

Held:

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the Issue:
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen Held:
because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso
facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption
children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his
in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any illegitimate.
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
Page 116
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code.

BENGZON VS. HRET


[357 SCRA 545; G. R. No. 142840; 7 May 2001]

Facts:

Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was
the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United
States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He
was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Issue:

Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen.

Held:

Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process
of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship
will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Page 117

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