Llamanzarez v. COMELEC (Loverly Barquez)

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO
G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

COMELEC AND FRANCISCO TATAD et.al
G.R. Nos. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
Facts:
Petitioner, Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares(Grace Poe) was found as a newborn infant in
the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo in 1968. She was found by one Edgardo Militar and transfers the babys
custody and care to his relative Emiliano Militar. The latter registered the baby as a foundling and
subsequently was issued a Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth which contained petitioners
given name and Militar as her surname. When petitioner was five (5) years old, she was adopted by the
Spouses Ronald Poe and Jesusa Poe and changes her surname to Poe. When petitioner reached the age of
eighteen (18) in 1986, she registered as a voter in San Juan City, two years after she was issued a Philippine
Passport. In 1988 she went to the United States to continue her studies, and graduated in the year 1991. At
that same year she married Teodoro Llamanzares, who is both an American and a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner stayed in the United States with her husband. In the year 1991, she was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently was issued a U.S. Passport. However, petitioner returns to the
Philippines in 2004 to support her fathers candidacy. After the election, it was not long when she
eventually returned to the Philippine because of the health condition of her father. In 2005, petitioner and
her husband decided to permanently reside in the Philippines in order to help her grieving mother. May 24,
2005 petitioner came home to the Philippines. On July 7, 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act 9225. Eleven (11) days after she takes her oath, the
Bureau of Immigration declared that she reacquired her Philippine Citizenship. Year 2010, she was
appointed by President Aquino as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board. Because of that, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States
of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship before a notary public. On July 12, 2011, petitioner
executed before the Vice-Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Nationality of the United States. Months later, she was issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the
United States. Petitioner ran and was voted as a Senator in 2012. And on October 15, 2015 she files her
Certificate of Candidacy as President of the Republic of the Philippines, which is the subject of the petition.
G.R. No. 221697

Estrella Elampara argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born citizen Filipino on
account of the fact that she was a foundling. And because of this she cannot be qualified under reacquisition
of citizenship under R.A. 9225 since it is only reserved to natural-born citizens. And even assuming that
petitioner was a natural-born Filipino she is deemed to have lost that when she was naturalized as an
American citizen. She argued that natural-born citizen must be continuous from birth.
G.R. Nos. 221698-700

Tatad et.al theorized that since the Philippines follows the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of
unknown parentage cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is
determinative of natural-born status. He also argues that as a rule in statutory construction, what is not
included is excluded, a foundling cannot be considered as natural-born since it was not expressly included
in the 1935 Constitution. He also argues that petitioner cannot rely on international laws since these are not
self-executory and that legislation is needed for it to take effect. No such legislation exists in the Philippines.
And just the same as Elampara, he argues that Grace Poe cannot avail of R.A. 9225 and that assuming she
can, it only bestowed her Philippine citizenship but did not revert her original status as a natural-born
citizen.
Issue:
1 Whether or not a foundling is considered a natural-born citizen.
2 Whether or not repatriation under Republic Act 9225 will result in reacquisition of natural-born
citizenship.
Held:
1 A FOUNDLING IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN.

Before discussing the grounds that the Court considered, the Supreme Court ruled that the burden
of proof is on the private respondent. Petitioners admission that she is a foundling did not shift the
burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos.
A
As shown by the official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority, there is more than ninety-
nine percent (99%) chance that petitioners parents are Filipino. The official statistics as offered by the
Solicitor General shows the total number of Filipinos born in the year petitioner was born, as compared
to the total number of foreigners born on that same year bracket. The figures show the ratio that as
compared to Filipino born, a foreigner is likely deficit. It also shows that in the year petitioner was born,
majority of population in Iloilo, where petitioner was left, was Filipino.
The court also accepted as circumstantial evidence the fact that petitioner was left in a Catholic
Church and her typical Filipino features, her height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond
shaped eyes and an oval face.
Additionally, the court observed that Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps,
shame. It is absurd to imagine that foreigners will come to the Philippines, just to get pregnant and
leave their newborn babies behind thinking that the infants would have a better economic opportunities
or believing that this country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children.
The rejection of the fact that a foundling is a natural-born based on a theoretical chance that one
among thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two foreigners is downright
discriminatory, irrational and unjust.
B
The deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention reveal the intent of the framers to include
foundlings as those enumerated as natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution. The framers
intend to include all kinds of illegitimate children, including children with unknown parentage, to be a
natural-born citizen. This was copied from the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage
born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards because it is presumed that the child is a daughter or
son of a Spaniard.
However, such intention was not expressly included in the 1935 Constitution because the framers
deem it not necessary due to a few number of cases involving this situation. What was declined was the
proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos in order to have linguistic
efficiency and avoid redundancy. Hence, foundlings as natural-born citizen, is impliedly recognized.
C
The Court also finds support in the domestic laws on adoption to establish that foundlings are
Filipinos. Under these laws, for an adoption to be valid, the adoptee must in the first place be a Filipino.
In the case of Ellis and Ellis v. Republic, 1 where alien adopters sought to adopt a child left by an
unidentified mother, adoption was granted since Court has acquired jurisdiction over the status of the
baby, she being a citizen of the Philippines.
Accordingly, recent legislation such as Republic Act 8043 entitled An Act Establishing the Rules to
Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other Purposes and Republic Act 8552
1 117 Phil. 976 (1963)

entitled An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes, expressly refer to Filipino Children and foundlings are those included as Filipino children
who may be adopted.
D
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international laws. The contention of private respondent that
international laws in order to take effect must have a local legislation is untenable. International law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The Philippines
follow the principle of incorporation, because as embodied in the Constitution, generally accepted
principles of international law forms part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations.
That being said, international laws are sufficient to form the conclusion that foundlings are natural-
born citizen. The principle embodied under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), clearly emphasize on the right of every child to acquire a nationality. It
even imposes a duty to register and grant such nationality immediately after birth and ensure that no
child is stateless.
Additionally there are two international conventions, with the same principle on citizenship of
foundlings. The first is the Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws, which provides that a child whose parents are unknown shall have the nationality of
the country of birth. xxx A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the
territory of the State in which it was found. And second is the United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Stateless, which provides that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
where he is found. These conventions even though not yet ratified by the Philippines are generally
accepted principles of international law. And even though the Philippines is not a party to both of these
conventions, it does not mean that their principles are not binding. These two convections effectively
affirm the provisions under the UDHR regarding nationality. The Philippines is a signatory to the
UDHR.
The Court also note that at least sixty (60) countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe
have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as citizen and forty-two (42) of these countries follow the
jus sanguinis regime just like the Philippines. And of the sixty (60), only twenty-six (26) are signatories
to the Convention on Stateless. This shows that it is a generally accepted principle of international law
to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.
E
And lastly, it is undeniable that the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) issue passports to
foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department
through the DFA considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
2 REPATRIATION UNDER REPUBLIC ACT 9225 RESULTS IN THE REACQUISITION OF

THE NATURAL-BORN STATUS.
Respondents argue that only Philippines citizenship and not the natural-born status is deemed
reacquired under RA 9225. Such contention is contrary to established jurisprudence. In Bengson III v.
HRET2, the Supreme Court held that repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen and on the other hand a natural-born citizen will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino. R.A. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in
several cases.
2 409 Phil 633, 649 (2001)

Additionally respondents contention that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain
uninterrupted and continuous from birth is also rejected by the Court. In the Bengson Case3, the Court
has ruled that there are only two types of citizens, natural-born or naturalized; there is no third category
for repatriated ones. The determination of citizenship depends on the reasons for the loss and the mode
prescribed by the applicable law. Since in repatriation, a person need not go through the process of
naturalization to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born citizen.
3 Id
G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

G.R. Nos. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
CJ. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO CONCURRING OPINION
On citizenship
COMELEC declared that Poe made false representation when she declared that she was natural-born
citizen of the Philippines. According to the resolution of COMELEC, petitioner was not able to prove her
blood relationship to a Filipino parent and her failure precluded her from claiming the status of natural-
born citizen under 1935 Constitution. Chief Justice Sereno disagreed to the decision of the COMELEC.
Petitioner did not make false material representation regarding her citizenship in 2016 Certificate of
Candidacy
There has been no ruling on the citizenship of foundlings. It would be unfair for the COMELEC to
declare that petitioner intentionally misrepresented her status. Based on the evidence presented, there is
every reason to believe that petitioner acted in good faith. There is sufficient legal basis to sustain
presumption of citizenship in favor of petitioner although there is no physical proof of filiation.
There was no deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render her
ineligible.
Documents were presented to support the finding of good faith on her part. These documents provide
the petitioner with sufficient basis for her claim of citizenship. She cannot be faulted for relying upon these
pieces of documents especially that when she made declaration that she was natural born, the presumption
created by these documents has not been overturned. It would be absurd for her to write foundling when
birth certificate and official documents provide otherwise.
A Adoption Decree
The decree issued in 1974 allows petitioner to legally claim to be the daughter of Ronald Allan Poe and
Jesusa Poe. In Republic v Court of Appeals, it was held that adoption decree creates a relationship in which
adopted children were declared born of their adoptive parents. Adoptees are entitled to maintain strict
confidentiality of adoption proceedings as provided in PD 603, RA 8552, and Rule on Adoption. To require
an adoptee to go beyond the adoption decree just to prove her parentage would defeat the purpose of
confidentiality.
B. Certificate of Live Birth
Upon issuance of adoption decree, amended certificate is issued. Petitioner has the right to rely on this
birth certificate for information regarding her identity, status, and filiation. Certificate of Live Birth is a
public document which enjoys presumption of validity. The birth certificate of petitioner has also the
official approval of Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal. Absence of any declaration that the adoption
proceeding is void, the birth certificate is deemed legitimate and genuine. Thus, petitioner cannot be faulted
for relying on the contents of her birth certificate. In fact, she is obliged to rely on it because the law does
not provide her with any other reference for information regarding her parentage. It must be noted that the
records evidencing her foundling status has already been sealed after issuance of adoption decree. The fact
that the amended birth certificate was without any notation should not be taken against the petitioner since
it merely complies with the confidentiality rule in adoption decree.
C. Voters ID
This also proves petitioners good faith. Because of all the entries made in Voters ID, petitioner could
not be expected to claim any citizenship other than that of the Philippines.
D. Philippine Passport
The passport should be issued to any Filipino citizen who complies with the requirements. The
Philippine Passport Act states that no passport shall be issued unless the Secretary is satisfied that
applicant is a Filipino citizen. Petitioner, holder of Philippine passport, is presumed to be Filipino citizen, in
view of the presumption of regularity accorded to acts of public officials in the course of their duties. If the
citizenship is doubtful, only travel document is issued. If the State considers foundling not to be citizens, it
would not have given them passport. However, DFAs website show a list of requirements that a foundling
should present to get a valid passport. This only means that foundlings are considered by the State, or at
least by the executive, to be Filipino citizens.
E. Bureau of Immigration Order
The findings of Bureau of Immigration on citizenship of petitioner is not conclusive on the COMELEC.
However, such negate notion of bad faith when petitioner made representation in her CoC that she was
natural-born citizen. At the time of filing, the presumption created by the Order was in operation. It has
been argued that petitioner only obtained the order because she misrepresented herself to be born of
Ronald Allan and Jesusa Poe. However, writing of the names of adoptive parents as indicated in birth
certificate was justified by the confidentiality rule in adoption proceeding.
F. Senate Electoral Tribunal Decision
The SET Decision is a prima facie finding that petitioner can rely on. The fact that the decision was
issued later than the filing of CoC does not take away its validity as basis of petitioner in saying that she is
natural-born. The decision of SET was the determination of petitioners citizenship status as of the time she
was elected as senator. Although the filing of CoC came first, the application of the ruling of SET predates
the filing of CoC for president.
Legal Significance of Confirmation of Renunciation
It was contended that petitioners repatriation as Filipino citizen under RA 9225 was doubtful because
of her subsequent acts in 2011 such as execution of Oath of Renunciation of Nationality of United States,
completion of Questionnaire on Information for Determining Possible Loss of U.S Citizenship, and issuance
of a Confirmation of Loss of Nationality of United States. These documents were only executed by petitioner
for purpose of complying with the requirements of US Law. What is important is that petitioner properly
renounced US citizenship through execution of Affidavit of Renunciation. Acts done after such were only to
confirm the renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Petitioner validly presumes that she is a citizen of the Philippines
Citizenship of foundling is not expressly addressed in Article IV of the Constitution. But statutes,
administrative orders, and jurisprudence support the conclusion even in absence of physical proof to
establish foundlings filiation. The presumption that foundlings are natural born citizens can be established
by the deliberations of 1935 Constitution. The proposed standard by COMELEC, which is proof of blood
relation to a parent who is Filipino citizen, is an impossible condition. The arguments of COMELEC are
unmeritorius. According to COMELEC, the fact that petitioner was abandoned in parish church and her
biological parents are unknown render her citizenship questionable. COMELEC further declared that since
petitioner is unable to establish identities of parents, she is incapable of proving blood relation to Filipino
citizen parents.
Filiation as a matter of legal fiction
Determination of filiation does not rely only on physical proof but also on legal presumptions and
circumstantial evidence. The Family Code allows paternity and filiation to be established through: 1) record
of birth; 2) written admission of filiation; 3) open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or
illegitimate child; 4)or other means allows by Rules or special laws. None of these requires physical proof of
parentage. The standard proposed by COMELEC finds no legal basis. To impose such is to impose undue
burden on the part of petitioner, particularly in view of her situation as foundling.
Contemporaneous and subsequent construction by the legislature, executive, and judicial branches of
government
Statutes, rules, issuances, and judicial decisions provided foundlings legal protection. Code of Civil
Procedure recognized that children whose parents are unknown have a right to be adopted. Failure to
identify the parents of a child was not an obstacle to adoption. Also, Act No. 1670 was enacted to provide
adoption of poor children in custody of asylums including orphans or child with unknown parents. The
congress enacted RA No 8043 which established rules on Inter-country Adoption of Filipino Children.
Section 8 of the law provides that foundling can be adopted through submission of foundling certificate. RA
No. 8552 was later on enacted, section 5 provides that the failure to locate parents of a child after exerting
efforts gives rise to the duty to register the child as foundling and should be declared abandoned. RA No.
9523 was also enacted which requires DSWD to declare first a child legally available for adoption as
prerequisite in adoption proceedings. Administrative Order No. 011-09 was adopted to implement the law.
Under this, the term child includes foundlings. These laws are important because they effectively recognize
foundling as citizens of the Philippines.
In the case of Spouses Ellis v Republic, the Court held that it has the power to determine citizenship of
a foundling based on presumption and that it has jurisdiction over adoption case of a baby born in the
Philippines, the baby being citizen of Philippines, in view of the theory that jurisdiction over the status of
natural person is determined by nationality. The 1976 case of Duncan v CFI of Rizal also presumed that
foundlings are Filipino citizen for purposes of adoption.
The enactments and decisions prove the contemporaneous interpretation of the Constitution by the
three branches of the government. It is evident that all branches presumed that these children are Filipino
citizens in the absence of contrary evidence. Presumptions are used by the Court to resolve issues on
citizenship. In the case of Board of Commissioners v Dela Rosa, the Court used presumption of citizenship
on basis of Bureau of Immigration Order. In the case of Tecson v COMELEC, the Court used the
presumption that the grandfather of Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen, being part of en masse
Filipinization. The citizenship would extend to Allan Poe which also extend to Fernando Poe.
It is reasonable to presume that petitioner is Filipino citizen since she was abandoned in Iloilo at a time
when number of children born to foreigners was small fraction of total children born. Absence contrary
evidence, the presumption stands.
The Place of Probability in the Rule of Law
The rules on evidence is a means by which uniformity is instituted in judicial system. These rules
govern the means of ascertaining truth respecting matter of fact. However, this does not entail absolute
certainty. Judges are not precluded from drawing conclusions from inferences based on established facts.
Jurisprudence is filled with cases decided on basis of probability. As a rule, administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies are not bound by technical rules of procedure but this does not warrant evidentiary rules to be
disregarded. In this case, COMELEC refused to consider pieces of evidence that tends to establish the
probability of a fact in issue.
First, it is admitted that petitioner has typical Filipino features like brown eyes, low nasal bridge, black
hair, oval- shaped face, and height. This by itself does not show belief as to her definite citizenship, but
coupled with other evidence, such as abandonment in Iloilo in 1968 when there were no international
airports in Iloilo, establishes probability that she was born of Filipino parents. This probability is supported
by statistics that 99.03% were born to Filipino parents while 0.07% to foreigners in the Philippines.
Election cases requires preponderance of evidence so it can reasonably concluded that petitioner has
fulfilled all requirements of citizenship.
Petitioner may be considered natural-born citizen under 1935 Constitution
It was already established that foundlings may be presumed citizens of the Philippines. The question as
to whether foundling can be considered natural born may be resolved by using originalist and functionalist
approach in interpretation of Constitution.
Originalist approach was used by the COMELEC in its resolution, saying that in light of principle of
inclusion unius est exlusion alterius, foundlings are not natural born. This approach resolved constitutional
issues by looking at the text and clear intent of framers. Functionalist approach is one which is not
formalism. It is associated with balancing test and with interpretation in a manner that goes beyond the
original intent of persons crafted the text in view of its adaptability.
A Originalist Approach (Interpretation in accordance with intent of framers). COMELEC urged the
Court to use this approach claiming that there was no intent on the part of the delegates to the 1934
Constitutional Convention to consider foundlings as natural born citizens for if it was their intention, they
can explicitly stated it. The rule is if the terms of the Constitution do not reveal intent of framers, extrinsic
aids may be resorted to such as the debates or proceedings, history, and executive or legislative
construction. The transcript of the deliberation reveals that intent of framers was to make foundling a
natural citizen. The delegates appeared to have been convinced that there was no need to include a
provision regarding foundling because the Spanish Code already recognizes foundlings born of Spanish
citizens as Spanish, foundlings citizenship could be determined by Congress, these case were so few, and
international law recognizes children born in a country with unknown parents as citizens of that country.
B. Functionalist Approach (Interpretation consistent with natural justice). Under this, the Court should
interpret Constitution that would allow fulfillment of its purpose. The COMELECs argument that
foundlings are excluded in 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitution would go against fundamental principle of
natural justice.
Mixture of jus soli and jus sanguinis
COMELEC opines that only those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines are considered natural
born under 1935 Constitution citing Valles v COMELEC. However, the Court in that case only stated that
citizenship by blood was retained in the 1973 Constitution but it never stated that jus sanguinis had been
exclusive regime in the Philippines.
The Malolos Constitution provides that all persons in Philippine territory are Filipinos. Under
Philippine Bill, citizen of Philippines includes native-born inhabitants, inhabitant who was native of Spain,
and inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers before April 1899. The Jones Law provides that citizens of
Philippines were subjects of Spain residing in Philippines on April 11,1899 and since that date, not citizens
of other country.
Citizenship under 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitution
In the three Constitutions, citizens include citizens of Philippines at the time of adoption of the
Constitution. This includes even those who did not have a single drop of Filipino blood. Constitution is
meant to advance fundamental values of the Filipino people. Thus, the Court should not construe
citizenship provisions in a manner that is unjustly depriving on the part of foundlings just like considering
them as stateless. The principle of natural justice was utilized to avoid unfair outcome.
The requirement of natural- born citizenship should serve to deny certain privileges to those who
acquired and perfect their citizenship through naturalization. The concept is meant to distinguish the
natural born from the foreign born. The term natural born was lifted from US Constitution. The US
Constitution does not define the term but cases decided indicated that those born in United States, even
born to alien parents, are natural born US citizen. In 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, the term was not
also defined. However, deliberations of 1935 Constitution framers reveal that natural citizen is person who
is a citizen by birth and not by naturalization or further declaration of law. The term was define in 1973
Constitution and it excludes only those who are naturalized. As ruled by the Court in Roa v Collector of
Customs, natural born citizen is a person who has become such at the moment of birth.
Foundling is not naturalized in accordance with law. The contention was when foundling is registered
in relation to administrative proceeding, the process amounts to naturalization in accordance with law. The
contention is unacceptable. First, the phrase naturalized in accordance with law refers to naturalization
process provided under naturalization statutes. Second, registration is not attributable to the foundling.
Foundlings do not perform any act equivalent to acts required in naturalization proceeding. Third, it is
possible to register a foundling even without administrative proceeding.
Applicability of Bengson v HRET
As to whether petitioner reacquired her natural born status, the Court must apply ruling in Bengson III
v HRET. In this case, the Court ruled that there were only two classes of citizens: natura- born and
naturalized. Citizen who is not naturalized Filipino necessarily is a natural- born. In the absence of separate
category for those who after losing their citizenship, reacquires it, they would either be natural born or
naturalized. If a citizen does not have to undergo naturalization process, then, he is a natural- born.
Bengson referred to repatriation of persons who served in US Army but re-acquisition under RA 9225 has
similar process. It allows former Filipino citizens to recover their natural-born status.
Determination of natural- born status
RA 9225 provides for the loss, re-acquisition, and retention of citizenship. It refers only to citizenship
and not the natural-born status. The status is determined by birth. This characteristic cannot be changed
except in case of naturalization.
Re-acquisition is not naturalization
RA no 9225 merely discusses retention and re-acquisition of citizenship and does not cover
naturalization. Congress already treated naturalization as different species apart from repatriation and
other modes as may be introduced. Re-acquisition under RA 9225 and repatriation under RA 8171 are
different from naturalization under CA 473. The former merely requires taking the oath of allegiance and
registering it in the proper civil registry. Petitioner did not have to undergo process of naturalization in
order to re-acquire citizenship. She only had to observe procedure under RA 9225. Therefore, declaring her
to be naturalized is contrary to law.
To refuse to recognize foundlings as citizens of the Philippines is to contravene our obligations under
existing international law
Customary international law becomes binding by virtue of Incorporation Clause. For it to occur there
muse be widespread and consistent practice of the states and psychological element known as the belief on
the part of the states that practice in question is rendered obligatory by existence of rule of law requiring it.
In 1935, there was no existing binding norm of customary international law granting citizenship to
foundlings. However, at present, this customary norm exists. Right of children to acquire nationality is
enshrined in international agreements. Presumption of citizenship accorded to foundlings in a states
territory is mentioned in 1930 Hague Convention, 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, and
European Convention on Nationality. These treaties, concurred by several states, show that there is
widespread recognition of the right to nationality of foundlings. 165 out of 189 countries consider
foundlings as citizens by operation of law. 142 countries enacted statutes granting citizenship to child found
in their territories if parents are unknown unless there is proof to the contrary. The Philippines is a state
party to ICCPR and CRC and for this we must respect right of every child to acquire nationality.
Declaration that foundlings are stateless would lead to unconscionable consequences. It would render
all children of unknown parentage stateless and would place them in an extreme vulnerable condition. In
the Philippines, stateless were deprived of many rights like right to suffrage, education and training,
candidacy, occupation of public office, use of natural resources, investment, practice of profession, and
participation in legal proceedings with regard to status, condition, and legal capacity. A declaration that
individuals of unknown parentage are not Filipinos or that they are naturalized citizens may lead to removal
from government positions, return of benefits already granted, and end of pension for retirees.
Conclusion
Chief Justice Sereno voted to grant the consolidated petitions. COMELEC relied on petitioners
admission that she was foundling. However, such did not establish the falsity of petitioners claim that she
was natural born citizen. Presumptions leaned in her favor to the effect that a foundling is a natural- born
citizen. Poe had the right to rely on these legal presumptions, negating the notion of deception on her part
in stating in her Certificate of Candidacy that she was a natural-born citizen.
G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

G.R. Nos. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
J. MARVIC LEONEN CONCURRING OPINION
PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS
The Constitution, as fundamental law, defines the minimum qualifications for a person to present his or her
candidacy to run for President. It is this same fundamental law which prescribes that it is the People, in
their sovereign capacity as electorate, to determine who among the candidates is best qualified for that
position.
The Constitution requires that either the father or the mother is a Filipino citizen. It does
not require an abandoned child or a foundling to identify his or her biological parents. It is
enough to show that there is a convincing likelihood that one of the parents is a Filipino.
Contrary to the respondents' submissions, it is not blood line that is required. One of the
parents can be a naturalized Filipino citizen. The reference is only one ascendant
generation. The constitutional provision does not absolutely require being born to an
indigenous ethnicity.
There is no rational basis to conclude that the loyalty to this country of a foundling, discovered in a rural
area and adopted by well-to-do parents, will be more suspect than a child born to naturalized Filipino
parents.
That a foundling is a natural-born Filipino, unless clear and convincing evidence is shown otherwise, is also
the definitive inference from contemporaneous acts of Congress and the Executive This is also the availing
conclusion considering our binding commitments in international law.There is clear and convincing
evidence from the history of the actual text of the entire Constitution.
In the case at bar, petitioner discharged her burden to prove that she is natural-born when
the parties stipulated as to her status as a foundling found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo.
When the yardsticks of common sense and statistics are used, it borders on the absurd to
start with the presumption that she was born to both a foreign father and a foreign mother.
In all likelihood, she was born to at least a Filipino father or to a Filipino mother, or both.
ON WHETHER PPETITIONE, A FOUNDLING, IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN
Citizenship essentially is the "right to have rights." It is one's "personal and more or less permanent
membership in a political community. . . . The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights,
that is, the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public
office[,] and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance."
Citizenship also entails obligations to the community. Because of the rights and protection provided by the
state, its citizens are presumed to be loyal to it, and even more so if it is the state that has protected them
since birth.
There are only two categories of citizens: natural-born and naturalized.

A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the Philippines "from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." On the other hand, a
naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-born.
In Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this court ruled that if a person is not
naturalized, he or she is considered a natural-born citizen of the Philippines:
[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration
of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: ... A citizen
who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Petitioner did not undergo the naturalization process. She reacquired her Filipino citizenship through
Republic Act No. 9225.
To consider petitioner, a foundling, as not natural-born will have grave consequences.

Naturalization requires that petitioner is of legal age. While it is true that she could exert
time and extraordinary expense to find the parents who might have abandoned her, this will
not apply to all foundlings. Thus, this approach will concede that we will have a class of
citizens who are stateless due to no fault of theirs.
There is no need for an express statement in the Constitution's citizenship provisions that
foundlings are natural-born Filipino citizens. A contrary interpretation will be inconsistent
with the other provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution should be interpreted as a
whole to "effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution."
Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution enjoin the state to defend children's
well-being and protect them from any condition that is prejudicial to their development. This includes
preventing discriminatory conditions in fact as well as in law:
Crucial government positions are exclusive to natural-born citizens of the Philippines. Justice Leonen
enumerated these government positions as mentioned in the 1987 Constitution and said that: An
interpretation that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens would mean that we
should teach our foundling citizens to never aspire to serve the country in any of the above
capacities. This is not only inconsistent with the text of our Constitution's citizenship
provisions, which required only evidence of citizenship and not of the identities of the
parents. It unnecessarily creates a classification of citizens with limited rights based on the
circumstances of their births. This is discriminatory. Our Constitution provides that citizens
shall have equal protection of the law and equal access to opportunities for public service.
Further, inasmuch as foundlings are citizens of the Philippines, they are human beings whose dignity we
value and rights we respect. Thus:
Article II, SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.
Moreover, in connection with petitioner who undergone adoption proces, Justice Leonen said that the
statutes providing for adoption only allow the recognition of filiation for children who are Filipinos. They
allow adoption of foundlings. Therefore, foundlings are, by law, presumed to be Filipino.
However, even if there is no legal presumption of natural-born status for all foundlings,
enough evidence was presented by petitioner before the Commission on Elections to prove
that at least one-if not both-of her parents were Filipino citizens.
Petitioner's Filipino biological lineage cannot be proven easily by direct evidence such as birth certificates
or witness testimonies of her birth. Her status as an abandoned child makes it improbable, if not too
expensive, to prove her citizenship through DNA evidence.
Aside from direct evidence, facts may be proved by using circumstantial evidence.
Petitioner was found in Jaro, Iloilo at a parish church on September 3, 1968. Iloilo, as in most if not all
provinces of the Philippines, had a population composed mostly of Filipinos. Petitioner is described as
having "brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face." She is
only 5 feet and 2 inches tall.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that majority of Filipinos are Roman Catholics. Many
Filipinos are poor. Poverty and shame may be dominant reasons why infants are abandoned.
There was also no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo at the time when petitioner was born.
These circumstances provide substantial evidence to infer the citizenship of her biological
parents. Her physical characteristics are consistent with that of many Filipinos. Her
abandonment at a Catholic Church is consistent with the expected behavior of a Filipino in
1968 who lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic environment. The nonexistence of
an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo can reasonably provide context that it is illogical for a
foreign father and a foreign mother to visit a rural area, give birth and leave their offspring
there.
The Solicitor General adds that petitioner is, in terms of probability, more likely born a Filipina than a
foreigner based on the records of Philippine Statistics Authority presented by the former, that out of the
900, 165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% of newborns were foreign. This
translates to roughly 99.8% chance that petitioner was born a Filipina at birth.
ON WHETHER PETITIONER VALIDLY REACQUIRED NATURAL-BORN PHILIPPINE

CITIZENSHIP IN RELATION TO THE FILING OF HER CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.
Justice Leonen emphsized that, Republic Act No. 9225 only requires that the personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship be made "at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy" for those
seeking elective public position. It does not require
CONCLUSION
Admittedly, there is more to democracy than having a wider choice of candidates during periodic elections.
The quality of democracy increases as people engage in meaningful deliberation often moving them to
various types of collective action to achieve a better society. Elections can retard or aid democracy. It
weakens society when these exercises reduce the electorate to subjects of entertainment, slogans, and empty
promises. This kind of elections betrays democracy They transform the exercise to a contest that puts
premium on image rather than substance. The potential of every voter gets wasted. Worse, having been
marginalized as mere passive subjects, voters are then manipulated by money and power.
Elections are at their best when they serve as venues for conscious and deliberate action. Choices made by
each voter should be the result of their own reasoned deliberation. These choices should be part of their
collective decision to choose candidates who will be accountable to them and further serious and workable
approaches to the most pressing and relevant social issues. Elections are at their best when the electorate
are not treated simply as numbers in polling statistics, but as partners in the quest for human dignity and
social justice.
This case should be understood in this context. There are no guarantees that the elections we will have in a
few months will lead us to more meaningful freedoms. How and when this comes about should not solely
depend on this court. In a working constitutional democracy framed by the rule of just law, how
we conceive and empower ourselves as a people should also matter significantly.
G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

G.R. Nos. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
J. FRANCIS JARDALEZA CONCURRING OPINION
There are only two types of citizens, natural-born or those from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship, and the other class who have to go naturalization process.
The former is the only one eligible to run as President of the Philippines.
A
Justice Jardaleza does not agree with the conclusion of the ponente that international laws
cited confer upon foundlings or Grace Poe for that matter, the status as natural-born citizen. He
reasoned that the power of the state to confer citizenship is derived from its sovereignty. As a
sovereign nation, the Philippines has the inherent right to determine for itself who its citizens are.
The determination and recognition made by such sovereign must be respected by international laws.
Likewise, Justice Jardaleza does not agree that the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness purportedly conferring birth right upon foundlings or
creating presumptions thereof can be considered as customary rule of international law. It is based
on the respect to the Presidents treaty-ratification powers and the Congress treaty-concurring
powers. Courts of law cannot declare a convention as customary without pre-empting the exercise of
the two branches of the Government of its authority.
Also, Poe and the ponencia anchors such right of foundlings to different international
covenants such as the Convention on Rights of the Child (CRC) and the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which both speaks of the childs right to nationality. However
such provision does not by itself create an enforceable right. A simple reading of it may seem to
suggest that a child shall be given an opportunity to become a Filipino. The obligation imposed is
upon the State to enact citizenship statutes specifically for children. The Constitution and statutes
providing for derivative citizenship is the Philippines compliance to such obligation.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) likewise does not specifically confer
such natural-born status to foundlings. The right to a nationality under the UDHR must be
interpreted as subject to domestic laws. A contrary interpretation would effectively amount to an
unqualified adoption of the jus soli principle which would be repugnant to our constitutional statute
which adheres to the jus sanguinis principle. It may be said then that the right conferred under
UDHR is not specifically for recognition of foundlings but as against statelessness and the obligation
of a negative duty not to create or perpetuate statelessness.
B
The 1935 Constitution is silent as to the citizenship of a foundling. In interpreting the silence
of the Constitution the best guide is none other than the Constitution itself. Certainly the 1935
Constitution adhered to the jus sanguinis principle as the primary basis of determining citizenship.
In determining a persons parentage, determination in appropriate proceedings is required
observing due process and equal protection rights. The COMELEC failed in such aspect.
In administrative proceedings, cardinal primary rights must be observed. These include: 1)

the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof (2) tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3)
while the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision; (4) not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial;" (5) the decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected; (6) the tribunal must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy; and ('7) the tribunal should render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.
The COMELEC failed to observe the third and fourth requirement. They made a conclusion of law
without making a determination based on the evidence on record and admissions of
the parties of the probability or improbability that Poe was born of Filipino parents; and second,
by concluding that Poe can only prove her parentage through DNA or other definitive evidence, set a
higher evidentiary hurdle than mere substantial evidence.
COMELECs position that foundlings are not natural-born citizen unless they can prove by
DNA evidence the contrary is a violation of the due process and equal protection rights of the
foundlings.
First, it creates a conclusive presumption. Conclusive presumptions are statutes creating

permanent and irrebuttable presumption violating due process clause. This was illustrated in the
case of Dycaico v SSS4 and GSIS v Montescarlos5 wherein two different laws create a conclusive
presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement date or within three (3) years before the
pensioner are qualified for the pension are only for the purpose of securing the survivorship
pension. The surviving spouse is deprived of the opportunity to disprove the same. The same is true
with COMELECs approach. It presumes a fact that foundlings are foreigner where in fact such
probability is very small as can be shown by the data of the Philippine Statistics Office. Also a
foundling may belong to any of the four classes: 1) her father and mother is a Filipino; 2) her father
is a Filipino and her mother is an alien; 3) her father is an alien and her mother is a Filipino; 4) both
of her parents are aliens. Of all the four classes only one does not confer to the foundling Filipino
citizenship.
Second, the requirement that the foundling must produce DNA evidence subjected the
petitioner to a higher standard of proof than that required of COMELEC proceedings. In COMELEC
proceedings, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence presented is measured is substantial
evidence, which is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. This is the least demanding in the hierarchy of evidence, as compared to the
highest, proof beyond reasonable doubt applicable to criminal cases, and the intermediate,
preponderance of evidence applicable to civil cases. When the COMELEC insisted that Poe must
present DNA or other definitive evidence, it effectively subjected her to a higher standard of proof,
that of absolute certainty. This is even higher than proof beyond reasonable doubt, which requires
only moral certainty; in criminal cases, neither DNA evidence nor direct evidence are always
necessary to sustain a conviction. If circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish proof beyond
reasonable doubt, then it should also be sufficient to hurdle the lower threshold of substantial
evidence, particularly in the present case where there are a number of circumstances in favor of Poe.
Third, COMELECs presumption creates two classes of children: (1) those who know their
biological parents; and (2) those whose biological parents are unknown. As the COMELEC would
have it, those belonging to the first class face no presumption that they are not natural-born and, if
4 G.R. No. 161357, November 30, 2005, 476 SCRA 538
5 GSIS v. Montesclaros, G.R. No. 146494 July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 441, 449
their citizenship is challenged, they may prove their citizenship by substantial evidence. On the
other hand, those belonging to the second class, such as Poe, are presumed not natural-born at the
outset and must prove their citizenship with near absolute certainty. The COMELECs classification
is objectionable on equal protection grounds because, in the first place, it is not warranted by the
text of the Constitution.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which the COMELEC used to arrive on its
presumption, is just one of the various rules of interpretation that courts use to construe the
Constitution; it is not the be-all and end-all of constitutional interpretation.
The more appropriate interpretive rule to apply is the doctrine of necessary implication,
which holds that no statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application.
There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. The doctrine states that what
is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
Another useful interpretive rule in cases with equal protection implications is the one
embodied in Article 10 of the Civil Code: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail." "When the
statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the
vehement urge of conscience." Indeed, it would be most unkind to the delegates of the 1934
Constitutional Convention to ascribe upon them any discriminatory animus against foundlings in
the absence of any positive showing of such intent.
The fourth conclusion arrive by Justice Jardaleza is that foundlings are being considered as
"discrete and insular" minority who are entitled to utmost protection against unreasonable
discrimination applying the strict scrutiny standard. According to this standard government action
that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a "fundamental right" or operates to the peculiar
class disadvantage of a "suspect class" is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and
that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
Foundlings comprise a suspect class under the strict scrutiny analysis. The traditional indicia
of "suspectness" are (1) if the class possesses an "immutable characteristic determined solely by the
accident of birth," or (2) when the class is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." The COMELEC's
classification is based solely on the happenstance that foundlings were abandoned by their biological
parents at birth and who, as a class, possess practically no political power. The classification is
therefore suspect and odious to a nation committed to a regime of equality.
Applying the strict scrutiny standard, the COMELEC failed to identify a compelling state
interest to justify the suspect classification and infringement of the foundling fundamental right. It
may be the rationale that only natural-born citizens may hold certain high public offices in order to
insure that the holders or these high public offices grew up knowing they were at birth citizens of the
Philippines. It flows from the presumption that, in their formative years, they knew they owed from
birth their allegiance to the Philippines aid that in case any other country claims their allegiance,
they would be faithful and loyal to the Philippines. To be sure this interest is compelling because the
Constitution itself demands it. Nonetheless, it can only be used where the issue involves the bright-
line between natural-born and naturalized citizens. It cannot be used as justification in a case where
no clear constitutional line has been drawn, i.e., between foundlings and persons who know their
parents. It finds no application in this case where there was absolutely no evidence, not even an
allegation, that Poe's parents were foreign nationals. Nevertheless the COMELEC failed to adopt the
least restrictive means to protect such interest. A more narrowly tailored approach would avoid
making a sweeping presumption. The COMELEC 's fixation with a scientific application of the jus
sanguinis principle, as opposed to a legal one guided by rules of evidence, led to its discriminatory
interpretation of the Constitution. It acted with "an evil eye and unequal hand.

G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

G.R. Nos. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
J. ALFREDO CAGUIOA CONCURRING OPINION
The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) positively requires an aspiring candidate to formally manifest his
or her intention to run through the filing of a certificate of candidacy, the information required in such COC
enumerated in Sec. 74 thereof. Under Sec. 78, a COC can be denied due course or cancelled in case of false
material representation therein: (1) that a representation is made with respect to a material fact, (2) that the
representation is false, and (3) that there is intent to deceive or mislead the electorate.
The question in these Consolidated Petitions is whether or not the Assailed Resolutions of the
COMELEC are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. If the
COMELEC committed grave abuse, then it becomes this Courts bounden duty to strike down the assailed
judgment. Moreso in this case, when the right of an individual to run and be voted for public office and the
right of the electorate to choose their leader are at stake.
I The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it cancelled the
petitioners certificate of candidacy
Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion by (1) misinterpreting the jurisprudential

requirements of cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Sec. 78, and (2) for placing the
burden of proof upon the petitioner to show that she complies with the residency and citizenship
qualifications for the position of President. Specifically, it gravely abused its discretion by failing
to determine the existence of petitioners intent to deceive separate from the determination of
whether there were false material representations in her certificate of candidacy. As culled from
Mitra v. Comelec and Jalover v. Comelec, there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Therefore, the
requirement of intent cannot be disposed of by a simple finding that there was false
misrepresentation of a material fact; to be sure, there must also be a showing of the candidates
intent to deceive as animating the making of a false material representation.
In the case of petitioner, apart from finding that there were false material representations in
the petitioners certificate of candidacy, the Comelec relied mainly on the representation
previously made in her 2012 COC for the position of Senator, and that she is a foundling, to
support the inference that the petitioner intended to mislead the electorate into believing that
she has the requisite residency and natural-born status. The existence of intent to mislead is not
a question of law; petitioner has adduced substantial evidence to show that she honestly believed
herself to have the requisite qualifications to run for President, but such evidence was not
considered by Comelec.
Also contrary to the rules of evidence, Comelec shifted the burden of proof to petitioner the
onus of showing that she had the qualifications to run for President, instead of requiring
respondents to prove the three elements to deny of due course or cancel the COC. This act
unfairly skewed the analysis and resulting conclusions reached by Comelec.
II There was no intent to deceive (citizenship)
The question of petitioners citizenship as a foundling is subject to legal interpretation. The

rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.
If indeed a mistake was made by petitioner as to her real status, this could be considered a
mistake on a difficult question of law that could be the basis for good faith. In this regard, good
faith is presumed in the same vein that a person is innocent of a crime or wrong.
The lack of intent to deceive is fully supported by evidence tending to show that she fully
discharged the burden of her oath in the COC that her status as a natural-born Filipino is true
and correct to the best of her knowledge. The evidence submitted by the petitioner tends to more
than adequately establish that before her naturalization as an American citizen, she consistently
comported herself as, and was deemed, a Filipino citizen, she consistently comported herself as,
and was deemed a Filipino citizen, even by the government. Given what petitioner believed of
her status, the claim that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen is far from groundless or
deceptive. It is credible that she believed in good faith that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen,
and that this fact is true and correct to the best of her knowledgeas she so swore in her COC.
Even assuming falsity in her representation, this fact alone should not have led to an automatic
finding of intent to mislead and deceive the electorate, and ultimately to the cancellation of her
COC under Rule 78.
G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

G.R. Nos. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
J. ANTONIO CARPIO DISSENTING OPINION
Petitioner, being a foundling, is not a natural-born Filipino citizen; thus, she is a nuisance candidate
whose certificate of candidacy may motu proprio be dismissed by the COMELEC.
First, there is no Philippine law automatically conferring Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth. Even
if there were, such a law would only result in the foundling being a naturalized Filipino citizen, not a
natural-born Filipino citizen. The laws conferring Filipino citizenship to foreigners are Commonwealth Act
No. 473, as amended by Republic Act No. 530, known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which refers to
judicial naturalization, and Republic Act No. 9139 which pertains to administrative naturalization.
Moreover, Philippine laws and jurisprudence on adoption, contrary to Chief Justice Serenos averment, are
not determinative of natural-born citizenship because the adoption laws do not distinguish between a
Filipino child and an alien child found in the Philippines, and thus these adoption laws apply to both
Filipino and alien children.
Second, there is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship, whether natural-born or

naturalized. Citizenship must be established as a matter of fact and any doubt is resolved against the person
claiming Philippine citizenship. Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of
proving the same. Any person who claims to be qualified to run for the position of President of the
Philippines because he or she is, among others, a natural-born Filipino citizen, has the burden of proving
such status. The constitutional requirement of a natural-born citizen, being an express qualification for
election as President, must be complied with strictly.
Third, petitioner failed to discharge her burden to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Being a foundling, she admitted that she does not know her biological parents, and therefore she cannot
trace blood relation to a Filipino father or mother. Without credible and convincing evidence that
petitioners biological father or mother is a Filipino citizen, petitioner cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen. However, res judicata does not lie in citizenship cases; thus, if in the future, petitioner can
find a DNA match to a Filipino parent, or any other credible and convincing evidence showing her Filipino
parentage, then petitioner can still be declared a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Fourth, the letter and intent of the 1935 Constitution clearly excluded foundlings from being
considered natural-born Filipino citizens. Contrary to the Solicitor Generals assertion, the silence of the
Constitution as regards foundlings is actually an express rejection by the Constitution of conferring
natural-born Filipino citizenship to a foundling given that such proposal was voted down by the 1934
Constitutional Convention. Moreover, the Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and identifies
natural-born Filipino citizens as only those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens. Petitioner failed
to prove that either her father or mother is a Filipino citizen.
Fifth, there is no treaty, customary international law or a general principle of international law
granting automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth. Petitioner failed to prove that there is
such a customary international law. At best, there exists a presumption that a foundling is domiciled, and
born, in the country where the foundling is found. Petitioner anchors her claim of natural-born Filipino
citizenship on the (a) 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, (b) 1966 International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, (c) 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (d) 1930 Hague Convention, and the
(e) 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, among others. However, all these Conventions do
not guarantee a child a nationality at birth, much less a natural-born citizenship at birth as understood
under the Philippine Constitution, but merely the right to acquire a nationality in accordance with
municipal law. Moreover, the principle forwarded by the 1961 CRS, that a foundling found in the territory
of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within
that territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State, cannot be deemed a customary
international law since out of the 64 States which ratified the Convention (less than the majority of UN
member-nations), only 13 provide for the automatic and unconditional acquisition of nationality by
foundlings with the other states imposing various conditions for the acquisition of nationality. Thus, the
first essential element for an international rule to be considered a customary international law, that is
widespread and consistent practice by states of a specific international principle, is immediately absent.
Further, the Philippines is not bound by the last two Conventions mentioned, the country not being a
Contracting State.
Sixth, even assuming that there is a customary international law presuming that a foundling is a
citizen of the country where the foundling is found, or is born to parents possessing the nationality of that
country, such presumption cannot prevail over our Constitution since customary international law has the
status merely of municipal statutory law. This means that customary international law is inferior to the
Constitution, and must yield to the Constitution in case of conflict. Any international law which contravenes
the jus sanguinis principle laid down in the Constitution must of course be rejected.
Seventh, a foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove his or her status as a foundling through
administrative proceedings, to acquire Philippine citizenship. It is only after a factual determination of the
childs status as a foundling after an administrative investigation (IRR of Act No. 3753 and Other Laws on
Civil Registration) verifying that the child is of unknown parentage that he or she may properly apply for
citizenship. Such application for citizenship may be any overt act which involves recognition by the
Philippines that the foundling is indeed its citizen, such as the act of applying for a Philippine passport,
which serves as evidence of citizenship. This being so, a foundling can only be deemed a naturalized Filipino
citizen because the foundling has to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Since there is no
Philippine law specifically governing the citizenship of foundlings, their citizenship is addressed by
customary international law, namely: the right of every human being to a nationality, being a fundamental
human right, and the States obligations to avoid statelessness and to facilitate the naturalization of
foundlings.
As a final word, the Constitution defines natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
From birth means that the possession of natural-born citizenship starts at birth and continues to the
present without interruption. The phrase without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship means that a person is not a natural-born Filipino citizen if he or she has to take an
oath of allegiance before a public official to acquire or reacquire Philippine citizenship. Thus, natural-born
Filipino citizens who have renounced Philippine citizenship and pledged allegiance to a foreign country
have become aliens, and can reacquire Philippine citizenship, just like other aliens, only if naturalized in
accordance with law.
G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

G.R. Nos. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
J. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DISSENTING OPINION
PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS
By their opinion, the seven (7) Justices would amend the 1935 Constitution which was in effect when
petitioner was born, to add "foundlings found in the Philippines whose parents are unknown" in the
enumeration of natural-born citizen, as follows:
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
(1935 Constitution)
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines [and foundlings found in the
Philippines whose parents are unknown].
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with the law.
This amendment of the Constitution by the judicial opinion put forth by the seven (7) Justices is
based mainly on extralegal grounds and a misreading of existing laws, which will have unimaginable grave
and far-reaching dire consequences in our constitutional and legal system and national interest which this
Dissenting Opinion will explain below.
Petitioner Senator Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (Poe for brevity) failed to show that
the COMELEC En banc gravely abused its discretion in affirming its Second Division's December 1, 2015
and its First Division's December 11, 2015 Resolutions, both denying due course to and/or cancelling her
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines, particularly
with respect to the finding that she made therein material representations that were false relating to her
natural-born citizenship and ten-year period of residence in the Philippines that warrant the cancellation of
her COC.
ON CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT
Justice Leonardo-De Castro submits that petitioner Poe's representation that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen, hence, eligible to run for and hold the position of President, is false. Justice Leonardo-De
Castro's position is anchored on the following reasons:
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION,

NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP IS BASED ON
BLOOD RELATIONSHIP TO A FILIPINO FATHER OR
MOTHER FOLLOWING THE ''JUS SANGUINIS" PRINCIPLE
Petitioner Poe being a foundling does not come within the purview of this constitutionally ordained
principle.
During the effectivity of the Spanish Civil Code in the Philippines on December 8, 1889, the
doctrines of jus soli and jus sanguinis were adopted as the principles of attribution of nationality at birth.
It was in the 1935 Constitution that the Philippines adopted the doctrine of jus sanguinis, literally
translated to right by blood, or the acquisition of citizenship by birth to parents who are citizens of the
Philippines. The doctrine of jus sanguinis considers blood relationship to one's parents as a sounder
guarantee of loyalty to the country than the doctrine of jus soli, or the attainment of a citizenship by the
place of one's birth.The case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections traced the history, significance, and
evolution of the doctrine of jus sanguinis in our jurisdiction as follows:
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of
acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by
adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions
at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that
of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women
from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of
Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this
anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the
framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
concerns.
"The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for
subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in
the 1935 Constitution.
The changes in the provisions on citizenship was done to harmonize the Article on Citizenship with
the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality before the law of women and men under Section 14,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, contrary to the insistence of petitioner Poe that there is nothing in our
Constitutions that enjoin our adherence to the principle of "jus sanguinis" or "by right of
blood," said principle is, in reality, well-entrenched in our constitutional system. One needs
only to read the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and the jurisprudence detailing the history of the well
deliberated adoption of the jus sanguinis principle as the basis for natural-born Filipino citizenship, to
understand that its significance cannot be lightly ignored, misconstrued, and trivialized.
NATURAL-BORN CITIZENSHIP BY LEGAL FICTION OR

PRESUMPTION OF LAW IS CONTRARY TO THE
CONSTITUTION UNDER SALIENT RULES OF
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
In this case, petitioner Poe's original birth certificate stated that she was a foundling, or a child of
unknown father or mother, found in Jaro, Iloilo, on September 3, 1968. The Constitution in effect then was
the 1935 Constitution. To reiterate, it enumerated the "citizens of the Philippines" in Section 1, Article IV,
which included the following:
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner Poe would want this Court to look beyond the above-quoted enumeration and apply the
disputable or rebuttable presumption brought about by the principles of international law and/or
customary international law. However, the above-quoted paragraphs (3) and (4) of Article IV are clear,
unequivocal and leave no room for any exception.
INTERNATIONAL LAW INSTRUMENTS/

CONVENTIONS ARE NOT SELF-EXECUTING
Petitioner Poe cannot find succor in the provisions of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness, in claiming natural-born Filipino citizenship primarily for the following reasons: firstly, the
Philippines has not ratified said International Conventions; secondly, they espouse a presumption by fiction
of law which is disputable and not based on the physical fact of biological ties to a Filipino parent; thirdly,
said conventions are not self-executing as the Contracting State is granted the discretion to determine by
enacting a domestic or national law the conditions and manner by which citizenship is to be granted; and
fourthly, the citizenship, if acquired by virtue of such conventions will be akin to a citizenship falling under
Section 1 ( 4 ), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, recognizing citizenship by naturalization in accordance
with law or by a special act of Congress.
Notice must be made of the fact that the treaties, conventions, covenants, or declarations invoked by
petitioner Poe are not self-executing, i.e., the international instruments invoked must comply with the
"transformation method' whereby "an international law [must first] be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation."
The cited international conventions are as follows:
(a) 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws;
(b) 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness;
(c) 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child;
(d) 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and
(e) 194 7 UN Declaration on Human RRight
Each of the aforementioned recognizes the need for its respective provisions to be transformed or embodied
through an enactment of Congress before it forms part of the domestic or municipal law.
Nowhere in the identified international rules or principles is there an obligation to accord the
stateless child a citizenship that is of a "natural-born" character. Moreover, even if it so provided, it cannot
be enforced in our jurisdiction because it would go against the provisions of the Constitution.
CITIZENSHIP BY "NATURALIZATION"
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Citizenship is not automatically conferred under the international conventions cited but will entail
an affirmative action of the State, by a national law or legislative enactment, so that the nature of
citizenship, if ever acquired pursuant thereto, is citizenship by naturalization. There must be a law by which
citizenship can be acquired by a foundling. By no means will this citizenship can be considered that of a
natural-born under the principle of jus sanguinis, which is based on the physical existence of blood ties to a
Filipino father or Filipino mother. It will be akin to citizenship by naturalization if conferred by fiction
created by an international convention, which is of legal status equal to a statute or law enacted by
Congress.
PROBABILITIES/POSSIBILITIES BASED ON
STATISTICS
The Solicitor General argues for Petitioner Poe citing the ratio of children born in the Philippines of
Filipino parents to children born in the Philippines of foreign parents during specific periods. He claims
that based on statistics, the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a
natural-born Filipino is either 99.93% or 99.83%, respectively, during the period between 2010 to 2014 and
1965 to 1975. This argument, to say the least, is fallacious.
Firstly, we are determining blood ties between a child and her/his parents. Statistics have never
been used to prove paternity or filiation. With more reason, it should not be used to determine
natural-born citizenship, as a qualification to hold public office, which is of paramount importance to
national interest. The issue here is the biological ties between a specific or named foundling and her
parents, which must be supported by credible and competent evidence. We are not dealing with the entire
population of our country that will justify a generalized approach that fails to take into account that the
circumstances under which a foundling is found may vary in each case.
Secondly, the place of birth of the foundling is unknown but the argument is based on the wrong
premise that a foundling was born in the place where he/she was found. The age of the foundling may
indicate if its place of birth is the place where he or she is found. If the foundling is a newly born baby, the
assumption may have solid basis. But this may not always be the case. It does not appear from the
documents on record that petitioner Poe was a newborn baby when she was found. There is no evidence as
to her place of birth. The Solicitor General cannot, therefore, use his statistics of the number of children
born to Filipino parents and to alien parents in the Philippines since the places of birth of foundlings are
unknown.
Natural-born citizenship, as a qualification for public office, must be an established fact in view of
the jus sanguinis principle enshrined in the Constitution, which should not be subjected to uncertainty nor
be based in statistical probabilities. A disputable presumption can be overcome anytime by evidence to the
contrary during the tenure of an elective official. Resort to this interpretation has a great potential to
prejudice the electorate who may vote a candidate in danger of being disqualified in the future and to cause
instability in public service.
A FOUNDLING DOES NOT MEET THE

DEFINITION OF A NATURAL-BORN
FILIPINO CITIZEN UNDER SECTION 2,
ARTICLE IV OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
Other than those whose fathers or mothers are Filipinos, Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution
further defines "natural-born citizens" to cover "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform an act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
A foundling is one who must first go through a legal process to obtain an official or formal
declaration proclaiming him/her to be a foundling in order to be granted certain rights reserved to Filipino
citizens. This will somehow prevent opening the floodgates to the danger foreseen by Justice del Castillo
that non-Filipinos may misuse a favorable ruling on foundlings to the detriment of national interest and
security. Stated otherwise, the fact of being a foundling must first be officially established before a foundling
can claim the rights of a Filipino citizen. This being the case, a foundling does not meet the above-quoted
definition of a natural-born citizen who is such "from birth".
Republic Act Nos. 8552 and 9523, though pertaining to adoption of a Filipino child, clearly
demonstrate that a foundling first undergoes a legal process to be considered as one before he/she is
accorded rights to be adopted available only to Filipino citizens. When the foundling is a minor, it is the
State under the concept of "parens patriae" which acts for or on behalf of the minor, but when the latter
reaches majority age, she/he must, by herself/himself, take the necessary step to be officially recognized as
a foundling. Prior to this, the error of out-rightly invoking the "disputable presumption" of alleged "natural-
born citizenship" is evident as there can be no presumption of citizenship before there is an official
determination of the fact that a child or person is a foundling. It is only after this factual premise is
established that interference or presumption can arise.
That being so, a foundling will not come within the definition of a natural-born citizen who by birth
right, being the biological child of a Filipino father or mother, does not need to perform any act to acquire
or perfect his/her citizenship.
It should also be emphasized that our adoption laws do not confer "natural-born citizenship" to
foundlings who are allowed to be adopted. To read that qualification into the adoption laws would amount
to judicial legislation. The said laws of limited application which allows the adoption of a foundling,
cannot also be used as a basis to justify the natural-born citizenship of a foundling who has reached
majority age like petitioner Poe who applied to reacquire her citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The opinion
of the seven (7) Justices if pursued, there will be no need for a foundling to misrepresent himself or
herself as a biological child of her adoptive parents like what petitioner Poe did, and instead, a foundling
can be truthful and just submit a Foundling Certificate to be entitled to the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Since
from their point of view a foundling need not perform any act to be considered a natural-born citizen, said
foundling need not prove the veracity of the Foundling Certificate. This will include a Foundling Certificate
in the Bureau of Immigration (BI) prepared list of evidence of natural-born citizenship. This is pure and
simple judicial legislation. Foundlings are not even mentioned at all in R.A. No. 9225.
Apart from violating the Constitution, it will be a reckless position to take as a Foundling Certificate
should not automatically confer natural-born citizenship as it can easily be obtained by impostors who
pretend to have found a child of unknown parents.
ON THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONER'S REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
In Justice Leonardo-De Castro's opinion, the July 18, 2006 Order of the Bureau of
immigration approving petitioner Poe's application for dual citizenship was not valid.
First, petitioner Poe's claim to a dual citizenship by virtue of R.A. No. 9225 is invalid for the simple
reason that the said law limits its application to natural-born Filipino citizens only. In other words, the right
to avail of dual citizenship is only available to natural-born citizens who have earlier lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of acquisition of foreign citizenship. Second, petitioner Poe obtained dual citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 by misrepresenting to the BI that she is the biological child of a Filipino father
and Filipino mother such that the Bureau was misled in to believing that "[petitioner Poe] was a former
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino parents. Third, the said order was not
signed by the Commissioner of the BI as required by implementing regulations. And her re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship being clearly invalid, petitioner Poe's acceptance and assumption to public office
requiring natural-born citizenship as condition sine qua non is likewise invalid.
Republic Act No. 9225 particularly Section 1 thereof, it is categorically provided that -
Section 1. Coverage. - These rules shall apply to natural-born citizens of the Philippines as
defined by Philippine law and jurisprudence, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country.
Hence, given my preceding discussion on the citizenship of petitioner Poe, I submit that she could
not have validly repatriated herself under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225 for purposes of
"reacquiring" natural-born Filipino citizenship.
Another point that Justice Leonardo-De Castro emphaized is the fact that in petitioner's Petition for
Retention and/or Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship filed before the BI on July 10, 2006, petitioner
Poe knowingly committed a false representation when she declared under oath that she was "a former
natural-born Philippine citizen, born on Sept. 3, 1968 at Iloilo City to Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, a
Filipino citizen and Jesusa Sonora Poe, a Filipino citizen[.]"
In so answering the blank form of the petition, petitioner Poe plainly represented that she is the
biological child of the spouses Ronald Allan Kelly Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe; thereby effectively concealing
the fact that she was a foundling who was subsequently adopted by the said spouses.
This false representation paved the way for the issuance by the BI of the Order dated July 18, 2006
that granted Poe's petition, which declared that she "was a former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines,
being born to Filipino parents and is presumed to be a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Petitioner Poe's re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship was not validly approved as it was based on
an erroneous finding of fact based on the false representation by petitioner Poe as to her parentage.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner Poe implores this Court not to allow the supposed disenfranchisement of the sovereign
people by depriving them of "of something rightfully theirs: the consideration of petitioner as a viable and
valid choice for President in the next elections. "
But the Constitution itself is the true embodiment of the supreme will of the people. It was the
people's decision to require in the Constitution, which they approved in a plebiscite, that their President be
a natural-born Filipino citizen. The people did not choose to disenfranchise themselves but rather to
disqualify those persons, who did not descend by blood from Filipino parents, from running in an election
for the Presidency.
The will of the electorate will never cure the vice of ineligibility. As so eloquently reminded by then
Justice Isagani A. Cruz in Frivaldo v. Commission on Election.
The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application
when the deficiency is lack of citizenship.
G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

G.R. Nos. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
J. ARTURO BRION DISSENTING OPINION
III On burden of proving that petitioner is a natural-born Philippine citizen
The cases before us are petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 (in relation to Rule 65) of the
Rules of Court. In these types of petitions, the petitioner challenges the rulings made by the
respondent pursuant to Art. VIII Sec. 1 of the Constitution. Thus, it is the petitioner who carries
the burden of showing that the respondent, the Comelec in this case, committed grave abuse of
discretion.
The original petitioners undertook the task on the citizenship issue by alleging that Poe is a
foundling; as such, her parents are unknown, so that she is not a Philippine citizen under the
terms of the 1935 Constitution. Since Poe indeed could not factually show that either of her
parents is a Philippine citizen, the Comelec concluded that the original petitioners are correct in
their position that they have discharged their original burden to prove that Poe is not a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines. To arrive at this conclusion, the Comelec considered and relied
on the terms of the 1935 Constitution. Thus, the original burden is discharged and the burden of
evidence was shifted to Poe.
Petitioner, by filing a COC, actively represents that she possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications for the office she is running for. When this representation is
questioned, particularly through proof of being a foundling, the burden should rest on the
present petitioner (Poe). Any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.
Citizenship cannot be presumed; the person who claims Filipino citizenship must prove that he
or she is in fact a Filipino. It is only upon proper proof that a claimant can be entitled to the
rights granted by the State.
The exercise by a person of the rights and/or privileges that are granted to Philippine citizens
is not conclusive proof that he or she is a Philippine citizen. A person, otherwise disqualified by
reason of citizenship, may exercise and enjoy the right or privilege of a Philippine citizen by
representing himself to be one.
IV Citizenship
a Equal protection clause not applied to citizenship
- The argument that the equal protection clause should be applied to the constitutional
provisions on citizenship is patently misplaced. The Constitution is supreme; as the
highest law of the land, it serves as the gauge or standard for all laws and for the
exercise of all powers of government. Hence, this Court cannot invalidate a
constitutional provision, but merely act on an unconstitutional governmental action
trampling on the equal protection clause.
- The citizenship provisions of the constitution authorize the States exercise of its
sovereign power to determine who its citizens are. the State accordingly grants rights
and imposes obligations to its citizens.
- Foundlings do not fall under any suspect class (a class saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process). Foundlings are not being treated differently on the
basis of their race, national origin, alienage, or religion. It is the lack of information
on the circumstances of their birth because of their unknown parentage and the jus
sanguinis standard of the Constitution itself that exclude them from being considered
as natural-born citizens. They are not purposely treated unequally nor are they
purposely rendered politically powerless; they are in fact recognized under binding
treaties to have the right to be naturalized as Philippine citizens. All these take place
because of distinctions that the Constitution itself made.
- There is likewise no denial of a fundamental right that does not emanate from the
Constitution. Naturalized citizens who do not fall under the definition of a natural-
born citizen have no actionable cause for complaint for unfair treatment based on the
equal protection clause under the strict scrutiny test.
- On immediate scrutiny test: foundlings may be arguably subject to intermediate

scrutiny since their classification may give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties.
The classification of foundlings vis--vis Philippine citizens is undeniably important
as already explained and the purpose of the classification is the State exercise of
sovereignty: it has the inherent power to determine who are included and excluded as
its own nationals.
- Under the circumstances, the most direct answer can be provided by the rational
basis test in considering petitioners charge that the Comelec denied her equal
protection by applying the constitutional provisions on citizenship the way it did. The
equal protection guaranty of the laws is not violated by a legislation or governmental
action based on reasonable classification. Poe is a foundling; in the context of
classification, the Comelec effectively recognized that Poe, whose parents are
unknown, cannot be the same, and cannot be similarly treated, as other persons born
in the Philippines of Filipino parents under the 1935 Constitution.
- All foundlings found in the Philippines and covered by international treaties have the
right to acquire Philippine nationality; it is a question of availing of the opportunity
that is already there.
- Comelecs exercise in classification could not be but reasonable, as it were based on

standards provided by the Constitution, to give effect to the Constitution and to
protect the integrity of our elections.
b Intent to deceive as an element in false misrepresentations; Poe had the intent to deceive
- The statement [t]he said statement becomes material only when there is or appears
to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible should thus be understood in the context of a
disqualification proceeding looking at the fact of a candidates residence, and not at a
COC cancellation proceeding determining whether a candidate falsely represented
her eligibility.
- The element of deliberate intent to deceive should be considered complied with

upon proof of the candidates knowledge that the representation he or she made in
the COC was false. The COC must contain the candidates representation, under oath,
that he or she is eligible for the office aspired for, i.e., that he or she possesses the
necessary eligibilities at the time he or she filed the COC. This statement must have
also been considered to be true by the candidate to the best of his or her knowledge.
- The oath, the representation of eligibility, and the representation that the statements
in the COC are true to the best of the candidates knowledge all operate as a
guarantee from a candidate that he or she has knowingly provided information
regarding his or her eligibility. The information provided in the COC should be
considered a deliberate representation on his or her part, and any falsehood
regarding such eligibility would thus be considered deliberate.
- Once the status of a candidates ineligibility has been determined, it is not necessary
to establish his deliberate intent to deceive the electorate as he had already vouched
for its veracity and is found to have committed falsehood.
- Even if deliberate intent to deceive needed to be established in a Sec. 78 proceeding,

Comelec did not gravely abuse its discretion in concluding that Poe deliberately
falsely represented her residence and citizenship qualifications. As a highly educated
woman, Poe had the necessary acumen to read and understand the plain meaning of
the law.
- Upon plain reading of Art. IV Sec. 1 of the 1935 Constitution: such section does not
provide for the situation where the identities of both an individuals parents from
whom citizenship may be traced are unknown; this exclusion necessarily means that
Poe cannot be a Philippine citizen under the 1935 Constitutions terms.
- The following also involve falsities: in Poes petition for reacquisition of citizenship,
she misrepresented her status as a former natural-born Philippine citizen, listing her
adoptive parents are her parents without qualifications; she also falsely represented
her status as a Philippine citizen in various public documents. Poes false
representation regarding her Philippine citizenship did not merely involve a single
and isolated statement, but a series of falsities that started from her RA no. 9225
application, as can be seen from the presented public documents recognizing her
citizenship.
- Heightened suspicion: Poes original birth certificate does not indicate her Philippine
citizenship as she had no known parents from whom her citizenship could be traced.
However, the birth certificate was amended in May 2006 shortly before she applied
for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. The timing strongly suggest that it was
used purposely in case questions are raised about Poes birth. This strongly indicates
that at the time she executed her COC, she knew that her claimed Philippine
citizenship is tainted with discrepancies, and that she is not a Philippine citizen under
Art. IV Sec. 1 of the 1935 Constitution.
c Comelec did not gravely abuse its discretion in interpreting Art. IV Sec. 1 of the 1935
Constitution
- The 1935 Constitution does not expressly list foundlings among Filipino citizens,
using verba legis. The 1934 Constitutional Convention also rejected the inclusion of
foundlings in the Constitution, lest foundlings, with unknown parents, would have
greater rights than those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and who had
to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
- As the list of Philippine citizens under Art. IV Sec. 1 does not include foundlings, then
they are not included among those constitutionally-granted or recognized to be
Philippine citizens except to the extent that they fall under the coverage of paragraph
5, that is, if they choose to avail of the opportunity to be naturalized.
- The 1935 Constitution did not also have the effect of fostering unfairness by not
expressly including foundlings as citizens via the parentage route as foundlings could
not rise any higher than children whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines. Like
them, they fell under the naturalized classification under the terms of the 1935
Constitution. That under the terms of the subsequent Constitutions the children of
Filipino mothers were deemed natural-born citizens of the Philippines does not also
unfairly treat foundlings as there is a reasonable distinction between their situations
the former have established Filipino parentage while the latters parents are
unknown.
d The application of Art. IV Sec. 1 of the 1935 Constitution does not violate social justice
principles or the equal protection clause
- The Court should not interpret the provisions of the 1987 Constitution to add
meaning to the provisions of the 1935 Constitution. Likewise, what the 1935
Constitution provides cannot be amended and applied at present because of what the
1987 Constitution now provides. Such will constitute judicial legislation.
- Determining the parameters of citizenship is a sovereign decision, ratified by the

Filipino nation acting as its own sovereign through the 1935 Constitution and should
not be disturbed. Distinguishing the kind of citizenship based on who of the two
parents is Filipino is a hallmark of the 1935 Constitution, and allowing persons with
whom no parent can be identified for purposes of tracing citizenship would
contravene this distinction.
- Adhering to the clear text of the 1935 Constitution would not necessarily deprive
foundlings the right to become Philippine citizens, as they can undergo naturalization
under our current laws.
e The Philippines has no treaty obligation to automatically bestow Philippine citizenship to

foundlings under the 1935 Constitution
- Treaties are acts made in the exercise of sovereign rights. The Philippines now has
every right to enter into treaties as it is independent and sovereign. Such sovereignty
only came with the full grant of Philippine independence on July 4, 1946. Thus, the
Philippines could not have entered into any binding treaty before this date, except
with the consent of the US which exercised foreign affairs powers for itself and all
colonies and territories under its jurisdiction. No such consent was every granted by
the US.
- Moreover, the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights and United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child do not require the immediate and
automatic grant of Philippine citizenship, much less of natural-born status, to
foundlings. These treaties merely require the grant to every child of the right to
acquire a nationality.
- The right to acquire a nationality is different from the grant of an outright Filipino
nationality. States are merely required to recognize and facilitate the childs right to
acquire a nationality. These treaties recognize, too, that the obligations should be
complied with within the framework of a States national laws. There is the measure
of flexibility which runs from the absolute obligation to recognize every childs right
to acquire a nationality, all the way to the allowable and varying measures that may
be taken to ensure this right. These measures may range from an immediate and
outright grant of nationality, to the passage of naturalization measures that the child
may avail of.
- Neither does the Philippines participation as signatory to the United Nation

Declaration on Human Rights, which is not a treaty, obligate it to automatically grant
Filipino citizenship to foundlings in its territory. Assuming, however, that we were to
accord the right to nationality under the UDHR the status of a treaty obligation or of
a generally-accepted principle of international law, it still does not require the
Philippine government to automatically grant Philippine citizenship to foundlings in
its territory. It only recognizes the right of nationality without imposing how
signatory States would recognize this right.
- In the context of the present case, compliance with our treaty obligations to recognize
the right of foundlings to acquire a nationality must be undertaken under the terms
of, and must not contradict, the citizenship provisions of our Constitution.
- In legal terms, a State is obliged to ensure every childs right to acquire a nationality
through laws in the States legal system that do not contradict the treaty. The 1935
Constitution defined who the citizens of the Philippines then were and the means of
acquiring Philippine citizenship at the time the respondent was found. This
constitutional definition must necessarily govern the petitioners case. The
constitutional listing is exclusive. It neither provided nor allowed for the citizenship
of foundlings except through naturalization. Since the obligation under the treaties
can be complied with by facilitating a childs right to acquire a nationality, the
presence of naturalization laws that allow persons to acquire Philippine citizenship
already constitutes compliance.
- Since the ICCPR and the UNCRC allow the States a significant measure of flexibility
in complying with their obligations, how the Philippines will comply within the range
of the flexibility is a policy question that is fully and wholly within the competence of
the Congress and of the Filipino people to address.
- Until the Court declares a legal norm to be a generally accepted principle of

international law, no other means exists in the Philippine legal system to determine
with certainty that a legal norm is indeed a generally accepted principle of
international law that forms part of the law of the land.
- A generally accepted principle of international law is considered binding on a State

because evidence shows that it considers this legal norm to be obligatory. Meanwhile,
States have the inherent right to decide who may or may not be its citizens, including
the process through which citizenship may be acquired.
- Given that the States right to determine who may be its nationals, it is inextricably
linked to its sovereignty, and cannot be properly be the subject of state consensus or
norm dictated by the practice of other States.
- Even if it is a generally-accepted principle of international law, it cannot be applied in

the Philippines as it contradicts the jus sanguinis principle of the 1935 Constitution.
- A presumption that a child with no known parents will be considered to have Filipino
parents runs counter to the most basic rules on citizenship under the 1935
Constitution. Also, the presumption that Jaro, Iloilo was her birth place because that
was where she was found is based on jus soli or place of birth, a theory on which
citizenship may be based and is a principle that has been pointedly rejected in the
country, thus the presumption runs counter to the 1935 Constitution.
- A presumption of Filipino parentage cannot similarly apply or extend to the character

of being natural-born, as this character of citizenship can only be based on reality;
when the Constitution speaks of natural-born, it cannot but refer to actual or
natural, not presumed, birth. A presumption of being natural-born is effectively a
legal fiction that the definition of the term natural-born under the Constitution and
the purposes this definition serves cannot accommodate.
G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

G.R. Nos. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
J. MARIANO DEL CASTILLO DISSENTING OPINION
The COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
in taking cognizance of the petitions and in denying due course to and cancelling petitioners 2015
Certificate of Candidacy. It properly exercised its power to determine whether a candidates COC contains
false material representation; its resolution was anchored on settled jurisprudence and fair appreciation of
facts; and it accorded the parties ample opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. The COMELEC
did not usurp the jurisdiction of the SET, or the PET, or the DOJ or any other tribunal; it did not disregard
or contravene settled jurisprudence; and it did not violate the parties right to due process. Petitioner
miserably fell short of portraying that the COMELEC had whimsically, arbitrarily, capriciously and
despotically exercised its judgment as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
However, as to the issue regarding petitioners citizenship, a loftier interest dictates that we take
pause and exhaust all possible avenues and opportunities to study the issue more dispassionately despite
the tempting opportunity to sit in judgment on said issue which has generated so much attention, invited
heated and vigorous discussion, and evoked heightened emotions. After all, any judgment at this time upon
this issue might directly impact on G.R. No. 221538 (David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal) which is a Quo
Warranto case seeking the removal of petitioner as Senator of the Philippines wherein her natural-born
citizenship status is directly assailed. The resolution of the issue on petitioners citizenship must be carefully
studied and deliberated upon. Any hasty or ill-considered ruling could open the floodgates to abuse by
certain groups and individuals looking only after their own interest to the prejudice and undoing of our
motherland. Non-Filipinos might use the ruling to advance their vested interests by simply posing as
foundlings so that they would be presumed or cloaked with natural-born citizenship without going through
the ordinary naturalization proceedings. The objective is to secure, protect and defend the Philippines from
being ruled by non-Filipinos; hence, the Court should stand firm on its own hearing and not allow itself to
be swept by the tides of sentimentality and emotion.
No less consequential is the Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, under which the Court may
choose to ignore or sidestep a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which the case can
be disposed of. Such is the situation in this case.
Moreover, it is not improbable, of course, that petitioner was born to Filipino parents; yet the fact
remains that their identities are unknown. Given that petitioners citizenship is uncertain, she could use this
breather to gather proof such as DNA evidence to establish her genealogy. Every opportunity should be
given to the innocent child, deprived not only of parental love and care but also of identity and pedigree, to
trace his/her parentage and determine compliance with the Constitution. This opportunity and privilege
should not be time-bound, and should be afforded to every foundling at any stage of his/her life. Thus, the
ruling laid down by the Court now can be changed or altered at any time when there is certainty or
definiteness about her biological lineage. Since there is generally no res judicata in matters of citizenship,
this issue may be threshed out again and again as the occasion demands.
Further, according unto petitioner ample opportunity to trace her genealogy is also better than (a)
creating a presumption that she is a natural-born citizen or fashioning a new specie/category of citizenship
based merely on statistical probabilities; or (b) denying her claim of citizenship outright. On one hand,
aliens with known parents may just take advantage of such presumption by representing themselves as
foundlings if only to be entitled to privileges exclusively enjoyed by natural-born Filipino citizens. On the
other hand, petitioner may be unwittingly denied of her rightful citizenship which she could very well
establish through the exertion or employment of more deliberate, vigorous, and sustained efforts.
Hence, it is imperative for the Court to carefully tread on the issue of citizenship. As correctly
postulated by petitioner, what is at stake in this case is not only a foundlings right to run for high public
offices, but the enjoyment of even seemingly ordinary rights or positions which our laws reserve only for
natural born citizens.
G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

G.R. Nos. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
DISSENTING OPINION (PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:)
Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe dissented to the ponencia, penned by Justice Jose Perez, emphasizing on
the COMLECs powers and functions, and the validity of the COMELECs disqualification of the Petitioner .
In her opinion in this case, she said that the COMELECs power to deny due course to or cancel the Petitioners
certificate of candidacy (COC) stems from Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, which gives the
COMELEC the broad power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, in order to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers
for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The quasi-judicial
power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election
laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies.
Thus, it would greatly emasculate the COMELEC's constitutionally-conferred powers by treating it as a mere
administrative organ, as held in the ponencia, relegated to the task of conducting perfunctory reviews only to spot
falsities on the face of COCs or ministerially enforce declarations from a prior authority.
As in this case, a pre-proclamation controversy may arise from a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC. It
is governed by Section 78, Article IX of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines (OEC):
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition
may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
The false representation contemplated by Section 78 of the OEC pertains to a material fact, and is not simply an
innocuous mistake. A material fact refers to a candidates qualification for elective office such as ones citizenship and
residence.
While there are decided cases wherein this Court has stated that a false representation under Section 78 must consist
of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible, nowhere does the provision mention this requirement.
Notably, the Dissenting Opinion of former Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga in Tecson v. COMELEC,
where he explains the irrelevance of the candidate's intention or belief in ruling on a Section 78 petition, and even
pointed out the jurisprudential missteps in the case of Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, wherein the phantom
requirement of deliberate intention to mislead was first foisted.
Asserting that proof of intent to conceal is also necessary for a petition under Section 78 to prosper, Justice Kapunan
wrote in Romualdez-Marcos:
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the Constitution's residency qualification requirement.
The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous
for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead
to his or her disqualification.
These pronouncements in Romualdez-Marcos, however, are clearly not supported by a plain reading of the
law. Nowhere in Section 78 is it stated or implied that there be an intention to deceive for a certificate of
candidacy to be denied due course or be cancelled. Also drawing on the principles of criminal law for analogy, the
offense of material representation is malum prohibitum not malum in se. Intent is irrelevant. When the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application.
The reason for the irrelevance of intent or belief is not difficult to divine. Even if a candidate believes that he is
eligible and purports to be so in his certificate of candidacy, but is subsequently proven to be, in fact or in law,
not eligible, it would be utterly foolish to allow him to proceed with his candidacy. The electorate would be
merely squandering its votes forand the COMELEC, its resources in counting the ballots cast in favor ofa
candidate who is not, in any case, qualified to hold public office.
The Kapunan pronouncement in the Romualdez-Marcos case did not establish a doctrine. It is not supported
by law and it smacks of judicial legislation. Moreover, such judicial legislation becomes even more egregious
considering that it arises out of the pronouncement of only one Justice, or 6% of a Supreme Court. While several other
Justices joined Justice Kapunan in upholding the residence qualification of Rep. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, they did
not share his dictum. It was his by his lonesome.
Thus, in this case, it does not matter that respondent knows that he was not a natural-born Filipino citizen and,
knowing such fact, proceeded to state otherwise in his certificate of candidacy, with an intent to deceive the electorate.
A candidate's citizenship eligibility in particular is determined by law, not by his good faith. It was, therefore,
improper for the COMELEC to dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to prove intent to mislead on
the part of respondent.
This broad constitutional power and function vested in the COMELEC is designed precisely to avoid any situation
where a dispute affecting elections is left without any legal remedy. If one who is obviously not a natural-born
Philippine citizen, like Arnold [Schwarzenegger], runs for President, the COMELEC is certainly not powerless to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to wait until after the elections before such
candidate may be disqualified.
Verily, we cannot tolerate an absurd situation wherein a presidential candidate, who has already been determined by
the COMELEC to have missed a particular eligibility requirement and, thus, had made a false representation in his/her
COC by declaring that he/she is eligible, is still allowed to continue his/her candidacy, and eventually be voted for.
Moreover, the proposition that the matter of eligibility should be left to the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) to
decide only after the elections is a dangerous one for not only does it debase the COMELECs constitutional powers, it
also effectively results in a mockery of the electoral process, not to mention the disenfranchisement of the voters. The
Filipino people deserve to know prior to the elections if the person they intend to vote for is ineligible. In all
reasonable likelihood, they would not have cast their votes for a particular candidate who would just be ousted from
office later on.
At any rate, the jurisdictional boundaries have already been set: the COMELECs jurisdiction ends, and that of the
PET begins, only when a candidate therefore has already been elected, and thereafter, proclaimed. The Supreme
Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. And the rules categorically speak of the
jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, of the Philippines, and not of candidates for President or Vice-President.
Thus, Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe respectfully objected to the ponencias enfeebling take on the COMELEC's
power to determine the eligibility of a candidate prior to the elections.
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC in its decision to cancel the COC of the Petitioner [due to
the reason that she would be a resident of this country for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day
immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 Elections and her citizenship, particularly, that she is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines in her 2015 CoC are false], the finding of falsity by the COMELEC even as to one representation
would already be enough to deny due course to or cancel her COC.
On the issue of residency, the ponencia claims that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in concluding that
petitioner falsely represented in her 2015 COC that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 elections. While the COMELEC, in ruling that petitioner
failed to re-establish her domicile in the Philippines on May 24, 2005 as she claimed, it primarily observed that all of
the evidence presented by petitioner were executed before July 2006, which is the date of reacquisition of her Filipino
citizenship.
While it is undisputed that petitioner resigned from her work in the US in 2004; acquired, together with her husband,
quotations and estimates from property movers regarding the relocation of all their goods, furniture, and cars from the
US to the Philippines as early as March 2005; enrolled two of her children in Philippine schools for the school year
2005 to 2006; and purchased a condominium unit in the Philippines in the second half of 2005, petitioner never
bothered applying for permanent residency up until July 2006, which is the date when she reacquired Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225, and consequently, waived her status as a non-resident alien.
Thus, the COMELEC can hardly be blamed from reaching its ruling as petitioners intention to permanently reside in
the Philippines and to abandon the US as her domicile on May 24, 2005 were, based on reasonable premises, shrouded
in doubt.
At any rate, the overt acts on which petitioner premises her claims are insufficient to prove her a nimus
manendiand animus non-revertendi. In fact, same as her failure to promptly address her permanent residency status,
some of these overt acts might even exhibit her ambivalence to re-establish her domicile in the Philippines on May 24,
2005. For instance, while she purchased a condominium unit in the Philippines in the second half of 2005 (which
period is even past May 24, 2005), records unveil that petitioner had other real properties in the US, one of which was
purchased in 1992 and another in 2008; among others.
For another, the COMELEC cannot be faulted for relying on petitioners admission in her 2012 COC for
Senator that her period of residence from May 13, 2013 is 6 years and 6 months, which, hence, implied that
she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006.
While it is true that it is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the Constitutions residency qualification requirement of 10
years, the COMELEC cannot be said to gravely abuse its discretion when it considered petitioners admission against
interest as another circumstance which militates against her claims legitimacy.
Neither did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that petitioner made a false material representation in
her 2015 COC when she declared that she was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring
citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen.
A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. As defined
under the present Constitution, natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, naturalized citizens are
those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality
or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which
determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
In Valles v. COMELEC, the Court held that the signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established
the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship. So also, the principle of jus
sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions.
Following this principle, proof of blood relation to a Filipino parent is therefore necessary to show that one is a
Filipino citizen by birth. In this case, petitioner has shown no evidence of blood relation to a Filipino parent to prove
that she acquired Filipino citizenship by birth under the jus sanguinis principle.
Moreover, under Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, foundlings are not included in the enumeration of who
are considered as Filipino citizens. A foundling refers to a deserted or abandoned infant or child whose parents,
guardian or relatives are unknown; or a child committed to an orphanage or charitable or similar institution with
unknown facts of birth and parentage and registered in the Civil Register as a foundling.
The fact that a candidates parents are unknown directly puts into question his/her Filipino citizenship because the
candidate has no prima facie link to a Filipino parent from which he/she could have traced her Filipino citizenship.
This is why the burden of evidence shifted to petitioner Poe.
Without any proof of blood relation to a Filipino parent, and without any mention in the 1935 Constitution that
foundlings are considered or are even presumed to be Filipino citizens by birth, the COMELEC's finding that
petitioner was not a natural-born citizen cannot be taken as patently unreasonable and grossly baseless so as to amount
to grave abuse of discretion. As it is apparent, the COMELEC, with good reason, relied on the plain text of the 1935
Constitution based on the statutory construction axioms of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and verba legis non est
recedendum, as well as firmly abided by the jus sanguinis principle which, as repeatedly stated, necessitates proof of
blood relation, of which petitioner presented none. Accordingly, its analysis was grounded on sound legal basis
and therefore unreflective of grave abuse of discretion.
As for Associate Justice Perslas-Bernabe, it [is] safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.
Furthermore, in our legal hierarchy, treaties and international principles belong to the same plane as domestic laws
and, hence, cannot prevail over the Constitution.
For all of these reasons, for Associate Justice Perslas-Bernabe dissent to the majoritys ruling that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion and therefore, voted to DISMISS the petitions.
G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

G.R. Nos. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
CONCURRING OPINION (VELASCO, JR., J.)
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concurred with the ponencia, penned by Justice Jose Perez, and added some
emphasis on the issues.
First, on the issue of residency, he emphasized the three requisites for a person to have a new domicile: (1) residence
or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there (animus manendi), and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi).
There was no issue as to Sen. Poe's actual bodily presence in the Philippines since May 24, 2005, whence she, per
her 2015 Certificate of Candidacy, reckoned her residency in the country. What has been questioned is the animus to
stay in the Philippines and to abandon the domicile in the US since then.
Intent is basically a state of mind that exists only in idea. Its existence can only be determined by the overt acts that
translate it to fact and can be made via a series of steps through what the Court adverts in Mitra v. COMELEC as an
incremental process.
The facts of the case showed that Petitioners change of domicile and repatriation from the US to the Philippines was,
to borrow from Mitra, accomplished, not in a single key move but, through an incremental process that started in
early 2005. Specifically, Sen Poe took definite albeit incremental moves to reacquire her domicile of origin as shown
by the following overt acts: repatriation of her children and their pet from the US to the Philippines; the enrollment of
her children in Philippine schools; the sale of their family home in the US; the repatriation of her husband and his
employment in the Philippines; the transfer of their household goods, furniture, cars and personal belongings from the
US to the Philippines; the purchase of a residential condominium in the Philippines; the purchase of a residential lot;
the construction of her family home in the country; her oath of allegiance under RA 9225; her children's acquisition of
derivative Philippine citizenship; the renunciation of her US citizenship; her service as chairperson of the MTRCB;
and her candidacy and service as a senator of the Philippines.
All these acts are indicative of the intent to stay and serve in the country permanently, and not simply to make
a temporary sojourn. The suggestion that Petitioners animus manendi only existed at the time she took her oath of
allegiance under RA 9225 in July 2006 and that her animus non revertendi existed only in October 2010 when she
renounced her US citizen is simply illogical.
Petitioner was born and raised in the Philippines, who went through the tedious motions of, and succeeded in, re-
establishing her home in the country. She maintained close ties to the country and has frequently visited it even during
the time she was still recognized as a US citizen. Her parents lived in the country, her friends she grew up with stayed
here. She is, by no means, foreign to the Philippines nor its people.
After all, the residence requirement was in context intended to prevent a stranger from holding office on the
assumption that she would be insufficiently acquainted with the conditions and needs of her prospective
constituents. Having helped her father during his presidential campaign and having served as a senator and before that
an MTRCB chairperson, it cannot be contested that she has more than enough knowledge of the country, its
people, and the many issues and problems that beset them.
Second, on the issue of citizenship, on whether Petitioner is a natural-born citizen or not. There was no question that
Petitioner has no known biological parents and was found on September 3, 1968 in Jaro, Iloilo when she was but a
newborn, and was then adopted by spouses Ronald Allan Kelly and Jesusa Sonora Poe in May 1974.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution merely provides:

Section1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
2. Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected
to public office in the Philippine Islands.
3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
4. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The term natural-born Filipino does not even appear in the above-quoted provision. This Court, however, had
construed the term to refer to those falling under items 1 to 4 of the section. But Petitioner was not born before the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution so that the first item is inapplicable. Her status as a foundling does not foreclose the
likelihood that either or both of her biological parents were Filipinos rendering her a natural-born Filipino under items
3 and/or 4.
Petitioners abandonment when she was just a newborn did not obliterate the fact that she had biological
parents and the private respondents had not shown any proof that they were not Filipino citizens.
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove the truth of
his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence required by law.
To shift the burden of proof to foundlings, like the Petitioner, to prove the citizenship of their parents who had
abandoned them is as preposterous as rubbing salt on an open bleeding wound. Instead, the judiciary, as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, must ensure that the abandoned children, who were forced
into an unfavorable position, are duly protected.
As pointed out by petitioner, the same view was shared by the framers of the 1935 Constitution. A delegate to the 1934
Constitutional Convention, Sr. Nicolas Rafols, proposed to explicitly include children of unknown parentage in the
enumeration of jus sanguinis Philippine Citizens in Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. The suggestion,
however, was not accepted not on the ground that these children are not Philippine citizens, but rather because the
cases of foundlings were few and far in between. As pointed out by delegate Manuel Roxas, citing a similar Spanish
Law, they are already presumed to have been born to Filipinos.
Moreover, an alternative construction of the 1935, not to say the present Constitution, presents dire consequences. In
such a scenario, abandoned children with no known parents will be considered stateless. This violates the rights of a
child to immediate registration and nationality after birth, as recognized in the United Nation's Convention on the
Rights of a Child.

Llamanzarez v. COMELEC (Loverly Barquez)

Cargado por

Información del documento

Derechos de autor

Formatos disponibles

Compartir este documento

Compartir o incrustar documentos

Opciones para compartir

¿Le pareció útil este documento?

¿Este contenido es inapropiado?

Copyright:

Formatos disponibles

Llamanzarez v. COMELEC (Loverly Barquez)

Cargado por

Copyright:

Formatos disponibles

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs.

COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO

G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs.

G.R. No. 221697

G.R. Nos. 221698-700

1 A FOUNDLING IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN.

1 117 Phil. 976 (1963)

2 REPATRIATION UNDER REPUBLIC ACT 9225 RESULTS IN THE REACQUISITION OF

2 409 Phil 633, 649 (2001)

G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs.

CJ. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO CONCURRING OPINION

B. Certificate of Live Birth

E. Bureau of Immigration Order

F. Senate Electoral Tribunal Decision

Legal Significance of Confirmation of Renunciation

Petitioner validly presumes that she is a citizen of the Philippines

Filiation as a matter of legal fiction

The Place of Probability in the Rule of Law

Petitioner may be considered natural-born citizen under 1935 Constitution

Mixture of jus soli and jus sanguinis

Citizenship under 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitution

Applicability of Bengson v HRET

Determination of natural- born status

Re-acquisition is not naturalization

G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs.

J. MARVIC LEONEN CONCURRING OPINION

ON WHETHER PPETITIONE, A FOUNDLING, IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN

There are only two categories of citizens: natural-born and naturalized.

To consider petitioner, a foundling, as not natural-born will have grave consequences.

ON WHETHER PETITIONER VALIDLY REACQUIRED NATURAL-BORN PHILIPPINE

G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs.

J. FRANCIS JARDALEZA CONCURRING OPINION

In administrative proceedings, cardinal primary rights must be observed. These include: 1)

First, it creates a conclusive presumption. Conclusive presumptions are statutes creating

4 G.R. No. 161357, November 30, 2005, 476 SCRA 538

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs.

G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs.

J. ALFREDO CAGUIOA CONCURRING OPINION

Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion by (1) misinterpreting the jurisprudential

The question of petitioners citizenship as a foundling is subject to legal interpretation. The

G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs.

J. ANTONIO CARPIO DISSENTING OPINION

Second, there is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship, whether natural-born or

G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs.

J. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DISSENTING OPINION

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION,

NATURAL-BORN CITIZENSHIP BY LEGAL FICTION OR

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

INTERNATIONAL LAW INSTRUMENTS/

The cited international conventions are as follows:

A FOUNDLING DOES NOT MEET THE

ON THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONER'S REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

G.R. Nos. 221697, March 8, 2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs.

J. ARTURO BRION DISSENTING OPINION

III On burden of proving that petitioner is a natural-born Philippine citizen