S INCE the rediscovery of Latin America in the late

1970s, the United States has devoted much time, energy

and mk to analyzing low-intensity conflict in the area. If in-
-.
versely proportional to news media coverage, our efforts in El
Salvador appear to be ach]evmg some success. The 1984 Na-
tional Bipartisan Commission on Central America report,
which outlined a campaign for the region, increased security 1959, the gear Fidel
assistance funding. Improvement of our Special Operations Costro took power in CU-
Forces posture is another positive sign. Before looking at ba, and 1979, the gear
what our adversaries are now doing in the region, a brief re- the Communists coopted
view of Marxist-Leninist insurgency in the 1960s and 1970s the Sandinista revohi-
is in order. tion in Nicaragua, delin-
1959, tbe year Fidel Castro took power in Cuba, and 1979, eate an era of debate re-
the year the Communists coopted the Sandinista revolution garding how insurgency
in Nicaragua, delineate an era of debate regarding how ]nsur- Uqasto prevail in this
gency was to prevail in this hemwphere. The debate went hemisphere.
something like this
HavanaThe revolution marked a major departure from
the tradkional and ineffective approach long advocated by
Moscow. Castros Rebel Army was the vanguard, not any po-
litical party or politmal organization. The Cuban revolution
is m line with the Latin-American revolutionary tradlnon.
The experience in the Sierra Maestra Mountmns can be re-
peated throughout the hemisphere As Ernesto (Che)
Guevm-a said, the Rebel Army is the little motor that starts
the blg motor of revolution. Parties and cltles are suspect. Ac-
tual combat, not theory, makes guerrillas, and that combat
emanating from the guerrilla focos (focuses) or centers of re-
sistance can be duplicated. Combat forges an ideologist as
well as a fighter, with sound conscience as well as mllltary
skills.
MoscowAdventurism! Coexistence and cooperation
vnth bourgeois parties are necessary Ingredients. Do the
homework, do the recruiting, do the organizing t)bjective
conditions cannot be created; only history and economics can
do that. Tactics cannot be automatically transferred to other
countries. Survwal of the party ]s the main consideration
There are many roads to power, and sophomoric, albeit hero-
ic, adventures do not guarantee success. ]
The ebb and flow ofthls debate was punctuated with pain-
ful frequency by the destruction or near destruction of var-lous
guerrilla movements in Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Guate-
mala, Uruguay, and so forth and, finally, for Guevara in Bo-
livia. In 1967, the Bolivian adventure saw the Commumst
Party working at cross-purposes with Guevaras foco in
Camiri, marking the extreme of the debate. Nowhere were

MILITARY REVIEW . Februay 1987 43

 the guerrillas able to duplicate the Cuban success. Salvador
Allendes 1970 success in Chile through the ballot box rather
than via guerrilla warfare was short-lived. In part, his failure
was due to his minority mandate and because he was unable
The insurgents insist-
or unwdling to control the rate of change to socialiem. As a
ence on blindly follow-
result of the Chilean example, many revolutionaries aban-
ing the Cuban model
doned the ballot box and returned to Guevaras approach.
made it relatively easy
The insurgents insistence on blindly following the Cuban
for host country counter-
model made it relatively easy for host country counterinsw- j
insurgency forces to
gency forces to neutralise what was essentially a military
neutralize what uw.s es-
threat. The guerrillas preoccupation with the armed aspect
sentiall~ a miiitary
ignored the broad front approach Moscow had long advocated.
threat. The guerrillas
The US response took the form of secumty, advisory and trai-
preoccupation with the
ningassistance. We trained host country armies in a multitude
armed aspect ignored
of subjects and helped them build effective counterguerrilla
the broad front approach
forces which, in turn, were able to deal with the guerrillas
,ffoscou, had long adco-
through small-unit operations, effective intelhgence opera-
cated.
tions and special operations We also pushed nation-burlding
operatlorrs through psychological operations and military
civic action. Because the guerrillas had little contact with the
civilian population, they had no organized popular support
and had poor security and recruiting mechanisms.
Guevaras demise resulted from these key failures. He had
no students from La Paz or Cochabamba, no miners from
Oruro and no access to tbe media for propaganda. He never
wrote an edltorlal for The New York Times. The churchs role
was essentially antiguerrilla. Shortly before his death,
Guevara is reputed to have noted that Latin-American revo-
lutionaries would never achieve success until they had
ach]eved an accommodation with the Catholic Church. The
followvng year, the Latin-American bishops conference at
Medellin, Colombia, unveiled IIberatlon theology and the be-
glnn]ng of a new relationship between the revolutionaries
and the church. By 1979, the modus operandt of revolution
changed radically. A new form of ]nsurgency was launched.
The success of the Communists in Nicaragua and their an-
tmtpatcd success in El Salvador marked a synthesis of the Ha-
vana and Moscow lines, The debate had become a compro-
mise:
An armed element LSstl[l a key requirement for revolution
u,h,,r~,ln the cadres arc educated and blooded. We earn our
[eadersh zp poszttons zn the new order by paying our dues m
S~erra. The mass appeal of broad -front political organ kations
M also a must [n which dmaffected non-MarxLsts and non-
.lfanrtsts-I.enznL.sts are brought into the movement. This en-
sures not only better and wzder internal support but outside

44 Februsry 19S7 . MILITARY REVIEW

 LATIN AMERICA

Emesto (Che) Guevara at a

Sovret state fsrm outs!de Moscow,
12 De~mber 1960

Nowhere were the

guemllas able to dupli-
cate the Cuban success.
Salvador Alfendes 1970
success in Chile through
the ballot box rather
than via guemlla war-,
fare was short-lived. In
part, his failure was due
to his minority mandate
and because he was un-
able or unwilling to con-
trol the rate ofchange to
socialism. As a result of
support that does not have Cuban, Eastern Bloc or Souiet taint the Chilean example,
can also be obtazned many revolutionaries
Because of the Superzor umty and discipline of the Party the abandoned the baltot
real power wtll not be shared wzth those who prouzde essential - bvx and returned to
[y window dressing for the recolutzan, Guevaras approach.
The Church, bynowheaudy Infiltrated with Ltberatton The-
alogwts, gzues us guerrillas the moral hzgh ground wece newer
en]oyed before.:
Addltlonally, the role of US public opinion was carefully
anal yzed and the real lesson of Vietnam taken to heart. That
lesson sounds like:
e Do not lose sight of the US attention level.
e Keep the revoi ution carefully under wraps and below
that level until }t is too late for the Llmted States to do what it
does best (for example, Grenada).
Q Control or influence US and world public opinions
through the med]a. (Guerrilla ch]efs wrote editorials in The
Neul York ?irrws.)
e Target the US Congress through that public opinion and
orchestrate the propaganda campa]gn to minimize US re-
sponse (for example, the 55 US tralrrer Iimlt in El Salvador
and the difficulty in getting aid for the Contras).
Other new characteristics are also apparent. The coopera-
tion between various guerrilla gToups and factions within a
country is now a prerequisite for financial, training and logis-
tical support from Moscow and Havana. Castros orders were:
e Stop fighting each other, and organ]ze effective com-
mand and control mechamsms.
e Establmh l]alson with other guerrilla movements to take

MILITARY REVIEW . February 1987 45

 Father Unel Mohna, a leader of
Nicaraguas Peoples Church cele.
bratmg mass m a church whose walls
are painted Wrth mUralS deplCtlPg
scenes of oppression and a
gun.lotmg priest
Shortly before his
death, Guevara is re-
puted to have noted that
Latin-American revolu-
tionaries would never
achieve success until
theyhad achieced an ac-
commodation with the
Catholic Church. The
following year, t!te I.at-
in-.4 mencan bishops
conference at lfede[lin,
Colombia, unvei[ed lib-
eration theology and the
beginning ofa new rela-
tionship between the
revolutionaries and the
church. By 1979, the mo-
dus operandi ofreuohf -
tion changed radicaily.
A new form ofinsurgen-
CY was launched.
46
full advantage of their experience and expertise.
e Establish front organizations outside the country to
function as public atTairs/information offices to generate sup-
port for the movement and to pressure the United States mto
a less responsive mode.
o Orchestrate and finance guest speakers to US academic,
civic and church gL-oups. These groups, in turn, will write let-
ters to US conWessmen who hold key commttee posmons
overseeing security asswtance operations.
All of this new sophistication, coordination and orchestra.
tion have created an insurgency much more dlfflcult to recog-
mze, define and deal with. Finally, and most seriously, the
United States is faced with one aspect of insurgency m Latin
America that offers the greatest threat but one which may yet
provide usw]th a weapon with which to regain the moral high
ground we have appeared to have lost.
There is an alliance between some drug traffickers and
some insurgents. Several countries m Latin America are
faced with the corruption of their government and military of-
ticlals. These countries are attempting to deal with. the prob-
lem with uncertain US support and wnth varying degrees of
success. Dollars accrued to the drug dealers find their way in-
to some guerrilla coffers or, possibly, in the form of weapons
and supplles, into guerrdla hands.
A meldlng in the .4merican publics mind and in Congress
of thm connection would lead to the necessary support to
counter the guerrillahrarcotlcs terrorists m this hemisphere.
Generating that suppoct would be relatively easy once the
connection wasproven and an all-out war was declared by the
Februaiy 1987. MILITARY REVIEW
 LATIN AMERICA

National Command Authority. Congress would find it diKl-

cult to stand in the way of supporting our allies with the tr~rr-
ing, advice and security assistance necessary to do the job.
Those church and academic groups that have slavishly sup-
ported insurgency in Latin America would End themselves on Dollars accrued to the
the wrong side of the moral issue. drug dea.kw find their
Above all, we would have the unassailable moral position way into some guerfitla
from which to launch a concerted offensive effort using De- coffers or, possibty, in
partment of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD assets. The recent the form of weapons and
operation in Bolivia is a first step. Instead of responding de- suppfies, into guemlta
fensively to each insurgency on a case-by .case basis, we could hands. A melding in the
act in concert with our allies. Instead of wading through the Amencan publics mind
legislative snarl and financial constraints that characterize and in Congress of this
our secur]ty assistance posture, we could act w]th alacrity to connection would fead to
the threat. Instead of debating each separate threat, we can the necessary support to
begin to see the hemisphere as a whole and ultimately de- counter the guemllal
velop the vision that has been sorely lacking. narcotics terrorists in
It w evident the msurgencies of today are much more so- this hemisphere.
phisticated than those of the 1960s, Public diplomacy, public
opinion, the media and church elements are now key factors.
The synthesis of the Moscow and Havana lines creates a much
more complex problem for us and our Latin-American allies.
The drug connection provides some financing and support
from sophisticated, organized and well armed criminals who
have the funding to sustain both themsel~,es and some insur-
gent groups. It will require equal Lfnot superior funding, or-
ganization and coordination to deal with th]s msll~ancy.

NOTES

1 +.,. rw, emmrj,!,...,,,s., ,. deba,e ,c. E Che G.e.ara G.wn,,.s Wsdere R.nd.m HO.J,e
N Y 19EJ3.Lw,lo Gu, . . . . EP>sodesofttw Re.otubona+ l+., ,.,,,,! 0,, P.b(,sher, N V 7964 R,
Q sDebray Re.cJ.m.,n the Rev.r.f on CYLWe Press V Y ?967 a.d Thw40re DraDer Ca$zro,sm The.
m-r.,. Pracoce Prww, Pub$sRer$ N V .1965
2 see Omar
Caoezas
6,0F*. m Von(e,n 7.. Hm..q .! a SZ7GP, ,,. crow. P.o ,s.,,s N Y
,985 Sh,,ey C,,, a fi.cerqu, Rec4.,,on, ,. F&hlr Random .0s. N Y 1985 ad Oa, o Nolan
The laeaog .1,. S,0>s,,s and 90, tAc.9rzwa Re.o!.,on 1s1!, 01 lP<er.3nenCan S16 es Cm.,

Colonel John D Wa,chrlskm m th? commander,

. 7111Specm[ Forces Group IAmborne), 1s? Specml
Forces, Fort Bragg, North Carohna He r+cewed a
B A from Western ,!fa~ land College, an M A
fmm Cornell Untwrsm and IS II graduate of the
USACGSC and the US Armv War College Hepre
utousl> sertied as an analyst u,tth the Strategrc
Srudzm Institute, US Army War College, Carl&
Barrack Pennsy{t anm HIS artrcle POSC.\rtet-
nam Coutermsurgmc) Doctrine appeared 8. the
hfa.v 1985 hlrlltary Rewew

MILITARY REVIEW . Februaw 1987 47