ADOPTION

A.M. No. RTJ-92-802 July 5, 1993

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs.
HON. GENARO C. GINES, as Presiding Judge, Branch 26; MA. GORGONIA L. FLORES, Court
Interpreter and Officer-in-Charge, Branch 26; ROSIE M. MUNAR, Stenographic Reporter,
Branch 26, PACITA B. DIAZ, Staff Assistant IV, Office of the Clerk of Court; MA. CONCEPCION
B. DIAZ, Staff Assistant I, Branch 26, and ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA, JR., Staff Assistant II,
Branch 26, all of the RTC, San Fernando, La Union, respondents.

FACTS
The petitioner therein alleges that she and her late husband, Fernando Averion who died
in 1987 "adopted" Cecilia Averion in 1967; only 1 year and 3 months old at the time, Cecilia was
supposedly given up by her natural parents, the whereabouts of whom remain unknown. Petitioner
further avers that she and her husband, during his lifetime, reared the child and gave her all their
love, attention, care and understanding. They also provided her with an education and considered
her as their own child.
Hence, the petition was filed "for the purpose of judicially confirming the de facto adoption of
Cecilia Averion by herein petitioner and her late husband." 14 The said petition was not
accompanied by the written consent of Cecilia Averion who, at the time of filing, was already of
legal age. On the very day the petition was filed, respondent Judge forthwith issued a Notice of
Hearing which provided that the petition would be heard on 31 October 1990; it was likewise
ordered therein that "a copy of this notice be published once a week for three consecutive
weeks at the expense of the petitioner in a newspaper of general circulation in La Union and in
the Philippines.

ISSUE:
WON action or proceeding for judicial confirmation of de facto adoption is authorized

HELD:
NO.
The remedy pursued is certainly unusual as we are not aware of any prescribed action that
may be instituted for the judicial confirmation of a de facto adoption. Nor do our adjective and
substantive laws on adoption provide for such a proceeding. In fact, the only proper and authorized
procedure relative to adoption is outlined in the rule on adoption itself. That Cecilia Averion had been
treated by the petitioner and her husband as their own child during the former's minority may only provide
compelling reasons to grant the decree of adoption notwithstanding her (Cecilia's) having attained the age
of majority. This is one of the exceptions provided by the Family Code to the rule that a person of legal
age cannot be adopted.

G.R. No. 97906 May 21, 1992

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG, respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina
Y. Alcala. Private respondent and his sister Margaret, with the consent of their natural parents and by
order of the court, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos.

Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, private respondent filed a petition to change his name
to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated
him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in
fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication
whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus
hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to
revert to his former surname.

ISSUE:
WON adoptee is allowed to change its surname without using adopters surname

HELD:
YES

The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More technically, it is an
act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between
persons not so related by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child
of another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of
such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of relationship between
the child and its adoptive parents, the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption
being more an incident than the object of the proceeding. The welfare of the child is the primary
consideration in the determination of an application for adoption.

It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from the natural parents to the adoptive parents
the custody of the child's person, the duty of obedience owing by the child, and all other legal consequences
and incidents of the natural relation, in the same manner as if the child had been born of such adoptive parents
in lawful wedlock, subject, however, to such limitations and restrictions as may be by statute imposed. 33 More
specifically under the present state of our law, the Family Code, superseding the pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code and of the Child and Youth Welfare Code on the matter, 34 relevantly provides in this wise with regard to the
issue involved in this case:
Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of the adopters
and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters; (Emphasis supplied.)
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

FACTS:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition[1] to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others,
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name
Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed
to Catindig, his surname.
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural
mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.

ISSUE:
WON an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when
she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

HELD:
YES.
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie,
to use, as middle name her mothers surname, the Court find no reason why she should not be allowed to
do so.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children to Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may
use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
 Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) a legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination
of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO

(previously referred to as DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM), respondent.

FACTS:

Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom decided to take into their care Isabelitas
nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose
Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child like their
own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally in
1971, the couple filed a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition
was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for
Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name Jose
Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
.
Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City because
respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into
effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption

ISSUE:

WON rescission of adoption is allowed

HELD

NO.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated
and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a
decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that
the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No.
8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to
the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the
right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period.
Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006,

Facts:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the
adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia
Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their
paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2
children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the
institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being
supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their
adoption.

A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and
narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after
weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.

However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to
present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.

Issue:
WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptees
biological mother.

Held:
No.
Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the
child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice
if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.
 The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to
insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed
adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent
must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to
the adoption.

Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in
the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

G.R. No. 97906 May 21, 1992

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG, respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina
Y. Alcala. Private respondent and his sister Margaret, with the consent of their natural parents and by
order of the court, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos.

Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, private respondent filed a petition to change his name
to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated
him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in
fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication
whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus
hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to
revert to his former surname.

ISSUE:
WON adoptee is allowed to change its surname without using adopters surname

HELD:
 YES

The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More technically, it is an
act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between
persons not so related by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child
of another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of
such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of relationship between
the child and its adoptive parents, the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption
being more an incident than the object of the proceeding. The welfare of the child is the primary
consideration in the determination of an application for adoption.

It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from the natural parents to the adoptive parents
the custody of the child's person, the duty of obedience owing by the child, and all other legal consequences
and incidents of the natural relation, in the same manner as if the child had been born of such adoptive parents
in lawful wedlock, subject, however, to such limitations and restrictions as may be by statute imposed. 33 More
specifically under the present state of our law, the Family Code, superseding the pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code and of the Child and Youth Welfare Code on the matter, 34 relevantly provides in this wise with regard to the
issue involved in this case:
Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of the adopters
and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters; (Emphasis supplied.)

G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR ANGELIE
ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA CARREON
CERVANTES, petitioners,
vs.
GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO, respondents.

FACTS:
Minor Angelie Anne Fajardo was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado
Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child
for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and
Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely two (2)
weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by petitioners, was also executed by
respondent Gina Carreon and the court granted it
 The adoptive parents, petitioners Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the
respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their
child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. The respondent Gina Carreon took the child from
her "yaya" at the petitioners' residence, on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her
mother.

Thus, the spouses filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court to compel Gina to
return custody of Angelie to them. During hearing, the social worker who conducted the case
study testified that she interviewed Gina in connection with the petition for adoption and Gina
manifested her desire to have the child adopted by the spouses.

ISSUE:

WON adoptive parents have better right to the minor over her natural mother

HELD:

YES
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's
welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5)
years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. 5 In all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and
social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social
standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion. 6
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than
respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife
relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that
desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person.
Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another married
man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a
minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father,
could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who
are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the
minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon),
who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give
her.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and
consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the
authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the
spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall
be exercised jointly by both spouses. 7 The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of
the adopted child 8 and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

G.R. No. 197099 September 28, 2015

EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO, Petitioner,
vs.
KAREN SANTOS, Respondent.

FACTS:
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino
and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and recovery of possession
against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her father. She
alleged that with the death of her parents, the property consisting of one half of the parcel of land
located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan with Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-00219 and belonging
to her parents was passed on to her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that
defendants executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves
as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the property in
question; and that consequently[,] they took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration
of the subject property to their names. She prayed that the document Exhibit C be annulled and the
tax declaration of the land transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the property and pay
her damages.
The defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their
brother. They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in
as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridads sister. They claimed that the birth
certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. It was allegedly impossible for Rufino and
Caridad to have registered the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they had never lived or
sojourned in the place and Caridad, who was an elementary teacher in Bulacan never filed any
maternity leave during the period of her service from August 1963 until October 1984.

ISSUE:
WON PETITIONERS HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO IMPUGN RESPONDENTS
LEGITIMATE FILIATION.

HELD:
YES
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest
involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside
of these cases, none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his
memory." 20

What petitioner failed to recognize, however, is that this procedural rule is applicable only to
actions where the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is at issue. This situation does not obtain in
the case at bar.
In the instant case, the filiation of a child herein respondent is not at issue. Petitioner
does not claim that respondent is not the legitimate child of his deceased brother Rufino and his wife
Caridad. What petitioner alleges is that respondent is not the child of the deceased spouses Rufino
and Caridad at all. He proffers this allegation in his Amended Answer before the trial court by way of
defense that respondent is not an heir to his brother Rufino. When petitioner alleged that respondent
is not a child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad in the proceedings below, jurisprudence
shows that the trial court was correct in admitting and ruling on the secondary evidence of
respondent even if such proof is similar to the evidence admissible under the second paragraph of
Article 172 and despite the instant case not being a direct action to prove ones filiation. In the
following cases, the courts a quo and this Court did not bar the introduction of secondary evidence in
actions which involve allegations that the opposing party is not the child of a particular couple even
if such evidence is similar to the kind of proof admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172.