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Social Justice Research, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2000

Perceptions of Poverty and Wealth in Western

and Post-Communist Countries
Martin Kreidl1

This paper analyzes the felt legitimacy of poverty and wealth in the United States,
West Germany, The Netherlands, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Russia. Sev-
eral theories on poverty and wealth perception are discussed; of these, dominant
ideology theory has been the most influential. This theory can predict the existence
not only of a legitimizing ideology in a society, but also of challenging beliefs that
incumbents of specific social positions hold. It is argued that poverty and wealth
perceptions are more complex, however, involving at least three latent dimensions.
Using data from the International Social Justice Project it is demonstrated that,
regarding poverty, individuals distinguish between merited, unmerited, and fatal-
istic types of poverty. Merited poverty is poverty brought about by the individuals
own doing or not doing, unmerited poverty is due to forces external to the individ-
ual, whereas fatalistic explanations attribute poverty to ascribed properties of the
individual. For wealth also there are three causally relevant factors: in addition
to merited und unmerited ones, a social capital factor that sees social contacts as
a source for determining economic success. Using a structural equation approach
and its group comparison option for comparing countries, the different expla-
nations of poverty and wealth are translated into specific measurement models.
Testing simultaneously with linear regression models show how preferences for
particular explanations are shaped by stratification-related experiences and by
the social position of an observer.
KEY WORDS: social perception; explanations of social inequality; comparative social research;
dominant ideology theory.

The commonsense notion on stratification systems involves two fundamental

questions. First, how does the stratification system work? Second, how should it
work? On the most general level, this is the issue of legitimacy of the inequality

1 Allcorrespondence should be addressed to Martin Kreidl, Institute of Sociology, Academy of

Sciences of the Czech Republic, Jilska 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic; e-mail: kreidl@cesnet.cz.

151

0885-7466/00/0600-0151$18.00/0
C 2000 Plenum Publishing Corporation
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152 Kreidl

system. The system is perceived as legitimate only if the answers to the two ques-
tions are identical or, equivalently, if the causes for inequality a person perceives
are those that he or she supports normatively. This paper explores the ways in which
people explain causes of social inequalities, particularly poverty and wealth. Do
they believe that wealth results from hard work, exceptional talents and effort,
for example, or that it follows from unequal opportunities, helpful connections,
dishonesty, or from failures of the economic system? Likewise, do they blame
the poor themselves for their poverty (insufficient individual effort, laziness, poor
morals) or is society responsible (discrimination, unequal opportunities, the eco-
nomic system)?
In this paper I intend to demonstrate empirically how perceptions are affected
by stratification-related experiences, educational background, and political culture.
Different theories make different predictions about what explanations people are
inclined to give regarding economic outcomes. According to the so-called domi-
nant ideology theory, certain types of explanationsindividualistic explanations
that hold the individual responsibleare likely to be shared by the majority, if
not all members of a society. Approaches focusing on self-interest, in contrast,
would predict individualistic explanations to increase with higher social posi-
tions. Views that give society and systemic factors responsibility for economic
outcomesstructural beliefsare usually also said to be dependent on the posi-
tions of observers.
I compare stratification effects on explanations of economic outcomes across
different societies, focusing mainly on differences between Western and former
communist countries. So far, most of the research in this field has not been compar-
ative. A noteworthy exception are Kluegel et al. (1995a,b), who base their analyses
on the 1991 wave of the International Social Justice Project. Here I use ISJP data
not only from 1991 but from 1996 as well, thus being in a position to make time
comparisons.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Individual and Structural Explanations

Kluegel and Smith (1986) have identified three conditions affecting attitudes
towards inequality in the United States: the dominant stratification ideology, indi-
vidual social experience, and the changing social atmosphere of the past decades,
namely, rising social liberalism. These three factors may affect explanations of
inequality in different ways, frequently contradicting each other.
A dominant stratification ideology represents a stable, comprehensive system
of opinions on the structure of opportunities, the causes of social inequality, and
justice. This ideology is assumed to be shared by virtually all members of a soci-
ety. According to Kluegel and Smith, the principle of equal opportunities and the
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Perceptions of Poverty and Wealth 153

belief in the responsibility of a person for his or her social fate are the fundamen-
tal elements of the American dominant stratification ideology (Aronowitz, 1997;
Feagin, 1975; Huber and Form, 1973; Kluegel, 1987; Kluegel and Smith, 1986;
Lee et al., 1990; Nilson, 1981; Rytina et al., 1970). International comparisons
have revealed that other Western societies shared (Mann, 1970) and still continue
to share a similar structure of attitudes towards social inequality (Kluegel et al.,

1995a,b; Kluegel and Mateju, 1995). Obviously, the dominant stratification ideol-
ogy legitimizes inequalities. Some authors attribute this to the power of the ruling
class. Through socialization, the family, school, media, and cultural and religious
institutions become agents of the ruling class and ensure legitimacy of inequalities
(Cheal, 1979; Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Mankoff, 1970). In compliance with the
dominant ideology, wealth is perceived as a product of ones exceptional effort
and talents, whereas poverty is caused by the lack of these attributes.
An alternative way of seeing things is to look at personal social experiences.
Note that the dominant ideology thesis tolerates the apparent contradiction that the
stratification system is perceived as legitimate even by those who are disadvantaged
(Della Fave, 1974, 1986; Ritzman and Tomaskovic-Devey, 1992). Scholars in the
Marxist tradition often refer to this as the false consciousness of the exploited.
According to Marx, however, there is a possibility to overcome false conscious-
ness: negative personal social experiences may lead workers to reject the dominant
ideology. Thus, a new, usually egalitarian ideology replaces the dominant ideol-
ogy. Indeed, a number of studies show that economic insecurity, uncertainty of job,
unemployment, low wages, etc. increase class consciousness and militant atti-
tudes of workers and affect political attitudes and behavior (Kreidl and Vlachova,
2000; Legget, 1964; Street and Legget, 1961; Vecernk, 1995; Zeitlin, 1966). It
is a matter of perspective then whether we view the personal social experience
approach as giving structural or individual explanations.
The dominant stratification hypothesis has been criticized in numerous ways.
Abercombie and colleagues (Abercombie et al., 1978; Abercombie and Turner,
1980) doubt that the dominant ideology could be deeply rooted in society and assert
that there is a strong disagreement between social classes on these values. Accord-
ing to their historical analyses, elites have never been successful in conveying
their ideology to the general population, that is it is unlikely that the stability of the
stratification system is based on the indoctrination of the disadvantaged classes by
the elites ideology. Other authors claim that the dominant stratification ideology
does not have to and cannot be a result of the elites influence on the socialization
institutions. It is hard to imagine that the vast number of socialization agencies that
are involved could be subject to absolute control. Kluegel and Smith (1986) also
doubt that the dominant ideology is an intentional product of social intervention
of the elites. They propose that a number of processes at the social-psychological
level operate directly to bring about or strengthen support for the dominant ideol-
ogy. Thus it may not be necessary to postulate its dissemination . . . by the elite
who dominate important societal institutions (Kluegel and Smith, 1986, p. 25).
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154 Kreidl

The dominant ideology approach involves accepting individual explanations

of poverty and wealth and, at the same time, rejecting structural ones. What Kluegel
and Smith call the challenging ideology of a society contradicts this by accept-
ing the structural explanation of inequalities while rejecting the individual. Thus
the relevant issue in the research on perceptions of the stratification system is
whether persons explain inequalities in individual or structural terms. Some may
not have consistent opinions in this respect, however, and sympathize with neither
or both of the ideologies. Split-consciousness theory (Cheal, 1979; Sennet and
Cobb, 1973) explains this possible inconsistency by different attitudes coexisting
on different levels in the individual. Thus, social experience and the acceptance
of new attitudes does not necessarily have to lead to rejection of attitudes al-
ready held. Opinions based on the dominant ideology and on challenging beliefs
may be compartmentalized (Lane, 1962) and people may not confront them
cognitively.
Kluegel et al. (1995a,b) find the pattern of attitudes towards inequalities more
complex than what the simple dichotomy (individual vs. structure) suggests. Their
results show that positive individualistic explanations of wealth (hard work,
ability) and negative explanations of poverty (lack of effort, loose morals) are
elements of the dominant ideology. Thus, structural explanations of poverty (lack
of equal opportunity, failure of the economic system) and of wealth (unequal
opportunities, connections, and a bad economic system) as well as negative in-
dividualistic explanations of wealth (dishonesty, corruption) represent challenging
beliefs.
Kreidl (1998) added to this by suggesting an additional explanation prin-
ciples. Based on ISJP data for the Czech Republic, he argues that people use
not only merited (individualistic) and unmerited (structural) explanations, but also
fatalistic ones. For explaining poverty, merited explanations are negative individ-
ualistic explanations (loose morals, lack of effort andsomewhat surprisingly
discrimination),2 unmerited poverty complies with structural explanation (discrim-
ination, failure of the economic system and a lack of equal opportunities), and,
thirdly, fatalistic poverty reflects the popularized version of the poverty culture
and innate abilities (bad luck and a lack of ability and talents). The perception of
wealth differs from the one suggested by Kluegel et al. as well. Wealth can be
merited or unmerited in nature or based on the social capital someone has. Thus,
merited wealth corresponds to positive individualistic explanations (hard work,
ability and good luck), unmerited wealth complies with negative explanations

2 It has been reported that discrimination might have different meanings for people living in distinct
cultural contexts (Kluegel et al., 1995a,b). The results presented by Kreidl (1998) might thus be
biased due to some singularities of the Czech society. We may speculate that discrimination loading
on the same factor as lack of ability and loose morals reflects the attitude of the Czech white majority
towards the Gypsy minority: Gypsies are often said to be lazy and lacking effort. Consequently,
discrimination against them (in terms of giving no jobs to them) might be seen as adequate, since
their unemployability is a well-known fact.
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Perceptions of Poverty and Wealth 155

(dishonesty and failure of the economic system) while social capital reflects social
contacts, unequal opportunities and good luck.3

Attitudes Towards Inequality in Post-Communist Societies

Sociological theory offers no consistent predictions about which attitudes

towards inequality prevail in the former communist societies. There are social
psychological theories, however, that consider individualistic explanations of
poverty and wealth as something like psychological constants (Della Fave, 1980,
1986). From this it would follow that the individualistic concept of inequalities
should be widespread and accepted in capitalist as well as in communist soci-
eties. Dominant ideology theory, in contrast, would suggest a different structure
of attitudes in communist and capitalist societies.
But what were the elements of the dominant ideology of the old communist
regime? The socialist system attempted to reorganize society by minimizing social
inequalities, eliminating private ownership and replacing unjust inequality with
just equality (Lenski, 1978; Vecernk, 1996a). At the beginning of the totalitarian
regime, therefore, political leaders used a radical egalitarian ideology to support the
revolution. Wealth was explained as an outcome of exploitation; thus, the wealthy
were to be blamed for the misfortune of the poor. After the precommunist elite
had disappeared, their properties became collective properties, and the new regime
adopted measures to improve the chances of the previously disadvantaged classes.
As they increasingly experienced collective social upward mobility, legitimacy
for the new system grew (Wesolowski and Mach, 1986a,b). However, in the long
run the nationalization of the economies and the leveling of wages appeared to be
socially dysfunctional (Connor, 1979; Vecernk, 1969, 1996b). Therefore, reform
communists (those involved in the Prague Spring of 1968) started to denounce
egalitarianism (Machonin and Tujek, 1996, p. 16). This led to a specific socialist
version of a meritocratic ideology: To each according to his or her functional
usefulness to the system. It is also true, however, that the communist leaders
promoting this ideology did so verbally, failing to implement it in reality (Machonin

and Tujek, 1996; Mateju and Vlachova, 1999). In any event, the official vocabulary
of the communist ideology included neither poverty nor wealth, as the communist
society was supposed to be classless. Rare cases of poverty were supposed to be
due to negative personal attributes of the poor (drunkenness, poor attitude to work,
etc.), and because being wealthy was not legitimate either, rare cases of wealth
were explained in negative terms (dishonesty, corruption, etc.).
The turn after 1989 created, among other things, a changed relationship of
poverty and wealth. Central and Eastern European countries experienced extensive
3 Good luck plays a complex role in explaining causes of inequalities. Not only people born with
exceptional abilities and talents but also those who had better opportunities when they were young
due to the environment they are from are said to have good luck.
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156 Kreidl

privatization and restitution. Therefore, one would expect the dominant postcom-
munist ideology to favor individualistic explanations of social inequality as this
would have been in accordance with the strive for economic rationality and eco-
nomic growth. The success of the postcommunist elite in creating this new ideology
remains questionable, however. Using the ISJP data of 1991, it was shown that
negative factors exceeded the positive ones in the perception of wealth in the trans-
formation countries (Kluegel et al., 1995a,b; Vecernk, 1996a). Thus, although in
theory the dominant ideology of individualistic explanations of inequality should
be strong in postcommunism, rising unemployment, decreasing real incomes, and
poverty are more likely to strengthen the call for egalitarian measures and poli-
cies and, consequently, favor structural explanations of poverty and wealth (Della

Fave, 1974; Kluegel, 1987; Kreidl, 1999; Mateju, 1999a; Rabusic and Mares, 1996;
akova and Vlachova, 1995; Robinson and Bell, 1978; Szirmai, 1986).
Reh

Determinants of Attitudes Towards Inequality

In Western countries, the pattern seems to be that it is a matter of the so-

cial position a person has whether he or she clings to the dominant ideology
(individualistic explanations) or to challenging beliefs (structural explanations).
In postcommunist societies we expect a somewhat different pattern. By and large,
we would expect that attitudes towards poverty are predominantly structural in
nature, challenging the dominant ideology of the newly acquired market economy.
They would be highly dependent on the stratification position. By the same token,
we would anticipate that explanations of wealth employ individualistic beliefs;
to the extent that they are not in line with the dominant ideology in the involved
countries, they would be challenging beliefs that are position dependent as well.
To sort this out, it will be useful to look at the determining factors of challenging
inequality beliefs that have been shown to be of influence in Western societies and
to see to what extent they can be generalized.
Mainly three sources of challenging beliefs have been suggested: deprivation,
education, and zeitgeist (Robinson and Bell, 1978; Szirmai, 1986).

Deprivation

According to the deprivation hypothesis, the inclination to favor structural

explanations of inequalities correlates with lower social status. Being female, hav-
ing a low income or experiencing long spells of unemployment might thus result in
choosing structural explanations over individualistic ones (Kluegel, 1987; Kluegel
and Smith, 1986). Conversely, the inclination of high-status individuals to refuse
these challenging beliefs is determined not only by their different stratification-
related experiences but also by a difference in self-interests. Individuals in high
social positions are usually not interested in having inequalities, from which they
profit, reduced.
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Perceptions of Poverty and Wealth 157

There is ample empirical evidence that economic insecurity and inferiority

of labor positions increase class awareness of workers (Legget, 1964; Street and
Legget, 1961; Zeitlin, 1966). However, challenging beliefs may be affected not
only by the position in the labor market but also by identifying with a group
the members of which feel discriminated (Form and Rytina, 1969; Mann, 1970;
Rytina et al., 1970). Not individual self-interest then but the norms and values
characterizing the group may be responsible for the stratification beliefs. Racial
affiliation, union membership, and political parties, in particular those leaning to
the left, would be examples (Della Fave, 1974; Kreidl, 1998; Robinson and Bell,
1978; Szirmai, 1986).
If social status matters in determining inequality beliefs, a distinction should
be made between the objective and the subjective assessment of status. Although
there is usually a high correlation between objective and subjective status, they must
not overlap completely (Hodge and Treiman, 1968; Jackman and Jackman, 1973).
It seems that the developmental stage a society is in plays a role here (Robinson
and Bell, 1978), a fact that appears to be of special relevance in postcommunist
societies. For example, an analysis of the development of status inconsistency in
the Czech Republic from 1991 to 1995 showed that the subjectively felt status
position increasingly reflected objective stratification variables. Only recently has

this relationship become weaker again (Mateju and Kreidl, 1999).
Attitudes towards inequalities are affected by absolute as well as relative
deprivation (Della Fave, 1974; Robinson and Bell, 1978). However, when mod-
eling attitudes towards inequalities, Szirmai (1986) applied two somewhat differ-
ent concepts of relative deprivation. The first concept defines relative deprivation
as a contradiction between what one has and what one thinks one should have.
The second concept of relative deprivation is based on a comparison with what
other people have. Nevertheless, the fact that relative deprivation adversely affects
legitimacy of inequalities should hold in both cases.
Finally, social mobility significantly affects attitudes towards inequalities.
People who have been rewarded by upward social mobility tend to attribute their
success to their own effort and abilities (Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Wegener and
Liebig, 1995). It can be assumed that they tend to generalize their experience,
inferring that all who are achieving deserve status increments. Upward social
mobility thus contributes to the strengthening of individual explanations. However,
upward social mobility in the postcommunist countries is the exception, drastically
decreasing the legitimizing effect of social mobility. In the United States, the ratio
of upward to downward mobility has been stable at approximately 2:1 over the last
few years (Featherman and Robert, 1978). In the Czech Republic, the frequency
of downward mobility exceeded that of upward mobility from 1989 to 1993 by
a ratio of 1.6:1, whereas this was just the other way around before the fall of
communism (from 1983 till 1988). Also in Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, the
ratios of upward and downward intragenerational mobility have decreased after

1989 (Mateju, 1999a). This is well reflected also in the subjective perceptions
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158 Kreidl

of changes in social status in these countries. From 1988 until 1993, 30.8% of
the economically active populations in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
and Slovakia experienced a deterioration of their social status whereas 13.5%

experienced an improvement (Mateju, 1999a). With regards to these findings, it is
obvious that subjective intragenerational mobility in the transformation countries
cannot affect the legitimization of inequalities as positively as in the stable Western
societies.

Education

Robinson and Bell (1978) and Szirmai (1986) assumed that the higher the
level of completed education of a person, the stronger is his or her devotion to
equality as a positive value. If this is so, we would expect that higher levels of
education makes people favor structural explanations of inequality, particularly of
poverty. Through the course of education, individuals are exposed to information,
showing that inequality is due not only to individual sources but also to structural
ones. Similarly, higher the education, more a person will make use of the media,
increasing the chances to receive information on unequal opportunities and differ-
ent ways of discrimination (Kluegel and Smith, 1986, p. 26). Indirect exposure to
the problems of homelessness, for instance, may reduce ones belief in individual
causes of the problems. Research by Lee et al. (1990) demonstrated that those who
have been exposed to public presentations of the problems of the homeless were
less likely to believe that the homeless were to blame but that structural measures
should be taken to improve their situation.

Zeitgeist Effects

The hypothesis on changing zeitgeist proposes that attitudes toward inequali-

ties are affected by their decreasing legitimacy. According to many commentators,
legal racial segregation was eliminated, racial prejudices were reduced, partic-
ipation of women on the labor market increased over time as did the general
awareness about poverty and its causes in modern societies (Firebaugh and Davis,
1998; Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Robinson and Bell, 1978; Szirmai, 1986; Togeby,
1994). Parallel to the increase in awareness about unequal opportunities, welfare
systems have been expanding. Social groups that have been put at a disadvantage
are thus compensated through redistribution organized in different ways. In par-
ticular, poverty became a key topic not only in sociology and economics, but also
in public discourse.
It is important therefore to explore the relationship between age and attitudes
to inequalities. Younger individuals should tend to be more liberal (left-oriented)
whereas older people should have conservative attitudes (Robinson and Bell, 1978).
This means that the individual explanation of inequalities should prevail among
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Perceptions of Poverty and Wealth 159

the oldest people whereas the younger people should tend towards structural ex-
planations. The generation effect regarding structural and fatalistic explanations of
poverty as well as the explanations of wealth through social capital should be par-
ticularly significant in this respect. Both can reflect a kind of culture of poverty
and of social capitalnotions that have become increasingly popular in public
discourse.
However, zeitgeist of the younger generation is not necessarily always
more liberal (left-oriented). Short-living opposite tendencies may superimpose the
long-term trends. Thus, shortly after the collapse of the communist regime, post-
communist countries appear to have experienced such a development in that there
was clearly a temporary rise in individualism in these countries. This has usually
been explained as an excessive reaction to the previous collectivist regime. In the
Czech Republic, for example, the youngest generations, which did not gain voting
rights until after November 1989, tended to support right-wing liberal-conservative
and extremist parties much more than the older ones did (Kreidl and Vlachova,
2000). Preferences of this generation for right-oriented parties appear to have lasted
only until 1996 when voting behavior of young people came to resemble the gen-
eral population. In postcommunist countries, conservative values of older people
lead to a continuing support for socialistic values of equality (Rehakova, 1997).
Social status is also directly related to age. Because younger individuals
tend to have less secure occupational positions, their left-oriented (liberal) at-
titudes can be explained as a reflection of their self-interest. But the situation
in the postcommunist countries is different. In the first phase of the postcom-
munist transformation, standard of living declined and poverty increased. In this
environment older people found it more difficult to get jobs, retrain, learn for-
eign languages etc., reducing tremendously their chances of upward mobility.
Rehakova and Vlachova have shown that in Central and Eastern Europe, it were
indeed the younger who most often experienced an upward social mobility after
1989 (Rehakova and Vlachova 1995). It should come as no surprise, therefore, if in
postcommunist societies the older people exhibit a strong tendency to explain in-
equalities in structural or fatalistic ways. On the other hand, improved social status
and bright prospects of young people may result in their stronger individualistic
tendencies.

METHOD

Data and Variables

The following analyses are based on pooled ISJP data of 1991 and 1996.
This allows me not only to compare perceptions of poverty and wealth in the
different countries but also to study change over time, particularly in the post-
communist countries. In the analyses I use data from former West Germany, The
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160 Kreidl

Netherlands, the United States, Russia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. For the
three Eastern European countries we have data for 1991 as well as for 1996. For the
Western countries only the 1991 data will be used. We thus have nine subsamples to
work with.
The perceptions of causes of poverty and wealth were measured by 14 items,
7 relating to poverty and 7 to wealth. Respondents were asked the following ques-
tion: In your view, how often is each of the following factors a reason why there
are rich (poor) people in [country] today? They had to indicate the importance of
each item on a 5-point scale coded as follows: 5: very often, 4: often, 3: sometimes,
2: rarely, 1: never. The explanations given for poverty were
Lack of ability or talent (PABIL)
Bad luck (PLUCK)
Lack of effort by the poor themselves (PEFFORT)
Loose morals and drunkenness (PMORAL)
Prejudice and discrimination against certain groups (PDISCR)
Lack of equal opportunity (POPPR)
Failure of the economic system (PSYST)
The explanations given for wealth were
Ability or talent (WABIL)
Luck (WLUCK)
Dishonesty (WDISHON)
Hard work (WHWORK)
Having the right connections (WKNOW)
More opportunities to begin with (WOPPR)
The economic system which allows to take unfair advantage (WSYST)
I will proceed in three analytic steps: first, the internal structure of the attitudes
will be explored using confirmatory factor analysis, followed by a description of
how the derived latent constructs are distributed in the different countries. In a
third step, an attempt is made to explain the attitudes, using regression analysis
and determining the effect different variables have on the perceptions of poverty
and wealth. For this the following independent variables are used:
sex (SEX; women: 1)
age in years (AGE)
income as total household income standardized in each country by z-scores
(HHINC)
length of unemployment (UNEMPL) as a continuous measure of the total
amount of time in months that the respondent spent unemployed4
Rs education (EDUC) coded according to the CASMIN scheme of inter-
nationally comparable education levels
4 Not included for Russia in 1991 and Hungary in 1996.
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Perceptions of Poverty and Wealth 161

subjective social status of respondent (SUBST; from the lowest, 1, to the

highest, 10)5
political leftright orientation (POLOR) on a 10-item scale6
relative deprivation (DEPRIV), a direct estimate of Rs actual household
income as fulfilling his or her needs recoded as follows: 5: has much less
than needed, 4: has less than needed, 3: has just about what is needed,
2: has more than needed, and 1: has much more than needed7
belief that people have equal opportunities for achievement (EQOPPR)
recoded as 1: strongly disagree, 2: somewhat disagree, 3: neither agree
nor disagree, 4: somewhat agree, 5: strongly agree).8
Analyses include economically active respondents only in order to assess the
effects of stratification variables related to the position on the labor market.

RESULT

The Factor Structure

As a first step we will explore an internal structure of perceptions of poverty

and wealth. The basic question we need to answer relates to the split-consciousness
theory. Is it possible to rank the items on a single factor or are multiple-factor
solutions more adequate? Tables I (poverty items) and II (wealth items) offer
an answer. From left to right, the tables show goodness of fit information for
single-factor and multiple-factor solutions (from LISREL runs). As can be seen,
the single-factor solutions are not acceptable in any of the countries. In models
measuring the causes of poverty, the chi-square values with 14 degrees of freedom
range from 85 (Czech Republic in 1991) to 275 (Germany). Values of the goodness
of fit index (GFI) range from .88 (Russia in 1996) to .94 (Russia in 1991, Czech
Republic in 1991, and the United States). Confirmation factor analyses of causes
of wealth also offer unsatisfactory results for the single-factor model. Chi squares
with 9 degrees of freedom9 range from 76 (Czech Republic in 1991) to 296 (The
Netherlands). GFI values vary from 0.90 (Russia in 1996) to 0.95 (Hungary, 1991).
5 Question: In [country] today, some people are considered to have a high social standing and some are
considered to have a low social standing. Thinking about yourself, where would you place yourself
on this scale if the top box indicated high social standing in this country and the bottom box indicated
low social standing?
6 Question: Some people use the terms, left and right when talking about politics. Here is a scale
running from left to right. Thinking about your own political views, please indicate where you would
place yourself on this scale by putting a cross in the appropriate box (not asked in Russia in 1996).
7 Question: Would you say your total (household) income is much less than you need, somewhat less
than you need, about what you need, somewhat more than you need, or much more than you need?
8 Statement: In [country], people have equal opportunities to get ahead.
9 In models of causes of wealth, we include six rather than the original seven variables since luck
(WLUCK) is the cause for some solution instability.
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162 Kreidl

Table I. Causes of PovertyGoodness of Fit Indexes of Confirmatory Factor Analyses

One factor Two factors Three factors Three-factors multisample
(df = 14) (df = 13) (df = 9) (df = 129)
2 GFI 2 GFI 2 GFI Contribution to 2

WG 275.3 .92 88.5 .97 44.4 .99 50

NE 250.6 .92 243.2 .92 23.8 .99 50.3
USA 215.3 .94 111.6 .96 61.8
HU91 111.4 .93 46.4 .97 22.1 .99 40.1
HU96 117.1 .91 55.6 .96 31.7 .98 36
RU91 146.1 .94 67.5 .97 35.6 .99 66.5
RU96 255.9 .88 99 .96 28.5 .99 40.3
CZ91 85.1 .94 71.6 .95 14.5 .99 43.3
CZ96 187.3 .91 162.9 .93 31.2 .99 72.7

Table II. Causes of WealthGoodness of Fit Indexes of Confirmatory Factor Analyses

One factor Two factors Three factors Three-factors multisample
(df = 9) (df = 8) (df = 5) (df = 77)
2 GFI 2 GFI 2 GFI Contribution to 2

WG 242.9 .93 110.8 .96 50.2 .98 79.7

NE 296.2 .93 88.2 .97 9.08 1.00 31.2
USA 220.8 .92 123.7 .96 41 .99 52.8
HU91 76.2 .95 40.1 .97 12.8 .99 18.8
HU96 69.6 .94 25.7 .98 10.7 .99 12.9
RU91 188.8 .93 105.6 .96 11.9 1.00 56.8
RU96 207.8 .90 129.9 .94 16.6 .99 37.1
CZ91 76.2 .94 39.2 .97 7.2 .99 10.3
CZ96 155.3 .92 77.9 .96 18.7 .99 20.3

In comparison to the single-factor solution, the two-factor solution appears to

be a better alternative regarding both poverty and wealth. According to our theo-
retical expectation, one of the factors should represent the structural items and the
other the individual ones. For poverty, the models used PABIL, PLUCK, PEFFOR,
and PMORAL as indicators of the individual factor and PDISCR, POPPR, and
PSYST as indicators of the structural factor (Fig. 1). Table I shows that this mod-
ification led to a significant improvement of quality of the model in all countries,
except for The Netherlands. Chi-square values with 13 degrees of freedom range
from 46 (Hungary in 1991) to 243 (The Netherlands). We have GFI values of .92
in The Netherlands and .97 in Germany, Hungary in 1991, and in Russia in 1991.
In the models measuring causes of wealth, we used WABIL and WHWORK
as indicators of the individual factor and WKNOW, WOPPR, WDISHON and
WSYST as indicators of the structural one (Fig. 2). Intuitively, WDISHON should
be part of the individual factor. As it turned out, however, this did not offer accept-
able solutions. Two-factor solutions with the WDISHON variable as an indicator of
the structural factor led to a significant improvement of the models in comparison
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Perceptions of Poverty and Wealth 163

Fig. 1. Perceptions of poverty: Confirmatory factor analysis.

to the single-factor solutions. Chi-square values (df = 8) vary from 26 (Hungary in

1996) to 130 (Russia in 1996) and GFI from .94 (Russia in 1996) to .98 (Hungary
in 1996).
We tested whether poverty and wealth are structured on the basis of three
independent factors. For wealth, WKNOW and WOPPR resulted as indicators of
a social capital factor, variables WDISHON and WSYST of a system allows
for an unfair profit factor, and variables WABIL, WHWORK and WKNOW
as indicators of an individual wealth factor. This three-factor solution led to
a number of statistically very robust models. Table II shows that chi square of
the model for causes of wealth in the three-factor case (df = 5) range from 7.2
(Czech Republic in 1991) to 50.2 (Germany), with the average value of all nine
subsamples at 19.8. GFI values are high and vary from 0.98 (Germany) to 1.00
(The Netherlands and Russia in 1991).
Models of poverty causes specify variables PMORAL and PEFFORT as in-
dicators of the individual factor, PFATAL, PLUCK, and PDISCR as indicators of
the fatalistic poverty, and PDISCR, POPPR, and PSYST as indicators of structural
poverty. Table I shows a significant improvement of quality of the model because
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164 Kreidl

Fig. 2. Perceptions of wealth: Confirmatory factor analysis.

of the use of three rather than two factors. Chi-square with 9 degrees of freedom
improved to a range of 14.5 (Czech Republic in 1991) to 44.4 (Germany). Only
for the United States, it was impossible to fine-tune a stable model that would
maintain a factor structure identical to the one in the other countries. However, the
model stabilized either by loosening the diagonal thetas epsilon or by specifying
a multisample analysis with invariant factor loadings described next.
Building multisample (group comparison) models with invariant factor load-
ings (Table III) is the final step in the LISREL analysis. It is of special concern for
two reasons: the multisample approach makes it possible to calculate the parame-
ters of the model with a common metric and it also enables to fix the factor loadings
to be invariant across samples (countries). Thus we can make cross-country com-
parisons of different parameters. We also can compute the factor scores regression
and calculate the values of the latent factors with an invariant pattern of factor
loadings. The factor scores can then be used in subsequent regression analyses.
Contribution of each country to the chi square of the final model is found in the
last columns of Tables I and II.
Table IV shows correlations between latent factors of the multisample re-
sults. The relation between individual and structural factors is of interest for eval-
uating the split-consciousness thesis. Our results do not give full support to split
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Perceptions of Poverty and Wealth 165

Table III. Perceptions of Wealth and Poverty: Structure

of Factor Loadings. Multisample, Invariant Factor
Loadings (Figs. 1 and 2)
INDIV SCAPIT SYST

Wealth
WABIL .50
WHWORK .72
WKNOW .13 .46
WOPPR .63
WDISHON .57
WSYST .59

INDIV FATAL STRUCT

Poverty
PMORAL .52
PEFFORT .66
PABIL .61
PLUCK .33 .21
PDISCR .07 .50
POPPR .78
PSYST .43

Table IV. Correlations Between Latent Variables: Multisample, Invariant Factor Loadings, Common
Metric Standardized Solution
WG NE USA HU91 HU96 RU91 RU96 CZ91 CZ96

Wealth
INDIV-SCAP .06 .02 .01 .04 .00 .06 .31 .05 .18
INDIV-SYST .26 .57 .37 .20 .31 .32 .38 .63 .65
SCAP-SYST .67 .82 .77 .72 .84 .53 .57 .71 1.05
Poverty
INDIV-FATAL .67 .47 .20 .63 .60 .64 .55 .19 .38
INDIV-STRUCT .36 .36 .32 .08 .14 .07 .09 .08 .17
FATAL-STRUCT .24 .38 .17 .05 .03 .18 .00 .17 .13

consciousness, however. Correlations observed in both the upper and lower panels
of Table IV reveal relatively strong relationships between individual and struc-
tural explanations of poverty and wealth. The correlations between individual and
structural explanations of poverty range from |.07| to |.36|. The correlation reached
the highest negative values in the Western countries (.30). The highest negative
value in the East is .17 for the Czech Republic in 1996, whereas it is zero or even
positive in the other countries. The independence of individual and structural ex-
planations is even less supported with the wealth items. Correlations between these
two wealth factors are very high, varying between .20 and .65. It thus cannot
be concluded that individualist and structural explanations are independent, as the
split-consciousness theory would have it, but that both beliefs are exclusionary
alternatives to the respondents.
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166 Kreidl

Distributions of Perceived Causes of Inequality

Table V gives percentages of respondents choosing strongly agree and

agree responses to the causes of wealth and poverty items. We immediately see
that there is a major division line splitting the countries into East and West. Re-
garding the causes of wealth first, the most significant differences are in WSYST,
WDISHON, WABIL, and WHWORK. Among the respondents in the postcom-
munist societies, 71 to 83% believe that wealth is accumulated in a dishonest
manner, whereas only approximately half as much believe this in the West. Also,
5586% in the postcommunist countries relate wealth to failures of the economic
system, whereas less than 38% say thus in the Western countries. Westerners tend
to emphasize individual causes of wealth by choosing the abilities and hard-work
items in particular. However, there are hardly any differences between Western
and Eastern countries regarding WKNOW and WOPPR. WKNOW receives high
preferences in all countriesfrom 74% in The Netherlands to 89% in Russia.
WOPPR is generally less preferredfrom 46% in the Czech Republic in 1991 to
79% in Hungary in 1996.
We conclude that even though preferences for individual explanations of
wealth are higher in the Western than in the Eastern countries, helpful connections

Table V. Perceptions of Poverty and Wealth: Percentage Distributions (Percent of Strongly Agree
plus Agree Responses)
WABIL WHWORK WKNOW WOPPR WDISHON WSYST WLUCK

Wealth
WG 60.7 55.8 77.1 67.8 33.2 22.3 37.3
NE 70.9 63.1 73.7 68.5 26 34.6 29
USA 60.2 65.3 75.3 62.9 40.5 37.8 24.6
HU91 60.8 34.8 74.1 68.9 71.1 55.1 40.5
HU96 57 37 88.1 78.8 77.1 59.9 39.2
RU91 47 23.6 89.1 52.4 82.7 86 29
RU96 51.6 40.2 88.7 59.4 76.8 80 42.9
CZ91 50.2 34.1 77.4 46.1 73.3 60.3 14.6
CZ96 61.2 52.4 81.6 58.3 71.3 56.5 36.7
PMORAL PEFFORT PABIL PLUCK PDISCR POPPR PSYST

Poverty
WG 37.8 35.8 29.1 19.3 34.9 37.2 34.9
NE 29.6 33.3 31.6 9.7 27.2 30.2 27.7
USA 41.5 50.3 34.1 12.2 35.2 31.7 41.6
HU91 71.8 29.7 45.6 28.4 29 56 75.2
HU96 71.1 37.2 42.5 27.3 25.7 56.8 75
RU91 81.2 42.3 33 21.5 34.5 51.9 92.9
RU96 77.9 44.2 31.7 29.5 45.6 64.5 82
CZ91 66.2 40.3 30.7 16.5 15.1 42.7 45.6
CZ96 60.2 47.4 36.1 18.4 13.2 38.8 31.6
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Perceptions of Poverty and Wealth 167

and unequal opportunities are considered most frequently as causes of wealth

even in the West. However, wealth is still perceived more positively in Western
countries, particularly due to low preferences of items such as dishonesty and
failures of the economic system. Because helpful connections, as we have seen,
are partly individual attributes, it is possible to confirm that individual causes of
wealth prevail in Western countries.
From 1991 to 1996, there was not much change of the generally negative
attitudes in perceiving wealth in the Eastern European countries. In the mid-1990s,
wealth was mainly attributed to helpful contacts, dishonesty, unequal opportunities,
and the poor economic system. In this respect, populations in Eastern Europe
maintained negative perceptions of wealth even after the fall of communism. In fact,
the percentage of those who believe that wealth is achieved by helpful connections
increased in Hungary by 14% (from 74 to 88%). The same holds for unequal
opportunities. Percentages increased by 12% in the Czech Republic (to 58%) and
by 10% in Hungary (to 79%). However, there are some contradictory trends in
the postcommunist countries. In addition to the mentioned negative perceptions,
public opinion in some of the countries started to associate wealth with personal
abilities and hard work. Preferences for explanations by abilities increased by 11%
in the Czech Republic reaching 61%. Hard work went up by 17% in Russia (to
40%) and 18% in the Czech Republic (to 52%). Perceived importance of good
luck in accumulating wealth also significantly increased. The percentage went up
by 22% in the Czech Republic (to 37%) and by 14% in Russia (to 43%).
With regard to the causes of poverty, there is little evidence of a domi-
nant ideology in the West. Neither individual, structural, nor fatalistic explana-
tions are particularly strong. Preference percentages range from 29% (PABIL) to
38% (PMORAL) in West Germany, from 27% (PDISCR) to 33% (PEFFORT)
in The Netherlands, and from 32% (POPPR) to 50% (PEFFORT) in the United
States. The United States is the only country to show slightly higher preferences
for individual causes.
Even though preferences for the explanations of poverty are not so leveled
in the postcommunist countries, there is no dominant ideology there either. Two
most frequently chosen causes of poverty are the failing economic system (93%
in Russia in 1991 and 75% in Hungary in 1991 and in 1996) and the poor morals
of those in poverty (from 60 to 81%). Czech Republic was the only country in
which individual causes prevailed over the structural and fatalistic ones. Structural
causes, particularly regarding the failure of the economic system, actually declined
from 1991 to 1996.

Regression Analyses

As the final analytic step, I report results of OLS regression models for the
three latent constructs that the confirmatory factor analyses for poverty and wealth
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Table VI. Regression of Stratification Variables and Equal Chances on Explanations of Poverty
(Structural, Individual, and Fatalistic)
WG NE US HU91 HU96 RU91 RU96 CZ91 CZ96

A. Structural poverty
SEX .148 .071 .002 .023 .002 .054 .089 .025 .007
AGE .003 .005 .004 .001 .002 .004 .000 .001 .000
HHINC .018 .017 .020 .038 .009 .032 .008 .008 .002
UNEMPL .008 .003 .001 .001 .001 .002 .061 .040
EDUC .016 .004 .004 .002 .001 .008 .016 .005 .012
SUBST .002 .030 .015 .036 .057 .001 .017 .021 .024
DEPRIV .024 .028 .037 .022 .006 .036 .052 .040 .006
POLOR .040 .032 .036 .027 .011 .021 .019 .016
EQOPPR .040 .074 .115 .062 .032 .016 .052 .029 .058
Constant 1.58 1.33 1.89 1.74 1.74 1.34 1.61 1.37 1.62
R2 .12 .16 .15 .17 .08 .07 .09 .08 .17
B. Individual poverty
SEX .039 .033 .021 .044 .079 .014 .055 .013 .054
AGE .004 .002 .002 .001 .001 .000 .004 .004 .003
HHINC .017 .003 .032 .004 .015 .040 .017 .0 .009
UMEPL .011 .004 .004 .001 .005 .133 .017
EDUC .019 .067 .113 .014 .010 .016 .006 .004 .023
SUBST .001 .012 .012 .034 .029 .010 .033 .058 .001
DEPRIV .023 .000 .041 .041 .039 .074 .036 .024 .026

POLOR .023 .054 .003 .016 .004 .008 .027 .017
EQOPPR .075 .035 .047 .009 .059 .016 .091 .015 .056
Constant 1.54 1.51 2.22 1.27 1.81 1.79 2.41 1.06 1.74
R2 .10 .18 .11 .06 .04 .05 .08 .08 .06
C. Fatalistic poverty
SEX .021 .017 .003 .007 .013 .006 .024 .009 .021
AGE .001 .003 .002 .000 .002 .000 .001 .000 .003
HHINC .000 .008 .002 .004 .029 .028 .002 .001 .023
UNEMPL .003 .001 .001 .001 .002 .06 .011
EDUC .003 .014 .010
.003 .013 .006 .018 .003 .014
SUBST .003 .010 .001 .002 .053 .017 .001 .007 .018
DEPRIV .011 .001 .008 .006 .015 .021 .016 .009 .024
POLOR .006 .005 .006 .004 .001 .002 .004 .010

EQOPPR .000 .006 .013 .009 .041 .000 .015 .008 .031
Constant .62 .59 .64 .39 1.01 .84 .92 .82 .78
R2 .03 .06 .06 .04 .06 .03 .02 .01 .04

have produced: individual, structural, and fatalistic causes in the case of poverty,
individual, system, and social capital causes for wealth.10

Poverty

We first look at the different amounts of explained variation (Table VI). The
structural explanation enjoys the least homogenous social support of all poverty
10 The original latent variables were converted to scales that can enter regressions as dependent variables
using factor scores regressions within LISREL.
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Perceptions of Poverty and Wealth 169

perception factors. The percentages of explained variance for this factor ranges
from .07 (Russia in 1991) to .17 (Hungary in 1991). Except for The Netherlands,
these values exceed R2 values of the other factors in all countries. Explained vari-
ance of the individual factors ranges from .04 (Hungary in 1996) to .18 (The
Netherlands). The factor of fatalistic poverty explanations has the lowest percent-
ages of explained variance, ranging from .01 (Czech Republic in 1991) to .06 (The
Netherlands, United States, and Hungary in1996).
The belief in equal opportunities influences the poverty perception strongly.
A positive effect of favoring equal opportunities (EQOPPR) on the individualistic
explanation of poverty and a negative effect on the structural explanation is visible
in most countries. The hypothesis that the belief in equal opportunities is crucial for
the dominant stratification ideology is thus confirmed. The relationship between
equal opportunities and fatalistic explanations of poverty is less clear. As Table VI
shows, regression coefficients are, for the most part, insignificant. Where they are
statistically significant, the picture is inconsistent: although the effect is negative
in the United States, it is positive in Hungary and the Czech Republic.
In compliance with theory, structural explanations of poverty are much more
closely related to political preferences (POLOR) than individual explanations.
People of different political beliefs share individualism (except for the United
States and the Czech Republic in 1991 where individual explanation rises with
right-leaning orientations). Structuralism is stronger when political preferences
are to the left. This means that poverty due to structural causes has indeed become
an important political issue that political parties have caught on to. This finding also
confirms a group effect on attitudes and opinions. In this case, more left-oriented
respondents tend to agree with the structural explanation of poverty. Political
socialization associated with alternative values (among members and supporters
of parties) offers a potential explanation.
The demographic effects on poverty perceptions offer empirical support for
the deprivation thesis. As can be seen, structural explanation of poverty is stronger
among women (in Germany, The Netherlands, and Russia), low-income house-
holds (Hungary in 1991 and Russia in 1991), people with lower subjective status
(Hungary in 1991 and 1996, Russia in 1996, and Czech Republic in 1991 and
1996), those with higher deprivation (The Netherlands, the United States, Russia
in 1996 and Czech Republic in 1991), and the long-term unemployed ones (The
Netherlands and Czech Republic in 1996). Particularly noticeable is the size of
individualism with family income (the United States and Russia in 1991) as well
as with subjective status in some of the countries (Hungary in 1991, Russia in
1996, and Czech Republic in 1991).
The effect of education level on the explanation of poverty is not very high. Ed-
ucation has no effect at all on structural causes. However, individual explanations
decrease with rising education in The Netherlands and United States. In these two
countries, the education effects manifest a skeptical attitude towards individualism
rather than the rising awareness of structural causes of poverty. It should also be
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170 Kreidl

noted that both in the United States and The Netherlands (and Russia in 1996),
higher education makes the belief in fatalistic causes of poverty less likely. This
tendency contradicts the hypothesis that people with the highest levels of education
will most strongly reflect public discussions on poverty risks.

Wealth

With regard to the causes of wealth (Table VII) the percentages of explained
variance are highest for the structural factor, that is structural explanations are

Table VII. Regression of Stratification Variables and Equal Chances on Explanations of Wealth
(Structural, Individual, and Social Capital)
WG NE US HU91 HU96 RU91 RU96 CZ91 CZ96

A. Structural wealth
SEX .002 .002 .008 .030 .004 .039 .009 .010 .018
AGE .004 .003 .001 0 .001 .001 .004 .006 .001
HHINC .012 .087 0 .016 .003 .007 .016 .024 .020
UNEMPL .011 .005 0 .001 0 .019 .008
EDUC .019 .026 .014 .002 .001 .017 .011 .021 .012
SUBST .033 0 .007 .030 .013 .007 .013 .01 .011
DEPRIV .023 .035 .029 .006 .007 .031 .070 .042 .071
POLOR .039 .025 .008 .014 .003 .006 0 .027
EQOPPR .040 .080 .033 .026 .01 .024 .048 .061 .089
Constant 1.88 2.18 .98 1.13 .40 .97 1.51 1.60 1.97
R2 .19 .14 .10 .11 .09 .09 .12 .09 .18
B. Individual wealth
SEX .045 .043 .003 .020 .019 .031 .003 .008 .014
AGE .003 .003 .001 .003 .002 .001 0 .002 .001
HHINC .054 .018 .028 .001 .008 .032 .010 .001 .022
UNEMPL .007 .003 .001 .001 .001 .103 .009
EDUC .020 .011 .001 .005 .012 .018 .009 .015 .004
SUBST .043 .031 .004 .029 .058 .001 .002 .024 .009
DEPRIV .053 .000 .015 .025 .053 .087 .052 .014 .070
POLOR .033 .023 .002 .013 .015 .003 .003 .017

EQOPPR .066 .054 .039 .051 .086 .027 .045 .068 .046
Constant 1.38 1.55 1.54 1.24 1.12 1.66 1.70 1.17 1.69
R2 .14 .08 .04 .08 .17 .06 .04 .10 .10
C. Social capital
SEX .030 .035 .008 .062 .026 .022 .018 .006 .042
AGE .004 .001 .004 .004 .001 0 .001 .002 0
HHINC .035 .01 .014 .019 .033 .009 .003 .009 .009
UNEMPL .004 .003 .000 .003 .000 .026 .010
EDUC .004 .016 .016 .022 .017 .005 .001 .007 .022

SUBST .009 .013 .001 .023 .029 .01 .007 .007 .017
DEPRIV .019 .017 .029 .037 .001 .033 .010 .017 .035
POLOR .018 .013 .025 .011 .021 .002 .001 .003
EQOPPR .035 .045 .060 .098 .023 .032 .006 .021 .065
Constant 2.05 1.69 2.17 2.71 1.85 1.54 .75 1.09 1.91
R2 .06 .09 .07 .09 .04 .03 .03 .03 .08
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Perceptions of Poverty and Wealth 171

socially highly structured beliefs. In the postcommunist countries, however, the

social determination of the perception of wealth differs between the countries. In
1991, the percentage of explained variance was the highest for the structural wealth
factor in Hungary and Russia, whereas in the Czech Republic it was for individ-
ualistic explanations. This had changed in 1996, when in the Czech Republic the
structural explanation of wealth became the most socially heterogeneous attitude,
whereas in Hungary this is true for the individual explanation of wealth.
In general, the social capital factor depended least on the stratification vari-
ables. Percentages of explained variance of this factor are low in all countries. The
only effect that is visible in most of the countries is that of EQOPPR. Those be-
lieving that social capital matters for getting rich do not perceive much equality of
opportunities as a relevant factor. There are only few other statistically significant
effects on the social capital factor and none is consistent over all societies.
Much more consistent are the determining effects of the individualistic and
structural attitudes towards wealth. The regression analyses show a strong support
for the deprivation hypothesis. For example, the higher the respondents income
(in the United States), education (in The Netherlands, Unites States, Russia in
1991, and Czech Republic in 1991), and subjective status (Western Germany,
Hungary in 1991 as well as 1996, and Russia in 1996), the weaker is the tendency
to believe in structural explanations of wealth. On the other hand, longer the
unemployment period (Germany and The Netherlands) and higher the deprivation
(in The Netherlands, United States, Russia in 1991 and 1996, and Czech Republic
in 1991 and 1996), stronger is the tendency to explain wealth by structural causes.
Structural perceptions of wealth also relate to the belief in equal opportunities.
The more one believes in equal opportunities, the lower is the tendency to attribute
wealth to structural causes. The only exception here is West Germany.
There is also evidence of support for the deprivation thesis, looking at the
effects on individualistic explanations of wealth. Individualistic explanations of
wealth are preferred more by the high-income respondents (in the United States
and Russia in 1991 whereas in Germany the trend was opposite) and those who
enjoy a high subjective status (Germany, The Netherlands, Hungary in 1991 and
1996, and Czech Republic in 1991). On the other hand, those who think they
need a higher income choose individualistic explanations less often. Also, there
is a strong relationship to the feeling of having equal opportunities. The more
the people believe in equal opportunities, the more they support the individual
explanation of inequalities. The feeling of having equal opportunities thus appears
crucial, both for adopting and refusing the dominant ideology.
We find little support for the education thesis in our data (Robinson and
Bell 1978; Szirmai 1986). Regression equations showed no effect of education on
wealth explanations in most of the countries. Only in The Netherlands, the United
States, Russia in 1991, and the Czech Republic in 1991, high levels of education
decrease the likelihood of preferring structural explanations of wealth, but no
effects on the perception of individual causes are present. Relationships between
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172 Kreidl

education and the social capital factor are not particularly consistent. Although the
belief in social capital increases with education in the Czech Republic in 1996, it
decreases in The Netherlands. Otherwise there are no significant effects.
What I call the zeitgeist effect is not visible with the perception of wealth
either. The inclination towards structural explanations diminishes with age in
Germany and rises towards individualistic explanations. In The Netherlands struc-
tural explanations increase, individualistic explanations decrease with age. We also
see a positive relationship between age and structural explanations in Russia in
1996 and in the Czech Republic in 1991. This relationship was predicted in the
theoretical perspectives as values of older people should more strongly reflect their
experience with the communist ideology. Nevertheless, it is not quite clear why
the effects in Russia and the Czech Republic were not identical in both years.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper explored the ways in which people explain poverty and wealth.
Three of the results found seem to be of special importance.
First, causes of inequalities were analyzed, particularly with regards to the
dominant ideology theory and potential challenging beliefs. The analysis con-
firmed hypotheses based on the split-consciousness theory that maintains that
structural and individual explanations of poverty are not mutually exclusive. Strong
preferences for individual explanations that an individual may have do not pre-
clude having preferences for structural explanation as well. As our analysis showed,
however, perception of poverty and wealth is structured not only by two, but by
three latent factors: in addition to structural and individual explanations, poverty
is sometimes explained fatalistically, and regarding wealth, social capital expla-
nations form an independent potential mode of explanation.
It should be noted that social contacts were mentioned most frequently in
the explanation of wealth in all countries. In fact, social connections were empha-
sized more frequently than constitutive features of the individualistic dominant
ideology, even in the West. Also, the belief in social capital as the way to ac-
cumulate wealth cuts across all social groups. It was socially more widespread
in Germany, the Czech Republic, Russia, and Hungary in 1996, superseding the
spread of individualistic explanations (that are more prevalent only in the United
States, The Netherlands, and Hungary in 1991). These findings cast doubt on
the dominant ideology theory. Although individualism dominates over structural
explanations with regard to wealth, helpful social connections and cronyism play an
important role.
Another result from this study that is important is that the development in
Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s had a significant impact on the legitimacy
of inequalities. Attitudes towards poverty and wealth differ substantially from
those in Western countries. The acceptance of inequalities is still much lower than
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Perceptions of Poverty and Wealth 173

in the West and, compared to the West, wealth is explained primarily in negative
terms, whereas poverty appears in a more positive light. This may be due to a com-
bination of the previous with the current dominant ideologies in these societies.
During socialism, as well as after its collapse, the elite was interested in supporting
negative individualistic explanations of poverty, and it is only gradually that pop-
ulations in these countries come to see either structural or positive individualistic
causes. If nothing else, this shows how restricted dominant stratification theory is
when it comes to explaining change: the strong support for structural explanations
of poverty demonstrates that the ability of the elite in pushing its ideology has
been limited, even under the postcommunist circumstances.
Finally, we conclude that even though the perceptions of inequalities are pre-
dominantly negative in the postcommunist countries, this does not necessarily lead
to an increase in potential for political action. Dissatisfaction with the stratification
system is a sensitive political issue for a wide range of parties and movements.
However, political actors are more likely to take advantage of accumulated dis-
satisfaction if it is concentrated in clearly defined segments of the population. As
shown, however, structural explanations gained in generality in the postcommunist
societies since 1991 (evidenced by increasing R2 values in Tables VI and VII) only
in the Czech Republic. This may be so because in the Czech Republic, attacking
unjust wealth and poverty had become a crucial issue for the left-oriented oppo-
sition and appears to have significantly contributed to its electoral successes. But
in most of the other postcommunist societies, insight into the structural causes of
inequality is widespread and not a feature of particular societal groups.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This research was supported by Grant No. 403/99/1129 from the Grant
Agency of the Czech Republic.

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