Francisco Salunga vs Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

NABAILUP-PAFLU & etc.

Principle:

Unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership,
and a closed-shop provision would not justify the employer in discharging, or a union
in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom the union thus refuses to admit
to membership, without any reasonable ground therefor. Needless to say, if said
unions may be compelled to admit new members, who have the requisite
qualifications, with more reason may the law and the courts exercise the coercive
power when the employee involved is a long standing union member, who, owing to
provocations of union officers, was impelled to tender his resignation, which he
forthwith withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may, at least, invoke the rights of those
who seek admission for the first time, and can not arbitrarily he denied readmission.

On the otherhand, the court did not agree with the trial court on holding the company
guilty of unfair practice. The company was reluctant in discharging the petitioner. On
the contrary, it did not merely show a commendable understanding and sympathy for
his plight. It even tried to help him, although to such extent only as was consistent
with its obligation to refrain from interfering in purely internal affairs of the Union. At
the same time, the Company could not safely inquire into the motives of the Union
officers, in refusing to allow the petitioner to withdraw his resignation. Inasmuch as
the true motives were not manifest, without such inquiry, and petitioner had
concededly tendered his resignation of his own free will, the arbitrary nature of the
decision of said officers was not such as to be apparent and to justify the company in
regarding said decision unreasonable. On the other hand, the Company cannot be
blamed for assuming the contrary, for petitioner had appealed to the National Officers
of the PAFLU and the latter had sustained the Union. The Company was justified in
presuming that the PAFLU had inquired into all relevant circumstances, including the
motives of the Union Officers.
 KAPATIRAN V. FERRER-CALLEJA
G.R. No. 82914, June 20, 1988

Priciple:

The right of members of the Religious group (IGLESIA NI KRISTO) sect not to join a
labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the members of
that sect from forming their own union. At the same time, NEW ULO was able to file a
timely petition for CE within the 60 day freedom period and was able to ascertain the
majority of the workers who prefer their union.

[G.R. No. 121241. December 10, 1997]FURUSAWA RUBBER PHILIPPINES,

INC., petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and FURUSAWA
EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT (FEU-IND), respondents.

Principle:

The submission of a xerox copy of the unions certificate of registration to prove its
legitimacy is sufficient, hence, the Med-Arbiter correctly granted the petition for
certification election. As it been held in a long line of cases, a certification
proceeding is not a litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily understood, but
an investigation of a fact-finding and non- adversarial character. It is not covered by
the technical rules of evidence. Thus, as provided in Art. 221 of the Labor Code,
proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission are not covered by the
technical rules of evidence and procedure. The court hasalready construed Art. 221 of
the Labor Code in favor of allowing the NLRC or the labor arbiter to decide the case
on the basis of position papers and other documents submitted without resorting to
technical rules of evidence as observed in regular courts of justice.[12] Indeed, the
technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds
from an examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments
contained in position papers and other documents. In this regard, the factual findings
of the Med-Arbiter appear to be supported by substantial evidence, hence, we must
accord them great weight and respect.

Under the premises, or at the very least, when conflicting interests of labor and
capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the
latter should be balanced by sympathy and compassion which the law must accord the
underprivileged worker. This is only in keeping with the constitutional mandate that
the State shall afford full protection to labor

Filipino Pipe & Foundry Corp. v. NLRC

November 16, 1999 | Purisima | Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 | National
Union or Federation

Principle:

DOCTRINE: The mother federation is a mere agent and the local chapter/ union is the
principal nothwithstanding the failure of the local union to comply with the
procedural requirements that would make it a legitimate labor organization. The local
union, being the principal and sole and exclusive bargaining agent, and having staged
the illegal strike should be held responsible for any resulting damage sustained by the
company as result thereof

The mother union, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, has the status of an agent
while the local union remained the basic unit of the association, free to serve the
common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints imposed by the
constitution and by-laws of the association. (Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v.
Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 512 [1975])

The same is true even if the local union is not a legitimate labor organization.
Conformably, in the abovecited case the Court ruled that the mother federation was a
mere agent and the local chapter/union was the principal, notwithstanding the failure
of the local union to comply with the procedural requirements that would make it a
legitimate labor organization.

It would not affect its status as the principal and basic unit of the association. The
requirement laid down in the Progressive Development case, that the local union must
be a legitimate labor organization, pertains to the conditions before a union may file
a petition for certification election and to be certified as sole and exclusive
bargaining agent. In the present case, there is no dispute that THE UNION is the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of petitioner
company. The union's status as a legitimate labor organization is therefore of no
moment in the resolution of the controversy here.

Furthermore, the petitioner company is now estopped from reneging on the

recognition it extended to the FPUW-NLU as the bargaining representative of its rank
and file workers, by belatedly attacking its status which petitioner company had
voluntarily recognized. It should be noted that even as early as 1981, when the
collective bargaining agreement sought to be implemented by the union was entered
into, the latter was already the bargaining representative of the employees
concerned. It is not, therefore, true that it was respondent NLU which formed FPWU.
At most, the entry into the picture of the private respondent on March 23, 1983,
merely affirmed the status of FPWU as the recognized bargaining representative of
the rank and file employees of petitioner company.

Evidently, direct and primary responsibility for the damages allegedly caused by the
illegal strike sued upon fall on the local union FPWU, being the principal, and not on
respondent NLU, a mere agent of THE UNION which assisted the latter in filing the
notice of strike. Being just an agent, the notice of strike filed by Atty. Eulogio Lerum,
the national president of NLU, is deemed to have been filed by its principal, the THE
UNION. Having thus dismissed the claim for damages against the principal, THE
UNION, the action for damages against its agent, respondent NLU, and Atty. Lerum,
has no more leg to stand on and should also be dismissed.

G.R. No. L-18442 November 30, 1962

RIZAL CEMENT WORKERS UNION (FFW), petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and RIZAL CEMENT CO.,
INC., respondents

Principle:

DOCTRINE: It could not be denied that the strikers failed to earn the wages they
ought to have received when they offered to return to work but not accepted; but it
likewise could not be denied that because of the strike and how it was carried out,
the employer also suffered.

upon certification by the President under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875, the case
comes under the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 103, which enforces compulsory
arbitration in cases of labor disputes in industries individual indespensable to the
national interest when the President certifies the case to the Court of Industrial
Relations. The evident intention of the law is to empower the Court of Industrial
Relations to act in such cases, not only in the manner prescribed under said Act No.
103, but with the same broad powers and jurisdiction granted by that Act. If the Court
of Industrial Relations is granted authority to find a solution in an industrial dispute
and such solution consists in the ordering of employees to return back to work, it
cannot be contended that the Court of Industrial Relations does not have the power or
jurisdiction to carry the solution into effect. And of what use is its power of
conciliation and arbitration if it does not have the power and jurisdiction to carry into
effect the solution it had adopted. Lastly, if said court has the power to fix the terms
and conditions of employment, it certainly can order the return of the workers with
or without backpay as a term or condition of employmen

G.R. No. L-53427 June 27, 1985

CESAR ARICA, CAMILO BADANGO, AZUCENA EPILEPSIA, NOEMI TABAMO, APOLONIO

ANIS, MARIANO LADIERO, ANTONIO DELA CUESTA, BERNARDO ALVARES, MYRNA
REYES, NORMA CRUZ, REDENTOR SABINO, LEONARDO SAN JUAN, ESTELITO
ZAPANTA, ZOSIMO RABAINO, ANTONIO EUBIEN, JUANITO TOLENTINO, JR., EFREN
MAGNAYE, REGALADO POSADAS, WILFREDO AYCARDO, and HERNANI
PATRIARCA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MINISTER OF LABOR and RIVERSIDE MILLS CORPORATION, respondents.

Principle:

Any legitimate labor union may strike and any employer may lock out in
establishments not covered by General Order No, 5 only on grounds of unresolved
economic issues in collective bargaining, in which case the union or the employer
shall file a notice with the Bureau of labor Relations at least 30 days before the
intended strike or lockout. The Bureau shall exert all-out efforts to effect a voluntary
settlement during the 30-day period. Should tile dispute remain unsettled thereafter,
the union may go on strike and the employer may lock out unless the President or his
duly authorized representative certificates the dispute to the National labor Relations
Commission for compulsory arbitration in the interest of national security or public
safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of
the rights and freedom of others. Such certification shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the strike or lockout
 UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES vs. NLRC and NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC.

Principle:

The Commission may sit en banc or in five (5) divisions, each composed of three (3)
members. The Commission shall sit en banc only for purposes of promulgating rules
and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases before any of its
divisions and regional branches and formulating policies affecting its administration
and operations. The Commission shall exercise its adjudicatory and all other powers,
functions and duties through its divisions.In view of the enactment of Republic Act
6715, the aforementioned rules requiring the Commission en banc to decide or resolve
a certified dispute have accordingly been repealed. Confirmed in Administrative Order
No. 36 (Series of 1989) promulgated by the Secretary under his delegated rule-making
power. Moreover, it is to be emphasized and it is a matter of judicial notice that since
the effectivity of R.A. 6715, many cases have already been decided by the 5 divisions
of the NLRC. We find no legal justification in entertaining petitioners claim
considering that the clear intent of the amendatory provision is to expedite the
disposition of labor cases filed before the Commission

PAFLU v. CLORIBEL, 27 SCRA 465

Principle:

The courts are vested with the power to limit the exercise of the right of peaceful
picketing to parties involved in the labor dispute, or having a direct interest to the
context of this issue. Wellington is a mere "innocent bystander" who is not involved in
the labor dispute. Thus, they are entitled to seek protection of their rights from the
courts and the courts may, accordingly, legally extend the same.
 G.R. No. L-49580 January 17, 1983

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), CATALINO LUZANO,

FELICIANO RUBIO, PRUDENCIO JALANDONI, RODOLFO ANASTACIO, DOMINADOR
REUBAL, DOMINGO BARREDO, ELISEO CARPIO, LEONARDO ESPEJON, RUFINO AGUA,
WILFREDO ADEFUIN, NICASIO MORDENO, JOSE FERRERAS, HONORIO UNTAL and
APOLINARIO DIZON, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINO, PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING MILLS COMPANY, INC. and ALFREDO CHING, respondents.

Principle:

What justifies the interposition of the corrective authority of this Tribunal even more
is the fact that the information is limited to petitioners having engaged in picketing.
It need not be stressed that peaceful picketing is embraced in freedom of expression.
As emphatically declared in Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Philnabank
Employees' Association

The present law on the subject, Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, is even more emphatic: "(e)
No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for
lawful purposes, or obstruct public thorough fares
 G.R. No. L-1340 October 13, 1947
HERMOGENES MORTERA and CANLUBANG WORKERS' UNION (CLO), petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE and BISIG NG
CANLUBANG (NLU

Principle:

Under he authority granted by the Constitution, the National Assembly sought through
Commonwealth Act No. 103 to set up a system of settling labor disputes orderly,
justly, and to the best interest of the parties concerned in particular and of the
people in general. Both the Delegates of the Constitutional Convention and the
Members of the National Assembly, without depriving laborers of their essential rights,
and rather having heir benefit in mind sought to avoid in the Philippines the repetition
of the interminable strikes occurring in the United States of America. Their evil
effects may easily be absorbed by the enormous economic capacity of the American
people but certainly will be disastrous to the economic life of the Philippines.

the blanket prohibition against picketing in any guise or form contained in the order
of February 21, 1947. The prohibition should be understood to cover only illegal
picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing
cannot be prohibited. It is part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
Constitution. Therefore, the order of the Court of Industrial Relations prohibiting
picketing must be understood to refer only to illegal picketing, that is, picketing
through the use of illegal means.
 [G.R. No. 117169. March 12, 1997]

PHILTREAD WORKERS UNION (PTWU), MAURICIO BARTOLO, CESAR DAVID,

EMMANUEL AGUSTIN, PECSON BARANDA, NELSON BAGUIO, ROLANDO
MATALOG, PEPITO DAMICOG, EDUARDO SANTOS, ISABELO GALOPE,
REYNALDO MALEON, AL PEDRIQUE, BAYANI HERNANDEZ, ROBERT LORESCA,
LEONARDO LACSINA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY NIEVES R. CONFESOR,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, GEN. RECAREDO SARMIENTO,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, PHILTREAD TIRE & RUBBER CORPORATION,
GERARD BRIMO, HARRY McMILLAN, respondents.

Principle:

The Labor Code vests upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what
industries are indispensable to national interest. Thus, upon the determination of the
Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to the national interest, it will
assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute of said industry. The assumption of
jurisdiction is in the nature of police power measure. This is done for the promotion
of the common good considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to
the national economy. The Secretary of Labor acts to maintain industrial peace. Thus,
his certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to impede the workers
right to strike but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute. This is well-
articulated in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor, in this wise:
Plainly, Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was meant to make both the
Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters share
jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions. Otherwise, the Secretary would not
be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. To hold
the contrary may even lead to the absurd and undesirable result wherein the
Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may have diametrically opposed
rulings. As we have said, (i)t is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a
manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it
 G.R. No. 88210 January 23, 1991

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, and PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA), respondents.

Principle:

Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful

lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a
worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his
employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such
lawful strike

Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding of
the strike, but not the company's right to take action against union officers who
participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts. The prohibition which the
Secretary issued to PAL constitutes an unlawful deprivation of property and denial of
due process for it prevents PAL from seeking redress for the huge property losses that
it suffered as a result of the union's illegal mass action

The Secretary may have realized that he was partly to blame for PAL's damages
because of his failure to act promptly and use his authority to avert the illegal strike
under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. The Secretary's delay does not excuse the
reckless and irresponsible action of the union in declaring the illegal strike. The
liability of the union for that is primary and exclusive.
 G.R. Nos. 92981-83 January 9, 1992

INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR and ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION (ALU), respondents.

Principle:

1. Article 217 (a) (1) and (5) of the Labor Code which provides:

Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission (a) Except
as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide . . . the following
cases involving all workers. . . .

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; . . .

2. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code which declares:

(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to
cause a strike of lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission for compulsory arbitration. . . .

3. Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC which states:

Sec. 6. Disposition of cases. . . .

Provided, that when the Minister (Secretary) of Labor and Employment

has assumed jurisdiction over a strike or lockout dispute or certified the
same to the Commission, the parties to such dispute shall immediately
inform the Minister (Secretary) or the Commission as the case may be, of
all cases between them pending before any Regional Arbitration Branch,
and the Labor Arbiter handling the same of such assumption or
certification, whereupon all proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
concerning such cases shall cease and the Labor Arbiter shall await
instructions from the Minister (Secretary) or the Commission.
The foregoing provisions persuade us that the Secretary did not gravely abuse his
discretion when he issued the questioned orders.

As early as 1913, this Court laid down in Herrera vs. Baretto, et al. the fundamental
normative rule that jurisdiction is the authority to bear and determine a cause the
right to act in a case. However, this should be distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction. The authority to decide a case at all and not the decision rendered
therein is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and
the subject matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an
exercise of that jurisdiction

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. ACTING SECRETARY OF

LABOR JOSE BRILLANTES, NATIONAL MINES & ALLIED WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU),
MARCOPPER EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (MELU), respondents.

Principle:

A return-to-work order is a statutory part and parcel [21] of the Secretarys assumption
or certification order. Article 263 (g) succintly provides that:

Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification
order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all
striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer
resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. x x x

Thus, following an assumption or certification order, returning to work, on the

part of a worker, is not a matter of option or voluntariness but obligation. The
sanction for failure to comply with such obligation, under the law, is loss of
employment status. Case law likewise provides that by staging a strike after the
assumption of jurisdiction or certification for arbitration, workers forfeited their right
to be readmitted to work, having abandoned their employment, and so could be
validly replaced.
We cannot countenance the Secretarys tolerance of the unions willful breach of
the provisions of Article 263(g) as well as its defiance of the February 28, 1995 order.
He cannot gloss over his findings showing prima facie the illegality of the unions
actuations. It would be unfair, indeed unreasonable and oppressive, to compel
petitioner to accept the workers who refused to return to work, pending arbitration
proceedings.
We stress that it is the NLRC which must resolve the issues involved in the labor
dispute. Our resolution in the instant case does not pre-empt the NLRC. We make no
findings or ruling on the relative merits of the parties positions. We rule simply
that pending arbitration proceedings, petitioner cannot be compelled to accept the
workers who failed to return to work.
We cannot but highlight the national interest involved in the instant case.
Petitioner Marcopper operates the San Antonio Copper Project in Marinduque. The
project is financed through long term loans granted by the Asian Development Bank
and its co-financers, in the aggregate amount of US$40,000,000.00. It also supplies
electrical power to the entire province of Marinduque. In the assumption order of the
Secretary, it was emphasized that:

Any disruption in the operations of the Company will adversely affect its financial
status and consequently its capacity to pay the loans acquired. Considering that the
Companys project is basically financed by these loans, the continued operation of the
project is threatened. Consequently, the means of livelihood of about 1,500
employees stands to suffer.

UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES vs. NLRC and NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC.

Principle:

The Commission may sit en banc or in five (5) divisions, each composed of three (3)
members. The Commission shall sit en banc only for purposes of promulgating rules
and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases before any of its
divisions and regional branches and formulating policies affecting its administration
and operations. The Commission shall exercise its adjudicatory and all other powers,
functions and duties through its divisions.In view of the enactment of Republic Act
6715, the aforementioned rules requiring the Commission en banc to decide or resolve
a certified dispute have accordingly been repealed. Confirmed in Administrative Order
No. 36 (Series of 1989) promulgated by the Secretary under his delegated rule-making
power. Moreover, it is to be emphasized and it is a matter of judicial notice that since
the effectivity of R.A. 6715, many cases have already been decided by the 5 divisions
of the NLRC. We find no legal justification in entertaining petitioners claim
considering that the clear intent of the amendatory provision is to expedite the
disposition of labor cases filed before the Commission

The failure of UNION officers and members to immediately comply with the return-to-
work orders was because the academic institutions were not industries indispensable
to the national interest.

ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE, petitioner,

vs.

HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,

and SAMAHANG NG MANGGAGAWANG PANG-EDUKASYON SA STA. ESKOLASTIKA-
NAFTEU, respondents.

Principle:

Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) the:

1. Authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest,
2. decide the same

This authority to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute must

1. include and extend to all questions and include and extend to all questions
2. controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has
exclusive jurisdiction.

Law which govern the effects of defying a return-to-work order:

Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to
the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction
over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration.

Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification
order.

If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking
or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of
law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with
such orders as he may issue to enforce the same . . . (as amended by Sec. 27, R.A.
6715; emphasis supplied).

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. No labor organization or employer shall declare a

strike or lockout:

1. without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book
or

2. without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or

3. without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and
reported to the Ministry.

No strike or lockout shall be declared:

1. after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or

2. after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary

arbitration or

3. during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout
Article 263 (g): if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, "all
striking . employees shall immediately return to work."

This means that a return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory

notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration (University of Sto. Tomas v.
NLRC).

It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition
questioning its validity