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The Signal Corps During The Korean War

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WWII Era ('40s)

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OFFICERS' CLUB Looking at this situation it is hard to believe that neither the US, the Soviet Union, nor any other country in the world
Veterans' Salutes at that time could see the folly of thinking that two western countries could set an arbitrary line along the 38th
Freedom Park parallel to separate Korea. Only two years before, in August 1947, the British had tried this same trick with India,
Bricks and it had already backfired by 1949, with war having broken out between the partiesa mess that lives on in the
Brief Histories form of internecine warfare between India and Pakistan even until today. How anyone back then could have
Memories thought that this approach would work in Korea boggles the mind. The lesson learned from the Britishs efforts in
India should have been a simple one to be taught: people from another culture and world cant simply take a pencil
Scrap Book
to a map and draw a line and say, So here, old boy, is how we are going to partition your country. It doesnt work.
PX
In the case of the two Koreas, civil unrest within the newly divided nation began literally as soon as the line was
Chat Rooms drawn.
Charity Efforts
AWARD Within a year of the partition of Korea, on 25 June 1950, North Korea invaded the south.
Could the Korean War have been avoided had an effective communication network been in place so that diplomats
in Korea and China could have communicated with Washington telling them what was happening on the ground
in real time interpreting what the Chinese were saying through the eyes and ears of local in-country experts
wholly familiar with the language and culture, and reporting same to Washington offering alternative approaches
to solving the problem, based on proximate knowledge, versus the issue based rhetoric of Washington politicians
becoming sure of the value the other side placed on an issue before either acting or reacting to it? One thinks
"yes," it could have been avoided.
Whatever the reason, whether it was an oversight on the part of the US government of that time in thinking that it
no longer needed the communication network the Signal Corps had in place at the end of the second world war,
shortsightedness on the part of each of the branches of the military in not protesting stronger the orders to
dismantle it, or simply a disbelief on the part of those in Washington that make the decisions that war could be
entered into again, so soon, on the heels of World War II, the fact of the matter is that as the Signal Corps global
communication network began to come down, Americas ability to hear what the world was saying was dying.
Worse, it would be many years to come before the Signal Corps would be able to resurrected it again.
Regardless, the damage was done. North Korea was inside of South Korea and advancing rapidly. Despite a
resolution by the United Nations calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of the North Koreans to the 38th Parallel,
the North pressed on. The South,
only lightly armed, was unable to
stop North Korea. Seoul fell within
a few days. Yet even with this win
under their belt the Communist
forces continued to push south.
Finally, on 30 June, Truman
stepped up to the bar and bought
the next round of drinks: he
committed American ground
forces.
For the Signal Corps, where once
the order had been to pack up its
communication equipment and go
home, now the order was to get as
many links to Washington, Japan,
and Taiwan up and running as fast
as possible, and expand each
regional system as required and
without limitation. Interestingly,
during all of this time North Korea
(the DPRK) showed not the
slightest interest in its own communication capabilities, not only disdaining telephone or radio circuits for civilian
use, but also for military use deciding instead to rely on whistles and bugles to control its own battlefield
movements. [4]
As in the case of the beginning of the second world war, so in the case of the Korean War. Once the U.S. made the
decision to go to war, it was all in. In rapid fashion, the U.S. drew its troops from the closest soldiers available: the
occupation forces in Japan. For the most part these included elements of the Eighth Army, under the command of
Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker. Four divisions were serving on occupation duty at that time: the 1st Cavalry Division and
the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions. Fortunately for all concerned, these were among the best troops in the
world, and America, its Allies, and certainly South Korea, were lucky they were there. Unfortunately, while they
were among the best we had, they had nevertheless lost most of the World War II veterans that had brought them
the glory their battle streamers screamed of. Under-strength, the best (but sorely in need of training), and saddled
with World War II era equipment and vehicles that were out of service more than in service, they sidled up to their
transport ships and headed for Korea.

Among this mass movement were the elements of

the Signal Corps that would support combat
operations and integrate its activities into what was
even at that early stage a rapidly growing effort to
quickly expand global US military communications
(back to WWII levels). Where a few months earlier if
one listened carefully one could hear the sucking
sound of global Signal Corps communications
imploding, now if one listened they could hear the
whooshing sound of it rapidly expanding.
However, all was not to go well in terms of
expanding the militarys (or the U.S.s global
diplomat corps') ability to communicate with
Washington. On the local level, while the Signal
Corps moved In lock step with the combat troops,
they both discovered that good intent is not
necessarily a substitute for good equipment. At the
same time as the combat troops were discovering
that they were critically short on ammunition, the
Signal Corps was discovering they faced the same
situation with radios, telephone cable, teletype
equipment, and almost everything else. In part this
was because no one expected to need a vast
quantity or stockpile of these materials to service the
needs of post-war occupied Japan, and in part it
was, again, because everyone within the U.S. was
looking out towards Europe, and not worrying about
what was going on in Asia.
In addition to equipment, as the war got underway it
quickly became obvious that dint of determination on
the part of the individual combat soldier and
signalman was no substitute for unit integrity and
cohesion. Because of the scarcity of open space for training in Japan, unit training had been neglected and in the
first meetings with the enemy it showed. Soldiers habituated to the leisurely pace of occupation duty found on the
other side of their barrel a hard-hitting, disciplined, and (in terms of their own needs) well-equipped opponent.
The Army eventually sent eight divisions to Korea, six Regular Army and two National Guard. The Marines
provided one. In support of Americas efforts, some twenty members of the United Nations contributed ground, air,
and/or naval forces.
Like the combat troops, the Signal Corps faced huge difficulties in getting operating systems and qualified people in
place so that it could effectively support combat operations, never mind global communication. Unlike the combat
arms however, where strategies and tactics tended to change slowly over decades (usually only in response to new
forms of weaponry... like tanks) with the result that training regimens rarely if ever change, thus insuring a
constant supply of well trained personnel with the Signal Corps change came quickly in the early 50s. The speed
and pace of technical advances in communication equipment made it such that during the Korean War most EMs
(who had completed training school long before the war broke out) found that what they had learned was often no
longer valid at least as far as equipment was concerned. This could be seen in how signalmen were finding new
gear arriving that they had no familiarity with. New devices and innovations such as the AN/GRC-26 mobile
radiotelephone station, an improved ground radar to locate mortar emplacements, L-5 Stinson aircraft for use in
delivering messages (up to 34,000 pounds of messages a month were delivered in Korea by the Signal Corps), and
both planes and helicopters for the laying of wire in difficult terrain, all challenged the signal troops on the ground to
perform their own OJT.
To add to the difficulty of getting up to speed with new technology their was the problem of finding people not just
qualified people, but any people. In June of 1950 the Signal Corps strength stood at only 48,500, barely enough to
handle global Signal Corps duties as they stood, never mind support a hot war in Korea while at the same time
trying to quickly rebuild global military communications. Worse, unlike in WWII where an interim mobilization period
was able to be set in motion before the US went to war, in Korea the unexpectedness of the invasion caught the
military and the Signal Corps, which was under orders to reduce its size and footprint with no plan, personnel,
program, or training facilities that could be activated quickly enough to meet an already operational wars
manpower requirements. The only option available was to call up the reserves.
With a green light given to dip into the
reserves, the Signal Corps began
searching for both individual signal
officers to recall to active duty, as well as
signal units that it could tap on the
shoulder. Training capabilities were also
expanded, with some of the first training
programs being stood up at Fort
Monmouth, Fort Holabird, and Camp
Gordon. To supplement these, in
December 1951 a new training facility
was set up at Camp San Luis Obispo,
California. A Class II training facility, it
was called the Southwest Signal Corps
Training Center.
Among the units set up to conduct
training at Camp San Luis Obispo were
the:
Southwestern Signal Replacement Training
Center (11 February 1952 - 30 October 1953)
Southwestern Signal School (2 April 1952 -
30 October 1953)
1st Signal Service Group (later 1st Signal Group) (January to August 1952)
505th Signal Group (16 January 1952 - 8 September 1953)
207th Signal Depot Company. Unit was activated on 16 February 1952 at Camp San Luis Obispo
509th Signal Service Battalion (later 509th Signal Battalion) (Activated 15 February 1952 at Camp San Luis Obispo)

Of course, with equipment, manpower, and training facilities being in short supply for use in an unannounced and
unanticipated war, the raw material needed by the civilian industrial sector that creates the equipment that the
Signal Corps uses was in short supply too. Everything from polypropylene (used in capacitors), to polyethylene,
nylon (to provide insulation for wires), synthetic manganese dioxide (for dry cell batteries), alkyd polyester
(resistors), aluminum foil and aluminum plates (capacitors), coils, transformers, quartz crystals, copper wire itself,
and much, much more was simply not available in the quantities needed.
So empty was the supply line that it took nearly 3 years for the industrial sector
to catch up with the militarys demand. Hopefully we have learned this lesson,
and today wont find ourselves, as a nation, praying that the Chinese wont shut
off our supply of rare earth elements, precious, and semi-precious metals when
we need them the most in the next war we get into.[5]
As most readers know, the fighting that was done in Korea fell under the
auspices of the Eighth Army. Activated in the continental U.S. in 1944, it was
ordered to the Pacific where it earned the sobriquet of the "Amphibious Eighth"
for its more than 60 "island-hopping" assaults across the Pacific, on its way to
Japan. And if it hadnt been for V-J day changing its mission, it would have hit
the beaches of the main island of Japan, along the Kanto Plain, just outside of
Tokyo, with a mission to defeat Japan on its home ground. After the war, it,
along with the Sixth Army, provided the ground forces MacArthur needed to
occupy Japan.
The first unit of the 8th that MacArthur sent to Korea was the 24th Infantry Division, which got there on June 30,
1950, five days after the North had come across the border. The first serious battle took place on July 5, five days
later, when a set piece of Army forward forces called Task Force Smith engaged the enemy and were badly
bloodied in a gallant but unsuccessful stand north of Osan.[6]
While the 24th was getting its knuckles rapped in Osan, Eighth Army's headquarters were being set up in Taegu, a
choice made by the Signal Corps because of the existence at that location of a relay station astride the old Tokyo-
Mukden (today known as Shenyang) cable. While during the nearly 40 years it occupied Korea Japan had done
some despicable things to the Koreans, one thing it did well for its own accord was set in place a communication
cable that linked China and Korea with Japan. That cable proved to be a God send for the U.S.
Even so, it quickly
became evident to the
Signal Corps that the
Eighth Army head-
quarters signal section
was simply unable to
provide the level and
amount of communic-
ation support needed
by the subordinate
divisions doing the
fighting. To meet their
urgent needs three
divisional Signal
Companies were
rushed into action (the
13th, 24th, and 25th),
while the 7th Infantry
Division and its Signal
Company was held
back in Japan and set
aside to provide a
source for any
emergen-cy
cannibalization that
might be needed (for both combat manpower as well as communication personnel and equipment). With the 13th,
24th, and 25th Signal Companies already in route to Korea, plans were then put in place to move the 304th Signal
Operation Battalion and the 522nd and 532nd Signal Construction Battalions to Korea too.

As the 24th ID was driven back from Osan to

Taejon (located about half way between
Osan and the Eighth Armys HQ in Taegu),
the Signal Companies supporting it found
themselves almost wholly unable to perform
their task. Lack of roads, un-fordable rivers,
ravines, and endless ridges made it near
impossible to lay cable, while mountainous
terrain that changed elevation by several
thousand feet every mile or so effectively
broke up UHF (200-512 MHz short range,
line-of-sight ) and VHF (30-180 MHz,
moderate to short range, local and line-of-
sight) communication links and transmission.
The fact that the U.S. didnt hold much of the
high ground at this early stage also
contributed to the problem, and even in those
cases where some high ground was held,
signalmen usually found that the distance to
the next high piece of securely held ground
was too far to support a battlefield radio net.
Adding insult to injury, the signals equipment that was deployed proved nearly useless. From radio batteries that
died after an hour or less of use, to brittle insulation on wires and radio tubes damaged by the rough transit
between Japan and Korea, the 24ths ability to establish effective command and control was severely tested.
Finally, factors beyond the control of anyone also stepped in to shut communication down. Fleeing civilians thought
nothing of cutting the wires they found strung along the ground to make harnesses with which to tie down their
belongings, while the enemy similarly thought nothing of shooting down signalmen in trees and on poles as they
tried to string cable. In the end, in spite of all of the advances in technology that had been made between the wars,
the Signal Corps found itself in the first few months in Korea falling back to running messengers between units in
order to get the message through.
As June rolled into July and August, and summer began to fade into autumn, both the Eighth Army and the Signal
Corps began to get things under control. Equipment from the States began to arrive, logistics bottlenecks were
worked out, and even the untrained men that populated units finally began to understand what their job was and
how to do it. I guess there is no better
incentive for effective on the job training than
being shot at, right?
Communication wise, the Signal Corps
settled on VHF and microwave radio systems
(technically, the upper VHF to microwave
range) to support tactical communication that
covered the long distances that were
involved in Korea. This worked out so well
that, not surprisingly, the same concept was
used when Vietnam rolled around 13 years
later.
What we know of VHF and microwave radio
is that its easy to deploy, easy to maintain,
and provides tons of communication circuits
for the dollar being spent. Unlike wire, which
requires an in-your-face effort to string at the
front and invites pot shots in return,
microwave and VHF allows you to sit back
and lob signals over hills and dales to the
next site, where it can then be wired directly
into the local commanders HQ tent. Its
flexible, allowing you to move the signal
equipment with the same haste and speed as
the Infantry moves, and if you site it properly,
it isnt stopped by mountains or rivers. Maybe
best of all, it allows you to pass everything
from teletype to voice over its circuits,
negating the need for more than one type of
communication network to be set up.
However, if you have been reading closely,
then you probably saw a bug in the woodpile
of words above something that did cause a
problem as re. the use of microwave and
mid- to long distance VHF in Korea. The
principal problem was that these forms of
communication require line-of-sight (LOS)
transmission. This meant that the Signal
Corps found itself in the role of dictating to
the combat commanders what terrain to
take, in order to allow it to set up an all
encompassing battlefield network. This in
turn necessitated more combat than would
have been preferred on the part of the
grunts if these mountain tops did not need
to be taken. Fortunately, mitigating this was
the knowledge that tricks and techniques
like Fresnel zone reflection, leveraging free
space propagation, atmospheric refraction,
rounded obstacle diffraction, and even
ground reflecting allowed Signal Corps
planners to turn almost any high ground
into an effective signal site, even if it was
not ideal. Even so, the necessity of
requirement to set up transmission stations
in highly elevated, isolated locations did
increase the combat load that the Eighth
Army had to carry, just so that it could talk
to its units.
An example of this was the Taejon Relay
station. Situated on a mountain near
Taejon, it still exists and is now called the
Richmond Microwave and VHF Radio
Relay Site. Once a Japanese aircraft
spotlight site during World War II, the site
was selected in part because it still had old
Japanese perimeter defense works that
could be quickly rebuilt to protect the troops
while the signal site was being set up. Its
purpose was to connect and relay
communication from a site to the north of
Taejon (called Highpoint Site) to another to
the south, near Taegue (called variously
Salem Site and Nite Cap). Taejon Relay
served as the link for these, a hub for other
connections to what is now known as Kunsan Air Base, and to several interior relay sites that provided short range
VHF links to local field combat troops.
When Taejon Relay was first put up the battle around it shifted back and forth across its base several times,
necessitating alternatively putting up and
then removing the equipment. Since an
entire station's equipment can weigh in
at several tons (8 tons in the case of the
Taejon Relay site), with one particular
piece of equipment weighing in at 330
pounds, moving equipment around from
one steeply sloped signal site to another
could prove to be a challenge. Today we
would do it by helicopter but back
during the early days of the Korean War
the old way was the best way: hike up
your sleeves, get a couple of men to set
up a harness, and lift the damn gear up
and onto the back of a deuce-and-a-
half if you could get one to the top of
the mountain in the first place. Add to
this the exposure of sitting on top of a
mountain, and, well, you quickly learned
that while the Signal Corps was technically not a combat arm of the Army, it spent as much time shooting at the
enemy as anyone else did. As I learned on the signal site I was stationed on in Vietnam, Search & Destroy is not a
game reserved exclusively for the Infantry. On my site we Signal guys played it weekly.
You can see from the picture of Taejon Relay site (as it stood in 1969) that the climate in Korea proved as much of
an enemy as the North Koreans did. While nominally a country situated in the temperate zone, Korea has some of
the most extreme weather variations in all of Asia. Anyone who has been to Beijing in winter can tell you about the
50 mile an hour Siberian winds that blow down across the Gobi desert and drive temperatures in the city down to
-15 to -30 below. Well, those same winds rip across the Korean peninsula too. Whether the troops were suffering in
the winter from frost bite, frozen and useless radio batteries, or ice covered grounds on which to lay their wires,
were sweltering in summer heat of 100+ degree days, or suffering through the June to September monsoons,
mother nature was not going to give a break to the combatants in the Korean War.
On the positive side, the Korean War occurred at the dawn of Americas greatest period of industrial strength and
growth. Coming on the heels of World War II, with America exiting that war as the supreme power in the world, it
was only natural that Americas technical, scientific, financial, and industrial might was ready, able and willing to
combine to deliver an industrial system capable of producing almost anything of need, in almost no time at all. If the
military wanted it, America could produce it.
American factories perfected the principles of mass production during the second world war and now they stood
ready to be tapped again to support the Korean War. As such, almost faster than the laboratories at Ft. Monmouth
could dream up new communication devices, the civilian industrial sector was able to turn those ideas into
products and not just commercial products mind you, but MIL-spec products.

Yes, its true that the occasional

Julius Rosenberg would worm their
way into Ft. Monmouths labs.[7] And
its also true that in 1953 Joe
McCarthy ranted about Ft. Monmouth
being chock-a-block full of spies. And
it may even be true, to some extent,
that there were a fair number of
communist spies in the facility during
the Korean War (two additional Fort
Monmouth scientists, Joel Barr and
Alfred Sarant fled to the Soviet Union
during this time), but that didnt
negate the fact that the Ft. Monmouth
labs were turning out all sorts of ideas
about how to help a government and
its military communicate better.
Two of the products of that effort were
the AN/GRC-26 mobile radio-teletype
(known as both the "Angry 26" and the "Jerk 26") and the Mortar-Radar Locator AN/MPQ-3 and AN/MPQ-10 (one
of the Signal Corps most useful pieces of equipment and rugged enough to withstand travel over the brutal Korean
roads). As for what other specific pieces of equipment came out of Ft. Monmouth's labs at the start of the Korean
war, that seems impossible to tell. It seems that , unfortunately, just as in how the Korean War itself has been
systematically neglected as an important historical point in our countrys history, with little consideration or
endorsement being given to the superb vets who fought it, the same seems to be true as re. the communication
equipment introduced to the military during the Korean War.
Today we know almost nothing of the radio equipment used in Korea except for the fact that most of it was said to
be of WW-II origin. With a mindset like this, its impossible to tell what was new, versus what was left over from
WWII. Worse, from this distance in time, equipment that did not even exist during the Korean War is now being
labeled as Korean War era communications equipment.
In researching this article, we've come across many such instances. One example has
to do with an RT-68 Korean War vintage transceiver which we saw advertised on the
internet for only $45.00. Looking a little deeper into what an RT-68 was, and when it
was released for use in the Army, it becomes clear that it didnt even exist during the
Korean War. As a quick quiz, consider the following list: PRC-6, 8, 9, and 10, a GRC-9,
and an RT-66, 67, 68, 70. Which of these were used in the Korean War? Wisdom on
the internet and in publications relating to this era says all of them. Unfortunately, only
two of the radios listed here could possibly have been in service in time to participate in
the Korean War, and one of those wouldn't have had anything compatible in the field to
talk to. The answer then is only one in the list was actually available and able to be
used in the Korean War, despite what one might read in any number of publications.
This problem of being unable to determine what new equipment the Signal Corps
seeded the Korean War with stems from how military equipment is dated. When no
other historical documentation is available, one would seemingly be able to depend on
several things to try and estimate the vintage of equipment and when it was
introduced. Unfortunately, as you will see here, most methods that are used to age
military radio equipment are flawed and will lead you astray.
The first item most commonly looked for in determining when a piece of signal
equipment was first brought into service is the order date present on the data plate.
Unfortunately, this date reflects the date an item was ordered, not when it was actually
put into service. The radio's actual delivery and usage date could lag this date by as
much as a year. Similarly, perhaps the worst way of determining a date of introduction
and use is by looking in the various equipment lists of the time, such as the Technical
Manuals (TM), as well as the SIG and FM series of publications. This approach doesnt
work either, as the information contained in these was very often obsolete before these
publications were even printed. As an example, the 1950 edition of TM11-487 lists
none of the radios commonly known to be of Korean War vintage.
Another unreliable approach is comparing the AN number, and it's order, with one from a radio of known vintage.
For instance, the actual timing of the release of the PRC series is as follows; the PRC-5 was in use during WW-II,
the PRC-6 would be introduced around 1950, the PRC-8,9, and 10 not until 1951 at the earliest, and the PRC-7
sometime around 1956. Simple, huh? Unfortunately, the problem inherent in this approach exists for all other series
of military equipment too. Whats the problem, you ask? Surely you noticed that the numbers went forward, and
then backwards, didnt you? With a varying number scheme like this, its impossible to pinpoint when a piece of
equipment was released.
The best reference of all for determining when signal equipment was introduced is by using the actual publications
that were issued at the time in question, and which discussed the new equipment coming online. Such publications
as the CMH series "The Signal Corps," or "Test for Technology," are good examples. Unfortunately, for the Korean
War period none of these exist because everyone was too busy making the equipment to write up nicely written
and published histories about what it was and how it worked.
Which leaves us with only one option in terms of telling you what kind of new communication equipment was
released during the Korean Warsince we cant tell you what it was, well tell you who made it:
The Sperry Gyroscope Company; the National Company, Inc.; Wells-Gardner Co; The Hallicrafters Co.;
E. H. Scott Radio Laboratories, Inc.; Crosley Corporation; Collins Radio Company; and Hammarlund
Mfg. Co., Inc.
One thing we know is true about some of these manufacturers, if youre a true Signals guy, your heart felt a burst of
warmth as you read their names. Companies like Hallicrafters, Collins, and Crosley will always spark a fond
memory in a real Signaleer, usually because as kids we cut our teeth on surplus equipment made by these folks.
Finally, let us begin to wrap up this article by telling you about how the Signal Corps itself changed during the
Korean War.
During World War II the role of the Signal Corps was perfected, but the structure it
operated under still left something to be desired. One can see this if one looks
closely at the chaos that ensued in Signal Corps personnel management when,
after the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel, it suddenly became a top
priority to recruit and train a ton of new personnel.
In a recent research project for the grandson of a WWII Signal OCS graduate
(Class 43-25) we discovered that the 848th Signal Training Battalion was created
to hold the wash-outs from AAF (Army Air Force, a division of the Signal Corps at
that time) training. That is, Signal Corps personnel that were to become Officers
once they completed AAF flight training were reassigned to the 848th, a unit
created specifically to "house" them if and when they failed to complete their
AAF training. That left the question of what to do with them once they got into the
848th, especially since the men involved were already well along on their way to
becoming Signal Officers by the time they washed-out.
The answer was to define the purpose of the 848th as being to provide some other form of specialized Signal
training for these wash-outs. After which, once this new specialized training was successfully completed, the men
would then and only then be sent on to complete their OCS training, and receive their commission as a Second
Lieutenant. As you'll see, while it was a good idea, it didn't work well in practice, even to the point of uncovering a
basic flaw in how all Signal Corps Officers were being trained back then.
With so many men filling the 848ths rosters at the start of the Korean War, it was decided to send them off to Camp
San Louis Obispo, where an Artillery and Infantry training center operated, preparing men in those branches for
service in Korea. Thus the wash-outs from AAF school left Camp Crowder in Missouri for the sunny climes of
California. There they were taught the role of a Signal Officer in supporting Infantry and Artillery operations. After
finishing their training in Camp San Louis Obispo, they were then sent on to Ft. Monmouth, to complete their officer
training, from whence they would then receive their commission and their final unit assignments.
Looking at this closely,
one can see that the
training being done
both at Camp Crowder
(aviation training), and
at Camp San Louis
Obispo (Artillery and
Infantry training) is
what we would call
today specialized
training. And it was
being given to men
who were, for all
practical purposes,
only officer candidates
(note the lower case
letters), not Officers. In
other words, the
process of training
Signal Officers during
and after World War II
generally involved
providing specialized
training first, and then
Officer (note the
capital O) training
second.
This is just the opposite of what was done for the Vietnam War. For the most part, during the Vietnam War
candidates for officer training went through Signal OCS training first, and became Officers, and only then, upon
completion and receipt of their commission, were sent away for specialized training.
Somehow, between the end of WWII and the beginning of the Vietnam War, someone thought it better to reverse
the order and conduct the bulk of the Officer training first, and the specialized training second. In hindsight, the
reason this decision was made is obvious, and can be found referred to in numerous contemporaneous documents
of the time that discuss the quality of the Officers the various OCS programs were turning out. The problem was
that what was found towards the end of the second world war turned out to be true again at the beginning of the
Korean War... by emphasizing technical training over Officer training, the skills, courage, intelligence, discipline,
education, dedication, character, and commitment needed to qualify someone as appropriate Officer material was
not being fully vetted in selecting those who were being sent off for specialized training. Worse, because of the
investment the Army had in putting someone through specialized training, and the demand for Officers to send to
the field, anyone who completed their specialized training was (in the early days at least) virtually guaranteed of
becoming an Officer. This resulted in a fair number of well trained technical specialists wearing bars, but who had
little of the moral fiber and personal makeup needed to lead troops in the field.
By reversing the order of the
training it was possible to put
an equal amount of emphasis
on the self-discipline,
motivation, confidence,
judgment, problem solving
skills, and ability to always
accomplish the mission that is
needed if one is to lead in
battle, as it was to emphasize a
person's technical competency.
Thus, over the course of the
Korean War, Signal Corps
Officer training migrated from
the form and type it had been at
the end of WWII, to what it was
at the beginning of the Vietnam
War: one where an increased
emphasis was placed on who
was being let into OCS for
training in the first place, and
how they were trained to be an
Officer once they were there.
The development of this new
philosophy in how to train
Signal OCS Officers was one of the byproducts of the Korean War. One can see its outcome by simply looking at
the dropout rate of Signal OCS candidates to those of its sister services. As many in this Association will readily tell
you, Signal OCS saw a dropout rate of 50%, while that of the other branches hovered around 25%. Thus, from the
Korean War forward, to be a Signal Officer who earned a commission through OCS two things had to be learned: i)
leadership and ii) mastery of the technology. For the Infantry and the other sister branches, only one thing was
needed: leadership. With Signal OCS candidates being graded in two key areas, versus the one of the other
branches, it was only natural that Signal OCS candidates had twice as many opportunities to fail the program... and
many did.
This is said not to be at all critical of the other branches, but only to state the obvious... a lesson learned by the
Signal Corps during the Korean War: unlike in the other branches where leadership is the prime capability one must
possess, in the Signal Corps both leadership and technical intelligence are needed. This is only natural, leading to
the obvious conclusion that among candidates for Signal OCS training it is a necessity that the vetting process find
people who can master these two things equally: i) the kind of incredibly unique strategic and tactical thinking that,
say, an Infantry Officer must master if he is to be an effective leader of men, and ii) the kind of technological and
signals intelligence skills that a Signal Officer must hold, and combine with his leadership skills, in order to achieve
his mission.
With the Korean War
prompting a new fresh
look at how its Officers
were to be trained, it
was only natural for the
Signal Corps to also
take a closer look at its
organizational makeup.
Unlike in WWII, Korea
showed that the kind of
warfare that resulted
from more modern
weapons and means of
communication would
be better served if a
more clear distinction
could be made between
the types of soldiers
that were being sent to
the field. That is, there
was a need for all
concerned, across all
branches, to
understand instantly
what the role was of the
many and varied types
of Signal units and
personnel that roamed
both the front lines and
the rear echelons.
To simplify things, during the Korean War the Signal Corps began to enhance the distinction between the various
types of Signal troops that it had, classifying them into three broad categories. The fist consisted of Signal soldiers
that were assigned to specific military bases ("Base Ops"). These troops were charged with installation, operation
and maintenance of the base's communication infrastructure, generally along with hired civilian contracted
companies. While those of us who went through the Vietnam War will instantly recognize this format, during the
Korean War this was a radical departure from how the Signal Corps operated during the second world war. For one
thing, there were far fewer civilian contractors in the field and on bases during the second world war than the
Korean War, and certainly fewer in both cases than during the Vietnam War.
The next group were Signal Corps personnel who were members of non-Signal Army units, like the Infantry,
Medical, and Armor corps. Their job was to provide communication capabilities for those with other jobs to
accomplish, like killing the enemy or keeping our own soldiers alive. As in an analogy mentioned earlier in this
article, these troops effectively became the I.T. department of the units they were assigned to.
The third major type of Signaleer became the one assigned to what purists would think of as a true Signal unit.
These Signaleers found that their mission was to provide communication links between Army units in their areas of
operation, as well as other signal nodes in still other areas served by still other Signal units. The most fundamental
form of Signalman, these people were the ones that prompted the review of how Signal Officers were being trained,
because while both the EMs and the Officers who did this work had the singular task of doing almost nothing but
signals work, they also had the task of building the signal sites they ran, and filling in their otherwise spare time by
defending them.
It was this latter duality of performing local combat operations (defense, combined with localized search and
destroy), as well as highly specialized technical work, that brought out the dichotomy of trying to find officer material
capable of thinking both strategically and tactically (right brain) as well as technically (left brain). Further, where in
World War II clearly defined front lines that almost always tended to move forward dominated (thus reducing both
the need and value of stationary signal sites, as well as the need to defend those that were built), and a pre-
existing telephone infrastructure existed (in Europe) to support regional military and combat communication, in
Korea none of this was true. In fact, it was just the opposite, in Korea it quickly became clear that signal sites on top
of mountains had to be built and they had to be vigorously defended, if the Army was to be able to communicate. In
other words, the Signal Corps' Officer corps had to learn how to fight and defend their own territory, as well as
communicate.
To round all of this out, during the Korean War the Signal Corps got its
wings back. Koreas terrain forced the issue of whether the Signal
Corps needed planes or not back to the Pentagon for review. The need
to be able to lay cable by plane and helicopter, the need to be able to
ship messages over the mountains by air (especially bulky maps and
documents that do not lend themselves to radio transmission), and the
need to perform photo recon of the battlefield all combined to cause
the Secretary of Defense to reverse his decision to strip the Signal
Corps of its wings. At the same time, the Signal Corps was given near
carte blanche to rebuild its logistical support capabilitieseverything
from building a more effective means for training its Officers and
enlisted men, to reinvigorating its laboratories back at Ft. Monmouth,
building new liaison laboratories with several civilian contractors, extending its combat photography services to
include motion picture cameramen, aerial photography, photo analysis, and so forth.
By the end of the war the Signal Corps had redefined itself across many levels. In one sense, it brought forth both
the new being that the Signal Corps would become as it took its place in the new form of warfare that resulted from
the Korean War, as well as the new substance it needed to support that new soul.
In terms of what this being was, mission wise, it was now clear to Signals people everywhere that the Infantrys
rejoinder that its goal, as the tip of the spear, was to shoot, move, and communicate was wrong. And knowing that
it would be a cold day in hell before the Infantry would change its motto to match anything the Signal Corps might
suggest, instead of setting off warfare between itself and its sister branch, the Signal Corps simply set about the
task of preparing to be there, by the Infantrys side and that of Armor, Artillery, Aviation, and any other branch of
service that wandered by, when they finally came to realize that what they needed most in order to effectively
engage the enemy and meet their mission was to communicate. That is to say, the Signal Corps new post-Korean
War soul would live to fulfill the purpose of supporting the other branches when they finally discovered that in the
real world of modern warfare it is more important to communicate first, and then shoot and move, than to fire first
and ask questions later. If one doubts this, one need only look at the impact on Americas war efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan of the many civilian and ally deaths resulting from poorly communicated targeting and target analysis
details.
For the record, it's not that what the other branches of the military does is wrong in putting shoot and move before
communicate, it's that warfare has changed, and along with that change there is a need to integrate into the
traditional tactics of warfare real time capabilities that weren't needed in the types of wars fought in the past. As the
Korean War unfolded the Signal Corps saw this fact come to life, and as a result began to incorporate these
lessons into its combined forces strategies.
One can see this if one
looks at how the very
concept of battlefield
communication has
changed down through
the ages. For example,
where in Custer's days
the only communication
needed was seeing the
Indians, and during the
Civil War all that was
needed in the form of
communication was to
observe troop
movements, perhaps
from a balloon 1,500 -
2,000 ft above the
ground, so that surprise
attacks could be
avoided, and during
WWI the primary need
was to find a weakness
in the trench system of
the opposition, likely by
observation from above
via a Spad flying at
5,000 feet, and
communicate this
information back to the
soldiers who were about
to go over the top, by
the time of WWII all of
these preliminary
communication-as-a-
form-of-seeing-where-
the-enemy-is needs
were replaced by a need
to be able to know what
the enemy's intentions were long before you could see him, or he could began to move his men.
This change in the fundamental concept of what battlefield communications is came about because as the speed of
warfare and combat increased, the ability to win an engagement purely on the basis of physical observation of the
enemy's position decreased. Simply put, in a fast paced, quickly evolving combat and/or war scenario,
communication in the form of listening in on the enemy's communication and moving the knowledge gleaned from
this exercise quickly throughout the combat arena (so that field commanders can move their men and then shoot)
becomes of supreme importance. In other words, as the pace of war increases, the value of shooting and moving...
or in some cases moving and shooting... becomes directly proportional to the amount of exocentric (listening to the
enemy) and endocentric (distributing what is learned within the unit) communication there is. Without these two,
one's combat forces are essentially blind. They can shoot and move all they want, but if they don't communicate
with those who know where the enemy is and what his intentions are, they will for the most part be wasting their
ammunition.
For the Signal Corps, this was one of the key closing lessons of WWII. As the North Korean blitz attacks of the
early days showed, the Korean War only reinforced it. The result was that the Signal Corps used the period of the
Korean War to perfect its ability to integrate in real time its ability to find, trap and analyze exocentric knowledge of
the enemy's intentions and activities... from all available sources and services... and build ever quicker, faster,
cheaper, better endocentric means of analyzing and sharing this information with the combat arms in need of it.
For the Signal Corps then, the Korean War proved to be an important period of transition, in both how it selected,
trained, organized, and managed its personnel, as well as how it performed its core task of communicating. At the
beginning of the Korean War the Signal Corps still had one foot in the past. By the end of the war it had firmly left
the past behind, had transformed itself into a modern, technologically advanced, work flow process management
focused military enterprise, had its feet planted firmly in the 20th century, and had its eyes on the 21st.
Communicate, shoot, and move. We, the Signal Corps, will help you do this.[8]
Finally, the United States Army paid for the Korean War with nearly 110,000 casualties, 334 were Signaleers.
The Eighth Army paid the price for its success by being asked to stay behind in Korea when everyone else went
home. It is still there, preserving the rights of the South Koreans to live under peace even while they complain
about the U.S. presence. In this authors view, the Eighth Army is the backbone of both the Korean country and its
people.
As for the Signal Corps units that entered Korea along side the Eighth Army, they remain with it even until today. In
our view, to make sure the Eighth Army can communicate before it decides to shoot and move, as well as after.
----

Next Month, The Last Chapter In This Three Part Series: The Signal Corps During The Vietnam War.
 READ MORE - - Go to Part I: The Signal Corps During The Cold War

READ MORE - - Go to Part III: The Signal Corps During The Vietnam War

-----
Footnotes:

[4] Even today the DPRK seems ambivalent about whether to bother building an effective communication network or not. As at 2007 it was
reported as having approximately 1.1 million phone lines, amounting to less than five mainlines per 100 inhabitants. Most of these are installed
in government offices, collective farms, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with only perhaps 10 percent controlled by individuals or
households. While there are perhaps 400 dedicated networks among SOEs, according to one eyewitness at least as recently as 2002 some
significant facilities (in the power generation and grid network) were still using hand-cranked phones for communications. To return to your
place in the text, click here:

[5] China controls more than 90% of global production of REs and has embarked on a series of deals to secure output from other
international producers, meaning it accounts for 97% of all REs sold globally. Nomura Securities chief strategist Sean Darby To return to
your place in the text, click here:

[6] Source: official 8th Army History; http://8tharmy.korea.army.mil/history.asp To return to your place in the text, click here:

[7] Julius Rosenberg had worked as a radar inspector at Fort Monmouth in 1942 and 1943. He was accused and convicted of stealing a new
form of proximity fuse that was developed at the labs, passing plans for the manufacture of the device to the Soviet Union. Documents
released by Russia after the Cold War verified that Julius Rosenberg was indeed a spy working under their employ. To return to your place in
the text, click here:

[8] The first time this author heard the inverted phrase "communicate, shoot, and move" was in the midst of a story told by MAJ (R) Richard
Green, one of the U.S. Army Signal Corps OCS Association's Directors. He was regaling this author in an eMail telling of a heated telephone
conversation he had had many years before with an Infantry Colonel. Apparently the Colonel had said or done something that offended Major
Green. When the Colonel tried to sooth Major Green's ruffled feathers by telling him to calm down, as we were all on the same team...
reminding him of the Infantry's motto to shoot, move and communicate as an example of how we all depended on each other, Major Green
shot back that that was the problem with the Infantry, and was probably the reason why they lost so many men in battle... they were "too
dumb" to know their task should be to communicate, move and shoot, not the other way around. According to Major Green the Colonel
promptly hung up on him.

Since that time the phrase has intrigued me, and it was in researching the evolution of the concept of shoot, move and
communicate that it first came to light for this author that the Signal Corps went through both a practical and philosophical migration
during the Korean War... going into it with one view of how it should go about meeting its goals, and coming out with another. For
the Signal Corps, the Korean War proved to be the crucible that brought the Signal Corps into the modern world, forcing it to
integrate more and newer forms of technology and thinking into its strategic and tactical mission plans. Research on how this
happened led to these three articles. Our thanks to Major Green for spurring the research. To return to your place in the text, click
here:

References:
Sources used in the writing of this article include:
Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Telecommunications in North Korea: Has Orascom Made the Connection?, a
research paper.
Anne E. Sartori, Faculty, Northwestern University, The Might Of The Pen: The Reputational Theory Of Communication In International
Disputes, "http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~aes797/MightofthePen.pdf.
Hall, M.P.M., Barclay, L.W. and Hewitt, M.T. (Eds.), Propagation of Radiowaves (Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, 1996).
CCIR Report 1145, "Propagation over irregular terrain with and without vegetation" (International Telecommunication Union, Geneva, 1990).
Info on Richmond Relay Site courtesy: http://www.paulnoll.com/Korea/8th-Sig/Noll-Richmond-1969-05.html
Blumtritt, Oskar, Petzold, Hartmut, and Aspray, William. Tracking the History of Radar, Piscataway. New Jersey, IEEE-Rutgers Center for the
History of Electrical Engineering, 1994.
Info on the history of the Taejon Signal Site courtesy: http://www.kmike.com/Support/Support1_4.htm
Info on dating Korean War era equipment from: Machines of War - Communications, Korean War Educator, http://www.koreanwar-
educator.org/topics/machines/p_machines_comm.htm

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