P O L I T ICA L STU D IES: 2003 VO L 51, 740758

Habermas: Discourse and

Cultural Diversity
Andrea T. Baumeister
University of Stirling

Habermass vision of discourse ethics can be reconciled with many of the concerns of proponents
of diversity whose demands for recognition are rooted in liberal values. However, his account
underestimates the challenge that diversity poses to collective identity and the fundamental nature
of value conflict. If discursive approaches to justice are to accommodate such claims, they must
abandon the Habermasian search for consensus in favour of a vision of liberalism which acknowl-
edges the plurality and incommensurability of fundamental values and which consequently accepts
the pervasiveness of value conflict. Whereas Habermas fears that such a perspective will reduce
political disputes to purely strategic struggles for power, such worries can be addressed through
innovative forms of joint governance.

Jrgen Habermass long-standing concern with questions of social cohesion and

legitimacy has led him recently to address the challenge posed to traditional liberal
conceptions of citizenship by demands for the recognition of particular cultures and
identities. In his response, he aims to show that his vision of discourse ethics can
be reconciled with the struggle for recognition on the part of many groups histori-
cally marginalised in liberal democracies and that, properly understood, a liberal
theory of rights is not blind to cultural difference. Indeed, his sophisticated account
of the distinction between the public and the private and the relationship between
the right and the good ensures that his approach is sensitive to many of the con-
cerns expressed by those proponents of diversity whose demands for recognition
are rooted in liberal values and a desire to enable citizens to participate in the public
realm on equal terms. Thus, not only does he appreciate the importance of secur-
ing greater political representation for traditionally marginalised or socially disad-
vantaged groups, he also openly acknowledges that this may imply the recognition
of special cultural and social rights.
Yet despite these strengths, he ultimately underestimates the depth of diversity and
the fundamental nature of value conflict. Although he now acknowledges that the
fact of pluralism makes negotiation, compromise and majority rule necessary in
order to conclude real deliberations and to reach a decision, he retains in his recent
democratic theory the emphasis on rational consensus as a regulative ideal which
guides deliberation and legitimates the outcome of democratic procedures. This
continued preoccupation with consensus has troubled many commentators sym-
pathetic to his position (for example, Bernstein, 1996; Bohman, 1995, 1996; Cham-
bers, 1995, 1996; Dryzek, 2000; Fraser, 1992; McCarthy, 1996; Rehg and Bohman,
1996). In this paper, I will argue that such worries are well founded, once Haber-
mass account is viewed in the light of the demands for recognition that confront
many contemporary liberal democratic regimes. Not only does his model underes-

Political Studies Association, 2003.

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HABERMAS: DISCOURSE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 741

timate the challenge cultural diversity poses to the idea of a shared collective iden-
tity and political consensus, it also denies equal recognition to members of society
whose conception of the good does not coincide with a liberal commitment to
autonomy. If discursive approaches to justice are to recognise the depth and com-
plexity of diversity, they must abandon the Habermasian search for consensus in
favour of a vision of liberalism that acknowledges the plurality and incommensu-
rability of fundamental values and which consequently accepts the pervasiveness
of value conflict. Contrary to Habermass quest for substantive rational acceptabil-
ity, a liberalism informed by such a principled commitment to value pluralism
favours a formal procedural account of democratic legitimacy and seeks to manage
value conflict via negotiation and compromise. Whereas Habermas fears that such
a perspective will reduce political disputes to purely strategic struggles for power,
such worries can be addressed via imaginative institutional mechanisms such as
transformative accommodation (Shachar, 2001), which combines the recognition
of deep cultural diversity with a regard for typically liberal concerns for individual
well-being, freedom and equality.

Multicultural Debates
Campaigns for the recognition of particular identities undoubtedly constitute one
of the most distinctive features of recent political discourse in contemporary liberal
democracies. These have included demands by feminists for greater representation
for women, calls for cultural recognition by ethnic and religious minorities, and
appeals by national minorities for greater regional autonomy. What unites these
rather disparate groups is the belief that the existing laws and institutions of con-
temporary liberal democracies fail to give sufficient recognition to diversity and
hence are unjust. Advocates of diversity have been particularly critical of the
emphasis that traditional liberal conceptions of citizenship have placed upon formal
equality, impartiality and a sharp public/private distinction. These criticisms have
in turn led to calls for a multicultural politics. Yet while the idea of a multicultural
politics is common in political and academic discourses, definitions of multicultur-
alism vary greatly, in line with the divergent array of demands associated with the
politics of recognition. Thus, the term has been variously used to assert the rights
of immigrants to express their own culture without fear of prejudice and discrim-
ination (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 198), to describe processes which allow for power-
sharing between different national communities and as a label for policies which
aim to promote the position of traditionally marginalised groups. Given this wide
variety of policies and ideas, it may be helpful, for the purposes of this paper, to
distinguish between thin and thick versions of multicultural politics and first-
and second-level diversity.1
Thin multiculturalism refers to instances of diversity where the various protago-
nists continue to subscribe to a shared set of liberal values. While the advocates of
thin multiculturalism stress the political significance of group membership and thus
reject the notion that difference and particularity should be relegated to the private
sphere, they nevertheless endorse the liberal vision of individual rights and free-
doms, including such core liberal values as individual autonomy and equality of
moral worth. Advocates of thin multiculturalism tend to see group membership as
742 ANDREA T. BAUMEISTER

a key aspect of individual identity and consequently regard the recognition of cul-
tural and social differences as vital if all individuals are to be guaranteed a secure
environment in which to flourish. Thus, the debate between French- and English-
speaking Canadians and the demands of feminists for the recognition of womens
distinctive experiences and perspective are best seen as instances of thin multicul-
turalism. Regardless of their differences, both English-speaking Canada and Quebec
are committed to liberal democratic values. Similarly, the feminist rejection of the
abstract, unitary conception of the self, central to traditional liberal conceptions of
citizenship, is typically informed by the desire to secure individual freedom and
substantive equality for women.
These debates need to be carefully distinguished from the demands of minorities
whose values and aspirations are in conflict with the wider liberal framework. For
instance, attempts by some religious minorities to ensure that their children are
not exposed in their schooling to views and values that challenge their religious
commitments run counter to the goals of a liberal education that seeks to en-
courage critical rationality and autonomy (Macedo, 1995; Halstead, 1995). Similar
difficulties surround campaigns for recognition by some aboriginal peoples who
perceive the liberal language of individual rights and freedoms as alien. Thus, for
example, in Canada some aboriginal groups have argued that, because of their
distinct values and traditions, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
introduced in 1982, should not apply to them (Carens, 2000). Debates that are
characterised by such a fundamental conflict of values, which challenges the basic
framework of moral assumptions and political procedures, are best described as
thick multiculturalism.
Both thin and thick multiculturalism can entail demands for either personal or
corporate cultural rights. While personal cultural rights are exercised by group
members individually, corporate cultural rights are exercised by the group collec-
tively. For example, the campaign by Muslim girls in France for the right to wear
headscarfs in the classroom constitutes a demand for personal cultural rights. In
contrast, claims by indigenous people for special hunting, fishing and land rights
are calls for corporate cultural rights. Corporate cultural rights can take a variety
of forms, including legal exemptions exercised by the group collectively, such as
exemptions to allow for ritual slaughter; recognition or enforcement rights, which
uphold traditional community law as legally binding; internal rules associated with
non-coercive sanctions such as ostracism; and self-government rights (Levy, 2000).
This distinction between personal and corporate cultural rights relates closely to
what Taylor (1993) and Carens (2000) refer to as first- and second-level diversity.
First-level diversity acknowledges that there are differences in culture, outlook and
background, but insists that all citizens stand in an identical relationship to the
state. Such first-level diversity is typified by approaches such as the Canadian
mosaic model of pluralism, which, rather than seek to assimilate different ethnic
groups, allows for a degree of diversity in terms of language and culture. In con-
trast, deep or second-level diversity permits members of different cultural and
national groups to belong to the state in different ways to be incorporated into
the state consociationally. Such deep diversity is associated with demands for dis-
tinct institutional and legal frameworks and typically entails claims for corporate
cultural rights.
HABERMAS: DISCOURSE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 743

Discourse Ethics and Cultural Diversity

Habermass discourse ethics offers one of the most influential and potentially
promising liberal responses to demands for a multicultural politics. In his recent
work, he claims that his version of discourse ethics can be reconciled with the
struggle for recognition on the part of many groups traditionally marginalised in
liberal democracies and that, properly understood, a liberal theory of rights is not
blind to cultural difference. This claim ultimately rests upon the distinction he
draws in Between Facts and Norms between moral and ethicalpolitical discourses
(Habermas, 1996a). Whereas moral discourse aims at a universal and impartial
point of view and thus requires a perspective freed from all egocentrism and
ethnocentrism, ethicalpolitical discourse seeks to express the authentic self-
understanding of a particular community. Thus, while moral discourse encom-
passes all of humanity and is used to justify regulations that lie in the equal
interest of all (Habermas, 1996a, p. 108), ethicalpolitical discourse takes place
among the members of a specific political community. In line with this distinction,
in his recent work he differentiates between the discourse principle and the prin-
ciple of morality. Whereas the discourse principle demands that only those action
norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants
in rational discourse (Habermas, 1996a, p. 107), it only takes the form of a uni-
versalisation principle in relation to moral norms. As the expression of a particu-
lar form of life, the formation of political will, on the other hand, is shaped by
ethical and pragmatic as well as moral reasons and consequently is always tied to
specific and contingent contexts. Hence, although in principle the decisive reasons
must be acceptable to all members, ethicalpolitical discourse may require a ratio-
nal balancing of competing value orientations and interest positions (Habermas,
1996a, p. 107). This differentiation between moral and ethicalpolitical discourse
provides the basis for three distinctive features of his approach to cultural diver-
sity: (i) the equiprimordiality of private and civic autonomy; (ii) the distinction
between the formulation and the application of norms; and (iii) the ethical pat-
terning of the constitutional state. Whereas the latter two features clarify the rela-
tionship between moral and ethicalpolitical discourses, his discussion of private
and civic autonomy addresses the question of political participation.

In Habermass account, the equiprimordiality of private and civic autonomy refers to the
complex interrelationship between the private and the public sphere. While private
autonomy safeguards a space for citizens to pursue private ends, civic autonomy
is embodied in rights to political participation and self-government. Given that
persons are individuated through the processes of socialisation, personal autonomy
can only be effectively safeguarded if the life context within which an individuals
identity is formulated is also protected. This can only be achieved if all citizens
participate in the formulation and interpretation of the rights and norms that safe-
guard individual autonomy. At the same time, citizens can make an appropriate
use of their public autonomy ... only if they are sufficiently independent in virtue
of an equally protected private autonomy (Habermas, 2001, p. 767). Conse-
quently, individual rights and democracy are interdependent. Thus, whereas clas-
sical liberals view individual rights as prepolitical endowments, Habermas insists
that human rights should not be regarded as prior to popular sovereignty. On the
744 ANDREA T. BAUMEISTER

contrary, the private autonomy of citizens must neither be set above, nor made
subordinate to their political autonomy (Habermas, 1996a, p. 104). Given the
interdependence of personal and civic autonomy, all citizens must participate in
public debate and express their diverse needs and interests.
This acknowledgment of the political significance of particularity and difference is
further underlined by the distinction Habermas draws between the formulation and
application of norms. While norms are justified impartially by reference to general-
isable interests and are stated in a general, decontextualised form, discourses of
justification cannot take into consideration ex ante all the possible constellations of
future cases (Habermas, 1996a, p. 162). Thus, the impartial application of norms
calls for its own argumentative clarification, based upon an assessment of what, in
the light of all the relevant facts, a specific norm entails. Thus, a norm may need
to be interpreted and applied differently in different situations. The impartial appli-
cation of norms therefore requires attention to the particular needs of actual
persons and socio-cultural groups. Such attention can only be assured if the politi-
cal culture of a democratic regime reflects the different perspectives of all the col-
lective identities that exist within the state (ONeill, 1997, p. 170). This may only
be possible if the members of minority groups are granted group-specific cultural
and social rights (Habermas, 1998a, p. 409):
multicultural societies can be held together by a political culture, ... only
if democratic citizenship pays off not only in terms of liberal individual
rights and rights of political participation but also in the enjoyment of
social and cultural rights.
The legal code that governs a particular state cannot be established in the abstract,
but has to be based upon the specific rights that citizens, who want to regulate
their living together, grant one another. It will therefore vary in accordance with
the constellation of social groups that make up the state and the particular histor-
ical context in which the state operates. The array of human and civil rights laid
down in specific historical constitutions is therefore best understood as a context-
dependent reading of a general, abstract system of rights. Hence, the constitution
of a democratic state is best seen as a tradition-building project. On such a dynamic
understanding of the constitution, ongoing legislation carries on the system of
rights by interpreting and adapting rights for current circumstances (Habermas,
2001, p. 774). Hence, the classical liberal rights to life, liberty, property, freedom
of movement and freedom to choose ones vocation are just interpretations of and
ways of working out a general right to individual liberties (Habermas, 1996a,
pp. 1256).
This recognition of the unique character of particular democratic states is further
underlined by Habermass readiness to accept that all constitutional states are ethically
patterned. While it is the primary aim of the rule of law in a constitutional state to
uphold universally valid norms, such as basic human rights, every legal system is
also the expression of a particular lifeform and not merely a reflection of the uni-
versal features of basic rights (Habermas, 1993, p. 138). Law is therefore also con-
cerned with the cooperative pursuit of collective goals and the safeguarding
of collective goods as well as the rational choice of the best means of achieving
these goals and goods. Hence, deliberations over policies and laws will address
HABERMAS: DISCOURSE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 745

ethicalpolitical and pragmatic questions2 as well as moral ones. Consequently,

every state is ethically patterned and will interpret constitutional principles in the
light of its particular historical experiences.
However, in Habermass account, the distinctive political identity of a particular
state is only legitimate if it does not violate the demands of moral discourse. Thus,
for instance, every constitutional state must ensure that human rights are effec-
tively guaranteed for all citizens. Furthermore, although states are shaped by the
experiences that make up their national histories, this does not imply that the con-
stitutional state should not aim to be neutral between the various conceptions of
the good and the different socio-cultural subgroups within the state. Here, Haber-
mas distinguishes between the civic sense of a nation based upon the common civic
identity of a group of citizens and the particular ethical discourses of specific sub-
cultures. While the ethical discourses of specific subcultures provide the basis for
and feed into the collective identity of a particular nation, he stresses the im-
portance of decoupling the majority culture from the wider political culture
(Habermas, 1995). The political culture must therefore reflect the ethical commit-
ments of all citizens and must not favour or discriminate against any specific sub-
culture. Hence, while For historic reasons, in many countries the majority culture
is fused with the general culture that claims to be recognised by all citizens ...,
This fusion must be dissolved if it is to be possible for different cultural, ethnic and
religious forms of life to coexist and interact on equal terms within the same polit-
ical community (Habermas, 1998a, p. 408). According to Habermas, battles for
recognition arise whenever a state fails in this task.
To facilitate mutual recognition and to build an all-encompassing political culture,
Habermas encourages citizens to engage in discourses that push beyond contested
interests and values and seek to establish deeper consonances [bereinstim-
mungen] in a common form of life (Habermas, 1996a, p. 165). However, while
citizens should strive towards an overarching ethical discourse which reflects the
ethical commitments of all citizens, he recognises that in complex and culturally
diverse modern societies it may not be possible to identify a generalisable interest
or to obtain agreement on the priority of a particular value. In these cases, he
appeals to two means of normatively neutralising differences: (i) the guarantee of
an equal right to coexistence and (ii) legitimation through procedures (Habermas,
1996c). For him, ethically controversial issues can be resolved at a more abstract
level by an appeal to an equal right to coexistence. This requires a shift in per-
spective on the part of participants in discourse away from the ethical question of
what is good for us to the moral point of view of what is equally good for all.
However, although an appeal to an equal right to coexistence holds out the possi-
bility of rational agreement, he is keenly aware that in practice, even at such an
abstract level, consensus is rarely reached. Consequently, he invokes a second
avenue for the resolution of differences: legitimation through procedures. Here,
the parties must engage in a process of bargaining that seeks to establish a nego-
tiated agreement (Vereinbarung) based upon a compromise that balances conflict-
ing interests. While a rationally motivated consensus [Einverstndniss] rests on
reasons that convince all the parties in the same way (Habermas, 1996a, p. 166), in
a bargaining process each party may accept a negotiated agreement (Vereinbargung)
for its own reasons. Nevertheless, he stresses that the discourse principle remains
746 ANDREA T. BAUMEISTER

relevant, although it can only be brought to bear indirectly in terms of the proce-
dures that govern the bargaining process. Thus, he closes the gap between formal,
procedural legitimacy and substantive, rational acceptability by insisting that legiti-
mate procedures themselves depend on rational discourse and reasoned agreement
(McCarthy, 1996, p. 1086). For a compromise to be fair, all relevant interests must
be given equal consideration and all parties must have an equal chance to influ-
ence the outcome.
Given that, for practical reasons, decisions must be made despite ongoing dissensus,
Habermas recognises that one of the most important decision procedures is major-
ity rule. However, for him, even majority rule retains an internal relation to the
search for truth (cited in McCarthy, 1996, p. 1103). Since the procedures that
guide deliberation themselves are shaped by rational discourse and reasoned agree-
ment, majority decisions are merely interim results in a process of discursive
opinion formation (Habermas, 1996c).3 If the outvoted minority is to accept major-
ity decisions as legitimate, it must recognise them as the product of a process
albeit a fallibalistic one which aims to arrive at the one correct solution to con-
troversial legal and political problems.4 The participants in these negotiations must
continue to assume that consensus is possible in principle, since in the absence of
such an assumption political disputes would forfeit their deliberative character and
degenerate into purely strategic struggles for power (Habermas, 1996c, p. 1493).5
Thus, despite his recognition of the facts of pluralism, he retains an emphasis on
rational consensus as a regulative ideal which guides deliberation and legitimates
the outcome of democratic procedures.

Discourse Ethics and Cultural Rights

Habermass accounts of the equiprimordiality of personal and civic autonomy, the
formulation/application distinction and the ethical patterning of the state together
provide a complex and sophisticated conception of the public/private distinction
and the relationship between the right and the good. This ensures that his per-
spective is indeed sensitive to those concerns expressed by advocates of thin mul-
ticulturalism that relate to first-level diversity and thus seek to guarantee that all
citizens can participate in the public realm on equal terms. The attractions of his
approach are quite apparent if discourse ethics is viewed in the light of two of the
pivotal concerns of thin multiculturalism: (i) the protection of minority cultures
from external pressures; and (ii) effective political participation.
According to Habermas, the state must in the application of legal norms take into
account the special needs and circumstances of citizens who belong to linguistic
and cultural minorities (Habermas, 1993, p. 141):
the integrity of the individual legal person cannot ... be guaranteed
without at the same time protecting those intersubjective shared com-
plexes of experiences and contexts of life in which he or she was
socialised and in which they formed their identity.
A persons native language and the culture associated with this language clearly
constitute a vital part of a persons identity and, as such, deserve protection. Con-
sequently, in applying legal norms, the state must be sensitive to the needs of
HABERMAS: DISCOURSE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 747

members of linguistic and cultural minorities and should ensure that the members
of minority cultures have meaningful cultural choices and can participate in their
cultural practices without discrimination. Such a difference-sensitive conception of
citizenship can be realised through a variety of measures such as the federalist del-
egation of powers, a functionally specified transfer or decentralisation of powers,
... guarantees of cultural autonomy, group-specific rights, [and] compensatory poli-
cies (Habermas, 1998b, p. 145).6 However, while both national and ethnic minori-
ties, such as immigrant groups, can lay claim to rights to cultural recognition, these
rights should not be bought at the cost of fragmenting society as a whole. Thus,
although the majority culture must detach itself from the wider political culture,
the common culture must remain strong enough to prevent the nation of citizens
from falling apart (Habermas, 1998b, p. 145).
Habermass context-responsive conception of impartiality is also sensitive to the
demands for greater political representation on the part of traditionally margin-
alised or socially disadvantaged groups. Since personal autonomy can only be effec-
tively safeguarded if the life context in which an individuals identity is formulated
is also protected, it is important that the specific needs and aspirations associated
with a particular lifestyle or social position are clearly perceived and understood.
Given that the needs of socially disadvantaged groups are liable to differ notably
from those of the majority, and taking account of the fact that even the most bene-
volent majority is liable to misunderstand the needs of minority groups, it is vital
that members of minority groups participate in public debate so as to ensure that
their needs and interests are clearly articulated. Thus, aboriginal groups and
national and cultural minorities, as well as traditionally marginalised groups such
as women,7 must be assured a greater say in the formulation of public policies
which affect their lives.

Habermas and the Limits of Diversity

Yet despite these apparent strengths of Habermass approach, the response by pro-
ponents of difference to discourse ethics has at best been ambivalent.8 In part, this
ambivalence reflects serious reservations regarding the manner in which he seeks
to limit the claims of difference and diversity. Here, his continued emphasis on
autonomy gives cause for particular concern. While he recognises that human
development takes place along two dimensions autonomy as self-determination
and self-realisation discourse ethics gives priority to autonomy, since in the
Habermasian account it is through the exercise of autonomy that the individual
develops her own unique sense of identity. This emphasis on autonomy is reflected
in two distinctive features of his approach to questions of cultural diversity: (i) his
rejection of corporate rights that seek to guarantee the survival of a collectivity;
and (ii) the manner in which he equates autonomy and reasonableness.
While Habermas supports rights to cultural membership, he stresses that this does
not imply that we should seek to preserve cultures in the same manner in which
we may attempt to preserve endangered species. Cultural rights are legitimate only
when exercised as individual liberties. While the constitutional state should ensure
that the reproduction of particular lifeworlds remains possible, it is up to the
members of a particular society or cultural group to decide whether they want to
748 ANDREA T. BAUMEISTER

preserve their cultural heritage. For Habermas, cultures and traditions only deserve
protection in as far as they promote the well-being and freedom of individuals.
Thus, the equal right to coexistence of diverse cultures not only implies that citi-
zens must be able to practice their own culture, but also entails that individual
members of a cultural group must be free to question existing cultural practices,
traditions and identities and to break free from them should they choose to do so.
Thus, individual autonomy provides the rationale for, and sets the limits to, rights
to cultural recognition. In such an account, group-differentiated rights are a
difference-sensitive application of the basic system of individual rights. Cultural
rights are valuable because they ensure that citizens are able to experience the
fair value of their rights and are not discriminated against in their capacity for
meaningful cultural choices.
Yet this idea of cultural rights as individual liberties fails to account for important
aspects of demands for greater self-government. For instance, many indigenous
peoples have campaigned for measures such as land rights, which would give them
greater control over policies that affect their lives. Similarly, religious minorities
like the Amish, Mennonites or Hasidic Jews have sought special rights and pro-
tections to maintain their distinctive way of life. The same is true of many national
minorities. Such demands are typically driven by a desire to preserve and per-
petuate a particular cultural community and frequently imply corporate cultural
rights rights that are exercised not by individual members of the community, but
by the collective as a whole. Yet such claims are not compatible with Habermass
conception of group-specific rights as individual liberties. As he observes, policies
such as laws in Quebec, which seek to systematically socialise future citizens into
the language, values and norms definitive of a particular culture, extend well
beyond what could be justified as just providing ... a facility to already existing
people (Habermas, 1993, p. 131). Corporate group rights like the Quebec language
laws not only potentially place restrictions upon the autonomy of individual group
members,9 they also constitute a significant obstacle to Habermass goal of build-
ing an all-encompassing political culture. Insofar as Habermas thematisies collec-
tive identities, it is typically in the singular (McCarthy, 1996). Plurality only enters
the discussion at the level of the individual. Corporate cultural rights, however,
challenge the claim that the state should constitute the only significant locus of
political belonging and are thus concerned with diversity at the level of the col-
lective. Such claims are closely associated with demands for deep or second-level
cultural diversity, which allows minorities to develop their own distinct legal and
institutional frameworks and enables citizens to be incorporated into the state
consociationally as members of their cultural group. In such a model, members
of different minority cultural and national groups belong to the state in different
ways. Ultimately, Habermass goal of building a common form of life and his sub-
sequent conception of group-specific rights as individual liberties underestimates
the challenge cultural diversity poses to the idea of a shared collective identity and
political consensus.
In addition to these worries regarding deep or second-level diversity, members of
non-liberal minorities are liable to object to the way in which Habermas equates
autonomy and reasonableness. All world views which lack an awareness of the
fallibility of their validity claim and do not respect what Rawls refers to as the
HABERMAS: DISCOURSE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 749

burdens of reason, are incompatible with practical discourse in a constitutional

state (Habermas, 1993, p. 143). Such world views remove themselves from a
modern attitude become reflexive (McCarthy, 1996, p. 1115), since they leave
no space for reflection on their relationship to ... other worldviews with which
they share the same universe of discourse and against whose competing validity
claims they can assert themselves only with reasons (Habermas, 1993, pp.
1434).10 However, this emphasis on fallibility and critical rationality is potentially
problematic for a wide range of conceptions of the good, including, among others,
adherents to the three main monotheistic religions, who regard the central tenet
of their religion as revealed truth to be accepted and cherished. The difficulties here
are further underlined by his insistence that ethical questions are open to rational
debate only within a particular concrete way of life or conception of the good.
Thus, values and ideals of the good associated with religious and metaphysical
worldviews cannot claim ... universal validity (Corin and DeGrieff, 1998, p. 20).
However, it is a fiction ... to suggest that ethical discourse is limited to discourse
about particular historical groups (Bernstein, 1996, p. 1143). While individuals
committed to the ideal of autonomy may well recognise that their ethical validity
claims are only shared by those who have also chosen to follow their specific way
of life, many ethical discourses, including those which centre around religious
beliefs, do not regard their validity claims as only applicable to those who share
their conception of the good. From the perspective of at least some conceptions of
the good, if a claim is ethically valid, it is valid for everyone and not just those who
share this conception of the good.11

Yet if rational consensus is to remain possible in the face of ethical disagreement,

participants in discourse must be able to distance themselves from their ethical
commitments and be able to appeal to a shared moral discourse distinct from their
different ethical commitments. Since groups that do not share the liberal commit-
ment to autonomy do not hold their ethical commitments in a suitably critical
reflexive manner and do not endorse Habermass sharp distinction between ethical
and moral discourse, he cannot grant equal political recognition to such groups.
While members of such groups are entitled to the same basic rights, including the
right to free speech, the demands associated with their specific ethical commit-
ments cannot be engaged with through public discourse. That is to say that such
groups are tolerated (Cohen and Arato, 1992), but their demands cannot form part
of a reciprocal discourse that pushes beyond contested interests and values in
search of a common form of life. However, such a denial of equal political recog-
nition to some persons on the basis of the content of their substantive ethical com-
mitments and convictions borders on contempt and does not sit well with
Habermass own commitment to respect each persons capacity to form her own
conception of the good life (Cooke, 1997, p. 281). Nor is it compatible with his
claim that discourse theory does not draw its legitimating force from the prior con-
vergence of settled ethical convictions (cited in Bernstein, 1996, p. 1137).

The difficulties that surround Habermass response to demands associated with

deep cultural diversity and thick multiculturalism reflect wider worries regarding
his continued commitment to the search for consensus expressed by many broadly
sympathetic commentators (for example, Bernstein, 1996; Bohman, 1995, 1996;
750 ANDREA T. BAUMEISTER

Chambers, 1995, 1996; Dryzek, 2000; Fraser, 1992; McCarthy, 1996; Rehg and
Bohman, 1996). While his conception can accommodate claims associated with
thin multiculturalism that relate to first-level diversity, it fails to take radical dif-
ference seriously. Given his long-standing concern with social cohesion and legiti-
macy, this failure is troubling. After all, it is difficult to see how a liberal state could
win the loyalty and support of all citizens if the challenges that cultural diversity
poses to collective identity are not fully addressed and those members of society
whose conception of the good does not coincide with the liberal commitment to
autonomy are denied equal recognition.

Value Pluralism and Discourse

Given the difficulties that surround Habermass continued emphasis on rational
consensus, it is worthwhile to contrast his approach with responses to cultural
diversity which explicitly reject these assumptions. Probably the most radical chal-
lenge to his picture of the limits of cultural diversity comes from liberal value
pluralists, such as Stuart Hampshire (1999), Richard Bellamy (1999), John Gray
(2000) and Bhikhu Parekh (2000). For these writers, moral life is characterised by
a plurality of values that cannot be harmoniously combined in a single life or a
single society. Not only are ultimate values frequently incompatible, they are often
incommensurable they cannot be compared with one another in ultimate value
(Gray, 2000, p. 63). This is not to suggest that value pluralists are relativists. On
the contrary, for these writers, ultimate values and goods have objective worth.
However, while there are a limited number of human goods and evils, these
underdetermine the possible forms of human flourishing (Bellamy, 1999, pp. 34).
Here, Hampshire invites us to distinguish between our common human potential-
ity and the equally human drive for diversity, which leads to these common needs
being realised and satisfied in many different ways. Although we are capable of
recognising what is of value in other lifestyles and cultures, these are inherently
diverse each expressing a distinct set of values and virtues. Thus, in contrast to
Habermas, value pluralists reject the idea that rational agreement must, in princi-
ple, be possible. Given a particular set of circumstances, values and commitments,
it may well be rational to pursue one option rather than another. However, value
conflicts cannot be settled by an appeal to the kind of abstract principles of ratio-
nality favoured by Habermas. While an action may well be rational insofar as it is
based upon what a particular individual or group takes to be an undefeated reason,
for value pluralists this does not imply that it is action for a reason which defeats
all others (Raz, 1986, p. 339).12 Choices among incommensurables are therefore
underdetermined by reason.
Since, for value pluralists, our common humanity does not determine our nature,
the values we pursue will in part be a reflection of our particular historical, politi-
cal and cultural heritage. Therefore, just as clashes between ultimate values are
likely to persist, so conflicts between distinct and incommensurable cultures and
identities constitute a pervasive feature of human existence. Hence, for value plu-
ralists, political life is characterised not by a Habermasian search for a common
standard, but by persistent conflict among incommensurable cultures and values.
The management and peaceful resolution of such conflict requires institutions
and procedures that facilitate negotiation and aid the search for compromise.
HABERMAS: DISCOURSE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 751

Therefore, in contrast to Habermass assertion that there is but one public reason
(Bohman, 1995, p. 262), value pluralism entails a commitment to hear the other
side and implies that we respect that people can be reasonably led to incom-
mensurable and incompatible values and interests and seeing the need to engage
with them in terms that they can accept (Bellamy, 1999, p. 121).

Cultural Diversity, Negotiation and Compromise

This recognition of a lack of rational agreement and the subsequent emphasis on
negotiation and compromise leads value pluralists to develop a picture of democ-
ratic legitimation and majority rule which differs significantly from that advocated
by Habermas. As noted earlier, although Habermas now acknowledges that the
facts of pluralism make negotiation, compromise and majority rule necessary in
order to conclude real deliberations and to reach a decision, he remains preoccu-
pied with substantive rational acceptability and the search for consensus. Thus, in
his account, democratic legitimacy ultimately rests upon a commitment to the pos-
sibility of substantive rational agreement. In contrast, value pluralists will favour
a formal procedural account of democratic legitimacy. Almost all societies have
found it necessary to set up institutions and regular procedures for adjudicating
between conflicting moral claims advanced by individuals or groups within a
society, cabinets or councils to discuss various policy options and diplomatic chan-
nels to negotiate conflicts of interests with neighbouring societies (Hampshire,
1991, p. 20). All these institutions and procedures involve the fair weighing and
balancing of contrary arguments bearing on an unavoidable and disputable issue
(p. 21). All are therefore subject to the single prescription audi alteram partem
(Hear the other side) (p. 20). According to Hampshire, it is this general experi-
ence of having to weigh pros and cons which provides the basis for a shared
minimal conception of justice. To enable participants in deliberation to hear the
other side, the institutional mechanisms and procedures that govern adversarial
argument ought not to grossly favour one side. They should enable members of all
value and belief groups to participate in the deliberation of public issues and the
formulation of public policy. Finally, they should encourage political actors to
search for common ground by looking for arguments and considerations that others
can find compelling.
However, given the pervasiveness of value conflict, any agreement reached
through such procedures will not signify a step towards rational consensus. Bearing
in mind their different values and perspectives, the various parties to a dispute may
well agree to a particular outcome for their own distinct reasons. From this per-
spective, majority rule is the outcome of procedures designed to bring about
legitimate democratic decisions in the absence of an agreement on rational accept-
ability. Hence, whereas, for Habermas, democratic legitimacy rests on the pre-
sumption that majority decisions are steps on the road towards substantive rational
agreement, value pluralists ground democratic legitimacy purely on the procedural
fairness of the processes whereby decisions are reached. Authoritative choice can
be accepted as right choice even when one believes it to be incorrect (Bellamy,
1996, p. 93).
Since value conflicts have no uniquely rational solution, shared institutional mech-
anisms and procedural rules cannot generate substantive conclusions. Therefore,
752 ANDREA T. BAUMEISTER

value conflicts can only be resolved provisionally within the context of specific his-
torical settlements. Consequently, while there is widespread agreement that justice
requires that all sides be given a fair hearing, the requirements of justice vary
immensely in different places and at different times in virtue of local customs and
rules (Hampshire, 1999, p. 58). Therefore, the institutions and values that help to
contain conflict will vary according to the historical circumstances and composi-
tion of a particular political community and thus are best regarded as practical
political agreements. However, given that no society can harmoniously combine
all values, and that values remain open to a variety of interpretations, such
political agreements will always be subject to challenge and revision. Hence, for
value pluralists, justice is strife (Hampshire, 1991, p. 27).

Value Pluralism, Liberalism and Group Rights

This recognition of the pervasiveness of value conflict, and the acknowledgement
that the procedures for negotiating such conflict are inevitably thickly embedded
in a particular culture and history, have far-reaching implications for the manner
in which liberal value pluralists respond to the demands associated with cultural
diversity. While they will welcome Habermass dynamic conception of democratic
constitutions and his subsequent recognition that classical liberal rights can be
interpreted and balanced in a variety of ways, they will be critical of his attempt
to seek a universal justification for the core values and principles that define lib-
eralism. From a value pluralist perspective, liberalism is best seen as one of a range
of worthwhile ways of life, with its own specific ranking of values. While core
liberal ideals such as toleration, autonomy, rights and equality allow for the recog-
nition of a plurality of values, value pluralism does not privilege liberalism. Indeed,
given that not all values can be pluralistically combined and that some become
very pale in too much pluralistic company (Williams, 1978, p. xvii), pluralist liberal
societies, in all their diversity, will only reflect a limited range of possible values.
For value pluralists, non-liberal societies that shelter worthwhile ways of life con-
stitute an expression of the diversity of fundamental values and, as such, are enti-
tled to seek to preserve their way of life.13 Rather than seek a universal justification,
value pluralists base their defence of liberalism upon the social milieu and histor-
ical circumstances that have given rise to liberal societies. From such a perspective,
liberalism is best seen as the product of a particular political settlement, which grad-
ually emerges from the long controversies surrounding religious toleration that
accompanied the Reformation and its aftermath.14 Allegiance to liberalism should
therefore not be conceived as allegiance to a set of abstract, universal principles,
but is best regarded as the expression of a specific shared culture.
Such a historicist defence of liberalism makes value pluralists sensitive to the depth
and complexity of cultural diversity and allows this approach to address some of
the limitations inherent in Habermass response to cultural diversity. As no society
can harmoniously combine all values, liberal value pluralists will be aware of the
challenge that cultural diversity poses to collective identity. Given that the institu-
tions and values of every society are inevitably thickly embedded in a particular
cultural context, they are liable to favour the outlooks and values of the majority.
Consequently, minorities may well seek greater self-government and try to develop
HABERMAS: DISCOURSE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 753

their own distinct institutional framework so as to protect their culture and way
of life. Since, in a value pluralist account, such conflicts between minority and
majority cannot be resolved by a Habermasian appeal to abstract reason and impar-
tial standards, they must be addressed through negotiation and compromise. These
agreements may well entail granting groups corporate cultural rights and allowing
citizens to be incorporated into the state consociationally.
Not only are liberal value pluralists aware of the challenge that cultural diversity
poses to collective identity, the recognition that our common human needs and
values can be realised in a variety of ways makes this version of liberalism also
sensitive to the worries of non-liberal minorities. From a value pluralist perspec-
tive, the tensions associated with thick multiculturalism do not constitute an
extraordinary threat to well-established liberal societies, but are a predictable con-
sequence of the plurality of values. This is not to suggest that liberal value plural-
ists will countenance all claims made by religious, cultural and national minorities.
For value pluralists, not all ways of life are of equal value. After all, some ways of
life do not respect fundamental human needs and interests. For example, accord-
ing to Hampshire, value conflicts should not be resolved by resort to brute force,
domination and tyranny.15 Furthermore, since a commitment to individual well-
being, liberty and equality is definitive of a commitment to liberalism in general,
in a liberal society the decision-making procedures will be shaped by liberal ideals.
Thus, while liberal value pluralists will be sympathetic to demands for group-
specific rights, as liberals they will nonetheless be concerned to uphold the
fundamental liberties of all citizens, including those who belong to non-liberal
minorities. Liberal value pluralists will therefore seek a balance between the
requirements of liberal justice and the demands of cultural diversity. The manner
in which such a balance can be struck will clearly depend upon the particular
circumstances of individual cases. In the following section, I will outline some
institutional mechanisms that can facilitate such processes.

Intercultural Dialogue and

Transformative Accommodation
Although value pluralism can be shown to be sensitive to the plurality of
values associated with deep cultural diversity, critics of liberal value pluralism
frequently express fears about the implications of an emphasis on the perva-
siveness of value conflict and the rejection of abstract rational criteria for conflict
resolution. The worry here is that value pluralism will ultimately give rise to politi-
cal fragmentation by undermining mutual understanding and solidarity, and sub-
sequently may lead to political settlements that simply favour the views of the
majority. Thus, Habermas (1996c), for instance, argues that, in the absence of a
search for rational agreement, political disputes will be reduced to a purely strate-
gic struggle for power. If such fears are to be averted, liberal value pluralists will
have to develop institutional mechanisms that ensure that minorities can partici-
pate in dialogue and political negotiation on equal terms, encourage both the
majority and the minority to reflect upon the nature and importance of existing
cultural practices and promote mutual adaptation and a search for common
ground.16
754 ANDREA T. BAUMEISTER

These aims can be advanced through innovative forms of joined governance, which
divide jurisdiction between several political actors. In the light of the complexity
and depth of cultural diversity, a particularly interesting model is the notion of
transformative accommodation, as developed by Ayelet Shachar. Many contested
social areas, such as, for example, family law or criminal justice, are internally divis-
ible into distinct, yet interdependent sub-matters or functions (Shachar, 2001). In
the model of transformative accommodation, both the minority group and the
state are given authority over part of the sub-matter, but neither is allowed to
control all aspects of the contested social area. For example, in the case of mar-
riage, the minority group may manage the demarcatory function, which controls
changes in marital status and entitlement to community membership, whereas the
state regulates the distributive function, which includes the rights and obligations
of marriage partners and economic and custodial matters. To take account of the
power asymmetry between the state and the group, the presumptions in the nego-
tiations regarding the initial allocation of areas of authority should be in favour of
the group. Thus, the group may, for example, be given the opportunity of setting
the agenda for negotiations or it may be given priority in the allocation of the sub-
matter it regards as the most crucial. Since a legal dispute in a particular social area
can only be fully resolved if these sub-matters are addressed together, neither party
has complete control over its members. This encourages both parties to be respon-
sive to the needs of their members. That aspect is reinforced via the final feature
of transformative accommodation the establishment of clearly delineated choice
options. At predefined reversal points, individuals are to be given the choice
whether to remain within the jurisdictional authority of the original powerholder.
Individuals are justified in opting out if the current powerholder in a particular
sub-matter systematically fails to address their concerns. Such reversal options
allow individuals to bring pressure to bear on the groups that represent them and
thus create a strong incentive for powerholders to address in-group problems.17
Consequently, groups may decide to reinterpret the existing rule to accommodate
the concerns of disaffected members.
The model of joint governance that characterises transformative accommodation
recognises demands by minorities to govern themselves and to develop their own
institutions and is sensitive to the worries of non-liberal minorities. At the same
time, it protects fundamental individual liberties. This model can therefore be
employed to strengthen the bargaining position of minorities, without undermin-
ing the fundamental rights of all citizens. Furthermore, since effective political
decision-making will normally require cooperation, transformative accommoda-
tion promotes dialogue between the various political actors and encourages mutual
adaptation. However, this model will not be suitable in all areas. For example, it is
not well suited to disputes concerning children, since, as minors, children are not
able to exercise the choice option. Nonetheless, the mechanisms employed in this
model suggest interesting ways forward in many potentially problematic areas.

Conclusion
Habermass sophisticated account of the relationship between the public and
the private and the right and the good clearly has much to offer to advocates of
HABERMAS: DISCOURSE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 755

diversity, and his emphasis on the importance of representation and discourse

among real participants is to be welcomed. Yet his continued emphasis on rational
consensus as a regulative ideal implies that his model can neither accommodate
demands associated with second-level diversity nor recognise claims that arise from
thick multiculturalism. However, given the facts of pluralism, it is difficult to see
how a liberal state that does not recognise such demands could gain the loyalty
and support of all its citizens and thus generate political stability. If discursive
approaches to justice are to generate political stability in the face of cultural diver-
sity, they must be based upon a liberalism that acknowledges the plurality and
imcommensurability of values and that consequently accepts the pervasiveness
of value conflict. Whereas Habermas fears that such a perspective is liable to
reduce political disputes to purely strategic struggles for power, such worries can
be addressed via imaginative institutional mechanisms such as transformative
accommodation.
(Accepted: 7 April 2003)

About the Author

Andrea Baumeister, Department of Politics, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, Scolland;
email: Atb1@stirling.ac.uk

Notes
1 For a discussion of first- and second-level diversity, see Taylor (1993) and Carens (2000), while thick
and thin multiculturalism is discussed by Tamir (1995). The distinction between thick and thin mul-
ticulturalism undoubtedly simplifies what is a complex debate and would be challenged by authors
such Brown (1993) and Connolly (1991). For example, according to Brown, although identity poli-
tics challenges the liberal construction of the undifferentiated we, it nonetheless reiterates the terms
of liberal discourse. However, while Browns analysis of identity politics in terms of the Nietzschean
notion of ressentiment provides an interesting and provocative analysis of the relationship between
liberalism and identity politics, it does not shed light on why liberals sympathetic to a politics of dif-
ference have consistently struggled to accommodate certain types of demands, while readily recog-
nising others.
2 Ethicalpolitical questions address the communitys shared form of life and ideals that members feel
should shape their common life, while pragmatic questions assess the consequences of particular
actions and seek to establish the best strategy for attaining our ends.
3 In terms of moral discourse, majority decisions are interim results in the search for impartial, uni-
versally valid norms, whereas in ethical discourses they constitute steps in the search for an all-
encompassing political culture and a common form of life.
4 Habermas draws attention to the important difference between the form of coercion involved in the
exercise of power within the framework of democratic laws and that which is involved wherever
this framework is not presumed (Cooke, 1999, p. 178). This is not to suggest that Habermas fails to
recognise that democratic decision-making involves coercion. Hence, as Cook notes, the worry,
expressed by Mansbridge (1994) and Cornell (1995), that Habermas denies the moment of coercion
is unfounded.
5 Indeed, if essentially relevant value conflicts and oppositions must penetrate all controversial politi-
cal questions, then in the final analysis we end up with something resembling Carl Schmitts under-
standing of politics (Habermas, 1996c, pp. 14923). Hence, for Habermas, democratic legitimacy is
only possible if we assume that questions of justice can transcend the ethical self-understanding of
competing forms of life.
6 Habermas stresses that rights to cultural recognition, such as the right to funding for cultural activi-
ties, apply not only to members of national minorities, but also extend to ethnic minorities such as
immigrant groups. While immigrants must accept the constitutional principles anchored in the political
culture of a given constitutional state, they should not be expected to take on board the basic ethical
orientations of a particular cultural lifeform prevailing in the country (Habermas, 1993, p. 147). On the
contrary, given that the particular ethical patterning of a given constitutional state should reflect the
756 ANDREA T. BAUMEISTER

concerns of the various social and cultural groups within its boundaries, the arrival of new ethnic
groups should, in the long run, lead to changes in the political identity of a constitutional state.
7 Habermas stresses that genuine equality between men and women cannot be achieved unless women
take part in the formulation of the criteria that determine what is to count as equal treatment. In
the absence of such participation, measures designed to compensate women are liable to stifle rather
than guarantee liberty and amount to little other than paternalism. While he is sensitive to the need
to secure greater political participation of traditionally marginalised groups such as women, feminist
critics nonetheless continue to express reservations regarding aspects of his work. Thus, for example,
Fraser (1985) argues that, while Habermas provides a sophisticated account of the relations between
public and private institutions in classical capitalism, he fails to systematically thematise the gender
subtext, and Young (1995) is critical of the manner in which Habermas privileges critical, rational
argumentation, which favours the speech patterns of socially privileged and powerful groups.
8 See, for example, Benhabib (1995), Fraser (1985), Warnke (1995) and Young (1995).
9 For example, the Quebec language laws restrict the liberty of children of French-speaking parents
and immigrants to learn English rather than French, and the land rights demanded by many in-
digenous peoples place limits upon the ability of group members to freely realise their assets.
10 While the various groups in a multicultural society clearly share the same political realm, Habermas
fails to recognise that, in instances of deep diversity, what is at stake is precisely whether and to what
extent groups do share the same universe of discourse.
11 For example, Catholics who strongly oppose abortion on moral grounds are unlikely to support
legislation which views abortion as a question of individual choice.
12 A helpful discussion of the value pluralist account of the role of reason is offered by Berlin and
Williams (1994).
13 Non-liberal societies need not deny the idea of a plurality of values. Most non-liberal societies are
particularist rather than universalistic in their outlook and consequently justify their way of life not
by an appeal to universal premises, but on the grounds that this is their existing way of life, with
which they identify deeply (Gray, 2000). Furthermore, non-liberal societies need not be hostile to
diversity. For instance, under the Ottoman empire, Muslims, Christians and Jews were all viewed as
self-governing units, thus allowing minority religions to exist alongside the dominant one.
14 In contrast to this contextual argument for liberalism, some value pluralists have tried to argue that
value pluralism implies liberalism, since pluralism gives us a reason to value diversity and that diver-
sity is best accommodated by liberalism (Crowder, 1998, p. 9). However, such an attempt to estab-
lish a strong link between liberalism and pluralism fails to acknowledge the extent to which the
typically liberal commitment to individual liberty and autonomy place limits upon the diversity that
can be accommodated within a liberal society. For a discussion of both the contextual and the uni-
versal argument from pluralism to liberalism, see Crowder (1998).
15 For example, ways of life, such as Nazism, which deliberately aim to eliminate all notions of fair-
ness and justice in favour of physical conflict and violence, are absolutely evil (Hampshire, 1989,
p. 68).
16 These concerns lie at the heart of Parekhs (2000) emphasis on morally serious intercultural dialogue.
17 For instance, women may choose to opt out of the groups jurisdiction if the rules of divorce
systematically discriminate against women by granting husbands the right to unilaterally divorce
their wives, as is the case under the Muslim form of divorce known as the talaq, or by insisting, as
Orthodox Jewish law does, that in order to obtain a divorce a wife must gain the consent of her
husband. Barry (2001) cites both these cases as arguments against granting religious groups greater
control over their members. However, this underestimates the extent to which imaginative institu-
tional mechanisms such as transformative accommodation can provide incentives for internal
reform.

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