1. PRAXEDES ALVAREZ, ET AL.
, predecessors-in-interest have always
plaintiffs-appellants, vs. THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ET AL., defendants-
appellees. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN
PEDRO, LAGUNA, interpleader-
appellant.
FACTS: In the complaint by which the
case was commenced, the plaintiffs
allege:
(A) that they appear and bring the
action for themselves and in the name
of other five thousand persons; that all
of them and their predecessors-in-
interest from time immemorial, are in
possession for may years of many lots,
where they now have their houses, any
many agricultural lands which they
have continously cultivated lots,
improvements and agricultural lands
which are found within the Hacienda de
San Pedro Tunasan, situated in the
municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna; that they do not claim to be the
owners of said lots and agricultural
lands, but only of the improvements on
the former, consisting of houses, that
they are entitled to occupy the lands
and agricultural lands, the first because
they have their houses thereon wherein
they and their predecessors-in-interest
have always lived, and the latter
because they as well as their
(D) And the plaintiffs conclude by asking
cultivated the same; that they recognize
in favor of someone their obligation to
pay reasonable rent or canon for their
occupation of the lots and agricultural
lands, rents and canon which they are
willing to pay to the person or entity
which the court may determine;
(B) that the Commonwealth of the
Philippines is the true owner of the
entire Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan
by the right of escheat; that this title
was acquired by the Commonwealth of
the Philippines because of the death of
Don Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, the
original owner of the hacienda, and his
two minor daughters without leaving
any heirs; that the Provincial
Government of Laguna may have an
interest in the hacienda, for the benefit
of the plaintiffs and the residents of the
municipality of San Pedro;
(C) that this municipality, the plaintiffs
are given to understand, will claim the
ownership of the hacienda also by the
right of escheat; that the Colegio de San
Jose, without any right, also claims to be
the owner of the hacienda; and that
Carlos Young, without any known right,
claims to have an interest in the same
hacienda.
that the court order the defendants or
interpleaders to litigate among
themselves over the ownership or
dominion of the hacienda and thereafter
determine by judgment who is the
rightful owner thereof entitled to collect
the rental from them.
In the complaint are joined as
defendants the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, the Provincial Government
of Laguna, the municipality of San
Pedro, the Colegio de San Jose, and
Carlos Young. The municipality of San
Pedro filed its complaint of interpleader
wherein it is stated: that according to
the history of the Philippines, the
ownership belongs to the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and
the municipality of San Pedro being the
beneficial owners
Carlos Young appeared and interposed a
demurrer to the complaint of the
plaintiffs on the grounds that it does not
state facts constituting a cause of
action and that is allegations are vague,
ambiguous, and unintelligible; and
urged that said complaint be finally
dismissed inasmuch as it is not
susceptible of amendment. Immediately
thereafter, the same Carlos Young filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint of
interpleader of the municipality of San
Pedro, on the ground that the latter
entity has no standing to bring the
action, that the complaint of
interpleader is premature because the
court has not yet ordered the parties
therein to litigate among themselves,
and that the attorney who represents
the said municipality has appeared and
is acting as such in favor of two
different parties with conflicting
interest. The CFI granted Carlos Youngs
demurrer and motion to dismiss. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Carlos Youngs
demurrer and motion to dismiss shall be
sustained.
RULING: YES.
Under the provisions of section 120 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, which
reads:
SEC. 120. Interpleading. Whenever
conflicting claims are or may be made
upon a person for or relation personal
property, or the performance of an
obligation or any portion thereof, so that
he may be made subject to several
actions by different person, unless the
court intervenes, such person may bring
an action against the conflicting
claimants, disclaiming personal interest
in the controversy, to compel them to
interplead and litigate their several
claims among themselves, and the
court may order the conflicting
claimants to interplead with one
another and thereupon proceed to
determine the right of the several
parties to the interpleading to the
personal property or the performance of
the obligation in controversy and shall
determine the right of all in interest.
Pursuant to this section, the remedy
provided for may be availed of by
bringing an "action", for no other
meaning may de deduced from the
phrase "such person may bring an
action against the conflicting claimants"
used to indicate the procedure to be
followed by one would avail himself of
its provisions. The word "action" means
the ordinary action defined in section 1
of the same Code and should be
commenced by complaint which may be
demurrer to as provided in section 91
and upon the grounds therein stated.
The pleading which commences an
ordinary action cannot be correctly
called an application or petition because
these, generally, are the pleadings used
only to commence special proceedings
(Section 1, Part II, Chapter XXV and XLII,
Code of Civil Procedure.)
The action of interpleader, under
section 120, is a remedy whereby a
person who has personal property in his
possession, or an obligation to render
wholly or partially, without claiming any
right in both, comes to court and asks
that the persons who claim the said
personal property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand
compliance with the obligation, be
required to litigate among themselves,
in order to determine finally who is
entitled to one or the other thing. The
remedy is afforded not to protect a
person against a double liability but to
protect him against a double vexation in
respect of one liability. (33 C. J., sec. 21,
p 438; Crawford vs. Fisher, 1 Hare, 436,
441; Johnson vs. Blackmon, 201 Ala.,
537, Pfister vs. Wade, 66 Cal., 43; Rauch
vs. Ft. Dearborn Nat. Bank, 233 Ill., 507;
Gonia vs. O'Brien, 223 Mass., 171;
McCormick vs. Supreme Council C. B. L.,
39 N. Y. S., 1010.) When the court
orders that the claimants litigate among
themselves, there arises in reality a new
action and the former are styled
interpleaders, and in such a case the
pleading which initiates the action is
called a complaint of interpleader and
not a cross-complaint.
In reaching this conclusion we have not
lost sight of the fact that the
municipality of San Pedro has already
filed its complaint of interpleader
wherein it alleges a certain interest in
the hacienda and in its rents; but apart
from the fact that in resolving the
demurrers only the allegation of the
plaintiffs' complaint should be taken
into account (sec. 91, Code of Civil
Procedure), because the former are
directed only against it, it appears from
the allegations said complaint of
interpleader that the municipality of San
Pedro also admits that the
Commonwealth of the Philippine is the
owner of the hacienda by transfer and
right of escheat.
Another question raised by the
appellants has to do with the holding of
the court that the complaint of
interpleader of the municipality of San
Pedro is premature inasmuch as there
has been no order yet that the
defendant litigate among themselves. In
the opinion of the court it is necessary
that there be a declaration to this effect
before the defendant may litigate
among themselves and file a complaint
of interpleader. Section 120 of the Code
of Civil Procedure in truth requires such
and good practice demands that the
defendants be not permitted to file
claims or complaint of interpleader until
after the court has ordered that they
should litigate among themselves. This
procedure will do way with groundless
suits, and will save the parties time,
inconvenience, and unnecessary
expenses.
2. SUBHASH C. PASRICHA and
JOSEPHINE A. PASRICHA,
Petitioners, vs. DON LUIS DISON
REALTY, INC., Respondent.
FACTS: Don Luis and petitioner
Pasrichas entered into a contract of
lease whereby the former, as lessor,
agreed to lease to the latter several
units of the San Luis Building.
Petitioners, in turn, agreed to pay
monthly rentals. While the contracts
were in effect, petitioners dealt with
Francis Pacheco (Pacheco), then General
Manager of private respondent.
Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by
Roswinda Bautista (Ms. Bautista).10
Petitioners religiously paid the monthly
rentals until May 1992.11 After that,
however, despite repeated demands,
petitioners continuously refused to pay
the stipulated rent. Consequently,
respondent was constrained to refer the
matter to its lawyer who, in turn, made
a final demand on petitioners for the
payment of the accrued rentals
amounting to P916,585.58.12 Because
petitioners still refused to comply, a
complaint for ejectment was filed by
private respondent through its
representative, Ms. Bautista, before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila.
Petitioners admitted their failure to pay
the stipulated rent for the leased
premises starting July until November
1992, but claimed that such refusal was
justified because of the internal
squabble in respondent company as to
the person authorized to receive
payment.
On November 24, 1994, the MeTC
rendered a Decision dismissing the
complaint for ejectment.19 It
considered petitioners non-payment of
rentals as unjustified. The court held
that mere willingness to pay the rent did
not amount to payment of the
obligation; petitioners should have
deposited their payment in the name of
respondent company. On the matter of
possession of the subject premises, the
court did not give credence to
petitioners claim that private
respondent failed to turn over
possession of the premises. The court,
however, dismissed the complaint
because of Ms. Bautistas alleged lack of
authority to sue on behalf of the
corporation.
Deciding the case on appeal, the RTC
adopted the MeTCs finding on
petitioners unjustified refusal to pay
the rent, which is a valid ground for
ejectment. It, however, faulted the
MeTC in dismissing the case on the
ground of lack of capacity to sue.
Instead, it upheld Ms. Bautistas
authority to represent respondent
notwithstanding the absence of a board
resolution to that effect, since her
authority was implied from her power as
a general manager/treasurer of the
company.
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals.The CA
denied the motions for lack of merit.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the non-payment of
herein petitioners is justified.
RULING: NO. What was, instead, clearly
established by the evidence was
petitioners non-payment of rentals
because ostensibly they did not know to
whom payment should be made.
However, this did not justify their failure
to pay, because if such were the case,
they were not without any remedy. They
should have availed of the provisions of
the Civil Code of the Philippines on the
consignation of payment and of the
Rules of Court on interpleader.
In the instant case, consignation alone
would have produced the effect of
payment of the rentals. The rationale
for consignation is to avoid the
performance of an obligation becoming
more onerous to the debtor by reason of
causes not imputable to him.58
Petitioners claim that they made a
written tender of payment and actually
prepared vouchers for their monthly
rentals. But that was insufficient to
constitute a valid tender of payment.
Even assuming that it was valid tender,
still, it would not constitute payment for
want of consignation of the amount.
Well-settled is the rule that tender of
payment must be accompanied by
consignation in order that the effects of
payment may be produced.59
(See Section 1, Rule 62 of the
ROC)Otherwise stated, an action for
interpleader is proper when the lessee
does not know to whom payment of
rentals should be made due to
conflicting claims on the property (or on
the right to collect).60 The remedy is
afforded not to protect a person against
double liability but to protect him
against double vexation in respect of
one liability.61
Notably, instead of availing of the above
remedies, petitioners opted to refrain
from making payments.
3. LEONARDO R. OCAMPO,
Petitioners, vs. LEONORA TIRONA,
Respondents.
FACTS: Ocampo bought the subject
land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the
subject lands registered owner Alipio
Breton Cruz. Possession and
administration of the subject land are
claimed to be already in Ocampos
management even though the TCT is
not yet in his name. Tirona, on the other
hand, is a lessee occupying a portion of
the subject land.
Tirona religiously paid her rents to
Ocampo. However, when the subject
premises were declared under area for
priority development, Tirona invoked
her right to first refusal and refused to
pay her rent until the NHA processed
her papers. Ocampo filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer. In her Answer,
Tironas asserted that Dona Yaneza was
the owner of the land and not Ocampo.
She likewise reiterated that she has the
right of first refusal over the land as it
was included in the area of priority
development under PD 1517. The MTC
ruled in favor of Ocampo.
In the RTC, Tirona changed her theory
and disclosed that Alipio Breton is the
registered owner of the subject land.
When Alipio Breton died, his children,
Rosauro Breton and Maria Lourdes
Breton-Mendiola, inherited the subject
land. Tirona claims she has never
stopped paying her rent to Maria
Lourdes. Tirona also stated that Rosauro
could not transfer ownership to the
subject land to Ocampo because
Rosauro executed a deed of conveyance
and waiver in favor of Maria Lourdes.
The RTC affirmed the decision of the
MTC.
The CA considered partition of the
estate of Alipio Breton as a prerequisite
to Ocampos action; hence, it dismissed
the case.
ISSUE: Whether Ocampo has the right
to eject Tirona from subject land.
RULING: YES. The good faith of Tirona
is put in question in her preference for
Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a
stakeholder, Tirona should have used
reasonable diligence in hailing the
contending claimants to court. Tirona
need not have awaited actual institution
of a suit by Ocampo against her before
filing a bill of interpleader.37 An action
for interpleader is proper when the
lessee does not know the person to
whom to pay rentals due to conflicting
claims on the property.38
The action of interpleader is a remedy
whereby a person who has property
whether personal or real, in his
possession, or an obligation to render
wholly or partially, without claiming any
right in both, or claims an interest which
in whole or in part is not disputed by the
conflicting claimants, comes to court
and asks that the persons who claim the
said property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand
compliance with the obligation, be
required to litigate among themselves,
in order to determine finally who is
entitled to one or the other thing. The
remedy is afforded not to protect a
person against a double liability but to
protect him against a double vexation in
respect of one liability. When the court
orders that the claimants litigate among
themselves, there arises in reality a new
action and the former are styled
interpleaders, and in such a case the
pleading which initiates the action is
called a complaint of interpleader and
not a cross-complaint.39
Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona
from the subject land. All the elements
required for an unlawful detainer case
to prosper are present. Ocampo notified
Tirona that he purchased the subject
land from Tironas lessor. Tironas
continued occupation of the subject
land amounted to acquiescence to
Ocampos terms. However, Tirona
eventually refused to pay rent to
Ocampo, thus violating the lease.
Finally, legal interest at the annual rate
of 6% is due on the unpaid monthly
rentals starting from 7 August 1995
when Ocampo made an extrajudicial
demand on Tirona for payment of the
monthly rental.40 On finality of our
decision, annual interest at 12%, in lieu
of 6% annual interest, is due on the
amounts the MTC awarded until full
payment.41
4. AGAPITO MANUEL, petitioner,
vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
RAMON MAKASIAR and SPOUSES
JESUS DE JESUS and CARMEN DE
JESUS, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondents are the
owners of an apartment unit which was
rented by the petitioner on a month to
month basis for a monthly rental of
P466.00 payable in advance; that the
petitioner failed to pay the
corresponding rentals for the month of
May 1987 up to the filing of the
complaint on August 31, 1987; that on
July 9, 1987, private respondents,
through their counsel, sent a demand
letter to the petitioner requiring him to
pay his rentals in arrears and to vacate
the leased premises within five (5) days
from receipt thereof, otherwise private
respondents will be constrained to file
the appropriate legal action against
him; that the demand letter of private
respondents' counsel was received by
the petitioner on July 14, 1987; that in
response thereto, the petitioner
addressed a letter dated July 15, 1987
to private respondent Carmen de Jesus,
furnishing a copy thereof to her counsel,
stating that the amount of rentals,
which the private respondents allegedly
refused to receive, had been deposited
at United Coconut Planters Bank, Taft
Avenue Branch, with Account No. 8893
in the name of the petitioner's son,
Mario Manuel, and could be withdrawn
upon notice of payment; that in order to
collect the said rentals allegedly
deposited with the bank, the private
respondents' counsel sent a letter dated
August 14, 1987 to the petitioner,
requesting the payment of the unpaid
rentals to his (private respondents'
counsel) office; that the said letter was
received by the petitioner on August 18,
1987, and, instead of complying with
private respondents' counsel's request,
the petitioner addressed a letter dated
August 24, 1987 to the private
respondents' counsel requesting that
the rentals in arrears be paid to the
private respondents at petitioner's
house. The private respondents did not
heed the petitioner's request
The RTC affirmed the aforesaid
judgment. On appeal, the petitioner
contends that since the NHA awarded
the lot over which thesubject structure
stands to the petitioner and other
tenants and disqualified the private
respondent. It said ruling or awards, the
private respondent are only given the
option to either sell the structure to the
petitioner and the other awardees or to
dismantle the same. Moreover, under
the circumstances prevailing in this
instant case, the private respondent
were really in mora accipiendi that even
if no deposit or consignation had been
made, said mora cannot be cured.
Petitioner had in fact continuously made
available and deposited his rentals had
been made moot and academic by
virtue of the NHA award in favor of the
petitioner and the governmental
expression of public policy to protect
the actual occupants, specifically the
petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether the contentions of
Alvarez is tenable.
RULING: NO. The award of the lot to
petitioner by NHA does not
automatically vest in him ownership
over the leased structure thereon.
Petitioner cannot invoke the provisions
of the Civil Code on accession there
being an existing lessor and lessee
relation between him and private
respondents. A tenant cannot, in an
action involving the possession of the
leased premises, controvert the title of
his landlord or assert any rights adverse
to that title or set up any inconsistent
right to change the relation existing
between himself and his landlord,
without first delivering up to the
landlord the premises acquired by virtue
of the agreement between themselves.
The rule estopping a tenant while he
retains possession applies whether the
tenant is defendant or plaintiff and
applies even though the landlord had no
title at the time the relationship was
created.
In an appeal from an inferior court in an
ejectment case the issue of ownership
should not be delved into, for an
ejectment action lies even against the
owner of the property. The fact of
possession in itself has a positive value
and is endowed with a distinct standing
of its own in the law of property. True,
by this principle of respect for the
possessory status, a wrongful possessor
may at times be upheld by the courts,
but this is only temporary and for one
sole and special purpose, namely, the
maintenance of public order. The
protection is only temporary because it
is intended that as soon as the lawless
act of dispossession has been
suppressed, the question of ownership
or of possession de jure is to be settled
in the proper court and in a proper
action. The larger and permanent
interests of property require that such
rare and exceptional instance of
preference in the courts of the actual
but wrongful possessor be permitted.
The contention of petitioner that private
respondents are in mora accipiendi
cannot be upheld either. The failure of
the owners to collect or their refusal to
accept the rentals are not valid
defenses. Consignation or an action for
interpleader is proper when lessee does
not know to whom payment of rentals
should be made.
5. ROMEO S. CHUA,
petitioner,vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, DENNIS CANOY AND ALEX
DE LEON, respondents.
FACTS: On April 12, 1986, Judge Lauro
V. Francisco of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City Branch XIII, after
examining 2Lt. Dennis P. Canoy and two
(2) other witnesses, issued a search
warrant directing the immediate search
of the premises of R.R. Construction and
the seizure of an Isuzu dump truck with
plate number GAP-175. At twelve noon
of the same date, respondent Canoy
seized the aforesaid vehicle and took
custody thereof. Two days thereafter, a
civil action for Replevin/Sum of Money
for the recovery of possession of the
same Isuzu dump truck was filed by
petitioner against respondent Canoy in
RTC presided by Judge Caares alleging
among other things, petitioner's lawful
ownership and possession of the subject
vehicle; that he has not sold the subject
vehicle to anyone; that he has not
stolen nor carnapped it, and that he has
never been charged of the crime of
carnapping or any other crime for that
matter. Further, petitioner questioned
the validity of the search warrant and
the subsequent seizure of the subject
vehicle on the strength of the aforesaid
search warrant.
On the same date, RTC directed the
issuance of a Replevin. Canoy filed a
motion for the dismissal and the
quashal of the writ which later on
reached to Certorari.
Meanwhile, a case for Carnapping
docketed against Chua was provisionally
dismissed without prejudice to its
reopening once the issue of ownership
is resolved.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the
replevin and the validity of the search
and seizure of the subject truck, it relied
on the ruling of Pagkaliwanan case
which state:
Once a Court of First Instance has been
informed that a search warrant has
been issued by another court of first
instance, it cannot require a sheriff or
any proper officer of the court to take
the property subject of the replevin
action, if theretofore it came into
custody of another public officer by
virtue of a search warrant. Only the
court of first instance that issued such a
search warrant may order its release.
Hence, this petition by Chua.
ISSUE: Whether the proper remedy by
Chua is Replevin.
RULING: NO.
It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that
replevin will not lie for property in
custodia legis. A thing is in custodia
legis when it is shown that it has been
and is subjected to the official custody
of a judicial executive officer in
pursuance of his execution of a legal
writ (Bagalihog vs. Fernandez, 198 SCRA
614 [1991]). The reason posited for this
principle is that if it was otherwise,
there would be interference with the
possession before the function of the
law had been performed as to the
process under which the property was
taken. Thus, a defendant in an
execution or attachment cannot replevy
goods in the possession of an officer
under a valid process, although after
the levy is discharged, an action to
recover possession will lie (Francisco,
Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines: Provisional Remedies, p.
402 [1985]).
The Court had occasion to rule on this
issue in the case of Vlasons Enterprises
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (155
SCRA 186 [1987]). In the
aforementioned case, two (2) propeller
pieces were seized on the strength of a
search warrant issued by the Court of
First Instance of Manila Branch XVIII.
After the seizure, criminal complaints
were filed against the alleged thieves.
However, the complaints were later on
dismissed. Five (5) months later, a civil
action for the recovery of the
possession of the propellers were filed
in the Court of First Instance of Manila
Branch XXIX. The latter court granted
the motion for repossession of the
propellers. On appeal this Court held:
The proceeding for the seizure of the
property in virtue of a search warrant
does not end with the actual taking of
the property . . . and its delivery . . ., to
the court . . . . It is merely the first step
in the process to determine the
character of the seized property. That
determination is done in the criminal
action involving the crime or crimes in
connection with which the search
warrant was issued. Hence, such a
criminal action should be prosecuted, or
commenced if not yet instituted, and
prosecuted. The outcome of the criminal
action will dictate the disposition of the
seized property. (Vlasons Enterprises
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, supra.)
In the Vlasons case, the Court
differentiated the case brought before it
therein, from the Pagkalinawan case. It
stated that in the Pagkalinawan case,
there was a conflict in jurisdiction. On
the other hand, in the Vlasons case, it
was certain that no criminal case would
ensue subsequent to or in connection
with the search warrant, hence no
conflict in jurisdiction or in the ultimate
disposition of the property could arise.
Thus, where personal property is seized
under a search warrant and it appears
that the seizure will not be followed by
the filing of any criminal action, but
there are conflicting claims asserted
over the seized property, the
appropriate remedy is the institution of
an ordinary civil action by any
interested party, or of an interpleader
action by the Government itself, in the
proper competent court to which the
seizing court shall transfer custody of
the articles. Another branch of the same
court, in an action to recover said
property and during the pendency
thereof, cannot order the delivery of
said personal property to therein
plaintiff pendente lite.
Construing the Pagkalinawan case
together with the Vlasons case, we rule
that where personal property is seized
under a search warrant and there is
reason to believe that the seizure will
not anymore be followed by the filing of
a criminal and there are conflicting
claims over the seized property, the
proper remedy is the filing of an action
for replevin, or an interpleader filed by
the Government in the proper court, not
necessarily the same one which issued
the search warrant; however, where
there is still a probability that the
seizure will be followed by the filing of a
criminal action, as in the case at bar
where the case for carnapping was
"dismissed provisionally, without
prejudice to its reopening once the issue
of ownership is resolved in favor of
complainant" (emphasis supplied), or
the criminal information has actually
been commenced, or filed, and actually
prosecuted, and there are conflicting
claims over the property seized, the
proper remedy is to question the
validity of the search warrant in the
same court which issued it and not in
any other branch of the said court.
6. MARCELO A. MESINA, vs. THE
HONORABLEINTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
NATURE: This is an appeal by certiorari
from the decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court which
dismissed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by Marcelo A. Mesina
against the trial court.
FACTS: Jose Go purchased from
Associate Bank a Cashiers Check,
which he left on top of the managers
desk
when he left the bank. The bank
manager then had it kept for
safekeeping by one of its employees.
The employee was then in conference
with one Alexander Lim. He left the
check in his desk and upon his return,
Lim and the check were gone. When Go
inquired about his check, the same
couldn't be found and Go was advised
to request for the stoppage of payment
which he did. He executed also an
affidavit of loss as well as reported it to
the police. The bank then received the
check twice for clearing. For these two
times, they dishonored the payment by
saying that payment has been stopped.
After the second time, a lawyer
contacted it demanding payment. He
refused to disclose the name of his
client and threatened to sue. Later on
the scheduled date of pretrial
conference in the interpleader case, the
name of Mesina was revealed. When
asked by the police on how he
possessed the check, he said it was paid
to him Lim. An information for theft was
then filed against Lim. A case of
interpleader was filed by the bank and
Go moved to participate as intervenor in
the complaint for damages. Petitioner
instead of filing his answer, He filed an
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss alleging lack
of jurisdiction. The trial court an order
denying the motion to dismiss ruling
that respondent bank's complaint
sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for
interpleader. Petitioner filed his motion
for reconsideration which was denied by
the trial court. Respondent judge issued
an order declaring petitioner in default
since his period to answer has already
expired. Petitioner Mesina filed a
petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction with IAC to set aside the
order of respondent court denying his
omnibus Motion to Dismiss. IAC
rendered its decision dimissing the
petition for certiorari. Petitioner Mesina
filed his Motion for Reconsideration
which was also denied by the same
court in its resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not IAC erred in
countenancing the filing and
maintenance of an interpleader suit by
a party who had earlier been sued on
the same claim.
HELD: Petitioner stubbornly insists that
there is no showing of conflicting claims
and interpleader is out of the question.
There is enough evidence to establish
the contrary. Considering the
aforementioned facts and
circumstances, respondent bank merely
took the necessary precaution not to
make a mistake as to whom to pay and
therefore interpleader was its proper
remedy. It has been shown that the
interpleader suit was filed by
respondent bank because petitioner and
Jose Go were both laying their claims on
the check, petitioner asking payment
thereon and Jose Go as the purchaser or
owner. The allegation of petitioner that
respondent bank had effectively
relieved itself of its primary liability
under the check by simply filing a
complaint for interpleader is belied by
the willingness of respondent bank to
issue a certificate of time deposit in the
amount of P800,000 representing the
cashier's check in question in the name
of the Clerk of Court of Manila to be
awarded to whoever wig be found by
the court as validly entitled to it. Said
validity will depend on the strength of
the parties' respective rights and titles
thereto. Bank filed the interpleader suit
not because petitioner sued it but
because petitioner is laying claim to the
same check that Go is claiming. On the
very day that the bank instituted the
case in interpleader, it was not aware of
any suit for damages filed by petitioner
against it as supported by the fact that
the interpleader case was first entitled
Associated Bank vs. Jose Go and John
Doe, but later on changed to Marcelo A.
Mesina for John Doe when his name
became known to respondent bank
7. ALFONSO PAGKALINAWAN
and MANUEL PAGKALINAWAN, vs.
SOTERO RODAS,
FACTS: In an ejectment suit between
Manuel Tambunting, plaintiff, and
Alfonso Pagkalinawan and Manuel
Pagkalinawan, defendants, appealed
from the municipal court to the Court of
First Instance of Manila, the latter court,
after trial, rendered a decision dated
July 3, 1947, sentencing the defendants
to vacate the house in question and to
pay the plaintiff the rentals from
November, 1946, at the rate of P45 a
month, plus the costs. Acting upon a
motion for reconsideration, filed by the
defendants, the Court of First Instance
of Manila issued an order dated July 26,
1947, granting said motion, setting
aside the decision of July 3, 1947, and
absolving the defendants from the
complaint. On motion for
reconsideration in turn filed by the
plaintiff, an order dated August 16,
1947,
This decision appears to have become
final, as a result of which, upon petition
of the plaintiff, the Court of First
Instance of Manila ordered the issuance
of a writ of execution. The defendants
sought to stay the execution on the
ground that they had in the meantime
filed with the same court an
interpleader suit against the plaintiff
and one Angel de Leon Ong, praying
that the latter two be ordered to litigate
their conflicting claims to the rentals
due from the defendants for the
premises in question, it appearing that
said defendants received a notice from
the Attorney of Angel de Leon Ong
advising the defendants to stop paying
rentals to the plaintiff. The Court of First
Instance of Manila acceded to the
motion for stay of execution, but, at the
instance of the plaintiff, it issued an
order on November 1, 1947, directing
that execution be proceeded with.
Failing to obtain a reconsideration of the
latter order, the defendants instituted
the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition, seeking from us an order
directing Hon. Sotero Rodas, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, and
Joaquin Garcia, sheriff, to desist from
carrying out the writ of execution.
HELD: There is merit in the petition. It
is true that the decision of the
respondent judge of August 16, 1947,
orders the petitioners to pay the rentals
directly to the respondent Manuel
Tambunting and provides for their
ejectment in case of default. But it
appears that, in connection with the
interpleader suit filed by the herein
petitioners in the Court of First Instance
of Manila, said rentals were deposited
with the clerk of court, of which fact the
respondent judge was informed by the
petitioners in their constancia dated
October 15, 1947. Such deposits, in our
opinion, constitute a bona fide
compliance with the decision of the
respondent judge, since it is undeniable
that the petitioners were warned by
Angel de Leon Ong not to pay rentals to
the respondent Manuel Tambunting.
That there is really a conflicting claim
between Angel de Leon Ong and
respondent Manuel Tambunting is
evidenced by the fact that there are
pending in the Court of First Instance of
Manila civil case No. 815, between
Manuel Tambunting, plaintiff, and Angel
de Leon Ong and Ong Hoa, defendants,
for the annulment of a contract of sale
involving the premises in question, and
civil case No. 2690, between Angel de
Leon Ong, plaintiff, and Manuel
Tambunting, defendant, for the
ejectment of Tambunting from the
property located at Nos. 329 to 339
Tanduay Street, Manila, which includes
the premises held by the petitioners.
Under the law, the latter have a right to
file the interpleader suit in view of the
claim for rentals of Angel de Leon Ong;
and if the respondent Tambunting
believes that he is legally entitled to
said rentals, he is free to move for
withdrawal of the deposits made by the
petitioners.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby
granted and the respondent judge and
sheriff are ordered to desist form
carrying out the writ of execution issued
in civil case No. 1489. So ordered, with
costs against the respondent Manuel
Tambunting.
8. GREGORIO R. SY-QUIA, petitioner,
vs THE SHERIFF OF ILOCOS SUR and
FILADELFO DE LEON, respondents.
FACTS: February 3, 1915, Miguel
Aglipay Cheng-Laco and Feliciano Reyes
ChengKiango executed a chattel
mortgage in favor of the petitioner
Gregorio R. Sy-Quia on their mercantile
establishment, with all the merchandise
therein contained, as security for a debt
of P6,000. The chattel mortgage was
duly recorded on the date of its
execution and fell due on February 3,
1917. From its terms it may be inferred
that it was the intention of the parties
that the mortgagors were to be
permitted to sell the merchandise
replenishing their stock from time to
time and that the new stock brought in
should also be subject to the mortgage.
On May 5, 1924, Miguel Aglipay Cheng-
Laco executed another chattel
mortgage on the same establishment
and all its contents in favor of the
respondent Filadelfo de Leon as security
for the sum of P4,900, which mortgage
was recorded on May 14, 1924.
On the latter date the petitioner, in
writing, requested the sheriff to take
possession of the mortgaged property
and to sell it at public auction under the
provisions of section 14 of the Chattel
Mortgage Law (Act No. 1508).
The sheriff seized the establishment in
question as well as its contents and
fixed the date of the sale at June 2,
1924. In the meantime Filadelfo de Leon
presented an adverse claim to the
property by virtue of his chattel
mortgage, alleging that all the goods on
which the chattel mortgage of Gregorio
R. Sy-Quia was given had been sold
long before the chattel mortgage in
favor of De Leon was executed and that,
therefore, the earlier chattel mortgage
was of no effect. The sheriff then filed
an interpleader. Petitioner filed a
mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether interpleader is proper
HELD: Yes. In respect to conflicting
claims to property seized by the sheriff
in the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage,
the sheriff may bring an action of
interpleader under section 120 of the
Code of Civil Procedure in order to
determine the respective rights of the
claimants. Though in such cases it may
ordinarily be better practice for the
sheriff to sell the property and hold the
proceeds of the same subject to the
outcome of the action of interpleader,
his action in suspending the sale
pending the determination of the action
of interpleader seems justified by the
facts in the present case and the court
will not interfere by mandamus.
Though it, perhaps, would have been
better practice for the sheriff to sell the
property and hold the proceeds of the
sale subject to the outcome of the
action of interpleader, we, nevertheless,
are of the opinion that the facts shown
do not justify our interference by
mandamus. The sheriff might lay
himself open to an action for damages if
he sold the goods without the consent
of the holder of the last mortgage, and
it does not appear that the petitioner
offered to give bond to hold him
harmless in such an event. In these
circumstances, his action in suspending
the sale pending the determination of
the action of interpleader seems
justified.
9. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
petitioner,vs. HON. MARCELINO L.
SAYO, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45),
NOAH'S ARK SUGAR REFINERY,
ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO, JIMMY T. GO
and WILSON T. GO, respondents.
FACTS: In accordance with Act No.
2137, the Warehouse Receipts Law,
Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery issued on
several dates, the following Warehouse
Receipts (Quedans): (a) March 1, 1989,
Receipt No. 18062, covering sugar
deposited by Rosa Sy; (b) March 7,
1989, Receipt No. 18080, covering
sugar deposited by RNS Merchandising
(Rosa Ng Sy); (c) March 21, 1989,
Receipt No. 18081, covering sugar
deposited by St. Therese Merchandising;
(d) March 31, 1989, Receipt No. 18086,
covering sugar deposited by St. Therese
Merchandising; and (e) April 1, 1989,
Receipt No. 18087, covering sugar
deposited by RNS Merchandising. The
receipts are substantially in the form,
and contains the terms, prescribed for
negotiable warehouse receipts by
Section 2 of the law.
Subsequently, Warehouse Receipts Nos.
18080 and 18081 were negotiated and
endorsed to Luis T. Ramos, and Receipts
Nos. 18086, 18087 and 18062 were
negotiated and endorsed to Cresencia
K. Zoleta. Ramos and Zoleta then used
the quedans as security for two loan
agreementsone for P15.6 million and
the other for P23.5 millionobtained by
them from the Philippine National Bank.
The aforementioned quedans were
endorsed by them to the Philippine
National Bank.
Luis T. Ramos and Cresencia K. Zoleta
failed to pay their loans upon maturity
on January 9, 1990. Consequently, on
March 16, 1990, the Philippine National
Bank wrote to Noahs Ark Sugar
Refinery demanding delivery of the
sugar stocks covered by the quedans
endorsed to it by Zoleta and Ramos.
Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery refused to
comply with the demand alleging
ownership thereof, for which reason the
Philippine National Bank filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila a verified
complaint for Specific Performance
with Damages and Application for Writ
of Attachment against Noahs Ark
Sugar Refinery, Alberto T. Looyuko,
Jimmy T. Go and Wilson T. Go, the last
three being identified as the sole
proprietor, managing partner, and
Executive Vice President of Noahs Ark,
respectively.
Noahs Ark was subsequently granted a
motion of execution which was opposed
by PNB. The court favored Noahs Ark.
PNB was held liable for P734,341,595.06
as warehousemans lien or storage fees.
ISSUE: Whether interpleader is proper;
whether certiorari is proper
HELD: Yes. The remedies available to a
warehouseman, such as private
respondents, to enforce his
warehousemans lien are: (1) To refuse
to deliver the goods until his lien is
satisfied, pursuant to Section 31 of the
Warehouse Receipts Law; (2) To sell the
goods and apply the proceeds thereof to
the value of the lien pursuant to
Sections 33 and 34 of the Warehouse
Receipts Law; and (3) By other means
allowed by law to a creditor against his
debtor, for the collection from the
depositor of all charges and advances
which the depositor expressly or
impliedly contracted with the
warehouseman to pay under Section 32
of the Warehouse Receipts Law; or such
other remedies allowed by law for the
enforcement of a lien against personal
property under Section 35 of said law.
The third remedy is sought judicially by
suing for the unpaid charges.
Section 8 enumerates what must
accompany a demand; while as regards
the reasons which a warehouseman
may invoke to legally refuse to effect
delivery of the goods covered by the
quedans, these are: (1) That the holder
of the receipt does not satisfy the
conditions prescribed in Section 8 of the
Act. (See Sec. 8, Act No. 2137); (2) That
the warehouseman has legal title in
himself on the goods, such title or right
being derived directly or indirectly from
a transfer made by the depositor at the
time of or subsequent to the deposit for
storage, or from the warehousemans
lien. (Sec. 16, Act No. 2137); (3) That
the warehouseman has legally set up
the title or right of third persons as
lawful defense for non-delivery of the
goods as follows: x x x (4) That the
warehouseman having a lien valid
against the person demanding the
goods refuses to deliver the goods to
him until the lien is satisfied. (Sec. 31,
Act No. 2137); (5) That the failure was
not due to any fault on the part of the
warehouseman, as by showing that,
prior to demand for delivery and refusal,
the goods were stolen or destroyed by
fire, flood, etc., without any negligence
on his part, unless he has contracted so
as to be liable in such case, or that the
goods have been taken by the mistake
of a third person without the knowledge
or implied assent of the warehouseman,
or some other justifiable ground for non-
delivery. (67 C.J. 532)
Adverse claim of ownership as a basis
by a warehouseman for refusing to
deliver the goods covered by warehouse
receipts is not a valid, legal excuse.
However, under Sec. 17 of Act 2137, if
more than one person claims the title or
possession of the goods, the
warehouseman may, either as a
defense to an action brought against
him for non-delivery of the goods or as
an original suit, whichever is
appropriate, require all known claimants
to interplead.
Yes. It is grave abuse of discretion on
the part of a court to order immediate
execution of a final order without
awaiting the expiration of the period to
appeal therefrom. Hence, certiorari is
proper. It is well-settled that the
availability of an appeal does not
foreclose recourse to the extraordinary
remedies of certiorari or prohibition
where appeal is not adequate, or
equally beneficial, speedy and
sufficient.
10. JOSE A. BELTRAN, ET AL.,
plaintiffs-appellants, vs. PEOPLE'S
HOMESITE & HOUSING
CORPORATION, defendants-
appellees.
FACTS: Plaintiffs' principal' allegations
in their complaint were as follows: Since
they first occupied in 1953 their
respective housing units at Project 4,
under lease from the People's Homesite
& Housing Corporation (PHHC) and
paying monthly rentals therefor, they
were assured by competent authority
that after five years of continuous
occupancy, they would be entitled to
purchase said units. On February 21,
1961, the PHHC announced to the
tenants that the management,
administration and ownership of Project
4 would be transferred by the PHHC to
the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) in payment of PHHC
debts to the GSIS. In the same
announcement. the PHHC also asked
the tenants to signify their conformity to
buy the housing units at the selling
price indicated on the back thereof,
agreeing to credit the tenants, as down
payment on the selling price, thirty
(30%) percent of what had been paid by
them as rentals. The tenants accepted
the PHHC offer, and on March 27, 1961,
the PHHC announced in another circular
that all payments made by the tenants
after March 31, 1961 would be
considered as amortizations or
installment-payments. The PHHC
furthermore instructed the Project
Housing Manager in a memorandum of
May 16, 1961 to accept as installments
on the selling price the payments made
after March, 31, 1961 by tenants who
were up-to-date in their accounts as of
said date. In September, 1961, pursuant
to the PHHC-GSIS arrangement,
collections from tenants on rentals
and/or installment payments were
delivered by the PHHC to the GSIS. On
December 27, 1961, the agreement of
turnover of administration and
ownership of PHHC properties, including
Project 4 was executed by PHHC in favor
of GSIS, pursuant to the release of
mortgage and amicable settlement of
the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings instituted in May, 1960 by
GSIS against PHHC. Subsequently,
however, PHHC through its new
Chairman-General Manager, Esmeraldo
Eco, refused to recognize all
agreements and undertakings
previously entered into with GSIS, while
GSIS insisted on its legal rights to
enforce the said agreements and was
upheld in its contention by both the
Government Corporate Counsel and the
Secretary of Justice. Plaintiffs thus
claimed that these conflicting claims
between the defendants-corp
corporations caused them great
inconvenience and incalculable moral
and material damage, as they did not
know to whom they should pay the
monthly amortizations or payments.
They further alleged that as the
majority of them were GSIS policy
holders, they preferred to have the
implementation of the outright sale in
their favor effected by the GSIS, since
the GSIS was "legally entitled to the
management, administration and
ownership of the PHHC properties in
question."
Hence, interpleader suit was filed on
August 21, 1962, by plaintiffs in their
own behalf and in behalf of all residents
of Project 4 in Quezon City, praying that
the two defendant-government
corporations be compelled to litigate
and interplead between themselves
their alleged conflicting claims involving
said Project 4,
Dismissed on the ground that: "During
the hearing of the said motion and
opposition thereto, the counsel for the
defendants ratified the allegations in his
motion and made of record that the
defendant Government Service
Insurance System has no objection that
payments on the monthly amortizations
from- the residents of Project 4 be made
directly to the defendant People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation.
From what appears in said motion and
the statement made, in open court by
the counsel for defendants that there is
no dispute as to whom the residents of
Project 4 should make their monthly
amortizations payments, there is,
therefore, no cause of action for
interpleading that the order of August
23, 1962 is not warranted by the
circumstances surrounding the case. In
so far as payments are concerned,
defendant GSIS has expressed its
conformity that they be made directly to
defendant PHHC, Counsel for
defendants went further to say that
whatever dispute, if any, may exist
between the two corporations over the
lots and buildings in Project 4, payments
made to the PHHC will not and cannot in
any way affect or prejudice the rights of
the residents thereof as they will be
credited by either of the two
defendants.
ISSUE: Whether interpleader is proper
HELD:No. the record shows clearly that
there were no conflicting claims by
defendant corporations as against
plaintiff-tenants, which they may
properly be compelled in an
interpleader suit to interplead and
litigate among themselves. Both
defendant corporations were agreed
that PHHC should continue receiving the
tenants' payments, and that such
payments would be duly recognized
even if the GSIS should eventually take
over Project 4 by virtue of their turnover
agreement of December 27, 1961.
Under Rule 63, section 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court (formerly Rule 14)
requires as an indispensable element
that "conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made"
against the plaintiff-in-interpleader "who
claims no interest. whatever in the
subject matter or an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the
claimants."
The action of interpleader is a remedy
whereby a person who has property in
his possession or has an obligation to
render wholly or partially, without
claiming any right in both, comes to
court and asks that the defendants who
have made upon him conflicting claims
upon the same property or who
consider themselves entitled to demand
compliance with the obligation be
required to litigate among themselves in
order to determine who is entitled to the
property or payment of the obligation.
The remedy is afforded not to protect a
person against a double liability but to
protect him against a double vexation in
respect of one liability.
The resolution of the issue of breach of
the defendants' undertakings towards
plaintiffs may not properly be sought
through the special civil action of
interpleader. Plaintiffs' recourse would
be an ordinary action of specific
performance or other appropriate suit
against the defendants or either of
them. as the circumstances warrant.
The dismissal on the ground that where
the defendants sought to be
interpleaded as conflicting claimants
have no conflicting claims against
plaintiff, is correctly found by the trial
court, the special civil action of
interpleader will not lie.