Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, Vol. 21, No.

2, 1991

Affect, Epistemology, and the Perceptual-

Ecological Perspective: Interpersonal Processes
and Affordances in Psychotherapy
Victor S. Alpher, Ph.D.

Burrell recently presented an approach to epistemology in psychotherapy cah'ed

the "motor-evolutionary metatheory." This approach to therapeutic learning
and knowledge is driven by the information-processing approach to cognition.
It is characterized by an acceptance of the doctrine of the impoverishment of
sense data, an information-processing theory of knowledge, and indirect
realism. A viable yet contrasting perspective, derived from the pioneering work
of James J. Gibson, is developed here. The resulting "perceptual-ecological
metatheory" is characterized by the doctrine of information inherent in sense
data, a perceptually based epistemic theory, and direct realism. It also includes
the central theory of affordances, which is extended to encompass social rela-
tions and affect. The perceptual-ecological metatheory links these phenomena
in a coherent way. Implications for reconceptualizing the psychotherapeutic
process are explored.

INTRODUCTION

The application of principles and concepts from cognitive psychology

presents new challenges and opportunities for the field of psychotherapy.
We are seeing a potentially powerful and useful set of constructs that can
expand our understanding of how an individual assimilates information
about the world, how that information may be internally represented, and
how that information may be transformed over time. These findings have
an impact on interpersonal processes that underlay effective psychotherapy.

Address for reprint requests: P.O. Box 300141, Houston, TX 77230-0141.

101

9 1991 Human Sciences Press, Inc.

102 Alpher

Burrell (1987) recently p r e s e n t e d a r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of

psychotherapy based upon concepts from modern cognitive psychology. He
called this approach the "motor-evolutionary metatheory." It includes an
information-processing metaphor for the mind, and an indirect realist epis-
temology. However, this approach uses but two of the alternative
metaphors and approaches to knowledge that are emerging and flourishing
in cognitive psychology. The so-called "ecological" movement argues for
an approach to these subjects that is radically different (see, e.g., Cutting,
1982, 1983; Mace, 1974, 1977; Michaels & Carello, 1981; Shaw &
Bransford, 1977; Turvey, 1974, 1979; Turvey, Shaw, Reed, & Mace, 1981;
Ullman, 1980).
A coherent theory of affect, in particular, has been problematic within
the information-processing (mind as computer) metaphor and indirect
realist epistemology (which implies that the world cannot be known directly,
but must be "inferred") (see, e.g., Alpher, 1984; Clark & Fiske, 1982;
Simon, 1982). As a result, Burrell's emphasis on epistemic functions as "ex-
tracting tacit rules," on knowledge structures as "abstract rules of action,"
and on process as a "negative feedback loop" does not integrate a theory
of affect for psychotherapy.
Theoretical constructions of the meaning and function of affect are
important for further developments bringing together cognitive science and
clinical reality. The purpose of this article is to present an analysis of affect
that requires a reformulation of some basic epistemological assumptions
regarding perception and action. This contemporary approach takes us
beyond the variety of approaches to affect that have occurred at vastly dif-
ferent levels of analysis (cf. Bullock & Russell, 1986; Fisher, Heise,
Bohrnstedt, & Lucke, 1985; Plutchik, 1980; Rogawski, 1987; Schafer, 1964).
This approach is distinctly "ecological." It helps to clarify the role of affect
in the change process in psychotherapy by integrating a theory of emotion
with interpersonal theory. First, for the purpose of contrast, we will examine
Burrell's thesis more closely.

THE MOTOR-EVOLUTIONARY METATHEORY

Burrell's (1987) motor-evolutionary metatheory involves a view that

knowledge is based on action. An organism will be structurally influenced
by the information to which it is exposed through action, including cognitive
"acts" of the mind. The result is the development of knowledge structures
that permit adaptive action in accordance with environmental constraints
and organismic aims.
Interpersonal Processes in Psychotherapy 103

Burrell focused his analysis on the concept of tacit knowing (Polanyi,

1966). That is, there seem to be ineffable and unconscious "abstract rules
of actions" that accrue through "trial and error." These knowledge struc-
tures are changed when there is a certain degree of error, or poor fit, be-
tween the individual's knowledge structures and the stimulation in the
environment.
This approach is based upon a concept of negative feedback. It im-
plies a motivational theory that assumes that the goal of the organism's
epistemic (knowledge-generating) system is the reduction of error, or input-
template mismatch. An analogy could be made to a thermostat, the func-
tion of which is to detect error leading to operations being performed to
reduce that error. This is an admittedly simple form of negative feedback,
but one that can be extended by analogy to complex systems such as neural
networks (cf. Powers, 1973).
The motor-evolutionary metatheory can be seen to be missing one
important element. What is the knowledge that the human organism seeks?
It is not sufficient to assert that the individual seeks to adapt to its en-
vironment (a tautology), or to "regulate" various body systems in an anal-
ogy to the thermostat. Such explanations are circular (cf. Bergmann, 1943;
Dennett, 1981).
The motor-evolutionary metatheory does not specify what is the na-
ture of knowledge or why that knowledge may change-only that behavior
leads to knowledge through "error." A fuller understanding of the nature
of knowledge structures, their dynamic aspects, and the function of be-
havior may be developed through an analysis of the nature of perception
and its implications for a theory of affect. It will be shown that this alter-
native view links interpersonal processes with perceptual processes in a par-
simonious, coherent way.

AN ALTERNATIVE: THE PERCEPTUAL-ECOLOGICAL

METATHEORY

The approach to epistemology and to a theory of affect I present

here draws on a particular approach to perception, as noted briefly above.
This approach asserts that the information for accurate perception is
present in the physical stimulation reaching the sense receptors. This may
be contrasted with the view supported by Burrell that stimulus informa-
tion-that is, the physical stimulation of the sense receptors-is ambiguous,
or impoverished, and that knowledge is in fact a cognitive "construction"
(see also Fodor, 1980, and Pylyshyn, 1980).
104 Alpher

The notion of impoverishment of actual sense data is the basis for

information-processing theories in psychology. Information-processing
theory assumes that the nervous system "makes sense" out of the structured
energy impinging on the various receptors of the nervous system (Michaels
& Carello, 1981). From this perspective, knowledge of the world is "in-
direct." That is, knowledge structures are themselves cognitively mediated.
There is a certain circularity to the idea of indirect perception that harks
back to the problem of the homunculus as the "overseer" of the operation
of the mind (see, e.g., Campbell, 1963). In other words, knowledge is
created by knowledge, which must therefore build on innate epistemic
(knowledge) structures (i.e., Platonism). Our current understanding of the
development of the nervous system renders the proposition of any such
substantial sophisticated foreknowledge highly questionable (e.g., Edelman,
1988).

The Ecological Perspective of James J. Gibson

An alternative view posits the idea of the direct perception of the

properties of the environment. If we don't process sense data and either
recognize ( P l a t o n i s m ) or construct (information-processing metaphor)
reality, where does the information for knowledge come from? James J.
Gibson (1966) suggested that the sensory apparatus "picks up" information
directly from sense data (stimulation of the receptors). This is called a direct
realist epistemological position, and is quite consistent with current analysis
in philosophy of science as applied to psychological phenomena (cf.
Manicas & Secord, 1983).
The work in perception guided by the direct realist epistemology is
known now as the ecological perspective (e.g. Gibson, 1979). The ecological
perspective posits that we know important properties of our environment
because the information specifying these properties ("invariants") is present
in the array of potential receptor stimulation. Each individual's perceptual
system is embedded continually in such a stimulus array.
Gibson proposed a direct realist epistemology for "knowing" systems
(i.e., those that change as information changes), because of the problem
noted above of circular reasoning in theories of indirect, cognitively-
mediated knowledge. He notes that,
[E]xplanations of perception based on [impoverished] sensory inputs fail because
they all come down to this: In order to perceive the world, one must already have
ideas about it. Knowledge of the world is explained by assuming that knowledge
of the world exists. Whether the ideas are learned or innate makes no difference;
the fallacy lies in the circular reasoning. (Gibson, 1979, p. 304).
Interpersonal Processes in Psychotherapy 105

The Gibsonian or "ecological" approach to knowing and meaning suggests

that information is inherent in the structure of the stimulus array-that is,
at the interface of the stimulus receptors and the environment. The tech-
nical term for available information is "invariant"-of which there may be
several distinct types (Cutting, 1982). The perceptual systems have evolved,
according to this position, to empower the individual to detect, or "pick
up," this available information directly and without cognitive mediation or
"enrichment" of the information detected (Gibson, 1966). Contrasted with
Burrell's motor-evolutionary metatheory, this alternative view may be called
a perceptual-ecological metatheoly.

The Theory of Affordances

Perceptual-ecological metatheory posits that through experience with

the elements of one's econiche, important information about their proper-
ties is learned through the detection of invariants in the information present
for sense receptor stimulation. This information is not mediated or con-
ceptual, but is perceptual in nature. The perceptual systems evolved to
detect properties of the environment that have specific meaning for a par-
ticular organism in a particular econiche. Those invariants with specific
meaning with respect to a particular organism/species/individual are called
affordances.
An affordance, according to James J. Gibson, "can be perceived if
the information is detected" (1977, p. 68). The theory of affordances
specifies that the "input" which regulates behavior is specific to the animal-
environment duality. That is, an invariant may be an affordance with
respect to one organism, yet go undetected by another organism/species
whose perceptual systems are not attuned to it. Individual development is,
then, conceptualized as a perceptual learning process. The "education of
attention" is the developmental process leading to knowledge and to mean-
ing (Gibson & Gibson, 1955). As Gibson explains:
The world of physical reality does not consist of meaningful things. The world of
ecological reality, as I have been trying to describe it, does. If what we perceived
were the entities of physics and mathematics, meanings would have to be imposed
on them. But if what we perceive are the entities of environmental science, their
meanings can be discovered. (Gibson, 1979, p. 33, italics in original)

The affordances of the person-environment matrix are broadly so-

cial or interpersonal (Baron, 1980; Gibson, 1977). They become increas-
ingly differentiated during maturation and development. Like the matrix
for other animals living within a niche, much of the environmental in-
formation is available for stimulation of the visual receptors in the form
106 Alpher

of light (photons). Facial expressions (Gibson, 1977), and body gestures

(Soraci, 1982), for example, are rich in visual information, specifying the
affordances available in person-person interactions. Yet, the affordances
of human interaction are neither limitless nor solely visual. Affect is im-
portant for understanding the available affordances for human interac-
tions.

Extension of the Concept of Affordance to Affect

Leeper (1970) proposed that "emotions are basically perceptions of

situations and that, commonly, they are long-sustained perceptions of the
more enduring and significant aspects of such situations" (p. 156).
Psychotherapists, of course, recognize that it is the presence of affect, or
affective knowledge, that indicates some of the fundamental ways in which
a person "sees the world." The most significant aspects of human environ-
ments are interpersonal ones.
Affective knowledge is the most veridical, in the sense that along with
it comes relative certainty that one has understood the environment cor-
rectly, realistically, and absolutely. And, we might say that the person who
does not experience affect (e.g., one who "isolates" affect) is ipso facto
relegated to living only in a part of the world, and a very limited one at
that (cf. Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1984, 1985; Shengold, 1985).
From a perceptual-ecological perspective, affect is information for per-
ception in the interpersonal and psychosocial stimulus array. In addition
to the visual stimulus information available for detection of affordances,
changes in bodily feelings make available additional interoceptive (includ-
ing proprioceptive and nociceptive) stimulus information that furthers the
differentiation of perceivable affordances (Alpher, 1984). Affect constitutes
stimulus information within the broad range of invariant information
present in what Gibson termed the "ambient stimulus array." It is not some-
thing "added to" ambiguous stimulation, but is rather inherent in the in-
formation specifying an affordance. In fact, the affective aspect of an
affordance seems automatic, rapid, "perceptual" (cf. Watts, 1983; Zajonc,
1980, 1984).
An affordance, therefore, indicates for the individual something quite
specific about the environment-what actions are available, as well as the
probable outcomes. This is consistent with direct realist epistemology,
which asserts that the world is knowable without cognitive enrichment of
stimulus information (Shaw & Bransford, 1977). Perception of an affor-
dance is immediate if the information is detected, and requires no inter-
pretation.
Interpersonal Processes ill Psychotherapy 107

AFFORDANCES IN THE THERAPEUTIC SITUATION

The perceptual-ecological metatheory, with its conceptualization of

affect within an affordance network in a temporally dynamic ambient
stimulus array, allows the p r o p o s i t i o n that the p r o t o t y p i c a l dyadic
therapeutic situation is an opportunity for the education of attention to
the affordances in social-interpersonal interaction. If therapeutic change
is to occur, a variegated network of affordances must be available for
p e r c e p t i o n . T h e s e i n t e r p e r s o n a l affordances are typically those with
which psychotherapy patients are concerned. Actual motor or cognitive
"acts" may not be necessary for the information that specifies affordan-
ces to be detected. The crucial factor is the actual salience of affordan-
ces to the perceptual systems (see, e.g., Soraci, Alpher, Deckner, &
Blanton, 1983).
For the senses considered as perceptual systems (Gibson, 1966), how-
ever, the face-to-face therapeutic situation is a rich, perceptually salient
context for the education of attention to interpersonal affordances. Sub-
tleties in expression and communication of affects, attitudes, and so forth
now are conceptualized as available for detection in an ambient stimulus
array. These subtleties can actually become more perceptually salient in a
situation in which action is constrained, such as psychotherapy.
The perceptual-ecological metatheory I advance here integrates a
conceptualization of affect within the theory of affordances. There is a
more or less continuous gradient of affect available for detection in the
course of allocation of attention to the affordances in the ambient stimulus
array. Affect variegates the perceptual salience of affordances, and influen-
ces the likelihood that action will be predicated on the detection of one
affordance among many.
Thus, affect is contained in the information specifying an affordance.
It is immediately perceived because affect inheres in the available affor-
dance network within the ambient stimulus array. This conceptual approach
is broad enough to encompass phenomena ranging from a startle reaction
(an abruptly salient affordance), to psychopathological states such as
depression (low salience o f all affordances), as well as manic excitement
or irritability (high salience of multiple affordances).

Affordances in Interpersonal Space

If the affordance concept of affect is to be considered useful, it should

have implications both in the theoretical and empirical domains. With the
108 Alpher

present focus on the perception of affordances, the integration of affect

with social and interpersonal behavior can be clarified and measured.
There are two interpersonal measurement technologies that integrate
affective and interpersonal factors within the relevant conceptual domain.
These are the Leary Interpersonal System (Leary, 1957), and the system
called Structural Analysis of Social Behavior (Benjamin, 1974, 1984).
Both of these measurement systems employ empirically derived cir-
cumplex structures. Two major dimensions have been demonstrated in
the Leary Interpersonal System: 1) an affective dimension (Love-Hate);
and 2) an action dimension (Dominate-Submit). The Leary approach
can be taken at several levels of functioning. Leary himself (1957) iden-
tified five levels: Public Communication; Conscious Communication;
Private Communication; The Unexpressed; and, the Level of Values.
The integration of the dimensions of affect and action among the various
levels provides a rich and variegated repertoire of affordances in the
interpersonal sphere. The classification of interpersonal behaviors from
the Interpersonal Check List (Leary, 1957, p. 135) exemplifies the
myriad possibilities.
The approach of Structural Analysis of Social Behavior (SASB)
builds upon and expands the Leary model. It "splits" the interpersonal
sphere into three separate circumplex surfaces-one for transitive action
("Other" focus) and one for intransitive reactive state ("Self" focus),
and a third for the self-concept which is a derivative of significant in-
terpersonal relations ("Introject" focus). The primary axes on which
each of the three circumplex surfaces-Other, Self, and Introject-are or-
ganized are affiliation and interdependence. Action is represented in
both the transitive (active) and intransitive (reactive) types.
The affect dimension is bipolar, with high affiliation ("tender sen-
suality and joyful connecting") and high disaffiliation ("murderous at-
tack or protest and recoiling") from others as the extremes. The
interdependence dimension is also bipolar, ranging from high enmesh-
ment with others to extreme differentiation from others or self at the
poles. The SASB model generates 108 categories of transactions, each
representing a unique composite of the underlying affect and inter-
dependence factors. The gradients for affect are virtually limitless in cir-
cumplex models such as SASB and Leary's Interpersonal System. A
circumplex for affect corresponding to the interpersonal model is also
being developed (Benjamin, 1986).
Both the Leary and SASB models are quite complex, and a full descrip-
tion of them is beyond the scope of this article. It is interesting to observe
that interpersonal measurement theorists who have further developed these
intricate and conceptually elegant systems (see Wiggins, 1982) have provided
Interpersonal Processes in Psychotherapy 1{19

us with findings that fit with a perceptual-ecological view of affect. As limited

range or differentiation of interpersonal behaviors limits social adaptation
(Leafy, 1957), so too is this often accompanied by limited range or variegation
of affect. On the other hand, more variegated or flexible interpersonal be-
havior is accompanied by greater affective differentiation.

Selfobjects and Affordances

Kohut (1971, 1977, 1984), a psychoanalytic theorist, has provided a

new theory of the development of the psyche that focuses on the relation-
ship between the self and what are termed selfobjects. Selfobjects are other
persons who function to perform self-regulative operations which the in-
dividual cannot accomplish. Kohut has developed the theory along three
lines, showing how relations between the self and its selfobjects further the
development of healthy self-esteem, values, and ideals. The domain of self-
selfobject relations involves three "poles" of the developing self-organiza-
tion: the grandiose self; the idealized parent imago; and, the alter ego.
These psychoanalytic constructs have been useful in clarifying the
development of an individual's ability to regulate a particular developmen-
tally archaic affective state, narcissistic equilibrium (Kohut, 1987). Relation-
ships with selfobjects throughout the life span are crucial in the
maintenance of optimal narcissistic equilibrium (Kohut, 1980).
These recent developments in psychoanalytic theory are complementary
to the present theory of affect. Regulation of narcissistic equilibrium involves
an archaic affective state, and relatively primitive interpersonal relations (three
categories for Kohut as compared with the 108 categories of SASB).
The theory of selfobject functions is quite consistent with our theory
of affordances. Self-selfobject relating involves, at the psychological level,
attunement to social-psychological affordances in the ambient stimulus
array early in development when differentiation from others is incomplete.
Kohut called this the self-selfobject matrix.
Later variegation of affects and interpersonal relations, in the
Kohutian developmental model, is made possible by a firm sense of self
in a matrix of empathic selfobjects, sensitive and responsive to the needs
of the nascent self. In the SASB model, this early self-selfobject matrix
would involve interpersonal transactions that occur in the highly inter-
dependent or enmeshed region of the interpersonal circumplex (cf. Ben-
jamin, 1984). It is in the later stages of perceptual development and
maturation, in which others are recognized as autonomous and quasi-in-
dependent objects, that the ambient stimulus array is informative with
respect to more complex social-interpersonal affordances.
110 Alpher

Affordances and the Process of Psychotherapy

Since the present theory of affordances and affect is a theory of per-

ception, rather than action, the role of psychotherapy becomes one of ex-
ploring and educating a person's perceptual systems to affordances that
are present in the ambient stimulus array. The therapist's function therefore
is to increase the perceptual salience of the affordances present in the
dyadic relationship, while holding in abeyance a person's acting on affor-
dances detected.
Verbal mediation may be helpful in perceptual salience manipulation.
Nevertheless, it is also the therapist's behavior and the parameters of the
therapeutic situation that ideally provide a rich matrix of selfobject and
interpersonal affordances that will lead to healthy self-esteem, narcissistic
equilibrium, and social adjustment. Also, the therapeutic dyad must lead
to a perception of increased possibilities for meaningful action, based on
the increased detection of interpersonal affordances.
In this context, the "as if" character of psychotherapy involves agree-
ment that affordances (commonly regarded as transference feelings, resis-
tance, and so forth) are to be perceived but not acted on. As therapy
progresses, these primitive phenomena tend to be replaced by a wider
variety of affects as other affordances in the structure and dynamics of the
dyadic relationship become more perceptually salient. This is colloquially
known as "getting in touch with feelings." As the more extreme poles of
the interpersonal matrix are clarified (i.e., the extremes of the ordinate and
abscissa of the Leary or SASB circumplex), more affordances, with accom-
panying variegated affects that enhance their salience and specificity, can
be detected.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of the present exposition has been to lay out some of
the basic principles of a perceptual-ecological theory of affect. This theory
is based on a direct realist epistemology, which can be contrasted with a
constructive or indirect realist epistemology in which the information avail-
able for perception is considered impoverished or ambiguous.
A perceptual-ecological approach to affect fits well with our current
understanding of the perceptual aspects of affect (commonly referred to
as affective "immediacy"). Using Gibson's concept of the ambient stimulus
array, and the simple proposition that the information for perception of
affordances must be available to the perceptual systems, we can derive a
new understanding of affect. In a sense, it places affect at the interface
Interpersonal Processes in Psychotherapy i11

b e t w e e n t h e p e r s o n a n d e n v i r o n m e n t , which is w h e r e the i m p o r t a n t infor-

m a t i o n s u p p o r t i n g action a n d b e h a v i o r can b e d e t e c t e d . R a t h e r t h a n dis-
rupting behavior, we can see the increased perceptual salience of
i n f o r m a t i o n actually specifies new actions.
I n p r e s e n t i n g a m o t o r - e v o l u t i o n a r y m e t a t h e o r y for p s y c h o t h e r a p y ,
B u r r e l l e m p l o y e d only o n e possible view o f the f u n c t i o n o f the senses for
p e r c e p t i o n . H o w e v e r , the i n f o r m a t i o n - p r o c e s s i n g p a r a d i g m for cognition
has b e e n d e m o n s t r a t e d as only o n e o f m a n y p o s s i b l e a p p r o a c h e s ( B r o a d -
b e n t , 1981). It is h o p e d that the p r e s e n t a p p r o a c h will f u r t h e r discussion
a n d e x p l o r a t i o n o f t h e ways in which p e r c e p t u a l - e c o l o g i c a l m e t a t h e o r y ,
d i r e c t r e a l i s t e p i s t e m o l o g y , a n d the t h e o r y o f a f f o r d a n c e s m a y e n h a n c e o u r
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f d e v e l o p m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s a n d the o n t o l o g y o f affect. This
m a y f u r t h e r t h e f u n c t i o n o f p s y c h o t h e r a p e u t i c i n t e r v e n t i o n in facilitating
t h e d e t e c t i o n o f s o c i a l - i n t e r p e r s o n a l affordances.

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