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Jeff Caldwell

26 November 2009

What Is A Woman’s Obligation?

1. Introduction

Does a woman who has decided to bring a fetus to term have an obligation to refrain from

activities which might harm that fetus? There are powerful arguments against such an expectation.

Should society begin to expect such obligations, it would lead inevitably to legislation of those

obligations, limiting a mother’s right to autonomy. Others argue personhood begins at birth or

later, and therefore a fetus is entitled to no obligations. Because pregnancy is unique to women,

any expected obligations are discriminatory as they cannot apply to men. I will exam each of these

objections and show that a pregnant woman does in fact have obligations. First I will show that

there is a special relationship between a woman and her unborn child, which creates special

obligations. Secondly I will consider the fetus in a temporal context. Thirdly I will determine if the

idea of autonomy is an expectation that a pregnant woman or anyone can have.

2. An Obligation Based On an Intention

It is the very decision to have the child that places the woman in a position of obligation. Ross

would refer to this as an implicit promise: “There are special obligations arising from acts the very

intention of which, when they were done, was to put us under such an obligation. The name for

such acts is promises” (Ross 27). Committing any act that might endanger the birth of the child

goes against the logic of the previous decision. That these obligations could become onerous is

irrelevant. As “there are duties to those with whom we have special relationships, relationships
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that prescribe even strenuous moral duties in certain domains” (Murray 297). If a mother decides

to terminate her pregnancy she is freed from these obligations. “All we need is a simple

distinction between those fetuses destined to be brought to live birth, and those who will not know

extra uterine life” (Murray 295). We are speaking only of the when, not of the if of the birth.

3. Temporal Considerations

Consider that the deceased are treated with the utmost amount of respect and dignity based on the

fact that they were once persons. The fact that they are no longer persons does not diminish the

obligations we have to them. This attitude does not need to occur only at the end of life. Should

the soon-to-be not be treated with the same respect as the recently-were? Yes. If we begin

perceiving “humans in a temporal context it should elicit some respect for former and potential

persons, respect that is derivative from and proportional, though not identical, to the respect

elicited by the actual persons they were or will become.” (Langerak 115) There is no reason that

all rights should be extended to the yet-to-be or previously-were. Clearly, neither can exercise all

of the rights of a living, breathing individual. What for instance would a fetus do with the right to

free speech? There are basic fundamental rights like those of safety and health that should be

considered when making decisions that will directly affect the unborn child. In this case my

argument is much like Murray’s “that the timing of a harm, in itself, is not morally relevant. An

act resulting in harm to a not-yet-born person, is as great a harm as if it were done later.” (Murray

295) There is no temporal context in which to consider moral obligations.

4. Expectations of Autonomy
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It is difficult to oblige one person to do something for the sake of another without infringing on the

autonomy of the first. When dealing with fetuses this danger becomes apparent: “Because there is

a link between most discussions of the fetus’ moral status and abortion, there is an unfortunate

tendency to think of our obligation to the fetus as all-or-none” (Murray 298). It is not necessary

that a woman give up her autonomy entirely. Society places special obligations, both positive and

negative, on some of its members. Drinking, smoking, voting and driving are all limited by an age

obligation, which is arbitrary. These limits though are not permanent and neither is pregnancy.

Policemen, firemen and soldiers are obliged to take risks that most citizens would not have to take

in the course of regular life. These special obligations exist because they occupy a unique position

in society. I would extend this type of occupation to being a mother. Therefore a temporary

implication of obligations, based on a decision freely made, is not necessarily morally

unacceptable in this case. Obligations and Autonomy need not be mutually exclusive. Simply

stating, expecting and “establishing that women have moral duties to their not-yet-born children

does not justify automatically coercive public policies to force them to fulfill those obligations”

(Murray 302). As to the issue of autonomy, women that are pregnant cease to be independent

beings in any sense. Autonomy is singular and does not apply plurally. If I accept someone into

my care, I am obliged to refrain from activities that would endanger them. There is an imagined

perfect autonomy that some authors appeal to when arguing against any type of obligation that

would limit this idealized autonomy. However obligations can be expected that would not “have

the horrendous consequences for women that it is typically thought” (Murray 302). Autonomy is

not an absolute right it is limited completely by our obligations to others.

5. Expectations Breed Legislation

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The idea that expectations breed legislation is an objection put forth by Warren in opposition to

placing obligations on an expectant mother: “The extension of equal rights to sentient fetuses

would inevitably license severe violations of women’s basic rights to personal autonomy and

physical security” (Warren 278). This is the slippery slope argument, and an appeal to our

emotions based on fear.

Warren goes on to argue that “pregnancy is a relationship different from any other . . . it is

probably the only case in which the legal personhood of one human being is necessarily

incompatible with that of another” (Warren 280). Warren is correct in her assessment that the

relationship between fetus and mother is unique. This uniqueness is what creates the obligation

upon the mother as I have argued previously in this essay. Warren though seems to want to put this

fetus-mother relationship in adversarial terms which is a mistake, in my opinion. It does not have

to be all or none (Warren 101).

“To try to “protect” the fetus ... potentially to expose her to violent physical assaults such as would

not be legally condoned in any other type of case” (Warren 280). This is an extreme position that

does not contain extreme evidence. There may have been historically good reasons why Warren

feels this way but they are outdated (Murray 300). Simply “establishing that women have moral

duties to their not-yet-born-children does not justify automatically coercive public policies to force

them to fulfill those obligations” (Murray 302). Using the “Child-As-Maximum” principle frees us

from the possible violent physical assaults that are of concern to Warren (Murray 299). This

principle states that “our obligations to ensure the fetus’ welfare can equal but not exceed our

obligations to a born child” (Murray 299). This would create an “upper bound for our duties to a

not-yet-born child” (Murray 300). Harming one person for the benefit of another, both born, is not

accepted nor should it be. There must be consideration left for other factors in a woman’s life.
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“Our common error has been to focus exclusively on a pregnant woman’s duty to avoid harming

her fetus, without regard for the multitude of other moral considerations she ought to include in

her decision” (Murray 302). It is simply that a woman has an obligation to avoid, as much as

possible, knowable and foreseeable causes of harm to her fetus. It would be difficult to legislate all

the possible factors that affect each individual.

6. Discriminates Against Women

“But, granting the uniqueness of pregnancy, why is it women’s rights that should be privileged?”

(Warren 280). I would also argue that it is during pregnancy that a woman’s rights are privileged

because women and men are not equal. Women are unique in that they and only they can bear

children. As a reflection of this capability society is obliged and does extend large portions of

health care for prenatal care. If we use the “Child-As-Maximum” (Murray 299) we can extend the

obligations equally to the father, family members and even society.

7. A Fetus Is Not A Person

Sherwin argues that fetuses “are not persons because they have not developed sufficiently in social

relationships to be persons in any morally significant sense” (Sherwin 289). Warren continues that

“human persons - and perhaps all persons – normally come into existence only in and through

social relationships” (Warren 275). Neither writer provides the number of relationships a being

must have for it to become a person. To be fair, Sherwin does expand her moral significance of a

fetus to include the mother. “Their very existence is relational, developing as they do within

particular women’s bodies, and their principal relationship is to the women who carry them. On

this view, fetuses are morally significant, but their status is relational rather than absolute”

(Sherwin 287). Again Warren is in line with Sherwin on the social changes at birth. The fetus
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“becomes involved in social relationships with others, of kinds that can only be dimly

foreshadowed before birth” (Murray 276). I don’t feel that either writer considers all of those

involved. The fetus as a yet-to-be-born person might not have actual relationships but the

knowledge of its existence creates in many expectations of relationships so real that they cannot be

discounted as dim foreshadows. The expected arrival of a new family member creates obligations

on both parents and extended family members. People expecting a baby live their life in a morally

when situation not an if”.

8. Conclusion

It is possible for a woman to have obligations to her child. If the “Child-As-Maxim” rule as

Murray outlines it were considered, the rule would protect women from any type of violent or

invasive assaults. It would also hold everyone equally accountable for the welfare of yet-to-be-

born children, not just women. The question of personhood fails to consider everyone involved in

the fetus’ life. In addition, we are dealing with a being that will undoubtedly become a person. The

unique relationship that a mother and fetus share, of which there is no debate, is what in and of

itself creates unique obligations upon the mother. To want to have a child and then to do things to

impede that want is logically unacceptable. If a fetus is considered in a temporal context as a soon-

to-be person and then compared with a recently-was person, an extension of obligations does not

seem so strange. The fear of one’s loss of autonomy is a valid fear, but when considered in

perspective of the limits society already places on our autonomy this claim begins to loose its

power. Any autonomy we already have is limited by many obligations that we already have,

legislated or not, to all members of society, including those that are, those that were, and those that

will be.
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Works Cited

Boetzkes, Elisabeth Airini, and Wilfrid J. Waluchow. Readings in Health Care

Ethics. Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2000.

Langerak, Edward A., “Litening to the Middle” in: Howell, Joseph H., and

William F. Sale. Life Choices: A Hastings Center Introduction to Bioethics. Hastings

Center studies in ethics.

Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1995.

Ross, W. D. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.

Word Count Total: 1870