Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
Virtuous City
Islamic Philosophy, Theology
and Science
Texts and Studies
Edited by
Hans Daiber
Anna Akasoy
Emilie Savage-Smith
Volume Lxxxi
Prophetic Niche in the
Virtuous City
The Concept of H ikmah in
Early Islamic Thought
By
Hikmet Yaman
Leiden boston
2011
Cover illustration: Paper marbling, Smeyra Yaman; Calligraphy, Nurettin Yldzs
private collection; Composition and design, Ouzetin.
The illustration refers to a notion in Islamic thought and arts, stating that
philosophy/wisdom originates from the niche/lamp of prophetic revelation. The
lamp in the illustration signifies prophetic knowledge and wisdom. The lamp is
covered by ebru, a traditional Islamic-Turkish art of paper marbling. The tulip in
the center of this marbling symbolizes God in traditional Islamic arts. The Arabic
calligraphy on and above the lamp is a Quranic verse (2:269) meaning,He (God)
gives hikmah (wisdom) to whom ever He wills. And the light (of revelation and
prophecy) coming from the lamp illuminates the mind and soul.
Yaman, Hikmet.
Prophetic niche in the virtuous city : the concept of hikmah in early Islamic
thought / by Hikmet Yaman.
p. cm. (Islamic philosophy, theology, and science ; v. 81)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-18662-0 (hardback : alk. paper)
1. Islamic philosophyHistory. 2. Knowledge, Theory of (Islam) 3. Islam
DoctrinesHistory. I. Title. II. Series.
B745.K53Y36 2011
181.07dc22
2010043088
ISSN 0169-8729
ISBN 978 90 04 18662 0
EISBN 978 90 04 19106 8
Acknowledgments .............................................................................. xi
Introduction ........................................................................................ 1
Part one
Part Two
Part three
Chapter Seven: H ikmah and the Earliest Sufi Authorities .......... 107
. Al-H asan al-Basr ........................................................................... 107
. Jafar al-Sdiq .................................................................................. 109
Part Four
The
many teachers,
colleagues, and friends who
supported the project through
their sincere companionship and
insights include Rahim Acar, Cemil
Aydn, William C. Chittick, Ann Cooper,
Recep G. Gkta, Trudy Kamperveen, M.
Erol Kl, Linda Mishkin, Shankar Nair,
Martin Nguyen, amil cal, Jennifer
Petrallia, Himmet Takmr, Robert
Wisnovsky, and M. Ali Yldrm.
The Yaman family has provided its own brand of support: I have
been blessed with the prayers of my parents, Asiye and Ziya Yaman;
the commitment of my sister Emine Yaman Akhan; the dedication of my
wife, Smeyra Yaman; and the joys of our children, Ziya and Zeynep Yaman.
INTRODUCTION
1
A more comprehensive scholarly analysis of h ikmah in wide-ranging Muslim
scholarship would be expected to discuss h ikmah in early legal ( fiqh), theological
(kalm), and ethical (akhlq) works as well. I will include h ikmah as an ethical con-
cept in the context of my philosophical discussions on h ikmah. As for the concept
of h ikmah in fiqh and kalm, though my plan in the initial stages of the book was
to assign separate chapters to the analysis of h ikmah in these two fields as well, after
preliminary research with this idea in mind, I concluded that it would be a more
realistic project to address h ikmah in fiqh and kalm literatures in separate detailed
studies. In Islamic legal works, h ikmah is elaborated upon in the context of the pur-
pose of legislation (h ikmah tashriyyah) and related to other concepts in this regard,
including illah (effective cause, or ratio legis, or a particular ruling), sabab (cause),
maslah ah (considerations of public interest), and maqsid (goals and objectives). For
further details see, Zak al-Dn Shabn, Usl al-Fiqh al-Islm (Beirut, 1974), 136158.
Muslim theologians, on the other hand, explain h ikmah in the context of their dis-
cussions on the purpose of the creation (h ikmah takwniyyah) and relate it to other
associated concepts such as ghyah (objective), nizm ([divine] organization), gharad
(purpose), and maqsad (intention). See, for instance, Ab Mansr al-Mturd, Kitb
2 introduction
al-Tawh d, ed. Bekir Topalolu and Muhammed Aruci (Istanbul, 2003), 151158, and
Ab H mid al-Ghazl, al-H ikmah fi-makhlqt Allh Azzah wa-Jallah, in Majmah
Rasil al-Imm al-Ghazl (Beirut, 1996), 746.
introduction 3
topic and its context within comparative Semitic studies lies beyond
the scope of the book.
I focus on primary lexicographical materials in my investigations
of the meanings of the Arabic root h -k-m with a special attention to
h ikmah. In addition to lexicographical works in the technical sense of
the word, I look to more specialized dictionaries oriented mainly toward
Qurnic vocabulary and terminology, examining the topic in the writ-
ings of Muqtil b. Sulaymn, Yahy b. Sallm, al-Rghib al-Isfahn,
as well as of Ab Hill al-Askar, al-Sayyid al-Sharf al-Jurjn, and
al-Tahnaw. I also discuss the related arguments of contemporary
western scholars, especially the work of Franz Rosenthal and Dimitri
Gutas. In the latter case, it becomes clear that neglect of contextual
and interdisciplinary peculiarities of h ikmah across the spectrum of
Islamic scholarly disciplines has led to inaccurate conclusions regard-
ing it as a concept.
In Part ii, I examine h ikmah in the early Muslim exegetical litera-
ture. As it occurs in the Qurn, h ikmah is often coupled with the word
kitb. Early Muslim commentators of the Qurn thus came to link it to
the divine revelation in the form of the revealed books and prophetic
practice. They came to emphasize the practical aspect of h ikmah and
argued that there is a causal relationship between sincere piety and
being given h ikmah, as attested to in the h adth, Whoever worships
God sincerely for forty days, the springs of h ikmah gush out from his
heart to his tongue.2
According to the Qurn, God is the ultimate possessor of h ikmah. He
is called al-H akm, and this is one of the Most Beautiful Names of God
(al-asm al-h usn). God also grants this preferential gift to His distin-
guished servants. The Qurn states that God has given h ikmah to the
prophets in general and to those from Abrahams progenyincluding
David, Jesus, and Muhammadin particular. In a general framework,
the Qurn says that God gives h ikmah to whomever He wills; the ideal
personification of the latter is Luqmn, who is not typically regarded in
early Muslim writings as a prophet, but is seen as a pious and upright
person who enjoyed h ikmah. Part ii addresses the diverse ways these
early commentators of the Qurn interpreted h ikmah.
After an analysis of the context of h ikmah in all of its appearances in
Qurnic verses and commentaries, I discuss the diverse interpretations
2
Quoted in al-Suyt , al-Durr al-manthr f al-tafsr al-mathr (Beirut, 1983), 2:69.
4 introduction
3
Dimitri Gutas, Classical Arabic Wisdom Literature: Nature and Scope, Journal
of the American Oriental Society 101, no. 1 (1981): 4986.
introduction 5
especially referring in this context to his works Essai sur les origines du lexique tech-
nique de la mystique musulmane (Paris, 1968) and Recueil de textes indits concernant
lhistoire de la mystique en pays dislam (Paris, 1929).
6 introduction
Ibn Sn, Uyn al-h ikmah, ed. Muwaffaq F. al-Jabr (Damascus, 1996), 64.
5
Ibn Sn, for instance, uses the word h ikmah in the sense of metaphysics and
6
defines it as the best knowledge of the best thing known. In his terminology,
this h ikmah is knowledge that yields certainty ( yaqn) of God. Ibn Sn, al-Shif:
al-Ilhiyyt, eds. Georges Anawt, et al. (Cairo, 1960), 15.
7
Al-Kind, Rasil al-Kind al-falsafiyyah, ed. Muhammad Abd al-Hd Ab Rdah
(Cairo, 19501953), 97.
8
In this context, I am referring especially to Gutas reading of the history of Islamic
philosophy and his criticism of the writings of Corbin and Nasr in this relation. See
Gutas, The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: An Essay on the
Historiography of Arabic Philosophy, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 29.1
(2002). By way of further clarification on this topic, especially when I use the term
philosophy of mankind, I am not, by any means, attempting to deny essential Ara-
bic and Islamic components of this philosophical tradition and to propose univer-
salism versus the Arabic-Islamic context of falsafah. Without neglecting the context of
introduction 7
to better understand this issue. For example, al-Kind depicts his con-
ception of philosophy as h ikmah and his perception of the history of
philosophy as a search for universal truth. He pictures this history as
a cooperative and cumulative tradition; he further sees it as a progres-
sive process of intellectualizing eternal truth, which, again, is h ikmah.9
Al-Kind searched for knowledge of the real nature of things, and, like
his followers al-Frb and Ibn Sn, he did not see himself as a pas-
sive recipient of the philosophers of the past; rather, he saw himself as
responsible for improving their intellectual legacy by completing their
statements, mending the deficiencies of their systems, and perfect-
ing their methods. According to al-Kind, philosophy is a cumulative
intellectual progression of mankind, which has an unbroken chain of
representatives among every human generation throughout history;
he envisages himself as a part of this distinguished community in his
lifetime, himself a custodian of truth or h ikmah.
Thus, I examine h ikmah in early Arabic lexicography, including an
analysis of the Arabic root h -k-m, its primary meanings in the Arabic
language, and its basic derivatives. I further investigate h ikmah in the
works on technical terminology in Islamic scholarly disciplines and
review contemporary western scholarship on the meaning of h ikmah.
Following this, I address early Muslim exegetical literature, investigate
h ikmah in the Qurn, together with its semantic relationship with
the word kitb (book), analyze the word h ikmah in each Qurnic
instance within its own context and reconstruct the meaning, usages,
and relational semantic components of h ikmah in the writings of early
Muslim exegetes. In a detailed examination of h ikmah in Sufi literature,
I delve into Sufi exegetical works, examining the network of associated
mystical concepts and focusing on the particular relation of h ikmah
to other epistemological concepts in Sufism. I also treat h ikmah as a
practical or applied concept found in the writings of the earliest Muslim
mystics, as they argue that, being a meritorious notion, h ikmah cannot
be properly understood or actualized without this aspect. Finally, by
looking to h ikmah in early philosophical literature, I investigate the
earliest Muslim philosophers reception and conception of philosophy
in its particular relation to h ikmah as it is mentioned in the primary
philosophical thinking in Islam, I merely emphasize the idea that in the views of the
earliest falsifah, the search for truth is not restricted to one nation or religion.
9
Al-Kind, 103.
8 introduction
It has been argued that the root h -k-m in the Arabic language expresses
primarily juridical and administrative or governmental activity, as
opposed to its use in other Semitic languages, in which it has long
denoted the idea of wisdom. In accordance with this historical
semantic background, it has been suggested that the Arabic words
h ikmah and h akm, in the sense of wisdom and wise, respectively,
and any derivation from this root that seems to imply wisdom, owe
their origin to foreign influence.1 I cannot completely disregard this
possibility for two simple reasons: first, I have not investigated the
original meaning/s of the root h -k-m in the context of comparative
Semitic languages; and second, for the time being, we do not possess
sufficient original, physical texts in ancient pre-Islamic Arabic to reject
or prove this argument. The earliest linguistic documents in which
we can examine the situation are later pre-Islamic Arabic materials,
primarily poetry, that have survived to our day; unfortunately, how-
ever, they do not help us in a satisfactory manner because they do not
include attestations (shawhid) for the word h ikmah sufficient to lead
us to well-argued conclusions.2
Facing this visibly unpromising scholarly situation, nevertheless, my
presentation in the following pages regarding the meanings of the root
h -k-m in the Arabic language in general, and of h ikmah in particular,
will, it is hoped, give some evidence that Arabic lexicographers do
provide enough materials to guide us to the conclusion that during
pre- and early Islamic times the Arabic words h ikmah and h akm could
carry the sense of wisdom. Lexicographers of the Arabic language
introduce a highly inclusive philological articulation for the root h -k-m
1
Horovitz, Koranische Untersuchungen (Berlin and Leipzig, 1926), 72; Jeffery, The
Foreign Vocabulary of the Qurn (Lahore, 1977), 111; Rosenthal, Knowledge Trium-
phant (Leiden, 1971), 37.
2
Alfred Bloch, Zur altarabischen Spruchdichtung, in Weststliche Abhandlungen,
ed. F. Meier (Wiesbaden, 1954), 181224. Bloch says, In der vorislamischen Gnomik
fehlt das Wort h ikmah bezeichnenderweise fast ganz, 221; Gutas, Classical Arabic
Wisdom Literature, 51.
10 part one
such that we must allow the possibility that the root is related to wis-
dom in Arabic as well. The existence of pre-Islamic Arabic gnomic
literature (h ikam/h ikmiyyt)3 and sages (h ukam al-Arab), including
the legendary Luqmn b. d, who uttered these wise sayings, can also
be seen as evidence that the words h ikmah and h akm were in use in
the Arabic language even before the rise of Islam.4
Methodologically speaking, my position is as plausible as that of
those who argue that the Arabic word h ikmah in the sense of wisdom
owes its origin to foreign influence. Within the study of the historical
development of the Arabic language, their argument is highly specula-
tive. It lacks the textual basis of a pre-Islamic stage of Arabic that is
required to examine the broader semantic environment of the word
h ikmah, such that they could claim that it did not originally have the
sense of wisdom. The burden of proof is thus theirs, and my argu-
ment is, at least, defensible, because it can be sustained by the early
Islamic sources available.
By way of compromise between the two positions we may assert
that, considering the limited extant linguistic materials in ancient pre-
Islamic Arabic and the absence of any mention of h ikmah in the sense
of wisdom, we cannot identify, positively, the origin of h ikmah in this
sense in the Arabic language. It might well have entered into Arabic
with this meaning from other Semitic languages and become indigenous
over time, as foreign loan words tend to follow this progression. In this
case, the absence of h ikmah in those materials might be because it had
not penetrated into the repository of the true arabiyyah, that is, poetry,
3
The initial coinage and use of this term to refer to this literary genre is some-
thing of an intractable question. With regard to the age of wisdom literature in Ara-
bic, we only really know that oral wisdom literature existed even before the Prophet
Muhammads lifetime. At present, we do not have sufficient linguistic documents to
lead us to clearly-stated conclusions regarding whether or not there also existed in
his time written materials (books, scrolls, etc.) containing wisdom literature. For this
question see Gutas, Classical Arabic Wisdom Literature, 4957.
4
If one is to subscribe to the idea of a foreign origin for h ikmah in the sense of
wisdom, the possibility of Greek influence, rather than the Semitic one, might be a
more defensible argument. In this case, one may be arguing that h ikmah, understood
as wisdom and maxim, entered Islam under the influence of a pre-Islamic gnomic
literature. For a monograph presenting a bio-bibliographical account of the oldest
collections of proverbs and maxims in Arabic, see Mohsen Zakeri, Persian Wisdom
in Arabic Garb (Leiden, 2007). In this study, Zakeri has edited and translated Al b.
Ubayda al-Rayhns (d. ca. 219/834) works, including his famous Jawhir al-kilam
wa-farid al-h ikam, which is a treasury of ancient proverbs, proverbial phrases, and
popular sayings. I owe this last reference to Hans Daiber.
h ikmah in early arabic lexicography 11
but was already part of the language of the Arab Jews, Christians, and
h unaf,5 who employed h ikmah in the sense of wisdom throughout
their h ikam.
My discussions in part i are limited to lexicographical materials in
the Arabic language and their semantic relation to h ikmah in the sense
of wisdom. By focusing on such primary materials, I analyze the
meanings of the Arabic root h -k-m with a special attention to h ikmah.
In the first chapter, I use works that are lexicographical in the techni-
cal sense of the word, while in the second chapter, I examine more
specialized dictionaries oriented mainly toward Qurnic vocabulary
and terminology. Since I investigate h ikmah in the Qurn based on
tafsr literature in part ii, here I only cover Qurnic quotations to the
extent that they are explained in these Arab-Islamic philological works.
In the third chapter, I discuss related arguments in secondary sources
in western languages.
5
I owe this explanation to Wolfhart Heinrichs.
Chapter one
1
Al-Khall b. Ahmad, Kitb al-Ayn, eds. Mahd al-Makhzm and Ibrhm
al-Smarr (Baghdad, 19801985), 3:6667. For this basic meaning of the root
h -k-m see also, Ibn Durayd, Jamharat al-lughah, ed. Ramz Munr Baalbakk (Beirut,
19871988), 1:564; al-Azhar, Tahdhb al-lughah, eds. Abd al-Karm al-Azabw and
Muhammad Al al-Najjr (Cairo, 19641967), 4:114; Isml b. Abbd, al-Muh t f
al-lughah, ed. Muhammad H asan l Ysn (Beirut, 1994), 3:387; Isml b. H ammd
al-Jawhar, al-Sih h , tj al-lughah wa-sih h al-Arabiyyah, eds. Iml Bad Yaqb and
Muhammad Nabl T arf (Beirut, 1999), 5:226; al-Saghn, al-Takmilah wa-al-dhayl
wa-al-silah li-Kitb tj al-lughah wa-sihh al-Arabiyyah, eds. Ibrhm Isml al-Abyr
and Muhammad Khalaf Allh Ahmad (Cairo, 1977), 5:618; Ibn Fris, Mujam maqys
al-lughah, ed. Ibrhm Shams al-Dn (Beirut, 1999), 1:311; Ibn Fris, Mujmal al-
lughah, ed. Hd H asan H ammd (Kuwait, 1985), 2:94; Ibn Sdah, al-Muh kam wa-al-
muh t al-azam, ed. Abd al-H amd Hindw (Beirut, 2000), 3:51; al-Zamakhshar,
Ass al-balghah (Beirut, 1996), 89; Ibn Manzr, Lisn al-Arab (Cairo, 1981), 2:953;
al-Frzbd, al-Qms al-Muh t (Egypt, 1884), 3:97; Murtad al-Zabd, Tj al-ars
min jawhir al-Qms, ed. Al Shr (Beirut, 1994), 16:161162.
2
Al-Khall b. Ahmad, 3:67; al-Azhar, 4:114; Isml b. Abbd, 3:387; al-Jawhar,
5:226; Ibn Fris, Mujam, 1:311; Ibn Fris, Mujmal, 2:94; Ibn Sdah, 3:51;
14 chapter one
al-Zamakhshar, Ass al-balghah, 89; Majd al-Dn Ibn al-Athr, al-Nihyah f gharb
al-h adth wa-al-athar, ed. Al b. H asan al-H alab (Dammm, 2000), 223; Ibn Manzr,
2:954; al-Frzbd, 3:97; al-Zabd, 16:162.
3
Ibn Sdah, 3:51; al-Saghn, 5:618; Ibn al-Athr, 223; Ibn Manzr, 2:954;
al-Frzbd, 3:97; al-Zabd, 16:162.
4
Ibn al-Athr, 223; Ibn Manzr, 2:954; al-Zabd, 16:162.
5
Ibn al-Athr, 223; Ibn Manzr, 2:954; al-Zabd, 16:162.
6
Ibn al-Athr, 223; Ibn Manzr, 2:954.
7
Even though the word h akamah is referring here to the actual bit, its application
to man is clearly figurative.
8
Al-Khall b. Ahmad, 3:67; Isml b. Abbd, 3:387; al-Jawhar, 5:226; Ibn Fris,
Mujam, 1:311; Ibn Fris, Mujmal, 2:94; Ibn Sdah, 3:51; al-Zamakhshar, Ass
al-balghah, 89; Ibn Manzr, 2:953; al-Zabd, 16:161. Some lexicographers use the
word rajaa (to restrain, refrain, hold back) as a synonym of manaa in their exposi-
tions of the root h -k-m. See for instance, al-Zabd, 16:161.
9
Al-Jawhar, 5:226; Ibn Fris, Mujam, 1:311; Ibn Fris, Mujmal, 2:94;
al-Zamakhshar, Ass al-balghah, 89; Ibn Manzr, 2:953; al-Zabd, 16:161.
the derivation of the word h ikmah 15
Atqana: to perfect. The verbal form ah kama means also atqana (to
perfect, do expertly, skillfully, firmly, or soundly) as it appears in the
saying Experiences have rendered him firm, or sound, in judgment
(qad ah kamathu al-tajribu).12 Another verbal form, istah kama,
similarly denotes It/He has become muh kam (perfect or sound).13
The word uh kima (the passive voice of ah kama) that appears in the
Qurnic verse 11:1, A book whose verses are set clear, precise, or
perfected (uh kimat ytuh) has a similar meaning, i.e., its verses are
set clear, precise, or perfected by commanding (amr) and prohibit-
ing (nahy), and the statement of what is lawful (h all ) and unlawful
(h arm); and then (they are) expounded ( fussi lat), i.e., by prom-
ising (wad) and threatening (wad). Ibn Sdah (d. 458/1066) asserts
that the verses of the Qurn are set clear, precise, or perfected and
10
Al-Azhar, 4:113; al-Zamakhshar, Ass al-balghah, 89; Ibn al-Athr, 223; Ibn
Manzr, 2:953; al-Zabd, 16:162.
11
Ibn al-Athr, 223; Ibn Manzr, 2:953; al-Zabd, 16:162.
12
Al-Khall b. Ahmad, 3:66; al-Azhar, 4:113; Ibn Sdah, 3:50; al-Zamakhshar, Ass
al-balghah, 89; Ibn Manzr, 2:953.
13
Al-Khall b. Ahmad, 3:67; al-Azhar, 4:113; Isml b. Abbd, 3:387; al-Jawhar,
5:226; Ibn Sdah, 3:50; Ibn Manzr, 2:953; al-Zabd, 16:161.
16 chapter one
Qad: to judge. The root h -k-m in general and the verbal form
h akama in particular hold the meaning of qad (to judge, rule, or
administer) as well. Since scholars of the language focus mainly on
14
Ibn Sdah, 3:50. See also, Ibn Manzr, 2:953; al-Zabd, 16:161.
15
Ibn Sdah, 3:50.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibn Manzr, 2:952; al-Zabd, 16:163.
18
Ibn Manzr, 2:952; Ibn al-Athr, 223; al-Zabd, 16:163.
the derivation of the word h ikmah 17
19
Al-Jawhar, 5:225; Ibn Sdah, 3:49; Ibn Manzr, 2:951952; al-Frzbd, 3:97;
al-Zabd, 16:160.
20
Al-Zabd, 16:160.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibn Manzr, 2:952; al-Zabd, 16:160.
23
Al-Zabd, 16:160.
24
Ibn al-Athr, 223; Ibn Manzr, 2:951952; al-Zabd, 16:165.
25
Al-Suyt i, al-Durr al-manthr, 6:513.
18 chapter one
(safah). Some scholars assert that with the word h ukm, the Prophet
meant admonitions (mawiz) and proverbs/adages (amthl ) from
which people would benefit.26
Besides its usage as a technical term in the context of Islamic legal
studies, the word h ukm has far-ranging connotations in the Arabic
language. Its sense of qad does not refer to an arbitrary judicial deci-
sion. Rather, it is closely related to other meanings of the root h -k-m,
especially to the idea of a wise course of action. A qd is a h kim who
is expected to be a knowledgeable, competent, insightful, and under-
standing person, such that he could give a just and wise judgment.
The meaning of the word wisdom in English includes such ideas of
knowledge, judgment, and insight as well. The definition qad for the
Arabic root h -k-m, therefore, may also be interpreted as implying this
sense of wisdom.
26
Ibn Manzr, 2:951952.
27
Al-Khall b. Ahmad, 3:66; Isml b. Abbd, 3:387; Ibn Sdah, 3:50; Ibn Manzr,
2:953.
28
Ibn Fris, Mujam, 1:311; Ibn Fris, Mujmal, 2:94.
29
Ibn al-Athr, 223; Ibn Manzr, 2:951952; al-Zabd, 16:165.
the derivation of the word h ikmah 19
30
Al-Jh iz, Kitb al-H ayawn, ed. Abd al-Salm Muhammad Hrn (Cairo, 1966
1969), 5:555.
31
I have followed Gutas translation with some modifications of my own. Gutas,
Classical Arabic Wisdom Literature, 51.
32
Ibid., 51.
33
Ibn Durayd, 1:564.
34
Ibn al-Athr, 223; al-Zabd, 16:165.
35
Al-Zabd, 16:165.
20 chapter one
36
Ibid., 16:161.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibn Sdah, 3:50.
the derivation of the word h ikmah 21
Ibn Sdahs explanations on the basis of these two verses imply that
he identifies these h ikmahsboth are definiteprimarily with the
institution of prophethood or revelation; in the first case he attributes
h ikmah to the Qurn and in the second one to the Gospel.
Al-Zabd introduces quite an elaborate discussion of the meaning of
the word h ikmah in the Qurn. He lists three verses in which, accord-
ing to him, h ikmah means prophethood, as in 3:48, He (God) will
teach him (Jesus) the Book and the h ikmah; 2:251, God gave him
(David) the kingship and the h ikmah; and 38:20, We (God) gave
him (David) the h ikmah. The word h ikmah occurs also in the sense of
the Qurn, the Torah, and the Gospel, for each of these comprises the
h ikmah of that which is spoken (al-h ikmah al-mantq bih), which is the
secrets of the sciences of the Law and the Path (asrr ulm al-sharah
wa-al-tarqah). These heavenly books also contain the h ikmah of that
which is not spoken, or ineffable h ikmah (al-h ikmah al-maskt anh),
which is the science of the secrets of the Divine Essence (ilm asrr
al-h aqqah al-ilhiyyah).39 In this last section of his discussion, al-Zabd
evidently refers to Sufi terminology.
Al-Zabd mentions the verse 2:269, He (God) gives h ikmah to
whomever He wants, and whoever is given h ikmah has been given much
good and argues that the word h ikmah here means [knowledge of] the
interpretation of the Qurn and speaking that which is correct regarding
it. Al-Zabd further defines the h ikmah as obedience to God (tat
Allh), comprehension in matters of religion (al-fiqh f al-dn) and
acting in accordance with it (al-amal bihi), understanding ( fahm),
pious fear (khashyah), moral scrupulousness (wara), doing/say-
ing that which is right (isbah), and reflecting (tafakkur) upon the
command[s] of God and adherence to them.40 Al-Zabd simply lists
all these definitions for the h ikmah in this verse, but without providing
any further attestations (shawhid), Qurnic or otherwise.
The word h ikmah is also defined as knowledge of the most excel-
lent things by the most excellent [kind of] knowledge (marifat afdal
al-ashy bi-afdal al-ulm). Accordingly, the h akm is the one who
executes the niceties of the crafts masterfully and perfects them ( yuh sin
daqiq al-sint wa-yutqinuh).41 This is one of the basic philosophical
39
Al-Zabd, 16:161.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibn Manzr, 2:951.
22 chapter one
The words al-h akam, al-h akm, and al-h kim, including ah kam
al-h kimn (the most qualified to judge among those who judge or
the most capable of those who possess the attribute of h ikmah) are
among the names of God mentioned in the Qurn.43 God is the Just
judge in His judgment,44 He is the possessor of h ikmah45 and of h ukm.46
With regard to their usage as attributes of God, the meanings of the
words al-h akam, al-h akm, and al-h kim are very close to each other.47
In addition, the words h akam, h akm, and h kim are used to describe
human qualities; a knowledgeable person or possessor of h ikmah is
called h akm. A person who does things perfectly or masterfully is
named h akm as well.48
As to its morphological pattern, Arabic lexicographers assert that the
word h akm in the pattern of fal could semantically be associated with
h kim, muh kim, or muh kam, in the patterns of fil (i.e., active participle
of the first form), mufil (i.e., active participle of the fourth form), or
mufal (i.e., passive participle of the fourth form), respectively.
According to Majd al-Dn Ibn al-Athr (d. 606/1209), the words
h akam and h akm are among the Most Beautiful Names of God, and
both words denote al-h kim, which in turn means judge (qd). In mor-
phological terms, the word h akm is in the pattern of fal in the sense
of fil (i.e., h kim); or he (the h akm) is one who perfects things, thus
it is in the pattern of fal in the sense of mufil (i.e., muh kim). Some
scholars argue that h akm is the possessor of h ikmah (dh al-h ikmah)
and h ikmah means knowledge of the most excellent of things by the
most excellent [kind] of knowledge. H akm is also used to describe
42
Al-Frzbd, 3:97.
43
See for instance, 6:114, 2:32, 2:129, 7:87, 10:109, 11:45, 95:8.
44
Ibn Durayd, 1:564.
45
Isml b. Abbd, 3:386.
46
Ibn Manzr, 2:951.
47
Ibid.
48
Al-Jawhar, 5:225; Ibn Manzr, 2:953.
the derivation of the word h ikmah 23
those who execute the niceties of the crafts masterfully and perfect
them.49 Ibn Manzr mentions other words on the pattern fal that
possess the same meaning in their fil pattern, such as the words qadr
(powerful ) and alm (knowledgeable) as in the senses of qdir and
lim,50 respectively, but he does not mention any word in the pattern
of fal as in the sense of mufil.
Regarding the h adth describing the Qurn, It (the Qurn) is the
wise remembrance (al-dhikr al-h akm), Arabic lexicographers assert
that the word h akm here means that the Qurn is a remembrance
that decides in ones favor or against ones favor; or it denotes that
the Qurn is perfected and there is nothing in it that could be called
disagreement or defect. Thus in this context, h akm is on the pattern
of fal in the sense of mufal (i.e., muh kam).51
The semantic framework of the word and its usage are indeed highly
inclusive; this can be seen even in well-known historical events. Scholars
of the Arabic language mention Ab Ms al-Ashar and Amr b.
al-s as the two arbitrators (h akamn) between Al and Muwiyah
when the two were on the verge of declaring war on each other. A
group of people who opposed the idea of judgment between the two
parties detached themselves from Al and on this occasion, the term
Khawrij (lit., those who go out) was coined to designate them. As the
oldest religious sect in Islam, they were called the muh akkimah because
they rejected the judgment of the h akamayn. In their view, judgment
(h ukm) belonged only to God (l h ukma ill li-Allh);52 this was their
slogan against Al and Muwiyah, and from this their appellation was
derived. These people were also called the H arriyyah and, referring to
their disallowance of any judgment other than by God, the expression
tah km al-h arriyyah was coined to describe their situation.53
Ibn Abbd (d. 385/995) refers to another meaning of the word
h akm closely related to the very basic meaning of the root h -k-m, that
is, to prevent, restrain, or withhold. He states that the h akm is the
person who holds his soul back from its caprice and who is vigilant
(mutayaqqiz).54 The expression h akuma al-rajulu is used to praise a
person when he attains and becomes imbued with the very meaning of
this quality.55 When a person becomes a wise man (h akm), the expres-
sion qad ah kamathu al-tajribu (experiences have rendered him firm
or sound in judgment) is used to portray his condition.56
In addition to their mention of the Qurnic occurrences of h ukm
and/or h ikmah as attributes of God, the Qurn, prophets, and Luqmn,
lexicographers list some wise men and women among the Arabs of pre-
Islamic times (h ukam and h ukkm/h akmt al-Arab f al-jhiliyyah).
They mention for instance, Aktham b. Sayf, H jib b. Zurrah, Abd
al-Mut t alib (the Prophets grandfather), and Ab T lib (the Prophets
paternal uncle) among the h ukam al-Arab f al-jhiliyyah. As for wise
women (h akmt), scholars list the names, for instance, of Suhr bint
Luqmn, Hind bint al-Khuss, Jumah bint H bis, and Ibnat mir b.
al-Z arib.57 The tribe of Tamm were known for their wisdom and Ibn
Durayd mentions that Aktham b. Sayf, who belonged to this tribe,
was one of the foremost h ukam al-Arab. Aktham uttered many wise
sayings (lah kalm kathr f al-h ikmah).58 At the same time, a person
advanced in age is described as h akam.59
Arabic lexicographers define the words muh akkam and muh akkim
as well. They cite the verse by T arafah b. Abd (d. 560? c.e.), who
employed the word muh akkam, I wish that the muh akkam and the
admonished one (mawz) [myself] would be your voice at the time
when that which is false becomes visible.60 Scholars define the word,
as used here, as an old man strengthened by experiences [in affairs]
to whom h ikmah is attributed.61
54
Isml b. Abbd, 3:387.
55
Al-Azhar, 4:114.
56
Al-Azhar, 4:113; al-Zamakhshar, Ass al-balghah, 89; Ibn Manzr, 2:953.
57
Al-Frzbd, 3:97; al-Zabd, 16:160164. They also report some people named
by the words derived from the root h -k-m, such as H akam, H akm/H akmah, H akkm,
Ahkam, and the like.
58
Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies II, ed. S.M. Stern (New York, 1971), 191.
59
Isml b. Abbd, 3:388; al-Saghn, 5:618; al-Frzbd, 3:97; al-Zabd, 16:163.
60
Al-Saghn, 5:618; Ibn Fris, Mujam, 1:311; Ibn Fris, Mujmal, 2:94; Ibn Manzr,
2:953; al-Zabd, 16:163. Text in al-Zabd, 16:163, layta l-muh akkama wa-l-mawza
sawtakum tah ta t-turbi idh m l-btilu (i)n-kashaf.
61
Al-Jawhar, 5:227; al-Saghn, 5:618; Ibn Fris, Mujam, 1:311; Ibn Fris, Mujmal
2:94; al-Zamakhshar, Ass al-balghah, 89; Ibn Manzr, 2:953; al-Frzbd, 3:97;
al-Zabd, 16:163.
the derivation of the word h ikmah 25
62
Al-Jawhar, 5:227; Ibn Fris, Mujam, 1:311; Ibn Fris, Mujmal, 2:9495;
al-Zamakhshar, Ass al-balghah, 89; Ibn al-Athr, 223; Ibn Manzr, 2:953;
al-Frzbd, 3:97; al-Zabd, 16:163. The Ashb al-Ukhdd in this context seems
to refer to the Christians of Najrn slaughtered by Dh Nuws around 523 ce. The
expression occurs in the Qurn (85:48), Slain were the People of the Pit, the fire
abounding in fuel, when they were seated over it and were themselves witnesses of
what they did with the believers. They took revenge on them only because they believed
in the All-Mighty, the All-Praiseworthy. Muslim scholars report various interpreta-
tions for the Ashb al-Ukhdd. In addition to the Christians of Najrn, they state that
the expression may be an eschatological reference. For a list of the interpretations
see, Rudi Paret, Ashb al-Ukhdd, EI; Roberto Tottoli, The People of the Ditch,
Encyclopedia of the Qurn, ed. Jane D. McAuliffe (Leiden, 2007).
63
Ibn Manzr, 2:953; al-Zabd, 16:163. One may speculate that this h adth could be
a personal reference to the Prophet Muhammad and the first three of the al-Khulaf
al-Rshidn (rightly-guided caliphs), for Ab Bakr was known as the siddq, Umar
was assassinated and thus became a martyr, and Uthmn, in a sense, allowed himself
to be killed.
64
Ibn al-Athr, 223; Ibn Manzr, 2:953; al-Zabd, 16:163.
65
Al-Azhar, 4:115.
Chapter two
1
This branch of Qurnic sciences (ulm al-Qurn) focuses on multivalent and
synonymous words in the Qurn. More literally speaking, the wujh explains seman-
tical expansion of the same word having multiple meanings upon different occasions
of mention in the Qurn, such as hud (explanation, religion, belief, inviter...), salh
(belief, well-being, gentleness...), rh (mercy, a certain angel, Gabriel, revelation,
Jesus), and the like. The nazir, on the other hand, deals with different words having
the same meaning in the Qurn, such as jahannam, nr, saqar, h utamah, and jah m,
all of which mean hell. See for instance, Muqtil b. Sulaymn, Kitb al-Wujh wa-al-
nazir, ed. Ali zek (Istanbul, 1993).
2
The gharb al-Qurn literature elucidates uncommon or ambiguous words in
the Qurn. See for instance, Ibn Qutaybah, Tafsr gharb al-Qurn, ed. Ahmad Saqr
(Cairo, 1958) and al-Rghib al-Isfahn, Mufradt alfz al-Qurn, ed. Safwn Adnn
Dwd (Damascus, 1992).
3
Muqtil, Kitb al-Wujh, 29; Muqtil b. Sulaymn, al-Ashbh wa-al-nazir f
al-Qurn al-Karm, ed. Abd Allh Mahmd Shahtah (Cairo, 1975), 112. In order to
28 chapter two
b.The word h ukmMuqtil uses the word h ukm rather than h ikmah
and apparently groups them togethermeans understanding ( fahm)
and knowledge (ilm). This occurs in verses 31:12, Indeed, We (God)
gave Luqmn the h ikmah; 21:79, We (God) gave each of them
(David and Solomon) h ukm and ilm; and 6:89, Those are they to
whom We (God) gave the kitb and h ukm.
c.The word h ikmah means prophethood (nubuwwah). Examples of
this occurrence are in the verses 4:54, We (God) gave the people of
Abraham the Book and h ikmah; 38:20, We (God) gave him (David)
h ikmah and decisive speech (fasl al-khitb); and 2:251, God gave
him (David) kingship (mulk) and h ikmah.
d.The word h ikmah means interpretation (tafsr) of the Qurn as it
comes in the verse 2:269, Whoever is given the h ikmah, he is indeed
given much good.
e.The h ikmah means the Qurn, as it occurs in 16:125, Call to the way
of your Lord with the h ikmah.4
In his work al-Tasrf, Yahy b. Sallm (known also as Ibn Sallm)
(d. 200/815) introduces a semantic categorization for the word h ikmah
very similar to that of Muqtil. He, too, says that the word h ikmah has
five meanings (wujh):
a.It means [the notion or institution of] the prophetic practice
(sunnah)Ibn Sallm uses the word sunnah here instead of mawiz,
which is used by Muqtilthat exists in the Qurn with respect to
commanding, prohibiting, lawful, and unlawful. Ibn Sallm cites the
same verses that Muqtil does and concludes that in all these Qurnic
instances the word h ikmah is used in the sense of sunnah. Ibn Sallm
notes also that the historical origin of this definition goes back to
Qatdah (d. 118/736), who says that the words kitb and h ikmah
mean the Qurn and sunnah, respectively.
b.The word h ikmah means understanding ( fahm) and intellect/reason
(aql);5 Ibn Sallm uses the word aql instead of ilm, which is used by
Muqtil. This is the case in verse 19:12, in which Ibn Sallm explains
the word h ukm as fahm and aql. Muqtil mentions this verse under
the first category. Ibn Sallm provides a more reasonable classification
by placing this verse under the second category. In addition to the
make sure that this is not an editorial mistake, I have checked two different editions
of the book, but both editions available show the same categorization, thus an editorial
mistake can be, presumably, ruled out.
4
Muqtil, Kitb al-Wujh, 2829.
5
The word aql has subtle and comprehensive connotations in early Muslim writ-
ings. Accordingly, throughout the book I will use various English translations of this
word (intellect, intelligence, reason, rationality, mind, understanding, and the like)
depending on the context.
h ikmah in terminological dictionaries 29
verses cited by Muqtil, Ibn Sallm quotes two other verses describing
Josephs and Moses heavenly gift as being granted h ukm, 12:22, We
(God) gave him (Joseph) h ukm and ilm; and 28:14, We (God) gave
him (Moses) h ukm and ilm. Ibn Sallm asserts that the word h ukm
in these verses denotes aql and fahm.
It is worth mentioning that neither Muqtil nor Ibn Sallm distinguish
between h ikmah and h ukm in the Qurnic texts. This occurrence could
be a result of the linguistic convention that used the two words inter-
changeably, as I have discussed previously.
c.The word h ikmah means prophethood (nubuwwah). Ibn Sallm cites
the same Qurnic verses (i.e., 4:54, 38:20, and 2:251) as Muqtil does
in his classification above.
d.H ikmah means the Qurn externally (zhiran) and knowledge of its
interpretation (ilm tafsrih). This meaning comes in 2:269, Who-
ever is given h ikmah, i.e., the knowledge of that which exists in the
Qurn and reading of it externally or according to its apparent mean-
ing (qiratahu zhiran), is indeed given much good. Ibn Sallms
emphasis on the apparent meaning of the Qurn might refer to the
principle in Muslim exegetical studies that every kind of interpretive
attempt in relation to the Qurn should emerge out of the outward
senses of Qurnic statements.
e.The word h ikmah means the Qurn itself, as it occurs in 16:125, Call
to the way of your Lord with the h ikmah i.e., with the Qurn.6
In his work, Tah s l nazir al-Qurn, al-H akm al-Tirmidh (d. ca.
300/910) provides four meanings for the word h ikmah: comprehen-
sion (fiqh), knowledge (ilm), prophethood (nubuwwah), and judging
between people (al-qad bayn al-khalq). Al-Tirmidh introduces his
explanations in a sophisticated Sufi tone. He asserts that h ikmah is the
esoteric dimension of knowledge (btin al-ilm). The exoteric (zhir)
dimension is for the scholars of Gods command (al-ulam bi-amr
Allh). The esoteric dimension is for the scholars of God (al-ulam
6
Yahy b. Sallm, al-Tasrf, ed. Hind Shalab (Tunis, 1979), 201203. Within this
framework, al-Imm al-Shfi (d. 204/820) asserts that in the Qurnic instances where
the words kitb and h ikmah are mentioned together, the h ikmah refers to the Sun-
nah of the Prophet. Muhammad b. Idrs al-Shfi, al-Rislah, ed. Muhammad Sayyid
Kln (Cairo, 1983), 4445. Another author on al-wujh wa-al-nazir literature,
al-Damaghn (d. 478/1085), gives exactly the same five-fold semantic classification as
Muqtil does for the meaning of the word h ikmah. Al-Damaghn argues that h ikmah
mentioned in the Qurn is of five meanings (awjuh), as mawizah, fahm and ilm,
nubuwwah, tafsr al-Qurn, and al-Qurn. H usayn b. Muhammad al-Damaghn,
Islh al-wujh wa-al-nazir, ed. Abd al-Azz Sayyid al-Ahl (Beirut, 1970), 141142.
30 chapter two
7
Al-H akm al-Tirmidh, Tah s l nazir al-Qurn, ed. H usn Nasr Zaydn (Cairo,
1969), 10708. The expressions ulam bi-Allh and ulam bi-tadbr Allh seem to
refer to the notion of awliy (saints or friends of God), for Sufis believe that awliy
possess particularly the knowledge of God and His actions.
8
Al-Tirmidh, Tah s l, 156 and 365366.
9
Muhammad b. Uzayr al-Sijistn, Tafsr gharb al-Qurn, ed. Muhammad
al-Sdiq Qamhw (Egypt, 1970), 105.
10
Al-Rghib al-Isfahn, 248.
h ikmah in terminological dictionaries 31
Ibid., 249.
11
14
Al-Rghib al-Isfahn, 249.
15
Ibid., 249250.
16
Ibid., 250251.
17
A discussion of the word h ikmah in h adth dictionaries has been covered, in
part, in an earlier mention of related materials in the example of al-Nihyah f gharb
al-h adth wa-al-athar by Ibn al-Athr, thus, I omit a subsection on this genre of litera-
ture. In part ii, I examine h ikmah in early Muslim exegetical works and treat h ikmah
in the statements of the Prophet in the context of related Qurnic verses.
h ikmah in terminological dictionaries 33
a.It means muh kim, which is the active participle of the verb ah kama
(to perfect, do well), just as the word bad means mubdi (creator)
and sam means musmi (the one who has s.o. listen [to him]).18
Al-Askars first example looks appropriate, but the second one does
not seem to support his classification, for the sam does not, precisely,
mean musmi.
b.It means muh kam, which is the passive participle of the same verb,
as it (h akm) occurs in the Qurn 44:4, On that night every precise
matter (amr h akm) is made distinct. The word h akm here means
muh kam. If God is described by the word h ikmah in this sense, it
would be among His attributes of action (min sift filih).19
Apparently, in this and the following categories, al-Askar is referring
to a theological (kalm) question regarding the attributes of God. In
this context, the theologians (mutakallimn) categorize the attributes
of God found in the Qurn under two major groups, namely the
attributes of essence (sift al-dht) and the attributes of action (sift
al-fil). The first group of attributes, such as oneness (tawhd) and
eternity (qidam), belongs peculiarly to God, to the exclusion of other
beings. Accordingly, one may not describe a human being with these
attributes. As for the second group, the attributes of action, in addi-
tion to God, other beings may be described by these attributes, such
as knowledgeable (alm) and generous (karm), even though the
nature of these attributes differs substantially when we apply them to
God as opposed to other beings. It should be noted that this categori-
zation of the divine attributes is a highly controversial subject matter in
Muslim theological discussions. In general, Sunn theologians embrace
it, while the Mutazil mutakallimn do not draw any distinction of this
kind between the attributes of God found in the Qurn.20
c.It means the person knowledgeable about the correct determinations
of things (al-lim bi-ah km al-umr) and the word h akm in this
context is more specific than the word lim. If God is described by
the word h akm in this sense, then it would be among His attributes
of essence (min sift dhtih).21
Considering his explanations here, it would seem that al-Askar does
not precisely follow the prevailing understanding of the theological
18
Ab Hill al-Askar, al-Furq al-lughawiyyah, ed. Muhammad Ibrhm Salm
(Cairo, 1998), 96.
19
Ibid.
20
For further details see, Daniel Gimaret, Sifa, EI.
21
Al-Askar, al-Furq al-lughawiyyah, 96.
34 chapter two
question concerning the attributes of God, for he does not base his
distinction between the attributes of God on whether the attribute in
question belongs to God exclusively or not. Instead, he seems to base
his categorization on the quality or the level of perfection of the attri-
bute. His categorization, therefore, does not conform exactly to the
sift discussions in kalm in the technical sense.
A respected author on technical vocabulary in Islamic scholarly dis-
ciplines, al-Sayyid al-Sharf al-Jurjn (d. 816/1413), defines the word
h ikmah according to its context. He treats h ikmah as a term in various
Islamic disciplines and elucidates it accordingly. He enumerates five
definitions for the word h ikmah, as follows.22
a.H ikmah is a scholarly discipline (ilm) with which one searches for
the realities of things as they are in existence in accordance with the
capacity of man; thus it is a theoretical discipline (ilm nazar), not
an instrumental ( ghayr l) one. H ikmah is also the configuration
of the scholarly intellectual faculty (hayat al-quwwah al-aqliyyah
al-ilmiyyah), intermediary (al-mutawassit ah) between deception ( jar-
bazah), which is an exaggeration (ifrt) of this faculty, and stupidity
(baldah), which is falling short of it (tafrtuh).23
Evidently, al-Jurjn here defines h ikmah as a philosophical and ethical
term. I will discuss this definition of h ikmah in detail in part iv, where
I elaborate on the concept of h ikmah in early philosophical literature,
especially in the case of Ibn Sn (d. 428/1037).
The next definition of h ikmah in al-Jurjns al-Tarft is more puz-
zling, as it contains more than one item under the same definition. It
does not seem to reflect his own categorization, but all the editions of
the book that I have consulted have the same classification. Here is a
possible translation:
22
Here I follow the enumeration of the editor, Abd al-Rahmn Umayrah. I have
consulted two other (uncritical ) editions of the al-Tarft, and they have the same
categorization regarding the word h ikmah. The first is the Istanbul edition published
in 1867 and the second is the Beirut edition published in 1969. In addition to h ikmah,
al-Tarft lists two other derivatives of the root h -k-m, namely, h ukm (three instances)
and h ukam (three instances).
23
Al-Sayyid al-Sharf al-Jurjn, al-Tarft, ed. Abd al-Rahmn Umayrah (Beirut,
1987), 124.
h ikmah in terminological dictionaries 35
b.H ikmah has three meanings: creation (jd), knowledge (ilm), and
triangular24 (celestial) acts (al-af l al-muthallathah) just like the sun,
moon, and the others.
Ibn Abbs explained the h ikmah that exists in the Qurn as learn-
ing the permitted and prohibited things.
Some scholars say that the word h ikmah, lexicographically speaking,
means knowledge together with practice (al-ilm maa al-amal).
Some others say that people benefit from h ikmah in accordance with
the capacity of mankind to decide on what is the truth in reality.
It is said that every speech that is consistent with the truth is a
h ikmah.
It is also asserted that h ikmah is reasonable speech (al-kalm
al-maql) well-protected from interpolation (al-masn an
al-h ashw).25
Apparently here al-Jurjn is interested mainly in lexicographical defini-
tions of the word hikmah, though he also introduces the definitions of
hikmah found in Qurnic exegetical literature (in the example of Ibn
Abbs) and in philosophical works (the third definition). One may,
reasonably, wonder if this categorization reflects al-Jurjns original
systematization of the concept of hikmah throughout various Islamic dis-
ciplines, or if, perhaps, it has been altered by later copyists or editors.
24
I use the word triangular speculatively, as an astronomical/astrological term
referring to the Triangulum, which is a constellation in the northern sky near Aries and
Andromeda. The following two words, i.e., the sun (shams) and the moon (qamar)
both being celestial entitieslead me to such an interpretation. It would seem that, with
the term al-af l al-muthallathah, al-Jurjn refers to a triad of heavenly signs, which
includes technically four groups of astronomical/astrological signs known to medieval
Muslim scholars: a) the watery three (al-muthallathah al-miyyah), b) the fiery three
(al-muthallathah al-nriyyah), c) the airy three (al-muthallathah al-hawiyyah), and
d) the earthy three (al-muthallathah al-turbiyyah). For further details in this sense,
see, for instance, F. Steingass Muthallathah in Persian-English Dictionary (Beirut,
1998). Yet I have not been able to understand exactly what al-Jurjn means by this
expression in this particular context. Other editions of the same bookincluding a
translation currently available in Persian and Frenchas well other books on the same
subject unfortunately do not offer a solution to this matter. Another speculative, but
remote, possibility could be that al-Jurjn uses the expression al-afl al-muthallathah
to refer to the actions of Hermes Trismegistus, who is described in the works of Mus-
lim writers on the history of philosophy as al-muthallath bi-al-h ikmah in the sense
of trismegistus. I will talk about h ikmah in this context in part iv in relation to
Hermes. In a similar fashion, in his entry for muthallatht, the Iranian lexicogra-
pher Al Akbar Dihkhud presents a relatively detailed explanation for the word in
an astronomical/astrological (ilm/ah km al-nujm) context. Al Akbar Dihkhud,
Lughatnmah (Tehran, 1994). I owe this final reference to A. M. Damghn.
25
Al-Jurjn, 124.
36 chapter two
26
Ibid., 124125.
27
Ibid., 125.
28
Ibid., 125. Al-Jurjn defines the word h ukm immediately after h ikmah, but he
does not use h ikmah and h ukm interchangeably, as we have seen previously in the
case of other scholars. He seems to be interested in h ukm more in a legal and logical
context. He defines h ukm as follows:
a)The h ukm is predicating a thing of another [thing] (isndu amrin il khar)
positively (jban) or negatively (salbiyyan). In this way that which is not a h ukm
is inferred/deduced as the restrictive relationship (al-nisbah al-taqydiyyah).
h ikmah in terminological dictionaries 37
b)The h ukm is placing a thing in its original (or proper) place (wad al-shay f
mawdiih). Some say that h ukm is anything for which there is a praiseworthy
outcome (qibah mah mdah).
c)Religious judgment (al-h ukm al-shar) consists of the judgment of God
related to the acts of legally competent persons (afl al-mukallafn).
29
Ibid., 125.
30
Ibid., 125.
38 chapter two
31
Al-Tahnaw, Kashshf isti lh t al-funn (Istanbul, 1900), 405406.
32
Ibid., 406.
33
Ibid., 406407.
h ikmah in terminological dictionaries 39
1
Lon Gauthier, La Racine arabe h -k-m et ses drivs, Homenaje a D. Francisco
Codera, ed. D. Eduardo Saavedra (Zaragoza, 1904), 435454.
2
Ibid., 453.
3
Horovitz, 7174.
4
A. M. Goichon, H ikma, EI.
42 chapter three
5
Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 36.
6
Ibid., 36.
7
Ibid., 3637.
8
Gutas, Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation (New Haven, 1975) and
Classical Arabic Wisdom Literature, 4986.
9
Gutas, Classical Arabic Wisdom Literature, 50.
10
Ibid., 76. This is the definition given in Websters Third International Dictionary,
1966.
contemporary western scholarship 43
Gutas is not the first western scholar to define the word h ikmah as
maxim. Gauthier, for instance, includes the word maxim in his list
of definitions for h ikmah,13 as do many contemporary Arabic-English
dictionaries, which cite the word maxim as a meaning of this Arabic
word as well.14
With regard to Gutas description of the bias of Arabic lexicogra-
phers, this is scarcely a fair judgment. They were very much concerned
with religious terminology, but as a natural outcome of the pervasive
influence that the Qurn and its vocabulary exercised on Arabic
thought, language, and literature, rather than an intentionally biased
attitude by lexicographers toward or against the materials before them.
A careful examination of the aforementioned lexicographical works
reveals that later authors quite honestly conveyed materials from the
previous generations through to the following ones. Given the fact that
as a scholarly field, lexicography is essentially a cumulative discipline,
it can hardly be unusual or blameworthy, for instance, for Ibn Manzr
or al-Zabd to rely extensively on al-Isfahn regarding some related
points. Surely Ibn Manzr or al-Zabd cannot be accused of being
biased in this respect. In Ibn Durayds specific case, the situation is
no different. He lists the meanings of the root h -k-m as adl and man
(including h akamat al-lijm),15 just as al-Khall b. Ahmad did in his
work before Ibn Durayd.16 It may also be noted that, as the main basis
of his argument, Gutas chooses a passage which is itself from a reli-
gious text. After all, Ibn Durayd is trying to define the word h ikmah
in a h adth, rather than as a commonly known (marf) word. Thus,
the basis for my methodological disagreement with Gutas is his view
of the bias of Arabic lexicographers; it is a simplistic generalization
regarding an extensive scholarly field with a long history and many
distinguished exponents.
The main passage that Gutas uses, which he claims to be the sole
passage defining the word h ikmah as maxim is Kullu kalimatin
waazatka wa-zajaratka wa-daatka il makramatin aw nahatka an
qabh in fa-hiya h ikmatun wa-h ukmun.17 I have translated this passage
13
Gauthier, 452.
14
See for instance, Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, ed. J. Milton
Cowan (Beirut, 1980) and Rh al-Baalbakk, al-Mawrid (Beirut, 1996).
15
Ibn Durayd, 1:564.
16
Al-Khall b. Ahmad, 3:6667.
17
Ibn Durayd, 1:564.
contemporary western scholarship 45
above as Every word that exhorts you, restrains you, and calls you to
a noble deed or deters you from a disgraceful thing/deed is a h ikmah
and h ukm. Parallel to this statement, al-Khall b. Ahmad defines the
verbal forms derived from the root h -k-m, Kullu shayin manatahu
min al-fasdi fa-qad [h akamtahu] wa-h akkamtahu wa-ah kamtahu.18
A translation of this passage would be, [For] everything that you pre-
vent from acting in a corrupt manner, you have restrained it. In both
passages, the dominant meaning of the root h -k-m is manaa, as both
al-Khall b. Ahmad and Ibn Durayd mention in their respective state-
ments regarding the sense of manaa. If we disregard the grammatical
subjects of these two sentences and focus particularly on the mean-
ings of the words derived from the root h -k-m mentioned therein, we
see that their meanings are very close. In the first, a word or saying
prevents a person from something that is not good, while in the sec-
ond, a person prevents a thing from something that is not good. In
this regard, there is no reason to single out Ibn Durayds passage as
opposed to others, such as that of al-Khall b. Ahmad. Semantically
speaking, then, the basic meaning of these derived words may not
refer solely to maxim, to the exclusion of wisdom. A maxim as
well as a wisdom/wise saying can quite reasonably prevent a person
from a disgraceful deed. Thus, I do not argue that Gutas definition of
the word as maxim is incorrect, rather I question the consistency of
his understanding of the Arabic proof texts. His categorization of the
Arabic materials does not seem to be well grounded. He seems to have
set out from preconceived conclusions and then to have arranged the
texts accordingly.
Furthermore, Gutas argues that the word la-h ukman in the h adth
(inna min al-shiri la-h ukman wa-inna min al-bayni la-sih ran) should
be read as la-h ikaman (i.e., the plural of h ikmah) instead. In his opinion,
certain sources read this word incorrectly.19 In addition to Ibn Durayds
statement in the edition I have used, the editors of both editions of
Ibn Manzrs text have vocalized the word as la-h ukman. Ibn Manzr
mentions the other version of the same h adth in which the word is
la-h ikmatan as well.20 Stylistically speaking, la-h ukman works more
effectively than la-h ikaman, as there is no apparent reason to break
18
Al-Khall b. Ahmad, 3:67.
19
Gutas, Classical Arabic Wisdom Literature, 76.
20
Ibn Manzr, 2:951952.
46 chapter three
the textual parallelism (la-h ukmanla-sih ran) and read the word as
plural (la-h ikaman) in this statement. Even Gutas himself seems to be
aware of this idea of stylistic parallelism when, in the same article, he
argues that the word h ikmah in al-Afwahs (d. ca. 570 c.e.) verse, min
h ikmat al-Arab wa-dbih (one of the maxims and precepts of the
Bedouin) should not be considered singular, but collective instead, for
the sake of the stylistic parallelism of this expression.21 Given that Ara-
bic lexicographers repeatedly define the word h ikmah as h ukm, there is
no reason to force Gutas reading either. Another saying I have men-
tioned above, al-samtu h ukmun/h ikmatun wa- qallun filuhu further
testifies that the words h ukm and h ikmah can be used interchangeably
in such contexts. I do not think that Gutas would be willing to change
the word h ukm to h ikam here as well.
21
Gutas, Classical Arabic Wisdom Literature, 50.
Part two
The word hikmah occurs twenty times in the Qurn and in half of these
it is coupled with the word kitb (book).1 This combination implies that
hikmah is closely related to the divine revelation2 in the form of revealed
books or prophetic practice (sunnah). Within such a seemingly simple
framework, nevertheless, hikmah has been diversely interpreted by early
commentators of the Qurn. This work examines the arguments of these
early exegetes and discusses the nature of this diversity: is it inclusive and
complementary or exclusive and contradictory? To facilitate a clear under-
standing, I analyze the word hikmah within the context of each Qurnic
verse, using related exegetical discussions provided by early Muslim com-
mentators. By grouping the Qurnic verses in which hikmah appears
1
In addition to the word h ikmah, the Qurn uses other derivatives of the root
h -k-m, including various verbal formssuch as h akama (40:48), yuh akkimu (5:43),
yuh kimu (22:52), and yatah kamu (4:60)as well as its masdar and adjectival forms
h ukm and h akm, respectively. In four places (12:22, 21:74, 21:79, and 28:14) h ukm is
accompanied by the word ilm. As for the word h akm, it is mentioned in the Qurn
ninety-seven times. As an attribute of God, h akm never occurs alone. Rather, it is
always coupled with another attribute such as azz h akm, alm h akm / h akm alm,
h akm khabr, h akm h amd, tawwb h akm, wsi h akm, and al h akm. Muh ammad
Fud Abd al-Bq, al-Mujam al-mufahras li-alfz al-Qurn al-Karm (Cairo, 1988),
269273.
2
Accordingly, Horovitz argues that h ikmah in this context refers to some part of
the revealed books. Horovitz, 7174. Ibn Qutaybah elucidates the meaning of the word
kitb in the Arabic language in general and in the Qurn in particular. He asserts that
the original meaning of kitb is that which God wrote in the Tablet (lawh ). From this
original meaning, other meanings derive. Ibn Qutaybah lists a number of meanings
as follows: 1) qad (to decree), as in 58:21, God has decreed (kataba Allhu), I will
surely overcome, I and My messenger ; in 9:51, Naught will visit us except what God
has decreed for us (kataba Allhu lan); and in 3:154, Those decreed (kutiba) to be
killed would have come out to their death beds. 2) furida (kutiba) (to be prescribed),
as in 2:178, Retaliation is prescribed for you (kutiba alaykum) in the matter of the
murdered; in 2:180, When death approaches you, it is prescribed for you (kutiba
alaykum); and in 4:77, They said, Our Lord, why have You prescribed fighting for
us (katabta alayn al-qitl). 3) jaala (to make), as in 58:22, He has written (kataba)
faith within/upon their hearts; in 3:53 and 5:83, Write us down (uktubn) among
the witnesses; and in 7:153, So I will write it down (sa-aktubuh) for those who are
godfearing. 4) amara (to command, order), as in 5:21, Go into the holy land which
God has ordained for you (kataba Allhu lakum). It is said that kataba here means
jaala as well, in which case the meaning would be, Go into the land that God has
written down (katabah) for Abrahams progeny, i.e., He made it (jaalah) for them.
Ibn Qutaybah, Tawl mushkil al-Qurn, ed. Ahmad Saqr (Cairo, 1973), 462463.
48 part two
3
Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 38.
4
I might also be expected to discuss the reliability of the ascriptions of the diverse
interpretations to the various early authorities, so that we might attempt to identify
lines of development or reason for change in interpretations of h ikmah, but consider-
ing the scholarship accessible in the field of Qurnic studies, this is a daunting task.
The problematic aspects of the narrated records are known. In the case of Ibn Abbs,
for instance, tafsr authors ascribe to him such a developed terminology of Qurnic
hermeneutics that ascribing it to the historical Ibn Abbs remains highly questionable.
Without focusing on developments in interpretations, therefore, I offer a collection of
interpretations from the earliest commentators of the Qurn and concentrate on iden-
tifying semantic centers of gravity within them; I classify and contextualize various
interpretations and make educated judgments within the contextual framework.
Chapter four
1
For the Qurnic passages, I have generally followed Arberrys translation with
some modifications.
50 chapter four
(h all) and unlawful (h arm), and its similitudes (amthl ).2 Mujhid
(d. 104/722) explains the h ikmah as being the Qurn itself and states
that God gives its correct understanding (isbatahu) to whomever He
wills.3 Al-D ah hk (d. 106/723) introduces a similar clarification, saying
that h ikmah means the Qurn as well as understanding it.4 Al-H asan
al-Basr (d. 110/728) argues that h ikmah in this verse denotes piety
or moral scrupulousness (wara) in the religion of God.5 Zayd b. Al
(d. 120/738) asserts that this word refers to trust (amnah), eloquence
(bayn), comprehension ( fiqh), intelligence (aql), and understanding
(fahm).6 Ibn Qutaybah (d. 276/889) defines h ikmah as knowledge
2
Al b. Ab Talhah, Sah fat Al b. Ab Talh ah an Ibn Abbs f tafsr al-Qurn
al-Karm, ed. Rshid Abd al-Munim al-Rajjl (Beirut, 1994), 119. See also Muhammad
b. Jarr al-Tabar, Tafsr al-Tabar: Jmi al-bayn an tawl y al-Qurn, ed. Mahmd
Muhammad Shkir (Cairo, 1954), 5:576; al-Suyt, al-Durr al-manthr 1:348. An early
Sh commentator of the Qurn, al-Imm al-Mansr bi-Allh Abd Allh b. H amzah
introduces a complementary interpretation to that of Ibn Abbs when he asserts,
h ikmah is useful knowledge (ilm nfi), which is the knowledge of the Qurn, the
interpretation of its meanings, and elaborate exposition of its concise expressions (tafsl
mujmalih). It is the knowledge of the judgments (ah km) of the Qurnic commands
and prohibitions, of its muh kam and mutashbih statements, of its specific/individual
(khss) and general (mm), concise (mujmal), and elaborate (mubayyan) passages,
and of its abrogating and abrogated verses. H ikmah is the knowledge of learning a les-
son from the Qurnic vicissitudes (itibr bi-ghiyarih), understanding its extraordinary
similitudes (amthlih al-ajbah), and unusual stories (qisasih al-gharbah). And this
is in our view, the beginning of h ikmah and key to rah mah. Abd Allh b. Ahmad b.
Ibrhm al-Sharaf, al-Masbh al-stiah al-anwr: Tafsr Ahl al-Bayt, eds. Muhammad
Qsim al-Hshim and Abd al-Salm Abbs al-Wajh (Sadah, 1998), 83. Clearly this
definition is of a highly inclusive character, as it covers almost every aspect of Qurnic
knowledge.
3
Mujhid b. Jabr, Tafsr al-Imm Mujhid b. Jabr, ed. Muhammad Abd al-Salm
Ab al-Nl (Beirut, 2003), 245. Similarly, al-Tustar reports Umar b. Wsils explana-
tion of h ikmah in this verse as meaning God gives correctness regarding His book to
whomever He wills. Sahl b. Abd Allh al-Tustar, Tafsr al-Tustar, ed. Muhammad
Bsil Uyn al-Sd (Beirut, 2002), 43.
4
Al-D ahhk b. Muzhim, Tafsr al-D ah h ak, ed. Muhammad Shukr Ahmad
al-Zwt (Cairo, 1999), 1:225. Ibn al-Jawz cites the same interpretation, mentioning
Ibn Masd, Mujhid, and Muqtil, as well as al-D ahhks name to do so. Ab al-Faraj
Abd al-Rahmn b. Al b. al-Jawz, Zd al-masr f ilm al-tafsr, ed. Abd al-Razzq
al-Mahd (Beirut, 2001), 1:242. Al-Suyt reports that h ikmah means the Qurn, i.e.,
its tafsr, for Ibn Abbs mentioned that a pious person as well as a sinner might read
the Qurn. Al-Suyt, al-Durr al-manthr, 2:66.
5
Al-H asan al-Basr, Tafsr al-H asan al-Basr, ed. Muhammad Abd al-Rahm (Cairo,
1992), 1:196; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:242.
6
Zayd b. Al, Tafsr gharb al-Qurn, ed. H asan Muhammad Taq al-H akm (Cairo,
1992), 105. Similarly, Muqtil says that h ikmah means knowledge of the Qurn and
comprehension of it. Muqtil, Tafsr Muqtil b. Sulaymn, ed. Abd Allh Mahmd
general definitions in the qurn 51
al-Shahtah (Cairo, 1969), 1:143. Abd al-Razzq asserts that this word denotes the
Qurn and comprehension of it. Abd al-Razzq b. Hammm al-Sann, Tafsr Abd
al-Razzq, ed. Mahmd Muhammad Abduh (Beirut, 1999), 1:373. Hd b. Muhakkam
(third/tenth century) mentions a similar report, saying that h ikmah refers to compre-
hension in the Qurn. Hd b. Muhakkam al-Huwwr, Tafsr Kitb Allh al-Azz, ed.
Blhjj b. Sad b. Sharf (Beirut, 1990), 1:250. Ibn Wahb reports that h ikmah means
intelligence in the religion. Abd Allh b. Wahb, al-Jmi li-Abd Allh b. Wahb b. Mus-
lim Ab Muh ammad al-Misr; bi-riwyat Sah nn b. Sad, ed. Miklsh Mrn (Beirut,
2003), 2:161.
7
Ibn Qutaybah, Tafsr gharb al-Qurn, 32.
8
Al-Tustar, 42. Al-Baghaw mentions the same interpretation on the authority of
al-H asan al-Basr, saying, Whoever is given the Qurn, it is as if he has received
prophethood with the exception that he has not been given revelation. Al-H usayn
b. Masd al-Baghaw, Tafsr al-Baghaw, al-musamm Malim al-tanzl, eds. Khlid
Abd al-Rahmn al-Akk and Marwn Suwr (Multan, 1988?), 1:257.
9
Al-Tustar, 42.
52 chapter four
10
Ab Ishq Ibrhm b. al-Sariyy al-Zajjj, Man al-Qurn wa-irbuh, ed.
Abd al-Jall Abduh Shalab (Beirut, 1973), 1:350. Another early commentator, Ibn
Wahb al-Dnawar (d. 308/920) describes this h ikmah as the prophethood given to
Muhammad. He also asserts that it means exposition of the Qurn and correctness in
speech and action, as well as thought. Abd Allh b. Muhammad b. Wahb al-Dnawar,
Tafsr Ibn Wahb, al-musamm al-Wdih f tafsr al-Qurn al-Karm, ed. Ahmed Fard
(Beirut, 2003), 1:90.
11
Al-Tabar mentions Ibn Abbs, Qatdah, Ab al-liyah, and Mujhid as having
interpreted h ikmah as such. Mujhid further says that h ikmah does not mean prophet-
hood, but instead denotes the Qurn, knowledge, and comprehension. Al-Tabar,
5:576577. Ibn Ati yyah cites a similar definition, saying that h ikmah means reflect-
ing (tafakkur) on Gods command[s] and following (ittib) them. Ibn Ati yyah,
al-Muh arrar al-wajz, 2:251.
12
This is the definition by Mujhid. Al-Tabar, 5:577578.
13
Al-Tabar cites Ibn Zayd and Mliks (b. Anas) interpretations in this regard. Ibn
Zayd uses the word aql to define h ikmah, while Mlik asserts that h ikmah means
knowledge of the religion, its comprehension, and adherence to it. Al-Tabar, 5:578.
14
This view belongs to Ibrhm al-Nakha. Al-Tabar, 5:578. Al-Samn further
elucidates this definition saying that h ikmah denotes knowledge of the meanings of
things and understanding them. Mansr b. Muhammad al-Samn, Tafsr al-Qurn
general definitions in the qurn 53
li-Ab al-Muzaffar al-Samn, eds. Ab Tamm Ysir Ibrhm and Ab Bill Ghanm
b. Abbs b. Ghanm (Riyad, 1997), 1:273.
15
Al-Tabar quotes al-Rabs explanation that, hikmah means khashyah, because
the beginning of everything is the fear of God (li-anna rasa kulli shayin khashyatu
Allh). Al-Rab then recites the verse, Only those of His servants who have knowl-
edge fear God (inna-m yakhsh Allha min ibdihi al-ulam) (35:28). Al-Tabar,
5:578; al-Suyt , al-Durr al-manthr, 2:66. It is related that Sad b. Jubayr (d. 95/713)
said, khashyah is hikmah; whoever has pious fear of God, hits upon the most excel-
lent of hikmah. Al-Suyt , al-Durr al-manthr, 2:67. Ahmad b. H anbal, on the other
hand, cites the same saying (ras al-hikmah khashyat al-rabb) but attributes it to the
Prophet David. Ahmads narration goes back to Khlid b. Thbit al-Rabi who says,
I have found [an expression] in the beginning ( ftihah) of Davids Zabr [stating] that
the beginning of hikmah is pious fear of God. Ahmad b. H anbal, Kitb al-Zuhd, ed.
Muhammad Jall al-Sharaf (Egypt, 1980), 1:155. One may argue that al-Rabi refers to
Solomons statement in the Old Testament, Proverbs (1:7), The fear of the Lord is the
beginning of knowledge. If this is the case, the word hikmah is then used in the place of
knowledge (marifah), which occurs in the Arabic versions of the Bible (makhfat al-Rabb
ras al-marifah). Another interesting definition is introduced by Urwah b. al-Zubayr who
says, kindness (rifq) is the beginning of hikmah. Al-Suyt , al-Durr al-manthr, 2:67.
16
Al-Sudd is mentioned as having presented this interpretation. Al-Tabar, 5:579.
17
Al-Tabar, 5:576579. Citing most of the abovementioned definitions, Ibn
Atiyyah asserts that with the exception of al-Sudds explanation (nubuwwah), all these
interpretations have a similar meaning, for h ikmah is a masdar derived from ih km
which means perfection (itqn) in practice and speech. Therefore, the Book of God is
a h ikmah; the sunnah of His messenger is a h ikmah; and every definition mentioned
above is a part of h ikmah which is a generic noun (jins). Ibn Atiyyah, 2:251252.
See also Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Qurtub, al-Jmi li-ah km al-Qurn (Cairo, 1967),
3:330331.
18
Abd al-Rahmn b. Muhammad b. Ab H tim, Tafsr al-Qurn al-Azm: mus-
nadan an Rasl Allh wa-al-Sah bah wa-al-Tbin, ed. Asad Muhammad al-Tayyib
(Mecca, 1997), 2:531532.
54 chapter four
19
Ibn Ab H tim, 2:532; Isml b. Umar b. Kathr, Tafsr al-Qurn al-Azm, ed.
Khall al-Mays (Beirut, 1983), 1:278; al-Suyt , al-Durr al-manthr, 2:67.
20
This view belongs to Ab al-Dard. Ibn Ab H tim, 2:533.
21
Ibn Ab H tim mentions Qatdah as having presented this explanation. Ibn Ab
H tim, 2:533.
22
It is Qatdah, once again, who argues such. Ibn Ab H tim, 2:533.
23
This interpretation is introduced by Matar al-Warrq. Ibn Ab H tim, 2:533.
24
Mlik b. Anas further elaborates this definition, saying that h ikmah is a light (nr)
through which He guides whomever He wills. Ibn Ab H tim, 2:534.
25
This explanation goes back to Makhl, who stated that the Qurn is one of
the seventy-two parts of nubuwwah and is thus a h ikmah. Ibn Ab H tim, 2:534.
Al-Zamakhshar introduces a similar interpretation asserting that h ikmah in this verse
refers to an agreement between knowledge and its practice. In the presence of God,
the h akm is the one who combines both knowledge and practice. Al-Zamakhshar,
al-Kashshf an h aqiq al-tanzl (Egypt, 1966), 1:396.
general definitions in the qurn 55
son is beneficial only to himself to the exclusion of the others. The third
type of person practices whatever God makes available of h ikmah in his
heart, which is the practice of the h ukam, and he expresses whatever
God makes available of h ikmah on his tongue, which is the speech of the
h ukam. He is beneficial both to himself as well as to others. That which
he speaks through the tongue is a proof of that which exists in the heart;
and that which he practices, which is in the heart, regarding h ikmah
confirms (musaddiq) that which he utters.26
Al-Samarqand (d. 375/985) introduces another interpretation of
h ikmah in this verse, saying that it means the knowledge of Satanic
deceptions (makyid) and whisperings (waswis).27 Al-Mward (d.
450/1058) cites, on the authority of Mujhid, an additional meaning of
h ikmah as handwriting (kitbah). He also asserts that this word refers
to worldly and other-worldly goodness (salh ).28
In his own definition of h ikmah, al-Qurtub (d. 671/1272) calls atten-
tion to the basic meaning of the root, which is manaa. He argues that
the origin[al meaning] of h ikmah is that through which one restrains
oneself from foolishness (safah). Ilm is defined as h ikmah on account
of the fact that, by means of ilm, one knows how to restrain oneself
from foolishness, which refers to every [kind of] bad/evil act. Likewise,
the Qurn, intellect (aql ), and understanding ( fahm) convey h ikmah.
Al-Qurtub mentions the following h adth from Sah h al-Bukhr,
For whomever God wants goodness, He makes him comprehend
religion (man yurid Allhu bihi khayran yufaqqihhu f al-dn). In the
same context, al-Bukhr refers to this verse (2:269) and he specifically
highlights the word h ikmah. Al-Qurt ub also cites a h adth from the
Musnad of al-Drim in which h ikmah is mentioned in the follow-
ing context, Indeed, God wants to punish the people of the earth,
but then when He hears that a teacher is teaching a child h ikmah, He
diverts the punishment from them. The narrator says that h ikmah here
refers to the Qurn. Regarding the second part of the verse (wa-man
eds. Al Muhammad Muawwad, dil Ahmad Abd al-Mawjd, and Zakariyy Abd
al-Majd al-Nawut (Beirut, 1993), 1:232.
28
Al b. Muhammad al-Mward, al-Nukat wa-al-uyn, tafsr al-Mward, ed. al-
Sayyid b. Abd al-Maqsd b. Abd al-Rahm (Beirut, 1992), 1:344345. Al-Samn
also mentions the definition that h ikmah means handwriting and its knowledge.
Al-Samn, 1:274.
56 chapter four
29
Al-Qurt ub, 3:330331.
30
Al-Qurt ub, 3:331; al-Suyt , al-Durr al-manthr, 2:69.
31
Ibn Kathr, 1:278.
32
Al-Suyt, al-Durr al-manthr, 2:6671.
general definitions in the qurn 57
33
Al-Suyt , al-Durr al-manthr, 2:69. Apparently, al-Amash was talking about the
same experiential and practical aspect of h ikmah when he described al-H asan al-Basr,
saying, H asan would keep devoting his attention to h ikmah until he spoke in terms
of it (m zla al-H asan yatan bi-al-h ikmah h att nataqa bih). Al-H asan al-Basr,
Tafsr, Editors introduction, 21.
34
Al-Suyt , al-Durr al-manthr, 2:69.
35
Ibid., 2:70.
36
Ibid., 2:71.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid., 2:70.
58 chapter four
and the best of your religion is wara.39 Similarly, the Prophet said, A
little [bit of] knowledge is better than a large amount of worship.40
Given this number of interpretations, it is not easy to define the word
h ikmah as mentioned in verse 2:269 with just one word. Its meaning
here is of a highly inclusive character. By no means does this fact imply
that introducing multiple meanings refers to a kind of inconsistency or
contradiction among various understandings. Rather, they are comple-
mentary to each other, as can be observed in the following Prophetic
statement reported by Ibn Atiyyah (d. 543/1148), One cannot reach
comprehension completely until he discerns in the Qurn numerous
dimensions (l yafqahu al-rajulu kulla al-fiqhi h att yar li-al-qurni
wujhan kathratan).41 One may regard h ikmah in the verse 2:269,
therefore, as the rationale or underlying reason of Qurnic regulations
in a general sense. Accordingly, Gutas argument that h ikmah in this
verse, means maxim42 does not seem to be a complete and proper
understanding of the word. Reducing its meaning merely to maxim
and treating it without regard to its context, does not offer a convinc-
ing meaning.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibn Ati yyah, 1:4445.
42
Gutas, Classical Arabic Wisdom Literature, 54.
43
Tafsr scholars relate narrations regarding the Israelites constant dispute with
their Prophet (Moses) with respect to divine commands, i.e., regarding which day was
the true Sabbath. Was it Friday, Saturday, or Sunday? See, for instance, al-Samarqand,
2:255 and Ibn al-Jawz, 2:592593.
general definitions in the qurn 59
In his translation of the Qurn, The Holy Qurn, Abdullh Ysuf Al (Mary-
44
land, 1989) reads this verse in connection with a possible argument presented by the
Jews, who could say to Muhammad, Why dont you then observe the Sabbath? The
Qurnic answer is twofold: first, the Sabbath has nothing to do with Abraham, for it
was instituted at the time of Moses; and second, there is no agreement among the Isra-
elites on the actual day on which the Sabbath falls. The Qurn instructs the Prophet to
avoid such endless disputes, as they will not be settled until the Day of Judgment.
45
Muqtil, Tafsr, 2:494; al-Tustar, 42; al-Huwwr, 2:395; al-Dnawar, 1:448;
al-Tabar, 14:194; al-Samarqand, 2:255; Ibn al-Jawz, 2:593; al-Mward, 3:220;
al-Samn, 3:210; al-Baghaw, 3:90.
46
Al-Tabar, 14:194.
47
Al-Samn, 3:210.
48
Ibn al-Jawz, 2:593.
49
Al-Samarqand, 2:255; Ibn al-Jawz, 2:593; al-Mward, 3:220.
50
Muqtil, Tafsr, 2:494; al-Huwwr, 2:395; al-Dnawar, 1:448; al-Samarqand,
2:255; Ibn al-Jawz, 2:593; al-Samn, 3:210; al-Baghaw, 3:90; Muqtil, Tafsr, 2:531;
Al-Samarqand, 2:269; Ibn al-Jawz, 3:25.
51
Al-Tabar, 14:194.
52
Ibn al-Jawz, 2:593; al-Samn, 3:210; al-Baghaw, 3:90.
53
Ibn al-Jawz, 2:593.
60 chapter four
In 2:129 the prayer of Abraham and his son Ishmael is cited. According
to the Qurnic statements, when the two were raising the foundations
of the House (Kabah) they uttered (2:127129),
Our Lord, accept [this service] from us; You are the All-Hearing, the
All-Knowing. Our Lord, make us submissive (muslimayn) to You and of
our progeny a nation submissive to You. And show us our holy rites and
accept our repentance. Indeed, You are the Accepter of repentance, the
All-Compassionate. Our Lord, send among them a Messenger, one of
them, who will recite to them Your signs, and teach them the kitb and
h ikmah, and purify them; You are the All-Mighty, the All-Wise.
According to the majority of the early commentators on the Qurn,
the word kitb in this verse refers to the Qurn.1 Ibn Ab H tim reports
another explanation handed down from Ibn Abbs, who stated that
kitb here means handwriting (khatt bi-al-qalam).2 As for the word
hikmah, tafsr scholars list various explanations, such as, 1) the Pro-
phetic practice (sunnah);3 2) admonitions (mawiz) found in the Qurn
regarding lawful and unlawful things;4 3) knowledge (marifah) and
comprehension (fiqh) in religious matters and adherence to the
religion;5 4) the religion (dn) that cannot be known or understood
1
Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:69; al-Huwwr, 1:150; al-Dnawar, 1:46; al-Tabar, 3:8688;
Ibn Ab H tim, 1:236237; al-Samarqand, 1:158159; Muhammad b. Abd Allh b.
Ab Zamanayn, Tafsr al-Qurn al-Azz li-Ibn Ab Zamanayn, eds. Ab Abd Allh
H usayn b. Ukshah and Muh ammad b. Must af al-Kanz (Cairo, 2002), 1:179; Ibn
al-Jawz, 1:113; al-Mward, 1:192; al-Samn, 1:141; al-Baghaw, 1:116117; Ibn
Ati yyah, 1:423424; al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 1:312; Mahmd b. Ab al-H asan
al-Naysbr, jz al-bayn an man al-Qurn, ed. Al b. Sulaymn al-Ubayd
(Riyadh, 1997), 1:119.
2
Ibn Ab H tim, 1:236237.
3
Al-H asan al-Basr, 1:115. See also, al-Suyt, al-Durr al-manthr, 1:335;
al-Huwwr, 1:150; al-Dnawar, 1:46; al-Tabar, 3:8688; Ibn Ab H tim, 1:236237;
Ibn Ab Zamanayn, 1:179; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:113; al-Mward, 1:192; al-Baghaw, 1:116
117; Ibn Ati yyah, 1:423424.
4
Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:69; al-Samarqand, 1:158159; al-Baghaw, 1:116117.
5
Al-Tabar, 3:8688; al-Mward, 1:192.
62 chapter five
6
Al-Tabar, 3:8688.
7
Ibid., 3:8688.
8
Ibid., 3:8688.
9
Ibn Ati yyah, 1:423424.
10
Al-Samarqand, 1:158159; al-Samn, 1:141; al-Baghaw, 1:116117.
11
Al-Tabars line of argument here seems to operate on the ground that the mor-
phological pattern of tikmah is filah which is the pattern (wazn) for ism al-naw. If this
is the case, then he argues that h ikmah is a kind of h ukm, just as jilsah is a kind juls
and qidah is a kind of qud. Otherwise, the morphological pattern of h ukm (ful) is
different from juls and qud (ful).
12
Al-Tabar, 3:8688.
13
Al-Samarqand, 1:158159.
h ikmah and the prophets 63
14
Ibn al-Jawz, 1:113.
15
Al-Samn, 1:141.
16
Al-Baghaw, 1:116117.
17
Al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 1:312.
18
Al-Naysbr, 1:119.
64 chapter five
guided than the believers (Muslims) (4:51).19 Because they had been
given a portion of the Book, and thus had a taste and experience of the
heavenly message, their evaluation of the two groups in this manner
was seen as a very blameworthy attitude indeed. The following verses
(4:5354) say,
Or have they a share of the Kingdom (mulk)? If that is so, they do not
give the people [even as much as] a single speck on the back of a date-
stone. Or are they jealous of the people for the bounty that God has given
them? Yet We gave the people of Abraham the kitb and h ikmah, and We
gave them a mighty kingdom. Some of them believed in it, and some of
them disbelieved in it.
Then the Qurn declares that both those who disbelieve and those
who believe in Gods signs will reap the harvest of their positions as
punishment and reward, respectively (4:5657).
Commentators assert that the jealous ones were the Jews during
the Prophets lifetime, since they did not like the fact that prophecy had
been sent to Muhammad (and thus to the Arabs) rather than to them-
selves.20 The kitb given to the people of Abraham refers to the Book
that God revealed to Abraham and his successors in prophethood
Moses and other prophets from among Abrahams progeny.21 Accord-
ing to the majority of the early tafsr authorities, the word H ikmah
in this verse means prophethood (nubuwwah).22 Al-Tabar, however,
argues that h ikmah refers to that which was revealed to the people of
Abraham in a form other than that of a recited book (kitb maqr).23
19
As the occasion of the revelation (sabab al-nuzl) of this verse, tafsr scholars
record that some unbelievers from the Quraysh questioned a group of Jews, includ-
ing Kab b. al-Ashraf, regarding whether the formers own religion or the religion of
Muhammad was more rightly guided. Kab responded that the religion of the Quraysh
was better than Islam, whereupon this verse was revealed to the Prophet. See, for
instance, Ibn al-Jawz, 1:419420; al-Samn, 1:436; al-Baghaw, 1:441.
20
Al-Tabar, 8:476480; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:420421; al-Baghaw, 1:442. A Sh com-
mentator, Ibn Furt al-Kf (third/ninth century) argues that, as in the l Ibrhm, the
members of the Prophet Muhammads family (ahl al-bayt) were given special heavenly
characteristics, such as sanctity (walyah). Thus the ahl al-bayt represent the envied
ones (mahsdn) meant in this verse. Ibn Furt al-Kf, Tafsr Ibn Furt al-Kf, ed.
Muhammad al-Kzim (Beirut, 1992), 1:106107.
21
Al-Tabar, 8:48082; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:421; al-Samn, 1:437; al-Baghaw, 1:442.
22
Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:243; al-Huwwr, 1:390; al-Dnawar, 1:156; al-Samarqand,
1:360361; Ibn Ab Zamanayn, 1:381; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:421; al-Samn, 1:437; al-Baghaw,
1:442.
23
Al-Tabar, 8:480.
h ikmah and the prophets 65
Al-Samarqand, 1:360361.
24
33
Unlike other Qurnic references, the words kitb and h ikmah in this verse are
indefinite, though there is another Qurnic instance (54:5) in which only the word
h ikmah, without kitb, occurs in the indefinite.
h ikmah and the prophets 67
Lord (3:7980). Within this context, the following two verses (seem-
ingly addressing the People of the Book)34 read,
And when God took the covenant of the prophets [saying]: I have given
you of kitb and h ikmah; then there comes to you a Messenger confirm-
ing what is with you, you [must] believe in him and support him. He
(God) said, Do you agree and take My covenant as binding on you?
They said, We do agree. He (God) said, Bear witness so, and I will be
with you among the witnesses. Then whoever turns his back after that,
they are the ungodly.
The Qurn continues its disapproval of the People of the Book because
of their disbelief in the religion of God (Islam) and concludes that
if they persist in this disbelief, they will not be among the felicitous
(3:8391).
The exegetes referred to thus far maintain that this verse does not
introduce any additional dimension to the meanings of the words kitb
and h ikmah that have been discussed in the previous Qurnic instances.
Some scholars, however, interpret these words as referring to the Torah
and that which is in it regarding what is lawful and unlawful.35
Of the Abrahamic prophets, the Qurn singles out David as having
been given h ikmah as well as worldly authority (mulk). In Islamic lit-
erature, accordingly, he is highly esteemed as an ideal ruler who com-
bined and practiced both spiritual and political leadership in a perfect
manner.
From the context of 2:251 we know the story of the Children of Israel
(after Moses); they said to their prophet (Samuel) that he should
appoint a king for them in order to fight in the way of God. The
prophet was hesitant to do so, since he feared that they would change
their minds with respect to such a duty. The Children of Israel insisted
on their demand, arguing that they had plausible reasons to fight in
Gods way, for they had been expelled from their lands and children
(2:246). When the Prophet informed them that God had appointed
Saul (T lt) as their leader, the Children of Israel were not pleased
with this decision and they raised petty objections. They argued that
Al-Tabar, 6:552559.
34
Sauls social position was inferior to theirs, seeing that he had not been
given an amplitude of wealth. The Prophet challenged the basis of their
argument, saying that God was the only authority to decide who would
be given kingship (mulk). God chose Saul over them and increased
him greatly in mental and physical powers (2:247). When Saul went
forth with the soldiers, many of them sought excuses to retrace their
steps, thinking that they had no chance against Goliath (Jlt) and his
forces. Only a small group of Sauls soldiers remained steadfast in their
promise. They faced the enemy with all their conviction, sincerity, and
prayers (2:249250). The following verse reads,
They defeated them by the will of God and David slew Goliath; and
God gave him (David) kingship (mulk) and h ikmah, and He taught him
whatever (else) He willed. Had God not driven the people back, some by
means of others, the earth would have surely been corrupted; but God is
full of bounty to the worlds.
The majority of early commentators interpret the word mulk and h ikmah
in this verse as kingship (mulk)36 and prophethood (nubuwwah),37
respectively. Some use the word sultn to define the word mulk,38 as
if to emphasize the type of kingship involved, that is, worldly. David
was the first to combine kingship and prophethood in the history of
the Children of Israel; as before him, kingship had belonged to one
tribe (sibt) of the Israelites and prophethood to another.39 By the time
of Davids reign, the Israelites had become a great kingdom to such an
extent that none of the previous Israelite leaders before David had ever
ruled over such a large land.40
In addition to their definition of the word h ikmah as prophethood,
some scholars present a complementary argument, saying that h ikmah
here refers to the book given to David, i.e., the Zabr.41 H ikmah also
means understanding (fahm)42 and intelligence (aql) in religion.43 It is
36
Al-D ah hk, 1:213; Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:132; al-Dnawar, 1:83; al-Samn, 1:254;
al-Baghaw, 1:235; al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 1:382.
37
Al-D ah hk, 1:213; al-Tustar, 42; al-Dnawar, 1:83; al-Huwwr, 1:237; al-Tabar,
5:371; Ibn Ab H tim, 2:480; al-Samarqand, 1:221; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:227; al-Mward,
1:320321; al-Samn, 1:254; al-Baghaw, 1:235; al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 1:382.
38
Al-Tabar, 5:371; al-Mward, 1:320321.
39
Al-D ah hk, 1:213; al-Samn, 1:254; al-Baghaw, 1:235.
40
Al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 1:382.
41
Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:132; al-Samarqand, 1:221; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:227.
42
Al-Dnawar, 1:83.
43
Ibn Ab H tim, 2:480.
h ikmah and the prophets 69
further said that mulk and h ikmah together in this verse denote knowl-
edge accompanied by action.44 Al-Mward mentions a second aspect
of this combination, as he argues that mulk means the submission
(inqiyd) to his (Davids) command(s) and h ikmah means upright-
ness in Davids behavior (sratih). This happened after the death of
Saul, when David was left unaccompanied to deal with the Israelites
affairs.45
In 38:20 the word h ikmah appears in relation to David in a context
similar to that of 2:251. As the occasion of revelation of the verses
in this section of the srah, commentators point to the situation of
the Meccan unbelievers who continuously derided the Prophets mes-
sage and statements. When verses 69:1927 were revealed, the Mec-
can unbelievers sarcastically hastened forth the punishment promised
in these verses, wherein an eschatological scene is described in which
people will be given their book of deeds in their right or left hands,
depending on their deeds in this world; in the Hereafter, they will be
rewarded or punished, respectively. Considering themselves among
those whose books will be given to them in their left hands, the Mec-
can unbelievers took to mocking, saying that they were ready for the
punishment and there was no reason to delay it (38:1516). There-
upon, the section of srah 38 in which the word h ikmah is mentioned
was revealed.46 The Prophet is instructed that he should be patient at
what they say and remember the story of David who was a man of
might and penitence (38:19). The relation between the case of David
and that of Muhammad could be the fact that they were both required
to be patient for a time before receiving worldly power and thus real-
izing their promises. David had not been known as a heroic person
before he slew Goliath and some had ridiculed his earlier eagerness to
face Goliath. Against the background of this story, the following verse
occurs, We strengthened his kingdom (mulk) and gave him h ikmah
and decisive speech (fasl al-khitb).
Early scholars of tafsr introduce various definitions of the word
h ikmah as it appears here. On the authority of Ibn Abbs, al-H asan
al-Basr, and Ibn Zayd, commentators report that h ikmah means
44
Al-Samn, 1:254; al-Baghaw, 1:235.
45
Al-Mward, 1:320321.
46
Ibn al-Jawz, 3:562563; al-Baghaw, 4:5051.
70 chapter five
47
Al-H asan al-Basr, 2:239; Zayd b. Al, 270; Muqtil, Tafsr, 3:639; al-Tustar, 42; Ibn
Wahb, 1:9; al-Tabar, 23:139; al-Samarqand, 3:132; Ibn al-Jawz, 3:564; al-Mward, 5:84.
48
Al-Tabar, 23:139; Ibn al-Jawz, 3:564; al-Mward, 5:84.
49
Al-Tustar, 42; Ibn Wahb, 1:9; al-Tabar, 23:139; al-Samarqand, 3:132; Ibn
al-Jawz, 3:564; al-Mward, 5:84; al-Baghaw, 4:52.
50
Ibn al-Jawz, 3:564; al-Baghaw, 4:52.
51
Al-Mward, 5:84.
52
Ibid.
53
Al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 2:365.
54
Gutas, Classical Arabic Wisdom Literature, 52.
h ikmah and the prophets 71
55
Al-H asan al-Basr, 2:239; al-Huwwr, 4:10. Al-Tabar attributes the same inter-
pretation to Mujhid and al-Sudd, saying that the two defined fasl al-khitb as knowl-
edge of judgment and understanding it. Al-Tabar, 23:140. On the authority of Ibn
Abbs, Ibn al-Jawz relates that this expression refers to knowledge of judgment and
justice. Ibn al-Jawz, 3:564. Likewise, al-Baghaw reports Ibn Masds explanation that
fasl al-khitb denotes knowledge of judgment and insightfulness (tabassu r) therein.
Al-Baghaw, 4:52.
56
Zayd b. Al, 270; Yahy b. Ziyd al-Farr, Man al-Qurn, eds. Ahmad Ysuf
al-Najt and Muh ammad Al al-Najjr (Beirut, 1955), 2:401; Ibn Wahb uses the word
bayyint instead of aymn together with the shuhd. Ibn Wahb, 1:9.
57
Ibn Qutaybah, Tafsr gharb al-Qurn, 378.
58
Al-Tabar, 23:140. See also al-Samarqand, 3:132; Ibn al-Jawz, 3:564. Al-Baghaw
attributes this definition to Al b. Ab T lib. Al-Baghaw, 4:52.
59
Ibn al-Jawz, 3:564.
60
Muqtil, Tafsr, 3:639; Abd al-Razzq, 3:113.
61
Al-Farr, 2:401; Ibn Qutaybah, Tafsr gharb al-Qurn, 378; Ibn al-Jawz, 3:564.
62
Al-Baghaw, 4:52.
63
Ibn al-Jawz, 3:564; al-Baghaw, 4:52.
64
Al-Tabar, 23:140. Jafar al-Sdiq (d. 148/765), on the other hand, is reported as
giving a combined definition of h ikmah and fasl al-khitb as truthfulness in speech
(idq al-qawl), soundness/reliability in contract (sih h at al-aqd), and stability in affairs
(thabt f al-umr). Paul Nwyia Le tafsr mystique attribu Jafar Sdiq, Mlanges
de lUniversit Saint-Joseph 43, no. 4 (1968), 218.
72 chapter five
65
As the occasion of revelation of this verse, tafsr scholars mention Nadr b. al-H riths
attitude against the Qurn. Nadr was a pagan who lived at the time of the Prophet. He
was known to buy books of Persian romance and read them to uneducated people to
divert their attention from the Qurn. He would tell them that Muhammad was telling
them stories about the people of d and Thamd and he was going to tell them stories
related to Iranians and Romans. See al-Dnawar, 2:158; Ibn al-Jawz, 3:430.
66
Ibn Qutaybah defines the word zulm, which is one of the opposite concepts to
hikmah, as putting a thing in a place which is not its authentic place (wad al-shay
f ghayr mawdiih). Ibn Qutaybah, Tafsr gharb al-Qurn, 28.
h ikmah and the prophets 73
67
Yahy b. Sallm (Ibn Sallm), Tafsr Yahy b. Sallm, ed. Hind Shalab (Beirut,
2004), 2:672673; al-Tabar, 21:6768; al-Samarqand, 3:2021; al-Mward, 4:331332.
68
Al-Suyt, al-Durr al-manthr, 6:510511.
69
Al-Tabar, 21:68.
70
Al-Samarqand, 3:21.
71
Al-Suyt, al-Durr al-manthr, 6:512. As mentioned above, al-Suyt cites the
same h adth when he explicates verse 2:269.
74 chapter five
72
Ibid., 6:519.
73
Ibid., 6:515.
74
Ibid., 6:513. In another context, al-Suyt reports accounts in which we find the
expressions it is written in h ikmah (maktb f al-h ikmah), i.e., the h ikmah of Luqmn
(yan h ikmat Luqmn), I have found (wajadtu) in h ikmah, and I have read (qaratu)
in h ikmah. Ibid., 6:517518. But as al-Suyt does not explain the meaning of h ikmah
in this context, one cannot be sure if he is referring to some written materials pre-
served as Luqmns sayings or to something else.
75
Al-Tabar, 21:67; Ibn Ab H tim, 9:3097; al-Samarqand, 3:20; Ibn al-Jawz, 3:430;
al-Baghaw, 3:490491.
76
Ibn Ab H tim, 9:3098; al-Samarqand, 3:20; Ibn al-Jawz, 3:430; al-Baghaw,
3:490491.
77
Ibn Ab H tim, 9:3097.
78
Mujhid b. Jabr, 541; Abd al-Razzq, 3:22; Yahy b. Sallm, Tafsr, 2:672; al-Tabar,
21:67; Ibn Ab H tim, 9:3097; al-Samarqand, 3:20; al-Mward, 4:332. Similarly, Zayd b.
Al says that the meaning of hikmah is comprehension and correctness in speech. Zayd
b. Al, 250. Muqtil and Ibn Wahb define hikmah as knowledge (ilm) and understand-
ing (fahm) in cases other than in prophethood. Muqtil, Tafsr, 3:434; al-Dnawar, 2:159.
Yahy b. Sallm reports that this hikmah also denotes understanding and intellect. Yahy
b. Sallm, Tafsr, 2:672. On the authority of Mujhids teacher, Ibn Abbs, al-Suyt nar-
rates that Ibn Abbs defined hi kmah in this place as intellect, understanding, and per-
ah) in everything other than prophethood. Al-Suyt, al-Durr al-manthr,
spicacity (fitn
6:510. Qatdah asserts that hikmah means comprehension in Islam. Al-Tabar, 21:67.
Al-Baghaw says that the meaning of hikmah here covers intellect, knowledge and
practice, and correctness in matters. Al-Baghaw, 3:490.
h ikmah and the prophets 75
In 3:48 the word h ikmah occurs in a context related to Jesus and his heav-
enly characteristics. God chose Adam, Noah, the family of Abraham,
the family of Imran, and their descendents over the worlds (3:3334).
The wife of Imran [Hannah] dedicated his unborn child to the service
Al-Samarqand, 3:20.
79
this verse as such, Mujhid should be defining this word in a general manner. Histori-
cally speaking, there is no reason to apply this definition to Luqmn.
81
Al-Samarqand, 3:20; Ibn al-Jawz, 3:430.
82
Muqtil, Tafsr, 3:434; al-Tabar, 21:68; al-Samarqand, 3:21.
83
I owe this explanation to Wolfhart Heinrichs.
84
Gutas, Classical Arabic Wisdom Literature, 54.
85
Ibid.
76 chapter five
of God and when she delivered the baby she named her Mary and
prayed that God would protect Mary and her offspring from the
accursed Satan (3:3536). God accepted the child with gracious favor
and assigned Zachariah to care for her as she grew up in purity and
beauty (3:37). Zachariah also desired to have a child and prayed that
God would give him a goodly offspring. When the angels informed
him that God would give him good tidings of John who would con-
firm a Word from God as well as be noble, chaste, a prophet, and a
righteous person, Zachariah was very surprised, because he was an
old man and his wife was barren. The angels responded that such was
Gods will (3:3840). The angels came and told Mary that she was cho-
sen above all women and purified by God; she should be obedient to
her Lord and worship Him (3:4243). The following verse expresses
that this was all from the news of the unseen to which Muhammad
had no physical access (3:44). The Qurn then tells the story of Jesus
birth. The angels said to Mary that God was sending her good tidings
of a Word from Him, whose name would be the Messiah, Jesus, son of
Mary and that he would be highly honored in this world and the next,
and that he would be among those who were stationed near to God.
He would also speak to the people in childhood and in maturity, and
he would be of the righteous. Mary was shocked by this message and
asked how she could have a son, seeing that no man had touched her.
She received the following response (3:4551),
Even so, God creates what He wills. When He decrees a thing He does
but say to it Be, and it is. And He will teach him the kitb, the h ikmah,
the Torah, and the Gospel, to be a Messenger to the Children of Israel
saying, I have come to you with a sign from your Lord. I will create for
you out of clay as the likeness of a bird; then I will breathe into it, and it
will be a bird by the permission of God. I will also heal the blind (from
birth) and the leper, and bring to life the dead, by the permission of God.
And I will inform you of what things you eat, and what you treasure up
in your houses. Surely, in that is a sign for you, if you are believers. And
[I have also come to you] to be a confirmer of the truth of the Torah that
came before me, and to make lawful to you some of the things that were
forbidden to you previously. I have come to you with a sign from your
Lord; so fear God and obey me. Indeed, God is my Lord and your Lord;
so worship Him. This is a straight path.
Scholars of tafsr do not seem to put any special emphasis on this
verse. The majority of early commentators explain the words kitb and
h ikmah and the prophets 77
86
Abd al-Malik b. Abd al-Azz b. Jurayj, Tafsr Ibn Jurayj, ed. Al H asan Abd
al-Ghan (Cairo, 1992), 68. Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:171; al-Huwwr, 1:284; al-Dnawar,
1:107; al-Tabar, 6:421422; al-Samarqand, 1:268; Ibn Ab Zamanayn, 1:289; Ibn
al-Jawz, 1:284; al-Samn, 1:320; al-Baghaw, 1:302; Ibn Atiyyah, 2:426427.
87
Ibn Jurayj, 68; Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:171; al-Huwwr, 1:284; al-Tabar, 6:421422; Ibn
Ab Zamanayn, 1:289; Ibn Atiyyah, 2:426427.
88
Al-Dnawar, 1:107; al-Samarqand, 1:268.
89
Al-Dnawar, 1:107.
90
Ibn al-Jawz, 1:284.
91
Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:171; al-Dnawar, 1:107.
92
Al-Dnawar, 1:107; al-Samarqand, 1:268; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:284; al-Samn, 1:320;
al-Baghaw, 1:302; Ibn Jurayj, 68.
93
Ibn al-Jawz, 1:284.
94
Ibn Ati yyah, 2:426427.
78 chapter five
be to You! It is not for me to say what I have no right to. If I had said it,
You would indeed have known it. You know what is within myself, and
I know not what is within Yourself; You know the things unseen. I only
said to them what You commanded me: Worship God, my Lord and
Your Lord. And I was a witness over them as long as I remained among
them. But when You took me up, You were the Watcher over them; You
are a Witness of everything. If You punish them, they are Your servants
and if You forgive them, You are the All-Mighty, the All-Wise. God will
say, This is the day the truthful will benefit from their truthfulness.
Most of the early authorities on tafsr argue that the word kitb in
this verse means handwriting.95 They also state that it means the kutub
(books); its singular form (kitb) is used here as a generic noun96 refer-
ring to the books of the prophets.97
As for the word h ikmah, authorities assert that in this case, it means
knowledge, understanding, comprehension,98 and the knowledge of
what is lawful and what is unlawful.99 Al-Tabar further elucidates this
definition by arguing that h ikmah here indicates understanding the
meanings of the book that God revealed to Jesus, which is the Gos-
pel.100 Al-Mward, however, expands the range of meaning to cover
the knowledge of that which exists in the previous books as well. He
also mentions, as a second interpretation for h ikmah, that it indicates
everything Jesus needed regarding his religion as well as his worldly
affairs.101
In 43:63 the word h ikmah is similarly mentioned in relation to
Jesus. According to the Qurnic statements, when the son of Mary
was cited as an example, the unbelievers attempted to mock him and
compare Jesus and their own gods. But they were not sincerely look-
ing for the truth of the matter; rather, they were only trying to engage
in meaningless disputations (43:5758).102 The Qurn introduces its
own description of Jesus, noting that he was a blessed servant and that
95
Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:351; Ibn Qutaybah, Tafsr gharb al-Qurn, 148; al-Dnawar,
1:215; al-Tabar, 11:215; al-Samarqand, 1:466; al-Mward, 2:79; al-Baghaw, 2:77.
96
Al-Mward, 2:7980.
97
Al-Dnawar, 1:215.
98
Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:351; Ibn Qutaybah, Tafsr gharb al-Qurn, 148; al-Tabar,
11:215; al-Samarqand, 1:466; al-Mward, 2:79; al-Baghaw, 2:77.
99
Al-Dnawar, 1:215.
100
Al-Tabar, 11:215.
101
Al-Mward, 2:7980.
102
Tafsr scholars report that these unbelievers knew something about the theologi-
cal position of Jesus in Christian belief at that time. By way of making a comparison
between their own gods and Jesus as held by those Christians, the unbelievers were
h ikmah and the prophets 79
God made him an example to the Children of Israel (43:59). The verses
6364 read,
And when Jesus came with the clear signs (bayyint), he said, I have
come to you with h ikmah, and that I may make clear to you some of that
over which you differ; so fear God and obey me. Indeed, God is my Lord
and your Lord; therefore worship Him; this is a straight path.
Early commentators do not focus special attention on the word h ikmah
in this verse either. They give mainly two references for the word,
namely, prophethood103 and the Gospel (Injl)104 that was revealed to
Jesus, in which there are explanations regarding what is lawful and
unlawful.105 Al-Mward mentions another possible meaning of h ikmah
here as knowledge that leads to good and prevents from evil.106
As for the word bayyint, some scholars assert that it refers to clear
proofs,107 including miracles, such as giving life to the dead, and cur-
ing the blind and the leper.108 Other scholars state that it refers to the
Gospel.109
In the case of Jesus, therefore, the Qurn states that he was par-
ticularly blessed by h ikmah, in addition to his other heavenly char-
acteristics. God taught him the kitb, the h ikmah, the Torah, and the
Gospel; and accordingly, Jesus came to his people with the clear signs
and h ikmah to clarify for them the points on which they disagreed.
Once again, it is not easy to define h ikmah in these verses with a single
word. Rather, together with other God-given qualities peculiar to him,
h ikmah seems to refer to Jesus exclusive position in the Qurn.
Having listed all the Qurnic verses in which the word h ikmah is
mentioned in relation to the earlier prophets, I now examine the appli-
cation of this notion to the Prophet of Islam.
entering into contentious speculations with the Muslims. Ibn al-Jawz, 4:81; al-Baghaw,
4:142143.
103
Al-Dnawar, 2:291; al-Tabar, 25:92; al-Samarqand, 3:212; Ibn al-Jawz, 4:82;
al-Mward, 5:236; al-Baghaw, 4:144.
104
Muqtil, Tafsr, 3:800; Ibn al-Jawz, 4:82; al-Mward, 5:236; al-Zamakhshar,
al-Kashshf, 2:495.
105
Muqtil, Tafsr, 3:800; al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 2:495.
106
Al-Mward, 5:236.
107
Al-Tabar, 25:92.
108
Al-Samarqand, 3:212.
109
Al-Tabar, 25:92; al-Samarqand, 3:212.
80 chapter five
In 2:151 the words kitb and h ikmah occur in a context related to the
idea of the qiblah (the direction faced in prayer). In the early days
of Islam, the Muslims used to turn toward Jerusalem as their qiblah,
and the Prophet was apparently willing to change this practice (2:144),
for the Jews of Medina took this to mean that the Prophet was sim-
ply imitating their religion. On the Muslims part, however, turning
to Jerusalem symbolized their allegiance to the continuity of heavenly
revelation. When the Prophets desire for direction was answered by
God, the Kabah became the qiblah for Muslims. On this occasion, the
Jews were sarcastic about this change, since they saw in it inconsistent
behavior. The Qurn challenges their attitude on the general grounds
that the whole world, East and West, belongs to God and He is the one
who guides to the straight path (2:142). Those who had been given the
Book previously were aware that this new message and Messenger were
sent by God, but still, some of them did not accept and appreciate it.
Muslims are encouraged to strive as in a race toward good works, not
embark upon endless disputations with those who were given the Book
before them (2:145149). Wherever they may be, Muslims should turn
their faces towards the Holy Mosque and should not fear the evildo-
ers. Rather, the Muslims should fear God so that He may perfect His
blessing upon them and that they may be guided (2:150). The follow-
ing two verses read,
Just as We have sent among you, from yourselves, a Messenger to recite
to you Our signs, to purify you, to teach you the kitb and h ikmah, and
to teach you that which you did not know, so remember Me, and I shall
remember you; and be thankful to Me; and do not be ungrateful to me.
These verses indicate that having being taught the kitb and h ikmah is
something that requires thankfulness and gratitude in return, as noted
above in the case of Luqmn.
The majority of the early exegetes interpret kitb in this verse as the
Qurn.110 Alongside this, al-Mward offers an explanation to the effect
that this word means informing (ikhbr) about that which existed in
the previous books regarding the earlier times and peoples.111 As far as
the word h ikmah is concerned, the commentators list various mean-
110
Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:77; al-Huwwr, 1:158; al-Dnawar, 2:52; al-Tabar, 3:211; Ibn
Ab Zamanayn, 1:188; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:123; al-Mward, 1:208.
111
Al-Mward, 1:208.
h ikmah and the prophets 81
ings, such as the sunnah112 and the admonitions of the Qurn,113 and
[the knowledge of] what is lawful and what is unlawful.114 Al-Tabar
asserts that h ikmah here means the prophetic practices (sunan) and
comprehension in religion.115
In 4:113, the words kitb and h ikmah are mentioned in an interest-
ing context. Tafsr authorities relate an anecdote about the occasion of
the revelation of this verse as follows: A man from the Ansr called
Tumah, who was a member of the tribe of Ban Z afar, was nominally
known as a Muslim but was actually a hypocrite who had committed
all sorts of wicked acts. He had, for example, stolen a set of armor
(dir) from his neighbor, Qatdah b. al-Numn. The armor was in a
sack filled with flour, but the sack also had a hole. Tumah first took the
armor to his own house and then intentionally left it in the house of
Zayd, who was a Jew. When the owner tracked his stolen property by
following the flour, it was eventually found in the house of Zayd. Zayd
denied the charge and accused Tumah, but the sympathies of the Mus-
lim community were with Tumah, who also took oaths to prove his
innocence. The case was brought to the Prophet. Out of tribal alliance
and honor, the Ban Z afar attempted to prejudice him and deceive
him into using his authority in favor of Tumah. Seeing Tumahs oath
and the testimony of his tribe, the Prophet was about to identify Zayd
as the guilty party when, at this moment exactly, he received this rev-
elation.116 In this context, the Prophet is instructed that he has been
given the kitb with the truth so that he might judge between people
with Gods guidance; he should not be an advocate for traitors, but
seek the forgiveness of God, who is All-Forgiving, All-Compassionate
(4:105106). Even if he and others should dispute on their behalf in the
present life, on the Resurrection Day those traitors will have no one to
help them. In reality, whoever commits a sin, commits it against him-
self only, for God is All-Knowing, All-Wise. And whoever commits a
sin and then blames it upon the innocent, has thereby laid upon him-
self a slander and manifest sin (4:109112). The following verse says,
112
Al-Huwwr, 1:158; Ibn Ab Zamanayn, 1:188; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:123; al-Mward,
1:208; al-Samn, 1:155; al-Baghaw, 1:128.
113
Al-Mward, 1:208; al-Samn, 1:155; al-Baghaw, 1:128.
114
Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:77; al-Dnawar, 2:52.
115
Al-Tabar, 3:211.
116
Mujhid b. Jabr, 291292; al-H asan al-Basr, 1:296297; al-D ah h k, 1:303304;
al-Dnawar, 1:168; al-Tabar, 9:196199; al-Samarqand, 1:384386; Ibn al-Jawz,
1:465466; al-Samn, 1:475476; al-Baghaw, 1:477; Al-Zajjj, 2:113.
82 chapter five
And if it were not for the grace of God to you, and His mercy, a group of
them would have intended to lead you astray; but they lead only them-
selves astray; they cannot hurt you in anything. God has sent down to
you the kitb and h ikmah, and He has taught you that which you did not
know; Gods grace to you is ever great.
The majority of the early commentators state that the word kitb in
this verse refers to the Qurn,117 in which there is an explanation of
all things, guidance, and admonition.118 As for h ikmah, they intro-
duce various interpretations. Al-Tabar asserts that in this verse, kitb
is accompanied by h ikmah, which denotes everything that exists in
the kitb in a general manner (mujmalan) in its statements indicating
lawful and unlawful things, commands and prohibitions, judgments,
and promises and threats.119 Ibn al-Jawz gives three definitions of
h ikmah as follows: 1) it means judgments through the revelation, as
Ibn Abbs said; 2) it refers to [the knowledge of] what is lawful and
what is unlawful, as Muqtil argued; and, 3) it denotes an explanation
of that which exists in the kitb, inspiring truth or correct(ness), and
delivering the correct answer in a confusing situation (raw), as stated
by Ab Sulaymn al-Dimashq.120 Al-Samn defines h ikmah in this
verse as sunnah.121 Al-Zajjj, however, argues that this passage means
that in His kitb, God has explained the h ikmah which does not allow
one to go astray (dall).122
In 17:39 the word hikmah occurs within a framework that covers
a number of essential Qurnic principles. According to the Qurnic
statements, God commands that He alone be worshipped and that
parents be treated with the highest respect and with utmost care in every
sense. Relatives, the needy, and travelers should be given their rights.
One should not spend wastefully nor tightfistedly, but should rather do
ones honest best to help the poor, even if this is only with a kind word.
Children should not be slain for fear of poverty; this is a grievous sin.
One should not approach fornication, since it is an indecent and evil act.
No one is to be killed unjustly. Until he reaches maturity, the property
117
Al-Tabar, 9:200; al-Samarqand, 1:387; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:470; al-Samn, 1:477;
al-Baghaw, 1:479.
118
Al-Tabar, 9:200.
119
Ibid., 9:200.
120
Ibn al-Jawz, 1:470. For similar treatments, see al-Dnawar, 1:171; al-Samarqand,
1:387; al-Baghaw, 1:479.
121
Al-Samn, 1:477.
122
Al-Zajjj, 2:113.
h ikmah and the prophets 83
123
Muqtil, Tafsr, 2:531.
124
Al-Tabar, 15:90; Ibn al-Jawz, 3:25.
125
Al-Samarqand, 2:269.
126
Muqtil, Tafsr, 4:177; al-Tabar, 27:89; Ibn al-Jawz, 4:196; al-Baghaw, 4:258.
84 chapter five
127
Muqtil, Tafsr, 4:177; al-Huwwr, 4:251; al-Dnawar, 2:359; al-Tabar, 27:89;
al-Samarqand, 3:298; al-Baghaw, 4:259.
128
Al-Baghaw, 4:259.
129
Al-Mward, 5:410411.
130
Al-Naysbr, 2:222.
131
Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:202; al-Shfi, Tafsr al-Imm al-Shfi, ed. Majd b. Mansr
b. Sayyid al-Shr (Beirut, 1995), 61; al-Huwwr, 1:330; al-Tabar, 7:369370;
al-Samarqand, 1:313; Ibn Ab Zamanayn, 1:332; al-Samn, 1:376; al-Zamakhshar,
al-Kashshf, 1:477.
132
Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:202; al-Shfi, Tafsr, 61; al-Huwwr, 1:330; al-Tabar, 7:369
370; Ibn Ab Zamanayn, 1:332; al-Samn, 1:376; al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 1:477.
133
Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:202.
134
Al-Samarqand, 1:281.
135
Al-Samn, 1:376.
h ikmah and the prophets 85
h ikmah right after the kitb and that this fact indicates the signifi-
cance of the authority of the Prophet in religious matters.136 Similarly,
al-Tabar says that h ikmah means the sunnah that God prescribed
(sanna) for the believers on the tongue (lisn) of the Prophet and his
explanation to them.137
In 62:2 the word h ikmah appears in a context similar to that of 2:151
and 3:164. The srah begins with a statement that all that is in the
heavens and the earth exalts God, the Sovereign, the All-Holy, the All-
Mighty, the All-Wise. The following verse says,
It is He who has sent among the unlettered people a Messenger from
among themselves, to recite His signs to them and to purify them, and
to teach them the kitb and h ikmah, though before that they were in
manifest error and others of them who have not yet joined them. And
He is the All-Mighty, All-Wise. (62:3)
This is a result of Gods bounty, which He gives to whom He wills
(62:4). Then the verses criticize the attitudes of the Jews toward this
new heavenly message. This section of the srah seems to imply that
the Jews were in error for looking down on the Arabs because they had
not received any heavenly message before. For that reason, the Jews
called the Arabs unlettered (umm). The Qurn says that this attitude
is a way to attempt to monopolize Gods bounty, which is free of all
such restrictive racial or national considerations.
The majority of early authorities on tafsr interpret the word kitb
in this verse as the Qurn.138 Some scholars report that it also means
knowledge of good and evil.139 For the word h ikmah, commentators
list a number of definitions including 1) sunnah,140 2) admonitions of
the Qurn,141 3) [knowledge of] what is lawful and what is unlawful,142
4) comprehension in the religion,143 and 5) understanding and taking
admonishment (ittiz).144
Al-Tabar, 7:369.
137
138
Muqtil, Tafsr, 4:325; al-Huwwr, 4:351; al-Dnawar, 2:406; Ibn Furt, 2:483;
al-Tabar, 28:94; al-Samarqand, 3:362; al-Mward, 6:6.
139
Al-Mward, 6:6.
140
Al-Huwwr, 4:351; al-Tabar, 28:94; al-Mward, 6:7.
141
Muqtil, Tafsr, 4:325; al-Dnawar, 2:406.
142
Muqtil, Tafsr, 4:325; al-Dnawar, 2:406; al-Samarqand, 3:362.
143
Al-Mward, 6:7.
144
Al-Mward, 6:7. Ibn Furt, however, argues that the word h ikmah in this verse
refers to the sanctity (walyah) of Al b. Ab T lib. Ibn Furt, 2:483.
86 chapter five
145
Two divorces with a reconciliation between the husband and wife are allowed.
146
Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:120; al-Huwwr, 1:223; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:205; al-Samn, 1:235;
al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 1:369.
147
Al-Huwwr, 1:223; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:205; al-Samn, 1:235; al-Baghaw, 1:210;
Ibn Ati yyah, 2:109; al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 1:369; al-Qurtub, 3:157.
148
Al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 1:369.
149
Muqtil, Tafsr, 1:120; al-Baghaw, 1:210.
150
Al-Dnawar, 1:77.
151
Al-Samarqand, 1:209.
152
Al-Tabar, 5:15.
153
Ibn Atiyyah, 2:109; al-Qurt ub, 3:157.
h ikmah and the prophets 87
Abd al-Razzq, 3:39; al-Shfi, Tafsr, 177; al-Tustar, 43; al-Tabar, 22:9; Ibn
155
Hakm
In the current canonical order of the Qurn, the first time we see the
word h akm is in verse 2:32. The verses 2:3033 describe a scene related
to the time when God informed the angels about His decision to create
a viceroy (khalfah) on the earth. In response to their questions, God said
to the angels that He knows that which they do not know. God taught
Adam the names, all of them; then He presented them [i.e., the entities
named] to the angels, asking them to tell Him their names. The angels
responded, Glory be to You! We do not have any knowledge except
what You have taught us. Surely, You are the All-Knowing (al-Alm),
the All-Wise (al-H akm). God instructed Adam to tell the angels their
names and when Adam did so, God said, Did I not tell you that
I know the unseen things of the heavens and earth? And I know what
you reveal and what you were concealing.
Ibn Abbs explains the word alm and h akm in this verse as the
one who is perfect in knowledge (ilm) and judgment (ukm), respec-
tively.1 Some scholars say that h akm means h akm, just as alm and
khabr mean lim and khbir, respectively.2 Narrating from previous
authorities, al-Mward lists three definitions of h akm as 1) the one
who is perfect in his acts (muh kim f aflih); 2) the one who pre-
vents from corruption (mni min al-fasd); and 3) the one who hits
upon the correct [thing] (musb li-al-h aqq). Al-Mward further clari-
fies these definitions from lexicographical literature. He reports, for
instance, that the second meaning is testified to by the expression bit
of the bridle (h akamat al-lijm), since it (the h akamah) prevents the
horse from walking aggressively (shadd). In this context, al-Mward
refers to Jarrs aforementioned line of poetry, O sons of H anfah,
restrain (ah kim) your foolish ones; I fear for you that I might get
Al-Tabar, 1:496.
2
90 chapter six
3
Al-Mward, 1:100101. For similar expositions, see also al-Samn, 1:6566;
al-Baghaw, 1:62.
4
Al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 1:271272. The aforementioned Sh commenta-
tor, al-Sharaf, reports that the word h akm in 64:18 means that God is the owner of
the perfected h ikmah (h ikmah mutqanah) and of masterly acts in whose arrangement
there is no disharmony to be found. Al-Sharaf, 465.
5
Al b. Ab Talhah, 127; al-D ahhk, 1:248; al-Tabar, 6:466467; al-Baghaw,
1:309.
6
Al b. Ab Talhah, 127. See also al-Tabar, 6:465; al-Suy, al-Durr al-manthr,
2:37.
7
Al-Tabar, 6:466467. Citing similar interpretations, al-Baghaw refers to Muqtils
definition of this expression as the Qurn being perfected in a way that there is no pos-
sibility for falsehood to penetrate it. Al-Baghaw mentions another meaning of al-dhikr
al-h akm as indicating al-lawh al-mah fz (Preserved Tablet). Al-Baghaw, 1:309.
h ikmah in relation to h akm and h ukm 91
pretations bring the meaning of al-dhikr al-h akm close to the meaning
of h ikmah blighah mentioned in 54:5.
Two other Qurnic instances in which the Qurn describes itself
as a h akm book are 31:2 and 36:2. Tafsr scholars assert that h akm in
these two verses means muh kam (perfected).8 This perfection is related
to its statements regarding [the knowledge of] what is lawful and what
is unlawful, judgments (ah km), and commands and prohibitions.9 In
this context, al-Mward cites the following Qurnic verse describing
h akm in the sense of perfected (mutqan), falsehood cannot approach
it from before it, nor from behind it (41:42).10
In another verse, the word h akm is used to describe the Essence/
Mother of the Book (umm al-kitb). The Qurn says that God has
made the kitb an Arabic Qurn, which is in the Essence of the Book
in Gods presence; exalted (al), h akm (43:24). Zayd b. Al says that
the essence of everything is its origin (asl). The word kitb refers to
the Qurn and to its essence, which is the copy (nuskhah) of it in
Gods presence (inda Allh).11 Al-H asan al-Basr introduces a similar
explanation when he asserts that the Qurn is in the Essence/Mother
of the Book in Gods presence.12 Ibn Wahb interprets the umm al-kitb
as the lawh mah fz (Preserved Tablet) and says that the Qurn is writ-
ten there.13
Hukm
8
Yahy b. Sallm, Tafsr, 2:669 and 799; al-Mward, 4:326.
9
Yahy b. Sallm, Tafsr, 2:669.
10
Al-Mward, 4:326.
11
Zayd b. Al, 284.
12
Al-H asan al-Basr, 2:273. See also Abd al-Razzq, 3:165.
13
Ibn Wahb, 2:285. On the authority of al-Zajjj, Ibn al-Jawz relates that umm
means asl, as the origin of everything is its umm, and the Qurn is established (muth-
bat) in Gods presence in the Preserved Tablet. Ibn al-Jawz, 4:72. See also, al-Baghaw,
4:133.
92 chapter six
14
Al-Tabar, 6:538; al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 1:440.
15
Ibn al-Jawz, 1:298; al-Baghaw, 1:320.
16
Sufyn b. Sad al-Thawr, Tafsr Sufyn al-Thawr, ed. Imtiyz Al Arsh (Ram-
pur, India, 1965), 3637; al-Tabar, 6:540544; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:298; al-Mward, 1:405
406; al-Baghaw, 1:320321; al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 1:440.
17
Al-Thawr, 3637; Abd al-Razzq, 1:399; al-Tabar, 6:540544; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:298;
al-Mward, 1:405406; al-Baghaw, 1:320321; al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 1:440.
18
Al-Tabar, 6:541542; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:298; al-Mward, 1:405406; al-Baghaw,
1:320321; al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 1:440.
19
Abd al-Razzq, 1:399.
20
Al-Tabar, 6:542544; Ibn al-Jawz, 1:298; al-Baghaw, 1:321; al-Zamakhshar,
al-Kashshf, 1:440.
21
Al-Baghaw, 1:321; al-Zamakhshar, al-Kashshf, 1:440.
22
Al-Baghaw, 1:320321.
h ikmah in relation to h akm and h ukm 93
just ruler, can also be called rabbn. The rabbniyyn, therefore, are
the leaders of their community with respect to comprehension, knowl-
edge, and worldly as well as other-worldly matters. Combining knowl-
edge and comprehension, they are insightful in ruling and arranging
public affairs.23
For the second (6:89) and third (45:16) Qurnic instances in which
the words kitb and h ukm (as well as nubuwwah) are mentioned, tafsr
authorities do not introduce a detailed argument. Regarding the second
instance, they simply report that the word h ukm in this verse means
comprehension and knowledge.24 As for the third instance, they assert
that it means knowledge of the kitb and understanding it.25
In addition to the Children of Israel and the People of the Book, the
Qurn states that Lot, Joseph, Moses, David, Solomon, and John were
given h ukm.
Regarding Lot, verse 21:74 says, And to Lot We gave hukm and knowl-
edge, and We saved him from the city that had been doing deeds of cor-
ruption; they were an evil people, truly ungodly. Commentators argue
that the word hukm in this verse means prophethood,26 understanding
and intelligence,27 and making a just judgment between opponents.28
According to the Qurnic statement in 12:22, Joseph is described as
being given h ukm, as follows, And when he (Joseph) was fully grown,
We gave him h ukm and knowledge. And thus We reward those who do
good. Tafsr authorities list a number of definitions of the word h ukm
in this verse: 1) understanding,29 2) intelligence,30 3) prophethood,31
23
Al-Tabar, 6:543544. Al-Mward introduces a similar explanation when he
argues that there are two opinions regarding the original meaning of the word rabbn.
First, the rabbni is one who has authority in public matters. In this context, a knowl-
edgeable person is called rabbn on the basis of the fact that he arranges matters with
knowledge. Second, the rabbn is one who has knowledge of the Lord, a religious
concept. Al-Mward, 1:406.
24
Ibn al-Jawz, 2:51; al-Baghaw, 2:113.
25
Al-Dnawar, 2:302; Ibn al-Jawz, 4:99.
26
Yahy b. Sallm, Tafsr, 1:326; al-Mward, 3:455; Ibn al-Jawz, 3:201.
27
Ibn al-Jawz, 3:201.
28
Al-Mward, 3:455; al-Baghaw, 3:252.
29
Al-Dnawar, 1:380; al-Tabar, 16:23.
30
Al-Tabar, 16:23; al-Mward, 3:21; al-Baghaw, 2:417.
31
Ibn al-Jawz, 2:425; al-Mward, 3:21; al-Baghaw, 2:417.
94 chapter six
32
Ibn al-Jawz, 2:425.
33
Ibid., 2:425.
34
Al-Mward, 3:21.
35
Al-Baghaw, 2:417.
36
Ibn al-Jawz, 2:425. For similar expositions, see also al-Mward, 3:22; al-Baghaw,
2:417.
37
Mujhid b. Jabr, 525; al-Baghaw, 3:438.
38
Mujhid b. Jabr, 525; al-Baghaw, 3:438.
39
Yahy b. Sallm, Tafsr, 2:582; al-Dnawar, 2:120.
40
Al-Baghaw, 3:438.
h ikmah in relation to h akm and h ukm 95
raised and fed by them for years during his childhood. Pharaoh also
reminded Moses of his having slain the Egyptian and implied that
Moses was not only a murderer but also ungrateful for the good treat-
ment he had received in the past (26:1619). Moses accepted the charge
and said, Indeed I did it then, being one of those that stray; so I fled
from you, fearing you. But my Lord gave (wahaba) me h ukm and made
me one of the messengers (26:2021). Early commentators assert that
the word h ukm in this verse could mean prophethood,41 the Torah,42 or
understanding and knowledge.43
In the same srah, Abraham prays to God, saying (26:83), My Lord,
give me h ukm and join me with the righteous. As in the explanations
of Moses case, tafsr authorities assert that the word h ukm here denotes
understanding,44 knowledge,45 and intelligence.46 Yahy b. Sallm inter-
prets this passage as make me firm in prophethood.47 Al-Baghaw
further elucidates such explanations, reporting that Ibn Abbs defined
the word h ukm in this verse as knowledge (marifah) of the divine
ordinance.48
David and Solomon are mentioned in the Qurn as having been
given h ukm and knowledge. Commentators relate the following story:
Two men came to David to resolve a conflict between them. One of
them had a herd of sheep and the other a cultivated field. The sheep had
gotten into the field, eaten the crops, and caused serious damage in the
field. In compensation for the damage, David judged that the owner of
the sheep had to give his herd to the owner of the field. But Davids son,
Solomon, still young, suggested a different judgment. In his view, the
owner of the field should not take the sheep permanently, but should
detain them only until the damage to his field was recouped; in the
meantime, he could benefit from the milk, wool, and newborn sheep. At
the end, each party would receive his original property. David liked his
sons judgment and gave his final decision accordingly.49 Referring back
to this story, the Qurn says, And [remember] David and Solomon,
41
Yahy b. Sallm, Tafsr, 2:499; al-Dnawar, 2:92.
42
Al-Farr, 2:279.
43
Al-Dnawar, 2:92.
44
Al-Dnawar, 2:97; al-Baghaw, 3:390.
45
Al-Dnawar, 2:97.
46
Al-Baghaw, 3:390.
47
Yahy b. Sallm, Tafsr, 2:508.
48
Al-Baghaw, 3:390.
49
Ibn al-Jawz, 3:202; al-Baghaw, 3:253.
96 chapter six
50
Ibn Wahb, 2:130.
51
Al-Dnawar, 2:27.
52
Al-Mward, 4:241.
53
Al-Shfi, Tafsr, 163. Ibn al-Jawz also relates the same saying, but with a difference
at the end. According to his narration, al-H asan al-Bazr said, If this verse did not
exist, I would think that [all] judges (qudh) would be destroyed; but God praised
(athn al) Solomon for his correctness and excused (adhara) David for his indi-
vidual judgment (ijtihd). Ibn al-Jawz, 3:203.
54
Al-H asan al-Bazr, 2:106; Zayd b. Al, 200. In the same place, Zayd b. Al gives
another definition of h ukm in this verse as proof or evidence (furqn). It is worth men-
tioning that in another Qurnic verse, John is described as a confirmer (musaddiq)
of a Word from God, as well as a nobleman (sayyid), chaste, prophet, and righteous
person. Al-H asan al-Basr defines the word sayyid in this verse as h akm. Al-H asan
al-Basr, 1:211.
h ikmah in relation to h akm and h ukm 97
children called him to play with them, but John replied, We have not
been created [just] for play.55 Al-Tabar also mentions that h ukm in
this instance refers to the fact that John was given understanding of the
Book of God during his childhood.56 Similarly, Ibn al-Jawz reports that
hukm denotes protecting (ifz) the Torah and its knowledge as well.57
Scholars of tafsr also use the words h ukm and h ikmah interchange-
ably for this verse. Ibn Wahb reports that Mlik (b. Anas) told him that
in this verse, hikmah means obedience to God, comprehension in the
religion, and the practice of it. As mentioned previously, in the similar
exposition of verse 2:269, Mlik elucidates his definition further, saying,
You could find a person intelligent (qil) in worldly things but weak
(daf ) in religious matters, while you could find another person weak in
worldly things but knowledgeable (lim) and insightful (basr) in reli-
gious matters. God gives this quality to the latter, but not to the former.
As for h ikmah, it is comprehension of the religion of God.58
In contrast to our discussion above, which classifies the references to
h ikmah in the Qurn in relation to the prophets, the Qurnic h ikmah
can also be classified in terms of its relation to the verb used with it.
For example, h ikmah is something given (the verb at) by God 1) to
the prophets in general (3:81); 2) to the family of Abraham (4:54); 3) to
David (2:251, 38:20); 4) to Luqmn (31:12); and 5) to whomever He wills
(2:269). It is something brought (the verb ja bi-) by Jesus to clarify
certain misconceptions to his people (43:63). H ikmah is something sent
(the verb anzala) to the believers (2:231) and to Muhammad (4:113);
it is something revealed (the verb awh ) to Muhammad (17:39); and
it is something to be remembered (the verb dhakara) by the wives of
Muhammad (33:34). H ikmah is something to be practiced to call others
to the way of the Lord (16:125), and it is something far-reaching (54:5).
It is also something taught (the verb allama) by God to Jesus (3:48,
5:110). Interestingly, the Qurnic statements identify Muhammad as
the only human being to teach h ikmah (2:151, 3:164, 62:2), for none
55
Yahy b. Sallm, Tafsr, 1:217. For the same story, see al-H asan b. Al al-Askar,
Tafsr al-Imm Ab Muh ammad al-H asan b. Al al-Askar, ed. Sayyid Al shr (Beirut,
2001), 515; al-Tabar, 16:55; al-Mward, 3:360.
56
Al-Tabar, 16:55.
57
Ibn al-Jawz, 3:121.
58
Ibn Wahb, 2:130131.
98 chapter six
1
An alternative scholarly method of dealing with such a conceptual inquiry is that
embraced by Toshihiko Izutsu, who analyzes the semantics of central Qurnic terms
within the Qurnic text alone. Limiting himself exclusively to this text rather than
extending his investigation to other written materials, he elaborates on the key terms
of the Qurn in order to present a conceptual grasp of the Weltanschauung of the
people who used the Arabic language to conceptualize and interpret the terminology
of the Book. In this regard, I am especially referring to Izutsus works, God and Man in
the Koran (Tokyo, 1964) and Ethico-religious Concepts in the Qurn (Montreal, 1966).
102 part three
The difficulty of examining technical terms properly within a variety of textual mate-
rials can be observed in Izutsus industrious efforts, which again, in fact, focus on a
single text, e.g., the Qurn. By no means would I permit myself to undervalue Izutsus
meticulous scholarly examinations; rather, I simply mention his case as an example of
the difficulty of the matter in question.
hikmah in early sufi literature 103
2
I agree with Arberry, who argues that the concept of marifah was not introduced
into Sufism by Dh al-Nn al-Misr because Muslim ascetics who lived before him
were already talking about this concept. A. J. Arberry, Sufism (London, 1950), 52. For
the attribution of ilm al-qulb to al-H asan al-Basr, see Louis Massignon, Essai sur les
origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane, 191.
3
Throughout my writing, I use the word gnosis as a translation of marifah in a
technical sense, but without implying any of its associations with Christian and more
general gnosticism.
104 part three
4
I refer his works Essai and Recueil de textes in particular.
5
Ate, r Tefsr Okulu, 27165. See also al-Dhahab, al-Tafsr wa-al-mufassirn,
2:337416; Gerhard Bwering, The Qurn Commentary of al-Sulam, Islamic Studies
Presented to Charles J. Adams, eds. Wael B. Hallaq and Donald P. Little (Leiden, 1991),
4143.
hikmah in early sufi literature 105
6
Ate, r, 1921; al-Dhahab, 2:377.
7
Ab T lib al-Makk, Qt al-qulb, ed. Sad Nasb Makrim (Beirut, 1995), 2:23
24.
Chapter seven
Almost every Sufi manual considers al-H asan al-Basr (d. 110/728)
among the earliest authorities to introduce initial examples of inter-
pretations of Qurnic statements from a Sufi perspective. His post-
humous influence on Islamic thought in general and on Sufism in
particular make him a legendary figure in Muslim scholarship; his
exemplary piety and asceticism are repeatedly and widely recorded.1
Such a wide-ranging popularity makes al-H asan a multifaceted per-
sonality in the Islamic intellectual tradition, and a figure it is quite
impossible to describe in a simple fashion. It would not be a complete
portrayal to describe him as merely a mufassir, a muh addith, a faqh,
a mutakallim, or a Sufi.
With regard to his explanations of h ikmah, it is evident that al-H asan
is mainly interested in the practical aspect of this concept. Al-Amash
(d. 148/765) describes al-H asan, saying, Al-H asan would keep devot-
ing his attention to h ikmah until he spoke in terms of it (m zla
al-H asan yatan bi-al-h ikmah h att nataqa bih).2 Al-H asan defines
the word h ikmah in verses 2:29, 2:269, and 38:20 as sunnah,3 moral
scrupulousness (wara) in the religion of God,4 and understanding
(fahm),5 respectively.
Al-H asans definition of h ikmah can be contextualized better in
relation to his broader understanding of Sufism and its concepts. He
encourages the strictest observance of religious commands in sincerity
1
Massignon, Essai, 174201; Ate, r, 3946; Abd al-Rahmn Badaw, Trkh
al-tasawwuf al-islm (Kuwait, 1975), 152187; Soleiman Ali Mourad, Early Islam
between Myth and History: Al-H asan al-Basr (d. 110H/728CE) and the Formation of
his Legacy in Classical Islamic Scholarship (Leiden, 2006). Furthermore, Ibn al-Nadm
(d. ca. 380/990) reports that al-H asan wrote a commentary on the Qurn. Ibn
al-Nadm, al-Fihrist (Cairo, 1957), 57.
2
Al-H asan al-Basr, Tafsr, Editors introduction, 21.
3
Al-H asan al-Basr, 1:115. See also al-Suyt , al-Durr al-manthr, 1:335.
4
Al-H asan al-Basr, 1:196.
5
Ibid., 2:239.
108 chapter seven
6
Quoted in Massignon, Essai, 187188. Here Massignon rightly notes that this say-
ing resonates a hadth famous in Sufi circles. In the hadth, God Himself speaks, saying,
I am as My servant thinks of Me: if he thinks good, the good is his; if he thinks bad,
the bad is his.
7
H ashwiyyah is a term used to describe those who blindly follow the external
and literal meanings of religious texts and reject every kind of reasoning in religious
matters, including in the case of the anthropomorphic statements of the Qurn with
respect to God. Al-Tahnaw mentions that in his teaching circle al-H asan criticized
this type of people, who would speak empty and useless words and ask meaningless
and unrelated questions. For various explanations for the etymological and historical
origins of the term see, al-Tahnaw, Kashshf ist ilht al-funn, 543.
8
Massignon, Essai, 188189.
9
Al-Jhiz, al-Bayn wa-al-tabyn, ed. Abd al-Salm Muhammad Hrn (Cairo,
1949), 2:135.
hikmah and the earliest sufi authorities 109
of his time.10 When he interprets the Qurnic verse 19:55,11 al-H asan
states,
O man, how could you be a [true] Muslim as long as your neighbor
does not feel secure from you and how could you be a mumin as long
as people do not feel safe from you?12
We can conclude from these and similar accounts that in al-H asans
view, Sufism and its concepts, including h ikmah, represent an overall
moral approach to worldly life and matters. He is not interested in
an elaborate articulation of mystical terms in the technical sense, but
instead appears to concentrate primarily on living a decent life, sin-
cerely, with integrity; a spiritual life. He talks about h ikmah and other
concepts with actions. The intellectual explanations of these notions
can better be contextualized in relation to al-H asans general under-
standing of knowledge, which is intended to be put into action, as it is
action, in turn, that leads to salvation. Thus, as long as knowledge falls
short of action, it basically becomes a burden for the knower rather
than a light indicating the straight path, which is the original function
of knowledge in Islam. Such teachings of al-H asan have come down to
us only in the form of fragments recorded by later writers on Islamic
intellectual history. Fortunately we are on firmer textual ground with
Jafar.
Jafar al-Sdiq
10
Massignon, Essai, 190192. Such an attitude, however, did not lead al-H asan to
ignore the critical agenda of his time; for instance, he questioned the legitimacy of
Yazds caliphate, and expressed his thoughts clearly in letter he was alleged to have
written to the caliph Abd al-Malik regarding the contemporary issue surrounding the
concept of predestination.
11
He (Ishmael) would enjoin upon his people prayer and alms-giving and he was
pleasing to his Lord.
12
Al-Jhiz, al-Bayn wa-al-tabyn 2:135.
13
Ab Nuaym al-Isfahn, H ilyat al-awliy (Cairo, 19321938), 3:192206. Fard
al-Dn At tr, Tadhkirat al-awliy, ed. Reynold A. Nicholson (London, 1905), 1:915.
Al-Hujwr states that Jafar wrote well-known books in explanation of Sufism. Al b.
110 chapter seven
thought and terminology was enormous. Much like al-H asan, Jafar
tried to detach himself from political issues and held a quietist stance
and inactive personal morality with respect to the political intrigues
of his time. He sought to disengage himself from worldly matters as
much as possible. Illustrating this fact, Ab Nuaym reports the follow-
ing saying of Jafar: God revealed to the world: Serve those who serve
Me, and weary of those who serve you.14
In fact, Jafar is quite an enigmatic figure in Muslim scholarship and
his critical and wide-ranging influence on subsequent generations is
recorded by historians and biographers alike. A member of the family
of the Prophet (ahl al-bayt), he came to be seen as the sixth Imam in
Sh Islam, was reputed to be a teacher of Ab H anfah (d. 150/767) in
fiqh, and was, at the same time, a venerated early authority in Sufism.
In reports by Jbir b. H ayyn (d. ca. 184/800)who lived in the sec-
ond/eighth century and is regarded as the father of Islamic alchemy
and a prolific writer on Islamic-Hermetic philosophyJafar is recur-
rently mentioned as Jbirs foremost master and scholarly source.15 Dh
al-Nn al-Misrs name, in turn, is mentioned as the main transmitter
of Jbirs doctrines on alchemy in the third/ninth century.16
Many accounts relating to the science of letters (ilm al-h urf or jafr)
in the Qurn, including the knowledge of the disconnected letters
(al-h urf al-muqatta ah) or the opening letters (h urf al-fawtih )
at the beginning of twenty-nine Qurnic suras go back to Jafar. In
classical tafsr methodology, the knowledge of these letters is regarded
See for instance, al-Suyt, al-Itqn f ulm al-Qurn (Lahore, 1980), 2:812.
17
At the same time, Ate questions the historical reality and authenticity of the many
reports attributed to Jafar regarding ilm al-hurf. Ate accuses al-Kulayn (d. 329/940)
of distorting Jafars legacy in Muslim scholarship by introducing absurd narrations.
The basis of Ates argument is the fact that even though some other eminent Mus-
lim scholarly authorities, such as Sufyn al-Thawr, Mlik b. Anas, and Ab H anfah
studied in Jafars circle, none of them related from Jafar anything similar to what
al-Kulayn relates. Ate, r, 4849.
19
Ab Abd al-Rahmn al-Sulam, H aqiq al-tafsr, ed. Sayyid Umrn (Beirut,
2001), 1:20.
20
Al-Sulam, H aqiq, 1:22; Nwyia, Le Tafsr, 188.
21
Al-Sulam, H aqiq, 1:378; Nwyia, Le Tafsr, 205. In his Ziydt al-tafsr,
al-Sulam phrases the same definition as, hikmah means a call/invitation from God to
God and through His command on the basis of His will. Al-Sulam, Ziydt H aqiq
al-tafsr, ed. Gerhard Bwering (Beirut, 1995), 79.
112 chapter seven
22
In fact, in al-Sulams narration, the expression is sih h at al-aqd, which can be
translated literally into English as soundness of agreement, but I could not make
sense out of such a literal translation in this specific context. I understand this expres-
sion in the sense of holding true opinions, believing correct things about reality.
Al-Sulam, H aqiq, 2:184.
23
Al-Sulam, H aqiq, 2:184; Nwyia, Le Tafsr, 219.
24
Jafar al-Sdiq, Kmil al-tafsr al-suf al-irfn li-al-Qurn, ed. Al Zayr (Beirut,
2002), 246.
25
Muhammad b. Yaqb al-Kulayn, Usl al-Kf, ed. Abd al-H usayn b. Abd Allh
(Najaf, 1956), 1:58.
26
Al-Kulayn, 1:58. The verse reads, Indeed, in that is a reminder whoever has a
heart (qalb)...
27
Nwyia, Le Tafsr, 221. Linguistically it is worth noting that the Qurn uses only
the verbal form of the root -q-l. On the basis of this fact Muslim scholars argue that
the Qurn emphasizes an active, experiential form of this notion, rather than merely
an inactive concept in its noun form (aql). See for instance, Muhammad Al al-Jz,
Mafhm al-aql wa-al-qalb f al-Qurn wa-al-Sunnah (Beirut, 1983), 5556.
28
Jafar al-Sdiq, al-H ikam al-Jafariyyah, ed. rif Tmir (Beirut, 1957), 25.
29
Ibid., 60.
30
Ibid., 25.
31
Ibid., 71.
hikmah and the earliest sufi authorities 113
Ab Nuaym, 3:193. For the same story with some modifications see, Att r, 1:12.
32
38
Ibid., 1:20.
39
Ibid., 1:27.
40
Ibid., 1:91.
41
Ibid., 1:31.
42
Ibid., 1:35.
43
Ibid., 1:78. Al-Sulam reports the same hadth in the context of verse 16:125,
where he explains the word hikmah. Al-Sulam, H aqiq, 1:377.
44
Jafar al-Sdiq, al-H ikam, 64.
45
Al-Kulayn, 2:26.
46
Ibid., 1:92.
47
Ibid., 1:7475.
48
In fact, in such texts the word haqq may refer to a number of meanings. It may
refer to God, as al-haqq is one of the Most Beautiful Names of God. In this case the
hikmah and the earliest sufi authorities 115
word has the sense of the nature of ultimate reality. In a broder sense, the word haqq
may refer to what corresponds to facts without being restricted to the Divine Name.
In such context, it may refer to any truth, reality, or fact.
49
Al-Kulayn, 1:66.
50
Ibid., 1:89.
51
Ibid., 1:92.
52
Ibid., 2:56.
53
Ibid., 2:14.
54
Ibid., 2:23.
55
Ibid., 2:29.
56
Ibid., 2:41.
116 chapter seven
57
Ibid., 2:42.
58
Ibid., 2:70.
59
Ibid., 1:58.
60
Ibid., 1:94.
61
Ibid., 2:39.
62
Ibid., 2:38. Underlining the same principle in the particular case of hikmah, Dh
al-Nn says, H ikmah does not reside in a stomach that is filled with food. Abd
al-Karm al-Qushayr, al-Rislah (Egypt, 1959), 9. Likewise, when he was asked about
the way in which he attained such a high level of marifah, Ab Yazd al-Bist m
responded, Through an empty stomach and a body without clothes. Al-Qushayr,
al-Risalh, 14.
hikmah and the earliest sufi authorities 117
relation to marifah.63 Jafar simply asserts that amal and marifah are
reciprocally dependent. Each of them is a prerequisite for the other
and one cannot leave the other aside in the course of staying steadfast
in sound mn.64
Having visited various elucidations on the concept of h ikmah within
a network of related epistemological terms as presented by the two ear-
liest pioneering Sufi figures, al-H asan and Jafar, I move on to examine
the writings of Sufi exegetes of subsequent centuries in the formative
period of Sufi Qurn commentary.
63
Al-Hujwr, 7879. For the basic meanings of ilm and marifah and their various
usages by authors at the earliest stages of Muslim metaphysical thought, see Rosen-
thal, Knowledge Triumphant, 165193. For an analytical examination of the concept
of marifah in Sufism, but mainly on the basis of secondary literary sources, see Reza
Shah-Kazemi, The Notion and Significance of marifa in Sufism, Journal of Islamic
Studies 13 (2002): 155181.
64
Al-Kulayn, 2:65. Emphasizing the same principle, on the authority of Wahb b.
Munabbih (d. 110/728), al-Makk relates, Faith (mn) is naked (uryn); its dress
(libs), ornament (znah), and fruit (thamarah) are God-consciousness (taqw), mod-
esty (hay), and knowledge (ilm), respectively. Al-Makk, Qt, 1:286.
Chapter eight
Sufyn al-Thawr
It is not for a mortal that God should give him the kitb, h ukm and
prophethood and that he should then say to the people, Be worshippers
(ibd) of mine rather than God; on the contrary (he would say), Be
pious scholars of the Lord (rabbniyyn) because of what you have taught
of the kitb and because of what you have studied. He would never order
you to take the angels and the prophets as lords; what, would he order
you to disbelieve, after you have surrendered?
Al-Thawr interprets the word rabbniyyn in this verse as h ukam and
ulam, which may both possibly be translated as sages and scholars
without implying a technical meaning for the term h ukam.1
According to al-Makks reports, al-Thawr divides scholars (ulam)
into three major categories: 1) those who have knowledge of God and
His commands (lim bi-Allh wa-bi-amr Allh)this group represents
competent/complete scholars (al-lim al-kmil); 2) those who have
only knowledge of Godthis category includes the God-conscious
scholars (al-taq al-khif );2 and, 3) those who have knowledge of Gods
command but not of Himselfthese are impudent/disrespectful schol-
ars (al-lim al-fjir).3 Upon being asked about ilm, Sufyn said, It is
scrupulousness (wara). When he was further asked about the meaning
of wara, he replied, It means seeking knowledge through which wara
can be learned, and in the eyes of authorities, wara actually means
lengthening ones silence and shortening ones speech.4 Such state-
ments indicate that al-Thawr was primarily concerned with a pious
religious life based on existential and experiential spirituality. In his
view, every epistemological acquisition, including h ikmah, derives from
and develops out of such diligent and sincere practice. Another decla-
ration expressed by the earliest Sufi authorities as narrated by al-Makk
1
Al-Thawr, 37. Al-Sulam reports a similar definition of rabbniyyn, saying that
they have knowledge of God and are the h ukam among His servants. Citing al-Wsit s
(d. 331/942) interpretation of the same word, al-Sulam states, Rabbniyyn are those
who own [worldly] things, while nothing owns them. Al-Sulam, H aqiq, 1:103.
2
In general many scholars translate the word taqw into English as fear or fear of
God. But we need to note that taqw has connotations beyond the ordinary sense of
fear as a negative notion and that it is not easy to render it in English with a single
word or expression. Especially in the Quranic context, taqw refers to embracement
of a willful personal God-consciousness, reverence, devotion, and piety full of posi-
tive elements, rather than to a stressful and anxious emotional and psychic state. For
such considerations, throughout the book in most cases I will translate taqw as God-
consciousness, which I believe captures the meaning of this word in English in a most
comprehensive and nuanced manner.
3
Al-Makk, Qt, 1:290.
4
Ibid., 1:290.
hikmah in the context of early sufi exegetical works 121
Sahl al-Tustar
Ibid., 1:292.
5
Ibid., 1:293.
6
7
Fuat Sezgin, Geschichte des Arabischen Schrifttums (Leiden, 1967), 1:647.
8
Al-Tustar, Editors introduction, 9; Gerhard Bwering, The Mystical Vision of
Existence in Classical Islam: The Qurnic Hermeneutics of the Sf Sahl at-Tustar
(d. 283/896) (Berlin and New York, 1980), 11.
122 chapter eight
9
Al-Tustar, 42. For the same h adth, see also al-Sulam, Ziydt, 20.
10
Ibid.
11
Al-Tustar, 42.
12
Ibid., 42.
13
Ibid., 43.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid., 43; al-Sulam, Ziydt, 20.
18
Al-Tustar, 43.
19
Ibid., 43.
hikmah in the context of early sufi exegetical works 123
Al-Tustar asserts that the capital (ras ml) of h ikmah is of three kinds, as
follows, The first one is training the soul (nafs)20 regarding reprehensible
things (makrht); the second is emptying the heart of the love of carnal
desires (shahawt); and the third is watching over the heart with respect
to safeguarding incoming thoughts (khtirt), as whoever is mindful of
God when incoming thoughts pour into his heart, God protects him at
the times when his limbs move to action (inda h arakti jawrih ihi).21
Like his scholarly predecessors in mystical writings, al-Tustar places
great emphasis on the practical and experiential aspects of Sufi terms.
This is clear in his exposition of belief (mn), when he says,
Certainty (yaqn), patience (sabr), and sincerity (ikhls) are the heart
(qalb), pillar (imd), and perfection (kaml) of belief, respectively; for a
servant reaches confirmation (tasdq), realization (tah qq), and the Truth
(al-h aqq) through ikhls, tasdq, and tah qq, correspondingly. Ikhls is
the fruit (thamarah) of yaqn because yaqn means witnessing of the
secret (mushhadat al-sirr). Whoever has not experienced witnessing of
the secret with his Lord, his practice has not become dedicated to God
sincerely, though God knows best.22
Ab Tlib al-Makk
20
Translating the word nafs into English is indeed a complex issue, because in early
Islamic texts, it may equally refer to soul, self, ego, spirit, and the like. Considering
the fact the we have also a semantic complexity in the English language with regard
to drawing clear semantic lines between these translations, I will make educated judg-
ments depending on the context and give an English translation accordingly.
21
Al-Tustar, 43.
22
Ibid., 52.
23
Although bibliographical works attribute a work titled Ilm al-qulb to al-Makk
(see for instance, Sezgin, 1:667), the editor of the presently available work questions
the authenticity of this book. In his view, there is no doubt that al-Makk wrote the
original Ilm al-qulb, but the content of the current manuscript, on the basis of which
he edited and published the work, includes certain anachronistic accounts that cannot
be al-Makks own statements. The editor believes that the original version of the book
was shorter and in the course of time it has been expanded through reproductions and
expositions. See editors introduction to al-Makk, Ilm al-qulb, eds. Abd al-Ghan
al-Daqr and Musta f Ibrhm H amzah (Damascus, 1998), 1617. H amzahs basic argu-
ment would seem to be sound. Throughout my reading of the book, I have also noted
124 chapter eight
aspects that lead me to believe that the extant version of Ilm al-qulb was expanded by
later scholars. See, for instance, al-Makks expositions on verse 2:269, where he intro-
duces a highly elaborate explanation of h ikmah that is much more detailed than earlier
commentators. It is only with later tafsr writers, such as al-Qurtub and al-Suyt,
that one can find such a categorically explicit definition of h ikmah. I suspect that the
original version of Ilm al-qulb did not treat h ikmah at this length, but over time the
work has been expanded through later reproductions. It may be of interest to note
that according to the extant version of this work, al-Makk attributes the following
oft-quoted statement, Whoever knows himself knows his Lord (man arafa nafsahu
fa-qad arafa rabbahu), to Al b. Ab T lib, instead of to the Prophet himself; while
many other Sufi writers attribute it to the prophet. Al-Makk, Ilm, 98.
24
Al-Makk, Ilm, 27.
25
Ibid., 27.
26
Ibid., 2729.
27
Ibid., 3031.
28
Ibid., 3132.
29
Ibid., 33.
hikmah in the context of early sufi exegetical works 125
30
Ibid., 3436.
31
Ibid., 3637.
32
Ibid., 3738.
33
Ibid., 40.
34
Ibid., 40.
126 chapter eight
that it was given to praising God and that it never committed sin;
how then could a sinner like himself prevent it from doing so?35
13)H ikmah means learning the Qurn by heart (h afiza al-qurna
an-zahri al-qalb). Al-Makk cites the following explanation of Ibn
Abbs in this regard, Whoever recites the Qurn before receiving
formal education, he is among those who are given h ikmah while
they are yet at a young age.36 Apparently here Ibn Abbs is referring
to verse 19:12, which says that God gave h ukm to John the Baptist
while he was yet a small child.
14)H ikmah denotes understanding the refined expressions (latif ) of
the Qurn and aspects of its meanings (wujh manhi), as it is
reported from Al b. Ab Tlib, If I wanted to overload seventy
camels with the interpretation of the Ftih ah, I could do so.37
Al-Makk also reports that every Qurnic verse has seven meanings
(manin):
1) external/exoteric (zhir) for the common people (awmm);
2) internal/esoteric (btin) for the elect (khawss) ;
3) allegorical (ishrt) for the elect of the elect;
4) indicative/symbolic (amrt) for the friends of God/saints (awliy);
5) refined (latif ) for the very truthful (siddqn);
6) subtle (daqiq) for the lovers (muh ibbn); and
7) real (h aqiq) for the prophets (nabiyyn).
Al-Makk further says that God gave prophethood to distinguished
individuals among the people of purity and sealed (khatama) the
institution of prophethood and closed its door with the Prophet
Muhammad. As for h ikmah alone, God gave it to Luqmn and since
then He has kept its door unreservedly open until the day of resur-
rection. Al-Makk asserts that h ikmah is one of the ten great Divine
blessings given to mankind. He also describes the way these should
be sought.38
Al-Makk lists the ten blessings as follows:
a)h ikmah given to the h ukam as mentioned in 2:269, which should be
sought through hunger (j) and thirst (zim);
b)mercy (rah mah), as found in 2:105,39 which should be requested
through imploring (tadarru) and weeping (buk);
35
Ibid., 4041.
36
Ibid., 41.
37
Ibid., 42.
38
Ibid., 1921.
39
He (God) singles out (yakhtassu ) for His mercy whomever He wills.
hikmah in the context of early sufi exegetical works 127
If you fear poverty, God will surely enrich you of His bounty.
41
42
He will remove that on account of which you invoked Him, if He wills.
43
Then God accepts repentance after that from whomever He wills.
44
God gives sustenance to whomever He wills without reckoning.
45
He (God) forgives whomever He wills.
46
He (God) guides whomever He wills to a straight path.
47
We raise up in degrees whomever We will.
48
Al-Makk, Ilm, 1921. In his Qt al-qulb, al-Makk introduces a much shorter
explanation of the word h ikmah in the same verse. Here, he simply reports that h ikmah
means understanding (fahm) and perspicacity (fitnah). Al-Makk, Qt, 1:305.
49
Ibid., 1:278.
128 chapter eight
50
Ibid., 1:305.
51
For a general outline of al-Sulams H aqiq and its position within Sufi Qurn
commentary, see Ate, Slem; Ate, r, 9195; Bwering, The Qurn, 4156. It
ought to be noted that a number of leading Muslim scholarly authorities, includ-
ing Ibn al-Jawz (d. 597/1200) and Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328), severely criticized
al-Sulam and his tafsr on the basis of al-Sulams interpretations regarding al-h urf
al-muqatta ah and alleged anthropomorphism. They further accused him of using
unsound ah dth and even of forgery. Ate, Slem, 4043; Ate, r, 9295.
52
Massignon, Essai, 359412 and Nwyia, Le Tafsr, 181230.
53
Bwering, The Qurn.
hikmah in the context of early sufi exegetical works 129
54
Ate, Slem.
55
Al-Sulam H aqiq.
56
By way of example, I quote a part from al-Sulams own introduction to the tafsr.
I spent a great deal of time trying to make sense out of this section as it is written
in the edition, though in the end, I was not able to. Fortunately, the editor included
a few examples of the manuscripts in his introduction to the book. Following the
editors reading of the text, together with those pages of the manuscripts, I noted the
following, as an example. After a traditional h amdalah (thanking of God) and salwalah
(sending blessings and prayers upon the Prophet), according to Umrns reading,
al-Sulam says, wa-lamm dnat al-mutawassimn bi-al-ulm al-zawhir sannaf f
anw al-qurn... (19). The verb dnat did not make any sense here to me in this
form. I thought that it might be dawwana (the second verbal form of the root d-w-
n) in the sense of to write or put down in writing. When I examined carefully the
written form of this word in the manuscript, however, I saw that dawwana was not a
reasonable solution. Then I realized that the word had to be read as raaytu (I saw/have
seen), which looks graphically very much like dnat. Thus I made sense out of this
passage and translated it as, I have seen examiners of the external sciences compile
[works] on various aspects of the Qurn... Again, we cannot know whether this sort
of error is a result of the editors negligence or a typographical mistake. In another
place al-Sulam discusses the gradational meanings of the Qurnic verses as ibrah,
ishrah, latif, and h aqiq. Here, instead of the word ibrah we find the word ibdah
(act of worship), both of which, once again, look very similar graphically. Al-Sulam,
H aqiq, 1:23.
57
Ibid., 1:1920.
130 chapter eight
58
Ibid., 1:21. The term mutta la literally means a place to which one may ascend.
In Sufi terminology, this term refers to the face of God present in every existent thing.
See for instance, William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-Arabs Meta-
physics of Imagination (Albany, 1989), 363 and Ethem Cebeciolu, Tasavvuf terimleri
ve deyimleri szl (Ankara, 2009), 448.
59
Al-Sulam, H aqiq, 1:22.
60
Ibid., 1:2223. The word sam in this context may well refer to the transmitted
texts of the Qurn and Sunnah as opposed to aql as it occurs in pairing expressions
of sam versus aql or naql versus aql.
61
This sentence does not make clear sense, and we can suspect an editorial mistake.
In his work on al-Sulam and his tafsr, Ate gives examples of al-Sulams interpre-
tations of Qurnic verses and, fortunately, he cites this verse as well. According to
Ate reading, this passage defines h ikmah as, emptying the soul/spirit of everything
other than God, so that inspiration would come in (Hikmet, ilhmn gelmesi iin rhu
msivadan boaltmaktr). Ate, Slem, 146.
62
Al-Sulam, H aqiq, 1:7980. In the case of another verse (38:20) stating that
David was given h ikmah, al-Sulam cites a number of interpretations of h ikmah pre-
sented by earlier authorities as follows: a) Davids knowledge of himself and his people;
b) knowledge (ilm) and understanding (fahm) in general; c) correctness in speech,
soundness in belief, and being steadfast in affairs. Al-Sulam, H aqiq, 2:184. For simi-
hikmah in the context of early sufi exegetical works 131
lar interpretations of the same verse, see al-Qushayr, Latif al-ishrt, ed. Ibrhm
Basyn (Egypt, 1981), 3:249. In another Qurnic instance (54:5), al-Sulam interprets
h ikmah blighah as the ultimate and perfect knowledge. Al-Sulam, H aqiq, 2:290.
Al-Qushayr, on the other hand, asserts that this h ikmah blighah is true, clear, and
open to those who reflect on it. Al-Qushayr, Latif, 3:494.
63
Al-Sulam, H aqiq, 1:80.
64
Ibid., 1:80.
65
Ibid., 1:80. In his tafsr, al-Thalab follows al-Sulams reports regarding this verse
(2:269). Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Thalab, al-Kashf wa-al-bayn, ed. Ab Muhammad
b. shr and Nazr al-Sid (Beirut, 2002), 2:271272.
66
Al-Sulam, Ziydt, 20. In the context of verse 31:12, al-Sulam relates a similar
interpretation of h ikmah when he notes that it means the knowledge of words, states,
and acts. In the exemplary case of Luqmn, he assumed this notion as an admonition
for himself and introduces it to his companions as well. Ibid., 124.
67
Ibid., 20. On the authority of earlier scholars, al-Sulam mentions a related expo-
sition when he defines h ikmah in verse 31:12 as knowledge of the danger[ous aspects]
of the soul (gharar al-nafs) and their treatment. Ibid., 124.
132 chapter eight
68
Ibid., 20.
69
Ibid., 21. According to al-Qushayrs narration, once a man saw a h akm eating
the leaves of vegetables fallen on the surface of the water. The man said, If you were
to serve the king (sultn), you would not need to eat this. The h akm replied, And
you, if you were content (law qanita) with this, you would not need to serve the king.
Al-Qushayr, al-Risalh, 82.
70
Al-Sulam, Ziydt, 20.
71
Ibid., 21.
72
Al-Sulam, Muqaddimah f al-tasawwuf, ed. Ysuf Zaydn (Beirut, 1999), 30;
al-Sulam, Tisat kutub f usl al-tasawwuf wa-al-zuhd, ed. Sleyman Ate (Beirut,
1993), 306. For the same account, see al-Qushayr, al-Risalh, 4.
73
Al-Sulam, Muqaddimah, 30; al-Sulam, Tisat kutub, 306307. The same state-
ment is also attributed to other eminent Sufi figures, including al-Junayd and Dh
al-Nn. Al-Junayd is mentioned as saying, I have known my Lord through my Lord;
otherwise I could not have known Him. Al-Sulam, Muqaddimah, 31. Dh al-Nn,
in his explanation of the knowledge of tawh d, said, when he was asked with what
he knew (arafa) his Lord, My Lord is more exalted than everything with which He
could be known, rather, I have come to know (araftu) my Lord through my Lord and
I have come to know everything other than my Lord through my Lord. Al-Makk,
Ilm, 105.
hikmah in the context of early sufi exegetical works 133
81
Al-Sulam, Tabaqt al-sfiyyah, ed. Nr al-Dn Sharbah (Cairo, 1969), 135.
82
Ibid., 189.
83
Al-Sulam, H aqiq, 1:377.
84
Ibid., 1:378.
85
Ibid., 1:378. Al-Sulam repeats this definition of h ikmah with a slight variation for
another Qurnic instance where h ikmah is mentioned in relation to Luqmn (31:12).
hikmah in the context of early sufi exegetical works 135
According to the report, No one can become h akm until he becomes h akm in his
speech, acts, social relations (f musharatihi) and companionship (f suh batihi). Oth-
erwise such a person would be described as speaking through/by h ikmah, but not as
actually being h akm. Al-Sulam, H aqiq, 2:129.
86
Al-Sulam, Tabaqt, 226. Al-Makk relates the same saying on the authority of
Ab Bakr al-Warrq as follows, The h ukam are the successors (khulaf) of the
prophets; there is no prophethood anymore, but there is h ikmah, which is explained
as perfecting matters (ih km al-umr). Al-Makk, Ilm, 52. For Sufis, there is a mutu-
ally exclusive relationship between talking excessively and attaining real knowledge.
They argue that lengthening silence and lessening speech are of the basic requirements
of a thorough spirituality, as can be observed in a saying of the h ukam reported
by al-Makk, which reads, If knowledge increases, speech decreases (idh kathura
al-ilm qalla al-kalm). Al-Makk, Qt, 1:294.
87
Al-Sulam, H aqiq, 1:423. See also, al-Qushayr, Latif, 2:422.
88
Al-Sulam, H aqiq, 1:423.
89
Ibid., 1:423.
136 chapter eight
Ab Ishq al-Thalab
90
Al-Thalab, 1:7375.
91
Ibid., 1:7584.
92
Ibid., 1:83.
93
Ibid., 1:8485.
94
This inclusive character of al-Thalabs tafsr is criticized by Ibn Taymiyyah,
though he appreciates al-Thalabs merits in terms of personal religious qualities, Ibn
Taymiyyah says, nevertheless, that al-Thalab was not very careful when compiling
his tafsr. In Ibn Taymiyyahs view, al-Thalab acted like someone who was gathering
wood at night (h tib layl), since he wrote down everything he found in earlier books
on tafsr, without paying attention to the reliability of the materials. Ibn Taymiyyah,
Muqaddimah f usl al-tafsr, eds. Ism Fris al-H arastn and Muhammad Shakr
H jj Amrr (Amman, 1997), 35. For a detailed study on al-Thalabs life and Qurn
commentary, see Walid A. Saleh, The Formation of the Classical Tafsr Tradition: The
Qurn Commentary of al-Thalab (d. 427/1035) (Leiden, 2004). Saleh argues that
al-Thalab was not a practicing Sufi himself, but his works indicate that he was a very
knowledgeable scholar of Sufi writings and was receptive to mystical influences as
well. Saleh, 5665.
hikmah in the context of early sufi exegetical works 137
In the context of his exposition of the root h -k-m and its derivatives,
al-Thalab discusses the meaning of the word h akm in verse 2:32, for
which he lists two meanings. First, being the passive participle form of
the root, h akm means to be perfected/perfectable/well-made; in this
case, it is an attribute of the action performed. Second, being the active
participle of the root, h akm holds the same meaning as h kim and it is
an attribute of the person who performs the action.95 Similar to earlier
tafsr authorities, al-Thalab mentions that the original meaning of the
word h ikmah is man (prevention or restraint). This is a prevention
from negative things and behaviors, as can be observed from the word
h akamah (bit) which is used to restrain a beast from running about
wildly. Thus does h ikmah prevent falsehood (bt il).96
In another Qurnic verse where h ikmah is mentioned in relation
to Luqmn (31:12), al-Thalab gives three definitions of the word:
a) intellect (aql), b) knowledge and practice, and c) correctness in
ones affairs (umr).97 On the authority of Ibn Umar, al-Thalab relates
that the Prophet considered Luqmn not as a prophet but an honest,
insightful man of sound opinion who loved God and was loved by
Him. God thus gave him h ikmah.98
95
Al-Thalab, 1:178.
96
Ibid., 1:178179. Al-Thalab records definitions of h ikmah by earlier authorities
in another verse of the same Qurnic chapter (2:129). He cites the following defini-
tions, which are more frequently mentioned in the context of verse 2:269: a) H ikmah
means understanding the Qurn (fahm al-Qurn), according to Mujhid; b) It denotes
admonitions found in the Qurn regarding lawful and unlawful things (Muqtil);
c) It refers to the concomitance of knowledge and practice, since no one can be called
h akm unless he combines the two (Ibn Qutaybah); d) H ikmah means putting things in
their original or proper places (al-Thalab). Al-Thalab also quotes Yahy b. Mudhs
explanation, saying, H ikmah is one of Gods armies that He sends to the hearts of
gnostics (rifn) to give them comfort against worldly troubles. Ibid., 1:276277.
97
Ibid., 7:312.
98
Ibid., 7:312.
99
Ate, r, 99.
138 chapter eight
100
Al-Qushayr, al-Rislah, 154.
101
Ibid., 154.
102
Al-Qushayr, al-Risalh, 154. Likewise, an earlier authority on Sufism, Ab Sad
al-Kharrz, uses the terms h ukam and ulam to refer to Sufis and he uses these two
terms interchangeably. See, for instance, al-Kharrz, 61, 71, 73, 93, 106, 115, 121, 142
and 75, 124, 164.
hikmah in the context of early sufi exegetical works 139
103
Al-Qushayr, Latif, 1:78. For another Qurnic case (31:2) in which h akm is
used as a description of the Book, al-Qushayr states that h akm refers to the fact that
the Qurn is protected against any kind of change or transformation. Ibid., 3:127.
104
Ibid., 1:207208.
105
Ibid., 2:329.
106
Ibid., 3:130.
140 chapter eight
example we can surmise that whoever does not have authority over
himself, cannot have authority over others either.107
In al-Qushayris terminology, h ikmah is positioned between practi-
cal (amal) and epistemological (ilm) concepts. It is treated as a cen-
tral point inherently connected with taqw (God-consciousness), zuhd
(asceticism), wara (moral scrupulousness), akhlq (good morals), and
ibdt (acts of worship), on the one hand, and with ilhm (inspira-
tion), kashf (unveiling), marifah (gnosis), sirr (secret), and haqqah
(reality) on the other. Practical notions are starting points without
which one cannot reap epistemological fruits. In other words, practical
notions bear the fruit of epistemological results. In testimony to this
fundamental point, al-Qushayr reports, When the servant renounces
(zahada) this world, God entrusts [him to] an angel who implants
h ikmah in his heart.108 The two groups of these concepts together
constitute, in an existential manner, the final destination of Muslim
spirituality, which is tawh d.
As a supporter of Asharism, thus of Sunn Islam, al-Qushayr states
that the earlier masters of Sufism established the bases of their princi-
ples on a very firm ground with respect to tawh d. He argues that those
eminent figures protected their beliefs (aqid) from heresy (bida) and
followed the methodology established by the forefathers (salaf ) of the
Muslim community and by the people of the Sunnah (ahl al-sunnah),
who stayed away from belief in anthropomorphism (tashbh) or denial
of Gods attributes mentioned in the Qurn (tatl), as in the context
of His eternity (qidam) and beginninglessness (azal), about which
al-Junayd said, Tawh d means being able to differentiate eternity
from temporal originatedness (h adath).109 According to al-Qushayrs
records, Ibn At asserted that if anyone was questioned regarding God
and His attributes, he was expected to look for an answer to that ques-
tion in the realm of ilm, and if he could not find the answer there,
he should search for it in the field of h ikmah; if he still could not see
an answer, then he should analyze the question in light of tawh d. If
he could not find the solution in any of these three places, he should
treat the question as a wicked Satanic thought instead of a matter of
107
Ibid., 2:177.
108
Al-Qushayr, al-Risalh, 62.
109
Ibid., 3.
hikmah in the context of early sufi exegetical works 141
Ibid., 25.
110
Ibid., 4.
111
Chapter nine
Al-Hrith al-Muhsib
1
Al-Kalbdh, Kitb al-Taarruf, ed. Ahmad Shams al-Dn (Beirut, 1993), 97100.
2
Al-H rith b. Asad al-Muhsib, al-Qasd wa-al-ruj il Allh, ed. Abd al-Qdir
Ahmad At (Cairo, 1980), 33.
3
Al-Muhsib, al-Qasd, 55.
4
Ibid., 5859.
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 145
5
Ibid., 78.
6
Ibid., 8384. In another of his works, al-Muhsib states that the pillars of
marifah are four:1) marifah of God, 2) marifah of the enemy of God, Satan (Ibls),
3) marifah of the baser self of man that incites to evil (al-nafs al-ammrah bi-al-s),
and 4) marifah of action for the sake of God. Al-Muhsib, Sharh al-marifah wa-
badhl al-nash ah, ed. Slih Ahmad al-Shm (Damascus, 1993), 29.
7
Al-Muhsib, Sharh al-marifah, 3032.
8
Al-Muhsib, al-Qasd, 88. Al-Makk and al-Qushayr cite the same h adth with a
small difference. In al-Makks variation, the same account reads, If you see a man
to whom silence (samt) and asceticism (zuhd) are given, draw near to him, for he
has been given h ikmah. Al-Makk, Qt, 1:277. Al-Qushayr mentions this report in
the context of his explanation of the concept of zuhd as follows, If you see a man
146 chapter nine
who has been endowed with zuhd regarding this world and [the ability] to speak of it
[zuhd] (mantiq), draw near to him, for he teaches (yulaqqin) h ikmah. Al-Qushayr,
al-Rislah, 60. The same h adth is found in another work of al-Makks, Ilm al-qulb,
but the word mantiq here has a slightly different connotation. This narration reads,
If you see a man who has been given asceticism (zuhd) regarding this world and
little speech (qillat mantiq), then draw near to him, for he has been endowed with
h ikmah. Al-Makk, Ilm, 51. Al-Fudayl b. Iyd (d. 187/802), on the other hand, under-
lines the mutually exclusive correlation between attaining h ikmah and, at the same
time, keeping close company with morally insincere people. Al-Fudayl states, Who-
ever sits together with an innovator (sh ib bidah) is not given h ikmah. Al-Sulam,
T abaqt, 10.
9
Al-Muhsib, al-Qasd, 88.
10
Ibid., 8990.
11
Ibid., 91. In his exposition on the relationship between men of conventional
knowledge (ahl al-ilm) and men of h ikmah and marifah, al-Makk states that some
eminent scholars of religious matters would ask the people of h ikmah and marifah
regarding certain complex matters. According to his report, the great jurisprudent
al-Shfi, whenever he would experience difficulty with a jurisprudential matter and
not find any solution to it in the Qurn and Sunnah, would visit Shaybn al-R
and ask the latters opinion. Al-Shfi would consult with Shaybn and the difficulty
of the matter would thus disappear. Al-Makk, Ilm, 85. Similarly, Ahmad b. H anbal
would visit Marf al-Karkh frequently. When his son Slih asked him about the
reason for this, Ahmad said, O my son, Marf knows the basis (asl) of the religion
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 147
Al-Junayd al-Baghdd
14
In fact, al-Junayds name is mentioned in Sufi sources among the masters of
declaring Gods unity (arbb al-tawh d), a group that is also called the Baghdadian
Sufi school, whose founder may be regarded as Sar al-Saqat . This group differed
from contemporary Sufi schools in Syria and Khursn. The main focus of the Bagh-
dadian school was tawh d; it developed the knowledge of tawh d mainly in eloquent
symbolic expressions. Al-Junayd explained this characteristic saying, Syria is the
home of chivalry (futuwwah), Iraq of eloquence (lisn), and Khursn of sincerity
(sidq). Abdel-Kader, 11.
15
Ibid., 100101.
16
Ibid., 102.
17
Ibid., 9697.
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 149
18
Ibid., 9799. Al-Makk reports that in al-Junayds view, ilm is more prestigious,
complete, and comprehensive than marifah. For this reason, God is named with
ilm (al-lim in 6:73 and al-alm in 8:43) and not with marifah. Al-Makk, Ilm, 99.
At the same time, however, al-Makk discusses this matter from another point of view.
He narrates the comparison between ilm and marifah by some early authorities, who
say, Surely marifah is greater, because during the questioning (sul) in the Here-
after, the prophets will say, We do not have any ilm (l ilma la-n), but they will
not say, We do not have any marifah (l marifata la-n). Ilm was given to Adam,
David, and Solomon, as the Qurn states (27:15), Indeed We had given knowledge
(ilm) to David and Solomon; and (2:31), He taught Adam the names, all of them.
As for Muhammad, he was given marifah, as is indicated in the Qurn (47:30), You
would know them (la-araftahum) by their mark; but you will certainly know them
(la-tarifannahum) in the twisting of their speech. Al-Makk, Ilm, 8586. In this
context, al-Makk uses the word marifah as a synonym of h ikmah and asserts that all
these explanations show the value of h ikmah. Al-Makk, Ilm, 86.
19
Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddimah, ed. Al Abd al-Whid Wf (Cairo, 1960),
3:1049.
20
Al-Sulam, T abaqt, 158; al-Qushayr, al-Risalh, 2021. According to
al-Qushayr, Dh al-Nn further clarifies this essential point and relates it to Sufi
150 chapter nine
epistemology, saying, Certainty calls one to cut short ones expectation (qasr al-
amal) [for worldly things] and cutting short ones expectation calls one to asceti-
cism; asceticism [in turn] bequeaths h ikmah, and h ikmah leads to the discerning of
outcomes (nazar f al-awqib). Al-Qushayr, al-Risalh, 91. See also al-Sayyid Ab
D ayf al-Madan, Dh al-Nn al-Misr wa-al-adab al-sf (Cairo, 1973), 71. A friend
of Dh al-Nn, al-Kharrz, defines zuhd as drawing the value of things away from
the heart. Al-Kharrz, 75.
21
Sezgin, 1:650. Ab al-H usayn al-Nr, Maqmt al-qulb, ed. Paul Nwyia,
Mlanges de lUniversit Saint-Joseph 44 (1968): 115154. The same epistle has also
been edited by Ahmet Subhi Furat, Abul-H useyn an-Nr ve Makmt al-Kulb adl
rislesi, slam Tetkikleri Enstits Dergisi 7 (1978): 345355. Although Furat edited
the epistle independently of Nwyias edition, and used two more manuscripts than
Nwyia did, the two editions are basically the same. My references will be to Nwyias
edition.
22
Al-Makk asserts that primarily, comprehension (fiqh) occurs in the heart, as is
mentioned in 7:179, They have hearts (qulb) with which they do not comprehend
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 151
(l yafqahna bi-h). Al-Makk, Qut 1:313. Al-Makk also says that the Arabs use
the nouns fiqh and fahm in the same sense and thus they say, faqihta in the sense
of fahimta. Ibid., 1:314.
23
Louis Gardet, Kalb, EI.
24
Al-Makk, Ilm, 54.
152 chapter nine
four different ways. Al-Ghazl asserts that the dignity and high rank
of man manifests itself in proportion to his capacity with respect to
the knowledge of God (marifat Allh). The seat of this knowledge
is the qalb rather than any other of the human organs, but the qalb
makes use of these organs in their proper and authorized realms to
gain knowledge. Al-Ghazl states that the physical heart is delicately
related to the spiritual heart, which is a subtle and lordly spiritual
thing (lat fah rabbniyyah rh niyyah). This heart is the reality of
man and his means of knowledge. At the same time, this heart is the
actual addressee of the heavenly instructions and the basis of religious
responsibility. Al-Ghazl does not attempt to elaborate the reality of
the heart in this second sense, as he states that this is a matter of
revealing the secret of the spirit (sirr al-rh ), of which the Prophet did
not speak.25
On a more psychological plane, al-Qushayr, who was the master
of al-Ghazls master Ab Al al-Farmadh, analyzes the structure of
inward consciousness and places it into a four-dimensional arrange-
ment consisting of nafs, qalb, rh , and sirr. In this restricted applica-
tion, nafs is regarded as the seat of blameworthy moral characteristics,
while qalb and rh are characterized as the locus of praiseworthy moral
characteristics. Sirr, which is the deepest dimension of human con-
sciousness, is considered to be the seat of witnessing (mushhadah).26
The hierarchical interpretation of Sufi terms is a common tradition
among Sufi writers. Throughout his Qt al-qulb, al-Makk repeat-
edly highlights various maqmt of Sufi concepts; for instance, he
articulates the stations of certainty in knowledge (maqmt al-yaqn)
and of those who know for certain (maqmt al-mqinn). In his
list of stations of certainty (maqmt al-yaqn), al-Makk mentions
nine stations, as follows: the stations of repentance (tawbah), patience
(sabr), thankfulness (shukr), hope (raj), fear of God (khawf), asceti-
cism (zuhd), trust (in God) (tawakkul), contentment (rid), and love
(mah abbah).27
In his exposition of the concept of thankfulness (shukr) mentioned
in verse 14:7, If you are thankful, surely I will increase you (la-in
shakartum la-azdannakum), al-Makk introduces another gradational
25
Ab H mid al-Ghazl, Ih y ulm al-dn (Cairo, 1967), 3:36.
26
Al-Qushayr, al-Rislah, 4849.
27
Al-Makk, Qt, 1:361537 and 2:7159.
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 153
relationship between the notions of islm, mn, ih sn, and irfn. This
order reflects the three broad categories of degrees in spiritual realiza-
tion as islm, mn, and ih sn, as mentioned in the well-known h adth
of Gabriel, but with the addition of irfn, which seems to be treated as
the highest spiritual notion in Sufism in this context. Al-Makk reports
that some earlier authorities interpreted this verse as follows, If you
are thankful for submission (islm), surely I will increase you in faith
(mn), if you are thankful for mn, surely I will increase you in virtue
or excellence (ih sn), and if you are thankful for ih sn, surely I will
increase you in gnosis (irfn).28
Historically, Dh al-Nn is regarded as one of the earliest Sufis
to give systematic explanations of the mystic states (ah wl) and sta-
tions (maqmt). As mentioned, he is also considered the earliest Sufi
to teach the true nature of intuitive knowledge or gnosis (marifah),
which he describes as knowledge of the attributes of Unity, and this
belongs to the saints, those who contemplate the Face of God within
their hearts, so that God reveals Himself to them in a way in which
He is not revealed to any others in the world. The gnostics are not
themselves, but in so far as they exist at all, they exist in God.29
The hierarchical formation of mystical knowledge is elaborated by
another classical Sufi author, al-Niffar (d. ca. 366/9767). He, how-
ever, introduces the term waqfah as a technical concept referring to
direct Divine audition. According to his explanations, waqfah indi-
cates a higher spiritual knowledge than marifah, which itself is above
ilm.30
An earlier authority on Sufism, Ab Sad al-Kharrz, presents a
more multi-leveled ontological as well as epistemological exposition
when he argues that the first and initial maqm on the spiritual path
is the maqm of repentance (tawbah). The following maqmt are
the maqmt of those who fear God (khawf), then those who have
hope (raj), followed by the rightheous ones (slihn), the seekers
(murdn), the obedient (mutn), the lovers (muh ibbn), those who
yearn (for God) (mushtqn), the saints, or friends of God (awliy),
and the intimate ones (muqarrabn), in succession.31
32
Al-Kalbdh, 70.
33
Roger Arnaldez, Marifa, EI.
34
See Chittick, 148149.
35
At t r, 2:50.
36
Annemarie Schimmel, al-Nr EI.
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 155
37
Al-Nr, 130.
38
Nwyia, Exgse coranique et langage mystique (Beirut, 1970), 321.
39
Al-Nr, 130131.
156 chapter nine
40
Ibid., 131.
41
Ibid., 131.
42
Ibid., 131132.
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 157
Is he whose breast God has expanded unto Islam, so he walks in a light from
44
58
Ibid., 135136.
59
Ibid., 137.
60
Ibid., 138. This must be similar to his conclusion when he utters, I looked into
the light until I became that light myself. Schimmel, Ab al-H usayn al-Nr: Qibla
of the Lights, The Heritage of Sufism, ed. Leonard Lewisohn (Oxford and Boston,
1999), 1:60.
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 159
61
In general, al-Nr is regarded as one of the most emotional of the early Sufis,
in contrast to his sober and prudent friend al-Junayd. His treatment of mah abbah
and ishq reveals his deeply emotional mystical tendency. For instance, according
to At trs writings, al-Nr was the one who was weeping alongside the sorrowful
Ibls, who claimed to be a true lover (shiq) of God. At t r, 2:51. On the basis of
the Qurnic phrase, whom He loves and who love Him (5:54), al-Nr asserts that
ishq is not a higher spiritual stage than mah abbah (wa-laysa al-ishq bi-akthar min
al-mah abbah). Massignon, Recueil, 51; for al-Nr, Love is to tear the veils and unveil
the secrets. Schimmel, Ab al-H usayn al-Nr, 62. Ab Bakr al-Shibl (d. 334/945),
on the other hand, argues that knowledge of God (marifah) requires love (mah abbah)
of Him, for whoever knows Him loves Him. Al-Sulam, Muqaddimah, 31.
62
Al-Nr, 140.
63
Ibid., 142.
160 chapter nine
64
Ibid., 143.
65
Ibid., 143.
66
Al-Sulam, T abaqt, 167. Similarly, one of al-Nrs most profound goals was the
famous Sufi principle, Qualify yourselves with Gods qualities (takhallaq bi-akhlq
Allh), which refers to substituting for each lowly quality a praiseworthy one. Schim-
mel, Ab al-H usayn al-Nr, 60.
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 161
of Oneness (nr al-wah dniyyah), the aql replied, You are God. Thus
the aql could know God only through God (bi-Allh).67
Similarly, when al-Nr was asked, What was the first Divine order
unto man? he replied,
Marifah, for God has said, I created the jinn and humankind only that
they might worship Me (li-yabudn) (51:56) and Ibn Abbs pointed
out that li-yabudn means li-yarifn.68
With regard to the concept of h ikmah, throughout his expositions
al-Nr does not seem to give any special consideration to it. He
uses h ikmah only twice in his epistle. In the first instance, h ikmah
is described as a heavenly fruit (thamarah) given to the heart as a
result of a secret and intimate conversation with God (munjh).69 In
the second case, al-Nr discusses h ikmah as an intermediary epis-
temological concept on the spiritual path. He compares the gnosis
(marifah) in the heart of a believer to a tree with seven branches:
the first he likens to the eyes of the believer; the second to his tongue
(lisn); the third to his heart (qalb); the fourth to his soul (nafs); the
fifth to his Lords creation (khalq rabbihi); the sixth to the Hereaf-
ter (khirah); and the seventh to his Lord. Al-Nr asserts that for
each branch there are two fruits (thamarah): the fruits of the eyes are
weeping (buk) and admonition (ibrah), the fruits of the tongue are
knowledge (ilm) and h ikmah, and the fruits of the following branches
are yearning (shawq) and repentance (inbah), asceticism (zuhd) and
worship (ibdah), faithfulness (waf) and trustworthiness (amnah),
felicity (nam) and paradise (jannah), and vision (ruyah) and near-
ness (qurbah), respectively.70
Al-H akm al-Tirmidh (d. ca. 300/912), another eminent mystical fig-
ure of the third/ninth century, also elaborates on the four subtly inter-
related maqmt al-qulb from a psychological and epistemological
67
Ab Nasr al-Sarrj, al-Luma, ed. Abd al-H alm Mahmd and T h Abd al-Bq
Surr (Cairo, 1960), 63. For the same narration, see al-Kalbdh, 69.
68
Al-Sarrj, 63.
69
Al-Nr, 135.
70
Ibid., 141.
162 chapter nine
71
Although bibliographical sources mention that al-Tirmidh did write a work with
this title (see, for instance, Sezgin, 1:655), several scholars, including Bernd Radtke
and Abd al-Fatth Barakah, have questioned the authenticity of this work. In Radtkes
view, its style, especially the use of saj (rhymed prose), differs from al-Tirmidhs
usual terminology; and he believes that the epistle is wrongly ascribed to him, though
I cannot make much sense out of this argument. Bernd Radtke, The Concept of
Wilaya in Early Sufism, Classical Persian Sufism: From its Origins to Rumi, ed. Leon-
ard Lewisohn (London, 1993), 1:486487. Radtke repeats this argument in his other
works, including the last one, to fortify his points. Radtke, Some Recent Research
on al-H akm al-Tirmidh, Der Islam 83 (2006), 53. See also Abd al-Fatth Barakah,
al-H akm al-Tirmidh wa-nazariyyatuhu f al-wilyah (Cairo, 1971), 1:10. In spite
of this controversy, I make use of Bayn al-farq because of its detailed and precise
description of the heart and its various functions with respect to Sufi epistemology.
The terminology found in Bayn al-farq does not directly contradict al-Tirmidhs
usual terminology, as found in his other works, which I have used throughout my
investigation. For instance, in the analysis of the stations of heart in his Khatm
al-awliy, al-Tirmidhs clarifications parallel those in Bayn al-farq. Al-Tirmidh,
Kitb Khatm al-awliy, ed. Uthmn Yahy (Beirut, 1965), 128 and al-Tirmidh, Kitb
Srat al-awliy in Thalth musannaft li-al-H akm al-Tirmidh, ed. Bernd Radtke
(Beirut, 1992), 1012. (In fact, the two titles, Khatm al-awliy and Srat al-awliy,
refer to the same work by al-Tirmidh. This work is also known under the title Ilm
al-awliy. Massignon, Essai, 287. Before Radtkes edition based on recently available
manuscripts, the work was known by the title Kitb Khatm al-awliy. According to
his own statement, Radtke re-edited the work to correct aspects of the content and
structure presented by Uthmn Yahy that remained obscure. Radtke, A Forerunner
of Ibn al-Arab: H akm Tirmidh on Sainthood, Journal of the Muh yiddn Ibn Arab
Society 8 [1989]: 43; and Radtke, Some Recent Research, 4445). Similarly, when he
explains the notion of sadr in Khatm al-awliy, al-Tirmidh introduces expositions
comparable to those in Bayn al-farq. Al-Tirmidh, Kitb Khatm al-awliy, 130132
(al-Tirmidh, Kitb Srat al-awliy, 1213). Massignon also provides scholarly mate-
rials that lead us to consider Bayn al-farq as an authentic work by al-Tirmidh. It
is also known that the science of the hearts, with a special focus on distinguishing
sadr from qalb, was an important concept in al-Tirmidhs terminology. Massignon,
Essai, 293294.
72
See, for instance, Massignon, Essai, 286287; Massignon, Recueil, 33, and Yves
Marquet, al-Tirmidh, EI. Massignon calls al-Tirmidh a theoretician who,
throughout his psychological expositions, inclines toward a kabbala of the letters of
scripture. Massignon, Essai, 293. Marquet examines al-Tirmidhs ideas against the
background of Plato, the Ikhwn al-Saf, and al-Frbs philosophies. He also com-
pares al-Tirmidhs theories to ancient Greek and Chinese thought. Marquet, al-H akm
al-Tirmidh et le noplatonisme de son temps (Universit de Dakar, 1976).
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 163
73
Abd al-Muhsin al-H usayn, al-Marifah inda al-H akm al-Tirmidh (Cairo,
1968), 31. Radtke asserts that al-Tirmidh never employs the term al-h akm with
respect to himself. Radtke, Some Recent Research, 84.
74
Att r, 2:91.
75
Editors introduction to al-Tirmidh, Kitb Khatm al-awliy, 8. Al-H usayn, for
his part, lists four main sources of al-Tirmidhs arguments: 1) Jewish and Christian
heritage (isrliyyt); 2) the Iranian spiritual legacy; 3) the Greek heritage; and 4) the
Islamic tradition, but with a particularly Sh tendency. Al-H usayn, 3031.
76
Editors introduction to al-Tirmidh, Kitb Khatm al-awliy, 111.
164 chapter nine
77
Al-Tirmidh, Kitb Khatm al-awliy, 348 (al-Tirmidh, Kitb Srat al-awliy, 48).
78
Al-Tirmidh, Kitb Khatm al-awliy, 362 (al-Tirmidh, Kitb Srat al-awliy,
58.) According to al-Makks narration, Yahy b. Mudh asserts that knowledge (ilm)
is passed on through teaching (talm), while h ikmah is passed on by safeguarding the
sanctities of the masters (bi-h ifz h urumt al-mashyikh). Al-Makk, Ilm, 7980.
79
Al-Tirmidh, Kitb Khatm al-awliy, 381.
80
Al-Tirmidh, Kitb Marifat al-asrr, ed. Muhammad Ibrhm al-Juysh (Egypt,
1977), 70. Again, although bibliographical sources attribute a work with this title to
al-Tirmidh (see, for instance, Sezgin, 1:658), Radtke questions its authenticity. Radtke,
Some Recent Research, 41.
81
Al-Tirmidh, Kitb Marifat al-asrr, 8485.
82
Al-H usayn, 50.
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 165
Ibid., 5153.
83
Ibid., 33.
84
85
Al-Qushayr, al-Risalh, 24.
86
I do not share Radtkes view; he says, Al-H akm al-Tirmidhs treatise (Khatm
al-awliy or Srat al-awliy) shows a clear structure and a conceptual framework.
Radtke blames Uthmn Yahy for presenting an unstructured and confused edition
of the work and claims that this is the reason this treatise has not been appreciated
as a clear Sufi exposition. Radtke, The Concept of Wilya, 486. Radtke severely
criticizes Yahys edition, to such an extent that he even describes Yahys work as
being based on an amateurish slipshod method of editing. Radtke, Some Recent
Research, 4445.
166 chapter nine
87
Al-H usayn, 55.
88
Al-H usayn, 6667.
89
Ibid., 135136.
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 167
Ibid., 136138.
90
Ibid., 140.
91
92
Al-Tirmidh, al-Furq wa-man al-tarduf, ed. Muhammad Ibrhm al-Juysh
(Cairo, 1998), 365.
93
Al-Tirmidh, Nawdir al-usl f marifat ah dth al-rasl, ed. Must af Abd
al-Qdir At (Beirut, 1992), 2:26. With regard to h alm, al-Tirmidh says that the
notion of h ilm describes a person whose breast is expanded (munsharih sadruhu) as
with the Qurnic cases of Abraham (11:75) and Ishmael (37:101). The forbearance of
Abraham became extraordinary when he was being Divinely tested to be willing to
sacrifice his son Ishmael. Similar was the forbearance of Ishmael, when he obediently
and willingly submitted himself to the service of his Lord. Ibid., 2:2627.
168 chapter nine
94
Ibid., 2:27.
95
Al-Tirmidh, Bayn al-farq bayn al-sadr wa-al-qalb wa-al-fud wa-al-lubb, ed.
Nicholas Heer (Cairo, 1958), 75. Later on, Heer translated and published this study,
which was originally his Ph.D. dissertation. A Treatise on the Heart in Three Early
Sufi Texts: al-H akm al-Tirmidh and Ab Abd al-Rah mn al-Sulam al-Naysabr,
trans. Nicholas Heer and Kenneth L. Honerkamp (Louisville, KY, 2003).
96
Al-Tirmidh, Bayn al-farq, 52, 79.
97
Ibid., 77.
98
See for instance, Massignon [Radtke], Tasawwuf, EI.
99
See for instance, al-Kharrz, 61, 71, 73, 93, 106, 115, 121, and 142.
100
My discussions with Wolfhart Heinrichs on the concept of h ikmah have helped
me immensely in arriving at this conclusion.
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 169
style throughout his works reveals that he was well acquainted with
philosophical and even alchemical notions, on account of which he is
regarded by certain scholars as the founder of an early theosophical
system in the Sufi tradition.101
Before presenting al-Tirmidhs exposition on the maqmat, it is
useful to note his highly developed understanding of the nature of the
heart. In al-Masil al-maknnah, al-Tirmidh states that God created
a piece of organ inside the human being which is called qalb because of
its fluctuating nature.102 God appointed the qalb as the leader over the
other organs (jawrih ) and placed the knowledge of Himself in this
101
Massignon, Tasawwuf, EI. Radtke further notes that the laqab al-h akm was
commonly used among the Sufis of the city of Balkh, which neighbors Tirmidh, with
the result that associating certain Sufi notions with Neoplatonic or gnostic conceptual
systems is not a plausible argument. In Radtkes view, h akm in this historical context
refers to someone who seeks God and strives after knowledge of nature and the soul.
Radtke, Some Recent Research, 8486. In fact Radtke defines h akm in the case
of al-Tirmidh as a theosophist, who would seek wisdom and advanced mystical
knowledge through his own inner experience instead of through the conventional
philosophical methods of acquiring knowledge in his age. Bernd Radtke and John
OKane, The Concept of Sainthood in Early Islamic Mysticism: Two Works by al-H akm
al-Tirmidh (London, 1996), 56.
102
Ibn al-Arab also discusses the fluctuating nature of the qalb. According to his
explanations, in its verbal noun form, the word qalb is almost synonymous with taqal-
lub (alteration, fluctuation). In this sense, relying on various Prophetic statements,
including, The hearts of all the children of Adam are like a single heart between two
of the fingers of the All-Merciful. He turns (tasrf) it however He desires. O God,
O Turner of Hearts, turn our hearts toward obeying You! Ibn al-Arab designates
qalb as a place of constant change and fluctuation. Similarly, in many ah dth, God is
called the Turner of hearts (Musarrif al-qulb) or He who makes hearts fluctuate
(Muqallib al-qulb). Chittick, 106.
On the other hand, according to al-Sulams records from earlier authorities, with
respect to listening to h ikmah, people may be categorized into two groups, intelli-
gent (qil), and [exoterically-minded] performer (mil). In reaction to listening to
h ikmah, the qil stands amazed (yataajjab), while the mil fluctuates (yataqallab);
like a snake, his heart gets twisted (yaltaw). Al-Sulam, T abaqt, 218.
Ibn al-Arab considers the heart as an epistemological seat rather than merely a
source of emotions, for the Qurn repeatedly speaks of the heart as a locus for under-
standing and intelligence. In this context, he compares the heart to the Kaba. Fur-
thermore, on the basis of a frequently quoted h adth quds, My earth and My heaven
embrace Me not, but the heart of My believing servant embraces Me, Ibn al-Arab
describes the heart as the Throne of God (al-arsh) in the microcosm, namely in man.
Because of such Divine connections, the heart possesses astonishing capacity (wus)
and its exclusive characteristics may only be comparable to another heavenly con-
cept, knowledge, as indicated in the Qurn on the tongues of angels, Our Lord, You
embrace all things in mercy and knowledge (40:7). Chittick, 107. On a more general
epistemological plane, Ibn al-Arab asserts that knowledge can be acquired in three
ways: reflection, unveiling, and scripture. The nafs, which is a subtle human entity,
attains knowledge through reflection, and the mode of its knowing is called reason
170 chapter nine
qalb. He entrusted to the qalb the safeguarding of the other organs and
entrusted man with the responsibility to safeguard the qalb. God is the
Cause of Fluctuation (Muqallib) of hearts in accordance with His will.
He empowered man with intellect (aql) and placed the knowledge of
Himself in this aql. There is an interior part of the aql that God made
a seat for the passions (shahawt) and in which He placed the desire
for worldly things. God gave authority to caprice (haw), in which he
placed the darkness of ignorance of Himself, over this shahwah as well.
Through that which is placed in it regarding the knowledge of God,
the aql directs the qalb toward God, while haw calls the soul (nafs)
toward ephemeral desires (shahawt fniyah). In reality, al-Tirmidh
argues, aql and haw are two spirits (rh n) and in each there is a life
(h ayh); one is heavenly (samwiyyah) and the other earthly (ardiyyah).
The first is called rh and the second nafs. Rh resides in the head and
from there spreads throughout the whole body, while nafs resides in
the belly (batn), from there it likewise spreads throughout the whole
body. During sleep, the nafs goes out of the body and ascends to God,
but the rh remains in the heart. Al-Tirmidh asserts that the qalb
contains four lights: the light of marifah, of ilm, of aql, and of life
(h ayh) through God. The first three lights in fact function by means
of the light of life through God.103 To underline the central position
of the aql during this subtle psychological process, al-Tirmidh refers
to a h adth in which the Prophet states, God created the aql and and
then addressed it, By My Glory, I have not created anything that is
dearer to Me than you.104
According to al-Tirmidhs deep psychological analysis, when God
wills something to happen, the qalb of an obedient servant submits
willingly with that will and the will of the nafs disappears for the
sake of Gods will. This person finds a love for his Lord in his qalb,
in which joy (farah ), sweetness (h alwah), and life (h ayh) exist for
him, as opposed to the will of the nafs. In the process of making a
decision regarding an action, there is a struggle (mujhadah) between
the nafs and the qalb. The qalb is inclined to please God and love
for Him, while the nasf is inclined to the joys of passions (shahawt)
(aql). When it knows through God, the mode of knowing is designated as heart
(qalb), which is contrasted with reason (aql). Chittick, 159.
103
Al-Tirmidh, al-Masil al-maknnah, ed. Muhammad Ibrhm al-Juysh
(Cairo, 1980), 5859.
104
Ibid., 69.
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 171
and love for them. Aql, ilm, marifah, understanding (fahm), clever-
ness (kiysah), perspicacity (fitnah), and mind (dhihn) are among the
soldiers (jund) of the qalb, while caprice (haw) for shahawt, joys
(afrh ), and ornament (znah) are among the soldiers of the nafs. If a
person deserts the battlefield, the nafs dominates, beats, and enslaves
the qalb and thus the qalb loses its power in controlling that persons
life. If, however, he fights together with the qalb until the nafs becomes
a slave, the qalb determines what is done or not done.105 Ultimately,
as al-Tirmidh states, marifah, ilm, fahm, dhihn, and h ifz (memory)
function under the decree of God. They are things placed within man
and when the permission of God comes, they all become causative
agents (awmil); if the permission does not come, they simply remain
in their (celestial) forms (hayt). This is the case mentioned in the
Qurn regarding the relationship between the heart and faith, Those
upon whose hearts God has written faith (58:22).106
Al-Tirmidh further asserts that haw stimulates shahawt, while
aql stimulates ulm and marifah.107 According to his explanations,
even though the qalb is the emir of the other organs, when marifah
controls the qalb, aql is on the right path (istaqma), but when caprice
(haw) controls the qalb, the soul (nafs) deviates from God. The rela-
tionship between marifah and aql is thus comparable to the one
between nafs and haw.108
As in the case of al-Nr, throughout his categorical expositions in
Bayn al-farq, al-Tirmidh relies primarily on Qurnic and Prophetic
statements. He offers several symbolizations to characterize the rela-
tionship between the four concentric parts of the heart and states that
each of these stations (maqmt) is also connected to one of the four
Divine lights: the sadr is the first and outward maqm of the heart and
is connected to the light of islm; the second maqm, the qalb, is the
internal part of the sadr and is connected to the light of mn; the fud
and lubb are the third and fourth maqmt and they are connected
to the lights of marifah and tawh d, respectively. To represent mans
spiritual ranking, these four maqmt are represented by the muslim,
mumin, rif, and muwah h id, according to the same order. At the same
time, these four maqmt correspond to the four Qurnic concepts
105
Ibid., 6062.
106
Ibid., 95.
107
Ibid., 65.
108
Ibid., 153.
172 chapter nine
pertaining to the states of the soul (h lt al-nafs): the soul that inspires
evil (al-nafs al-ammrah bi-al-s),109 the blaming or reproachful soul
(al-nafs al-lawwmah),110 the inspiring soul (al-nafs al-mulhimah),111
and the soul at peace (al-nafs al-mutmainnah),112 respectively.113 Thus
al-Tirmidh argues that the qalb is a general term containing these
four inner maqmt, and that each of these internal maqmt bears
an exclusive significance which is irreducible to the other, as each one
has its own functions and characterizations.114
Al-Tirmidh uses images to illustrate the four concentric circles
of these maqmt; for instance, he compares the maqmt to the
parts of a homestead (dr) and to the sacred precincts around Mecca
(h aram). In fact, each part of this homestead fulfills particular func-
tions in domestic life. Similarly, the general term maqmt al-qulb
resembles the h aram, which roughly refers to the Meccan territories
including the city of Mecca (balad), the Mosque (masjid), and the
Kaba (al-bayt al-atq)115yet each of these places requires specific
rituals (mansik).116 Likewise, and in accordance with Qurnic testi-
mony, We have raised some of them above others in rank (43:32)
and Over every man of knowledge is one who knows better (12:76),
al-Tirmidh asserts that the members of this religion differ from one
another in rank. This ranking takes place in the qalb, while in the eyes
of ordinary people, the term qalb can be used interchangeably for each
of these four maqmt.117
Within al-Tirmidhs complex understanding of the heart, the
sadr-qalb relationship resembles the courtyard-homestead (sah n-dr)
109
Yet I do not claim that my soul is innocent, the soul is certainly prone to evil
(12:53).
110
Nay! I swear by the blaming soul (75:2).
111
By the soul and Him that formed it, then inspired it with iniquity and piety
(91:78).
112
O soul at peace! Return to your Lord, well-pleased and well-pleasing (89:2728).
113
Al-Tirmidh, Bayn al-farq, 2829.
114
Ibid., 33.
115
The Kaba motif is also employed by the Shaykh al-Akbar, Ibn al-Arab, when he
elaborates his understanding of the heart. In Khatm al-awliy, al-Tirmidh poses a list
of 157 questions that could only be answered by the distinguished saints. Al-Tirmidh,
Kitb Khatm al-awliy, 142326. Ibn al-Arab was the first and only person to respond
to this challenge. He wrote a treatise, Jawb al-mustaqm, and later incorporated its
expanded version into his magnum opus, al-Futh t al-Makkiyyah. Ibn al-Arab,
Futht al-Makkiyyah, ed. Ahmad Shams al-Dn (Beirut, 1999), 3:61207.
116
Al-Tirmidh, Bayn al-farq, 3334.
117
Ibid., 34.
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 173
Ibid., 3536.
118
Ibid., 4647.
119
174 chapter nine
only through regular learning; thus the qalb is the principle (asl), while
the sadr is only a branch (far); the qalb resembles the king, while the
sadr only a kingdom. From the qalb emerges certainty (yaqn), knowl-
edge (ilm), and intention (niyyah), for which the Prophet declared,
Indeed, deeds are according to intentions.120 The Prophet explained
that the soundness of other bodily organs is dependent on the sound-
ness of the qalb and that their corruption leads to the corruption of
the qalb. Al-Tirmidh concludes that religious responsibility (taklf) is
based on the inner stirrings and deeds of this qalb, for the Qurn indi-
cates, God will call you to account for what your hearts have earned
(2: 225).121
According to al-Tirmidhs elaborations, the sadr is the seat of con-
ceptual or expressible knowledge (ilm al-ibrah), while the qalb is
the seat of the knowledge embedded within the ilm al-ibrah, which
is known as the knowledge of h ikmah and allusions (ilm al-h ikmah
wa-al-ishrah). The ilm al-ibrah is the proof of God to His creatures
on the basis of which they are to improve themselves by practicing
that knowledge, while the ilm al-ishrah is a path leading to God by
means of His guidance.122
In al-Tirmidhs view, the third maqm of the heart, the fud,
resembles the Sacred Mosque in Mecca, and corresponds to a closet
(makhda) or storeroom (khiznah) in a house. This fud is the seat
of marifah, as well as of incoming thoughts (khawt ir) and the vision
of God (ruyah). A man first benefits from his fud, then from his
qalb, then from his sadr. The fud is situated at the center of the qalb,
just as the qalb itself is embedded in the middle of the sadr and the
pearl (lulu) is located within the oyster (sadaf).123 The Qurn itself
describes the fud as the seat of vision (ruyah), saying, The fud
lied not (in seeing) what it saw (53:41). Thus, al-Tirmidh argues, the
fud benefits from the ruyah, while the qalb enjoys ilm; but as long as
the fud does not see, the qalb cannot benefit from ilm either. In this
context al-Tirmidh refers to the famous h adth of Gabriel in which
the Prophet explains the concept of ih sn (virtue, doing good works,
120
Ibid., 3637.
121
Ibid., 37.
122
Ibid., 58.
123
Ibid., 38.
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 175
124
Ibid., 68. In his treatment of qalb, al-Sarrj calls attention to its limitations. He
severely criticizes the argument presented by a group of people who claim that God
can be seen in this world by means of the qalb. He asserts that the sight of the heart
to which the Sufis allude refers in fact to confirmation (tasdq), the witnessing of
mn, and the reality of certainty (h aqqat al-yaqn), rather than physically seeing
God Himself. According to al-Sarrjs statements, such an assumption is a subtle evil
trick on the path of the spiritual journey, for everything that can be seen in this world
is a created thing. For him, the sight of the heart must be understood in light of the
Prophetic statement, Worship God as if you saw Him, for even though you do not
see Him, He [certainly] sees you. Al-Sarrj, 544545.
125
And We strengthened their hearts (18:14).
126
Al-Tirmidh, Bayn al-farq, 6970.
127
Ibid., 38.
176 chapter nine
them out with His address (khitb). The Qurn admonishes the men
of understanding in various ways and also praises their characteris-
tics in many passages.128 It also recurrently describes their privileged
position in terms of spiritual ranking, intimacy with their Lord, pro-
found comprehension, and their merits with respect to their under-
standing and forbearance. God has favored them exclusively with the
light of lubb.129
Al-Tirmidh notes that in the eyes of lexicographers (lit., language
experts, ahl al-adab wa-man lahum marifah bi-shay min al-lughah),
lubb simply means aql. He argues that, in fact, the two terms bear dif-
ferent meanings. He illustrates the difference between lubb and aql
by the lights of the sun and a lamp (sirj), respectively, arguing that
even though both the sun and the lamp provide light, the difference
between their lights is obvious. Likewise, for him, the ranking of aql
differs subtly depending on its bearer, because the aql itself comprises
various stations (maqmt). The first maqm of the aql is the primor-
dial nature of aql or innate reason (aql al-fit rah), which distinguishes
child and man from those who suffer insanity (junn). By means of
this faculty, man differentiates good from evil, near from far, and the
like. This aql is also the basis of mans responsibility for his actions.
The second kind of aql is the aql of argumentation (aql al-h ujjah),
on the basis of which God addresses mankind. When a person attains
forbearance (h ilm), the light of support (nr al-tayd) supports the
light of reason (nr al-aql) and he attains Gods address (khit b). The
third kind of aql is the aql of experience (aql al-tajribah), which is
the most beneficial and excellent of the three, as it is by means of such
experience that a servant becomes a h akm. Al-Tirmidh asserts that
epistemologically this kind of aql empowers its holder to go beyond
128
For example, So fear God, O men of understanding (5:100); Those are the
ones whom God has guided, so follow their guidance (6:90); Whoever is given
h ikmah has indeed been given much good; yet none remember except men of under-
standing (2:269); ...and that they may know that He is but one God and that the
men of understanding may remember (14:52); and ...that they might reflect upon
its verses and that men of understanding may remember (38:29). Al-Tirmidh, Bayn
al-farq, 73.
129
Ibid., 7073. In al-Masil al-maknnah, al-Tirmidh further explains this point
saying that God helps men of tawh d (muwah h idn) through the light of marifah,
which is the light of unification (tawh d) coming from Unity (ah adiyyah), so that they
would declare His Unity. Then their hearts do not get cut off from this light and the
caprice of polytheism (shirk) disappears, as the Qurn states, God has endeared faith
to you and beautified it in your hearts. (49:7) Al-Tirmidh, al-Masil al-maknnah, 68.
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 177
Surely in this there are signs for men of intelligence (li-ul al-nuh) (20:54
131
and 128).
132
There surely is an oath for those who understand (li-dh h ijr) (89:5).
133
Ibn al-Arab also stated that mans rational faculty (aql) is subject to limitations
and incapabilities, and called attention to the semantic connection between aql and
iql (fetter), the latter being used to hobble a camel. Despite all its striving, aql is not
capable of understanding God, while the heart alone is able to perceive Gods self-
disclosures through the faculty of imagination. Chittick, 107.
178 chapter nine
134
Al-Tirmidh, Bayn al-farq, 7577.
135
Ibid., 7778. On an epistemological plane, al-Tirmidh distinguishes five com-
ponents of intelligence: intelligence proper (dhihn), the faculty of memory (h ifz),
understanding (fahm), penetration of spirit or sharp-wittedness (dhak), and knowl-
edge, as in the immediate perceptions of awareness (ilm). For him, at the begin-
ning of the creation, all these faculties were established by God in mans primordial
nature (fitrah). Through this process, man is expected to attain true knowledge. In
al-Tirmidhs view, an ordinary believer who has already acquired a proper awareness
of the exterior world will soon be interested in a higher level of awareness. By means
of Divine guidance, he gradually ascends towards the Divine Unity and awareness
of God. Hence, human reason establishes the basis of faith, but above the reason of
faith there are the reason of knowledge and of perception (idrk), the reason of
right guidance (hidyah), and the reason of gnosis and of insight (basrah). Mar-
quet, al-Tirmidh, EI.
136
Al-Tirmidh, Bayn al-farq, 8789.
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 179
Ibid., 90.
137
Ibid., 90. Att r records that Ab Sad al-Kharrz intentionally preferred being
138
remote from God over being close to Him, because al-Kharrz thought that he could
not withstand closeness to God. In this context, al-Kharrz mentions Luqmns say-
ing, I was given the choice between h ikmah and prophethood. I choose h ikmah,
because I could not support the burden of prophethood. At t r, 2:41.
139
Al-Tirmidh, Bayn al-farq, 91.
180 chapter nine
Ibid., 9294.
140
Ibid., 9798.
141
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 181
nessing Gods birr and safeguarding His sirr, because he cannot under-
stand the real nature (kayfiyyah) of His Lordship (rubbiyyah). He
merely knows that He is One and refrains from anthropomorphism
(tashbh) and denial of His attributes (tatl). It is mn that witnesses
the birr and safeguards the sirr. As for islm, it is the directing of
the self (nafs) toward Gods birr through obedience, thankfulness, and
submissiveness to Him, for islm is practiced only through the nafs
and the nafs itself is blind to the comprehension of the Truth (h aqq)
and to witnessing Him. This very nafs is not responsible for knowing
realities, because mn is prescribed on the basis of the qalb. Therefore
the nafs, without understanding the real nature of the realities, can
only embrace and follow Divine prescriptions.142
According to al-Tirmidhs explanations, the unspeakable or inef-
fable stations (al-maqmt al-maskt an-h), which lie beyond the
four stations (maqmt) mentioned above, are grasped by a servant of
God who has been Divinely assisted to understand the four stations in
accordance with the manner in which they are described. Only then
can such a servant gain access to the knowledge of those ineffable sta-
tions.143 In al-Tirmidhs view, the subtle peculiarities of such psycho-
logical states, as occur in the cases of the differences between qalb and
fud and between rh and nafs, can be understood properly only by
the elect of scholars (khass al-ulam), who are the h ukam, not the
scholars of the zhir.144
In al-Tirmidhs view also, not every kind of mental activity deserves
to be called knowledge (ilm) in the proper sense of the word; addi-
tionally, ilm should always be accompanied by the appropriate prac-
tice (amal). He states that the knowledge embedded in the qalb is
beneficial knowledge, as opposed to the useless knowledge criticized
by the Prophet, who said, O God! I seek refuge in You from knowl-
edge that has no benefit (l yanfa).145 On the basis of another Pro-
phetic statement, Whoever acts in accordance with what he knows,
God gives him knowledge of what he does not know, al-Tirmidh
calls attention to the practical and experiential aspect of knowledge.146
He asserts that the station of the qalb is a profound maqm whose
142
Ibid., 3839.
143
Ibid., 40.
144
Al-Tirmidh, al-Furq, 56.
145
Al-Tirmidh, Bayn al-farq, 4950.
146
Ibid., 50.
182 chapter nine
147
Ibid., 50.
148
Ibid., 5961.
149
Ibid., 67.
150
Al-Tirmidh, al-Masil al-maknnah, 124.
151
Ibid., 133.
152
Al-Tirmidh, Nawdir al-usl 2:118. Interestingly, this h adth resembles a verse
in the Old Testament, Proverbs 1:7, The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowl-
edge. In the Hebrew Bible, however, the word is not hokhmah, but instead daat
which means knowledge. In fact, there are other ah dth in line with this state-
ment which put h ikmah and fear of God in the same context. For instance, according
to al-Makks report, the Prophet says with regard to h ikmah, Whoever is content
h ikmah in early sufi manuals and treatises 183
with God (istaghn bi-Allh), God makes other people in need of him and whoever
makes the fear of God present in his heart, God makes him speak with/by h ikmah.
Al-Makk, Ilm, 101. As for the epistemological relationship between the concepts of
fearing God and knowledge, Islamic sources also mention statements parallel to the
Biblical verse above, but with a different wording. A h adth narrated by ishah, for
instance, uses a parallel syntactical structure between knowledge and fear of God in
which the Prophet says, Among you I am the most knowledgeable of God and the
most attentive with respect to fearing Him (ana alamukum bi-Allh wa-ashaddukum
la-hu khashyatan)... Al-Kharrz, 160. Fear of God in the context of religious epis-
temology is not, therefore, unknown to Muslim scholarship. In fact, the Qurn also
stresses this point, saying (35:28) Only those fear God, from among His servants,
who have knowledge.
153
Al-Tirmidh, Bayn al-farq, 53.
154
Ibid., 7879. Similarly, Ab Sad al-Kharrz says, Every/any btin that contra-
dicts the zhir is btil. See editors introduction to al-Kharrz, 18. Supporting this
essential point, al-Makk asserts that there are two kinds of knowledge (ilm): esoteric
(btin) and exoteric (zhir). The two are bases (asln) and cannot do without each
other. Their situation is similar to the relationship between islm and mn, which
are inseparably connected to each other, as is the case of the body and the heart.
Al-Makk, Ilm, 88.
Chapter ten
1
Al-Sulam, T abaqt, 261.
2
Ibid., 387.
3
Ibid., 483.
4
Al-Makk, Ilm, 93.
186 chapter ten
5
Ibid., 58. On the authority of al-Kharrz, al-Qushayr reports, Whoever thinks
that he could attain his goal (matlb) through [merely] his personal effort (jahd)
tires himself out in vain, but at the same time, whoever thinks that this would occur
without his own effort hopes idly. Al-Qushayr, al-Risalh, 5.
6
Al-Makk, Ilm, 56. Al-Makk introduces a similar hierarchical classification of
human beings on the basis of their hearts when he states that a h akm heart is one
thousand times better than a knowledgeable (alm) heart; a believing (mumin) heart is
one thousand times better than a submitting (muslim) heart; and a convinced (mqin)
heart is, in turn, one thousand times better than a mumin heart. Ibid., 54.
7
Ibid., 56.
8
Ibid., 79.
the merit of h ikmah 187
9
Al-Sulam, T abaqt, 32. This saying recalls a verse in the New Testament, Mat-
thew 7:6, Do not give dogs what is holy and do not throw your pearls before swine,
lest they trample them under foot and turn to attack you.
10
Al-Sulam, T abaqt, 3233.
11
Ibid., 81. In this regard, al-Makk reports that it was revealed to the prophet
David that any heart that loves this world is prohibited from tasting the pleasant
flavor of h ikmah. Al-Makk, Ilm, 80. Al-Qushayr also talks about such an essential
mystical notion in the context of his exposition on the concept of hunger (j). He
states that j is among the characteristics of the Sufis and one of the pillars of striv-
ing (mujhadah). By means of refraining from eating, the Sufis find the wellsprings
(uyn) of h ikmah in hunger. Al-Qushayr, al-Risalh, 72. In order to testify to this
important point, al-Qushayr cites another saying by Sufis which reads, God has
placed five things in five places: honor (izz) in obedience (tah), disgrace (dhull)
in disobedience (masiyah), awe (haybah) in nightly worship (qiym al-layl), h ikmah
in the empty stomach, and wealth (ghin) in contentment (qanah). Al-Qushayr,
al-Risalh, 8182.
12
Al-Makk, Ilm, 66.
13
Al-Makk, Qt, 1:285. Relating this essential principle in Sufism to the concept
of h ikmah, al-Qushayr reports on the authority of Ab Uthmn al-H r (d. 298/910),
188 chapter ten
The murd is one who, when he hears something of the Sufi sciences and acts accord-
ingly, this (his hearing and practice) becomes a h ikmah in his heart, from which he
benefits until the end of his life. Al-Qushayr, al-Risalh, 102.
14
Al-Makk, Ilm, 63. In the same context, al-Makk reports a saying by earlier
h ukam that, If a person becomes an ascetic toward this world, God appoints in his
heart an angel who plants h ikmah there just as anyone among yourselves plants trees
in his garden. Ibid., 63.
15
Ibid., 105106.
16
Ibid., 106.
17
In the context of the Qurnic verse 42:19, God is All-Gentle (latf) to His ser-
vants, providing for whomsoever He wills (yarzuqu man yash); He is the All-Strong,
All-Mighty, al-Makk relates an interpretation by al-Qsim b. Sallm (d. 224/838).
The latter says that God provides h ikmah and perspicacity (fitnah) for whomever He
wills and He does not give these generously to everyone. Ibid., 52.
18
Ibid., 53. In the same manner, al-Kharrz emphasizes the significance of the con-
cept of shortening ones expectations (qasr mal) in the mystical life when he says,
the merit of h ikmah 189
In fact, asceticism with regard to this world means shortening ones expectations.
Al-Kharrz, 73.
19
Al-Qushayr, al-Risalh, 63.
20
Al-Makk, Ilm, 53.
21
Ibid., 5354.
190 chapter ten
(riy), he plucks it out and throws it away. Second, he goes into the
garden of yaqn and if he sees any greed (h irs) or expectation (amal)
there, he plucks it out and throws it away. Third, he goes into the garden
of marifah and if he sees any anthropomorphism (tashbh), likening
(tamthl) or denial [of Gods attributes] (taattu l) there, he plucks it out
and throws it away. Fourth, he goes into the garden of love and if he sees
any preoccupation with things other than God (ishtighl bi-al-aghyr),
or pleasure from the creation (h alwat al-khalq) and habitation (diyr)
there, he plucks it out and throws it away. Fifth, he goes into the garden
of ilm and if he sees any ignorance (jahl) there he plucks it out and
throws it away. Sixth, he goes into the garden of h ilm and if he sees any
anger (ghadab), overzealousness (h amiyyah), treachery (khiynah), or
incapacity (ajz) there, he plucks it out and throws it away. Seventh, he
goes into the garden of the Sunnah and if he sees any innovation (bidah)
or deviation (zaygh) there, he plucks it out and throws it away. Eighth,
he goes into the garden of the lawful (h all) and if he sees any unlawful
(h arm) or doubtful thing there, he plucks it out and throws it away.
And ninth, he goes into the garden of sakh and if he sees any stinginess
(bukhl) or greediness (tam) there, he plucks it out and throws it away.22
While the gardens are allegorical, they demonstrate that there are
actions that go along with the states, just as for the h akm, there are
social responsibilities in the society in which he lives, for he is expected
to lead his society in a better direction through his exemplary personal
behavior. He should be the first to practice whatever he advises people
around him to do. He is expected to facilitate things for his commu-
nity, even at the expense of his own suffering. On the authority of
Ruwaym b. Ahmad al-Baghdd (d. 303/915), al-Sulam reports,
Part of the defining quality (min h ukm) of a h akm is to make things
easier (yuwassi) with respect to rules (ah km) for his brothers, while
restraining himself strictly (yudayyiq al nafsihi f-h); because being
tolerant toward his brothers means following knowledge, while being
restrictive toward himself is a part of the defining quality of scrupulous-
ness (min h ukm al-wara).23
In the same manner, one of the basic characteristics of a Sufi master
is being a h akm himself and dealing with the matters of his disciples
and community with h ikmah.24 The Prophet emphasizes the potential
22
Ibid., 6365. Al-Makk does not mention the garden of tawdu in the second
part of his list.
23
Al-Sulam, T abaqt, 181. See also, al-Qushayr, al-Risalh, 22.
24
Al-Sulam, Tisat kutub, 143150. In this regard, relying on previous authorities,
al-Sulam says, The sign of h ikmah is the knowledge of the portions measured out to
people (marifat aqdr al-ns). Al-Sulam, T abaqt, 193.
the merit of h ikmah 191
Ibid., 52.
25
Ibid., 73. Al-Makk also reports that some earlier authorities said, Seven things
26
are wasted in seven situations: 1) A h akm among ignorant people who do not listen
to his h ikmah and uphold his sanctity (h urmah); 2) A lamp in the light of the sun; 3)
A delicious meal presented to a drunk person; 4) A beautiful woman married to an
impotent man (innn); 5) A person who has a nice voice but sings in a graveyard; 6)
The writing of a pencil [but] with a poor handwriting; 7) Soft speech conducted by a
hostile and jealous person. Ibid., 74.
27
Ibid., 103.
192 chapter ten
You confirmed with the Holy Spirit. You favored the people (ummah) of
Moses over the other scholars of their time. What is the thing that You
have given to me and to my people? God replied, O Muhammad, I have
given the Seven Oft-Repeated (saban min al-mathn)28 and the mighty
Qurn to you and h ikmah to your people; whoever is given h ikmah has
indeed been given much good.29
The fact that h ikmah is given particularly to the people of Muhammad,
however, does not exclude the possibility that it can also be found
among some other peoples. Sufis believe that h ikmah should be sought
and taken from every source, regardless of its possessors. Al-Makk
relates a saying that sets the principle of this matter as,
Take gold from stone (h ajar), pearls (lulu) from the sea, musk from
skin, pearls (durr) from an oyster (sadaf), and h ikmah from anyone who
says it, even if he might not be worthy of it, as many a shot is without
a (skilled) marksman.30
On the authority of Dh al-Nn, al-Makk relates that during one of
his expeditions, the former saw a huge stone, on which the follow-
ing statement was written, How do you seek the knowledge of that
which you do not know while you do not practice that which you do
know? Upon seeing this report, Dh al-Nn said to himself, Take
it (this expression) as a h ikmah.31 Al-Makk also records an anecdote
regarding the permissibility of taking h ikmah even from an unbeliever.
According to the story, two companions of the Prophet, H udhayfah b.
al-Yamn and Salmn al-Fris, once met an unbelieving woman and
asked her if she knew of a clean place for them to pray. The woman
responded to their request saying, Clean your heart [first], then pray
wherever you wish. H udhayfah and Salmn looked at each other and
28
The phrase saban min al-mathn is regarded to be one of the names of the
Ftih ah, which consists of seven verses.
29
Al-Makk, Ilm, 4950. Al-Makk further elucidates his points in this context,
stating that Luqmn was given a heavenly option to choose between prophethood and
h ikmah and chose h ikmah over prophethood. The prophet Solomon was also given
a heavenly option to choose between having a kingdom (mulk), knowledge (ilm),
or intellect (aql). He chose knowledge, but was given a kingdom as well. As for the
prophet Muhammad, he was given to choose between wealth (ghin) and poverty
(faqr). He chose poverty over wealth and said, I am hungry one day and full on
the following day; I live as a poor man and will be resurrected among poor people.
Ibid., 55.
30
Ibid., 50.
31
Ibid., 8990.
the merit of h ikmah 193
Ibid., 51.
32
194 chapter ten
following the Messenger of God, fear of God, and the like. In the final
analysis, al-Tustar understands h ikmah as a combination of the sci-
ences beneficial to humankind.
Al-Makk, on the other hand, states that God gave prophethood to
distinguished individuals among the people of purity and completed
the institution of prophethood and closed its door with the Prophet
Muhammad. God also gave Luqmn h ikmah, though He keeps its door
unreservedly open until the Day of Resurrection. Al-Makk asserts that
h ikmah is one of the great Divine blessings given to mankind and
that it should be sought through ascetic practices, including hunger
and thirst. The knowledge of h ikmah cannot be obtained by means of
conventional instruction or knowledge from books, rather it must be
attained through good deeds, which establish an intimate and special
relationship between a servant and God, who places h ikmah in the
servants purified and sincere heart as a result of the latters super-
erogatory esoteric practices.
Al-Sulam lists similar definitions of the word h ikmah in the Qurn
and asserts that it also refers to a light that distinguishes God-given
inspiration from evil insinuations. He reports that h ikmah means ilm,
h ilm, aql, and marifah, and that it was only after diligent efforts to
humble their (prideful) selves (nufs) that h ikmah began to influence
early Sufi masters. The intrinsic relationship between the notions of
h ikmah and aql is further attested in a Prophetic statement that draws
a parallel between the level of the intelligibility or comprehensibility of
the prophetic discourse with the intellectual level of the people receiv-
ing that message. According to al-Sulams writings, depending on the
spiritual levels of different Sufis, h ikmah speaks to the hearts of gnostics
(rifn), ascetics (zhidn), worshippers (ubbd), seekers (murdn),
and men of knowledge (ulam) by means of the tongue of confirma-
tion (tasdq), preference (tafdl), success (tawfq), reflection (tafakkur),
and remembrance (tadhakkur), respectively. Al-Sulam concludes that
one cannot be characterized as h akm until one becomes h akm in
ones actions (afl), words (aqwl), and states (ah wl). Otherwise
such a person would be described as speaking of h ikmah, but not as
being a h akm himself.
In the terminologies of al-Thalab and al-Qushayr, h ikmah is also
positioned between practical (amal) and epistemological or intellec-
tual (ilm) concepts. They treat h ikmah as a central point inherently
related to taqw (God-consciousness), zuhd (asceticism), wara (moral
196 chapter ten
1
Such an inclusive usage of h ikmah may also be illustrated by the names of the ear-
liest scholarly institution of Muslims, namely the Bayt al-h ikmah (House of h ikmah)
the Khiznat al-h ikmah (Storehouse of h ikmah) being its initial formfounded at
215/830 in Baghdad by the Abbsid caliph al-Mamn (r. 198218/813833). Accord-
ing to the report of Ibn al-Nadm (d. 379/990), this institution functioned as a scien-
tific research center, library, and translation office. Ibn al-Nadm, 353356. The word
h ikmah in this usage indicates that, from its first usages, Muslims understood h ikmah
as a comprehensive concept related to every kind of intellectual activityincluding
philosophyin quest for truth. For a discussion on the political objectives behind
the establishment of the Bayt al-h ikmah and its relation to the translation movement
from Greek into Arabic, see Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic
Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early Abbsid Society (2nd4th/8th10th cen-
turies) (London, 1998), 5360. In this work Gutas minimizes the significance of the
Bayt al-h ikmah in the intellectual activites of the Abbsids and considers it as merely
a bureau-like library that functioned as a small office for translations only for works
of Sasanian history and culture from Persian into Arabic; otherwise, in Gutas view,
the Bayt al-h ikmah was not worthy to be called a scholarly institution, or a compre-
hensive translation office. For a detailed bibliographical analysis of the translations
and the translators of this movement, see Gerhard Endress, Die wissenschaftliche
Literatur, Grundriss der Arabischen Philologie 2 (1987): 400506, and 3 (Supplement)
(1992): 3152.
200 part four
2
According to al-Mubashshir b. Ftiks statement, it was this prophetic encour-
agement (H ikmah is the stray camel of the believer [dllat al-mumin]; he takes it
h ikmah in early philosophical literature 201
wherever he finds it) that motivated him to collect the wise sayings of earlier sages.
Al-Mubashshir b. Ftik, Mukhtr al-h ikam wa-mah sin al-kalim, ed. Abd al-Rahmn
Badaw (Beirut, 1980), 12. According to Muslim thinkers, the principle of welcoming
h ikmah wherever it comes from was also prevalent among the ancient philosophers.
Aristotle, for instance, is reported to have said, Take the pearl from the oyster of the
sea, the gold from the earth, and h ikmah from whoever says it. Al-Mubashshir, 209.
For an overview of the intellectual centers of the Greeks in the Near and Middle East
at the time of the rise of Islam in the seventh century, see Ian R. Netton, The Origins
of Islamic Philosophy, Companion Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy, eds. B. Carr and
I. Mahalingam (London, 1997). In this regard, Netton underlines three main centers
of intellectual activity: Alexandria, primarily for philosophical studies; Jundi-Shpr
for medical studies; and H arrn for Neoplatonic and astral studies. Netton, The Ori-
gins of Islamic Philosophy, 842846. For an examination of the historical situation
with regard to the relationship between Greek thought and the Christian Church in
this region at the dawn of Islam, see Richard Walzer, Islamic Philosophy, Greek into
Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge, MA, 1962), 129.
3
If we approach the history of Arabic/Islamic philosophy from this perspective, the
whole controversial question of whether we should refer to it exclusively as Arabic
or Islamic would be on more solid ground for scholarly discussion. Gutas criticizes
Corbins understanding of the philosophical activities in the Muslim lands as Islamic,
on the basis of the latters argument that this philosophy was linked innately to the
Muslim mind. See Henry Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, trans. Liadain Sherrard
(London, 1993). Gutas himself does not agree with this argument and asserts that we
should use the word Arabic, not Islamic, to designate this philosophical tradition.
He reminds us of the contributions of non-Muslim philosophical figures and argues
that we should base our designation on the language which was the means of philo-
sophical expression, rather than on the religion itself. Otherwise, Gutas adds, we could
reduce Arabic philosophy to Islamic theology and mysticism. See Gutas, The Study of
Arabic Philosophy. Throughout my discussions in this chapter, I use the term Islamic
philosophy in a more general cultural sense, meaning that the founding fathers of this
intellectual tradition belong to the civilization called Islamic, despite the fact that
it includes many non-Muslim contributers, such as H unayn b. Ishq, Qust b. Lq,
and Yahy b. Ad. By this term, I refer to what Marshall Hodgson (The Venture of
Islam, vol. 1 [Chicago, 1974]) means by the term Islamicate, referring to the culture
or civilization, rather than to the religion itself. But since I am not entirely comfort-
able adopting Hodgsons term, I use Islamic instead, within the reserved semantic
framework explained here.
202 part four
4
In this context, Plato is reported to have said, One of the things that facilitate a
mans quest for wisdom (talab al-h ikmah) is the assistance [given to him] by fortune
(bakht). By fortune I do not mean that whose cause is unknown [i.e., luck], but I
mean the divine fortune (al-bakht al-rubb) [i.e., divine causation] only, which illu-
minates the intellect (aql) and guides it toward essential natures of things. Quoted in
Gutas, Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation, 122.
h ikmah in early philosophical literature 203
5
For an overview of the scholarship on the description of Aristotle as interpreted by
the Arabs and of the important texts of Aristotle, including pseudo-Aristotelian writ-
ings, see Hans Daiber, Salient Trends of the Arabic Aristotle, The Ancient Tradition
in Christian and Islamic Hellenism: Studies on the Transmission of Greek Philosophy and
Sciences, eds. Gerhard Endress and Remke Kruk (Leiden, 1997): 2941. For a survey
of the wide-ranging texts of classical antiquity translated into Arabic during the earli-
est period of the translation movement, see Rosenthal, The Classical Heritage in Islam,
trans. Emile and Jenny Marmorstein (London, 1975). For the same topic, see also
Badaw, La Transmission de la Philosophie Grecque au Monde Arabe (Paris, 1987).
6
One might include the Hermetic writings in the same category. Muslim think-
ers became aware of these writings mainly through the translations and expositions
of Thbit b. Qurrah (d. 288/901) and his son Sinn. Thbit was a member of the
H arrnian Sbians whose religion, in addition to Hermeticism, was an eclecticism
consisting of the heathen and astral religion of Syria mixed with some Hellenic and
Persian elements. This Hermetic corpus also contributed to the idea that religion and
philosophy teach the same fundamental principles. For this subject matter see, A. E.
Aff, The Influence of Hermetic Literature on Moslem Thought, Bulletin of the School
of Oriental and African Studies, 13, no. 4 (1951): 840855.
7
Gotthard Strohmaier, H unayn b. Ishq, EI.
204 part four
8
Ab al-H asan Muhammad b. Ysuf al-mir, Kitb al-Amad al al-abad, ed. and
trans. Everett Rowson, American Oriental Series 70 (New Haven, 1988), 41.
9
Al-Mubashshir, 129130 and 185186, respectively.
10
Ab Sulaymn al-Sijistn, Muntakhab Siwn al-h ikmah, ed. D. M. Dunlop (The
Hague, 1979), 35.
h ikmah in early philosophical literature 205
1
Sid b. Ahmad al-Andalus, Kitb Tabaqt al-umam, ed. Louis Cheikho (Beirut,
1912), 2021.
2
Everett Rowson worked on al-Amad for his Ph.D. dissertation under F. Rosenthal
in Yale University (1982) and then revised, edited, translated, and published it with
a commentary. Throughout this section, my references are to the Arabic text edited
by Rowson; I also compared my own translations to those of Rowson and benefited
from the latter. Rowson sheds light on the historical origins of al-mirs accounts in
Greek and Syriac sources prior to Islam. As my focus is in the reception of the Greek
philosophical heritage by the earliest Muslim intellectuals, rather than in tracing their
arguments back to the Greek or Syriac origins, I do not see a need to reiterate Row-
sons findings.
208 chapter eleven
was one of the most able students of the earliest Muslim philosophi-
cal authority, al-Kind. Al-mirs conception of Greek philosophical
tradition, therefore, is quite representative as regards the approaches
of the earliest Muslim intellectuals to this tradition.
Before delving into the history of Greek philosophy in detail,
al-mir introduces a brief sketch pertaining to the prehistorical
scientific activities of mankind in the Near East. He asserts that the
Babylonians needed the science of astronomy (ilm al-nujm) for agri-
culture and navigation; therefore, they applied themselves to develop-
ing the knowledge of the positions of the stars. The Egyptians needed
a reliable knowledge of geometry to protect their cultivated fields from
the rise of the water of the Nile, so they applied themselves to meth-
ods of measuring the land. The Syrians, meanwhile, were in need of
the science of medicine, because of the frequency of plagues afflicting
the people of that region. For such practical reasons, the peoples of
the Near East improved themselves in particular sciences depending
on their basic daily needs. Al-mir further states that the land of
ancient Greece was next to greater Syria (Shm), and that this region
was also inhabited by the Israelites, who had a long unbroken tradition
of prophethood. As for the people of ancient Greece themselves, they
were idol-worshippers, except for a few individuals who used to visit
the Israelite prophets there to interact with them.3
According to al-mirs reports, the first person to whom people
attributed h ikmah was Luqmn the H akm, mentioned in Qurn 31:12.
He was a contemporary of the prophet David, both of whom lived in
the land of greater Syria (bild al-Shm). It is said that Empedocles
used to keep company with Luqmn and learn from his h ikmah (wis-
dom). When Empedocles returned to Greece, he spoke of this teaching,
but he expressed it in a language that, taken literally, would lead one
to elements that could be understood as conflicting with monotheistic
religious beliefs concerning the Hereafter (mad). The Greeks used to
attribute h ikmah to Empedocles on account of his former affiliation
with Luqmn, and he was the first Greek to be called such.4
3
Al-mir, 6667. In fact, al-mir describes the Greeks as simply worshippers
(ubbd), but the context implies that their religion was not monotheistic. I have used
the word idol-worshipers on the basis of a further description provided by Sid
al-Andalus, who says they were star-worshipers (muazzi m li-al-kawkib) and idol-
worshipers (din bi-ibdat al-asnm). Al-Andalus, 20.
4
Al-mir, 70. The convention of associating the earliest Greek philosophical per-
sonalities with Luqmn is followed by later Muslim intellectuals as well. In his Muqad-
h ikmah in the pre-islamic philosophical world 209
dimah, for instance, Ibn Khaldn mentions that philosophical sciences are said to have
passed from Luqmn the H akm and his pupils to Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Alexander
of Aphrodisias, and Themistius, and others in succession. Ibn Khaldn, 3:10881089.
5
Al-mir, 70. For similar accounts with respect to Pythagoras reception of
h ikmah, see al-Mubashshir, 5255.
6
Al-mir, 70.
210 chapter eleven
7
Al-mir, 72. Al-Mubashshir b. Ftik reports that after his master Socrates death,
Plato went to Egypt to learn from the associates of Pythagoras. Then he returned to
Greece and taught his h ikmah. Al-Mubashshir, 126127. Al-Mubashshir also reports
that Aristotle used to express his master Platos h ikmah in a symbolic and obscure
language. He used to speak of it ambiguously so that only those who possess h ikmah
could understand his masters teachings. Al-Mubashshir, 128. Ibn Ab Usaybiah men-
tions a book dealing with the unity of God, entitled Kitb al-Tawh d, in his list of
Platos works. Ibn Ab Usaybiah, Uyn al-anb f tabaqt al-atibb, ed. Nizr Rid
(Beirut, 1965), 86.
8
Al-mir, 74. See also al-Mubashshir, 178184.
9
Al-mir, 74. Al-mirs account of the five Greek pillars of h ikmah was quoted
by historians of Muslim intellectual history among the following generations. We find
the same report with minor modifications in Muntakhab Siwn al-h ikmah, which is a
selection of Ab Sulaymn al-Sijistns Siwn al-h ikmaha work that did not reach
us in its original format. In his quotation, al-Sijistn clearly acknowledges his source.
Al-Sijistn, 57. Sid al-Andalus reports the same materials, but without acknowl-
edging his source, neither al-mir nor al-Sijistn. Al-Andalus, 2127. For the same
account, see also al-Shahrastn, 2:72100; Ibn al-Qift, Trkh al-h ukam, ed. Julius
Lippert (Leipzig, 1903), 1517, 2729, 198, 258; Ibn Ab Usaybiah, 6162, 70, 91.
h ikmah in the pre-islamic philosophical world 211
Al-mir, 74.
10
Ibid., 74.
11
12
Ibid., 76. On the other hand, in his Kitb f Srat al-falsafiyyah, Ab Bakr al-Rz
describes his personal and professional lifestyle as to be truly compatible with a philo-
sophic way of life and defends himself against some unnamed critics, who apparently
saw certain shortcomings and wrongdoings in al-Rzs lifestyle. Ab Bakr al-Rz,
Kitb f Srat al-falsafiyyah in Rasil al-falsafiyyah, ed. Paul Kraus (Beirut, 1997),
99111.
13
Al-Sijistn, 30.
14
Ab al-Faraj b. Hind (Ibn Hind), al-Kalim al-rh niyah min al-h ikam
al-Ynniyyah, ed. Muhammad Jalb al-Farhn (Beirut, 2001), 157. Al-Mubashshir
reports the same idea with respect to Socrates, who also did not like to record and
leave h ikmah merely in pages. Al-Mubashshir, 82.
15
Ibn Hind, 160.
212 chapter eleven
16
Al-Mubashshir, 62.
17
Ibn Ab Usaybiah, 63.
18
Al-Mubashshir, 62.
19
Al-Andalus, 22. See also, Ibn Ab Usaybiah, 6162.
20
Ibn Ab Usaybiah, 71.
21
Ibn Hind, 167. For the same account see, al-Mubashshir, 91.
22
Ibn Ab Usaybiah, 7071.
23
Al-Mubashshir, 130.
h ikmah in the pre-islamic philosophical world 213
not a h akm, but rather, the h akm is one who puts h ikmah into action.24
Like his master Socrates, Plato embraced the teachings of Pythagoras,
but he did not become well-known for his h ikmah until after the death
of his teacher, even though he was a man of noble origin and his family
was famous for its scholars. He was knowledgeable in all the branches
of philosophy and wrote many illustrious books on metaphysical and
physical subjects. He used to lecture his students while walking, on
account of which they became known as Peripatetics or pedestrians
(mashshn). As noted above, toward the end of his life, he authorized
his most able students and associates to teach his classes and isolated
himself from people to devote his life to the worship of his Lord.25
In addition to the epistemological or philosophical function of
h ikmah, Plato emphasizes that it is also a means of purifying the
soul and making its possessor similar to the eternal Cause (al-illah
al-qadmah), since the goal of h ikmah (ghyat al-h ikmah) is adorning
human souls and warding off vices from them.26
Accounts in the writings of Muslim scholars on the history of Greek
philosophy characterize Aristotle by similar features. He is said to have
written a book on the unity of God (tawh d) and entitled it Lord-
ship (rubbiyyah).27 For him, h ikmah was the most valuable goal and,
accordingly, the philosophical method/logic (mantiq) to attain it had
to be as precise and perfect as possible. Such a method had to be free
of all kinds of imperfections, including error (zalal), confusion (labs),
or uncertainty (shubhah).28 Aristotle continually advised Alexander to
turn away from worldly things and aspire to eternal happiness.29 It is
reported that Aristotle used to say, Drugs cure bodies and h ikmah
cures souls.30 He also said, The virtues of the soul are four, corre-
sponding to which there are four virtues of the body: to h ikmah (wis-
dom) of the soul corresponds perfection of the body; to justice, beauty;
to courage, strength; and to temperance, health.31
24
Al-Sijistn, 38. See also al-Mubashshir, 141 and 174. Al-Mubashshir further
reports Plato as saying, Do not be a h akm through your speech, but through your
action; for h ikmah through [mere] speech does not continue, but h ikmah through
actions is beneficial [even] in the world to come. Al-Mubashshir, 153.
25
Al-Andalus, 23.
26
Quoted in Gutas, Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation, 116.
27
Ibn Juljul, Tabaqt al-atibb wa-al-h ukam, ed. Fud Sayyid (Cairo, 1955), 25.
28
Al-Mubashshir, 180. See also Ibn Ab Usaybiah, 89.
29
Al-Andalus, 2627.
30
Quoted in Gutas, Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation, 164.
31
Ibid., 166.
214 chapter eleven
Al-Andalus, 31.
32
h ikmah in the pre-islamic philosophical world 215
33
In this context, the following figures are among the leading authors who cite
sayings from Greek, Arab, Persian, and Indian sages and whose works are known to
us today: H unayn b. Ishq, db al-falsifah, ed. Abd al-Rahmn Badaw (Kuwait,
1985); Ibn Ab al-Duny, Makrim al-akhlq, ed. Ysn Muhammad al-Sawws (Bei-
rut, 1999); Ibn Durayd, al-Mujtan; al-Sijistn, Siwn al-h ikmah; Ibn al-Nadm, al-
Fihrist; al-mir, al-Sadah wa-al-isd; Ibn Juljul, Tabaqt al-atibb; Ibn Hind,
al-Kalim al-rh niyyah; Miskawayh, al-H ikmah al-khlidah; Sid al-Andalus, Tabaqt
al-umam; al-Mubashshir b. Ftik, Mukhtr al-h ikam; and Ibn Ab Usaybiah, Uyn
al-anb. For Greek gnomic literature and its translation into Arabic see, Gutas, Greek
Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation.
34
Quoted in Gutas, Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation, 457458.
216 chapter eleven
35
Al-Andalus, 27.
36
Suhraward calls Hermes the father of the philosophers (wlid al-h ukam)
and the ultimate authority in true philosophy. Shihb al-Dn Yahy al-Suhraward,
H ikmat al-ishrq, ed. and trans. John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai (Utah, 1999), 2, 3,
and 107108.
37
Ibn al-Nadm, for instance, lists twenty-two treatises of Hermes: thirteen in alchemy,
four in talismans, and five in astrology. Ibn al-Nadm, 510, 448, 387, respectively.
h ikmah in the pre-islamic philosophical world 217
38
Arabic bio-bibliographical works are full of Hermetic accounts. See, for instance,
H unayn b. Ishq, db al-falsifah, 133135; al-Sijistn, 6366; Ibn Juljul, 510;
al-Andalus, 1819, 3940; Ibn al-Qift , 17; al-Mubashshir, 726.
39
The famous astrologer Ab Mashar al-Balkhs Kitb al-Ulf is the main source
used by the Muslim historians to uncover Hermes identity. The most complete account
is preserved in Ibn Ab Usaybiahs Uyn al-anb f tabaqt al-atibb, which was
originally based on Ibn Juljuls narration. Ibn Ab Usaybiah, 3133. For the same nar-
ration, see also, al-Sijistn, 6364; Ibn Juljul, 510; al-Andalus, 1819. David Pingree
reconstructs Ab Mashars astronomy, astrology, and his conception of the history of
science through fragments and later quotations found in his three lost works, namely
Kitb al-Ulf, Zj al-hazrt, and Kitb Ikhtilf al-zjt. With regard to the biographies
of the three Hermes, however, Pingree does not provide any additional original mate-
rials, other than translating Ibn Juljuls narration from Ab Mashar and comparing it
with that of Ibn Ab Usaybiah. David Pingree, The Thousands of Ab Mashar (London,
1968), 1418.
Historically speaking, it is impossible to identify the figure of Hermes with abso-
lute certainty. On the one hand, Hermes is the Hellenistic name of the Egyptian god
Thoth, on the other hand, he is the author of scientific, philosophical, astrological,
alchemical, and magical works. Muslim writers transformed his godhead and divided
his characteristics into three legendary individuals: Idrs of the ante-diluvian days,
Hermes the Babylonian (al-Bbil), and Hermes of the post-diluvian days. Martin
Plessner, Hirmis, EI and Plessner, Hermes Trismegistus and Arab Science, Studia
Islamica 2 (1954): 4559. Ibn al-Nadm seems to believe that the second and third
Hermes were in fact one person who was born and lived for some time in Babylon
and then traveled to Egypt. Ibn al-Nadm, 507508. Aff, on the other hand, argues
that a great deal of myth fabricated around the personality of Hermes in Egyptian and
Greek sources underwent a certain modification and elaboration at the hands of Jewish
and Oriental writers. He asserts that the identification of Hermes with Idrs or Enoch
owes its origin to such a Jewish background, which was taken up by Muslim historians
uncritically. Aff concludes that the first and second personalities are mythical and
legendary figures, rather than actual men and prophets; the first one was a creation of
the Jewish mind, while the second one was invented by the heathen people of H arrn.
As for the third one, he was the real Egyptian or Greco-Egyptian Hermes whom Arabs
knew relatively well and whose writings (or those attributed to him) they knew much
218 chapter eleven
better. Aff, 854855. The Hermetic written corpus came into being in ancient Alex-
andria, where the Egyptian and Greek traditions were combined. Before this mixture,
no school was known as Hermeticism. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hermes and Hermetic
Writings in the Islamic World, Islamic Studies: Essays on Law and Society, the Sciences,
and Philosophy and Sufism (Beirut, 1967), 64. For further details see, Ibn al-Qift, 17;
al-Mubashshir, 710.
For an investigation of the figure of Hermes Trismegistus and the texts attributed
to him in the Arabic tradition with a special emphasis on the transmission of Greek
Hermetica into Arabic, see Kevin Thomas van Bladel, Hermes Arabicus (Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Yale University, 2004).
40
Ibn Ab Usaybiah, 31. Al-Mubashshir lists these three Graces as prophethood
(nubuwwah), h ikmah, and dominion (mulk). Al-Mubashshir, 11.
41
Ibn Ab Usaybiah, 3132.
42
Ibid., 32.
43
Ibid., 32. See also al-Andalus, 39.
h ikmah in the pre-islamic philosophical world 219
In his Kitb al-H udd, al-Kind (d. ca. 260/873) cites six canonical
definitions of falsafah provided by the ancients (qudam). 1) On the
basis of its etymology, the ancients defined falsafah as the love of
wisdom (h ubb al-h ikmah); for philosopher (faylasf) is composed
of philo and sophia, which mean love and wisdom, respectively.1
2) From the perspective of its real nature and aim, they said that phi-
losophy is the art of arts (sinat al-sint) and the science of sciences
[or wisdom of wisdoms] (h ikmat al-h ikam).2 3) With respect to its
function or action (fil), they defined philosophy as imitation of the
actions of God (al-tashabbuh bi-afl Allh) as much as is within mans
capacity.3 Al-Kind notes that, by this definition, the ancients meant
that man should be perfect in virtue (kmil al-fadlah).4 4) According
1
Al-Kind, Rasil al-Kind al-falsafiyyah, 172. I have changed al-Kinds order in
the list of the definitions and rearranged them. The Kitb al-H udd has caught the
attention of western scholarship for decades. Two studies deserve special treatment in
this regard. One is S. M. Sterns article, Notes on Al-Kinds Treatise on Definitions,
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1959): 3243. The other is T. Z. Franks Ph.D.
dissertation under F. Rosenthal. Al-Kinds Book of Definitions: Its Place in Arabic
Definition Literature (Yale University, 1975). Throughout my translations from Kitb
al-H udd, I have benefited from Franks renderings as well. The concept of love
(mah abbah) is quite interesting in the first definition because al-Kind defines love
as the cause of the coming-together of things (illatu ijtimi al-ashy). Al-Kind,
Rasil, 168. Mah abbah, in his view, further denotes that which is sought by the soul
(matlb al-nafs), and the condition of the soul in which there is an attraction (jadhb)
between the soul and a thing. Ibid., 175. The idea of coming-together (ijtim) in
turn means being naturally caused for love (mall bi-al-tabi li-al-mah abbah). Ibid.,
170.
2
Ibid., 173.
3
Ibid., 172. Apparently, this definition implies that such a likeness is based on
possessing the knowledge of truth and the doing of good; for one of the essential
characteristics of God is knowing the truth and doing good. Mans efforts to imitate
God in this respect are then one of the basic expectations of philosophical inquiry.
For an analysis of this definition, especially in the cases of al-Frb and Maimonides,
see Lawrence Berman, The Political Interpretation of the Maxim: The Purpose of
Philosophy is the Imitation of God, Studia Islamica 15 (1961): 5361.
4
Al-Kind, Rasil, 172.
222 chapter twelve
5
Ibid., 173. In addition to these four definitions, al-Kind lists the following two
definitions of philosophy provided by the ancients. 5) From the perspective of its
function, they defined philosophy as the concern with death (al-inyah bi-al-mawt).
Al-Kind explains this definition saying, In their view, there are two kinds of death:
the natural (tab), which occurs with the souls leaving the use of the body (tarku
al-nafsi istimla al-badani); and second, the putting to death of passions (imtat
al-shahawt). The latter is the death they aim at, for the death of passions is the path
to virtue (al-sabl il al-fadlah). For that reason, many of the notable ancients said,
Pleasure (ladhdhah) is evil (sharr). Necessarily, since there are two kinds of use for
the soul (one sensible [h iss] and the other intellectual [aql]), that which people call
pleasure is what appears in the senses (ih ss), and concern with sensory pleasures
is a leaving of the use of the intellect (172173). 6) The ancients also defined phi-
losophy as mans knowledge of himself (marifat al-insn nafsahu). Al-Kind finds
this definition an extremely meaningful and comprehensive statement. He states that
things are either bodies (ajsm) or not bodies. That which are not bodies are either
substances (jawhir) or accidents (ard). Man is body, soul, and accidents, while the
soul is substance, and not body. Al-Kind asserts that if man knows his real nature, he
knows the realities of his body and soul; if he knows this, then he knows everything.
For this reason, the sages (h ukam) called man a microcosm (al-lam al-asghar).
(173)
Understandably, these six definitions of philosophy all go back to the Greek sources.
Since I am primarily interested in al-Kinds conception of philosophy as h ikmah, I
focus on this particular relation, rather than on identifying his sources. For the origins
of these definitions, see for instance, Frank.
6
Al-Kind, Rasil, 177.
7
Ibid., 177. In his Kitb al-H udd, al-Kind does not present a full-fledged treat-
ment of the subject matter of human virtues. His statements are quite brief and
incomplete. A more elaborate presentation of this topic can be found in Miskawayh,
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 223
Tahdhb al-akhlq (Beirut, 1978), and especially in Nasr al-Dn al-T s, Akhlq-i
Nsir (Tehran, 1952).
8
In this work, al-Kind deals with two main philosophical questions: first, he rejects
the idea of the eternity of the world, and second, he argues that God is ineffable. The text
has been translated into English with an introduction and commentary; see Alfred Ivry,
Al-Kinds Metaphysics: A Translation of Yaqb b. Ish q al-Kinds Treatise On First
Philosophy (F al-Falsafah al-l) (Albany, 1974). I have consulted Ivrys renderings
throughout my translations from this work.
9
Al-Kind, Rasil, 97.
10
Ibid., 97.
11
Ibid., 97.
224 chapter twelve
necessarily (idti rran), and this existence further originates the exis-
tence of beings.12
In al-Kinds view, the ultimate goal of philosophy is to attain true
knowledge of God. He states that the noblest part of philosophy and the
highest in rank is the first/primordial philosophy (al-falsafah al-l),
namely, knowledge of the First Truth (ilm al-h aqq al-awwal), which
is the cause of all truth. Therefore, according to al-Kinds argument,
only the one who fully understands (muh t) this most noble knowl-
edge deserves to be called the perfect and most noble philosopher in
the proper sense of the word. Al-Kind bases this conclusion on the
principle that the knowledge of the cause (illah) is more noble than
knowledge of the effect (mall), for one can have complete knowledge
of every object of knowledge (malmt) only when one obtains full
knowledge of its causes.13 In this regard, al-Kind makes use of the
four Aristotelian causes (material, formal, efficient, and final) in order
to demonstrate philosophically the existence of God. He describes
knowledge of the first cause (ilm al-illah al-l) as first philosophy,
since it contains the knowledge of all the rest of philosophy.14
Al-Kinds conception of philosophy as h ikmahencouraged by
religion to be sought everywhere by any reasonable means possibleis
evident also in his depiction of the history of philosophy. He envisions
this history as a cooperative and cumulative tradition; a progressive
process of intellectualizing eternal truth, which is h ikmah. Without
undervaluing their attempts, he gratefully acknowledges the extent
and result of the efforts of all previous philosophers who sought to
attain truth, regardless of their being small or great, sufficient or defi-
cient in reaching truth, and regardless of the ethnicity of the thinker.
Al-Kind holds each of those attempts to be a contribution to the
intellectual advancement of mankind and an instrument leading to
further knowledge of the real nature of things. At the same time, he
does not see himself as a passive recipient of the philosophers of the
past; rather, he puts himself in charge of improving their intellectual
legacy by completing their statements and perfecting their methods.
He is aware of the difficulty of a single individual obtaining all the
12
Ibid., 97. Al-Kinds use of the term al-h aqq may owe its origin either the Qurnic
description of God (20:114; 18:44) and/or to the Neoplatonic description of God as
The One. See Ivrys note on this, 120.
13
Al-Kind, Rasil, 98101.
14
Ibid., 101.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 225
15
Ibid., 102. In his introduction to F al-Falsafah al-l, Ab Rdah states that
such an approach, welcoming and appreciating the truth regardless of its origin, was
a part of the spirit of Arabic and Islamic culture long before al-Kind. Well-known
statements, like the following, had paved the way for this approach: H ikmah is the
stray camel of the believer; Take h ikmah, as whatever its origin would be, it does not
harm you; and Do not [try to] know the truth by people, [instead] know the truth
itself, then you will know its possessors. Al-Kind, Rasil, 83.
16
Ibid., 103.
17
Ibid., 384. We do not know the exact scholarly quality of the copy of Aristotles
Metaphysics that al-Kind had access to, though we know that he had the work in Ara-
bic, for Ibn al-Nadm reports that Ustth (Eustathius) translated the Metaphysics into
Arabic for al-Kind himself. Ibn al-Nadm, 367. For al-Kinds intellectual activities
with respect to the newly translated Greek works, see also, Matti Moosa, Al-Kinds
Role in the Transmission of Greek Knowledge to the Arabs, Journal of the Pakistan
Historical Society 15 (1967): 118.
226 chapter twelve
18
Al-Kind, Rasil, 103.
19
Ibid., 103104. Since al-Kind does not name the addressees of his statements,
modern scholars have different opinions regarding his actual target. Ivry argues that
they are the Mutazil theologians, for he finds internal clues in the passage leading to
this conclusion; for instance, al-Kind mentions their use of speculation (nazar) and
accuses them of trafficking in religion (al-tijrah bi-al-dn) in order to gain positions
of prestige and power. Ivry states that these are characteristics of the Mutazil theology
and their political stance during the Mih nah (Time of Tribulations), respectively. In
this regard, he disagrees with Walzer and Ab Rdah, who portray al-Kind as a mem-
ber of the Mutazilah. For Ivrys argument, see his introductory notes in his translation
of al-Kinds F al-Falsafah al-l, Ivry, 2234. For Walzers description of al-Kind as
a thinker affiliated to the Mutazilah, see Walzer, New Studies on Al-Kind, Oriens
10 (1957): 203232, and The Rise of Islamic Philosophy, Oriens 3 (1950), 9. For a
similar portrayal of al-Kind, see Ab Rdahs introduction to his edition of al-Kinds
treatises, al-Kind, Rasil, 2831. On the other hand, Adamson, in his recent study on
al-Kind, disagrees with Ivry and argues that the theologians whom al-Kind attacks
must be the traditionalists, such as Ibn H anbal and his supporters. In Adamsons view,
it is not logical to group the diverse competing trends within kalm during the middle
of the third/ninth century under a single Mutazil heading. For Adamsons argument
see, Peter Adamson, al-Kind (Oxford, 2007), 2225. I find Adamsons conclusion
problematic as well, for he identifies al-Kinds opponents as the traditionalists like
Ibn H anbal and his followers, but without any substantial internal or external proof
from al-Kinds statements. Adamsons argument is, after all, subject to the same criti-
cism he himself directs to that of Ivry. I am, therefore, more inclined to Ivrys position,
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 227
ers because what they call unbelief (kufr) is in fact the knowledge
of the true nature of things.20 This knowledge includes the knowledge
of divinity (ilm al-rubbiyyah), of unity (wah dniyyah), and of virtue
(fadlah). It further comprises knowledge of everything useful (nfi)
and of the way to it, while at the same time protecting its possessor
against anything harmful (drr).21 Al-Kind asserts that the adversar-
ies of the philosophical method are not eligible to evaluate the neces-
sity of philosophy, for they do not know the reality of philosophical
knowledge. He challenges their claims with a counter argument (of
Aristotles), saying that they ought to know philosophy sufficiently in
order to be able to refute the necessity of knowing it.22
According to al-Kinds statements, the authentic prophetic message
is entirely compatible with true philosophy, for the essence of what
the true messengers brought from God teaches the affirmation (iqrr)
of the divinity of God alone and adherence to virtues that He deems
praiseworthy, while, at the same time, it necessitates the relinquishment
of vices of any kind.23 Therefore, al-Kind believes that both religion
and philosophy teach the same fundamental metaphysical and ethi-
cal principles. Throughout his personal philosophical inquiry, al-Kind
invokes divine assistance in his efforts to satisfactorily establish proofs
of the existence and unity of God. He puts himself in charge of this
crucial mission so that he can be among those whose intentions God
likes and whose actions He accepts.24
Above, I mentioned that the term h ikmah is used for two major
kinds of knowledge, prophetic or sacred on the one hand, and phil-
osophical or intellectual on the other. In his F Kammiyyat kutub
Aristtls, al-Kind explains his understanding of prophethood and
prophetic knowledge as opposed to philosophical knowledge: the for-
mer occurs through revelation, the latter through philosophical pur-
suit. He regards the human sciences (al-ulm al-insniyyah) to be of a
lower rank (martabah) than divine knowledge (al-ilm al-ilh), because
the acquisition of the latter does not necessitate personal study, effort,
logical inquiry, or time. Such knowledge is peculiar to the prophets,
25
Ibid., 372373.
26
In this regard, Adamson asserts that in al-Kinds view, prophets have access to
precisely the same truths as do philosophers, though the former receive their knowl-
edge instantly and effortlessly. Adamson, 43.
27
Say that He will give them life who originated them the first time; He knows all
creation; He who has made fire for you out of the green tree, so that you might kindle
flame from it. Is not He, who created the heavens and earth, able to create the like of
them? Yes indeed, He is the All-Creating, the All-Knowing. His command, when He
wills a thing, is to say to it, Be, and it is.
28
Al-Kind, Rasil, 377.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 229
the meaning of the verse. He reminds his reader that everything that
comes to be is generated from something other than itself, as God
made fire from what is not fire, and heat from what is not heat. God
can therefore create through intermediaries or without them; He may
make use of material substrata (resurrecting the decayed bones) or
perform His deed without them (creating bones for the first time).
Since human beings are accustomed to seeing generation from pre-
existing matter, the Qurn brings the act of Divine creation close to
their understanding; otherwise, God creates originally from nothing.
Thus, in the example of this verse, al-Kind expresses his admiration
for the Qurnic argumentation and seems to integrate philosophy
into the service of explicating Qurnic passages.29
Given that al-Kind identifies metaphysics with theology and treats it
as h ikmah leading to the true knowledge of God and His existence, it is
necessary to examine briefly al-Kinds philosophical method for estab-
lishing the existence of God. He bases his step-by-step argument on a
progressive intellection. He states that there are two kinds of human
perceptions (wujdn): sensory (h iss) and intellectual (aql). The first
kind, in addition to the human being, is common to all animals, but it
is also unstable because of the motion and fluctuation of the object (of
perception), and because of the physical and emotional condition of
the perceiver. The second kind of perceptionintellectualis peculiar
to the human being and superior to sensory perception, for, unlike the
first, which is directed to particular (juz) things, the second one
produces the knowledge of universal (kull) things. Intellectual per-
ception is a faculty of the human soul that produces stable, necessary,
and direct knowledge.30 Al-Kinds conception of intellect (aql) is as
a simple substance (jawhar bast) that perceives things in their reali-
ties (mudrik li-al-ashy bi-h aqiqih).31 Therefore, he argues that the
knowledge of metaphysics in general and of God in particular should
be sought by way of intellectual, as opposed to sensory, perception.
Another noteworthy point in al-Kinds attempts to establish philo-
sophical proofs for the necessity of the existence of God is his emphasis
on the need to use the appropriate method in investigating a particu-
lar subject. He argues that it is not reasonable to seek an apodictical
29
Ibid., 373376. See also Adamson, 4445.
30
Al-Kind, Rasil, 106108.
31
Ibid., 165.
230 chapter twelve
Ibid., 111112.
32
Ibid.
33
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 231
Ibid., 154.
34
Ibid.
35
36
Ibid., 155. Unlike his successors, al-Frb and Ibn Sn, al-Kind does not articu-
late a complete scheme of hierarchically emanated intelligences, and thus he does not
explain clearly his understanding of the relation between personal and universal intel-
ligences and God. Even though he uses the expression the emanation of unity from
the True One, the First (fayd al-wah dah an al-wh id al-h aqq al-awwal) (Al-Kind,
Rasil, 162), he does not elaborate this issue.
37
Al-Kind, Rasil, 155.
38
Ibid., 156.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid., 113114.
41
Ibid., 160.
232 chapter twelve
42
Ibid., 165.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid., 182.
45
Ibid., 183.
46
Ibid., 169.
47
Ibid., 118120.
48
Ibid., 123.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 233
them. It is, rather, superior (al), more noble (ashraf), and prior
(aqdam) to them, being the cause of their generation and maintenance
(sababu kawnih wa-thabtih).49 Thus, in al-Kinds view, everything
owes the origin of its existence to God and the existence of everything
is dependent on His existence; but unlike His eternal and infinite exis-
tence, everything has a being created and finite in time.
Al-Kinds argument follows that this first cause must be either
single (wh id) or multiple (kathr): if it were multiple, then it would
contain unity (wah dah), since multiplicity (kathrah) is nothing other
than a collection of units (jim awh d), and it would then be mul-
tiplicity and unity together. In such a case, the cause of multiplicity
and unity would be unity and multiplicity, and a thing would be the
cause of itself. Al-Kind emphasizes the basic logical principle that a
cause is other than its effect (mall), and this leads him to the con-
clusion that the first cause (illah l) is neither multiple nor multiple
and single, but rather, it is one.50 Every multiplicity comes into being
through unity and there would never be multiplicity if there were not
first unity.51 In the final analysis, al-Kind conceptualizes God as the
True One, the First, who is the Creator (mubdi) and Sustainer (mum-
sik) of everything.52
In explanation of the relation between God and the universe,
al-Kind asserts that the relation of the Creator (al-Bri) to this world
resembles the relation of the soul to the body. It is not possible for the
soul to be recognized (yulam) except through the body, in which the
effects (thr) of the souls management (tadbr) of the body can be
seen. Likewise, al-Kind says, the visible world (al-lam al-mar) is to
the Creator: It is not possible for the invisible (l yur) world to be
known except through the management found (yjad) in this world
and the effects that indicate it (al-dllah alayhi).53
Al-Kind seems to be, with these and other arguments, attempting
to explain religious notions in accordance with philosophical pursuits.
In this regard, he sets the stage for Greek philosophy in the Islamic
world, or, as Ibn al-Nadm expresses it, he is the Philosopher of the
Arabs (faylasf al-arab), meaning that he is the earliest authority in
49
Ibid., 143.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid., 161162.
52
Ibid., 162.
53
Ibid., 174.
234 chapter twelve
54
Ibn al-Nadm, 371. In addition to al-Kinds philosophical works, Ibn al-Nadm
lists his wide-ranging scholarly works covering the whole spectrum of knowledge in
his time, including mathematics, music, astronomy, medicine, psychology, and poli-
tics. Ibn al-Nadm, 372379.
55
This point can be illustrated by al-Kinds use of philosophy to explain Qurnic
expressions. For instance, in his treatise F Ibnah an sujd al-jirm al-aqs, he deals
with the idea of the prostration of the outermost sphere and its obedience to God. This
work is in fact an interpretation of the Qurnic verse 55:6, reading, And the stars
and the trees prostrate themselves (yasjudn). Before going into detailed philosophi-
cal explanation regarding body, motion, and so forth, al-Kind discusses the linguistic
aspect of the topic. He argues that when one attempts to interpret a Qurnic expres-
sion, one should first examine its linguistic peculiarities in the Arabic language. In his
view, literal meaning should not be ignored, but should not be blindly insisted upon
as the unique explanation either. In the example of the word sujd (prostration),
al-Kind states that it literally means the physical act of prostration in Islamic prayer.
When it comes to the stars, this literal meaning does not make much sense, as they
physically cannot prostrate themselves; so, al-Kind asserts, we should take the word
sujd in this verse in the sense of obedience. He further exemplifies this meaning
by attestations from Arabic poetry. Al-Kind, Rasil, 244246.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 235
56
See, for instance, al-Andalus, 52.
57
Similarly, Endress asserts that al-Kinds efforts to legitimize philosophy rely on
h ikmah, which was a long-lasting and universal concept in circulation among the
Arabs through its pre-Islamic and Qurnic components. Endress, The Circle of
al-Kind: Early Arabic Translations from the Greek and the Rise of Islamic Philoso-
phy, The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism (Leiden, 1997), 65.
58
Al-Frb uses the term the theoretical virtue (al-fadlah al-nazariyyah) to
refer apparently to philosophy in general, and to metaphysics and logic in particular.
According to his statements, the science of theoretical virtue relies on demonstrative
methods, and in this regard, it is the foremost among the following four major intel-
lectual sciences: first, the theoretical virtue through which beings become intelligible
with certain demonstrations (bi-barhn yaqniyyah); second, the science in which
the same intelligibles become acquired by persuasive methods (turuq iqniyyah);
third, the science that comprises the similitudes (mithlt) of these intelligibles,
which, again, become accepted by persuasive methods; fourth, the sciences derived
(muntazaah) from these three for each and every nation. Al-Frb, Tah s l al-sadah,
35. See the translation by Muhsin Mahdi, The Attainment of Happiness Alfarabis
Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle (Ithaca, NY, 1969), 1350. Throughout my discus-
sions, I have used the Arabic primary text, and have consulted Mahdis translation
as needed. Al-Frb describes theoretical virtue as the superior science to which
the rest of the authoritative sciences (namely, the second, third, and fourth sciences)
are subordinate: these sciences merely follow the example of the science of theoreti-
cal virtue and are employed to accomplish its purpose, which is supreme happiness
(al-sadah al-qusw) and the final perfection (al-kaml al-akhr) to be achieved by
man. Al-Frb, Tah s l al-sadah, 38.
236 chapter twelve
59
Ibid., 38. In addition to the above information concerning the history of philoso-
phy in the lands of the various nations in the Near East, al-Frb reports the history of
philosophy specifically in the land of the Greeks and its transmission to his own time.
In this regard, he presents an unbroken historical chain of philosophical instruction.
In his treatise on the rise of philosophy (F Z uhr al-falsafah)unfortunately lost in
its complete form, but recorded partly by Ibn Ab Usaybiahal-Frb tells a story in
which he describes himself as an heir to the Aristotelian philosophy through Alexan-
drian and then H arrnian schools. He states that philosophy became widespread dur-
ing the reign of the [Ptolemaic] Greek kings. After the death of Aristotle, it flourished
and continued unchanged in Alexandria until the last days of the Woman (i.e., Cleo-
patra), who was defeated by Augustus, the Roman emperor. Augustus ordered that
the Aristotelian corpus, together with the expositions written by his pupils, be copied
and taught. He ordered that multiple copies be made, one of which he took with him
to Rome and others he left in Alexandria. At the same time, he took Andronicus, a
competent teacher of Aristotelian philosophy, with him to Rome. Thus, the centers
of learning became two and continued so until the appearance of Christianity. Then,
the teaching came to an end in Rome, but continued in Alexandria until the king of
the Christians looked into the matter. The bishops met and discussed which parts
of Aristotles works were to be taught and which were to be dropped. Their main
criterion was religiously oriented, for they dropped the parts that they thought to be
in contradiction with Christianity, while they allowed the teaching of the parts that
could be used in support of their religion. Accordingly, they decided that the logical
works (Organon) were to be taught up to the end of the existential figures (al-ashkl
al-wujdiyyah), (i.e., up to Prior Analytics, I, 7), but not beyond that. To this extent,
philosophical instruction remained unchanged, while the rest was kept hidden until
the coming of Islam. In the meantime, according to al-Frbs narration, the teach-
ing was transferred from Alexandria to Antioch, where it survived a long time, until
only a single teacher was left. Fortunately, this teacher passed his knowledge on to
two men, one from H arrn, the other from Marw. These two men left their teacher,
taking the books with them. Al-Frb traces his own philosophical education back to
them. He reports that the man from Marw had two students, Ibrhm al-Marwaz and
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 237
Yuhann b. H ayln. The H arranian, likewise, taught two students, Isrl the Bishop
and Quwayr. Ibrhm and Quwayr moved to Baghdad, the former engaging in reli-
gious subject matters, while the latter took up philosophical teaching. As for Yuhann,
he too engaged in religious activity in his own religion; at the same time, it was he
from whom al-Frb received his own learning in logic. Matt b. Ynus, a contem-
porary of al-Frb, in turn received instruction from al-Marwaz. Ibn Ab Usaybiah,
604605. For a critical analysis of Ibn Ab Usaybiahs records, see Dimitri Gutas,
The Alexandria to Baghdad Complex of Narratives: A Contribution to the Study
of Philosophical and Medical Historiography among the Arabs, Documenti e studi
sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 10 (1999): 155193. In this article Gutas questions
the historical accuracy and reliability of Ibn Ab Usaybiahs story of philosophical
instruction from Alexandria to Baghdad which the latter attributes to al-Frb. In
this narration, Gutas highlights, for instance, that there is no mention of al-Kind or
al-Rz, though the story attempts to give the history of philosophy up to al-Frbs
own time and its earliest stages in Islam; furthermore, the story does not mention any
subject regarding the concerns and problems with which al-Kind and his circle dealt.
On the basis of such internal evidence in the story and external historical evidence
outside Ibn Ab Usaybiahs narration, Gutas argues that this account is a part of a
larger complex of similar narratives and that they should be analyzed all together. For
critical remarks on Gutas findings and arguments in this article, see Hans Daiber,
Die Aristotelesrezeption in der syrischen Literatur, Die Gegenwart des Altertums,
ed. D. Kuhn and H. Stahl (Heidelberg, 2001), 331ff. With regard to al-Frbs con-
ception of Plato and Aristotle, he describes them as two sages (h akmn) who are the
fountainheads (mubdin) of philosophy and the originators (munshin) of systematic
philosophy, with its primary and secondary subject matters. Al-Frb also cites their
definition of philosophy as knowledge of existing things insofar as they are existent
(al-ilm bi-al-mawjdt bi-m hiya mawjdah). Al-Frb, Kitb al-Jam bayn rayay
al-H akmayn, ed. Albr N. Ndir (Beirut, 1960), 80.
60
Al-Frb, Tah s l al-sadah, 3839.
61
Ibid., 39.
238 chapter twelve
62
Ibid., 39.
63
Ibid., 3940. In a more logical connotation, al-Frb lays the same categorical
principles of employing different kinds of reasoning in accordance with the situa-
tion and capacity of the audience: 1) Demonstrative reasoning leads to certainty, but
is appropriate only for philosophers and scholars. 2) Dialectical reasoning leads to
a semblance of certainty through good intention, and is to be employed by theolo-
gians. 3) Sophistical reasoning leads to a semblance of certainty through bad inten-
tions. 4) Rhetorical reasoning leads to a probable opinion, and is used by politicians.
5) Poetical reasoning leads to imagery-causing pleasure, or pain in the soul. Al-Frb,
Ih s al-ulm, ed. Uthmn Amn (Cairo, 1949), 6469. In al-Frbs view, making
use of the appropriate kind of reasoning in accordance with the intellectual level of
the addressee is, therefore, a crucial part of philosophical argumentation, and in this
regard, the arts of dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics are integral parts of philosophy, for
they represent the efficient means of communication with common people.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 239
(ilm al-asbb al-badah) by which exist all the rest of the existents and
the proximate causes (al-asbb al-qarbah) of the things that are caused
(dhawt al-asbb).64 According to his statements, h ikmah comprises
the knowledge of the real nature of things, including the knowledge
of the reality of their existence with respect to their essences, qualities,
and quantities. H ikmah also comprises the knowledge of the hierarchi-
cal and causal relationship between the One Existence (wujd wh id)
and the remote, as well as proximate, causes. H ikmah further deals
with the knowledge that the One is the First in truth (al-awwal f
al-h aqqah), that the continuity of its existence is not due to the exis-
tence of anything else, and that it is sufficient in itself, not deriving
existence from any other thing. H ikmah, in continuation of the idea
of al-Kind, contains the knowledge that the existence of the One is
absolutely different from other things, that it does not share any of the
qualities found in the existence of other things, and that it has ultimate
perfection.65 In such a metaphysical context, al-Frbs conception of
h ikmah refers specifically to the knowledge of the One or First Truth
and its relation to other beings. Al-Frb expresses this conception
in his definition of h ikmah as the most excellent knowledge (afdal
al-ilm) of the most excellent existents (li-afdal al-mawjdt).66
In his exposition on the word h akm as an attribution of God,
al-Frb says, h ikmah consists in thinking the most excellent thing
through the most excellent knowledge.67 This definition obviously
reminds us of the Aristotelian God, whose primary action is think-
ing or self-contemplation, for al-Frb continues his discussion,
arguing that the Wise comprehends (yaqil) His essence and, through
this knowledge, He knows the most excellent thing. The most excel-
lent knowledge is permanent knowledge, which cannot cease to exist.
This is the knowledge of what is permanent and cannot cease to exist,
namely His knowledge of His essence.68 In this context, al-Frb
ascribes h ikmah in its absolute sense to God alone.
Al-Frb, Fusl al-madan, ed. and trans. D. M. Dunlop (Cambridge, 1961), 126.
64
Ibid., 126127.
65
66
Ibid., 133.
67
Al-Frb, Kitb r ahl al-madnah al-fdilah, ed. Albr N. Ndir (Beirut,
1968), 4748.
68
Ibid., 4748. For the same argument see, al-Frb, Kitb al-Siysah al-madaniyyah:
al-mulaqqab bi-mabdi al-mawjdt, ed. Fawz M. Najjr (Beirut, 1964), 4546.
240 chapter twelve
Al-Frb asserts that the person who attains true happiness may
be called h akm, but it is only the necessary existent (God) who pos-
sesses h ikmah in the ultimate sense of the word. He elaborates this
point saying,
H ikmah is the knowledge of the real existence (marifat al-wujd al-h aqq),
which is a necessary existent by itself (wjib al-wujd bi-dhtihi); the
h akm is the one who possesses such knowledge perfectly. There is an
imperfection (nuqsn) in the existence of everything other than the [nec-
essary] existent by itself. This imperfection occurs in accordance with
that things (hierarchical) rank with respect to the First and thus the
former attains an imperfect perception (nqis al-idrk). Therefore, there
is no [real] h akm but the First, for He knows Himself perfectly.69
In fact, al-Frb argues that in comparison to its usage pertaining to
God, h ikmah may be used with respect to man only figuratively. He
reports that on the basis of mans faculty of intellection (taaqqul), some
people call those who practice such intellection h ukam. Al-Frb
finds this designation inappropriate, for h ikmah, in his view, is the
most excellent knowledge of the most excellent of existents, while
human intellection merely knows things in a human way, and man is
not the most excellent thing in the world, nor is he the most excellent
of existents. Due to such essential imperfections, human intellection
cannot truly be called h ikmah, save figuratively (bi-al-istirah wa-al-
tashbh).70
Furthermore, according to al-Frbs writings, h ikmah is the means
of true happiness (sadah). He bases his argument on three successive
premises: first, h ikmah is the knowledge of the ultimate causes (al-asbb
al-qusw) of things; second, the ultimate end (al-ghyah al-qusw) for
the sake of which man exists (li-ajlih kuwwina al-insn) is happiness;
69
Al-Frb, Kitb al-Talqt, in al-Frb: al-alm al-falsafiyyah, ed. Jafar l
Ysn (Beirut, 1992), 382.
70
Al-Frb, Fusl al-madan, 133. In his treatise al-Tanbh al tah s l al-sadah,
al-Frb explains such a figurative usage in another way. With respect to their objec-
tives (maqsd), al-Frb classifies the arts (sani) into two main categories: a cat-
egory whose objective is attaining the good (jaml), and the other whose objective
is attaining the beneficial (nfi). According to Frbian philosophical terminology,
it is only the former kind of art that properly deserves to be called philosophy (fal-
safah) and absolute human h ikmah (al-h ikmah al-insniyyah al al-itlq). As for the
arts whose objectives are attaining the beneficial, they are not to be called abso-
lute h ikmah, but instead, some might be called falsafah only figuratively (al tarq
al-tashbh). Al-Frb, Rislat al-Tanbh al tah s l al-sadah, ed. Sahbn Khalft
(Amman, 1987), 223.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 241
and third, the end (ghyah) is one of the (four Aristotelian) causes.
This argumentative chain brings al-Frb to define h ikmah as, that
which acquaints a person with what is true happiness.71
In Frbian epistemology, h ikmah holds the highest and most per-
fect kind of knowledge, and the definition of h ikmah as the most
excellent knowledge of the most excellent existents is related primar-
ily to God. Furthermore, al-Frbs treatment of h ikmah goes beyond
his epistemology as it has ontological as well as ethical connotations.
His theory of attaining true happiness is based on two kinds of intel-
lectual activity, namely h ikmah and intellection (taaqqul). H ikmah
alone possesses knowledge of the One (al-wh id), the First (al-awwal),
from which the rest of the existents derive their virtue and perfection.
It also possesses knowledge of the way and quantity of virtue and per-
fection that each existent derives from the One, the First. Being one
among the existents, man derives perfection in the same manner from
the One, the First. It follows that h ikmah possesses knowledge of the
greatest perfection derived from the First by man, and that is happi-
ness. H ikmah, therefore, acquaints a person with true happiness.72 As
for taaqqul, it acquaints a person with what must be done to attain
happiness.73 H ikmah and taaqqul then are two principle components
of the perfection of man: the former provides the ultimate end, and
the latter provides that by which this end is attained.74
71
Al-Frb, Fusl al-madan, 133134. In his Kitb r ahl al-madnah al-fdilah,
al-Frb explains sadah as a degree of perfection that the human soul can reach in
its existence. At this level of its hierarchical perfection, the soul no longer needs any
material support, since it has become one of the incorporeal and immaterial things.
This is a permanent and highly advanced degree of perfection, for it is only one rank
below the rank of the Active Intellect, which is the highest destination for the soul.
Al-Frb further defines sadah as the good (khayr) which is sought for its own
sake; it is never sought for attaining something else through it; and there is nothing
greater beyond it for man to attain. Al-Frb, Kitb r ahl al-madnah al-fdilah,
105106. In his view, the attainment of happiness is achieved only by way of certain
voluntary actions (afl irdiyyah), some of which are mental (fikr) and others bodily
(badan) actions of man. The good actions help in attaining sadah and lead to vir-
tues (fadil), while the evil actions become an obstacle to sadah and lead to vices
(radhil). Ibid., 106.
72
Al-Frb, Fusl al-madan, 134.
73
Ibid., 134.
74
Ibid., 134. In a more ethical connotation, al-Frb describes h ikmah as a vir-
tue of the speculative part of the soul. According to his classification, the human
soul has two basic rational components: the rational speculative part (al-juz al-ntiq
al-nazar), and the rational reflective part (al-juz al-ntiq al-fikr). Each of the two
has a corresponding virtue (fadlah): the virtue of the speculative part is speculative
intellect (al-aql al-nazar), knowledge (al-ilm), and wisdom (al-h ikmah). As for the
242 chapter twelve
virtue of the reflective part, it is practical intellect (al-aql al-amal), the act of the
intellecting (taaqqul), discernment (dhihn), excellence of idea (jawdat al-ray), and
correctness of opinion (sawb al-zann). Ibid., 124.
75
Ibn Ab Usaybiah, 438.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 243
76
Al-Frb, Maqlah f Aghrd m bad al-tabah, in Rasil al-Frb (Hydera-
bad, 1926), 35. In his Kitab al-Jam bayn rayay al-H akmayn, al-Frb also empha-
sizes Aristotles conception of philosophy as knowledge of beings as they exist
(al-ilm bi-al-mawjdt bi-m hiya mawjdah). Al-Frb, Kitab al-Jam bayn rayay
al-H akmayn, 80. Al-Frbs own systematization of metaphysics has three major
parts: 1) a part dealing with the existence of beings, namely ontology; 2) a part deal-
ing with immaterial substances, their nature, number, and the degrees of their excel-
lence in being, leading ultimately to the study of the most perfect being, which is the
origin and utmost principle of all things, namely theology; and 3) a part dealing with
the basic principles of demonstration underlying the special sciences. Majid Fakhry,
A History of Islamic Philosophy (New York, 1970), 133134.
77
Al-Frb, Kitb al-Siysah al-madaniyyah, 31.
244 chapter twelve
78
Al-Frb, Kitb r ahl al-madnah al-fdilah, 37, and Al-Frb, Kitb
al-Siysah al-madaniyyah, 4243.
79
Al-Frb, Kitb r ahl al-madnah al-fdilah, 4950.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 245
80
Al-Frb, Kitb al-Siysah al-madaniyyah, 32. In his commentary on Kitb
r ahl al-madnah al-fdilah, Walzer argues that, in this context, al-Frb simply
equates the separate immaterial intellect with the angels or the spiritual beings of
Islam. In Walzers view, this is another case of al-Frbs understanding of religious
terms as symbols for philosophical truth. Walzer asserts that the Greek word theos in
philosophical texts was frequently translated into Arabic by the word angels, and
that, following this practice, al-Frb transformed the pagan Greek gods into Mus-
lim angels. Al-Frb, [Kitb r ahl al-madnah al-fdilah, English] Al-Farabi on
the Perfect State, ed. and trans. Richard Walzer (Oxford, 1985), 363364. I believe
Walzer oversimplifies al-Frbs effort in this regard. It is true that the origins of
al-Frbs metaphysical and epistemological discussions go back to Neoplatonic and
Aristotelian philosophical traditions, just as the majority of his political theories have
a Platonic origin. At the same time, however, it is evident that, throughout his dis-
cussions, al-Frb remodels and rethinks the philosophical conceptions he receives
from earlier intellectuals. He does not imprison himself slavishly within their philo-
sophical formulations; rather, he refines and modifies their arguments to present a
detailed and coherent philosophical system that could, simultaneously, be compatible
with the basic Islamic doctrines. Al-Frbs efforts to integrate philosophy within
Islamic intellectual disciplines do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he simply
transforms the pagan Greek religious conceptions into Islamic ones. If al-Frb seems
to be concerned with presenting philosophy to his contemporary cultural circles as
an acceptable intellectual field of study, as long as he introduces a coherent philo-
sophical system, I would let it be so without questioning his motivations, nor over-
simplifying his efforts. After all, what he tries to achieve is to present a system which
is as inclusive as possible under the historical circumstances in which he lives. In
this regard, one might also consider al-Frbs inclusion of Islamic theology (kalm)
and jurisprudence (fiqh) into his classification of sciences to be an indication of his
continual efforts to present an inclusive intellectual system. Al-Frb, Ih s al-ulm,
130132. For further reading on al-Frbs system of emanations (followed later by
Ibn Sn as well) see Miklos Maroth, Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie
(Leiden, 1994), 199ff. For a detailed analysis of the specific influence of Alexander of
Aphrodisias cosmology on al-Frbs system, see Charles Genequand, Alexander of
Aphrodisias on the Cosmos (Leiden, 2001), 20ff.
246 chapter twelve
81
Al-Frb, Kitb r ahl al-madnah al-fdilah, 102103. For a detailed expla-
nation of al-Frbs theory of intellect and his well-known formulation of the Ten
Intelligences within an emanationist cosmology, see, al-Frb, Risalah f al-Aql, ed.
Maurice Bouyges (Beirut, 1938). This theory of intellect is the basis of the Frbian
theory of knowledge in general and of prophecy in particular. For a detailed exam-
ination of al-Frb and Ibn Sns conceptions of intellect within the Aristotelian
philosophical tradition, see Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active
Intellect, Viator 3 (1972): 109179, and Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect:
Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect
(New York, 1992).
82
Al-Frb, Kitb al-Siysah al-madaniyyah, 79. In addition to his purely philo-
sophical concerns, al-Frb had other historical motivations, to establish a theoretical
ground for the institution of prophethood. Ibrahim Madkour states that in the third/
ninth and fourth/tenth centuries a wave of skepticism, questioning and refuting rev-
elation and prophethood was prevalent. Ibn al-Rwand and Ab Bakr al-Rz were
among the leading figures of that movement. Al-Frbs particular interest in this
matter was a contribution to the intellectual efforts of the mainstream Muslim schol-
ars to disprove the arguments of the adversaries of the prophetic institution and to
explain prophecy on a rational ground. Ibrahim Madkour, Al-Frb, A History of
Muslim Philosophy, ed. M. M. Sharif (Wiesbaden, 1963), 465.
In the same context, I also refer to Hans Daibers discussions in his article The
Ismaili Background of Frbs Political Philosophy, Gottes ist der Orient, Gottes
ist der Okzident, ed. Udo Tworuschka (Kln, 1991), 143150. In this article, Daiber
speculates on the reasons al-Frb integrated the Platonic idea of a philosopher-king
into his combination of Islamic prophetology and religion with Platonic-Aristotelian
political philosophy. In Daibers view, al-Frbs prophetology should not be traced
back to middle-Platonic traditions, as Walzer argues. Instead, Daiber finds al-Frbs
source in Isml circles in Iran, specifically in Ab H tim al-Rzs (d. 322/933934)
Kitb Alm al-nubuwwah. We know that Ab H tim composed this work on the
occasion of his well-known dispute with Ab Bakr al-Rz in the presence of the gov-
ernor Mardawj. Daiber states that al-Frbs al-Madnah al-fdilah was inspired
by the ideas found in this work, especially with regard to al-Frbs conception of
prophecy. Consequently, Daiber argues, since al-Frb agreed with the Isml idea
of the universality of thinking, the latter combined Greek and Islamic-Isml ideas
in this context.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 247
83
Al-Frb, Kitb al-Millah wa-nuss ukhr, ed. Muhsin Mahd (Beirut, 1968),
4647.
84
Al-Frb does make reference to Qurnic statements in his less well-known
works or those which are of questionable authenticity. See, for instance, Du azm
and Min al-asilah al-lmiah wa-al-ajwibah al-jmiah in al-Frb, Kitb al-Millah,
8992 and 95115, respectively. In this context, Fuss al-h ikam is especially notewor-
thy because it is full of Qurnic references; see for instance, al-Frb, Fuss al-h ikam,
ed. Muhammad l Ysn (Baghdad, 1976), 60, 62, 63, 68 and 70. P. Kraus and R. Walzer
talk negatively with respect to its attribution to al-Frb, while Corbin and l Ysn
consider Fuss to be a genuinely Frbian work. For the discussions on this issue see
l Ysns introduction to al-Frbs Fuss al-h ikam, 2326, and Corbin, History of
Islamic Philosophy, 159160.
85
See, for instance, Ibn Ab Usaybiah, 603604.
86
In this context, I should also emphasize al-Frbs recurrent emphasis on logic
as a universal criterion for correct reasoning. In his view, the art of logic gives the
basic rules to correct the mind and direct man to the (right) way to truth. It thus helps
248 chapter twelve
one in distinguishing truth from error and attaining the right way of thinking, as well
as teaching other people the same rules. Al-Frb, Ih s al-ulm, 5355.
87
Al-Frb, Kitb al-Millah, 4344.
88
Al-Frb, Ih s al-ulm, 130132.
89
Al-Frbs political philosophy represents his formulations of an ideal practice
of philosophical truths under worldly conditions. He in fact uses the expressions
practical philosophy (al-falsafah al-amaliyyah) and political/civil philosophy
(al-falsafah al-madaniyyah) interchangeably. Al-Frb, Rislat al-Tanbh, 224225.
For an overview of al-Frbs delicate balance between philosophy and religion, see
Mahdi, Alfarabi on Philosophy and Religion, The Philosophical Forum 4, no. 1
(1972): 525.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 249
points moving from the edges of the two fields toward a converging
point. Al-Frb relates metaphysics to politics and ethics in an organic
unity, and thus conceptualizes it as an extension and practice in a real
and virtuous human society. On the one hand, al-Frbs formulations
of the Peripatetic tradition, cloaked in Neoplatonic garb, help him in
presenting his philosophical ideas as more compatible with Islamic
doctrines; on the other hand, he gives philosophical explanations of
religious concepts, especially of God and revelation. Al-Frbs philo-
sophical expositions in this regard gave Islamic philosophy its direc-
tion in the following centuries. Later Muslim philosophers, especially
Ibn Sn, elaborated on al-Frbs characteristically brief and concise
philosophical formulations.
Al-Frbs philosophical formulations pertaining to God and reve-
lation aroused intense religious objections in Muslim scholarly circles,
especially from al-Ghazl. His conception of an emanative cosmol-
ogy conflicts seriously with Islamic dogma in relation to the Godhead
and His attributes. Al-Frbs cosmology presupposes that the world
proceeds from God in a series of successive intelligences constituting
a hierarchical chain of being. Starting from the First Cause, who is the
Intellect of intellects, the existence of every intellect (ten in number)
is caused through emanation by the higher intellect, while at the same
time that intellect itself is the cause of the succeeding lower intellect.
Al-Frb thus reduces everything to intellect: his conceptions of God,
celestial bodies, and the Active Intellect are all intellects, and their
ontological relations are explained by way of the theory of emana-
tion. This theory, however, has certain constituents incompatible with
Islamic religious tenets. First, al-Frbs God is no longer a Creator
of the universe from nothing, nor does He create by His will. Rather,
it is a result of His self-contemplation; an emanation (fayd) from Him
occurs by itself; He is the Intellect that intellects Itself.90
To return to the central discussion of al-Frbs writings in rela-
tion to h ikmah, I would add another traditional treatment of h ikmah
found in his writings. In the introduction to Part iv, I mentioned that
Muslim philosophers treat h ikmah as a very high degree of knowledge
that should not be improperly divulged to uninitiated people, or to
91
Al-Frb, Tah s l al-sadah, 3638.
92
Al-Frb, Kitb r ahl al-madnah al-fdilah, 142144.
93
Madkour, 453.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 251
94
See, for instance, Muhsin Mahdi, The Political Orientation of Islamic Philosophy
(Washington, D.C., 1982).
95
See, for instance, Charles Butterworth, Rhetoric and Islamic Political Philoso-
phy, International Journal of Middle East Studies 3 (1972): 187198.
96
Gutas, The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 1920. For
further critical reading on Leo Strauss understanding and interpretation of the his-
tory of Islamic philosopy in general and of al-Frb, Ibn Sn, and Ibn Rushds phi-
losophies in particular, see Georges Tamer, Islamische Philosophy und die Krise der
Moderne (Leiden, 2001). Tamer argues that Strauss approach is based on a type of
dichotomizing religion and philosophy, whereas in the case of these Islamic philoso-
phers what we see is a harmonious system in which there is no place for such a cat-
egorical conflict between reason and faith.
97
Gutas, The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 21.
252 chapter twelve
98
See, for instance, Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Ilhiyyt, 3, 443. Accordingly, Ibn Sn
uses the word h ukam and h akm to refer to philosophers in general and to Aristotle
in particular. See, for instance, Ibn Sn, Kitb al-H udd, ed. A.-M. Goichon (Cairo,
1963), 4 and 10 respectively. He also uses the word h ikmah in the sense of sagac-
ity (Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Ilhiyyt, 50), and of divine wisdom (Ibn Sn, al-Shif:
al-Ilhiyyt, 421, 443, 446). Throughout my translations from al-Shif: al-Ilhiyyt, I
have also benefited from Marmuras translation of the work: Avicenna, The Metaphys-
ics of the Healing: A Parallel English-Arabic Text = al-Ilhiyyt min al-Shif, trans-
lated, introduced, and annotated by M. Marmura (Utah, 2005). In his introduction
to logic, Ibn Sn states that unlike the conventional scholarly practices of his time,
he will not explain the principles of logic (mabdi al-mantiq) in the section on logic
in his al-Shif, but rather, he thinks that these principles should be explained in the
part on metaphysics, or, in his own words, al-sinah al-h ikamiyyah, i.e., al-falsafah
al-l. Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Mantiq, al-Madkhal, eds. Georges C. Anawt, et al.
(Cairo, 1952), 10.
99
Ibn Sn, Uyn al-h ikmah, 63.
100
Such combination was not unknown to the Greek sages either; for according to
their encyclopedic conception of sciences, philosophy is to be united with the study of
nature, and the perfection of man is to be manifested in both knowledge and action.
Goichon, Ibn Sn, EI.
101
Ibn Sn, Uyn al-h ikmah, 64.
102
Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Ilhiyyt, 3.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 253
103
Ibid., 4, 5.
104
Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Mantiq, al-Madkhal, 12.
105
Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Ilhiyyt, 34. In the section on logic in his al-Shif, Ibn
Sn introduces the same categorization, saying that the existence of existent things
are either independent of our choice (ikhtiyr) and action (fil), or they are dependent
on our choice and action. The knowledge of the former is called theoretical philoso-
phy, while the knowledge of the latter is called practical philosophy. The purpose of
theoretical philosophy is the perfecting of the soul through knowledge only, whereas
the purpose of practical philosophy is not only knowledge but also putting this knowl-
edge into action. The purpose of theoretical philosophy is, thus, belief in an opinion
(itiqdu rayin), not action, while the purpose of practical philosophy is the knowledge
of the opinion of that action. It follows, Ibn Sn argues, that theoretical philosophy is
more closely related to opinion. Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Mantiq, al-Madkhal, 12.
In his Uyn al-h ikmah, Ibn Sn introduces the same classification of philosophical
sciences, but this time, instead of the word falsafah, he uses h ikmah to refer philoso-
phy. Ibn Sn, Uyn al-h ikmah, 6364.
106
Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Mantiq, al-Madkhal, 14.
254 chapter twelve
(ilh). The divine science differs from the first two in its exclusive
investigation of the things that are separable from matter in substance
and definition.107 It is the divine science in which the first causes of
natural and mathematical existence and what relates to them are
investigated, and in which the Cause of causes and Principle of prin-
ciples, namely God, is investigated.108 Ibn Sn defines the divine sci-
ence as philosophy in the real sense. He further describes it as the first
philosophy, the science that imparts validation to the principles of the
rest of the sciences, and as h ikmah in reality.109
Ibn Sn gives three definitions of this h ikmah: 1) the best knowledge
of the best object of knowledge (afdalu ilmin bi-afdali malmin);110
2) the most correct and perfect knowledge (al-marifah allat hiya
asah h u marifatih wa-atqanuh);111 and 3) knowledge of the first
causes of all things (al-ilm bi-al-asbb al-l li-al-kull).112 According
to Ibn Sns statement, these three definitions refer to the same art,
107
Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Ilhiyyt, 4. Ibn Sn stresses that the subject matter of the
natural is bodies, with regard to their being in motion and at rest, while the subject
matter of mathematics is quantity, either a quantity that is essentially abstracted from
matter, or a quantity that has quantity itself. Ibid., 4, and 1012. See also, Ibn Sn,
Uyn al-h ikmah, 63. In his Kitb al-Talqt, Ibn Sn divides being (mawjd) into
two kinds: separate (mufriq) and non-separate (ghayr mufriq). The former is pecu-
liar to the science of the divine, which investigates beings free of matter and provides
universal (kull) knowledge, while the latter are the subject matter of all the other sci-
ences that produce partial (juz) knowledge. Ibn Sn, Kitb al-Talqt, ed. H asan M.
al-Ubayd (Baghdad, 2002), 147148. Ibn Sn argues, therefore, that all sciences other
than the divine science provide only partial (juz) knowledge on the basis of a certain
state of the beings. Ibn Sn, Kitb al-Najt, ed. Majid Fakhry (Beirut, 1985), 235.
108
Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Ilhiyyt, 4.
109
Ibid., 5. As for the divisions of practical philosophy, Ibn Sn classifies them
under three categories as well: a) politics (tadbr al-madnah or ilm al-siysah), which
teaches the opinions regulating public relations in a human community, b) household
management (tadbr al-manzil), which teaches the opinions relating to domestic life,
and c) ethics (akhlq), which teaches the opinions regulating an individuals state with
respect to purifying his soul. Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Mantiq, al-Madkhal, 14. For the
same categorization, see Ibn Sn, Uyn al-h ikmah, 63. For Ibn Sns classification
of philosophy and science, see also H. Hinrich Biesterfeldt, Medieval Arabic Ency-
clopedias of Science and Philosophy, The Medieval Hebrew Encyclopedias of Science
and Philosophy (Dortrecht, 2000): 7798. In this article, Biesterfeldt investigates Ibn
Sns classification of philosophy and science within a broader context of classical
methods of classification in medieval Islamic scholarship. In addition to Ibn Sns
categorization, Biesterfeldt investigates other classifications presented by al-Kind,
al-mir, Ibn Farghn, al-Frb, Ikhwn al-Saf, Ibn H azm, Fakhr al-Dn al-Rz,
and Ibn Rushd.
110
Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Ilhiyyt, 5.
111
Ibid., 5.
112
Ibid.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 255
namely, the divine science, which is the first philosophy and absolute
h ikmah (al-h ikmah al-mutlaqah).113
On the subject matter of the divine science, Ibn Sn argues that the
existence of God is just one of the things, not the only thing, sought
in this science.114 He phrases its subject matter as being, which is
the first and most essential concept of the mind that does not need
any prior explanation.115 The subject matter of the divine science is,
thus, the existent inasmuch as it is an existent (al-mawjd bi-m
huwa mawjd),116 and the things sought in this science are those that
come unconditionally with the existent, inasmuch as it is an existent.117
On the existence of God specifically in relation to the divine science,
Ibn Sn conceptualizes it within the framework of the concept of
being. One should always keep in mind, however, that, according to
Ibn Snnian ontology, the most complete and perfect being is God,
who deserves to be called the Absolute Being (al-mawjd al-mutlaq),
and in this regard the divine science investigates the existence of God.
Starting from the Absolute Being, the divine science also investigates
the principles of the other sciences.118
From Ibn Sns definition of the subject matter of the divine sci-
ence as the existent inasmuch as it is existent, it follows that the
divine science investigates the states of the existent (ah wl al-mawjd).
He calls this science the first philosophy, because it is the knowl-
edge of the first thing in existence, i.e., the First Cause, and of the
first thing in generality (f al-umm), that is, existence and unity.
It is also h ikmah, which means the best knowledge of the best thing
known. H ikmah deserves this designation because it is knowledge that
yields certainty (yaqn) of God and the causes after Him. The divine
113
Ibid., 5.
114
Ibid., 5. For a detailed logical explanation of the reason the existence of God can-
not literally be admitted as the subject matter of the divine science, see, Ibid., 59.
115
Ibn Sn, Kitb al-Najt, 235. For Ibn Sns detailed discussions on being
and its kinds (the necessary existent [wjib al-wujd], the possible existent [mum-
kin al-wujd]) see, Ibn Sn, al-Mabda wa-al-mad, ed. Abd Allh Nrn (Tehran,
1984), 123.
116
Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Ilhiyyt, 13.
117
Ibid.
118
Ibn Sn, Kitb al-Najt, 235. For a detailed scholarly presentation of the his-
tory of the metaphysics of Ibn Sn, see Robert Wisnovsky, Avicennas Metaphysics in
Context (Ithaca, 2003). For Ibn Sns reception of Aristotles Metaphysics, particularly
in his al-Shif, see Amos Bertolacci, The Reception of Aristotles Metaphysics in Avi-
cennas Kitb al-Shif: A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought (Leiden, 2006).
256 chapter twelve
science is also knowledge of the ultimate causes of all existent things. Ibn
Sn further describes this science as knowledge of God (al-marifah
bi-Allh) and states that since it consists of a knowledge of the things
that are separable from matter in definition and existence, it is called
the divine science.119 With regard to its significance in relation to
other sciences, Ibn Sn asserts that, in its own right, the divine sci-
ence should be prior to all the other sciences, but, from the human
perspective, it is posterior to all of them.120 To put it another way, the
divine science is, in fact, the most prestigious and advanced science,
but in relation to its acquisition by human beings, it is the most dif-
ficult and sophisticated science, which necessitates the pre-acquisition
of the knowledge acquired in all the other sciences.
Through the divine science, Ibn Sn strives to establish philosophi-
cal proofs for the existence of the First Principle, to show that He is
One, Truth, and utmost majesty, and to explain the true nature of
His attributes, including His oneness, knowledge, power, generosity,
and pure goodness. In this science, Ibn Sn explicates His relation
to the existents that proceed from Him in hierarchical ranks, start-
ing from the angelic intellectual substances (al-jawhir al-malakiyyah
al-aqliyyah), followed by the celestial spherical substances, down to
man. It is also through this science that Ibn Sn elucidates the nature
of the dependence of all things on the First Principle, and discusses the
condition of the human soul with respect to its rank in existence and
to the prestigious position of the prophetic institution and knowledge.
And it is this science that Ibn Sn deals with the morals and actions
which, together with h ikmah (wisdom), are needed by the human soul
for attaining happiness in the Hereafter, and with the different types
of happiness.121
In Ibn Snnian philosophical terminology, besides its use in the
sense of theoretical philosophy (al-h ikmah al-nazariyyah), h ikmah
also has an ethical connotation in practical philosophy, or, al-h ikmah
al-amaliyyah. In this context, h ikmah is the third virtue, in addi-
tion to temperance (iffah) and courage (shajah). Unlike al-h ikmah
119
Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Ilhiyyt, 15.
120
Ibid., 21. For a comparative analysis of the subject matter of metaphysics in the
philosophies of Aristotle and Ibn Sn, see Fakhry, The Subject-Matter of Metaphys-
ics: Aristotle and Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in
Honor of George F. Hourani, ed. Michael Marmura (Albany, 1984): 137147.
121
Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Ilhiyyt, 2728.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 257
Ibid., 455.
122
Ibid., 455. For a detailed analysis of Ibn Sns conception of prophethood, see
123
that is beyond their reach and hidden from them. Rather, Ibn Sn
continues, a prophet is expected to let the masses know of Gods maj-
esty and greatness through symbols and similitudes based on their
conventional understanding of majesty and greatness. A prophet is
expected likewise to bring metaphysical concepts, including the real
natures of the resurrection and the afterlife, closer to their understand-
ing by way of parables derived from what they can comprehend and
conceive.124 In this context, Ibn Sn makes reference to the practice of
the foremost Greek philosophers and prophets who made use of sym-
bols and signs in their works, in order to hide their secret doctrines.
He lists Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato as having done so. Accord-
ing to Ibn Sns narration, Aristotle abandonedonly to a certain
extentthis tradition in Greece, for Plato blamed Aristotle for divulg-
ing h ikmah and making knowledge manifest, in response to which
Aristotle asserted that even though he had done so, he still left many
intricate statements in his books, and these can only be comprehended
by distinguished intellectuals. Ibn Sn applies the same practice to
Islam and says that there is nothing unusual in the case of the Prophet,
who brought knowledge [i.e., h ikmah] first to uneducated nomads and
then to the whole human race.125
Unlike in the case of al-Frb, I have not come across any com-
prehensive account of the history of philosophy in Ibn Sns major
philosophical writings.126 Throughout his works, he most frequently
mentions Aristotle, usually under the appelletion the First Teacher
(al-muallim al-awwal).127 It seems that, in Ibn Sns view, philosophy
was no longer a new scholarly field, and therefore he does not con-
cern himself with presenting historical information about the origin
or development of philosophy from its beginning to his own lifetime.
Instead, he mentions the names of the ancient philosophers only when
the context of his argument requires it.128 He therefore does not seem
124
Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Ilhiyyt, 443.
125
Ibn Sn, Rislah f Ithbt al-nubuwwt, ed. Michael Marmura (Beirut, 1991), 48.
126
Neither does Gutas mention any detailed account with respect to Ibn Sns
conception of the history of philosophy and the philosophical figures of the antiquity.
Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden, 1988), 199218.
127
See, for instance, Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Mantiq, al-Madkhal, 59; Ibn Sn,
al-Shif: al-Ilhiyyt, 333, 392. Ibn Sn also calls Aristotle the Logician (sh ib
al-mantiq), Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Mantiq, al-Madkhal, 11, and the Foremost Phi-
losopher (al-faylasl al-muqaddam), Ibn Sn, al-Shif: al-Ilhiyyt, 122.
128
See for instance Ibn Sns mention of Socrates and Plato within the context
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 259
133
Ibid., 10. Originally, al-Falsafah al-mashriqiyyah contained four parts: Logic,
Metaphysics Physics, and, Ethics but only Mantiq al-mashriqiyyn is extant. Ibn Sn,
Mantiq al-mashriqiyyn, ed. Shukr al-Najjr (Beirut, 1982).
134
For a brief analysis of both works titled H ayy b. Yaqzn see, Goichon, H ayy
b. Yaqzn, EI.
135
This point is elaborately discussed in Gutas, Avicennas Eastern (Oriental)
Philosophy: Nature Contents, Transmission, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 10 (2000):
159180.
136
Gutas, The Study of Arabic Philosophy, 1619. For Corbins discussions on
Ibn Sn and his Oriental philosophy see, Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy,
167175, and Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, trans. W. R. Trask (Irving, 1980),
271278. For Nasrs designation of Ibn Sns al-h ikmah al-mashriqiyyah as Orien-
tal philosophy see, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ibn Sns Oriental Philosophy, History
of Islamic Philosophy, eds. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (London, 2001),
247251, and An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines (Albany, 1993), 187ff.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 261
Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 18, 4344, and 115130. See
137
also Gutas, The Study of Arabic Philosophy, 9. Goichon, on the other hand, sees
the loss of this work as an irreparable lacuna in reaching a conclusive argument
concerning the real nature of Ibn Sns own philosophy, for he clearly states that he
wishes to complete, and even correct, Aristotle. Goichon speculates on this issue and
says, We may suppose that he wished to make room for the oriental scientific tradi-
tion, which was more experimental than Greek science. The small alterations made
to Aristotelian logic are slanted in this direction. Goichon, Ibn Sn. Marmura,
in turn, finds inconclusive arguments as well as critical misunderstandings of Ibn
Sns terminology in Gutas work, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. Marmura
acknowledges the contribution of Gutas work to Avicennan studies, but also raises
serious questions regarding its accuracy and representative quality of real Avicennan
thought. Marmura mentions, for instance, Gutas discussion of Ibn Sns theory of
intuition (h ads), which holds a central role in Ibn Sns psychology, epistemology,
metaphysics, and his conception of philosophy. Marmura argues that Gutas fixed
translation of h ads as intuition misses the close relationship between h ads and fitrah
(natural intelligence, the inborn cognitive disposition) in Avicennan terminology on
the one hand, and its delicately-balanced interrelation with ilm, marifah, and dhawq
on the other. Marmura thus criticizes Gutas tendency to assign a fixed single meaning
to each term, as this leads to a rigidity in translating the texts. For Marmuras discus-
sions see, Michael Marmura, Plotting the Course of Avicennas Thought, Journal
of the American Oriental Society 111, no. 2 (1991): 333342. With regard to the real
nature of Ibn Sns philosophy, Marmura regards Gutas monolithic interpretation
of the Avicennan corpus as incomprehensive, for the latter does not pay attention to
Ibn Sns subtle expressions throughout his works. Marmura mentions, for example,
Ibn Sns usage of marifah in al-Ishrt and its relation to ilm, dhawq, and h ads.
In the last three sections of the Ishrt (namely, the eighth, ninth, and tenth), Ibn
Sn discusses marifah and rifn (knowers), but his statements should not be con-
fined to intuition of the intelligible order, as Gutas presents them in his work. Rather,
Marmura argues, Ibn Sns conception of marifah goes beyond the semantic limits
assigned to it by Gutas. In the ninth section, there is no direct reference to h ads,
though Ibn Sn discusses further epistemological steps (darajt) or stages (maqmt)
for the rif, and these stages cannot be expressed in language. In this regard, Marmura
finds Gutas work limited in terms of presenting a comprehensive portrayal of Ibn
Sns philosophy, as the latter does not elaborate Ibn Sns statements in the last sec-
tions of al-Ishrt. Marmura, Plotting the Course of Avicennas Thought, 340343.
262 chapter twelve
138
Goichon, Ibn Sn.
139
Ibn Sn, al-Ishrt wa-al-tanbht, ed. Sulaymn Duny (Cairo, 1960), 1:165.
140
Ibid., 2:147.
141
Ibid., 4:161164.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 263
Ibid., 22.
143
264 chapter twelve
144
In this regard, I agree with Marmuras argument, when he says, There is little
reason to suppose that the lost part of this work [al-H ikmah al-mashriqiyyah] contains
views not found in Avicennas known writings. The available data indicates that in
this work he [Avicenna] intends to express his own thoughts even when this means
disagreement with prevalent peripatetic view. Marmura, Plotting the Course of Avi-
cennas Thought, 335. For further reading on Ibn Sns use of ishrah in his works
and its epistemological and theological aspects and implications, see Hans Daiber,
The Limitations of Knowledge According to Ibn Sn, Erkenntnis und Wissenschaft,
eds. M. Lutz-Bachmann, A. Fidora, and P. Antolic (Berlin, 2004): 2434. In this article
Daiber analyzes Ibn Sns use of this term on the basis of the Neoplatonic doctrine of
emanations from the divine One to the First Intellect, which itself implies an impor-
tant earlier change of the Greek commentators of Aristotle, received later by the Ara-
bic philosophers including Ibn Sn. Daiber argues that Ibn Sn modified Aristotles
own position by combining it in the tradition of Neoplatonic philsophers.
145
Ibn Sn, al-Ishrt wa-al-tanbht, 4:746.
146
Ibid., 4:47110.
147
Ibid., 4:111164.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 265
148
It is noteworthy to mention that, on a more popular plane, Ibn Sn is fre-
quently affiliated with Sufism, especially with Ab Sad al-Khayr (d. 440/1049). It is
said that the two would meet and talk about their psychological and epistemological
experiences. On one occasion, it is narrated, Ab Sad described Ibn Sns arguments,
saying, all that he knows, I see, to which Ibn Sn answered, all he sees, I know.
J. Houben, Avicenna and Mysticism, Avicenna Commemoration Volume (Calcutta,
1956), 207.
266 chapter twelve
It was only with the help of al-Frb149 that he overcame that difficulty.
According to Ibn Sns statement, throughout his individual study of
philosophical sciences, he did not apparently feel himself alone, for
whenever a problem would baffle him, he used to go to the mosque
and worship, praying humbly to God until He opened the mystery
of that problem to him and made things easy for him.150 Therefore,
in Ibn Sns view, philosophy is not a completely secular discipline,
unrelated to religion. In fact, one can describe the whole enterprise of
Ibn Sn as a philosophical attempt to establish the existence of God,
His unity, and His relation to beings. Ibn Sn is properly regarded as
the philosopher of being, but again, one should be mindful that, in
Ibn Sns understanding, the most complete and perfect being is
God, on whose existence every other being is dependent. Furthermore,
through his theory of prophethood as an institution in general and
in the case of Muhammad in particular, Ibn Sn attempts to provide
a philosophical ground for fundamental religious notions.151 He thus
seeks the knowledge of the truth by any means possible. Consequently,
Ibn Sns case, too, fits well into my argument that, in their inqui-
ries, Muslim philosophers believed that their efforts to attain the truth
were in harmony with the Qurnic notion of h ikmah, which was to
be sought everywhere and by any reasonable means.
As with al-Kind and al-Frb before him, Ibn Sns philosophical
inquiries should be seen as intellectual efforts to attain the knowl-
edge of the absolute, though Ibn Sn presents his discussions with
more scholarly systematization and linguistic clarification. All three
of these philosophical figures strive to solidify their systematizations
in two main philosophical disciplines, namely, metaphysics and logic.
They considered that metaphysics formulates the knowledge of being
149
It is not clear to which work of al-Frb Ibn Sn is referring in his autobiog-
raphy. It is not likely that he is referring to the abovementioned F Aghrd m bad
al-tab ah, but rather to Kitb al-H urf, which is composed according to the system
found in Aristotles Metaphysics. Otherwise the Aghrd that we possess today is a very
short text containing little more than a table of contents of the Metaphysics. It could
hardly be the book which so decisively influenced Ibn Sn. See Gohlmans note on
this issue in Ibn Sn, Autobiography, ed. and trans. William E. Gohlman (The Life of
Ibn Sn) (Albany, 1974), 122.
150
Ibn Ab Usaybiah, 437438.
151
For this topic see, Ibn Sn, Rislah f Ithbt al-nubuwwt.
h ikmah in the islamic philosophical world 267
in general and of God in particular, and that logic is the universal tool
for this knowledge.
Ibn Sn and his predecessors in Islamic philosophy regarded them-
selves as custodians of truth or h ikmah, which had a long history of
representatives in human history. They clearly acknowledged and
appreciated the contributions of previous thinkersregardless of their
ethnic and religious backgroundsfor the philosophical advancement
of mankind, which, in their view, was as much cumulative and coop-
erative as corrective and progressive. They considered this activity to
be the everlasting intellectual effort to attain the knowledge of the
true natures of all things, insofar as is possible for man, and then to
make use of this knowledge to improve the worldly condition of the
human race. It was in this context of h ikmah that they welcomed the
Greek philosophical heritage, on which they worked conscientiously
to deal with the perennial philosophical problems of mankind, but in
a more elaborate and refined philosophical system. They clearly did
not see themselves as passive recipients of the ideas of Greek thinkers,
merely repeating their arguments. In this connection, one need only
consider the minute philosophical discussions of the earliest Muslim
philosophers, who sought to introduce a comprehensive metaphysical
system to prove the existence of God. Or one might also remember
their meticulous intellectual efforts to accommodate the institution of
prophethood and revelation within their philosophical system.
It is true that there has always been a cultural and religious tendency
in Muslim societies to maintain that Islam is self-sufficient and that
the Qurn and H adth contain all the religious and moral truth neces-
sary for mankind. As one would expect, our Muslim philosophers also
faced this challenge and took the social realities of their current situ-
ations into consideration in their philosophical writings. At the same
time, however, they did not see this idea as an essentialist challenge,
but rather as a contextual one. They sought truth rigorously wherever
it might be found, as the Prophet of Islam instructed his followers to
do. Paradoxically, it was the conception of h ikmah found in the very
same Qurn and H adth that provided for Muslim philosophers the
necessary inspiration, as well as protection, to do their work.
CONCLUSION
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