VASQUEZ vs.

BORJA
Case Topic: Negligence (CULPA)

In January 1932, Francisco De Borja entered into a contract of sale with the NVSD
(Natividad-Vasquez Sabani Development Co., Inc.). The subject of the sale was
4,000 cavans of rice valued at Php2.10 per cavan. On behalf of the company, the
contract was executed by Antonio Vasquez as the companys acting president.
NVSD. only delivered 2,488 cavans and failed and refused despite demand to
deliver the rest hence De Borja incurred damages (apparently, NVSD was insolvent).
He then sue Vasquez for payment of damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Vasquez is liable for damages.
HELD: No. Vasquez is not party to the contract as it was NVSD which De Borja
contracted with. It is well known that a corporation is an artificial being invested by
law with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of its stockholders
and from that of its officers who manage and run its affairs. The mere fact that its
personality is owing to a legal fiction and that it necessarily has to act thru its
agents, does not make the latter personally liable on a contract duly entered into, or
for an act lawfully performed, by them for an in its behalf.
The fact that the corporation, acting thru Vazquez as its manager, was guilty of
negligence in the fulfillment of the contract did not make Vazquez principally or
even subsidiarily liable for such negligence. Since it was the corporations contract,
its non-fulfillment, whether due to negligence or fault or to any other cause, made
the corporation and not its agent liable.
RCPI Vs. Verchez et.al
Case Topic: Negligence (CULPA)

FACTS:
A social condolence telegram sent through the facilities of the RADIO
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (RCPI). The condolence telegram was
correctly transmitted as far as the written text was concerned. However, the
condolence message as communicated and delivered to the addressees was
typewritten on a Happy Birthday card and placed inside a Christmasgram
envelope. The RCPIs defense is that it ran out of social forms and envelope for
condolence telegrams.
ISSUE: WON RCPI is liable for breach of contract and negligence
HELD: YES.
The SC fully agrees with the appellate courts endorsement of the trial courts
conclusion that RCPI, a corporation dealing in telecommunications and offering its
services to the public, is engaged in a business affected with public interest. As
such, it is bound to exercise that degree of diligence expected of it in the
performance of its obligation.
In the present case, it is self-evident that a telegram of condolence is intended and
meant to convey a message of sorrow and sympathy. It seems out of this world,
therefore, to place that message of condolence in a birthday card and deliver the
same in a Christmas envelope for such acts of carelessness and incompetence not
only render violence to good taste and common sense, they depict a bizarre
presentation of the senders feelings. Gross negligence or carelessness can be
attributed to defendant-appellant in not supplying its various stations with such
sufficient and adequate social condolence forms when it held out to the public
the availability of such social condolence forms and accepted for a fee the
transmission of messages on said forms. Knowing that there are no such forms as
testified to by its Material Control Manager and entering into a contract for the
transmission of messages in such forms, defendant-appellant committed acts of bad
faith, fraud or malice.

Francisco vs. CBCI

Case Topic: Standard Care Required

Francisco bought diesel fuel from a certain Bacsa who allegedly was the agent of
Chemical Bulk Carriers. Deliveries were then made. Later on, Chemical Bulk
Carrierswrote a demand letter to Francisco demanding the latter payment for the
dieselfuels it delivered. Francisco refused to pay alleging that it already paid to
Bacsa asevidenced by the invoice issued by CBCI and a receipt with no letter
headwhatsoever issued by Bacsa to him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Francisco exercised the required diligence of a blind person
to conduct the business
Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable
person who is blind. First, Francisco merely relied on the identification card of Bacsa
to determine if he was authorized by CBCI. Francisco did not do any other
background check on the identity and authority of Bacsa. Second, Francisco already
expressed his misgivings about the diesel fuel, fearing that they might be stolen
property,29 yet he did not verify with CBCI the authority of Bacsa to sell the diesel
fuel. Third, Francisco relied on the receipts issued by Bacsa which were typewritten
on a half sheet of plain bond paper. If Francisco exercised reasonable diligence, he
should have asked for an official receipt issued by CBCI. Fourth, the delivery to
Francisco, as indicated in Petrons invoice, does not show that CBCI authorized Bacsa
to sell the diesel fuel to Francisco. Clearly, Francisco failed to exercise the standard
of conduct expected of a reasonable person who is blind.
One who is physically disabled is required to use the same degree of care that a
reasonably careful person who has the same physical disability would use. Physical
handicaps and infirmities, such as blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the
circumstances under which a reasonable person must act. Thus, the standard of
conduct for a blind person becomes that of a reasonable person who is blind.
Loadmasters Customs Services Inc. Vs. Glodel Brokerage Corp
Case Topic: Standard Care Required

FACTS
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in
favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes
against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the
vessel Richard Rey from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They
arrived on the same date. Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release
and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its
warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use
of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbias warehouses/plants in
Bulacan and Valenzuela City. The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks
owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by its
employed truck helpers. Six (6) truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered
to Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other six (6) truck loads were destined for Lawang
Bato, Valenzuela City. The cargoes in six truckloads for Lawang Bato were duly
delivered in Columbias warehouses there. Of the six (6) trucks en route to Balagtas,
Bulacan, however, only five (5) reached the destination. One (1) truck, loaded with
11bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo. Later on, the
said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered but without the copper
cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for
insurance indemnity in the amount of P1,903,335.39. After the requisite
investigation and adjustment, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount of
P1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity. R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint
for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional Trial Court. It
sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the
subject cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated to the right of the consignee
to recover from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss. On
November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision holding Glodel liable for damages
for the loss of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters counterclaim for
damages and attorneys fees against R&B Insurance. Upon appeal by both R&B
Insurance and Glodel, the Court of Appeals held the Loadmasters to be liable to
Glodel in the amount of P1,896,789.62representing the insurance indemnity which
R&B Insurance Corporation (R&B Insurance )paid to the insured-consignee,
Columbia Wire and Cable Corporation(Columbia).
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari filed by the Loadmasters.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. exercised the diligence
required for a transport and whether or not respondent Glodel Brokerage
Corporation jointly and severally liable for the lost of goods;
HELD:
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the
nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them
according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the
Civil Code. When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme
measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and
circumspection observe for securing and preserving their own property or rights.
This exacting standard imposed on common carriers in a contract of carriage of
goods is intended to tilt the scales in favor of the shipper who is at the mercy of the
common carrier once the goods have been lodged for shipment. Thus, in case of
loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently. This presumption of fault or negligence, however, may be
rebutted by proof that the common carrier has observed extraordinary diligence
over the goods.
With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil Code
provides that the exercise of extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods
are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for
transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier
to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.
Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are
jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo.
Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.

Crisostomo Vs. CA
Case Topic: Standard Care Required

FACTS
Petitioner Estela L. Crisostomo contracted the services of respondent Caravan Travel
and Tours International, Inc. to arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing, and
accommodation in a tour dubbed Jewels of Europe. A 5% discount on the total
cost of P74,322.70 which included the airfare was given to the petitioner. The
booking fee was also waived because petitioners niece, Meriam Menor, was
respondents ticketing manager.
On June 12, 1991, Menor went to her aunts residence to deliver petitioners travel
documents and plane tickets. In return, petitioner gave the full payment for the
package tour. Menor then told her to be at the NAIA on Saturday, June 15, 1991, two
hours before her flight on board British Airways. Without checking her travel
documents, petitioner went to NAIA and to her dismay, she discovered that the
flight she was supposed to take had already departed the previous day. She learned
that her plane ticket was for the flight scheduled on June 14, 1991. She called up
Menor to complain and Menor suggested upon petitioner to take another tour
British Pageant. Petitioner was asked anew to pay US$785.00. Petitioner gave
respondentUS$300 as partial payment and commenced the trip.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Caravan did not observe the standard of care required of
a common carrier when it informed the petitioner wrongly of the flight schedule
HELD:
The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals was
affirmed. A common carrier is defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code as
persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation,
affecting their services to the public. It is obvious from the above definition that
respondent is not an entity engaged in the business of transporting either
passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier.
Respondent did not undertake to transport petitioner from one place to another
since its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements in their
behalf. Respondents services as a travel agency include procuring tickets and
facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking customers for tours. It is in this
sense that the contract between the parties in this case was an ordinary one for
services and not one of carriage.
The standard of care required of respondent is that of a good father of a family
under Article 1173 of the Civil Code. This connotes reasonable care consistent with
that which an ordinarily prudent person would have observed when confronted with
a similar situation. It is clear that respondent performed its prestation under the
contract as well as everything else that was essential to book petitioner for the tour.
Had petitioner exercised due diligence in the conduct of her affairs, there would
have been no reason for her to miss the flight. Needless to say, after the travel
papers were delivered to petitioners, it became incumbent upon her to take
ordinary care of her concerns. This undoubtedly would require that she at least read
the documents in order to assure herself of the important details regarding the trip.

Sarmiento vs. Sps. Cabrido

Case Topic: Standard Care Required

FACTS:
Petitioner, Tomasa Sarmiento, states that sometime in April 1994, a friend, Dra.
Virginia Lao, requested her to find somebody to reset a pair of diamond earrings
into two gold rings. Accordingly, petitioner sent a certain Tita Payag with the pair of
earrings to Dingdings Jewelry Shop, owned and managed by respondent spouses
Luis and Rose Cabrido, which accepted the job order for P400.
Petitioner provided 12 grams of gold to be used in crafting the pair of ring settings.
After 3 days, Tita Payag delivered to the jewelry shop one of Dra. Laos diamond
earrings which was earlier appraised as worth .33 carat and almost perfect in cut
and clarity. Respondent Ma. Lourdes (Marilou) Sun went on to dismount the diamond
from its original setting. Unsuccessful, she asked their goldsmith, Zenon Santos, to
do it. Santos removed the diamond by twisting the setting with a pair of pliers,
breaking the gem in the process.
Petitioner required the respondents to replace the diamond with the same size and
quality. When they refused, the petitioner was forced to buy a replacement in the
amount of P30,000. Petitioner filed a complaint for damages on June 28, 1994.
Private respondents vigorously denied any transaction between Dingdings Jewelry
Shop and the petitioner, through Tita Payag.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents are liable.
HELD:
YES.
Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting
parties. Corollarily, those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
In the case at bar, it is beyond doubt that Santos acted negligently in dismounting
the diamond from its original setting. It appears to be the practice of the trade to
use a miniature wire saw in dismounting precious gems, such as diamonds, from
their original settings. However, Santos employed a pair of pliers in clipping the
original setting, thus resulting in breakage of the diamond. The jewelry shop failed
to perform its obligation with the ordinary diligence required by the circumstances.
It should be pointed out that Marilou examined the diamond before dismounting it
from the original setting and found the same to be in order. Its subsequent breakage
in the hands of Santos could only have been caused by his negligence in using the
wrong equipment. Res ipsa loquitur.