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The value is morality.

In order to be normative, an ethical theory must give an


account of the subject without one, it is impossible to guide
action without such an account since there would be no actors
action to guide in the first place and thus no need for morality.

We must begin with an account of power, since it guides our


actions and functions as constitutive of our identities.
Dreyfus and Rabinow1:
Foucaults next proposals follow from this first one. Power is not restricted to political

institutions. Power plays a directly productive role; it comes from


below; it is multidirectional, operating from the top down and also from the

bottom up. We have seen that political technologies cannot be identified with particular institutions. But
we have also seen that it is precisely when these technologies find a localization within specific institutions (schools,
hospitals, prisons), when they invest these institutions, that bio-power really begins its take-off. When the
disciplinary technologies establish links between these institutional settings, then [it] disciplinary technology is truly

effective. It is in this sense that Foucault sayspower is productive; it is not in a position


of exteriority to other types of relationships. Although relationships of power are imminent to
institutions, power and institutions are not identical. But neither are

their relationships merely pasted-on, superstructural detail. For example,


the school cannot be reduced to its disciplinary function. The content of
Euclids geometry is not changed by the architecture of the school building. However, many other aspects

of school life are changed by the introduction of disciplinary technology (rigid


scheduling, separation of pupils, surveillance of sexuality, ranking, individuation and so on) .

In order for this account of the subject to matter, we cannot


allow for total domination in this state, power relations
collapse and the subject is simply reduced to an object.
Foucault2:
This brings us back to the problem of what I mean by power. I scarcely use the word power, and if I use it on occasion it is simply as shorthand for the
expression I generally use: relations of power. But there are readymade models: when one speaks of power, people immediately think of a political
structure, a government, a dominant social class, the master and the slave, and so on. I am not thinking of this at all when I speak of relations of power, I

human relationships, whether they involve verbal


mean that in

communication such as we are engaged in at this moment, or amorous, institutional, or


economic relationships, power is always present: I mean a

1 Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Paul Rabinow. Michel Foucault: Beyond


structuralism and hermeneutics. University of Chicago Press, 2014.
2
relationship in which one person tries to control the conduct of
the other. So I am speaking of relations that exist at different levels, in different forms; these power
relations are mobile, they can be modified, they are not fixed once and for all. For example, the fact that I may
be older than you, and that you may initially have been intimidated, may be turned around during the course of our conversation, and I

may end up being intimidated before someone precisely because he is younger than I am. These power relations
are thus mobile, reversible, and unstable. It should also be noted that power relations are possible
only insofar as the subjects are free. If one of them were completely at the other's disposal and became his thing,

an object on which he [one] could wreak boundless and limitless


violence, there wouldn't be any relations of power. Thus, in order for power
relations to come into play, there must be at least a certain degree of freedom on both sides. Even when the power relation is
completely out of balance, when it can truly be claimed that one side has "total power" over the other, a power can be exercised over the
other only insofar as the other still has the option of killing himself, of leaping out the window, or of killing the other person. This means

that in power relations there is necessarily the possibility of


resistance because if there were no possibility of resistance (of violent
resistance, flight, deception, strategies capable of reversing the situation ),

there would be no power relations at all. This being the general form, I refuse to reply to the
question I am sometimes asked: "But if power is everywhere, there is no freedom." I answer that if there are

relations of power in every social field, this is because there is


freedom everywhere. Of course, states of domination do indeed exist. In a great many cases, power relations
are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom. To take what is
undoubtedly a very simplified example, one cannot say that it was only men who wielded power in the conventional marital structure of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; women had quite a few options: they could deceive their husbands, pilfer money from them,
refuse them sex. Yet they were still in a state of domination insofar as these options were ultimately only stratagems that never
succeeded in reversing the situation. In such cases of domination, be they economic, social, institutional, or sexual, the problem is
knowing where resistance will develop. For example, in a working class that will resist domination, will this be in unions or political
parties; and what form will it take-a strike, a general strike, revolution, or parliamentary opposition? In such a situation of domination,
all of these questions demand specific answers that take account of the kind, and precise form of domination in question. But the claim
that "you see power everywhere, thus there is no room for freedom" seems to me absolutely inadequate. The idea that power is a
system of domination that controls everything and leaves no room for freedom cannot be attributed to me.

Three impacts: 1) This generates a normative obligation to


resist oppression this is a benefit to any permutation of a
kritik because it provides the justification that they seek, so at
worst doing the AFF first carries a net benefit 2) this demands
a nonstatic conception of identity since both members of a
relationship constantly generate each other through the
exertion of power relationships, our understanding of identity
must be fluid 3) power relations are the best liberation
strategy they highlight the focal points along which
domination may exert itself, thereby uncovering the root cause
of the problem means the AC is always a prior question.
Furthermore, the static oppressed-oppressor dichotomy is
constitutive of oppression we need to look towards breaking
these boundaries.
hooks3:

Casting blame and calling for vengeance was an aspect of militant movements for black power that have really
failed to sustain the climate of unlearning racism previously
forged by nonviolen[ce]t anti-racist struggle. In the aftermath of sixties rebellion, the more
black folks were encouraged to vent rage, to blame all white folks for
race-based exploitation and domination, and to eschew any notion of forgiveness, the more an

internalized sense of victimhood became the norm. Tragically, today


many black folks are more despairing of any possibility that racism can
be effectively challenged and [of] changed than at other similar historical moments when white

supremacist aggression was more overtly life threatening. Unenlightened white


folks who proclaim either that racism has ended or that they are not responsible for slavery engage a politics of blame wherein they
disavow political reality to insist that black folk are never really victims of racism but are the agents of their own suffering.

Dualistic thinking, which is at the core of dominator thinking,


[and] teaches people that there is always the oppressed and
the oppressor, a victim and a victimizer. Hence there is always someone to
blame. Moving past the ideology of blame to a politics of accountability is a difficult move to make in a society where almost all
political organizing, whether conservative or radical, has been structured around the binary of good guys and bad guys. Accountability is

blame allows a contemporary white person to


a much more complex issue. A politics of

make statements like, My family never owned slaves, or Slavery is over.


Why cant they just get over it? In contrast, a politics of accountability would emphasize that all
white people benefit from the privileges accrued from racist exploitation past and present and therefore are accountable for changing

. Accountability is a more expansive concept because it opens a field of


and transforming white supremacy and racism

possibility wherein we are all compel[s us]led to move beyond blame to see where our responsibility

lies. Seeing clearly that we live within a dominator culture of imperialist white supremacist

capitalist patriarchy, I am compelled to locate where my responsibility lies. In

some circumstances I am more likely to be victimized by an aspect of that


system, in other circumstances I am in a position to be a victimizer. If I only lay claim

to those aspects of the system where I define myself as the oppressed and

someone else as my oppressor, then I continually fail to see


the larger picture. Any effort I might make to challenge
domination is likely to fail if I am not looking accurately at the circumstances that create suffering, and
thus seeing the larger picture. After more than thirty years of talking to folks about domination, I can testify that masses of folks in our

societyboth black and white resist seeing the larger picture .

Impact analysis:
1. This turns any critical alternative that
delineates a clear group of oppressed or relies on
overthrowing an oppressor because your strategy reifies

3 bell hooks, Writing Beyond Race: Living Theory and Practice.; Routledge. 2013; Collegiate DM
their logic, you simply reverse the roles of dominator and
dominated; any prescription of a binary is inevitably
hierarchical outweighs their alt on a) real-world
applicability specific comparison to the CRM, b) scope -
concession of the harm of the oppressor-oppressed binary
means your perspective will never be large enough.
2. This is also a root cause argument, so the
AC is always a prior question if we cannot address the
attitude that makes domination possible, we will never be
able to solve the problems it causes.
Additionally, any attempts to solve oppression from a single
standpoint will always fail.
Crenshaw4:

identity politics
The problem with is not that it fails to transcend difference, as some critics charge, but rather the oppositethat it

frequently conflates or ignores intragroup differences. In the context of


violence against women, this elision of difference in identity politics is

problematic, fundamentally because the violence that many women


experience is often shaped by other dimensions of their identities, such as race
and class. Moreover, ignoring difference within groups contributes to tension among

groups, another problem of identity politics that bears on efforts to politicize violence against women . Feminist efforts to

and antiracist efforts


politicize experiences of women have
to politicize experiences of people of color

frequently proceeded as though the issues and experiences they each detail occur on mutually
exclusive terrains. Although racism and sexism readily intersect in the lives of real
people, they seldom do in feminist and antiracist practices. And so, when the practices expound

identity as woman or person of color as an either/or proposition, they relegate


the identity of women of color to a location that resists telling.

This link turns any kritik under which given identity informs
our oppression; even though the warrants specifically apply to
race and fem, the warrant applies to any single standpoint; a
single viewpoint will not only fail but also relegate those in the
group you seek to help who occupy multiple standpoints to
obscurity.

4 Crenshaw, Kimberl. Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,


Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color.
Stanford Law Review 43.6 (1991): 12411299. JSTOR. Web.
The only possible solution is to approach power relations from
the view of white supremacist capitalist patriarchy or WSCP
no other framework is sufficiently intersectional solves both
for perspective by including multiple forms of oppression and
the dichotomy because its specifically targeted towards the
ways in which forms of oppression interlock.
hooks 25:

the phrase in my work white supremacist capitalist


I began to use

patriarchy because I wanted to have some language that would actually remind[s] us continually of
the interlocking systems of domination that define our reality
and not to just have one thing be like, you know, gender is the important issue, race is the important issue, but for me the use of that
particular jargonistic phrase was a way, a sort of short cut way of saying all of these things actually are functioning simultaneously at all

times in our lives and that if I really want to understand what's happening to
me, right now at this moment in my life, as a black female of a certain age group, I won't be able to
understand it if I'm only looking through the lens of race. I won't be
able to understand it if I'm only looking through the lens [or] of gender. I won't be able to understand it if I'm only
looking at how white people see me. To me an important break through, I felt, in my work and that of others was the call to use the term
white supremacy, over racism because racism in and of itself did not really allow for a discourse of colonization and decolonization, the
recognition of the internalized racism within people of color and it was always in a sense keeping things at the level at which whiteness
and white people remained at the center of the discussion. In my classroom I might say to students that you know that when we use the

term white supremacy it doesn't just evoke white people, it


evokes a political world that we can all frame ourselves in
relationship to. And I think that I was able to do that because I grew up, again, in racial apartheid, where there was a color caste
system. So that obviously I knew that through my own experiential reality, you know, that it wasn't just what white people do to black
people that was wounding and damaging to our lives, I knew that when we went over to my grandmother's house, who looked white,
who lived in a white neighborhood, and she called my sister, Blackie, because she was dark and her hair was nappy and my sister would
sit in a corner and cry or not want to go over there. I knew that there is some system here that is hurting this little girl, that is not
directly, the direct hit from the white person. And white supremacy was that term that allowed one to acknowledge our collusion with
the forces of racism and imperialism. And so for me those words were very much about the constant reminder, one of institutional
construct, that we're not talking about personal construct in the sense of, how do you feel about me as a woman, or how do you feel
about me as a black person? But they really seem to me to evoke a larger apparatus and I don't know why those terms have become so

mocked by people because in fact, far from simplifying the issues, I think they actually when you merge them
together really complicate the questions of freedom and justice globally, because it means then that
we have to look at what black people are doing to each other
in Rwanda, we can't just say racism, what have you. We have to problematize
nationalism beyond race, in all kinds of ways that I think there's a tremendous reluctance, particularly in the United States to do, to

have a more complex accounting of identity.

The only way to combat WCSP is through the care of the self
only in this way are we able to extend ourselves to others in a
way that is morally binding.

5 Patierno, Mary, and Harriet Hirshorn, eds. Bell Hooks: Cultural Criticism
& Transformation. Media Education Foundation, 2002.
Foucault6:

Certainly. Taking care of oneself requires knowing [connaitre] oneself. Care of


the self is, of course, knowledge [connaissance] of the self-this is the Socratic-Platonic
aspect-but also knowledge of a number of rules of acceptable

conduct or of principles that are both truths and prescriptions.


To take care of the self is to equip oneself with these truths: this is
where ethics is linked to the game of truth.

He continues:
care of the self is ethical in
What makes it ethical for the Greeks is not that it is care for others. The

itself; but it implies complex relationships with others insofar as this


ethos of freedom is also a way of caring for others. This is why it is important for a
free man who conducts himself as he should to be able to govern his wife, his children, his household; it is also the art of governing.

Ethos also implies a relationship with others, insofar as the care of


the self enables one to occupy his [or her] rightful position in the
city, the community, or interpersonal relationships, whether as a magistrate or a friend . And the care of the self

also implies a relationship with the other insofar as [it] proper care of
the self requires listening to the lessons of a master. One needs a

guide, a counselor, a friend, someone who will be truthful with you.


Thus, the problem of relationships with others is present
throughout the development of the care of the self.

The ethic of self-care allows you to find your place, so it


precludes other ethics that dont have a starting point;
specifically precludes ends-based standards since you cant
calculate consequences without some sort of perspective on
what matters.
Thus, the role of the ballot and standard is promoting the ethic
of self-care. Also, consequences are unimportant the intent
to foster self-care is what matters since a) were concerned
with how it fosters the growth of character, b) forgiveness is
essential, rather than blame, c) its impossible to calculate
consequences since each consequence has infinite
consequences as a result and d) you must intend to love, so
the intent is a prior question.

6 Foucault, Michel. Ethics: Subjectivity and truth. Vol. 1. New Press, 1997.
This means that consequences dont matter theyre not about
realizing the ability to love, theyre about maximizing love. The
problem with this is that we need to learn how to love in the
first place; we need to concern ourselves with arranging
society properly, not with any given state of affairs.
Aggregation of love is also impossible each person has
unique aspects of themselves that cannot be reduced into
aggregable form.
I contend that affirming is consistent with the ethic of love.
I defend the intent of the United States guaranteeing the right
to housing, so consequences are irrelevant, but Ill accept
reasonable neg spec as long as I dont abandon my maxim. To
clarify, the intention of a right to housing is to prevent and
eliminate homelessness.
I defend this as a general principle, but if you want me to
defend a particular means of implementation Ill do so if you
ask me in CX.
First, the right to housing is an intrinsic extension of our right
to freedom. It serves as the bedrock that allows us to freely
exercise all other rights.
KING7:

Freedom rights can be seen as negative rights , in that they prohibit coercion and interference in the interests of others
(Berlin, 1969). The importance of negative rights for some libertarian thinkers such as Machan (1989) and Ras- mussen & Den Uyl (1991), is that they do not clash. Omissions can have simultaneous multiple
effects. Coercion by the state impinges on the rights of all its citizens. But importantly, these thinkers would argue that the enjoyment of life, liberty and property by one does not deny it to others. The

amount of liberty in any society is not governed by a zero-sum game, where one person taking a share diminishes the pool left for the rest. However, socio-economic
claims frequently entail the distribution of scarce resources, and thus any settlement will involve the adjudication between rival claims. Thus, because they involve finite resources, these

place individual rights-holders in direct competition


claims with their fellow citizens.

As a result, libertarian[s] limit


theserights to indivisible thinkers the remit of

goods such as liberty autonomy, and property rights, and to which, they suggest,

the notion of negative rights


underpin these other rights. Sen (1985) has argued that , as propounded in this case by Nozick (1974), is
flawed. Sen questions whether it is sufficient to allow individuals legitimately to pursue their ends even when this might have disastrous consequences. Sens point is that

7 Housing as a Freedom Right PETER KING Housing Studies,


Vol. 18, No. 5, 661672, September 2003 Centre for
Comparative Housing Research, Department of Public Policy,
De Montfort University, Leicester, UK DD
individuals may be unable to command certain necessary
goods because they have no entitlement to possess those
goods. they have no property rights over goods
In this case, and services. Bengtsson (1995)

people have been deprived of


relates Sens argument to housing, and states, It is not difficult to find examples of how

shelter, just because they lackedand others hadcontrol of


private property (p. 126). This implies that the positive rights of some, to property, clash with the negative rights of others. Again it suggests that one cannot divorce
rights-based theories from utilitarian considerations (which is precisely why libertarian theories like those of Machan and Rasmussen & Den Uyl restrict rights to negative entities only). An interesting way

the
around the apparent clash between freedom rights and socio-economic claims has been offered by Waldron (1993b). His discussion is also important for a further reason. It shows that

right to housing might actually be one of the most significant


rights, if not the most significant [right]. because it acts as This is

the bedrock for all others, in that all rights must be situated.
(665-666)

This very clearly links into self-care if you are not able to
access any other rights, then you cannot extend yourself to
foster growth either individually or to others willing
homelessness is the antithesis of willing love. Also, this is not
an abstract freedom to do whatever we want, this is a concrete
freedom stemming from the ability to love each other; means
taxation or standard liberty NCs dont apply because freedom
is understood only within a community, not as an individual.
A right to housing is essential to development of support
communities and the formation of connections this is offense
under love because we need to form connections in order to
extend ourselves in loving ways.
Hartman citing Massachusetts Episcopal Diocese8:

Shelter in decent, affordable housing is not a luxury. It is a necessity


upon which access to other necessities and the development of healthy, productive families and
communities most often depend[s]. Nothing is more essential
to the welfare of men, women and children. Nothing is tied
more directly to the recognition of the dignity, worth and values of
persons. Because housing is so closely related to the welfare of persons and to
recognition of their value as persons, nothing is a more basic
right than the opportunity, regardless of income or class, to live in that kind of housing which supports the welfare of the family
and community.... Whether persons of limited income have access to adequate shelter is thus for us at its heart both a question of
justice, and a religious and theological question of central importance.

8 Hartman, Chester. "The case for a right to housing." (1998): 223-246..


Engaging multiple sites of resistance through the state is
necessary to overcome oppression pure critique fails.
Connolly 13 William, Professor of Political Theory at Johns Hopkins University, The Fragility of
Things, pp. 36-42
A philosophy attending to the acceleration, expansion, irrationalities, interdependencies, and fragilities of late capitalism suggests that we do not know with confidence, in advance of experimental action,
just how far or fast changes in the systemic character of neoliberal capitalism can be made. The structures often seem solid and intractable, and indeed such a semblance may turn out to be true. Some may
seem solid, infinitely absorptive, and intractable when theyre in fact punctuated by hidden vulnerabilities, soft spots, uncertainties, and potential lines of flight that become appar- ent when they are
subjected to experimental action, upheaval, testing, and strain. Indeed no ecology of late capitalism, given the variety of forces to which it is connected by a thousand pulleys, vibrations, impingements,
de- pendencies, shocks, and threads, can specify with supreme confidence the solidity or potential flexibility of the structures it seeks to change. The strength of structural theory, at its best, was in
identifying, institutional intersections that hold a system together; its conceit, at its worst, was the claim to know in advance how resistant such intersections are to potential change. Without adopting the

it seems important to pursue possible sites of strategic action that might


opposite conceit,

open up room for productive change and . Today it seems important to attend to the relation be- tween the need for structural change

identification of multiple sites of potential action . You do not know precisely what you are doing when you participate in such a venture.
You combine an experimental temper with the appreciation that living and acting into the future inevitably contain a shifting quotient of uncertainty. The following tentative judgments and sites of action
may be pertinent. 1) Neither neoliberal theory, nor socialist productivism, nor deep ecology, nor social democracy in its classic form seems sufficient to the contemporary condition. This is so in part
because the powers of market self-regulation are both real and limited in relation to a larger multitude of heterogeneous force fields beyond the human estate with differential powers of self-regulation and
metamorphosis. A first task is to challenge neoliberal ideology through critique and by elaborating and publicizing positive alternatives that acknowledge the disparate relations between market processes,
other cultural systems, and nonhuman systems. Doing so to render the fragility of things more visible and palpable. Doing so, too, to set the stage for a series of interceded shifts in citizen role
performances, social movements, and state action. 2) Those who seek to reshape the ecology of late capitalism might set an interim agenda of radical reform and then recoil back on the initiatives to see
how they work. An interim agenda is the best thing to focus on because in a world of becoming the more distant future is too cloudy to engage. We must, for instance, become involved in experimental
micropolitics on a variety of fronts, as we participate in role experimentations, social movements, artistic displaces, erotic-political shows, electoral campaigns, and creative interventions on the new media
to help recode the ethos that now occupies investment practices, consumption desires, family savings, state priorities, church assemblies, university curricula, and media reporting. It is important to bear
in mind how extant ideologies, established role performances, social movements, and commitments to state action intersect. To shift some of our own role performances in the zones of travel, church
participation, home energy use, investment, and consumption, for instance, that now implicate us deeply in foreign oil dependence and the huge military expenditures that secure it, could make a minor
difference on its own and also lift some of the burdens of institutional implications from us to support participation in more adventurous interpretations, political strategies, demands upon the state, and
cross-state citizen actions. 3) Today perhaps the initial target, should be on reconstituting established patterns of consumption by a combination of direct citizen actions in consumption choices, publicity of
such actions, the organization of local collectives to modify consumption practices, and social movements to reconstitute the current state- and market-supported infrastructure of consumption. By the
infrastructure of consumption I mean publicly supported and subsidized market subsystems such as a national highway system, a system of airports, medical care through private insurance, agribusiness
pouring high sugar, salt, and fat content into foods, corporate ownership of the public media, the prominence of corporate 403 accounts over retirement pensions, and so forth that enable some modes of
consumption in the zones of travel, education, diet, retirement, medical care, energy use, health, and education and render others much more difficult or expensive to procure.22 To change the
infrastructure is also to shift the types of work and investment available. Social movements that work upon the infrastructure and ethos of consumption in tandem can thus make a real difference directly,
encourage more people to heighten their critical perspectives, and thereby open more people to a more militant politics if and as the next disruptive event emerges. Perhaps a cross-state citizen goal
should construct a pluralist assemblage by moving back and forth between experiments in role performances, the refinement of sensitive modes of perception, revisions in political ideology, and
adjustments in political sensibility; doing so to mobilize enough collective energy to launch a general strike simultaneously in several countries in the near future. The aim of such an event would be to
reverse the deadly future created by established patterns of climate change by fomenting significant shifts in patterns of consumption, corporate policies, state law, and the priorities of interstate
organizations. Again, the dilemma of today is that the fragility of things demands shifting and slowing down intrusions into several aspects of nature as we speed up shifts in identity; role performance,
cultural ethos, market regulation, and state policy.4) The existential forces of hubris (expressed above all in those confident drives to mastery conveyed by military elites, financial economists, financial
elites, and CEOs) and of ressentiment (expressed in some sectors of secularism and evangelicalism) now play roles of importance in the shape of consumption practices, investment portfolios, worker
routines, managerial demands, and the uneven senses of entitlement that constitute neoliberalism. For that reason activism inside churches, schools, street life, and the media must become increasingly
skilled and sensitive. As we proceed, some of us may present the themes of a world of becoming to larger audiences, challenging thereby the complementary notions of a providential world and secular
mastery that now infuse too many role performances, market practices, and state priorities in capitalist life. For existential dispositions do infuse the role priorities of late capitalism. Today it is both
difficult for people to perform the same roles with the same old innocence and difficult to challenge those performances amid our own implication in them. Drives by evangelists, the media,
neoconservatives, and the neoliberal right to draw a veil of innocence across the priorities of contemporary life make the situation much worse.5) The emergence of a neofascist or mafia-type capitalism
slinks as a dangerous possibility on the horizon, partly because of the expansion and intensification of capital, partly because of the real fragility of things, partly because the identity needs of many facing
these pressures encourage them to cling more intensely to a neoliberal imaginary as its bankruptcy becomes increasingly apparent, partly because so many in America insist upon retaining the special
world entitlements the country achieved after World War II in a world decreasingly favorable to them, partly because of the crisis tendencies inherent in neoliberal capitalism, and partly because so many
resist living evidence around and in them that challenges a couple of secular and theistic images of the cosmos now folded into the institutional life of capitalism. Indeed the danger is that those
constituencies now most disinclined to give close attention to public issues could oscillate between attraction to the mythic promises of neoliberal automaticity and attraction to a neofascist movement
when the next crisis unfolds. It has happened before. I am not saying that neoliberalism is itself a form of fascism, but that the failures and meltdowns it periodically promotes could once again foment

The
fascist or neofascist responses, as happened in several countries after the onset of the Great Depression. 6) state democratic , while it certainly cannot alone tame capital or re- constitute

the ethos and infrastructure of consumption, must play a significant role in reconstituting lived relations our to climate, weather, resource
use, ocean currents, bee survival, tectonic instability, glacier flows, species diversity, work, local life, consumption, and investment, as it also responds favorably to the public pressures we must generate
to forge a new ethos. A new, new left will thus experimentally enact new intersections be- tween role performance and political activity, outgrow its old disgust with the very idea of the state, and remain

A refusal to
alert to the dangers states can pose. It will do- so because, as already suggested, the fragile ecology of late capital requires state interventions of several sorts.

participate in the state today cedes too much hegemony to neoliberal markets , either

Drives to fascism,
explicitly or by implication. rose the last time in capitalist states after market
remember ,

meltdown . Most of those movements failed. But a couple became consolidated through a series of resonances (vibrations) back and forth between industrialists, the state, and vigilante

You do not fight the danger of a new kind of


groups in neighborhoods, clubs, churches, the police, the media, and pubs.

neofascism by withdrawing from either micropolitics or state politics. You do so through a multisited politics designed
to infuse a new ethos into the fabric of everyday life. Changes in ethos can in turn open doors to new possibilities of state and interstate action, so that an advance in one domain seeds that in the other.
And vice versa. A positive dynamic of mutual amplification might be generated here. Could a series of significant shifts in the routines of state and global capitalism even press the fractured system to a
point where it hovers on the edge of capitalism itself? We dont know. That is one reason it is important to focus on interim goals. Another is that in a world of becoming, replete with periodic and surprising
shifts in the course of events, you cannot project far beyond an interim period. Another yet is that activism needs to project concrete, interim possibilities to gain support and propel itself forward. That
being said, it does seem unlikely to me, at least, that a positive interim future includes either socialist productivism or the world projected by proponents of deep ecology. 7) To advance such an agenda it is
also imperative to negotiate new connections between nontheistic constituencies who care about the future of the Earth and numerous devotees of diverse religious traditions who fold positive
spiritualities into their creedal practices. The new, multifaceted movement needed today, if it emerges, will take the shape of a vibrant pluralist assemblage acting at multiple sites within and across states,
rather than either a centered movement with a series of fellow travelers attached to it or a mere electoral constellation. Electoral victories are important, but they work best when they touch priorities
already embedded in churches, universities, film, music, consumption practices, media reporting, investment priorities, and the like. A related thing to keep in mind is that the capitalist modes of
acceleration, expansion, and intensification that heighten the fra- gility of things today also generate pressures to minoritize the world along multiple dimensions at a more rapid pace than heretofore. A
new pluralist constellation will build upon the latter developments as it works to reduce the former effects.I am sure that the forgoing comments will appear to some as "optimistic" or "utopian." But
optimism and pessimism are both primarily spectatorial views. Neither seems sufficient to the contemporary condition. Indeed pessimism, if you dwell on it long, easily slides into cynicism, and cynicism
often plays into the hands of a right wing that applies exclusively to any set of state activities not designed to protect or coddle the corporate estate. That is one reason that "dysfunctional politics"

Pure
redounds so readily to the advantage of cynics on the right who work to promote it. They want to promote cynicism with respect to the state and innocence with respect to the market.

critique as already suggested, does not suffice either. Pure critique too readily
carries critics and their followers to the edge of cynicism . It is also true that the above critique concentrates on neoliberal
capital- ism, not capitalism writ large. That is because it seems to me that we need to specify the terms of critique as closely as possible and think first of all about interim responses. If we lived under, say,
Keynesian capitalism, a somewhat different set of issues would be defined and other strategies identified.25 Capitalism writ largewhile it sets a general context that neoliberalism inflects in specific ways
sets too large and generic a target. It can assume multiple forms, as the differences between Swedish and American capitalism suggest; the times demand a set of interim agendas targeting the

hegemonic form of today, pursued with heightened militancy at several sites. The point today is not to wait for a revolution that
overthrows the whole system . The "system," as we shall see further, is replete with too many loose ends, uneven edges, dicey intersections with nonhuman forces,

and uncertain trajectories to make such a wholesale project plausible. Besides, things are too urgent and too many people on the ground

are suffering too much now .