Categorical Propositions

Now that we've taken notice of many of the difficulties that can be caused by sloppy use of
ordinary language in argumentation, we're ready to begin the more precise study of deductive
reasoning. Here we'll achieve the greater precision by eliminating ambiguous words and
phrases from ordinary language and carefully defining those that remain. The basic strategy is
to create a narrowly restricted formal systeman artificial, rigidly structured logical language
within which the validity of deductive arguments can be discerned with ease. Only after we've
become familiar with this limited range of cases will we consider to what extent our ordinary-
language argumentation can be made to conform to its structure.
Our initial effort to pursue this strategy is the ancient but worthy method of categorical logic. This
approach was originally developed by Aristotle, codified in greater detail by medieval logicians,
and then interpreted mathematically by George Boole and John Venn in the nineteenth century.
Respected by many generations of philosophers as the the chief embodiment of deductive
reasoning, this logical system continues to be useful in a broad range of ordinary
circumstances.
Terms and Propositions
We'll start very simply, then work our way toward a higher level. The basic unit of meaning or
content in our new deductive system is the categorical term. Usually expressed grammatically
as a noun or noun phrase, each categorical term designates a class of things. Notice that these
are (deliberately) very broad notions: a categorical term may designate any classwhether it's
a natural species or merely an arbitrary collectionof things of any variety, real or imaginary.
Thus, "cows," "unicorns," "square circles," "philosophical concepts," "things weighing more than
fifty kilograms," and "times when the earth is nearer than 75 million miles from the sun," are all
categorical terms.
Notice also that each categorical term cleaves the world into exactly two mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive parts: those things to which the term applies and those things to which it does
not apply. For every class designated by a categorical term, there is another class,
its complement, that includes everything excluded from the original class, and this
complementary class can of course be designated by its own categorical term. Thus, "cows"
and "non-cows" are complementary classes, as are "things weighing more than fifty kilograms"
and "things weighing fifty kilograms or less." Everything in the world (in fact, everything we can
talk or think about) belongs either to the class designated by a categorical term or to its
complement; nothing is omitted.
Now let's use these simple building blocks to assemble something more interesting.
A categorical proposition joins together exactly two categorical terms and asserts that some
relationship holds between the classes they designate. (For our own convenience, we'll call the
term that occurs first in each categorical proposition its subject term and other its predicate
term.) Thus, for example, "All cows are mammals" and "Some philosophy teachers are young
mothers" are categorical propositions whose subject terms are "cows" and "philosophy
teachers" and whose predicate terms are "mammals" and "young mothers" respectively.
Each categorical proposition states that there is some logical relationship that holds between its
two terms. In this context, a categorical term is said to be distributed if that proposition provides
some information about every member of the class designated by that term. Thus, in our first
example above, "cows" is distributed because the proposition in which it occurs affirms that
each and every cow is also a mammal, but "mammals" is undistributed because the proposition
does not state anything about each and every member of that class. In the second example,
neither of the terms is distributed, since this proposition tells us only that the two classes overlap
to some (unstated) extent.
Quality and Quantity
Since we can always invent new categorical terms and consider the possible relationship of the
classes they designate, there are indefinitely many different individual categorical propositions.
But if we disregard the content of these propositions, what classes of things they're about, and
concentrate on their form, the general manner in which they conjoin their subject and predicate
terms, then we need only four distinct kinds of categorical proposition, distinguished from each
other only by their quality and quantity, in order to assert anything we like about the relationship
between two classes.
The quality of a categorical proposition indicates the nature of the relationship it affirms between
its subject and predicate terms: it is an affirmative proposition if it states that the class
designated by its subject term is included, either as a whole or only in part, within the class
designated by its predicate term, and it is a negative proposition if it wholly or partially excludes
members of the subject class from the predicate class. Notice that the predicate term is
distributed in every negative proposition but undistributed in all affirmative propositions.
The quantity of a categorical proposition, on the other hand, is a measure of the degree to which
the relationship between its subject and predicate terms holds: it is a universal proposition if the
asserted inclusion or exclusion holds for every member of the class designated by its subject
term, and it is a particular proposition if it merely asserts that the relationship holds for one or
more members of the subject class. Thus, you'll see that the subject term is distributed in all
universal propositions but undistributed in every particular proposition.
Combining these two distinctions and representing the subject and predicate terms respectively
by the letters "S" and "P," we can uniquely identify the four possible forms of categorical
proposition:
A universal affirmative proposition (to which, following the practice of medieval logicians,
we will refer by the letter "A") is of the form
All S are P.
Such a proposition asserts that every member of the class designated by the subject term is
also included in the class designated by the predicate term. Thus, it distributes its subject term
but not its predicate term.
A universal negative proposition (or "E") is of the form

No S are P.
This proposition asserts that nothing is a member both of the class designated by the subject
term and of the class designated by the predicate terms. Since it reports that every member of
each class is excluded from the other, this proposition distributes both its subject term and its
predicate term.
 A particular affirmative proposition ("I") is of the form

Some S are P.
A proposition of this form asserts that there is at least one thing which is a member both of the
class designated by the subject term and of the class designated by the predicate term. Both
terms are undistributed in propositions of this form.
Finally, a particular negative proposition ("O") is of the form

Some S are not P.

Such a proposition asserts that there is at least one thing which is a member of the class
designated by the subject term but not a member of the class designated by the predicate term.
Since it affirms that the one or more crucial things that they are distinct from each and every
member of the predicate class, a proposition of this form distributes its predicate term but not its
subject term.
Although the specific content of any actual categorical proposition depends upon the categorical
terms which occur as its subject and predicate, the logical form of the categorical proposition
must always be one of these four types.

The Square of Opposition

When two categorical propositions are of different forms but share exactly the same subject and
predicate terms, their truth is logically interdependent in a variety of interesting ways, all of
which are conveniently represented in the traditional "square of opposition."
"All S are P." (A)- - - - - - -(E) "No S are P."
|* *|
* *
| * * |
*
| * * |
* *
|* *|
"Some S are P." (I)--- --- ---(O) "Some S are not P."

Propositions that appear diagonally across from each other in this diagram (A and O on the one
hand and E and I on the other) are contradictories. No matter what their subject and predicate
terms happen to be (so long as they are the same in both) and no matter how the classes they
designate happen to be related to each other in fact, one of the propositions in each
contradictory pair must be true and the other false. Thus, for example, "No squirrels are
predators" and "Some squirrels are predators" are contradictories because either the classes
designated by the terms "squirrel" and "predator" have at least one common member (in which
case the I proposition is true and the E proposition is false) or they do not (in which case
the E is true and the I is false). In exactly the same sense, the A and O propositions, "All
senators are politicians" and "Some senators are not politicians" are also contradictories.
The universal propositions that appear across from each other at the top of the square
(A and E) are contraries. Assuming that there is at least one member of the class designated by
their shared subject term, it is impossible for both of these propositions to be true, although both
could be false. Thus, for example, "All flowers are colorful objects" and "No flowers are colorful
objects" are contraries: if there are any flowers, then either all of them are colorful (making
the A true and the E false) or none of them are (making the E true and the A false) or some of
them are colorful and some are not (making both the A and the E false).
Particular propositions across from each other at the bottom of the square (I and O), on the
other hand, are the subcontraries. Again assuming that the class designated by their subject
term has at least one member, it is impossible for both of these propositions to be false, but
possible for both to be true. "Some logicians are professors" and "Some logicians are not
professors" are subcontraries, for example, since if there any logicians, then either at least one
of them is a professor (making the I proposition true) or at least one is not a professor (making
the O true) or some are and some are not professors (making both the I and the O true).
Finally, the universal and particular propositions on either side of the square of opposition
(A and I on the one left and E and O on the right) exhibit a relationship known as subalternation.
Provided that there is at least one member of the class designated by the subject term they
have in common, it is impossible for the universal proposition of either quality to be true while
the particular proposition of the same quality is false. Thus, for example, if it is universally true
that "All sheep are ruminants", then it must also hold for each particular case, so that "Some
sheep are ruminants" is true, and if "Some sheep are ruminants" is false, then "All sheep are
ruminants" must also be false, always on the assumption that there is at least one sheep. The
same relationships hold for corresponding E and O propositions.