1/25/2017 CerezovsTuazon:141538:March23,2004:J.

Carpio:FirstDivision:Decision

FIRSTDIVISION

[G.R.No.141538.March23,2004]

HermanaR.Cerezo,petitioner,vs.DavidTuazon,respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO,J.:

TheCase

[1] [2]
Thisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorari toannultheResolution dated21October1999ofthe
CourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.53572,aswellasitsResolutiondated20January2000denying
the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of the
[3]
Decision dated30May1995renderedbytheRegionalTrialCourtofAngelesCity,Branch56(trial
court),inCivilCaseNo.7415.ThetrialcourtorderedpetitionerHermanaR.Cerezo(Mrs.Cerezo)to
payrespondentDavidTuazon(Tuazon)actualdamages,lossofearnings,moraldamages,andcosts
ofsuit.

AntecedentFacts

Aroundnoontimeof26June1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger bus with plate number NYA
241collidedwithatricyclebearingplatenumberTCRV126alongCaptainM.PaloStreet,Sta.Ines,
Mabalacat, Pampanga. On 1 October 1993, tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages
againstMrs.Cerezo,asownerofthebusline,herhusbandAttorneyJuanCerezo(Atty.Cerezo),and
busdriverDaniloA.Foronda(Foronda).Thecomplaintallegedthat:

7.Atthetimeoftheincident,plaintiff[Tuazon]wasinhisproperlanewhenthesecondnameddefendant
[Foronda],beingthenthedriverandpersoninchargeoftheCountryBuswithplatenumberNYA241,didthen
andtherewillfully,unlawfully,andfeloniouslyoperatethesaidmotorvehicleinanegligent,careless,and
imprudentmannerwithoutdueregardtotrafficrulesandregulations,therebeingaSlowDownsignnearthe
sceneoftheincident,andwithouttakingthenecessaryprecautiontopreventlossoflivesorinjuries,his
negligence,carelessnessandimprudenceresultedtoseveredamagetothetricycleandseriousphysicalinjuries
toplaintiffthusmakinghimunabletowalkandbecomingdisabled,withhisthumbandmiddlefingerontheleft
[4]
handbeingcut[.]

On 1 October 1993, Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a pauper. Subsequently, the trial court
issuedsummonsagainstAtty.CerezoandMrs.Cerezo(theCerezospouses)attheMakati address
statedinthecomplaint.However,thesummonswasreturnedunservedon10November1993asthe
CerezospousesnolongerheldofficenorresidedinMakati.On18April1994, the trial court issued
aliassummonsagainsttheCerezospousesattheiraddressinBarangaySta.Maria,Camiling,Tarlac.
Thealiassummonsandacopyofthecomplaintwerefinallyservedon20April1994attheofficeof
Atty.Cerezo,whowasthenworkingasTarlacProvincialProsecutor.Atty.Cerezoreactedangrilyon
learning of the service of summons upon his person. Atty. Cerezo allegedly told Sheriff William
Canlas: Punyeta, ano ang gusto mong mangyari? Gusto mong hindi ka makalabas ng buhay dito?
[5]
Teritoryokoito.Walakasateritoryomo.
TherecordsshowthattheCerezospousesparticipatedintheproceedingsbeforethetrialcourt.
TheCerezospousesfiledacommentwithmotionforbillofparticularsdated29April1994andareply
[6]
tooppositiontocommentwithmotiondated13June1994. On1August1994,thetrialcourtissued
an order directing the Cerezo spouses to file a comment to the opposition to the bill of particulars.
Atty. Elpidio B. Valera (Atty. Valera) of Valera and Valera Law Offices appeared on behalf of the
Cerezo spouses. On 29 August 1994, Atty. Valera filed an urgent exparte motion praying for the
resolution of Tuazons motion to litigate as a pauper and for the issuance of new summons on the
[7]
CerezospousestosatisfyproperserviceinaccordancewiththeRulesofCourt.
On 30 August 1994, the trial court issued an order resolving Tuazons motion to litigate as a
pauperandtheCerezospousesurgentexpartemotion.Theorderreads:

AtthehearingonAugust30,1994,theplaintiff[Tuazon]testifiedthatheispresentlyjoblessthatatthetimeof
thefilingofthiscase,hissonwhoisworkinginMalaysiahelpshimandsendshimonceinawhileP300.00a
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month,andthathedoesnothaveanyrealproperty.AttachedtotheMotiontoLitigateasPauperarehis
AffidavitthatheisunemployedaCertificationbytheBarangayCaptainofhispoblacionthathisincomeisnot
enoughforhisfamilyssubsistenceandaCertificationbytheOfficeoftheMunicipalAssessorthathehasno
landholdingintheMunicipalityofMabalacat,ProvinceofPampanga.

TheCourtissatisfiedfromtheunrebuttedtestimonyoftheplaintiffthatheisentitledtoprosecutehiscomplaint
inthiscaseasapauperunderexistingrules.

Ontheotherhand,theCourtdeniestheprayerintheAppearanceandUrgentExParteMotionrequiringnew
summonstobeservedtothedefendants.TheCourtisoftheopinionthatanyinfirmityintheserviceofthe
summonstothedefendantbeforeplaintiffwasallowedtoprosecutehiscomplaintinthiscaseasapauperhas
beencuredbythisOrder.

Ifwithin15daysfromreceiptofthisOrder,thedefendantsdonotquestiononappealthisOrderofthisCourt,
[8]
theCourtshallproceedtoresolvetheMotionforBillofParticulars.

On27September1994,theCerezospousesfiledanurgentexpartemotionforreconsideration.
Thetrialcourtdeniedthemotionforreconsideration.
On14November1994, the trial court issued an order directing the Cerezo spouses to file their
answerwithinfifteendaysfromreceiptoftheorder.TheCerezospousesdidnotfileananswer.On27
January1995,TuazonfiledamotiontodeclaretheCerezospousesindefault.On6February1995,
the trial court issued an order declaring the Cerezo spouses in default and authorizing Tuazon to
[9]
presenthisevidence.
On30May1995,afterconsideringTuazonstestimonialanddocumentaryevidence,thetrialcourt
ruled in Tuazons favor.The trial court made no pronouncement on Forondas liability because there
wasnoserviceofsummonsonhim.ThetrialcourtdidnotholdAtty.CerezoliableasTuazonfailedto
showthatMrs.Cerezosbusinessbenefitedthefamily,pursuanttoArticle121(3)oftheFamilyCode.
ThetrialcourtheldMrs.CerezosolelyliableforthedamagessustainedbyTuazonarisingfromthe
negligence of Mrs. Cerezos employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The dispositive
portionofthetrialcourtsdecisionreads:

WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrenderedorderingthedefendantHermanaCerezotopaytheplaintiff:

a)ForActualDamages
1)Expensesforoperationandmedical
TreatmentP69,485.35
2)Costofrepairofthetricycle39,921.00
b)Forlossofearnings43,300.00
c)Formoraldamages20,000.00
d)Andtopaythecostofthesuit.

Thedocketfeesandotherexpensesinthefilingofthissuitshallbelienonwhateverjudgmentmayberendered
infavoroftheplaintiff.
[10]
SOORDERED.

Mrs.Cerezoreceivedacopyofthedecisionon25June1995.On10July1995,Mrs.Cerezofiled
beforethetrialcourtapetitionforrelieffromjudgmentonthegroundsoffraud,mistakeorexcusable
negligence. Testifying before the trial court, both Mrs. Cerezo and Atty. Valera denied receipt of
noticesofhearingsandofordersofthecourt.Atty.Valeraaddedthathereceivednonoticebeforeor
during the 8 May 1995 elections, when he was a senatorial candidate for the KBL Party, and very
busy,usinghisofficeandresidenceasPartyNationalHeadquarters.Atty.Valeraclaimedthathewas
[11]
abletoreadthedecisionofthetrialcourtonlyafterMrs.Cerezosenthimacopy.
Tuazon did not testify but presented documentary evidence to prove the participation of the
Cerezospousesinthecase.Tuazonpresentedthefollowingexhibits:
Exhibit1Sheriffsreturnandsummons
Exhibit1AAliassummonsdatedApril20,1994
Exhibit2CommentwithMotion
Exhibit3MinutesofthehearingheldonAugust1,1994
Exhibit3ASignatureofdefendantscounsel
Exhibit4MinutesofthehearingheldonAugust30,1994
Exhibit4ASignatureofthedefendantscounsel
Exhibit5AppearanceandUrgentExParteMotion
Exhibit6OrderdatedNovember14,1994
Exhibit6APostalcertificationdatedJanuary13,1995
Exhibit7OrderdatedFebruary[illegible]
Exhibit7ACourtsreturnslipaddressedtoAtty.Elpidio

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Valera
Exhibit7BCourtsreturnslipaddressedtoSpousesJuan
andHermanaCerezo
Exhibit8DecisiondatedMay[30],1995
Exhibit8ACourtsreturnslipaddressedtodefendantHermana
Cerezo
Exhibit8BCourtsreturnslipaddressedtodefendantscounsel,
Atty.ElpidioValera
Exhibit9OrderdatedSeptember21,1995
Exhibit9ASecondPageofExhibit9
Exhibit9BThirdpageofExhibit9
Exhibit9CFourthpageofExhibit9
Exhibit9DCourtsreturnslipaddressedtoAtty.ElpidioValera
and
Exhibit9ECourtsreturnslipaddressedtoplaintiffscounsel,
[12]
Atty.NormanDickdeGuzman.
[13]
On4March1998,thetrialcourtissuedanorder denyingthepetitionforrelieffromjudgment.
Thetrialcourtstatedthathavingreceivedthedecisionon25June1995,theCerezospousesshould
havefiledanoticeofappealinsteadofresortingtoapetitionforrelieffromjudgment.Thetrialcourt
refusedtograntrelieffromjudgmentbecausetheCerezospousescouldhaveavailedoftheremedy
of appeal. Moreover, the Cerezo spouses not only failed to prove fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence by conclusive evidence, they also failed to prove that they had a good and
substantial defense. The trial court noted that the Cerezo spouses failed to appeal because they
reliedonanexpectedsettlementofthecase.
TheCerezospousessubsequentlyfiledbeforetheCourtofAppealsapetitionforcertiorariunder
[14]
Section1ofRule65.ThepetitionwasdocketedasCAG.R.SPNo.48132. Thepetitionquestioned
whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case considering there was no service of
summons on Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses claimed was an indispensable party. In a
[15]
resolution dated 21 January 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari and
affirmed the trial courts order denying the petition for relief from judgment. The Court of Appeals
declared that the Cerezo spouses failure to file an answer was due to their own negligence,
consideringthattheycontinuedtoparticipateintheproceedingswithoutfilingananswer.Therewas
alsonothingintherecordstoshowthattheCerezospousesactuallyofferedareasonablesettlement
toTuazon.TheCourtofAppealsalsodeniedCerezospousesmotionforreconsiderationforlackof
merit.
TheCerezospousesfiledbeforethisCourtapetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule45.Atty.
Cerezo himself signed the petition, docketed as G.R. No. 137593. On 13 April 1999, this Court
rendered a resolution denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure to attach an affidavit of
serviceofcopiesofthepetitiontotheCourtofAppealsandtotheadverseparties.Evenifthepetition
compliedwiththisrequirement,theCourtwouldstillhavedeniedthepetitionastheCerezospouses
failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error. The Courts resolution was
enteredintheBookofEntriesandJudgmentswhenitbecamefinalandexecutoryon28June1999.
[16]

Undaunted, the Cerezo spouses filed before the Court of Appeals on 6 July 1999 a petition for
annulmentofjudgmentunderRule47withprayerforrestrainingorder.Atty.ValeraandAtty.Dionisio
[17]
S.Daga(Atty.Daga)representedMrs.Cerezointhepetition,docketedasCAG.R.SPNo.53572.
The petition prayed for the annulment of the 30 May 1995 decision of the trial court and for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining execution of the trial courts decision pending
resolutionofthepetition.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of judgment in a resolution dated 21
October1999.Theresolutionreadsinpart:

Inthiscase,recordsshowthatthepetitionerpreviouslyfiledwiththelowercourtaPetitionforRelieffrom
Judgmentonthegroundthattheywerewrongfullydeclaredindefaultwhilewaitingforanamicablesettlement
ofthecomplaintfordamages.Thecourtaquocorrectlyruledthatsuchpetitioniswithoutmerit.Thedefendant
spousesadmitthatduringtheinitialhearingtheyappearedbeforethecourtandevenmentionedtheneedforan
amicablesettlement.Thus,thelowercourtacquiredjurisdictionoverthedefendantspouses.

Therefore,petitionerhavingavailedofapetitionforrelief,theremedyofanannulmentofjudgmentisnolonger
available.Theproperactionforthepetitioneristoappealtheorderofthelowercourtdenyingthepetitionfor
relief.

Wherefore,theinstantpetitioncouldnotbegivenduecourseandshouldaccordinglybedismissed.
[18]
SOORDERED.
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On20January2000,theCourtofAppealsdeniedtheCerezospousesmotionforreconsideration.
[19]
TheCourtofAppealsstated:

Adistinctionshouldbemadebetweenacourtsjurisdictionoverapersonanditsjurisdictionoverthesubject
matterofacase.Theformerisacquiredbytheproperserviceofsummonsorbythepartiesvoluntary
appearancewhilethelatterisconferredbylaw.

Resolvingthematterofjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter,Section19(1)ofB[atas]P[ambansa]129provides
thatRegionalTrialCourtsshallexerciseexclusiveoriginaljurisdictioninallcivilactionsinwhichthesubjectof
thelitigationisincapableofpecuniaryestimation.Thusitwasproperforthelowercourttodecidetheinstant
casefordamages.

Unlikejurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterofacasewhichisabsoluteandconferredbylawanydefects[sic]in
theacquisitionofjurisdictionoveraperson(i.e.,improperfilingofcivilcomplaintorimproperserviceof
summons)maybewaivedbythevoluntaryappearanceofparties.

ThelowercourtadmitsthefactthatnosummonswasservedondefendantForonda.Thus,jurisdictionoverthe
personofdefendantForondawasnotacquired,forwhichreasonhewasnotheldliableinthiscase.However,it
hasbeenproventhatjurisdictionovertheotherdefendantswasvalidlyacquiredbythecourtaquo.

Thedefendantspousesadmittohavingappearedintheinitialhearingsandinthehearingforplaintiffsmotionto
litigateasapauper.Theyevenmentionedconferenceswhereattemptsweremadetoreachanamicable
settlementwithplaintiff.However,thepossibilityofamicablesettlementisnotagoodandsubstantialdefense
whichwillwarrantthegrantingofsaidpetition.

xxx

Assumingarguendothatprivaterespondentfailedtoreservehisrighttoinstituteaseparateactionfordamages
inthecriminalaction,thepetitionercannotnowraisesuchissueandquestionthelowercourtsjurisdiction
becausepetitionerandherhusbandhavewaivedsuchrightbyvoluntarilyappearinginthecivilcasefor
damages.Therefore,thefindingsandthedecisionofthelowercourtmaybindthem.

RecordsshowthatthepetitionerpreviouslyfiledwiththelowercourtaPetitionforRelieffromJudgmentonthe
groundthattheywerewrongfullydeclaredindefaultwhilewaitingforanamicablesettlementofthecomplaint
fordamages.Thecourtaquocorrectlyruledthatsuchpetitioniswithoutmerit,jurisdictionhavingbeen
acquiredbythevoluntaryappearanceofdefendantspouses.

Onceagain,itbearsstressingthathavingavailedofapetitionforrelief,theremedyofannulmentofjudgmentis
nolongeravailable.

Basedontheforegoing,themotionforreconsiderationcouldnotbegivenduecourseandisherebyDENIED.
[20]
SOORDERED.

TheIssues

On 7 February 2000, Mrs. Cerezo, this time with Atty. Daga alone representing her, filed the
presentpetitionforreviewoncertioraribeforethisCourt.Mrs.Cerezoclaimsthat:
1.IndismissingthePetitionforAnnulmentofJudgment,theCourtofAppealsassumesthattheissues
raisedinthepetitionforannulmentisbasedonextrinsicfraudrelatedtothedeniedpetitionforrelief
notwithstandingthatthegroundsrelieduponinvolvesquestionsoflackofjurisdiction.
2. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment, the Court of Appeals disregarded the allegation that the
lowercourt[s]findingsofnegligenceagainstdefendantdriverDaniloForonda[whom]thelowercourt
did not summon is null and void for want of due process and consequently, such findings of
negligence which is [sic] null and void cannot become the basis of the lower court to adjudge
petitioneremployerliableforcivildamages.
3.IndismissingthePetitionforAnnulment,theCourtofAppealsignoredtheallegationthatdefendant
driver Danilo A. Foronda whose negligence is the main issue is an indispensable party whose
presenceiscompulsorybut[whom]thelowercourtdidnotsummon.
4. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment, the Court of Appeals ruled that assuming arguendo that
privaterespondentfailedtoreservehisrighttoinstituteaseparateactionfordamagesinthecriminal
action,thepetitionercannotnowraisesuchissueandquestionthelowercourtsjurisdictionbecause
petitioner [has] waived such right by voluntarily appearing in the civil case for damages
[21]
notwithstandingthatlackofjurisdictioncannotbewaived.

TheCourtsRuling

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Thepetitionhasnomerit.Astheissuesareinterrelated,weshalldiscussthemjointly.
RemediesAvailable
toaPartyDeclaredinDefault
Anexaminationoftherecordsoftheentireproceedingsshowsthatthreelawyersfiledandsigned
pleadingsonbehalfofMrs.Cerezo,namely,Atty.Daga,Atty.Valera,andAtty.Cerezo.Despite their
number,Mrs.Cerezoscounselsfailedtoavailoftheproperremedies.Itiseitherbysheerignorance
orbymaliciousmanipulationoflegaltechnicalitiesthattheyhavemanagedtodelaythedispositionof
thepresentcase,tothedetrimentofpauperlitigantTuazon.
Mrs. Cerezo claims she did not receive any copy of the order declaring the Cerezo spouses in
default.Mrs.Cerezoassertsthatsheonlycametoknowofthedefaultorderon25June1995,when
shereceivedacopyofthedecision.On10July1995,Mrs.Cerezofiledbeforethetrialcourtapetition
forrelieffromjudgmentunderRule38,allegingfraud,mistake,orexcusablenegligenceasgrounds.
On4March1998,thetrialcourtdeniedMrs.Cerezospetitionforrelieffromjudgment.Thetrialcourt
statedthatMrs.Cerezocouldhaveavailedofappealasaremedyandthatshefailedtoprovethatthe
judgment was entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.Mrs. Cerezo then
filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65 assailing the
denialofthepetitionforrelieffromjudgment.On21January1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed
Mrs. Cerezos petition. On 24 February 1999, the appellate court denied Mrs. Cerezos motion for
reconsideration. On 11 March 1999, Mrs. Cerezo filed before this Court a petition for review on
certiorariunderRule45,questioningthedenialofthepetitionforrelieffromjudgment.Wedeniedthe
petitionandourresolutionbecamefinalandexecutoryon28June1999.
On6July1999,amereeightdaysafterourresolutionbecamefinalandexecutory,Mrs.Cerezo
filedbeforetheCourtofAppealsapetitionforannulmentofthejudgmentofthetrialcourtunderRule
47.Meanwhile,on25August1999,thetrialcourtissuedovertheobjectionofMrs.Cerezoanorderof
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 7415. On 21 October 1999, the Court of Appeals
dismissedthepetitionforannulmentofjudgment.On20January2000,theCourtofAppealsdenied
Mrs.Cerezosmotionforreconsideration.On7February2000,Mrs.Cerezofiledthepresentpetition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the dismissal of her petition for annulment of
judgment.
[22]
Linav.CourtofAppeals enumeratestheremediesavailabletoapartydeclaredindefault:
a)Thedefendantindefaultmay,atanytimeafterdiscoverythereofandbeforejudgment,fileamotion
underoathtosetasidetheorderofdefaultonthegroundthathisfailuretoanswerwasdueto
fraud,accident,mistakeorexcusablenegligence,andthathehasameritoriousdefense(Sec.3,Rule
18[nowSec.3(b),Rule9])
b)Ifthejudgmenthasalreadybeenrenderedwhenthedefendantdiscoveredthedefault,butbeforethe
samehasbecomefinalandexecutory,hemayfileamotionfornewtrialunderSection1(a)ofRule
37
c)Ifthedefendantdiscoveredthedefaultafterthejudgmenthasbecomefinalandexecutory,hemayfile
apetitionforreliefunderSection2[nowSection1]ofRule38and
d)Hemayalsoappealfromthejudgmentrenderedagainsthimascontrarytotheevidenceortothe
law,evenifnopetitiontosetasidetheorderofdefaulthasbeenpresentedbyhim(Sec.2,Rule41).
(Emphasisadded)
Moreover,apetitionforcertioraritodeclarethenullityofajudgmentbydefaultisalsoavailableif
thetrialcourtimproperlydeclaredapartyindefault,orevenifthetrialcourtproperlydeclaredaparty
[23]
indefault,ifgraveabuseofdiscretionattendedsuchdeclaration.
Mrs. Cerezo admitted that she received a copy of the trial courts decision on 25 June 1995.
Based on this admission, Mrs. Cerezo had at least three remedies at her disposal: an appeal, a
motionfornewtrial,orapetitionforcertiorari.
[24]
Mrs.CerezocouldhaveappealedunderRule41 fromthedefaultjudgmentwithin15daysfrom
noticeofthejudgment.ShecouldhaveavailedofthepoweroftheCourtofAppealstotrycasesand
conducthearings,receiveevidence,andperformallactsnecessarytoresolvefactualissuesraisedin
[25]
casesfallingwithinitsappellatejurisdiction.
[26]
Mrs.CerezoalsohadtheoptiontofileunderRule37 amotionfornewtrialwithintheperiodfor
takinganappeal.Ifthetrialcourtgrantsanewtrial,theoriginaljudgmentisvacated,andtheaction
will stand for trial de novo. The recorded evidence taken in the former trial, as far as the same is
material and competent to establish the issues, shall be used at the new trial without retaking the
[27]
same.
[28]
Mrs.CerezoalsohadthealternativeoffilingunderRule65 apetitionforcertiorariassailingthe
orderofdefaultwithin60daysfromnoticeofthejudgment.Anorderofdefaultisinterlocutory,andan
[29]
aggrievedpartymayfileanappropriatespecialcivilactionunderRule65. Inapetitionforcertiorari,
theappellatecourtmaydeclarevoidboththeorderofdefaultandthejudgmentofdefault.
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Clearly, Mrs. Cerezo had every opportunity to avail of these remedies within the reglementary
periodsprovidedundertheRulesofCourt.However,Mrs.Cerezooptedtofileapetitionforrelieffrom
judgment,whichisavailableonlyinexceptionalcases.Apetitionforrelieffromjudgmentshouldbe
filedwithinthereglementaryperiodof60daysfromknowledgeofjudgmentandsixmonthsfromentry
ofjudgment,pursuantto
[30] [31]
Rule38oftheRulesofCivilProcedure. Tuasonv.CourtofAppeals explainedthenature
ofapetitionforrelieffromjudgment:

Whenapartyhasanotherremedyavailabletohim,whichmayeitherbeamotionfornewtrialorappealfroman
adversedecisionofthetrialcourt,andhewasnotpreventedbyfraud,accident,mistakeorexcusablenegligence
fromfilingsuchmotionortakingsuchappeal,hecannotavailhimselfofthispetition.Indeed,reliefwillnotbe
grantedtoapartywhoseeksavoidancefromtheeffectsofthejudgmentwhenthelossoftheremedyatlawwas
duetohisownnegligenceotherwisethepetitionforreliefcanbeusedtorevivetherighttoappealwhichhas
beenlostthruinexcusablenegligence.

Evidently, there was no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that prevented Mrs.
Cerezofromfilinganappeal,amotionfornewtrialorapetitionforcertiorari.It waserrorforher to
availofapetitionforrelieffromjudgment.
After our resolution denying Mrs. Cerezos petition for relief became final and executory, Mrs.
Cerezo, in her last ditch attempt to evade liability, filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
annulmentofthejudgmentofthetrialcourt.Annulmentisavailableonlyonthegroundsofextrinsic
fraudandlackofjurisdiction.Ifbasedonextrinsicfraud,apartymustfilethepetitionwithinfouryears
from its discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before laches or estoppel bars the petition.
Extrinsicfraudisnotavalidgroundifsuchfraudwasusedasaground,orcouldhavebeenusedasa
[32]
ground,inamotionfornewtrialorpetitionforrelieffromjudgment.
Mrs. Cerezo insists that lack of jurisdiction, not extrinsic fraud, was her ground for filing the
petition for annulment of judgment. However, a party may avail of the remedy of annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 only if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
[33]
judgment,orotherappropriateremediesarenolongeravailablethroughnofaultoftheparty. Mrs.
Cerezocouldhaveavailedofanewtrialorappealbutthroughherownfaultsheerroneouslyavailed
oftheremedyofapetitionforrelief,whichwasdeniedwithfinality.Thus,Mrs.Cerezomaynolonger
availoftheremedyofannulment.
In any event, the trial court clearly acquired jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezos person.Mrs. Cerezo
actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court, submitting herself to the jurisdiction of
thetrialcourt.Thedefenseoflackofjurisdictionfailsinlightofheractiveparticipationinthetrialcourt
proceedings.Estoppelorlachesmayalsobarlackofjurisdictionasagroundfornullityespeciallyif
raisedforthefirsttimeonappealbyapartywhoparticipatedintheproceedingsbeforethetrialcourt,
[34]
aswhathappenedinthiscase.
For these reasons, the present petition should be dismissed for utter lack of merit. The
extraordinaryactiontoannulafinaljudgmentisrestrictedtothegroundsspecifiedintherules.The
reasonfortherestrictionistopreventthisextraordinaryactionfrombeingusedbyalosingpartyto
make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory.
There would be no end to litigation if parties who have unsuccessfully availed of any of the
appropriate remedies or lost them through their fault could still bring an action for annulment of
[35]
judgment. Nevertheless, we shall discuss the issues raised in the present petition to clear any
doubtaboutthecorrectnessofthedecisionofthetrialcourt.
Mrs.CerezosLiabilityandthe
TrialCourtsAcquisitionofJurisdiction

Mrs. Cerezo contends that the basis of the present petition for annulment is lack of jurisdiction.
Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly render judgment since it failed to acquire
jurisdictionoverForonda.Mrs.CerezopointsoutthattherewasnoserviceofsummonsonForonda.
Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for damages in the
criminalaction.Suchcontentionbetraysafaultyfoundation.Mrs.Cerezoscontentionproceedsfrom
thepointofviewofcriminallawandnotofcivillaw,whilethebasisofthepresentactionofTuazonis
quasidelictundertheCivilCode,notdelictundertheRevisedPenalCode.
The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasidelict under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.Anaggrievedpartymaychoosebetweenthetworemedies.Anactionbasedonaquasidelict
[36]
mayproceedindependentlyfromthecriminalaction. Thereis,however,adistinctionbetweencivil
liabilityarisingfromadelictandcivilliabilityarisingfromaquasidelict.Thechoiceofremedy,whether
[37]
tosueforadelictoraquasidelict,affectstheproceduralandjurisdictionalissuesoftheaction.
Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasidelict. In his complaint, Tuazon
alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, without exercising due care and diligence in the supervision and
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management of her employees and buses, hired Foronda as her driver. Tuazon became disabled
becauseofForondasrecklessness,grossnegligenceandimprudence,aggravatedbyMrs.Cerezos
lackofduecareanddiligenceintheselectionandsupervisionofheremployees,particularlyForonda.
[38]

The trial court thus found Mrs. Cerezo liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Article 2180
statesinpart:

Employersshallbeliableforthedamagescausedbytheiremployeesandhouseholdhelpersactingwithinthe
scopeoftheirassignedtasks,eventhoughtheformerarenotengagedinanybusinessorindustry.

Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. An
indispensablepartyisonewhoseinterestisaffectedbythecourtsactioninthelitigation,andwithout
[39]
whomnofinalresolutionofthecaseispossible. However,Mrs.Cerezosliabilityasanemployerin
an action for a quasidelict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an
indispensablepartytothefinalresolutionofTuazonsactionfordamagesagainstMrs.Cerezo.
[40]
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasidelict is solidary. Where
thereisasolidaryobligationonthepartofdebtors,asinthiscase,eachdebtorisliablefortheentire
obligation.Hence,eachdebtorisliabletopayfortheentireobligationinfull.There is no merger or
[41]
renunciationofrights,butonlymutualrepresentation. Wheretheobligationofthepartiesissolidary,
eitherofthepartiesisindispensable,andtheotherisnotevenanecessarypartybecausecomplete
[42]
reliefisavailablefromeither. Therefore,jurisdictionoverForondaisnotevennecessaryasTuazon
maycollectdamagesfromMrs.Cerezoalone.
Moreover,anemployersliabilitybasedonaquasidelictisprimaryanddirect,whiletheemployers
[43]
liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words primary and direct, as contrasted with
subsidiary,refertotheremedyprovidedbylawforenforcingtheobligationratherthantothecharacter
[44]
andlimitsoftheobligation. AlthoughliabilityunderArticle2180originatesfromthenegligentactof
the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes
damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not
preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is
civillyliableinasubsidiarycapacityfortheemployeescriminalnegligence,theemployerisalsocivilly
liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in
selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the employers liability is solely subsidiary is
[45]
wrong.

Theactioncanbebroughtdirectlyagainstthepersonresponsible(foranother),withoutincludingtheauthorof
theact.Theactionagainsttheprincipalisaccessoryinthesensethatitimpliestheexistenceofaprejudicialact
committedbytheemployee,butitisnotsubsidiaryinthesensethatitcannotbeinstitutedtillafterthe
judgmentagainsttheauthoroftheactoratleast,thatitissubsidiarytotheprincipalactiontheactionfor
[46]
responsibility(oftheemployer)isinitselfaprincipalaction.

Thus,thereisnoneedinthiscaseforthetrialcourttoacquirejurisdictionoverForonda.Thetrial
courtsacquisitionofjurisdictionoverMrs.Cerezoissufficienttodisposeofthepresentcaseonthe
merits.
Incontrast,anactionbasedonadelictseekstoenforcethesubsidiaryliabilityoftheemployerfor
thecriminalnegligenceoftheemployeeasprovidedinArticle103oftheRevisedPenalCode.Tohold
theemployerliableinasubsidiarycapacityunderadelict,theaggrievedpartymustinitiateacriminal
[47]
actionwheretheemployeesdelictandcorrespondingprimaryliabilityareestablished. Ifthepresent
action proceeds from a delict, then the trial courts jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However,
thepresentactionisclearlyforthequasidelictofMrs.CerezoandnotforthedelictofForonda.
TheCerezospouses contention that summons be served anew on themisuntenableinlightof
theirparticipationinthetrialcourtproceedings.ToupholdtheCerezospousescontentionwouldmake
[48]
a fetish of a technicality. Moreover, any irregularity in the service of summons that might have
vitiatedthetrialcourtsjurisdictionoverthepersonsoftheCerezospouseswasdeemedwaivedwhen
[49]
theCerezospousesfiledapetitionforrelieffromjudgment.
We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction and was competent to decide the case in favor of
Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezo even in the absence of Foronda. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos
contention, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the present case. It is not even necessary for
Tuazon to reserve the filing of a separate civil action because he opted to file a civil action for
damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable for her own civil negligence. The
wordsofJusticeJorgeBocoboinBarredov.Garciastillholdtruetodayasmuchasitdidin1942:

xxx[T]oholdthatthereisonlyonewaytomakedefendantsliabilityeffective,andthatis,tosuethedriverand
exhausthis(thelatters)propertyfirst,wouldbetantamounttocompellingtheplaintifftofollowadeviousand

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cumbersomemethodofobtainingrelief.True,thereissucharemedyunderourlaws,butthereisalsoamore
expeditiousway,whichisbasedontheprimaryanddirectresponsibilityofthedefendantunderarticle[2180]of
theCivilCode.Ourviewofthelawismorelikelytofacilitateremedyforcivilwrongs,becausetheprocedure
indicatedbythedefendantiswastefulandproductiveofdelay,itbeingamatterofcommonknowledgethat
professionaldriversoftaxisandothersimilarpublicconveyancesdonothavesufficientmeanswithwhichto
paydamages.Why,then,shouldtheplaintiffberequiredinallcasestogothroughthisroundabout,unnecessary,
andprobablyuselessprocedure?Inconstruingthelaws,courtshaveendeavoredtoshortenandfacilitatethe
[50]
pathwaysofrightandjustice.

Interestattherateof6%perannumisdueontheamountofdamagesadjudgedbythetrialcourt.
[51]
The6%perannuminterestshallcommencefrom30May1995,thedateofthedecisionofthetrial
court.Uponfinalityofthisdecision,interestat12%perannum,inlieuof6%perannum,isdueonthe
amountofdamagesadjudgedbythetrialcourtuntilfullpayment.
WHEREFORE,weDENYtheinstantpetitionforreview.TheResolutiondated21October1999of
the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 53572, as well as its Resolution dated 20 January 2000
denyingthemotionforreconsideration,isAFFIRMEDwiththeMODIFICATIONthattheamountdue
shall earn legal interest at 6% perannum computed from 30 May 1995, the date of the trial courts
decision.Uponfinalityofthisdecision,theamountdueshallearninterestat12%perannum,inlieuof
6%perannum,untilfullpayment.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,(Chairman),YnaresSantiago,andAzcuna,JJ.,concur.
Panganiban,J.,onofficialleave.

[1]
UnderRule45oftheRulesofCourt.
[2]
PennedbyAssociateJusticeElviJohnS.Asuncion,withAssociateJusticesEubuloG.VerzolaandArtemioG.Tuquero,
concurring.
[3]
PennedbyJudgeCarlosD.Rustia.
[4]
CARollo,p.8.
[5]
Ibid.,pp.1317.
[6]
Rollo,p.66.
[7]
CARollo,pp.1820.
[8]
Ibid.,p.21.
[9]
Rollo,p.4.
[10]
CARollo,p.23.
[11]
Ibid.,pp.2433.
[12]
Ibid.,pp.3536.
[13]
PennedbyJudgeLourdesF.Gatbalite.
[14]
Captioned Hermana R. Cerezo and Juan D. Cerezo, as husband, petitioners, v. Hon. Lourdes Gatbalite and David
Tuazon,respondents.
[15]
Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner, with Associate Justices Angelina SandovalGutierrez and Martin S.
Villarama,Jr.,concurring.
[16]
Rollo,pp.6061.
[17]
Captioned Hermana R. Cerezo and Juan D. Cerezo, as husband, petitioners, v. Lourdes Gatbalite, Presiding Judge
(incumbent),RTCBranch56,AngelesCity,andDavidTuazon,respondents.
[18]
Rollo,pp.3637.
[19]
Ibid.,pp.3334.
[20]
Ibid.,pp.1819.
[21]
Ibid.,pp.67.
[22]
No.L63397,9April1985,135SCRA637.
[23]
Pacetev.Cariaga,Jr.,G.R.No.53880,17March1994,231SCRA321.SeealsoMatutev.CourtofAppeals,136Phil.
162(1969)OmicoMiningandIndustrialCorporationv.Vallejos,No.L38974,25March1975,63SCRA285.
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[24]
Section3,Rule41.
[25]
Section9(3),BatasPambansaBlg.129,asamended.
[26]
Section1.Groundsofandperiodforfilingmotionfornewtrialorreconsideration.Withintheperiodfortakinganappeal,
theaggrievedpartymaymovethetrialcourttosetasidethejudgmentorfinalorderandgrantanewtrialforoneor
moreofthefollowingcausesmateriallyaffectingthesubstantialrightsofsaidparty:
(a)Fraud,accident,mistakeorexcusablenegligencewhichordinaryprudencecouldnothaveguardedagainstand
byreasonofwhichsuchaggrievedpartyhasprobablybeenimpairedinhisrightsor
(b)Newlydiscoveredevidence,whichhecouldnot,withreasonablediligence,havediscoveredandproducedatthe
trial,andwhichifpresentedwouldprobablyaltertheresult.
xxx
[27]
Sections1and6,Rule37.
[28]
Section 1.Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has
actedwithoutorinexcessofitsorhisjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessof
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
personaggrievedtherebymayfileaverifiedpetitioninthepropercourt,allegingthefactswithcertaintyandpraying
thatjudgmentberenderedannullingormodifyingtheproceedingsofsuchtribunal,boardorofficer,andgrantingsuch
incidentalreliefsaslawandjusticemayrequire.
xxx
Section4.Where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, order or
resolutionsoughttobeassailedintheSupremeCourtor,ifitrelatestotheactsoromissionsofalowercourtorof
acorporation,board,officerorperson,intheRegionalTrialCourtexercisingjurisdictionovertheterritorialareaas
definedbytheSupremeCourt.ItmayalsobefiledintheCourtofAppealswhetherornotthesameisinaidofits
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction.If it involves acts or omissions of a
quasijudicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizableonlybytheCourtofAppeals.
[29]
Section1,Rule41.
[30]
Section1.Petitionforrelieffromjudgment,order,orotherproceedings.Whenajudgmentorfinalorderisentered,orany
other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence,hemayfileapetitioninsuchcourtandinthesamecaseprayingthatthejudgment,orderorproceeding
besetaside.
Section3.Timeforfilingpetitioncontentsandverification.Apetitionprovidedforineitheroftheprecedingsectionsofthis
Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceedingtobesetaside,andnotmorethansix(6)monthsaftersuchjudgmentorfinalorderwasentered,orsuch
proceedingwastakenxxx.
SeeTurquezav.Hernando,No.L51626,30April1980,97SCRA483.
[31]
326Phil.169(1996).
[32]
Sections2and3,Rule47.
[33]
CiprianoM.Lazarov.RuralBankofFranciscoBalagtas(Bulacan),Inc.andTheRegisterofDeedsofValenzuelaCity,
G.R.No.139895,15August2003Teresita Villasor Manipol, etal.,v. Spouses Pablo and Antonia Ricafort, G.R.
No.150159,25July2003.
[34]
Tijam,etal.v.Sibonghanoy,etal.,181Phil.556(1968).
[35]
SeeIbabaov.IntermediateAppellateCourt,No.L74848,20May1987,150SCRA76.
[36]
SeeArticle2177,CivilCodeofthePhilippines.CompareSections1and3,Rule111,1988RulesofCriminalProcedure
withSections1and3,Rule111,2000RulesofCriminalProcedure.
[37]
SeeBarredov.Garcia,73Phil.607(1942).
[38]
CARollo,pp.89.
[39]
Imsonv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.106436,8December1994,239SCRA59.
[40]
Article2194,CivilCodeofthePhilippines.
[41]
Quiombingv.CA,G.R.No.93219,30August1990,189SCRA331(citingTolentino, IV Civil Code of the Philippines
218(1985ed.)).
[42]
Ibid.,(citingFeria,CivilProcedure153(1969ed.).
[43]
Pobletev.Fabros,No.L29803,14September1979,93SCRA200.
[44]
33AWordsandPhrases215(1971ed.)
[45]
SeeBarredov.Garcia,supranote37(1942)(citingAmandi,4CuestionariodelCdigoCivilReformado429,430).
[46]
Ibid.,(citingLaurent,20PrinciplesofFrenchCivilLaw734735(Spanishtranslation)).
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[47]
Pobletev.Fabros,supranote43Francov.IntermediateAppellateCourt,G.R.No.71137,5October1989,178SCRA
331.
[48]
Gumabayv.Baralin,No.L30683,77SCRA258,31May1977Rule14,Section20.
[49]
SeeJ.M.Tuason&Co.,Inc.,v.Estabillo,No.L20610,9January1975,62SCRA1.
[50]
Barredov.Garcia,supranote36,pp.620621.
[51]
EasternShippingLines,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.97412,12July1994,234SCRA78Reforminav.Tomol,Jr.,
No.L59096,11October1985,139SCRA260.

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