Russias Soft Power Offensive in Georgia

O OPINION

O SECURITY

27/12/2014

GIORGI MUCHAIDZE

Russias power choices, post-Cold War

Russia has over two centuries experience of using hard and soft power
for establishing and maintaining control over the Caucasus, including
Georgia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation
relied more on hard power tools to retain this control. The active use
and boosting of its degraded soft powerwhich the concepts
inventor, the distinguished Harvard professor Joseph Nye, defines as a
countrys capacity to get what it wants by attraction rather than
through coercionwas not a priority for post-Cold War Russia.
According to Nye, attractive, or soft, power stems from culture,
values, and policies that are broadly inclusive and seen as legitimate in
the eyes of others. He also underlines the importance of combining hard
and soft power to achieve results, and calls this combination smart
power.

Smart power was not really what Russia practiced in the 1990s. While its
huge market, historical ties with Georgia (a positive interpretation of
which still lingers in the minds of much of the older, Soviet-educated
generation), culture and orthodox Christianity remained Russias main
soft power assets from the end of the Cold War to 2012, it never
implemented any consistent policy to increase its potential to attract in
Georgia, nor did it combine it with hard power. There were no meaningful
efforts to foster Georgias economic growth, to help with civil and
military capacity building, or to encourage public diplomacy to facilitate
a restoration of Georgias territorial integrity.

Conversely, continuous military support for separatists in the South

Caucasus and Russias two genocidal wars in Chechnyawhich caused
massive civilian casualties and fueled the process by which local ethnic
groups residing in the Caucasus are stigmatizedhave significantly
decreased Russias soft power in the region, including in Georgia.
The introduction of a visa regime in 2000, the imposition of a full
economic embargo in 2006 followed by the severance of all transport
and postal links, the deportation of Georgian citizens from Russia,
military aggression against Georgia in 2008 with the subsequent
occupation of 20% of Georgian territory have all have contributed to
the steady decline of Russias power of attraction. Towards the end of
Saakashvilis second term in office, relations between Georgia and
Russia were at one of their lowest points ever.

A Georgian-Russian Reset

After coming to power during the October 2012 parliamentary elections,

the Georgian Dream Coalition began to carry out one of its most vocal
electoral promises and to follow a policy of normalizing relations with the
Russian Federationthe so-called Georgian-Russian Reset.

Russia never stopped its policy of bullying, as the continued

borderisation process (the erection of barbed wire fences along the
administrative boundary line between Russian-controlled South Ossetia
and the rest of Georgia) and the kidnappings of peaceful Georgian
villagers residing in Georgian-controlled areas adjacent to Russian-
occupied South Ossetia vividly demonstrate. Nevertheless, Russia
welcomed the establishment of direct communication with the new
Georgian government, and has gradually opened its market to Georgian
goods. Wine was a first export, soon to be followed by other agricultural
products.

The Georgian Dream government has been constantly pointing to the

results of its Russian Reset policy as one of its main achievements,
particularly the opening of the Russian market to Georgian goods. At the
same time, it has toned downed criticism of Russias aggressive actions
such as borderisation and has shied away from regularly raising the
issue of Georgias de-occupation with the international communitys
attention. In an interview he gave the BBC in July 2014, in which he once
again claimed success for his governments Reset policy, the Georgian
PM Irakli Gharibashvili declared that, unlike Crimea, Russia was not
interested in annexing Georgias breakaway regions of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia.

Yet only five months later, in a written statement given shortly after the
signature on the 24th of November of the treaty on alliance and
strategic partnership between Russia and the breakaway region of
Abkhazia, the Georgian PM had to backtrack and recognize that this was
a step taken by Russia towards the actual annexation of Abkhazia. He
then went even further by underlining the fact that the level of
normalization of relations between Georgia and Russia will be defined in
terms of Russias respect for this principle.

Russias soft power tools in action

The Georgian governments Russian Reset policy has concentrated on

achievements and has understated threats to the population. Today,
while the majority of Georgians identify Russia as the countrys number
one foe, many of them, especially those living in the countryside, have
bought into the Georgian Dreams rhetoric. They have taken note of the
rapid and significant increase of agricultural exports to Russia, and are
pinning their hopes for a higher standard of living on Russia.

People living in Kakheti, Georgias major grape and wine producing

region, are certainly no exception in this respect: after Russia lifted its
restrictions on Georgian wine imports in 2013, the volume of Georgias
wine exports to its neighbor to the north increased rapidly. According to
data for the first half of 2014 published by the Georgian National Wine
Agency, Russias share of Georgian wine exports reached 65% of the
total. As economic restrictions began to ease, this trend spread to some
other exports and, according to the latest figures, Russia has become
Georgias third largest export marketa big jump from eleventh place in
2012.

It is also worth noting that Russia is currently very busy with the rapid
construction of a highway linking Russias North Caucasian republic of
Daghestan with Georgias eastern province of Kakheti. The main purpose
of this link seems to be the creation of a short, reliable land route for
transporting military and civilian cargo through Georgia to Armenia and
onwards to Iran. (Currently, the only legal border crossing linking
Georgia to Russia goes through the Larsi checkpoint in the High
Caucasus, which is forced to close for several months every winter due
to the harsh weather and climate). Opening this planned highway
through Daghestan would definitely worsen relations between Georgia
and Azerbaijan, its close ally and main energy supplier. The highway
could also serve as alternative route in case Russia decides to intervene
militarily in the South Caucasus again.

Despite all this, Georgias current frenzy to reap the benefits of the
Russian marketwhich is encouraged by the Georgian governments
overemphasis on the economic benefits of its Russian Reset policy and
its understatement of the threats its northern neighbor posesmakes
the plan to build this new route popular with people working in Georgias
agricultural sector. (According to the National Statistics Office, around
half of the countrys entire labor force is employed in this sector.)

A month ago, on the 10th of November, Moscow also launched a new

media agency called Sputnik, which will be controlled by Russia Today
the Russian state-owned news agency widely recognized as a Kremlin
mouthpiece. Information published on Sputniks website claims that in
2015, Sputnik will be broadcast in 30 languages and that it will cover
over 130 cities and 34 countries. Sputnik promises to tell the untold to
a global audience of billions who are tired of aggressive propaganda
promoting a unipolar world and want a different perspective. Its
multimedia centers will maintain their own websites and broadcast over
local radio stations. Tbilisi is mentioned as one of the host cities.

Indeed, following an agreement signed between Russia Today and the

privately owned R Radio stationaka Radio Monte Carlo, which is
licensed to broadcast in TbilisiSputnik was allotted 4 hours per day of
R Radios airtime and began broadcasting. But it soon went off the air
after the Georgian National Communication Commission began to
question its compliance with Georgian legislation. After investigating the
matter, the Commission declared that Sputnik was neither a
broadcasting license holder, nor indeed an authorized entity.

Nevertheless, Sputnik has already started round-the-clock radio

broadcasting (in Abkhaz and Russian) in Russian-occupied Abkhazia. The
agency also plans to begin broadcasting through another multimedia
center established in South Ossetia.

To justify and legitimize its global and regional policies, the Kremlin, with
the help of its media outlets, has long presented Russia as a country
aspiring to establish a more just, multipolar world order in which
international law will rule instead of superpowers. Putins regime has
also created the concept of sovereign democracya clever play on
two positive-sounding wordswhich it has used as a smokescreen to
hide its efforts to consolidate autocracy at home. Such rhetoric was at
least partially successful early on, against the background of an
unpopular war in Iraq and increased anti-Americanism triggered by
George W. Bushs unilateral policies. But Russias blatant aggression
against Georgia in 2008 limited the impact of this rhetoric, and the
annexation of Crimea in 2014 stripped it of much of its semblance of
legitimacy.

In the meantime, Kremlin spin doctors and ideologists have not stood
idle, and have been crafting another concept of unique Russian Pole out
of older building blocks and infused with newish twists. If one agrees
that the biggest clich of the post-Cold War era is that of a clash of
civilizations, its easy to see that by pursuing the noble mission of
bringing civilizations together through Eurasianism and the Eurasian
Union, Russia hoped to increase its power of attraction and rebuild its
lost empire. Having capitalized on anti-gay sentiments both at home and
abroad, Putins regime has been continuously presenting Russia to
domestic and certain European audiences as the last conservative
outpost in Europe, as the only untainted streak of Christian civilization
that will save the world from Western decadence. These concepts have
been blended with the idea of a Russian World to further electrify and
garner support from domestic audiences and Russian speakers abroad,
and to justify Russias foreign military interventions.

In the good old tradition of the Russian Empire, the Russian Orthodox
Church wholeheartedly supports the Kremlins ideological ventures. In an
address to the World Russian Peoples Council just a month ago, Kirill,
the Russian Patriarch, accused the West of interfering in the post-Soviet
space and argued that as they [the West] dominate the global
information space, they impose their understanding of the economy and
state governance on everyone else in an effort to muzzle those who are
ready to defend the values and ideals which diverge from the concept of
a consumer society.

The depiction of Orthodox Russia as the true upholder of Christian values

against Gay-vropa (a play on the words gay and the Russian
Evropa, and another clich invented by Kremlin ideologists to
demonize the West) and a consumer society model devoid of
spirituality also resonates with a significant part of Georgian society.
Statements made by high-ranking clerics of Georgias extremely popular
Orthodox Church, in which they emphasize the countrys spiritual unity
with Russia, further increase Russias attractiveness in Georgia.

Russia also makes skilful use of its financial institutions to pander to the
Georgian population. One of the lowest interest rates on consumer loans
in Georgia is offered by VTB BankRussias second-largest bank, closely
associated with Putins administration and currently targeted by US and
EU sanctions. The VTB logo features prominently on the Georgian
national rugby teams kit, as the Russian bank has recently become its
major sponsor. While this has driven a feeling of protest among some
Georgians, others are grateful for Russian financial support for the
countrys most successful and revered national team.

Georgian National Rugby Team

Countering Russias soft power offensive

Its high time that the current Georgian government realized that its
overemphasis on the benefits of the Russian market, its downplay of the
threat Russia poses and its seeming ignorance of Russias efficient and
increased use of soft power tools are increasing the vulnerability of
Georgian citizens to Russian propaganda.

After Russias 2008 war with Georgia, its economic embargo and now its
creeping annexation of Abkhazia; after its annexation of Crimea and
military intervention in Ukraines Lugansk and Donetsk regions; after it
forcing Armenia to abandon its association agreement with the EU and
to join the Eurasian Union instead; after it imposing sanctions on
Moldova; after it issuing half-veiled threats to Kazakhstans territorial
integritythere should be no doubt left that Russias growing use of hard
and soft power is a reason for serious concern.

The US and the EU have already acknowledged the importance of the

need to respond to Moscows threats and have begun to implement
appropriate measures. Just recently, the U.S. Congress unanimously
approved the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 which imposes
additional sanctions on Russia and authorizes the United States to
provide significant assistance in support of Ukraine, Georgia and
Moldova. This assistance includes increased funding for Voice of America
and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in order to increase their potential
as an efficient counter to Russian propaganda.

And the EU is not lagging far behind. On the 15th of December, its
Foreign Affairs Council agreed in principle to the adoption of additional
restrictive measures against Russia. Visiting Tbilisi this December, the
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier assured Georgians of
the benefits of association with the EU and underlined the fact that the
establishment of visa-free travel between Georgia and the EU was within
arms reach. He also proposed holding a Georgian-German business
forum in Germany to strengthen business ties between two countries
and to attract more German investments to Georgia. At the same time,
in a speech she gave on the 9th of December during a convention of her
Christian Democratic Union in Cologne, the German Chancellor Angela
Merkel denounced Russias spheres of influence politics and stated
that we wont overcome these problems if we dont speak the plain
truth.

Regrettably, all we hear on the same issues from some members of the
Georgian government is abracadabra. Commenting late last November
on Russia and Abkhazias signature of their treaty on alliance and
strategic partnership, which is widely seen as a step towards the
annexation of Georgian territory by Russia, Georgias State Minister for
Reconciliation and Civic Equality, Mr Paata Zakareishvili, said that the
signing of this treaty was a sign of unequivocal success of the Georgian
governments policies. In turn, PM Gharibashvili unlinked Georgias
political and economic relations with Russia, stating that while Moscow is
not willing to improve political relations, economic relations were a
separate issue.

Such an approach or absence of strategy will only play into Russias

hands, and Moscow will continue to pursue its political objectives
through the further expansion and unrestricted use of its soft power vis-
-vis Georgia. The Georgian government must acknowledge the urgent
need for a fundamental reassessment and change of its Russia policy. It
must come to grips with the old truism that a states economic, cultural
and sporting policies are never detached from politics. All these and
other state policies serve the national interest, which in Russias case
means establishing control over Georgias foreign and security policy by
preventing the countrys membership of NATO and the EU and forcing it
to join the Eurasian Union instead (as it recently achieved with Armenia).
Russia makes no secret of this. On the 10th of December 2014, the
Russian Foreign Ministry released a statement in which it indicated that
Georgias unrestrained desire to join NATO was the reason behind
signing the treaty on alliance and strategic partnership with Abkhazia.
The Georgian government must create and follow a consistent,
multifaceted policy to efficiently withstand Russias soft power offensive.
It must plan efforts to counter Russian disinformation both at home and
abroad and co-ordinate them with local stakeholders and partner
countries. Countermeasures should include preventing non-fact-based
news broadcasting in Georgia.

Increasing the Georgian populations awareness of the benefits of NATO

and EU integration must be another priority. In this respect, it is vitally
important that the government ensures that the country rapidly meets
all its obligations in order to quickly materialize the benefits of its EU
Association Agreement, of its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU and of the substantial package of
measures to support its NATO integration offered during the Alliances
summit in Wales. The opportunities which Georgias Association
Agreement and DCFTA with the EU offer must be better explained to the
Georgian business sector, and their realization should be a priority. The
government should also support programmes seeking to educate the
population on the risks of relying upon a single market and to help the
country diversify its export markets. It also has to do its utmost to
ensure the early introduction of the visa-free travel regime with the EU.

Finally, it is critically important that an efficient, targeted policy for

reforming Georgias national security strategy be drafted and
implemented in line with democratic principles. Civil society must be
closely engaged in this process. If carried out successfully, such a reform
will boost the states ability to put in place an effective national security
policy. It will also contribute immensely to removing existing bottlenecks
to rapid democratic development, and thus substantially increase
Georgias power of attraction as a beacon of freedom and democracy.

A lot remains to be done, and time is running out.