SUMMARY REPORT

Fishery buy-ins: Applying rights-based incentive

agreements to sustainable fishery interventions
December 31, 2013
The Nature Conservancy
Fishery buy-ins
The Nature Conservancy
December 31, 2013

In Memory of Creusa Tetha Hitipeuw

Creusa Tetha Hitipeuw passed away on December 22, 2013, in Jakarta, Indonesia, following a brief and
unexpected battle with cancer. She was 44 years old. Serving as staff for WWF-Indonesia for over 17
years, Tetha was a consistent contributor to rights-based incentive agreement projects in Indonesia. As
such, some of Tethas work is represented in this report. Tetha received a Master in Marine Biology
degree from the Vrije Universiteit in Belgium. With WWF-Indonesia, she worked on various marine
conservation projects in Kepulauan Aru in Maluku, Kepulauan Derawan in East Kalimantan, in the Birds
Head Seascape and the Teluk Cenderawasih of Papua, and in the Kei Kecil Island in Maluku. As a kind
person, marine scientist and passionate conservationist, Tetha will be missed by all.

Fishery buy-ins: Applying rights-based incentive agreements to sustainable fishery interventions

Reproduction:
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www.mcatoolkit.org. Reference or use of this guide in any form should be properly cited.

Suggested citation:
The Nature Conservancy. 2013. Fishery buy-ins: Applying rights-based incentive agreements to
sustainable fishery interventions. The Nature Conservancy. Narragansett, Rhode Island. 15pp.

Contributing authors: Jay Udelhoven a, Carmen Revenga b, Andrea Moreno c and Ben Gilmer d
a, b, c
The Nature Conservancy
d
Downstream Strategies

For more information, contact:

The Nature Conservancy
URI Narragansett Campus, South Ferry Road
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Phone: (401) 874-6871
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Cover photo: Local community members surveying the Koon MCA site, Indonesia; J. Udelhoven 2012.

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When printing this document, please use recycled paper.

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CONTENTS

Overview ....................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Report objective and scope............................................................................................................ 1
1.2 Report audience ............................................................................................................................. 2
1.3 MCAs defined ................................................................................................................................. 2
1.4 The rationale for fishery buy-ins .................................................................................................... 3
2.0 Analysis process and framework ............................................................................................................ 3
3.0 Findings................................................................................................................................................... 3
3.1 Number and distribution of MCA projects ..................................................................................... 3
3.2 General findings related to the MCA elements ............................................................................. 4
3.3 Types and examples of fishery buy-ins .......................................................................................... 5
3.3.1 Fishing Rights Acquisitions .................................................................................................. 5
3.3.2 Fishing and Aquaculture Rights Contracting ....................................................................... 6
3.3.3 Government Permitted Fishing and Aquaculture Rights .................................................... 6
4.0 Discussion ............................................................................................................................................... 7
4.1 Lessons learned from existing fishery buy-ins ............................................................................... 8
4.2 Recommended practices based on MCA elements ....................................................................... 8
4.3 Final points ................................................................................................................................... 11
5.0 Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................. 11
6.0 References ............................................................................................................................................ 11
Appendix 1: Fishing Rights Acquisition Case Study: New England Groundfish Permit Banking ................. 13
Appendix 2: TURF Contracting Case Study: Chilean Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries Project ............... 14
Appendix 3: Govt.-Permitted Aquaculture Rights Case Study: Oyster Restoration, Washington, U. S. ..... 15

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Summary Report

Fishery buy-ins: Applying rights-based incentive agreements to sustainable fishery interventions

December 20, 2013

The Nature Conservancy

Overview
The Nature Conservancy and partners assessed the use of rights-based incentive agreements
[i.e. Marine Conservation Agreements (MCAs)] in ocean and coastal conservation broadly, and in
sustainable fishery interventions specifically, for over ten years beginning in the early 2000s. Two-
hundred-sixty-five field projects were identified in 30 countries, including 63 projects involving one of
three types of fishery buy-ins. The fishery buy-ins included: 1) acquisitions of private fishing rights,
vessels, and gear; 2) contracting of private fishing and aquaculture rights; and 3) government-permitted
fishing and aquaculture rights. As illustrated through case studies in the United States and Chile,
conservation entities used a variety of rights-based fisheries management scenarios to obtain or direct
fishery-related rights and assets. In doing so, conservation entities directly engaged fishermen,
businesses, local communities, and regulatory agencies over the long term while testing and
institutionalizing fishery reforms and recovery. Most identified projects possessed, or could employ, the
seven major elements of MCAs, including: 1) contractual arrangements; 2) conservation goals; 3) right-
holders; 4) conservation commitments; 5) quid pro quo exchanges; 6) conservation entities; and 7)
direct or indirect economic incentives. Lessons learned and recommended practices are proposed for
new fishery buy-in projects based on information gained from interviews, project documents, site visits,
and literature.

1.0 Introduction
Acquisitions of fishery permits, vessels and gear by government agencies (commonly referred to as
fishery buy-backs) have been used with mixed success to decrease fishing pressure, habitat impacts,
and by-catch throughout the world (Curtis and Squires 2007). Recently, The Nature Conservancy (TNC)
and other conservation entities have employed similar strategies as a means to buy-in to fisheries and
subsequently catalyze fishery reform. The fishery buy-ins have utilized various rights-based incentive
agreements, broadly termed Marine Conservation Agreements (MCAs), to solidify the fulfillment of
conservation commitments and delivery of economic incentives.

1.1 Report objective and scope

As the most common form of MCA, the use of MCAs in area-based ocean and coastal management
actions is becoming increasingly familiar within the global conservation community (for example, see:
Teh et al. 2008, Svensson et al. 2009, Lobue and Udelhoven 2013, Nordlund et al. 2013). And while
establishing and managing geographically-defined ocean and coastal areas as marine sanctuaries,
marine protect areas, and No Take Zones (NTZs) are recognized fisheries management tactics, these
types of area-based management strategies will likely not lead to sustainable fisheries by themselves
(FAO 2011). Given this, the focus of this report is on the lesser known, but more direct, fisheries-specific
MCAs. The primary objective of this report is thus to summarize information gleaned from and lessons
learned through numerous and often seemingly disparate TNC and non-TNC MCA-related projects,
specifically those directly associated with sustainable fisheries interventions. In narrowing the focus of
the report, we identify common themes and strategies among projects, as well as understand how they
differ from one another. With this new understanding, we identify lessons learned and recommended

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practices that we hope will help catalyze, benefit and improve the likelihood of success of new fishery
buy-in projects.

1.2 Report audience

The target audience for this report is TNC and partner field practitioners who are implementing or
considering implementing one or more fishery buy-in projects. Secondary audiences include TNC and
non-TNC organizational decision-makers, policy advisors, and academic researchers.

1.3 MCAs defined

MCA is an umbrella term applied to projects which include formal or informal contractual
arrangements that aim to achieve ocean or coastal conservation goals (including sustainable fishery
goals) through quid pro quo exchanges of conservation commitments and economic incentives between
right-holders and conservation entities. For readers unfamiliar with MCAs, a large amount of supporting
information can be accessed online through the MCA Practitioners Toolkit (www.mcatoolkit.org). In
short, the MCA approach can be viewed as an offshore extension of the tried and true private
conservation approach which uses transactions to obtain or direct rights, interests and uses of terrestrial
areas and resources. While not without some controversy and detractors, upland transactions, and now
MCAs, have allowed conservation entities to assume first-hand responsibility for the protection,
restoration and management of terrestrial and marine resources and biodiversity.
The term MCA evolved from a 2008 gathering of over 50 conservationists representing over 30
entities throughout the world. While the MCA definition is now codified in the MCA Field Guide (TNC
and Conservation International 2012) it is important to note that based on differing organizational
strategies, perspectives, funding, and geographic settings, projects that meet the definition of MCAs
may be referred to as Biodiversity Payments, Market-based Conservation, Payments for Ecosystem (or
Environmental) Services (PES), and Direct Payments for Conservation, among others (Wunder 2007,
Milne and Niesten 2009, Sommerville 2009, Forest Trends and The Katoomba Group 2010). In some
cases, there may be unique characteristics that distinguish these projects from MCAs, but in other cases
it may be a matter of semantics.
Regardless of whether a specific project is formally referred to as an MCA or another term, when
projects possess the seven primary elements below, they can be considered an MCA. The elements of an
MCA (taken from the definition) include:
1. any formal or informal contractual arrangement that
2. aims to achieve ocean or coastal conservation goals in which
3. one or more parties (usually right-holders)
4. voluntarily commit to taking certain actions,
refraining from certain actions, or
transferring certain rights and responsibilities
5. in exchange for
6. one or more other parties (usually conservation-oriented entities)
7. voluntarily committing to deliver explicit (direct or indirect) economic incentives.
By employing the seven primary elements, MCA projects incentivize government, community, and
private right-holders to establish management areas, protect species, restore habitats, and initiate
sustainable fishery activities, among others. In the case of MCAs, the rights in question are alienable
rights, which can be sold, transferred, modified or otherwise encumbered. These alienable rights are
associated with ownership, management, and use of fishery-related assets and resources. In some
contexts, alienable rights are referred to as privileges.

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1.4 The rationale for fishery buy-ins

The use of MCA fishery buy-in mechanisms recognizes, facilitates and takes advantage of a shift
being observed generally in fisheries governance away from top-down government management to a
range of legally recognized partnerships with civil society and industry actors. Fishery buy-ins have
allowed TNC and other conservation entities to obtain or direct long-term interests in fishery-related
assets and then use the assets as legal standing to test, promote, and institutionalize fishery reforms.

2.0 Analysis process and framework

TNC began investigating opportunities for and applications of MCAs in the early 2000s, primarily
focusing on native shellfish and submerged lands leasing and ownership within the U.S. (for example
see: Beck et. al. 2004, 2005, Bryant and Fletcher 2006, Marsh et. al. 2002, Lobue and Udelhoven 2013).
From 2009 to 2011, TNC completed country-wide analyses in Costa Rica, Indonesia, Mexico and Panama
to understand how MCAs have been and can be used for ocean and coastal conservation broadly and,
more specifically, for sustainable fishery initiatives. In 2012, to further understand fishery-related MCA
mechanisms, TNC evaluated site-specific field projects in Chile, Indonesia, and the U.S. The country-wide
analyses and site-specific evaluations generally used the seven MCA elements (as identified above) as an
assessment framework and followed qualitative research methods described by Marshall and Rossman
(2011), employing first-hand observations, in-depth interviews, and narrative inquiries. As part of the
MCA field project research, TNC completed over 200 interviews, nine workshops and 15 site visits,
involving staff from government agencies, NGOs, academia, and business ventures. These activities were
complemented by desk-based literature reviews and geospatial data analyses.
The research, completed by small, inter-disciplinary teams, included casual identifications of MCA
projects based on literature reviews, self-identification by project managers, and field observations and
thus did not constitute systematic identifications or statistically valid samplings of MCA projects within
identified geographies. Also, due to several factors (i.e. the qualitative nature of this body of work, the
recent launch of some field projects, and the lack of field project monitoring) we did not quantitatively
evaluate the cumulative success of the projects in terms of how well they were achieving stated
conservation goals.

3.0 Findings
3.1 Number and distribution of MCA projects
TNC and partners identified 265 field projects in 30 countries which included or likely included,
either explicitly or implicitly, the seven MCA elements (see Figure 1 and Table 1). Field projects were
implemented by NGOs, businesses, and government agencies. Project totals include de facto MCAs
(DMCAs), which are rights-based incentive agreement projects that are not primarily intended to
achieve conservation, but do so as a consequence of intended activities (e.g. in some cases,
aquaculture). The total number of confirmed and probable MCA projects reported here, however, is
likely lower, sometimes substantially, than the actual number of MCA projects occurring within the
identified geographies because: 1) a single reported MCA project may have included more than one
physical site or contractual arrangement; and 2) a single conservation entity may have had numerous
MCA projects, but reported only a single MCA. As a result, the number of MCA projects per country may,
but does not necessarily, represent where MCA projects are most prevalent. Given the above caveats,
geographies that dominated the findings, by accounting for 61% of the identified MCA projects, were
Mexico (90), Indonesia (43), and the United States (31).

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Figure 1: Confirmed and probable MCA projects per country

Table 1: Confirmed and probable MCA projects per country

Number Number
Country of Country of
Projects Projects
Belize 5 Malaysia 1
Cambodia 1 Marshall Islands 1
Chile * 10 Mexico * 90
Chuuk 2 Mozambique 1
Colombia 1 Palau 4
Cook Islands 1 Panama * 17
Costa Rica * 6 Papua New Guinea 3
Ecuador * 2 Philippines 5
Federated States of
1 Pohnpei 1
Micronesia
Fiji * 19 Spain 4
India 2 Tanzania * 3
Indonesia * 43 Thailand 1
Jamaica 1 United Kingdom 1
Kiribati 1 United States * 31
Kosrae 1 Vanuatu 6
Total 265
* Countries with identified fishery buy-ins

3.2 General findings related to the MCA elements

The types of contractual arrangements used in the MCA projects varied greatly, from formal
contracts to handshake deals. Goals associated with the projects were wide-ranging, but all projects
directly or indirectly affected finfish populations or habitats and/or shellfish populations or habitats. In
terms of right-holders, most significantly we found that legal or de facto rights and right-holders within
ocean and coastal environments existed in numerous countries and under a variety of circumstances.
Right-holders included the owners, managers and users of uplands, underwater lands, resources,
activities, and ecosystem services associated with ocean and coastal areas. Formal and exclusive rights

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were not always needed to achieve project goals. Right-holders included, but were not limited to,
private individuals and entities, user and community groups, and government agencies. Right-holders
established and fulfilled conservation commitments in exchange for the delivery of economic incentives
provided by conservation entities. Conservation commitments made by right-holders included
commitments to: 1) take actions; 2) refrain from actions; and/or 3) transfer rights and responsibilities.
Economic incentives provided by conservation entities included: 1) required payments for the MCA
itself; 2) offsets for lost opportunity costs; and 3) additional incentives needed to garner community
support or otherwise motivate decision makers and other stakeholders. The specific type of economic
incentives provided to right-holders involved direct cash payments, community infrastructure and
utilities, social services, capacity building and training, market creation and access, and in-kind technical
assistance, among others. Lessons learned and recommended practices based on these findings are
summarized in the Discussion section of this report.

3.3 Types and examples of fishery buy-ins

Identified MCA projects were classified as: 1) one of three types of fishery buy-ins; 2) area-based
acquisitions and contracts; or 3) other and unclear (see Table 2). Collectively, the three types of fishery
buy-ins accounted for 24% (63) while area-based MCAs accounted for 63% (167) of the total. This
classification of MCA projects was not precise, however, because of limited information and substantive
overlaps within some projects. The groupings, therefore, provide areas of primary emphasis only.

Table 2: Types of confirmed and probable MCA projects

Fishery Buy-ins Area-based
Other and
Private Private Government Acquisition and Total
Unclear
Acquisition Contracting Permitted Contracting

6 39 18 167 35 265

2% 15% 7% 63% 13% 100%

Below are brief descriptions of the three basic scenarios under which fishery buy-ins are being
implemented, including: 1) acquisition and management of privately-held fishing rights; 2) contractual
management of privately-held fishing and aquaculture rights; and 3) direct implementation of
government-issued fishing and aquaculture rights. Appendices 1, 2 and 3 provide case studies
illustrating how specific fishery buy-in projects are unfolding. The case studies do not necessarily
represent best practices, but are included here to illustrate the practical application of fishery buy-ins. It
is important to note that MCA project implementers (including case study implementers) are learning
through implementation and, as such, the applications of MCAs in fishery buy-ins are ever evolving and
adapting. Lessons we believe we have learned in the past and are currently learning at present will likely
continue to be refined as projects develop.

3.3.1 Fishing Rights Acquisitions

Two percent (six) of the identified MCA field projects involved conservation entities purchasing
fishing rights directly from fishermen as a means to manage the associated fishing and, in some cases,
influence the behavior of fishermen remaining in the fleet (see Appendix 1 for the New England case
study). The projects, which primarily focused on groundfish and shrimp, were located in Costa Rica,
Mexico, and the U.S. The projects acquired formal, alienable fishing rights originally obtained by
government issuance of fishing licenses to private fishermen. Fishing rights acquisitions were

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consummated using purchase and sale agreements, sales contracts, and other forms of transaction
agreements. Fishing rights, and in some cases, fishing vessels and gear, were transferred to the
conservation entities. The assets were then held or deployed to support more sustainable fishing
practices. When acquisitions did not include vessels and gear, conservation entities sometimes included
contract clauses that specified how vessels and gear could be used in the future so as not to undermine
the projects conservation goals. Conservation entities also included contract clauses that prevented
fishermen from returning to fishing (with time, species, and/or location dependent restrictions) even if
the fishermen transferred vessels and gear to the conservation entities.

3.3.2 Fishing and Aquaculture Rights Contracting

In 15% (39) of the MCA field projects, conservation entities entered into contracts with fishermen
and fishing cooperatives to incentivize changes in how, when and/or where fishing occurred using
existing permitted fishing rights (see Appendix 2 for the Chile case study). These projects involved
artisanal, small-scale commercial, and in one case, recreational fisheries, including billfish, lobster,
sharks, shrimp, and, in some cases, general fishing rights to all finfish and shellfish. Projects were found
in Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Fiji, Indonesia, Mexico, Panam, Tanzania, and the U.S. Under the projects,
fishing rights were not transferred to conservation entities, but fishermen agreed to use their fishing
rights in specific, newly-defined ways. For example, in some cases fishermen fished only in specific
areas, at specific times, and/or with specific methods and gear. In other projects, fishermen also traded
their existing vessels and gear for new vessels and gear. The cessation of fishing activities during specific
times of the year (for example, when species or affected habitats were most vulnerable or there were
user conflicts) was referred to as a time-out, while the cessation of fishing activities in specific
locations was referred to as a move-out. Gear trades generally took two forms: 1) permanent gear
changes, referred to as swap-outs; and 2) temporary experimentations with new gear, referred to as
try-outs. Gear trades replaced harmful fishing gear with less harmful fishing gear. Gear trades were
usually intended to decrease bycatch and/or habitat impacts, as opposed to decreasing fishing effort. In
exchange for changing their fishing techniques and gear, fishermen were provided with a range of
incentives by conservation entities, such as training, gear, boats, motors, and direct cash payments.
Allowing observers aboard fishing vessels and the recordation of fishing data were also components of
fishing gear trades.
Some MCA contracts between fishermens cooperatives and conservation entities were used to help
establish and better manage geographically-based exclusive fishing rights [i.e. Territorial Use Rights in
Fisheries (TURFs)]. These included conditions that established specific fishery management activities and
self-imposed fishing restrictions. Obligations on behalf of conservation entities to help establish TURFs
became or will become explicit or implied components of the benefits package that will incentivize right-
holders to participate in projects.
Conservation entities could also engage directly with aquaculture companies that have obtained
geographically-based exclusive management access to ocean and coastal areas. While we did not
encounter specific evidence of this, by establishing a contractual arrangement with aquaculture
companies, conservation entities could help develop and implement a more conservation-minded
approach to the rights held under the government-issued aquaculture permits. The possibilities under
this scenario include, but are not limited to, developing and implementing management plans for buffer
areas, restoring habitats, and restocking dwindling wild stock animals.

3.3.3 Government Permitted Fishing and Aquaculture Rights

In 7% (18) of the MCA field projects, conservation entities obtained rights directly from government
agencies through permits for fishing and aquaculture (see Appendix 3 for the Washington State case

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study). Projects in Indonesia and the U.S. focused on shellfish while projects in Mexico included finfish
and shellfish. In most cases, the permits and associated terms and conditions served as the contract
which obligated the parties and defined roles and responsibilities. Permits could, however, be
accompanied by separate documents that detail how the associated rights can be used.
In the simplest scenario, after receiving permits conservation entities would refrain completely from
fishing or implementing aquaculture activities. This, in theory, would reduce the total amount of fishing
pressure, by-catch, and/or habitat impacts that would otherwise take place if the permits were used for
their originally conceived purposes. Abstaining from fishing or culturing species under these conditions
has sometimes been referred to as implementing a reverse fishing or aquaculture license. A project in
Kiribati has been referred to as a reverse fishing license, but in application is actually an area-based
agreement wherein the government agreed to restrict fishing without issuing the associated fishing
permits to the conservation entity (Niesten and Shelley 2013). A reverse fishing license or aquaculture
strategy would only be viable as a harvest reduction strategy if limits on the total number of permits
were set and enforced. While possible, we did not uncover any MCA projects that did exactly this, thus
none were used to directly reduce fishing pressure. The 18 MCA field projects in this category employed
the associated fishing and aquaculture rights, but did so in more conservation-minded ways. Of the 18
projects, one project obtained a fishing permit and 17 projects obtained aquaculture-related permits.
In terms of aquaculture, permits were used in two distinct ways: seven permits were used by non-
governmental organizations to restore shellfish habitat and 10 permits were used by aquaculture
businesses to cultivate, harvest, and sell shellfish. While the aquaculture businesses sought profit
returns, they also needed to protect their infrastructure and cultured species from interference by
humans and to ensure that the areas within and affecting their operations possessed sufficiently good
water quality and relatively undisturbed natural environments. In protecting and managing the
aquaculture sites and surrounding areas, at least one aquaculture business was making de facto
contributions to the conservation of biodiversity by limiting illegal and destructive fishing and preventing
unauthorized infrastructure and uses from occurring in areas much larger than the aquaculture site
itself. While the list of real and perceived negative impacts from some types of aquaculture is long
(Klinger and Naylor 2012), many of the impacts had been reduced and many of the above-mentioned
conservation gains could be magnified. This project and nine other business-led aquaculture projects
suspected of making similar contributions were thus classified as de facto MCAs (DMCAs).

4.0 Discussion
Rights-based fisheries management (RBFM) , which includes the assignment of fishery-related rights
to private fishermen through mechanisms such as individual transferable quotas, catch shares, limited
access privileges, and TURFs, is recognized as a potential solution to over-fishing and destructive fishing
(Costello 2012). The simple allocation of fishing rights by itself, however, is not likely to recover fisheries,
lead to the long-term sustainability of fisheries, or lead to the sustainable management of marine
ecosystems (Arnason 2012, Costello 2012, Essington et al. 2012, Nowlis and Van Benthem 2012, Preau
et al. 2012, Rieser et al. 2013). Additional actions beyond the allocation of rights are thus needed to
secure fishery access and incentivize fishermen to take risks on new gear and practices, explore new
markets, participate in research, and collaborate with other fishermen. Research completed by TNC and
partners documented how conservation entities have successfully used RBFM as a platform to buy into
fisheries through MCAs, engaging fishermen, businesses, local communities, and regulatory agencies
over extended periods of time while catalyzing fisheries reform and recovery.
Below we identify lessons learned and recommended practices based primarily on practitioner
interviews, project documents, site visits, and a limited review of published literature.

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4.1 Lessons learned from existing fishery buy-ins

Many of the lessons learned focus on the framework and status of the fishery management regime
within which fishery buy-ins take place. Since fishery management regimes are usually administered by
government actors, practitioners must carefully consider the necessary role of and actions by
governments prior to implementing fishery buy-ins.
While all identified fishery buy-in projects did not successfully account for the items listed below,
based on our findings we recommend project managers consider if and how the following activities and
conditions can be accounted for and/or how they will affect project implementation and outcomes if
not accounted for, prior to launching new fishery buy-in projects:
Identification, registration, and monitoring of all or nearly all legal and illegal fishing or
aquaculture permits, vessels, motors, and gear;
Reduction, elimination, and redirection of perverse subsidies and creation of positive incentives;
Development and implementation of ecosystem-based sustainable fishery or aquaculture
management plans;
Establishment of limited entry for targeted fisheries or aquaculture;
Development and allocation of transferable user rights;
Implementation of strict monitoring and enforcement of fishing or aquaculture-related laws;
and
Implementation and monitoring of alternative livelihoods over the long-term.

4.2 Recommended practices based on MCA elements

In addition to the above lessons learned, we identify below recommended practices that project
leads should consider when developing and implementing fishery buy-in projects. These recommended
practices are grouped below by the seven major elements of MCAs.
1) Whenever possible, contractual arrangements should be formal and legally enforceable. The
formal agreements should be detailed, long-term (including close-out options when the end of
term is reached), understood by all parties, and explicit in identifying the legal basis for the
agreement. Due to the nature of some projects and right-holders, contractual arrangements
may need to be informal and short-term during the early phases of the project. As these
projects evolve greater formality in and duration of the agreements can be established.
2) Conservation-related sustainable fishery or aquaculture goals should be explicitly articulated,
easily understood, achievable, and readily monitored. Biological baseline and monitoring data
were available for some identified MCA projects and empirical evidence was available for
others, but many projects appeared not to have biological data or it was not made available.
Establishing baseline biological conditions and monitoring conditions over time to evaluate
progress towards conservation goals was an area where many MCA projects could improve.
However, while each project was specific in terms of goals and success, interim data from select
projects were positive. For example: a project in Southeast Misool, Indonesia, documented
increased fish biomass over a three-year period when compared to areas outside the project
area; a project in California, U.S., documented lower non-target species catches and higher
target species catches over a one-year period when compared to non-project participant
fishermen; and a project in the Gulf of Thailand, Cambodia, after three years of project
implementation documented substantially larger and more dense populations of finfish and
invertebrates when compared to areas outside the project area.
3) Right-holders should have legal standing, decision-making authority, and capacity to perform as
expected under the agreement. The roles, responsibilities and expected actions of right-holders
should be explicitly articulated within the agreement.

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4) Conservation entities should employ an individual project champion (who can personally
commit to achieving project success) and a knowledgeable and experienced attorney (who can
prepare the contractual arrangement). Both the conservation entity and project champion
should have field experience and knowledge of the identified fishery or aquaculture operation
as well as profound relationships with relevant stakeholders.
Note that government agencies may be involved in fishery buy-ins in one of three ways: 1)
as right-holders (i.e. resource owners or fishery/aquaculture program managers); 2) as
conservation entities (i.e. entities with conservation-related sustainable fishery goals); or 3) as
indirect stakeholders (i.e. entities that could affect or be affected by projects). If directly
involved as right-holders or conservation entities, government agencies may assess, develop,
approve and/or implement projects. If indirectly involved, government agencies may still have
oversight roles to ensure the parties to the agreement are treating each other fairly, have
identified and accounted for all necessary issues and requirements, and are generally acting in
accordance with the law. Regardless of the specific role of government, relevant government
agencies should be consulted and given opportunities for input at several points during the
fishery buy-in evaluation, development, and implementation process.
5) Conservation commitments, generally falling into one of three categoriesfishing or
aquaculture rights sales, contracting, or permittingshould be within right-holders abilities,
explicitly stated within contractual arrangements, and include long-term monitoring and
enforcement protocols.
6) Exchange options should include the explicit quid pro quo delivery of economic incentives (by
conservation entities) periodically and predictably over the life of the agreement after
conservation commitment milestones are achieved (by right-holders). The exchange options
should also include contingencies, such as reductions and deferrals of economic benefits, for
non-compliance.
7) Economic incentives should include: required payments for any acquisition or lease; negotiated
offset payments for any lost opportunity costs; and any additional incentives needed to garner
community support or otherwise motivate decision makers and other stakeholders. Also, if
fishermen are no longer expected to fish, alternative livelihood conditions, such as when and
how funding, training, capacity building, and performance monitoring will be completed, should
be included within the incentives package.

While we believe the above lessons learned and recommended practices are equally valuable for
developed countries as well as developing and emerging countries, there are some distinctions to be
made. Table 3 compares and contrasts some of the major distinctions practitioners should be aware of
regarding the recommended practices. When evaluating the applicability of the lessons learned and
recommended practices presented here, practitioners should always consider country and site-specific
circumstances that may affect fishery buy-in development and implementation.

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Table 3: Developed and Developing/Emerging Country Comparison
MCA Element Developed Countries
Because legal systems are likely better
established and more formal, the terms and
Contract terms
conditions of the contracts are likely to be
and conditions
enforced more easily through the legal
system.
Scientific information, biological inventories
and long-term monitoring are likely to be
Conservation more sophisticated and regimented,
goals allowing for more elaborate conservation
goals as well as the measurement of
progress toward achieving those goals.
Governments usually represent the formally
recognized resource owners and managers,
which are more developed, structured and
rigid, and, as a result, less likely to be
Right-holders
immediately or easily adapted to private
conservation-purposed fishery buy-ins.
Formal, legally-recognized rights will often
be required to achieve conservation goals.
Because the fishery management regime is
likely to be more developed, structured and
Conservation rigid, conservation actions are more likely to
actions be limited by laws and regulations and may
also need the explicit approval of
government actors.
Short and long-term conditioned exchanges
of goods and services are likely more
Exchanges
common and thus easier to explain, develop,
implement and enforce.
Local conservation entities are likely more
familiar with acquiring and managing rights
related to terrestrial resource protection.
Thus, extending these strategies into ocean
and coastal waters via fishery buy-ins may
Conservation
be more intuitive. Also, while any single
entities
entity may not have the capacity or technical
expertise to develop and implement fishery
buy-ins, due to the large number of
conservation entities likely in existence,
collaboration opportunities will be greater.
The use of direct cash payments and
developing access to markets for use as
Economic
economic incentives will likely be more
incentives
prevalent generally and thus more readily
available for conservation purposes.
Developing/Emerging Countries
Because legal systems are likely less established and
formal, the terms and conditions are likely to be enforced
more readily through informal means, such as through
well-established relationships with right-holders, peer
pressure from other fishermen/resource users and
discussions with community leaders.
Scientific information, biological inventories and long-
term monitoring may be less sophisticated and
regimented, requiring the use of more general
conservation goals and limiting the ability and likelihood
of consistent measurement of progress toward achieving
those goals.
Individuals, families, local communities, and fishermen
can often be considered the formal or informal owners,
managers, and users of the resources. These right-holders
may be searching for assistance in sustainably managing
their resources and thus more are likely to be
immediately amenable to fishery buy-ins. Because
traditional right-holders are more common, formal
ownership, management or user rights may not be
required to achieve conservation goals.
Because the fishery management regime is likely to be
less developed, structured and rigid, there are likely to be
more options available for conservation actions with less
legal and regulatory restrictions; explicit approval by
government actors may not be necessary.
Short and long-term conditioned exchanges of goods and
services are likely less common (especially for
conservation purposes) and thus more difficult to explain,
develop, implement and enforce. As a result, additional
time, sometimes substantial, may be required for initial
outreach, education, and relationship building. Also, more
explicit and continuous information about the timing,
cause-effect relationship, and allocation of the goods and
services will likely be required.
Local conservation entities are likely less familiar with
acquiring and managing rights related to terrestrial
resource protection. Thus, extending these strategies into
ocean and coastal waters via fishery buy-ins may be less
intuitive. Needed capacity building or development of
technical expertise may have to be done within a single
entity, requiring more time and financing, because
additional conservation entities are less likely to be
available for collaborations.
The use of direct cash payments and developing access to
markets for use as economic incentives will likely be less
prevalent generally and thus less readily available for
conservation purposes. As a result, alternatives such as
education, community services and infrastructure, public
utilities, and livelihoods may be more easily employed as
indirect economic incentives for conservation purposes.
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4.3 Final points

Even when all of the above lessons learned are accounted for and recommended practices are
adhered to, fishery buy-ins may present risks and potential controversies. Fishery reform can be
technically, socially, politically, and economically difficult. Many needed reforms are new and
experimental, creating a great deal of uncertainty, which is often compounded by changing rules and
volatile market prices. In geographies where the need is greatest, there are often few opportunities to
organize and pay for necessary data collection, active management, and enforcement. Some fishery
buy-ins, such as the acquisition of fishing privileges, are controversial due to industrys suspicion of
conservation entities. To address many of these difficulties, substantial relationship building with
fishermen and communities will be required. If the potential risks and controversies are too great or
most of the enabling conditions are not present or otherwise cannot be addressed, a fishery buy-in may
not be possible at that time and alternatives to fishery buy-ins (such as capacity building, education,
litigation, lobbying, and scientific research, which are not evaluated in this paper), should be considered
or time should be allowed to address the enabling conditions.

5.0 Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the Walton Family Foundation who graciously provided funding that
made much of this research and report possible. While it is impractical to list all of the individuals who
contributed substantively to the entirety of this work, special thanks are due to individuals who
contributed to the concept development, geographic and site-based research and reprot preparation,
many of whom are also helping to implement rights-based incentive agreement field projects, including,
but not limited to: Michael Bell, Peter Bryant, Diana Bermudez, Nirari Cardenas, Eleanor Carter, Chuck
Cook, Robert Deacon, Fernando Ghersi, Mary Gleason, Lynne Hale, Abdul Halim, Jerry Knecht, Kathryn
Labrum, Layla Osman, Fabian Sanchez, Geoffrey Smith, and Lotus Vermeer. We would also like to thank
several anonymous reviewers.

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Forest Trends and The Katoomba Group. (2010) Payments for Ecosystem Services: Getting Started in
Marine and Coastal Ecosystems: A Primer. Whitmore Group, Washington, D.C., 80 pp.
Gleason, M., Feller, E., Merrifield, M., et al. (In press) A transactional and collaborative approach to
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Klinger, D. and R. Naylor. 2012. Searching for Solutions in Aquaculture: Charting a Sustainable Course.
Annual Review of Environment and Resources. 2012. 37:24776.
LoBue, C. and Udelhoven, J. (2013) Private ownership of underwater lands in Great South Bay, New
York: a case study in degradation, restoration and protection. Marine Policy. 41: 103-109.
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Thousand Oaks, California, 321 pp.
Milne, S. and Niesten, E. (2009) Direct payments for biodiversity conservation in developing countries:
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Niesten, E. and Shelley, P. (2013) Protecting Paradise. In: Underwater Eden: saving the last coral
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Resource Economics. 27: 89-105.
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Rieser, A., Watling, L. and Guinotte, J. (2013) Trawl fisheries, catch shares and the protection of benthic
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40: 7583.
Sommerville, M., Jones, J. and Milner-Gulland, E. (2009) A revised conceptual framework for payments
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Appendix 1: Fishing Rights Acquisition Case Study: New England Groundfish Permit Banking
A successful multi-species fishery for over a century, the Northeast groundfish fishery in the United
States included cod (Gadus morhua, Gadidae), halibut (Hippoglossus hippoglossus, Pleuronectidae), haddock
(Melanogrammus aeglefinus, Gadidae), white hake (Urophycis tenius, Phycidae), flounder (Pleuronectes spp.,
Pleuronectidae), and Pollock (Pollachius virens, Gadidae), among others. Fish were harvested using bottom
trawls, gillnets, hand lines, traps, pots, long lines and dredges. By the early to mid-1990s, many groundfish
stocks in the region became severely depleted. In 2010 a new catch share system was established that
included fishing quota allocations. That same year, TNC and several conservation partners (including the
Penobscot East Resource Center and Island Institute) initiated a permit banking project aimed at: 1)
supporting collaborative research with fishermen on more selective gear; 2) improving scientific
understanding regarding key habitats and groundfish distributions; 3) providing fishermen incentives to use
more sustainable fishing practices; and 4) helping secure long-term access to the fishery for inshore boats
and traditional fishing communities. To implement the project, formal and explicit rights-based incentive
agreements were employed. With fishermen as privilege-holders, the contractual MCA mechanisms included
purchase and sale agreements and lease-back fishing agreements.
Similar to an earlier TNC initiative in California that acquired fishing permits (Deacon and Parker 2009,
Gleason et al. In Press), TNC and partners purchased a total of four federal groundfish permits from willing
sellers within the New England groundfish fishery. Of the four permits, some were purchased jointly between
the partners while others were purchased by individual entities. In 2013, TNC owned a single permit and had
operational agreements on the use of the three other permits. With hundreds of permits within the fishery,
the permits acquired under this project made up less than 5% of the total quota. However, the project was
able to use a small amount of quota as leverage to make significant improvements within the overall fishery
because many of the fishing companies operated on the very edge of profitability. As a result, the
opportunity for fishermen to obtain additional quota (even if small) from the project was significant in terms
of business viability.
Under the project, fishing quota associated with the acquired permits was made available to fishermen
subject to specific conditions. Pounds of quota for specific species within the fishery were leased to
fishermen who held valid fishing permits and vessels for the fishery and were seeking additional quota.
Quota from the acquired permits was leased under three scenarios: 1) fishermen who participated in
research received quota for free; 2) fishermen who agreed to use modified gear and/or practices received
quota at below-market rate; and 3) fishermen who agreed to no additional constraints received quota for
close to fair market value. For example, quota from one permit was leased to commercial fishermen and
used to collect information on the relative abundance and distribution of groundfish species in poorly
sampled parts of the project area. This information is being used to support an effort to develop a finer-scale
stock assessment of groundfish species in the region. Quota from another permit was leased to commercial
fishermen and used to research trawling modifications that increased selectivity and reduced impacts on
sensitive marine habitats.
While other existing permit banking entities protected fishing access for local communities, TNC and
partners evaluated the possibility of formally establishing a new permit banking entity (TNC 2011). The new
banking entity would assume ownership over the project-acquired permits in addition to permits acquired by
other entities in the future. Fishing communities, state agencies, conservation groups, and others would be
able to purchase permits from willing sellers on the open market, contribute quota associated with the
permits to the permit bank, and subsequently utilize the quota to leverage conservation and socio-economic
gains through fishing leases. The agreed upon leases would provide fishermen incentives to use more
sustainable fishing techniques and would also ease the transition to a new management system. While the
permit bank-issued fishing agreements would continue to help implement research and gear modifications,
the permit bank would also maintain fishing access for local communities by retaining ownership of the
fishing permits in perpetuity. While the option remains viable, to date, the New England Groundfish Permit
Banking project continues to progress without having formally established a new permit banking entity.

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Appendix 2: TURF Contracting Case Study: Chilean Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries Project
In Chile, between 1985 and 1995, an overfishing crisis in the abalone (Concholepas concholepas,
Muricidae) fishery led to regional and national fishing closures and to the establishment of a TURF
policy. Chile now has over 700 multi-species TURFs, which involve approximately 22% of the 86,000
artisanal fishermen in the country. This is one of the largest TURF-based co-management systems in the
world and provides secure access to coastal benthic resources for artisanal fishermen. Each TURF
provides exclusive rights to fishermens associations for harvesting benthic invertebrate species (and, in
some cases, algae) in a limited and well defined nearshore area. Fishermens associations must submit
baseline analyses and management plans for targeted species before TURF requests are approved. The
analyses and plans, however, do not guarantee sustainable management of the TURFs. Once a TURF is
granted, TURF-holders are free to design their own allocation systems and to distribute related quota
among its members. While rights associated with TURFs do not apply to finfish, finfishing is allowed
inside TURF areas under specific conditions (i.e. baseline analyses and management plans for targeted
species must be developed).
One local fishermens association, the Chaihuin Fishers Union, oversees three TURFs within
estuarine and open rocky coastal areas adjacent to TNCs Valdivia Coastal Reserve. The Chaihuin Fishers
Unions TURFs include harvesting rights for species such as abalone, sea urchin (Loxechinus albus,
Parechinidae) several limpet species (Fissurella spp., Fissurellidae), and Chilean mussel (Mytilus chilensis,
Mytilidae). An agreement was established in 2011 between the Chaihuin Fishers Union, Conservacion
Marina (a local marine conservation organization), and TNC regarding the management of one of the
TURFs which had been subjected to a high degree of exploitation. The agreement, while not legally
binding as the parties can withdraw without penalty if they wish, was established for an initial four-year
term and is automatically renewable for four additional years. The goal of the agreement was to
demonstrate how initial establishment of a NTZ and subsequent restoration could improve the long-
term ecological and economic performance of the TURF fisheries. The NTZ designation was in
recognition of the areas central role in serving as a spawner sanctuary and thus sustaining the fishery
over time
While TURF-related user rights remained with the fishers union, parties to the agreement
committed to: 1) designating the entire TURF as a NTZ, which applied to all commercial species, for an
initial three-year period (subsistence shoreline collection by community members was allowed); 2)
restoring productivity of over-exploited species within the TURF by developing and implementing a long-
term management plan leading to the protection and sustainable use of TURF resources and by
undertaking scientific research and monitoring; 3) under the guise of the management plan,
establishing, monitoring, and enforcing future zoned areas within the TURF; 4) securing project funding,
in part through eco-tourism and other value-added products; 5) increasing awareness, education and
outreach to disseminate lessons learned; 6) building capacity and training for the fishermens
association; and 7) supporting follow-up studies required by the national fisheries service. The project is
currently in its third year of implementation with project partners steadily moving toward the
achievement of the agreement milestones.

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Appendix 3: Govt.-Permitted Aquaculture Rights Case Study: Oyster Restoration, Washington, U. S.

For several decades prior to 1988, a private timber company used a portion of Woodard Bay,
located within south Puget Sound in Washington State, U.S., to store logs. As a result, much of the bay
bottom was clogged with sunken logs and wood debris. The state acquired the parcel in 1988, but
initially did little with the site in terms of management and restoration. In the early 2000s, TNC and the
Washington State Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) began a collaborative effort to develop a
conservation leasing program for state owned aquatic lands. As part of this effort, TNC and WDNR
selected Woodard Bay as a pilot site to test the newly established conservation leasing process and
newly emerging native Olympia oyster (Ostreola conchaphila, Ostreidae) restoration techniques. At the
time, less than 4% of the Olympia oysters historic core populations remained in Puget Sound.
Restoration techniques for native oysters were still evolving and experimentation was needed to
determine the best, most reliable methods and conditions. If the Woodard Bay pilot project was
successful, the conservation leasing process would be vetted and improved upon while the restoration
efforts would lead to improved local shellfish populations and improved restoration projects elsewhere
within Puget Sound.
In 2005, TNC and WDNR entered into a 10-year lease for 10 acres of subtidal lands within Woodard
Bay. The site contained a small remnant population of Olympia oysters and was not targeted for use by
other user groups. The lease provided TNC proprietary control over the site for the purpose of restoring
native oyster habitat. In this case, the oyster restoration activities were considered aquaculture by
state definition. Authority to enter into the lease thus stemmed from the states aquatic land
management and aquaculture laws. The restoration of Olympia oysters at the lease site was intended to
increase benthic diversity and abundance, as well as improve water quality. Parallel Olympia oyster
restoration efforts were developing at other sites within Puget Sound, but the Woodard Bay site was
unique in that it was primarily testing restoration below the low tideline.
Finalizing the Woodard Bay conservation lease required extensive planning and survey work. WDNR
required TNC to complete a legal boundary survey and in-depth ecological assessment, pre- and post-
restoration surveys, and submit a detailed restoration and management plan. In 2005, TNC completed
baseline physical and biological characterizations along with experiments on oyster recruitment and
survival. In 2006, TNC tested restoration methods and identified locations for expanded restoration. In
2007, TNC completed approximately three acres of oyster habitat enhancement. From 2008-2010, TNC
completed monitoring of oyster recruitment, survival and predation.
Ultimately, monitoring indicated that Olympia oyster restoration at the Woodard Bay lease site was
not successful. The project did, however, successfully test the new conservation leasing program and
(coupled with the parallel restoration efforts elsewhere) helped spawn numerous successful restoration
projects throughout Puget Sound. Collaborative restoration efforts of more than 100 partners resulted
in over 30 acres of enhanced Olympia oyster habitat; many of these projects obtained a conservation
license as state authorization. In addition, Washington State now has a 10-year Olympia oyster
restoration goal to reestablish self-maintaining native oyster habitat. A corresponding restoration
objective is to enhance 100 acres of native oyster habitat by 2020. These efforts will not only improve
shellfish populations, habitat, and water quality, they may also provide opportunities for Native
Americans and recreational users to sustainably harvest Olympia oysters in Puget Sound.

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