JUDICIARY
or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and
1. Fernando Lopez vs Gerardo Roxas
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice
President in the 1965 elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas
appealed his loss before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET). The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law
that:
There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . .
. which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and
the Vice-president elect of the Philippines.
In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his
loss. Lopez assailed the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and
the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the
PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the
constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice
and the other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET
cannot be validly appealed before the SC or that there may be
conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before
the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.
HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely
conferred a new function to the Supreme Court. Such is within
its power, the Constitution allowed Congress to determine which
body should decide controversies relating to the election of the
President or the Vice President. RA 1793 did not create another
court within the SC for pursuant to the Constitution, the Judicial
power shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as
may be established by law
The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental
law vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely
some specified or limited judicial power, but the judicial
power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety
or all of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution
confers upon some other agency, such as the power to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the Senate and those of the House of
Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely
in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral
Tribunal, respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies
demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of
wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said
authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such
enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies
for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in
the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the
Constitution ordains that Congress shall have the power to
define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental
law.
The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution.
RA 1793 merely added the courts jurisdiction and such can be
validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC
additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid
because the determining of election contests is essentially
judicial.
2. Lansang vs. Garcia
Facts: On the evening of August 21, 1971, two grenades were
thrown at the miting the avance of the Liberal Party killing 8
persons and injuring many. Thus, on August 23 then President
Marcos issued proclamation 889, the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus. Herein petitioners were apprehended by
members of the Philippine Constabulary having invoked the said
proclamation. In effect the proclamation implies that the
authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring
suspension of the writ belongs to the President and it expressly
states that such declaration is deemed final and conclusive
upon the courts and all other persons
August 30: the president issued proclamation 889-A,
amending the previous proclamation.
September 18: proclamation 889-B issued; lifting the
suspension on selected provinces/cities.
September 25: proclamation 889-C issued; lifting the
suspension on selected provinces/cities.
October 4: proclamation 889-D issued; same as 889-C on
selected areas.
In view thereof, 18 provinces, 2 sub-provinces and 18 cities are
still under the suspension of writ of habeas corpus
Issue: Whether the court would adhere to its previous decision
in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda?
Held: First, Proclamation 889-A superseded the original
proclamation and that flaws attributed thereto are formal in
nature. Which actually emphasize the actuality of the intent to
rise in arms. Second, The court intervention: In Sterling vs.
Constantin, Chief Justice Hughes declared that when there is a
substantial showing that the exertion of state power has
overridden private rights secured by the Constitution, the
subject is necessarily one for judicial review. Thus, the grant of
power to suspend the privilege of writ is neither absolute or
unqualified
The declaration of a rebellion as argued by the petitioners need
not to be a wide-scale event, it may be declared even if it only
involves a small part of the country. The president decision to
suspend the writ was by fact constitutional hence VALID, as he
has three available courses to suppress rebellion. First, to call
out the military, second to suspend the privilege of writ and
lastly to declare martial law.
Petitions DENIED; the CFI is directed to conduct preliminary
investigations
3. Isidro Cario vs The Commission on Human
Rights
On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in
Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order
to air grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers were
suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then
investigated, and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro
Cario ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher
and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to
the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the
Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case
and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless,
CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Cario.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and
determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human
rights violation involving civil and political rights.
HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no
judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights
violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and
should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved
therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the
trial.
4. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v SAGUN
FACTS:
Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a
Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She
was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In
1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex
Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty.
Cristeta Leungon but was not recorded and registered with
the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a
Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the
citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on
her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine
citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration
of her election of Philippine citizenship averring that she was
raised as a Filipino and she is a registered voter of Precinct
No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and
had voted in local and national elections as shown in the
Voter Certification. She asserted that by virtue of her
positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine
citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record
of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine
passport.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the
assailed Decision on April 3, 2009 granting the petition and
declaring respondent a Filipino citizen.
Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar
of Baguio City is hereby directed to annotate [on] her birth
certificate, this judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship of
said petitioner.
Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant
recourse via a petition for review on certiorari before us.
Petitioner points out that while respondent executed an oath
of allegiance before a notary public, there was no affidavit of
her election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath
of allegiance which was not registered with the nearest local
civil registry was executed when she was already 33 years
old or 12 years after she reached the age of majority.
ISSUES: Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial
declaration of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and
jurisdictionally permissible;
Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made
twelve (12) years after reaching the age of majority, is
considered to have been made within a reasonable time as
interpreted by jurisprudence.
HELD: The original ruling was reversed.
POLITICAL LAW: requirements of citizenship
The petition is meritorious.
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the
judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts
of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies,
which imply a given right, legally demandable and
enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a
remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of
right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of
the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and
make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise,
such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a
specific declaration of respondents Filipino citizenship as
such pronouncement was not within the court's
competence.
As to the propriety of respondent's petition seeking a judicial
declaration of election of Philippine citizenship, it is
imperative that we determine whether respondent is
required under the law to make an election and if so,
whether she has complied with the procedural requirements
in the election of Philippine citizenship.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the
governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares
as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935
Constitution reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and
an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless,
upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine
citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it
provided that [t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines.
Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was
carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that
[t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority are Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however,
that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the
election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood
as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935
Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to
 challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to
challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of
the new Constitution.
GRANTED.
5. Sinica v. Mula
In this case, assailed was the COMELEC Resolution on Oct. 6, 1998
in SPA No. 98-292, declaring the substitution of mayoralty
candidate Teodoro Sinaca, Jr. by petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca as
invalid.
Facts:
In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinica was a
substitute candidate for the mayoral post of the Matugas Wing after
their original candidate, Teodoro Sinica, Jr., was disqualified for
being convicted of bigamy. He was proclaimed winner after the
canvassing.
(Matugas Wing was a faction in the LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD party, as
well as the Barbers Wing. Each faction has separate candidates for
the mayoral post in the Municipality of Malimono , Surigao del
Norte.)
Respondent Mula (who got Sinica, Jr. disqualified) filed a
disqualification case against Emmanuel Sinica before the COMELEC.
He alleged that said substitution was invalid because:
a) Sinica was not member of the LAKAS party when he was
nominated as a substitute; and
b) it lacks approval of Sen. Barbers as a joint signatory of the
substitution.
The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the disqualification case.
However, when respondent Mula filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
COMELEC en banc set aside the resolution of the Second Division
and disqualified EMMANUEL asserting that the substitution violated
the provisions of Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code that the
substitute must belong to the same political party as the
substituted candidate. Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because
he was an independent candidate for councilor prior to his
nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing
candidate who was a Lakas party member.
Therefore, this case before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON the substitution of Emmanuel Sinica was against the
provisions of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution of 6
October 1998 of the COMELEC en banc is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and another one rendered declaring EMMANUEL SINACA
as having been duly elected mayor of the Municipality of
Malimono , Surigao del Norte.
Ratio Decidendi:
NO. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a
substitute candidate should be a person belonging to and certified
by the same political party as the candidate to be replaced.
Petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca, an independent candidate, had first
withdrawn his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan
Member before he joined the LAKAS party and nominated by the
LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as the substitute candidate. He had filed his
certificate of candidacy and his certificate of nomination as LAKAS
mayoralty candidate signed by Gov. Matugas with his written
acceptance of the party's nomination. Therefore, he is a bona fide
LAKAS member.
There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as
a condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been
a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time
before he can be nominated as such.
6. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS v ANG CHO KIO (NO DIGEST)
The power to revoke a conditional pardon is within the realm of the
executive, and does not fall within the jurisdiction of the judiciary.
Neither does the judiciary have the power to give advisory
opinions. Its main duty is to settle disputes and uphold rights, in the
absence of which it cannot render opinions, as this is not one of its
functions.
FULL TEXT:
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS and THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, petitioners,
vs.
ANG CHO KIO @ ANG MING HUY and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, by the Solicitor General in behalf of the Director
of Prisons and the Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 39018-R of said Court,
entitled "Ang Cho Kio (Ang Ming Huy) Petitioner-Appellee versus The
Director of Prisons and the Executive Secretary, Respondents-
Appellees." 1 In his petition the Solicitor General prays this Court "to render
judgment ordering the striking out from said decision of the portions
recommending to the Executive Secretary 'to allow the (petitioner)
(respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy) to leave this country in the first
available transportation abroad' but otherwise affirming the dismissal of the
petition for habeas corpus, with costs in all instances against respondent Ang
Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy."
The pertinent facts for the purposes of this decision, as shown in the
record, are as follows:
Respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy had been charged, tried and
convicted of various offenses committed in the Philippines and was
sentenced to suffer penalties, to wit: a total of forty-five (45) years, ten
(10) months and twenty one (21) days of imprisonment, P6,000
indemnity, and P5,000 moral damages, plus life imprisonment and
P6,000 indemnity. 2 After serving six and one-half (6-) years of his
sentence said respondent was granted conditional pardon on July 4, 1959 by
the President of the Philippines. The conditional pardon partly reads as
follows:
By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the
Constitution, and upon the recommendation of the Board
of Pardons and Parole, the unexecuted portions of the
prison terms of prisoner ANG CHO KIO @ KIWA @
PHILIPP ANG @ ANG TIU CHIO @ KE WA @ LUCIO
LEE @ GO ONG @ MR. ANG @ GO ANG @ MR. ONG
is hereby remitted on condition that he will voluntarily
leave the Philippines upon his release and never to return
to this country. Should the above-named prisoner refuse
to accept said condition, be shall continue serving his
sentence and upon the expiration thereof, he shall be
deported from the Philippines for being an undesirable
alien.
Ang Cho Kio duly accepted the conditions of his pardon
and actually left the Philippines for Taipeh, Nationalist
China, on July 28, 1959.
In the evening of June 26, 1966 Ang Cho Kio arrived at the Manila
International Airport on a Philippine Air Lines plane from Taipeh, travelling
under the name "Ang Ming Huy." He held a round-trip ticket from Taipeh
to Honolulu, to San Francisco, to Los Angeles, to Chicago, to Washington
D.C. to New York, to Vancouver, to Tokyo, to Seoul, to Osaka, to Taipeh
to Bangkok, to Saigon, to Hongkong and back to Taipeh. He was booked
on Philippine Air Lines earliest connecting flight to Honolulu on June 29,
1966 at 6:30 p.m., or with a stop-over of about 72 hours in Manila. He
surrendered his passport to the immigration authorities at the Manila
International Airport, and was issued a note that his departure was
scheduled for June 29, 1966 at 6:30 p.m. He left his luggage at the
airport and was issued claim tags. He registered for a three-day stay at
the El Presidente Hotel at Paraaque, Rizal. He contacted his two friends
in Manila, Lim Pin and Go Bon Kim. These two friends invited him to stay
longer in the Philippines. On June 28, 1966 he and his two friends went
to the Bureau of Immigration, where his friend Lim Pin signed a letter
addressed to the Commissioner of Immigration requesting for a fourteen-
day extension of stay in the Philippines for him. Ang Cho Kio was
identified by inspector Mariano Cristi of the Immigration Bureau as the
Ang Cho Kio who was deported to Taipeh on July 18, 1959. His identity
having been established, Ang Cho Kio was arrested, and the immigration
authorities conducted an investigation regarding his presence in the
Philippines. The immigration authorities did not allow him to proceed with
his trip to Honolulu. On July 5, 1966 the Executive Secretary, by authority
of the President, ordered him recommitted to prison to serve the
unexpired portion of the sentence that were imposed on him, for having
violated the conditioned of his pardon. The supplemental order of
recommitment reads as follows:
 TO THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL
WHEREAS, ANG CHO KIO @ KIWA & PHILIPP ANG @
ANG TIU CHIO @ KI WA @ LUCIO DEE @ GO ONG @
MR. ANG @ GO ANG @ MR. ONG was granted
conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines on
July 4, 1959, upon the condition that he will voluntarily
leave the Philippines upon his release and never to return
to this country; and
WHEREAS, said ANG CHO KIO has violated the
condition of his pardon in that on June 26, 1966, he
returned to this country from Taipei and gained entry
under an assumed name, ANG MING HUY, failed to leave
on the first available connecting flight to Honolulu, his
alleged destination; instead requested a fourteen day
extension of his 72-hour transient stop-over; and had in
December 1965 applied for a temporary visitor's visa to
Manila also under his assumed name, ANG MING HUY;
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority conferred
upon the President of the Philippines by Section 64(i) of
the Revised Administrative Code, you are hereby ordered
to recommit to prison said ANG CHO KIO @ KIWA @
PHILIPP ANG @ ANG TIU CHIO @ KI WA @ LUCIO
DEE @ GO ONG @ MR. ANG @ GO ANG @ MR. ONG
@ ANG MING HUY to serve the unexpired portion of the
sentences for which he was originally committed to
prison, and upon expiration thereof, to deliver said person
to the custody of the Commissioner of Immigration for
immediate deportation for being an undesirable alien.
Manila, July 5, 1966.
By Authority of the President: (Sgd.) RAFAEL M. SALAS
Executive Secretary RS/ara.
Ang Cho Kio filed with the Executive Secretary a motion, dated August
29, 1966, for the reconsideration of the supplemental order of
recommitment. The Executive Secretary failed to act on the motion for
reconsideration, and so on October 5, 1966 Ang Cho Kio filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Pasay Branch), making as respondents in said petition the Director of
Prisons and the Executive secretary. Under date of October 10, 1966, the
officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Prisons filed his return. Under date of
October 17, 1966, the Solicitor General filed a return for the Director of
Prisons and the Executive Secretary.
After due hearing the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on January 31,
1967, rendered a decision dismissing the petition for habeas corpus. The
Court of First Instance of Rizal held that Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy
was validly recommitted to prison by the President of the Philippines in
the exercise of his prerogatives pursuant to the provisions of Section
64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
Ang Cho Kio appealed to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. In the decision of a special division of five
justices, with three justices concurring, and two justices concurring and
dissenting, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which in effect
affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing
Ang Cho Kio's petition for habeas corpus.
We read the following in the majority opinion:
It having been settled that Section 64(i) of the Revised
Administrative Code is still in force, and that the
respondent Executive Secretary, in the name and by
authority of the President, exercised the power of
recommitment herein under the provisions of said Code,
and not under Art. 159 of the Revised Penal Code, it
becomes apparent that any discussion regarding failure to
file the corresponding indictment and the presence or
absence of criminal intent, will be off-tangent. On the
contrary, the issue, in this connection, is whether the
courts of justice may interfere in the exercise by the
President, thru his Executive Secretary, of his
administrative power of recommitment. Again, it is
settled jurisprudence that the Chief Executive may
determine, alone and by himself, whether the condition
attached to a pardon given by him has been violated; and
in the exercise of this prerogative, the courts may not
interfere, however erroneous the findings may be
 (Espuelas v. The Provincial Warden, supra; Tesoro v.
Director of Prisons, 68 Phil. 154).
The aforequoted portion of the majority opinion affirms the reasons of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in dismissing the petition for habeas
corpus. However, the majority opinion contains the recommendation that
Ang Cho Kio
... be sent out at once from this country and that he be
allowed to leave Muntinlupa Prisons under guard only
when he has been booked for outward flight at the Manila
International Airport so as to avoid the possibility of any
further violation of his conditional pardon. At any rate it
would be to the best interest of the security and peace of
this country to have the petitioner expatriated from the
Philippines, instead of being recommitted for a long
duration of time to prison where his presence may
constitute a constant menace to our country's welfare and
bring about some sinister influence among the people
with whom he will associate or come in contact.
Then the dispositive portion of the majority opinion reads as follows:
FOR ALL OF THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petition
herein filed is hereby dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner, and with a reiteration of the recommendation to
allow the petitioner to leave this country in the first
available transportation abroad made in the course of this
decision. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Executive Secretary.
The concurring and dissenting opinion of the two justices opens with the
following statement:
We concur with the majority opinion insofar as the
dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus of
petitioner-appellant Ang Cho Kio is concerned, for such
dismissal, in effect, is equivalent to an affirmance of the
appealed decision. However, we beg to dissent from that
portion of the majority opinion recommending that said
petitioner-appellant be allowed to leave this country by
the first available transportation.
In due time the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a motion
for reconsideration, praying for the deletion from the majority opinion of
the recommendation to allow Ang Cho Kio to leave the country on the
first available transportation abroad. The Court of Appeals, by a vote of
three to two in the special division which decided the case, denied the
motion. Hence this appeal by certiorari by the Solicitor General to this
Court.
It is now contended by the Solicitor General that the majority of the
special division of five justices of the Court of Appeals erred in making a
recommendation to allow respondent Ang Cho Kio to have this country
on the first available transportation abroad. The Solicitor General
maintains that the recommendation is not a part of the decision binding
upon the parties, and is uncalled for; that it gives the decision a political
complexion, because courts are not empowered to make such a
recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the exercise of judicial
powers; that there is no law which gives the court the authority to
recommend to the President the voluntary departure of an undesirable
alien who is lawfully committed to jail; that the deportation of aliens
sentenced by the courts for violation of the laws of the land, and even the
act of merely allowing such convicted aliens to voluntarily leave the
country, is an act of state exercised solely in the discretion of the Chief
Executive. It is urged by the Solicitor General that the act of sending an
undesirable alien out of the country is political in character, and the courts
should not interfere with, nor attempt to influence, the political acts of the
Chief Executive.
In a motion dated April 7, 1969, Ang Cho Kio manifested that he waived
his right to file an answer to any brief filed by the Solicitor General. 4
We agree with the Solicitor General. The case before the Court of
Appeals was for habeas corpus. The only question to be resolved by the
Court of Appeals was whether, or not, the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
had rightly dismissed the petition of Ang Cho Kio for habeas corpus. The
Court of Appeals was not called upon to review any sentence imposed
upon Ang Cho Kio. The sentence against him had long become final,
and, in fact, he has served part of the sentence when he was extended
pardon on July 4, 1959, upon the condition that he should leave the
country, never to return. The opinion of the three justices of the special
division of the Court of Appeals, to which the two other justices have
concurred, found that the recommitment to prison of Ang Cho Kio was
done in the exercise by the President of the Philippines of his power
pursuant to the provision of Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative
Code, and the courts should not interfere with the exercise of that power.
The majority opinion should have been limited to the affirmance of the
decision of the lower court, and no more.
The recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction are limited to
those expressly provided in the law and such law is the provision of
Section 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may
deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by
law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act
should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending
the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement
of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused
by the offense.
Certainly, the recommendation in the majority opinion of the special
division of the Court of Appeals, now in question, is not authorized under
the aforequoted provision of Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Court of Appeals was not called upon to review any sentence that was
imposed on Ang Cho Kio. It was simply called upon to determine whether
Ang Cho Kio was illegally confined, or not, in the insular penitentiary
under the Director of Prisons. We do not consider it proper that the
majority of the justices in the special division make a recommendation
that would suggest a modification or a correction of the act of the Chief
Executive, after the same justices have said in their opinion "that the
Chief Executive may determine, alone and by himself, whether the
condition attached to a pardon given by him had been violated; and in the
exercise of this prerogative, the courts may not interfere, however
erroneous the findings may be." When the Chief Executive, exercising his
powers pursuant to Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code,
ordered Ang Cho Kio recommitted to prison, it is assumed that the Chief
Executive had decided that Ang Cho Kio should be dealt with that way
under the circumstances. For the court to suggest to the Chief Executive
to modify his decision to recommit Ang Cho Kio to prison by allowing him
to leave the country instead is indeed to interfere with the functions of the
Chief Executive. It would be, as urged by the Solicitor General, an
interference on, or an attempt to influence, the exercise by the Chief
Executive of the political powers of his office. The matter of whether an
alien who violated the laws in this country may remain or be deported is a
political question that should be left entirely to the Chief Executive to
decide. Under the principle of separation of powers, it is not within the
province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or express a suggestion,
that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of the action of the Chief
Executive on matters purely political in nature.
It may be said that the recommendation embodied in the majority opinion
of the special division of the Court of Appeals simply represents the
private opinion of the three justices, and judges should be left free to
express even their private opinions in judicial decisions. We believe,
however, that the better practice should be that the decision of a court
should contain only opinion that is relevant to the question that is before
the court for decision. After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom
or morality of laws, but only in the interpretation and application of the
law. We believe that judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant
opinions in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably upon their
competence and the propriety of their judicial actuations.
However, of the ten members of the Court, as presently constituted, only
five are of the opinion that the recommendation embodied in the decision
of the majority of the special division of the Court of Appeals, now in
question, should be deleted from the decision. 5 Two members of the Court
are of a different opinion, 6 and three others did not take part in the decision
because of their official actuations relative to the case of respondent Ang
Cho Kio before it reached this Court. 7 There is, therefore, one vote less than the majority
of the Court that is necessary to grant the certiorari prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied, and the
decision of the special division of the Court of Appeals stands. No costs.

7. DE LA LLANA v ALBA
FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice
from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except
the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed
to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered
separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their
incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it
being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of
justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution.
RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the
judges and justices from their services. What is important is the
validity of the abolition of their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not
amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that,
in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent
office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict
law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not
arise.
8. ECHEGARAY v SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
PARTIES:
Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY
Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public
respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO
arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on
finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the
executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray
despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been
rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in
effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the
source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as
denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their
decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to
save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the
simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to
life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the
Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final
conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate
powers of the three branches of our government.
9. RADIOWEALTH INC v AGREGADO
The preservation of Judiciarys integrity and effectiveness is
necessary. Corollary to this is the power of judiciary to
maintain its existence. The quality of the government
depends upon the independence of judiciary and the
officials of the government cannot deprive the courts of
 anything which is vital to their functions. Furthermore, the
prerogatives of this court which the Constitution secures
against interference include not only the powers to
adjudicate cases but all things that are REASONABLY
necessary for the administration of justice. The purchase of
the necessary equipment would contribute to a more
effective judiciary. Lastly, these are implied and incidental
powers that are as essential to the existence of the court as
the powers specifically granted to it.
FACTS:
A Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker were bought for
Pho 585 and installed in the second and third floor of the
Malacanang Annex which houses the Supreme Court.
The Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee (appointed by
the President) disapproved of the purchase and its installation
invoking EO 302 which discontinues open market purchases.
Petitioners also contend that Judicial functions do not include
purchase of property.
Radiowealth, Inc. (vendor) is now requesting that the payment be
approved however, the Auditor of the SC refused to countersign the
warrant for payment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Judicial Dept can make purchases without the
prior approval of the Executive?
HELD: YES, they can.
RD:
Found in a ruling in Tarlac VS Gale
All three departments are co-equal and co-important, each is
independent from the other and cannot control or interfere with
each other in the exercise of special functions.
Judiciary has the power to maintain its existence and do whatever
is necessary to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and
ensure effectiveness in the administration of justice.
Officials of the government who owe duty to the court under the
law cannot deprive the courts of anything vital to their functions.
Officials and boards are duty-bound to construct or purchase offices
or court rooms and furnish them. They also have to insure that the
character of these rooms would permit the court to exercise its
functions in a reasonably effective manner.
In case of conflict to, the court shall overpower the officials as they
will be the ultimate judge in determining what is necessary for its
efficiency.
Officials have the power to assign a particular room or court room
to the Court of First Instance and change the assignments provided
that the new rooms are reasonable adequate.
Courts have the power to refuse dispossession of the room if they
deem that the new room would be inadequate in the exercise of
their duties.
If board refuses to furnish the articles mentioned by law, then the
court would have the power either to purchase things directly or by
proper proceedings to compel the officials to perform their duties to
the law.
Executive does not have power over the purchase of books and
other office equipment needed for the convenient transaction of its
business.
Court could not maintain its independence and dignity if it
executive could determine what the courts should have. They are
of equal footing when it comes to the requisition of for fixtures,
equipment and supplies.
10.RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE
APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES PURCHAED BY
THE RETIRED CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SC
NO DIGEST: FULL TEXT DIFF DOCU
11.IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT OF
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY
 MOVEMENT v ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVT FUND
AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY
NO DIGEST: FULL TEXT DIFF DOCU
12.MARBURY v MADISON
Marbury v. Madison, arguably the most important case in Supreme
Court history, was the first U.S. Supreme Court case to apply the
principle of "judicial review" -- the power of federal courts to void
acts of Congress in conflict with the Constitution. Written in 1803
by Chief Justice John Marshall, the decision played a key role in
making the Supreme Court a separate branch of government on
par with Congress and the executive.
The facts surrounding Marbury were complicated. In the election of
1800, the newly organized Democratic-Republican party of Thomas
Jefferson defeated the Federalist party of John Adams, creating an
atmosphere of political panic for the lame duck Federalists. In the
final days of his presidency, Adams appointed a large number of
justices of peace for the District of Columbia whose commissions
were approved by the Senate, signed by the president, and affixed
with the official seal of the government. The commissions were not
delivered, however, and when President Jefferson assumed office
March 5, 1801, he ordered James Madison, his Secretary of State,
not to deliver them. William Marbury, one of the appointees, then
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, or legal
order, compelling Madison to show cause why he should not
receive his commission.
In resolving the case, Chief Justice Marshall answered three
questions. First, did Marbury have a right to the writ for which he
petitioned? Second, did the laws of the United States allow the
courts to grant Marbury such a writ? Third, if they did, could the
Supreme Court issue such a writ? With regard to the first question,
Marshall ruled that Marbury had been properly appointed in
accordance with procedures established by law, and that he
therefore had a right to the writ. Secondly, because Marbury had a
legal right to his commission, the law must afford him a remedy.
The Chief Justice went on to say that it was the particular
responsibility of the courts to protect the rights of individuals --
even against the president of the United States. At the time,
Marshall's thinly disguised lecture to President Jefferson about the
rule of law was much more controversial than his statement about
judicial review (which doctrine was widely accepted).
It was in answering the third question -- whether a writ of
mandamus issuing from the Supreme Court was the proper remedy
-- that Marshall addressed the question of judicial review. The Chief
Justice ruled that the Court could not grant the writ because
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which granted it the right to
do so, was unconstitutional insofar as it extended to cases
of original jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction -- the power to bring
cases directly to the Supreme Court -- was the only jurisdictional
matter dealt with by the Constitution itself. According to Article III,
it applied only to cases "affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls" and to cases "in which the state shall be
party." By extending the Court's original jurisdiction to include
cases like Marbury's, Congress had exceeded its authority. And
when an act of Congress is in conflict with the Constitution, it is,
Marshall said, the obligation of the Court to uphold the Constitution
because, by Article VI, it is the "supreme law of the land."
As a result of Marshall's decision Marbury was denied his
commission -- which presumably pleased President Jefferson.
Jefferson was not pleased with the lecture given him by the Chief
Justice, however, nor with Marshall's affirmation of the Court's
power to review acts of Congress. For practical strategic reasons,
Marshall did not say that the Court was the only interpreter of the
Constitution (though he hoped it would be) and he did not say how
the Court would enforce its decisions if Congress or the Executive
opposed them. But, by his timely assertion of judicial review, the
Court began its ascent as an equal branch of government -- an
equal in power to the Congress and the president. Throughout its
long history, when the Court needed to affirm its legitimacy, it has
cited Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison.
2ND DIGEST
In Marbury v. Madison (1803) the Supreme Court announced
for the first time the principle that a court may declare an
act of Congress void if it is inconsistent with the
 Constitution. William Marbury had been appointed a justice
of the peace for the District of Columbia in the final hours of
the Adams administration. When James Madison, Thomas
Jeffersons secretary of state, refused to deliver Marburys
commission, Marbury, joined by three other similarly
situated appointees, petitioned for a writ of mandamus
compelling delivery of the commissions.
Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court,
denied the petition and refused to issue the writ. Although
he found that the petitioners were entitled to their
commissions, he held that the Constitution did not give the
Supreme Court the power to issue writs of mandamus.
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that such
writs might be issued, but that section of the act was
inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore invalid.
Although the immediate effect of the decision was to deny
power to the Court, its long-run effect has been to increase
the Courts power by establishing the rule that it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Since Marbury v.
Madison the Supreme Court has been the final arbiter of the
constitutionality of congressional legislation.
13.PHILIPPINE ASSOC OF COLLEGES & UNIV (PACU) v SEC
OF EDUC
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU)
assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act
No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to
regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is
provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured from
the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted the
right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the
Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that
must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the
Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from
being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a
school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring
previous governmental approval or permit before such person could
exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a
practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also
avers that such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an
undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue
delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the
standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said discretion;
that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to
censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is
unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy
presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury from the
exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to
him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the
ownership of schools. The Constitution provides for state control of
all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain
fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of
moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and
vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of
citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by
the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that
are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of the power of
control and regulation by the State over all schools.
14.EXECUTIVE SEC v CA (2004)
Facts: The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 RA 8042 was,
thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila
Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian
Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed,
on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63
of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g),
Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7,
paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a
plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein
from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law.
Peitioner claims that great majority of the duly licensed
recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their
operations for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of
a law that are unjust and unconstitutional.
On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order effective for a period of only twenty (20) days
therefrom. After the petitioners filed their comment on the
petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the
amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption thereof
eleven (11) other corporations which it alleged were its
members and which it represented in the suit, and a plea for a
temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6 subsection (k) and
paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10,
paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of Rep. Act No.
8042.
The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of
Rep. Act No. 8042 violate Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution. 5 According to the respondent, Section 6(g) and (i)
discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and,
as such, violated the equal protection clause, as well as Article
II, Section 12 6 and Article XV, Sections 1 7 and 3(3) of the
Constitution. 8 As the law encouraged the deployment of skilled
Filipino workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted
rights. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have
the right to seek employment abroad.
According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to
due process is violated because they are prevented from finding
employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued
that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers,
while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was
pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are
subjected to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the
prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would
only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.
According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to
service contractors and manning agencies to the exclusion of all
other licensed and authorized recruiters is an invalid
classification. Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus
deprived of their right to property and due process and to the
"equality of the person." It is understandable for the law to
prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed
and registered recruiters is unconstitutional.
The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections
(a) to (m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized
recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal
recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished
between recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders
thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does
not make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b)
being based on an invalid classification are, therefore,
repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being
excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1),
Article III of the Constitution. 9 It was also pointed out that the
penalty for officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies
who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal
recruitment under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment.
The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and
paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8, 9 and 10, paragraph 2 of
the law violate Section 22, Article III of the Constitution 10
prohibiting ex-post facto laws and bills of attainder. This is
because the provisions presume that a licensed and registered
recruitment agency is guilty of illegal recruitment involving
economic sabotage, upon a finding that it committed any of the
prohibited acts under the law. Furthermore, officials, employees
and their relatives are presumed guilty of illegal recruitment
involving economic sabotage upon such finding that they
committed any of the said prohibited acts.
The respondent further argued that the 90-day period in
Section 10, paragraph (1) within which a labor arbiter should
decide a money claim is relatively short, and could deprive
licensed and registered recruiters of their right to due process.
The period within which the summons and the complaint would
be served on foreign employees and, thereafter, the filing of the
answer to the complaint would take more than 90 days. This
would thereby shift on local licensed and authorized recruiters
the burden of proving the defense of foreign employers.
The respondent asserted that the following provisions of the law
are unconstitutional:
SEC. 9. Venue. A criminal action arising from illegal
recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional
Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was
committed or where the offended party actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the court
where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction
to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the
aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions
that have already been filed in court at the time of the
effectivity of this Act.
In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged, inter
alia, that (a) the respondent has no cause of action for a
declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as the rules
implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been released as
yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of
the Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in
the exercise of the police power of the State.
In opposition to the respondent's plea for injunctive relief,
the petitioners averred that: As earlier shown, the amended
petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit for failure of
petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that the assailed law is
unconstitutional, apart from the defect and impropriety of the
petition.
On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a
four-page decision dismissing the petition and affirming the
assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
trial court. The appellate court, likewise, denied the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
Issue: The core issue in this case is whether or not the trial
court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and
the writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of only P50,000;
and
Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the trial
court's order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it.
Held: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED. The assailed decision of the appellate court is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court
dated August 21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401 and the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by it in the said case on
August 24, 1995 are NULLIFIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ratio: The matter of whether to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction or not is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. However, if the court commits grave abuse of its
discretion in issuing the said writ amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction, the same may be nullified via a writ of certiorari
and prohibition.
The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face,
does not of itself justify an injunction against good faith
attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith,
harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call
for equitable relief. The "on its face" invalidation of statutes has
been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally
disfavored.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party
must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to
succeed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips
decidedly in its favor.

Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes does
not automatically render them unconstitutional, so the chilling
effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of
certain laws on the statute books does not in itself justify
prohibiting the State from carrying out the important and
necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful
conduct that the State believes in good faith to be punishable
under its laws and the Constitution.
One who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must
prove its invalidity beyond reasonable doubt (Caleon v. Agus
Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748). All reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This presumption of
constitutionality is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoin upon each department a becoming respect
for the acts of the other departments (Garcia vs. Executive
Secretary, 204 SCRA 516 [1991]).
In view of petitioner's standing
The petitioners contend that the respondent has no locus
standi. It is a non-stock, non-profit organization; hence, not the
real party-in-interest as petitioner in the action. Although the
respondent filed the petition in the Regional Trial Court in behalf
of licensed and registered recruitment agencies, it failed to
adduce in evidence a certified copy of its Articles of
Incorporation and the resolutions of the said members
authorizing it to represent the said agencies in the proceedings.
Neither is the suit of the respondent a class suit so as to vest in
it a personality to assail Rep. Act No. 8042; the respondent is
service-oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to
represent are profit-oriented.
The petition is meritorious. The respondent has locus standi
to file the petition in the RTC in representation of the eleven
licensed and registered recruitment agencies impleaded in the
amended petition. The modern view is that an association has
standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses
the legal identity of an association with that of its members. 16
An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its
lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action.
An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its
constituents.
We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the
respondent was organized for the purposes inter alia of
promoting and supporting the growth and development of the
manpower recruitment industry, both in the local and
international levels; providing, creating and exploring
employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its
general membership; enhancing and promoting the general
welfare and protection of Filipino workers; and, to act as the
representative of any individual, company, entity or association
on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and
to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the
purposes embodied therein.
In view of standing in behalf of unskilled workers
However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the
petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers. We note that it
even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition.
Furthermore, in failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the
eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies it claimed
to represent, the respondent failed to comply with Section 2 of
Rule 63 20 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since the eleven
licensed and registered recruitment agencies for which the
respondent filed the suit are specifically named in the petition,
the amended petition is deemed amended to avoid multiplicity
of suits.
In view of retroactivity
In People v. Diaz, 24 we held that Rep. Act No. 8042 is but an
amendment of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is not an
ex-post facto law because it is not applied retroactively.
In view of equal protection clause
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures
is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or
accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to
ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police
power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or
professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to
pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed
fit to practice their trade.
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to
invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support
their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed
regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to
contract.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against
undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is
directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not
require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated
alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities imposed.
In view of the VALIDITY of Sec. 6 of RA 8042
The validity of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 which provides that
employees of recruitment agencies may be criminally liable for
illegal recruitment has been upheld in People v. Chowdury: An
employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal
recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his
employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously
participated in illegal recruitment.
By its rulings, the Court thereby affirmed the validity of the
assailed penal and procedural provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042,
including the imposable penalties therefor. Until the Court, by
final judgment, declares that the said provisions are
unconstitutional, the enforcement of the said provisions cannot
be enjoined.
Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies and
their officers and employees and their relatives employed in
government agencies charged with the enforcement of the law
for illegal recruitment and imposing life imprisonment for those
who commit large scale illegal recruitment is not offensive to
the Constitution. The accused may be convicted of illegal
recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment only if, after trial,
the prosecution is able to prove all the elements of the crime
charged.
The respondent merely speculated and surmised that
licensed and registered recruitment agencies would close shop
and stop business operations because of the assailed penal
provisions of the law. A writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
the enforcement of penal laws cannot be based on such
conjectures or speculations. The respondent even failed to
adduce any evidence to prove irreparable injury because of the
enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No. 8042. Its fear or
apprehension that, because of time constraints, its members
would have to defend foreign employees in cases before the
Labor Arbiter is based on speculations. Even if true, such
inconvenience or difficulty is hardly irreparable injury.
Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and
syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain
employment abroad is one of the primary considerations that
led to the enactment of The Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at affording greater protection to
overseas Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on
existing laws in the recruitment and placement of workers for
overseas employment.
By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the
petitioners sans any evidence, the trial court frustrated, albeit
temporarily, the prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed
them to continue victimizing hapless and innocent people
desiring to obtain employment abroad as overseas workers, and
blocked the attainment of the salutary policies 52 embedded in
Rep. Act No. 8042.
The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
 assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction. It is for this
reason that the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the enforcement of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court.
15.TAADA v TUVERA (READ FT)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern
as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal
of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law
or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the
height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in
the Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general
applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no force and effect.
16.KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO
FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease
Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment
and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of
ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net
receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to
employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon
the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25
million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid
because it is the same as the Contract of Lease.
Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease..
It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law
regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987
Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has
become the law of the case
Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease.
There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is
advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO
does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral
crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they
were not parties to the contract
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining
the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled
rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues
were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since
the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before
in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be
regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the
cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An
issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former
suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action
between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But
the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially
unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding
involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form
separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court
is free in the second proceeding to make an independent
examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different
contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of
the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional
law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The
more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES
in INTEREST.
17.TOLENTINO v SECRETARY OF FINANCE
Facts:
- House of Rep. filed House Bill 11197 (An Act Restructuring
the VAT System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance its Admin.,
Amending for these Purposes)
- Upon receipt of Senate, Senate filed another bill completely
different from that of the House Bill
- Senate finished debates on the bill and had the 2nd and
3rd reading of the Bill on the same day
- Bill was deliberated upon in the Conference Committee and
become enrolled bill which eventually became the EVAT law.
Procedural Issue:
(1) WoN RA 7716 originated exclusively from the House of Rep. in
accordance with sec 24, art 6 of Consti
(2) WoN the Senate bill violated the three readings on separate
days requirement of the Consti
(3) WoN RA 7716 violated sec 26(1), art 6 - one subject, one title
rule.
NOTE: This case was filed by PAL because before the EVAT Law,
they were exempt from taxes. After the passage of EVAT, they were
already included. PAL contended that neither the House or Senate
bill provided for the removal of the exemption from taxes of PAL
and that it was inly made after the meeting of the Conference
Committee w/c was not expressed in the title of RA 7166
Held:
(1) YES! Court said that it is not the law which should originate
from the House of Rep, but the revenue bill which was required to
originate from the House of Rep. The inititiative must ocme from
the Lower House because they are elected in the district level
meaning they are expected to be more sensitive to the needs of
the locality.
Also, a bill originating from the Lower House may undergo
extensive changes while in the Senate. Senate can introduce a
separate and distinct bill other than the one the Lower House
proposed. The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the House
bill, so long as action by Senate is withheld pending the receipt of
the House bill.
(2) NO. The Pres. certified that the Senate bill was urgent.
Presidential certification dispensed the requirement not only of
printing but also reading the bill in 3 separate days. In fact, the
Senate accepted the Pres. certification
(3) No. Court said that the title states that the purpose of the
statute is to expand the VAT system and one way of doing this is to
widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted
before. It is also in the power of Congress to amend, alter, repeal
grant of franchises for operation of public utility when the common
good so requires.
One subject rule is intended to prevent surprise upon Congress
members and inform people of pending legislation. In the case of
PAL, they did not know of their situation not because of any defect
in title but because they might have not noticed its publication until
some event calls attention to its existence.
18.LOZANO v NOGRALES
Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their
capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the
nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution
Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose
of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon
a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress. Both
petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would
warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article
XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the
Constitution. The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is
unconstitutional for deviation from the prescribed procedures to
amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the Philippines
from the complete process of proposing amendments to the
Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.
Issue:
Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating
the HR1109.
Held:
No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a
Constituent Assembly and adopt some Rules for proposing changes
to the charter. The House has said it would forward H.Res.1109 to
the Senate for its approval and adoption and the possible
promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent Resolution convening the
Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners have not
sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act
complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the
House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the
purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure
have yet been adopted. No proposal has yet been made, and
hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet
taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential
example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not
occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has
not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention
from this Court. Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a
particular and concrete injury.
The petitions were dismissed.
19.GALICTO v AQUINO III
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation
Address the alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and other
benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of
the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System a government
owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which has been
unable to meet its standing obligations. Subsequently, the
Senate conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of
GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs). Based on
its findings, officials and governing boards of various GOCCs
and GFIs have been granting themselves unwarranted
allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other
benefits as well as other irregular and abusive practices.
Consequently, the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17
urging the President to order the immediate suspension of
the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances,
bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the
governing boards of GOCCs and GFIs. Heeding the call of
Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7,
entitled Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation
and Position Classification System in the GOCCs and GFIs,
and for Other Purposes. EO 7 provided for the guiding
principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation
and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs.
EO 7 was published and precluded the Board of Directors,
Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs from granting and
releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board
of directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting
new or additional benefits and allowances to their
employees.
The respondents pointed out the following procedural defects
as grounds for the petition's dismissal: (1) the petitioner
lacks locus standi; and (2) certiorari is not applicable
to this case.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10149, otherwise known as the GOCC Governance
Act of 2011. Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the
President to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and
GFIs.
ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy.
HELD: Petition is dismissed.
REMEDIAL LAW: formal and procedural infirmities
Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition are availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial
and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not
judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for
certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a
petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper
recourse to assail the validity of EO 7.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: locus standi
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question on standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.
In the present case, the petitioner has not demonstrated that
he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of
the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and
based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of
future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but
be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be
sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and,
therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of
legal standing to assail EO 7.
The petition has been mooted by supervening events.
Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed
out that the present case has already been rendered moot by
the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in
the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering their board of
directors/trustees to determine their own compensation
system, in favor of the grant of authority to the President to
perform this act. With the enactment of the GOCC
Governance Act of 2011, the President is now authorized to
fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
DISMISSED.
20.MOLDEX REALTY v HLURB (NO DIGEST)

21.FABIAN V DESIERTO
FACTS:
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction
project including those under the FMED. Later, misunderstanding
and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties. Fabian
tried to terminate their relationship but Agustin refused and
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the
aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-
complaint dated July 24, 1995.
A complaint sought the dismissal of Agustin for violation of Section
19, R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of P.D.
No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his
preventive suspension. The case later led to an appeal to the
Ombudsman - who inhibited himself - and transferred the case to
the Deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and
in the order exonerated the private respondents from the
administrative charges.
Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all
administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from
receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or
denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives
or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to
the Supreme Court.
RULING:
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an
appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a
law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify
such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly
explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals,
et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over
cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
22.SAMEER OVERSEAS v CABILES
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is
a recruitment and placement agency.
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year
employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy
was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June
26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed
to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to
work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr.
Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she
was terminated and that she should immediately report to their
office to get her salary and passport. She was asked to prepare
for immediate repatriation. Joy claims that she was told that from
June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15
According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her
plane ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. LA
dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LAs decision. CA affirmed
the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding
respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months
worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation,
and attorneys fees
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired
portion of her salary due to illegal dismissal.
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month
equivalent of respondents salary should be increased to the
amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment
contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that the clause or
for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause and substantive due process.
A statute or provision which was declared
unconstitutional is not a law. It confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative
as if it has not been passed at all.
The Court said that they are aware that the clause or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of
Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Ruling on the constitutional issue
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No
branch or office of the government may exercise its powers in any
manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the
existence of any law that supports such exercise. The
Constitutioncannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be
read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it
is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is
inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or
provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so
changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time
as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional
rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as
the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in
the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the clause, or for three
(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less
in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore,
null and void.
23.DE AGBAYANI v PNB
FACTS: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939,
maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage. On
July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan, defendant
instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of
the balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with
his suit against both alleging that the mortgage sought to be
foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from
the date of maturity. PNB on the other hand claims that the defense
of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10,
1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948,
when the subsequent legislative act 2 extending the period of
moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the
computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps
for the recovery of the loan. The lower court did not find such
contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.
ISSUE: W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act
extending the Moratorium Law before the same were declared
invalid tolled the period of prescription (Effect of the declaration of
Unconstitutionality of a law)
HELD: YES. In the language of an American Supreme Court
decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of
the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. 4
The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or
executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact
to which legal consequences are attached. Precisely because of the
judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental
response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferers, this
Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive in
their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that
Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force,
prescription did not run.
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiffs suit is thus
manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13,
1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by
appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen
years. The prescriptive period was tolled however, from March 10,
1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953,
when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering
eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously then, when
resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage
obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be
availed of as a defense.
24.TAN v BARRIOS
WITH FT
FACTS: Petitioners, who were civilians, were charged before
Military Commission No. 1 with murder and unlawful possession of
a pistol. They were acquitted. Two informations for illegal
possession of a firearm and murder were filed against petitioners in
the Regional Trial Court on the basis of the claim of the government
that the proceedings before the military commission were void,
since it had no jurisdiction over civilians.
HELD: The decision nullifying the proceedings in military
commissions against civilians cannot adversely affect petitioners,
who were not parties to the case. To apply the ruling to them will
violate their right to due process. In the interest of justice, the
decision should be applied prospectively to future cases and cases
where no final decision had been rendered. It will be a cruel
distortion of the decision to reprosecute civilians who have been
acquitted. The trial of civilians by military commission is an
operative fact that may not be justly ignored. The doctrine of
double jeopardy protects petitioner from a second prosecution. To
deprive them of the protection of the judgment of acquittal by
retroactively divesting the military commission of
its jurisdiction over them will amount to an ex post facto ruling.
(Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686)
25.Planters Products Inc s Fertiphil Corp
FACTS: Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private
corporations incorporated under Philippine laws, both engaged in
the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and
agricultural chemicals.
Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1465, imposing a capital
recovery component of Php10.00 per bag of fertilizer. The levy was
to continue until adequate capital was raised to make PPI
financially viable. Fertiphil remitted to the Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority (FPA), which was then remitted the depository bank of
PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from 1985 to 1986.
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the
imposition of the P10 levy. Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of
the amount it remitted, however PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a
complaint for collection and damages, questioning the
constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was unjust,
unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that
amounted to a denial of due process. PPI argues that Fertiphil has
no locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465
because it does not have a "personal and substantial interest in the
case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement." It
asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the imposition
because "incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the
farmers themselves, not on the seller fertilizer company.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465.
What is the power of taxation?
RULING: Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury;
doctrine of standing is a mere procedural technicality which may be
waived.
The imposition of the levy was an exercise of the taxation power of
the state. While it is true that the power to tax can be used as an
implement of police power, the primary purpose of the levy was
revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if
revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then
the exaction is properly called a tax.
Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the
State. These powers are distinct and have different tests for
validity. Police power is the power of the State to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare, while the power of taxation is the
power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The main
purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct,
while taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful subjects" and
"lawful means" tests are used to determine the validity of a law
enacted under the police power. The power of taxation, on the
other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional
limitations.
26.LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PH v COMELEC
League of Cities v. Comelec
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo,
City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the constitutionality
of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills
converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not
act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act
No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into
a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities
solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the
12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to
exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the
24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the
11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the
Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to
the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the
P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the
cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in
February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7
June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on
various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents
signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to
determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality
approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in
the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the
same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under
Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to
the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application,
because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills
became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all
the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the
national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a
municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing
no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent
and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government
Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on
unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting
a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written
in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would
still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
27.REPUBLIC v EXPRESS TELECOM
Facts: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted
Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a Cellular Mobile
Telephone System/Service (CMTS) on its own initiative applying
Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1987 Rules of Practice and Procedures.
Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied
the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National
Administrative Register where the phrase on its own initiative
were deleted and since the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the
UP Law Center.
Issue: WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law
Center is the law in force and effect in granting provisional
authority.
Held: No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which
implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the
operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National
Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules.
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules and
regulations can take effect.
28.FORTICH v CORONA
DOCTRINE: The orderly administration of justice requires that the
judgements/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach
a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations; a resolution
which substantially modifies a decision after it has attained finality
is utterly void. When an administrative agency's decision becomes
final and executory and no one has seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said agency has lost its jurisdiction to
re-open the case, more so modify its decision.
FACTS:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a
decision converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to
agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of farmer-
beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9,
1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of
Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998 elections)
intervened on behalf of the farmers.
Because of this blackmail, the OP re-opened the case and
through Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the
so-called, politically motivated, win-win resolution on November
7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had
become final and executory.
ISSUE: WON the win-win resolution, issued after the original
decision had become final and executory, had any legal effect.
HELD:
No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring
the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said
Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify
its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President
has no more authority to entertain the second motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second
motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution.
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of
the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for
reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March
29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was
permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as
provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the
said motion should not have been entertained considering that the
first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby
allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus,
the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and
substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had
already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the
rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the
judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a
point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble
purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all
29.FIRESTONE v CA
Facts:
Forjas-Arca Enterprise Company is maintaining a special
savings account with Luzon Development Bank, the latter
authorized and allowed withdrawals of funds though the medium of
special withdrawal slips. These are supplied by Fojas-Arca. Fojas-
Arca purchased on credit with FirestoneTire & Rubber Company, in
payment Fojas-Arca delivered a 6 special withdrawal slips. In turn,
these were deposited by the Firsestone to its bank account in
Citibank. With this, relying on such confidence and belief Firestone
extended to Fojas-Arca other purchase on credit of its products but
several withdrawal slips were dishonored and not paid. As a
consequence, Citibank debited the plaintiffs account representing
the aggregate amount of the two dishonored special withdrawal
slips. Fojas-Arca averred that the pecuniary losses it suffered are a
caused by and directly attributes to defendants gross negligence
as a result Fojas-Arca filed a complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the acceptance and payment of the special
withdrawal slips without the presentation of the depositors
passbook thereby giving the impression that it is a negotiable
instrument like a check.
Held:
No. Withdrawal slips in question were non negotiable
instrument. Hence, the rules governing the giving immediate notice
of dishonor of negotiable instrument do not apply. The essence of
negotiability which characterizes a negotiable paper as a credit
instrument lies in its freedom to circulate freely as a substitute for
money. The withdrawal slips in question lacked this character
30.PHIL DUPLICATORS INC v NLRC
FACTS:
(Note, the case was very procedurally technical, walang facts, nasa
ratio na)
Case differentiates between Productivity Bonuses vs. Commissions
Productivity bonuses are generally tied to the productivity or profit
generation of the employer corporation. Productivity bonuses are
not directly dependent on the extent an individual employee exerts
himself. A productivity bonus is something extra for which no
specific additional services are rendered by any particular
employee and hence not legally demandable, absent a contractual
undertaking to pay it.
Sales commissions are intimately related to or directly proportional
to the extent or energy of an employee's endeavours. Commissions
are paid upon the specific results achieved by a salesman-
employee. It is a percentage of the sales closed by a salesman and
operates as an integral part of such salesman's basic pay.
ISSUE:
1 WON The commissions received by the salesmen were part
of the
wages to be considered for their 13th month pay. - Yes
2 WON Productivity bonus shall be considered as part of
wages in 13th month pay - No
HELD:
1 The commissions were an integral part of the pay of the
workers, considering that the fixed wage was only 30% of
what they were normally receiving.
2 Productivity bonuses are generally tied to the productivity,
or capacity for revenue production, of a corporation; such
bonuses closely resemble profit-sharing payments and have
no clear director necessary relation to the amount of work
actually done by each individual employee. More generally,
a bonus is an amount granted and paid ex gratia to the
employee; its payment constitutes an act of enlightened
generosity and self-interest on the part of the employer,
rather than as a demandable or enforceable obligation.
Since productivity bonus is not demandable, then it cannot
be considered part of basic salary when time comes to
compute 13th month pay.
Additional payments made to employees, to the extent they
partake of the nature of profit-sharing payments, are
properly excluded from the ambit of the term "basic salary"
for purposes of computing the 13th month pay due to
employees. Such additional payments are not
"commissions" within the meaning of the second paragraph
of Section 5 (a) of the Revised Guidelines Implementing 13th
Month Pay.
The Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing
P.D. No. 851 subsequently issued by former Labor Minister
Ople sought to clarify the scope of items excluded in the
computation of the 13th month pay; viz.:
Sec. 4. Overtime pay, earnings and other
remunerations which are not part of the basic salary
shall not be included in the computation of the 13th
month pay.
31.CABUAY v MALVAR
Facts:
I.
In the early part of 1936, Hermogenes Lopez went to the Bureau of
Lands and inquired about his fathers (Fermin Lopez) homestead
application over a land which was possessed by the latter since
1920. Upon knowing that said application was not acted upon, he
filed his own application docketed as Homestead Application No.
138612. After he complied with requirements of the Public Land
Act, the Director of Lands approved and issued Plan No. H-138612
in his name. He has been in the continuous possession and was
recognized as the owner of the land until he transferred his rights
to Ambrosio Aguilar in July 31, 1959.
Prior to the sale of the land to Aguilar, Hermogenes filed with the
CFI of Rizal an application for registration of the land which was
then opposed by Beatrice Zuzuarregi and Eduardo Santos. The
oppositors claimed that the land was already registered under
Transfer Certificate Title no. 7375 (which was originally registered
under OCT No. 537 in the name of Fernando Gorospe).
CFI of Rizal. Hermogenes then filed with the CFI of Rizal a complaint
for annulment of OCT No. 537 and all TCTs derived therefrom
against Gorospe, spouses Tagle, Zuzuarregi and Santos.
However, the complaint was dismissed by the CFI on the ground
that he was not the real party in interest since he sold the property
to Aguilar.
Thereafter, Aguilar filed with same CFI a similar action against the
defendants.
The court rendered judgment in favor of Aguilar, declaring him the
true and lawful owner of the land and nullifying OCT No. 537 in
Gorospes as void ab intio (from the beginning) and all TCTs
derived therefrom.
CA. On appeal, CA affirmed the trial courts judgment.
SC FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 90380. Santos filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the SC. However, the Court through its
First Division denied the petition and affirmed the CA decision,
ruling that Aguilar, successor-in-interest of Hermogenes, is the
lawful owner of the property. With respect to Santos, successor-in-
interest of Gorospe, the land in dispute was not brought within the
operation of the Land Registration Act for there was no evidence
proving that Gorospe filed any application for the parcel of land in
question.
This Decision of the First Division became final and executory on
November 29, 1990.
II.
Lopez heirs, on July 16, 1984, filed with the RTC of Antipolo a
complaint for the cancellation of the Deed of Sale between
Hermogenes and Aguilar over the land. Lopez heirs alleged that the
sale was made by Hermogenes who was insufficiently educated.
RTC in Civil Case No. 463-A ruled in favor of Lopez heirs, restoring
to them the possession of the land.
CA. Aguilar appealed to the CA. During the pendency of the appeal,
CA issued an order of execution and then affirmed the RTC decision.
Adia heirs filed with the same RTC a separate action for partial
quashal of the writ of execution with preliminary injunction against
the Lopez heirs.
RTC did not take any action.
CA. Adia heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was
dismissed by the latter.
The Appellate Court held that it is beyond dispute that Lopez heirs
are the judicially acknowledged and recognized owners of the
property (pursuant to Civil Case No. 463-A).
LMB. Adia heirs then filed a protest with the Land Management
Bureau praying that the property be titled in their names.
LMB Director then rendered a decision disregarding the final
Decision of the SC in G.R. No. 90380 and ordered the reconstitution
of the homestead application of Adia.
Lopez heirs filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the LMB. The heirs then appealed to the CA but it was also denied
and affirmed the LMB decision.
CA held that SC Decision in G.R. No. 90380 did not bind the LMB for
two (2) reasons:
It was not impleaded as a party to the case
The cases were in personam (against the person) in nature while
the subject was a right over a piece of land
And held that the subject property being part of the public domain
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the LMB.
SC Third Division G.R. No. 110900. Lopez filed a petition for
review with the SC. The Third Division denied the petition and
recognized the Adia heirs claim over the land as valid and
therefore reversed the First Division Decision in G.R. No. 90380.
III.
Lopez heirs together with Dr. Potenciano Malvar who bought a
portion of the land from the former, filed with the RTC a motion for
the issuance of an alias writ of execution of the decision in Civil
Case No. 463-A.
RTC granted the motion and issued a writ of execution (which would
call for the demolition of the facilities and structures belonging to
the Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Army, which
also purchased a portion of the property from the Adia heirs.
This prompted Col. Pedro Cabuay, Jr., Group Commander of the ISG,
to file with the SC petition for clarification as to the validity and
forceful effect of two (2) final and executory but conflicting
decisions (G.R. No. 90380 and G.R. No. 110900) of the SC.
The issue of whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the LMB decision and disregarding the SC
First Division Decision was raised.
Third Division rendered a decision saying that CA did not act with
grave abuse of discretion. It also clarified that Decision of the Third
Division in in G.R. No. 110900 prevails the Decision of the First
Division in G.R. No. 90380.
Dr. Malvar then filed a motion for reconsideration with alternative
prayer for referral to the Court en banc.
Issue:
WON the Decision of the Third Division of the SC in G.R. No. 110900
prevails over the Decision of the First Division in G.R. No. 90380 in
relation to determining the lawful owner of the subject property.
Ruling (en banc):
No. Decision of the First Division in G.R. No. 90380 prevails.
The weight of evidence and jurisprudence show that the Lopez
heirs are the lawful owners of the subject land.
With the ruling of the First Division recognizing Hermogenes as the
rightful owner of the land by reason of his fathers continuous
possession since 1920 and his full compliance with the
requirements by the Public Land Act for issuance of the homestead
patent.
Because of this, LMB should have refrained from adjudicating the
property to Adia heirs since the land ceased to be public domain
and thus the LMB had lost jurisdiction.
The property became the private property of Hermogenes since
1950, or after the lapse of 30 years of continued possession that
began in 1920 (jurisprudence declares that mere lapse of 30 years
of open, continuous and exclusive possession of disposable public
land automatically transforms the same into private property and
vests title on the possessor pursuant to R.A. 1942). *The doctrine
was also applied in the Acme case and NPC vs. CA.
Under the provisions of Act No. 2874, the President of the
Philippines or the Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free
patent for land that has ceased to be a public land (Susi doctrine).
Lopez heirs ownership must be upheld because of the applicability
of the law of the case doctrine (SC being the court of last resort,
is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it
and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that
case. Once its judgment becomes final, it is binding on all inferior
courts, and hence beyond their power and authority to alter and
modify).
SC held that Decision of the First Division in G.R. No. 90380 is the
law of the case binding upon the LMB and CA and beyond their
authority to reverse.
The Decision of the First Division in G.R. No. 90380 declaring the
Lopez heirs the lawful owners of the land in question is reinstated.
32.AGOY v ARANETA CENTER
Facts:
Petitioners case for review on the Court of Appeals dismissal of his
case on serious misconduct and dishonesty, was denied by the
Supreme through a minute resolution dated 15 June 2011.
Petitioners motion to rescind said minute resolution was again
denied through the Courts 21 September 2011 resolution. Upon
receipt, Agoy filed a motion to rescind the same or have his case
resolved by the Court En Banc for proper disposition through a
signed resolution or decision.
Issues:
Whether or not the copies of the minute resolutions dated 15 June
2011 and 21 September 2011 that Agoy received are authentic;
and Whether or not it was proper for the court to deny his petition
through a minute resolution.
Ruling:
Yes. The stated minute resolutions signed by the Assistant Clerk of
Court and the Deputy Clerk of Court are authentic. The signatories
are duly authorized by the Court. As held in Borromeo vs. Court of
Appeals (264 SCRA 388), minute resolutions are the results of the
deliberations by the Justices of the Court but are promulgated by
the Clerk of Court or his assistants to effect prompt dispatch of the
actions of the Court.
Yes. It is proper for the Court to deny Agoys petition through a
minute resolution. While the Constitution requires every court to
state in its decision clearly and distinctly the fact and the law on
which it is based, the Constitution requires the court, in denying
due course to a petition for review, merely to state the legal basis
for such denial. Such legal basis is the absence of reversible error in
the challenged decision, resolution or order of the court. In
addition, when there is no reversible error in the decision of the CA
and the Court denies the petition, there is no need for it to fully
explain the denial, since it already means that it agrees with and
adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA.
The motion to rescind was denied for lack of merit.
33.RE: SAMANODIN L. AMPASO

RE: REQUEST OF JURISCONSULT SAMANODIN L. AMPASO
FOR UPGRADING OF HIS POSITION TO SALARY GRADE 31,
EQUIVALENT TO ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:p
Samanodin L. Ampaso, former Judge of the Shari'a Circuit Court in
Tubod, Lanao del Norte, was appointed as Juris-consult in Islamic
Law on March 26, 1991 by then President Corazon C. Aquino, and
took his oath of office on April 10,1991. The said position was
created by virtue of Section 164, paragraph 2 of P. D. No. 1083,
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines.
Thereafter, on May 2, 1991, the newly appointed Juris-consult
requested this Court for the upgrading of his position to Salary
Grade 31, equivalent to an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,
claiming that under P.D. 1083 he is the highest Muslim Judicial
Officer of the Philippines. He also submitted a proposed plaintilla
calling for the creation of 209 staff positions for the Office of the
Jurisconsult.
Under P.D. 1083, a Jurisconsult in Islamic Law or Muf is an officer
who renders legal opinions on any question relating to Muslim law.
He assist the Qadi or Judge, by giving him fatwas or legal opinions.
The opinions thus rendered shall merely serve to enlighten the
court or the parties concerned, who, however are not necessarily
bound to follow the same.
The pertinent provisions of P.D. 1083 are herein below reproduced
for ease of reference:
Title III. Jurisconsult in Islamic Law
Art. 164. Creation of ofce and appointment. (1)
There shall be a Jurisconsult in Islamic Law, who shall
be appointed by the President of the Philippines and
hold office for a term of seven years, without
prejudice to reappointment, unless sooner removed
for cause or incapacitated to discharge the duties of
his office.
(2) The Office of the Jurisconsult shall be under the
administrative supervision of the Supreme Court of
the Philippines, which shall also fix its permanent
station, preferably in the City of Zamboanga.
Art. 165. Qualifications. No person shall be
appointed Jurisconsult in Islamic Law unless he is a
citizen of the Philippines, at least forty years of age,
of good moral character and proven integrity, and an
eminent scholar in the Qur'an and Hadith and in
Islamic jurisprudence as well as proficient in Arabic.
Art. 166. Functions. (1) The Jurisconsult shall, on
the written request of any interested party, have the
authority to render legal opinions, based on
recognized authorities, regarding any question
relating to Muslim Law. For this purpose, he may, if
he deems it necessary, consult or ask for a
consensus of the 'ulama.
(2) The Jurisconsult shall consider and act on every
such request unless, in his opinion and for good
reason, the question need not be answered.
(3) The Office of the Jurisconsult shall keep a
compilation and cause the publication of all his legal
opinions.
Art. 167. Compensation. Until otherwise provided
by law, the jurisconsult shall receive an annual
compensation of forty-eight thousand pesos which
shall not be diminished during his term of office.
Art. 168. Ofce personnel. The Jurisconsult may, in
accordance with the Civil Service Law and subject to
the approval of the Supreme Court, appoint and fix
the compensation of such personnel as may be
necessary for the performance of his functions.
However, a cursory check by the Office of the Court Administrator
into the 201 files of Mr. Ampaso revealed that he was born on
January 2, 1952. This information regarding his date of birth was
personally supplied by him in his Personal Data Sheet for judges
and in the information sheet for membership in the GSIS which he
personally filled up and filed on July 1, 1985. On the basis of such
data, it is evident that when he took his oath as Jurisconsult on
April 10, 1991, he was only 39 years, 3 months and 8 days, and
that therefore, he failed to comply with the age requirement as
provided under Article 165 of P.D. 1083.
Thus, on March 31, 1992, the Court through an en banc resolution
required Mr. Ampaso to show cause why he should not be removed
from office for failing to fulfill the age requirement at the time he
took his oath as Jurisconsult.
In his comment, he claimed that his true birthdate is January 2,
1948 and not January 2, 1952 as appearing in his GSIS information
sheet and personal data sheet, and that the latter documents were
not personally prepared by him but by his brother who
inadvertently mis-stated the year of his birth. To support his claim,
he submitted various documentary proof, including the original of
his passport issued on July 17, 1985, and a duplicate copy of his
"Birth Certificate for Late Registration" issued on February 10,
1983. He alleged that the mis-statement in his year of birth was not
done in bad faith nor was it intended to cause damage to any
party, it having been the result of an honest mistake.
Obviously, the issue of the validity of the appointment of Mr.
Ampaso as Jurisconsult must first be resolved before determining
whether or not his request for upgrading of salary is proper. The
resolution of said primordial issue hinges on whether all the
requirements for the appointment had been duly complied with or
not.
The Senior Deputy Court Administrator found the comment and
explanation of Mr. Ampaso attributing to his brother the innocent
mis-declaration of his year of birth, to be unacceptable. We hold
that Mr. Ampaso's claim is nothing but a lame excuse and a mere
after-thought. It is very unlikely, improbable and unbecoming that a
person aspiring to such a high office would request another to fill
up and file such personal data farms. But granting that he did make
such request, still, he himself had to sign the forms just the same
prior to filing, and in the normal course of things, he should have
read the documents before affixing his signature thereto. That he
signed it without reading and/or understanding its contents is not
excusable, nor credible. As an aspiring member of the Bench, it was
incumbent upon Mr. Ampaso to check and double-check important
personal data being supplied through such forms. It is thus no
excuse to say that someone else prepared the forms or that his
own brother must have forgotten. (or was not aware of) his year of
birth. The subsequent submission of what purports to be a late-
registration birth certificate (uncertified), plus a passport and
affidavits of disinterested person attesting to his actual date of
birth did not cure the defect. Neither do they constitute adequate
proof as to the actual date/year of his birth, since the affidavits are
hearsay and self-serving, while passports by their very nature
and process of issurance cannot pass as conclusive evidence
insofar as the year and date of birth are concerned, since such data
are supplied by the passport applicants themselves. Neither would
purportedly issued some thirty-five (35) years after the supposed
date of birth.
The foregoing premises considered, we are constrained to hold that
the appointment of Mr. Ampaso as Jurisconsult was legally invalid
from the beginning.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby Resolves to
declare NULL and VOID ab initio the appointment of Samanodin
Ampaso as Jurisconsult.
SO ORDERED.
34.IN RE: TRANSFER OF HEARING
IN RE: TRANSFER OF HEARING OF CRIMINAL CASE NOS.
13308 (PP v. CRISOSTOMO ARMAMENTO) and 13337 (PP. v.
MARK ANTONY PEREZ) FROM RTC - BR. 4, BATANGAS CITY
TO THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA CITY
RESOLUTION
AS far as practicable, the judge who hears the case should be the
one to decide it, as he had the opportunity to observe firsthand the
deportment of witnesses and the presentation of evidence. The
practice of allowing one judge to conduct trial and another to
render decision in the same case based only on records should be
avoided.
This administrative matter concerns two criminal cases pending
before Branch 4, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Batangas City, to wit:
1.) Criminal Case No. 13308, entitled "People v. Crisostomo
Armamento" for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165;1 and
2.) Criminal Case No. 13337, entitled "People v. Mark Antony Perez
for Murder."
The accused in both cases are currently detained and serving
sentence in the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
Whenever hearings are conducted, they are brought to the RTC in
Batangas City.
On November 6, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
received an undated letter from Judge Albert A. Kalalo of Branch 4
of the RTC in Batangas City. He seeks guidance on the course of
action to be taken in the subject cases considering that these are
undergoing trial.
Taking into consideration the risks involved and the expenses
incurred by the Government whenever the accused are brought to
court for hearings, the OCA, in its evaluation and recommendation
of November 13, 2007, recommends that the following courses of
action be taken:
1. the undated letter of Hon. Albert A. Kalalo, RTC, Branch 4,
Batangas City informing this Office that the accused in Criminal
Case Nos. 13308 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Crisostomo
Armamento" and 13337 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Mark
Antony Perez" are detained and already serving sentence at the
Bureau of Corrections, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City
be NOTED;
2. the Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 4, Batangas City
be DIRECTED to forward the records of Criminal Case Nos. 13308
and 13337 to the executive judge, RTC, Muntinlupa City for raffle of
the subject cases among the courts thereat;
3. the judge to whom the cases are assigned be DIRECTED to
conduct the entire trial of the aforesaid cases within the premises
of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City. For this purpose, the
judge shall be assisted by at least two (2) of his personnel;
4. thereafter, the records of the cases shall be RETURNED to RTC,
Branch 4, Batangas City for the preparation of the decisions;
andcralawlibrary
5. after which, the records of the cases shall be RETURNED to RTC,
Muntinlupa City for the promulgation of the decisions.
We cannot give our nod to the recommendations.
It is settled that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded
greatest respect by the appellate court absent any abuse of
discretion.2 In fact, should there be no indication of grave error
committed by the trial court, all appellate courts are bound to
respect such findings of facts.3
There is good reason behind this time-honored legal precept. The
trial judge has the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses
and to determine by their demeanor on the stand the probative
value of their testimonies. The Court in People v. Yadao,4 elucidated
thus:
x x x The witnesses reveal much when they testify that is not
reflected in the transcript, which only records what they say but not
how they said it. The meaningful pause, the ready reply, the angry
denial, the elusive eyes or the forthright stare, the sudden pallor
when a lie is exposed or the flush of face that accentuates a sincere
assertion - these and many other tell-tale marks of honesty or
invention are not lost on the trial judge. It is for this reason that his
factual findings are generally not disturbed by the appellate court
unless they are found to be clearly biased or arbitrary. x x x5
Such rationale ceases to exist should it become acceptable to split
the burden of work in one case between two or more judges - one
to conduct the hearings, and another to write the decision based on
the records alone. This should be discouraged. Indeed, it should
only be allowed when there is no other viable option.
The doctrine laid down in U.S. v. Abreu,6 that it is not necessary
that the judge who prepares and signs the decision be the one who
heard the case, stems from an entirely different factual milieu. In
said case, the judge who had received evidence resigned before
deciding the case. It was held by the Court that his successor may
decide the case on the evidence already taken; and that where
competent and admissible evidence is properly taken by a judge
who dies, retires or resigns before a decision is promulgated, his
successor must necessarily be able to continue his predecessor's
functions without a retrial.
The case at bar does not involve circumstances where the judge
who hears the trial is no longer available by reason of death,
retirement or resignation to render the decision. Hence, it is to the
best interest of justice that the judge who hears the trial be the one
to decide the case.
WHEREFORE, Judge Albert A. Kalalo is ORDERED to go to
Muntinlupa City and conduct the rest of the trial of the subject
cases within the premises of the Bureau of Corrections. SO
ORDERED.
35.IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR LOUIS BIRAOGO
Gilbert Copy (submitted to Investigating Committee),
Biraogos Copy and New Copy:
Cover page (agenda date and item number)
o Biraogos copy bore the agenda date July 15, 2008.
Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 52. Same was
true for the new copy.
o Committees copy bore the agenda date "July 29, 2008."
Said case was listed as Item No. 66.
Page 1
o In the committees copy, there were asterisks after the
names of Justice Azcuna and Justice Tinga and footnotes
that the two were on official leave, whereas no such
asterisks and footnotes appeared on page 1 of Biraogos
copy and the New copy.
Slight variance between the initials on page 34 of the
committees copy and the initials on page 34 of Biraogos copy.
Biraogos Copy and Advance Copies of Associate Justices:
An examination of the copy in Biraogos possession readily
shows that every page thereof pages 1 to 36 contained
Justice Reyess authenticating initials while none of the advance
copies furnished to the Justices was similarly authenticated.
Testimonies of Witnesses:
o Armando Del Rosario (Court Stenographer, Office of Justice
Reyes)
In charge of circulating ponencias for the signatures of the
Justice and of forwarding signed (by all the Associate Justices
who are not on leave) ponencias to the Office of the Chief
Justice (OCJ).
July 15, 2008 He received from Justice Reyes the
unpromulgated ponencia and an instruction that it be signed by
Justice Nachura (Note: in the presence of Atty. Evangelista). As
he was busy, he instructed his co-employee Manabat to bring
the copy quickly to the Office of Justice Nachura for signing as
said Justice was about to leave (for lunch). After 30 minutes,
Manabat returned with the Gilbert copy already signed by
Justice Nachura who was the last to sign. Del Rosario then
transmitted the Gilbert copy together with the rollo, temporary
rollos, and diskettes to the OCJ pursuant to their SOP for the
promulgation of decisions. This was received by Gatdula at
around 3 p.m.
July 16, 2008 (4:00 pm) Justice Reyes instructed him to
retrieve the Gilbert copy and the accompanying documents and
diskettes as he was told that the promulgation of the ponencia
had been placed on hold. He then placed the Gilbert copy in a
sealed brown envelope (note: sealed it with the officially issued
blue and white seal provided by the Printing Office) and placed
it inside his unlocked drawer and wrote a note in his logbook
when he retrieved the Gilbert copy that its promulgation was on
hold and would be called again on July 29, 2008.
July 16, 2008 December 15, 2008 (first hearing of
Investigating Committee) Gilbert copy was in his sole custody.
He never opened the envelope from the day he sealed it on
July 16, 2008 until December 10, 2008, when Justice Reyes
told everybody in their office that the Gilbert copy had been
 photocopied and leaked. He did not have any news of any
leakage before then.
The seal placed on the envelope was still intact when he
opened it on December 10, 2008.
He did not photocopy the Gilbert copy.
He did not know any of the parties to the case and none of
them ever called him. And he did not know what Gatdula did
after receiving the Gilbert copy.
July 25, 2008 Upon receipt of the En Banc agenda for July 29,
2008 (Limkaichong case as Item No. 66), the Office of Justice
Reyes prepared a new cover page and attached it to the Gilbert
copy. The original cover page of the Gilbert copy for the agenda
of July 15, 2008 showing the case as Item No. 52 was thrown
away.
When he was asked by Justice Carpio Morales whether it was
possible for him to recognize any tampering if, for instance, the
envelope and the seal were replaced with a similar envelope
and blue and white seal with a similar print-out information on
the face of the envelope, he answered in the negative.
Nobody told him to guard the Gilbert copy.
Everybody in the office knew how to operate the xerox
machine
It was possible for someone to take the Gilbert copy from his
drawer and photocopy it on a weekend or after office hours.
He also circulated copies of the Revised Draft of the decision to
the other Justices but he never received a copy of Justice
Carpios Reflections. He did not offer an explanation why the
Gilbert copy, which was in his possession, and the Revised
Draft, were leaked.
He and the driver of Justice Reyes were given keys to the main
door of the Office of Justice Reyes but he could not say that only
the two of them held keys to the main door.
April Candelaria (Justice Reyes secretary for social activities
and in-charge of door-to-door papers to his chamber) and Atty.
Ferdinand Juan asked for and got duplicates of the key.
When news of the leakage came out, Justice Reyes called all his
legal staff and him to a meeting. Justice Reyes also talked to
him and asked him if a copy of Justice Carpios Reflections was
attached to the Gilbert copy and other documents when they
were sent to the OCJ. He replied that there was none and that
he just kept the Gilbert copy in his drawer and had in fact
forgotten all about it until Justice Reyes inquired about it in
December.
During the initial hearing in December 15, 2008, nobody talked
to him or knew that he was testifying as he was even surprised
that he was called to testify. 51 When confronted with the
testimony of his officemate, Chester Del Castillo, who testified
that Justice Reyes called only one meeting, he opined that Del
Castillo might not have known about the meeting with the
lawyers since Del Castillo was frequently absent.
o Rodrigo Manabat, Jr. (Staff Officer, Office of Justice Reyes)
Personal aide of Justice Reyes
Upon instruction of Del Rosario and Evangelista, he took the
copy to the Office of Justice Nachura. He gave the Gilbert copy
to the receptionist and waited outside the said office. After ten
minutes, the document was returned to him. It took him not
more than 15 minutes to return the document to Del Rosario.
He averred that he did not photocopy the Gilbert copy nor did
he notice if anybody from the Office of Justice Nachura
photocopied it.
He also did not know if Del Rosario placed the document in a
sealed envelope or photocopied it.
o Atty. Rosendo Evangelista (Judicial Staff Head, Office of
Justice Reyes)
July 15, 2008 (1 pm) - Justice Reyes instructed him to have
signature page 36 of the ponencia reprinted and circulated for
signing because Justice Chico-Nazario wanted to change her
qualified concurrence "in the result" to an unqualified
concurrence.
He instructed Yabut, the stenographer in charge of finalizing
drafts, to reprint page 36 of the Gilbert copy. Then he ordered
the reprinted page circulated for signatures together with the
other pages of the ponencia.
He assumed that the original page 36 was discarded as it was
no longer in their files. He likewise assumed that the signatures
were completed on the reprinted page 36 as the Gilbert copy
was forwarded around 3:00 p.m. to the OCJ per standard
operating procedure.
He did not know that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy had
been put on hold until July 17, 2008, when Del Rosario informed
him upon his arrival at the office. Because the information was
unusual and because it was his duty to make sure that signed
decisions were promulgated, he asked Justice Reyes for
confirmation which he did give. After that, he just assumed that
the Gilbert copy was in their office with Del Rosario who was
assigned to keep such documents.
 He did not make a photocopy of the Gilbert copy nor did he
order Del Rosario and Manabat to make photocopies. Neither
did he know how the Gilbert copy was photocopied. He only
came to know about the leakage last December 10, 2008.
When directed to compare the front page of the photocopy
Biraogo submitted (3) to his Compliance to the Show Cause
Order with the original Gilbert copy submitted to the committee
by Justice Reyes, Atty. Evangelista noticed the difference in the
dates of the agenda.
Biraogos copy bore the agenda date July 15, 2008.
Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 52.
Reyes copy bore the agenda date "July 29, 2008." Said case
was listed as Item No. 66.
To him, it was probable that Biraogo got his copy from another
source but it was not probable that Biraogo photocopied a
copy in the office.
He reiterated that he did not know where, exactly, Del Rosario
kept the documents. He admitted that he was remiss in his
duties as staff head for not knowing.
It was their practice not to lock drawers.
He was aware that Justice Reyes eventually prepared another
draft of a ponencia changing his position in the Limkaichong
case because he helped in the research in November 2008. He
did not ask why this was so.
He denied that he knew Biraogo, Limkaichong, Jerome Paras,
Olive Paras or any party to the case.
o Justice Chico-Nazario
She signed the Gilbert copy only once, in the En Banc
conference room before going to the En Banc dining hall.
Immediately after signing, she returned the Gilbert copy to
Justice Reyes who circulated it for the signatures of the other
Justices.
She did not photocopy the ponencia nor was there any
opportunity for her to do so as there was only one Gilbert copy
and the only time she held it was when she affixed her
signature.
She added that her concurrence to the ponencia was without
qualification but when it was noted during lunch that most of
the Justices had simply concurred "in the result," she and Justice
Leonardo-De Castro signified their intention to qualify their
concurrence and concur likewise only "in the result." However,
she was no longer able to indicate the change on the document
as she and the other Justices had decided to put on hold the
promulgation of the decision until after holding oral arguments
on the Limkaichong case.
No reprinted signature page was ever sent to her office for her
signature and she did not affix her signature on any other copy
of the ponencia.
She was not the last to sign the ponencia.
o Justice Leonardo-De Castro
She signed the Gilbert copy right after the En Banc session.
No reprinted signature page 36 was ever sent to her office for
signature and she did not affix her signature on any other copy
of the ponencia.
She did not photocopy the ponencia and there could have been
no opportunity to do so right after she signed it
o Justice Nachura
He believed that he signed the ponencia in the En Banc
conference room just before he went to the En Banc dining hall
for lunch.
He believed he was never sent a reprinted signature page.
He could not recall if he was the last to sign the ponencia.
He further stated that there was no opportunity to photocopy
the ponencia as he was not in custody thereof.
Although he knew the husband of one of the petitioners, Olivia
Paras, neither she nor her husband ever asked for a copy of the
ponencia. Also, he never leaked it.
o ACA Jose Midas Marquez (Chief, Public Information Office)
The leak could not have come from the PIO as they were never
given a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia bearing the
signatures of 14 Justices.
He also did not bring drafts from the OCJ to the PIO. It is only
after a case has been promulgated that the Clerk of Court gives
the PIO copies. But in this case, the Clerk of Court did not even
have a copy as the decision had not been signed by the Chief
Justice.
o Ramon Gatdula (Executive Assistant, Office of the Chief
Justice)
July 15, 2008 (3:30 pm) - He received from Del Rosario the
Gilbert copy of the ponencia together with the rollos and two
diskettes.
July 16, 2008 - an employee from the Office of Justice Reyes
retrieved the Gilbert copy.
Gatdula said that he does not photocopy the decisions he
receives. Their office also never photocopies decisions. They
forward such decisions straight to the Clerk of Court for
 promulgation and they receive copies thereof only after the
Clerk of Court has affixed her signature thereon and indicated
the date of promulgation.
o Atty. Ma. Luisa Villarama (Clerk of Court En Banc)
She denied having seen the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice
Reyes and stated that the same never reached their office
during the period from July 16, 2008 to December 10, 2008. She
and her staff only learned of the draft decision after it was
circulated by the media.
o Major Eduardo Escala (Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security
Division, Office of Administrative Services)
Security personnel inspect all offices everyday at 5:00 pm. As
far as photocopiers are concerned, they only make sure that
these are unplugged after office hours. His office has nothing to
do with the operation of the machines.
They always check if employees bring out papers from the
Court but that it is difficult to check if said employees were
indeed allowed by their respective bosses to do so.
He suggested that the memory cards of the machines be
checked.
o Atty. Felipe Anama (Assistant Clerk of Court)
She acts as Clerk of Court in the absence of Atty. Villarama.
Their office never releases unpromulgated ponencias and they
ascertain that every decision or resolution to be promulgated is
complete.
She indicated that it was very difficult to serve something at
Biraogos residence for by the account of Desamero, he was
stopped at the guard house and was made to wait in the
clubhouse until Biraogo was notified of his presence; and that it
took Desamero two hours to serve the December 10, 2008
resolution on Biraogo.
o Willie Desamero (Records Officer, Office of the Clerk of
Court)
He served the December 10, 2008 Resolution on Biraogo on
December 12, 2008
While it was not his usual duty to serve court processes, Atty.
Anama and Atty. Villarama requested him to serve the
resolution on Biraogo since the regular process servers in their
office were not then available and he is the only one in their
office who resides in Laguna.
o Glorivy Nysa Tolentino (Executive Assistant I, Office of
Justice Nachura)
She is responsible for communications, drafts and door-to-door
papers that come in at the Office of Justice Nachura.
According to the logbook entry, the Gilbert copy was brought to
their office on July 15, 2008 and that Justice Nachura signed the
copy. However, since it is not office practice to record the time
of receipt or release, she could not remember what time the
Gilbert copy was brought to their office for signature.
Gilbert copy was given a preferential treatment as it was a door-
to-door paper. Justice Nachura also immediately signed the
ponencia when she gave it to him.
She could not recall if Justice Nachura was the last to sign the
Gilbert copy.
She added that their office did not have a copy of the
unpromulgated ponencia bearing the signatures of 14 Justices.
They only had the advance copies circulated for concurrence.
o Onofre Cuento (Process Server, Office of the Clerk of Court)
He personally served two resolutions on Biraogo at his
residence last August 6, 2008, together with driver Mateo
Bihag.
They had a hard time getting to the residence of Biraogo whom
he does not personally know.
o Chester George Del Castillo (Utility Worker, Office of Justice
Reyes)
He was the most proficient in the use of the photocopiers in the
office of Justice Reyes so it was to him that the task of
photocopying documents was usually given by Del Rosario and
the lawyers. He, however, never photocopied any paper bearing
the signatures of the Justices. He did not handle ponencias in
Gilbert paper nor ever photocopy any ponencia in Gilbert paper.
He does not know Biraogo or his wife. Neither does he know
Paras.
He did not know where Gilbert copies were kept.
The office staff knew of the leaked decision on the Limkaichong
case, but the staff remained apathetic and did not talk about it.
The apathy was probably because the staff thought that the
matter had already been settled since Del Rosario and Atty.
Evangelista had already been interviewed.
He was not part of the meeting called by Justice Reyes before
the start of the investigation.Only Atty. Evangelista, Del Rosario,
and Manabat were called to the meeting.He surmised that the
meeting was about the leakage.
o Conrado Bayanin, Jr. (Messenger, Office of Justice Reyes)
 Part of his duties in the Office of Justice Reyes was to receive
and release papers and rollos as he was seated near the door. It
was not his duty to handle or receive ponencias in Gilbert form.
He had never photocopied anything signed by the Justices,
especially those on Gilbert paper.
o Fermin Segotier (Judicial Staff Assistant, Office of Justice
Nachura)
His duty is to receive communications.
He does not remember any details pertaining to the July 15,
2008 signing of the Limkaichong Ponencia, aside from the fact
that it was to Justice Reyess staff (assumed it to be Del Rosario)
to whom he gave it back.
He could not recall handing a Gilbert paper to Manabat.
The ponencia stayed only for a short time (about 5 minutes) in
their office because it was a door-to-door paper. After it was
signed, it was immediately returned.
No chance to photocopy it.
It was not their standard operating procedure to leave any
Gilbert paper in their office if it could not be signed right away.
o Retired Justice Ruben Reyes
The investigation should not only focus on the leak of the
unpromulgated ponencia but also on the leak of the two other
confidential and internal documents of the Court (2 and 4).
Justice Reyes pointed out that Biraogos informant mentioned
a certain Atty. Rosel, who was allegedly a close friend and
former partner of Justice Carpio. Justice Reyes said that Atty.
Rosel allegedly asked a favor from Justice Carpio before the
latter wrote his Reflections. Thus, he said, the committee
should also question Atty. Rosel and even Justice Carpio
himself.
He, however, reiterated that he had said in his media
interviews that he believed that none of the Justices
themselves, much less the Chief Justice, leaked the ponencia
or authorized its leakage.
On why he did not lift a finger when Biraogo got hold of the
decision, despite reports regarding the leak, Justice Reyes
stated that he was on a sabbatical leave with the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education research in four States in the United
States from October 10, 2008 to November 1, 2008.
He had nothing to do with the leak and he even prepared a
second draft decision (deviating from his prior disposition) after
oral arguments were held on the case. His change in position
also showed his lack of personal interest in the case.
But if it could be proven by evidence that one of his staff was
the source of the leak, Justice Reyes argued that only that staff
should be made liable, for he had publicly declared that he did
not and would never allow nor tolerate such leakage.
The Gilbert copy which he submitted to the committee was
given to him by Del Rosario. He did not photocopy the Gilbert
copy nor provide Biraogo a copy thereof or instruct any of his
staff to photocopy the same.
Biraogos copy vs. Invesitgating Committees copy:
Different cover page (agenda date and item number)
Page 1 differed
In the committees copy, there were asterisks after the names
of Justice Azcuna and Justice Tinga and footnotes that the two
were on official leave, whereas no such asterisks and
footnotes appeared on page 1 of Biraogos copy.
Slight variance between the initials on page 34 of the
committees copy and the initials on page 34 of Biraogos
copy.
Justice Quisumbing then posed the question whether Justice
Reyes would admit that there were at least two sources. Justice
Reyes then brought out another photocopy (new copy or Justice
Reyess new copy) of the Gilbert copy to which new copy the
left top corner of the top cover was stapled (1) a 1"x1" piece of
thick paper bearing the initials "RTR" and (2) on the right top
corner of the same cover appeared a handwritten notation
reading "Gilbert copy."
Justice Reyes repeatedly stated that his new copy was a
facsimile of the committees copy. It was a photocopy of the
Gilbert copy.
Justice Reyes avoided the question of whether he or his staff
kept more than one xerox copy of the Gilbert copy.
Justice Reyes stated that he found the new copy in his files
just the week before the January 22, 2009 hearing.
Biraogos copy vs. Committees copy vs. New copy:
o He also pointed out that in Biraogos copy, particularly on
page 3, there was a handwritten correction superimposed
over the misspelled name of Jerome Paras while no such
handwritten correction appeared on page 3 of both the
committees copy and the new copy. (Note: Justice Reyes
said he did not know who made the correction.)
o Justice Carpio Morales then invited his attention to the fact
that page 1 of the new copy, like page 1 of Biraogos copy,
did not contain the footnotes and asterisks appearing in the
 committees copy. She also noted that the copy of Biraogo
and the new copy presented by Justice Reyes matched to a
T.
o page 3 of Biraogos copy a handwritten correction over the
misspelled name of Jerome Paras while no such correction
was made on the new copy. Additionally, on page 34 of
Biraogos copy, his initial appeared to have a smudge while
on page 34 of the new copy, there was no smudge.
When asked to explain why the new copy, which he claimed to
have been photocopied from the committees copy, did not
match the committees copy on page 1 but matched page 1 of
Biraogos copy, Justice Reyes offered no explanation.
Justice Reyes denied having given Atty. Evangelista the
instruction to reprint signature page 36 of the Gilbert copy and
stated that it must have been Atty. Evangelistas sole decision.
Justice Reyes denied having given Atty. Evangelista the
instruction to reprint signature page 36 of the Gilbert copy and
stated that it must have been Atty. Evangelistas sole decision.
No instruction from him to give Gilbert copy to Nachura
He likewise insisted that the testimony of Atty. Evangelista was
incorrect and that he would rather believe Del Rosarios
testimony.
Justice Reyes could not offer a straight answer to the question
of what his undue interest was in still trying to have the
signature of all the Justices after he had taken his lunch and to
forward the Gilbert copy and the rollo etc. to the OCJ even after
the decision to put the promulgation of the ponencia on hold
was arrived at, at lunchtime of July 15, 2008.
36.REPUBLIC v GINGOYON
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON
[G.R. No. 166429. December 19, 2005.]
FACTS:
The Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA 3) was conceived, designed and constructed to serve as the
country's show window to the world. Despite the apparent
completion of the terminal complex way back it has not yet been
operated.
The case was raffled to the Pasay City RTC, presided by
respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). Rep.
Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires
the immediate payment by the Government of at least the
proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides
certain valuation standards or methods for the determination of
just compensation. RTC erroneously applied the provisions of Rule
67 of the Rules of Court, instead of Rep. Act No. 8974, in
ascertaining compliance with the requisites for the issuance of
the writ of possession. The Government filed a Motion for
Inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon. The RTC denied these motions in an
Omnibus Order.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition for the
nullification of the RTC orders and for the inhibition of Hon.
Gingoyon from taking further action on the expropriation case.
HELD:
As a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter
how erroneous and vigorously and consistently expressed, are not
a basis for disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and
prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad
faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error
which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.
This court has an inherent power to reverse itself, especially when
in its honest opinion it has committed an error or mistake in
judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to
a party litigant. Incompetence may be a ground for administrative
sanction, but not for inhibition, which requires lack of objectivity
or impartiality to sit on a case.
The mere vehemence of the Government's claim of bias does not
translate to clear and convincing evidence of impairing bias.
There is no sufficient ground to direct the inhibition of Hon.
Gingoyon from hearing the expropriation case. There is no basis
for the Court to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon.
37.RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION
OF THE GSIS
FACTS:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed
on GOCCs under Sec 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the ROC. The said
provision states:
SEC. 22. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal
fees provided in this Rule. Local government corporations and
government-owned or controlled corporations with or without
independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees. xx
The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The
GSIS Act of 1997):
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of
the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all
times and that contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits
under this Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to
burden the members of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes
imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its
funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the
benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the
contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals thereto,
and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments,
fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall
continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any
assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are
hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances,
regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in
derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed,
superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and
effect. xx
Required to comment on the GSIS petition, the OSG maintains that
the petition should be denied. On this Courts order, the Office of
the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation
on the petition of the GSIS and the comment of the OSG thereon.
According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for exemption from
the payment of legal fees has no legal basis.
ISSUE: May the legislature exempt the GSIS from legal fees
imposed by the Court on GOCCs and local government units?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition of the GSIS for recognition of its
exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed under Sec 22 of
Rule 141 of the ROC on GOCCs and LGUs is hereby DENIED .
NO
Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the ROC was promulgated by this Court
in the exercise of its rule-making powers under Sec 5(5), Art VIII of
the Constitution:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged.
xxxxxxxx
Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the
ROC is an integral part of the rules promulgated by this Court
pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of
the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of
legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules
promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by
Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional
independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That power is
no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the
Executive.
NOTES:
-The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of
government employees in support of its petition. It is a corporate
entity whose personality is separate and distinct from that of its
individual members. The rights of its members are not its rights; its
rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely and are not shared
by its members.
-Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS
from the payment of legal fees without transgressing another
equally important institutional safeguard of the Courts
independence fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the
power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees,
including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two
basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the
Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which
established the JDF and the SAJF[33] expressly declare the identical
purpose of these funds to guarantee the independence of the
Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy. Legal
fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Courts
financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the
Courts fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of
legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled
corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the
JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally
infirm for it impairs the Courts guaranteed fiscal autonomy and
erodes its independence.
-Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice)
Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the rule-making power of this
Court and highlighted its evolution and development in Echegaray
v. Secretary of Justice:
Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but
it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was
subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement.
Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared
Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter
and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may
appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan, Congress in the exercise of
its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission
to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which
considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the
1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as
unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that x x x
the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the
bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can
revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor
executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of
these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is
the case with the law in question. The venerable jurist further
ruled: It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant
license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and
the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license. By its ruling, this Court qualified the
absolutist tone of the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure,
and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the
1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power
of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed,
altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x. More
completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the
integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition
of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further
strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the
additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of
the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more
independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making
power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxxxxxxx
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for
the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court
was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of
Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, more so with the Executive.
38.RE: IN THE MATTER OF CLARIFICATION OF EXEMPTION
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
In a Petition[1] dated 24 October 2011, Perpetual Help Community
Cooperative (PHCCI), through counsel, requests for the issuance of
a court order to clarify and implement the exemption of
cooperatives from the payment of court and sheriffs fees pursuant
to Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No. 9520,
otherwise known as the Philippine Cooperative Act of 2008.
PHCCI contends that as a cooperative it enjoys the exemption
provided for under Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520,
which states:
(6) Cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all
court and sheriffs fees payable to the Philippine Government
for and in connection with all actions brought under this
Code, or where such actions is brought by the Authority
before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations
contracted in favor of the cooperative.
It claims that this was a reiteration of Section 62, paragraph 6 of
Republic Act No. 6938, An Act to Ordain a Cooperative Code of the
Philippines,[2] and was made basis for the Courts Resolution in A.M.
No. 03-4-01-0, as well as of Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
Circular No. 44-2007.[3]
It avers that despite the exemptions granted by the aforesaid laws
and issuances, PHCCI had been continuously assessed and required
to pay legal and other fees whenever it files cases in court.
PHCCI reports that it filed with the Office of the Executive Judge of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Dumaguete City, Negros
Oriental, a Motion to implement the exemption of cooperatives
from the payment of court and sheriffs fees in cases filed before the
courts in his jurisdiction, but the Executive Judge ruled that the
matter is of national concern and should be brought to the
attention of the Supreme Court for it to come up with a straight
policy and uniform system of collection. In the meantime, the MTCC
has continued the assessment of filing fees against cooperatives.
Records reveal that on 21 September 2011, Executive Judge
Antonio Estoconing (Executive Judge Estoconing), MTCC,
Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, issued an Order treating the
motion filed by PHCCI as a mere consulta considering that no main
action was filed in his court. Executive Judge Estoconing submits
that he had second thoughts in considering the exemption in view
of the guidelines laid down in the Rules. He reported that many
cases filed by PHCCI are small claims cases and under Section 8 of
the Rule on Small Claims, the plaintiff is required to pay docket fees
and other related costs unless he is allowed to litigate the case as
an indigent.
Hence, this Petition.
Before this Court is the issue on whether cooperatives are exempt
from the payment of court and sheriffs fees. The fees referred to
are those provided for under Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of
Court.
The term all court fees under Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act
No. 9520 refers to the totality of legal fees imposed under Rule 141
of the Rules of Court as an incident of instituting an action in court.
[4]
These fees include filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for
issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriffs fees,
stenographers fees and commissioners fees.[5]
With regard to the term sheriffs fees, this Court, in an extended
minute Resolution dated 1 September 2009, held that the
exemptions granted to cooperatives under Section 2, paragraph 6
of Republic Act No. 6938; Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act No.
9520; and OCA Circular No. 44-2007 clearly do not cover the
amount required to defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff,
process server or other court-authorized person in the service of
summons, subpoena and other court processes issued relative to
the trial of the case,[6] which are neither considered as court and
sheriffs fees nor are amounts payable to the Philippine
Government.[7]
In fine, the 1 September 2009 Resolution exempted the
cooperative from court fees but not from sheriffs fees/expenses.
On 11 February 2010, however, the Supreme Court En Banc issued
a Resolution in A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, [8] which denied the petition of
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for recognition of
its exemption from payment of legal fees imposed under Section 22
of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. In the GSIS case, the Court
citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,[9] stressed that the 1987
Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary; took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure; and
held that the power to promulgate these Rules is no longer shared
by the Court with Congress, more so, with the Executive, [10] thus:
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the
rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled,
changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards
of this Courts institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now
the Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared
by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive. [11]
xxxx
The separation of powers among the three co-equal
branches of our government has erected an impregnable
wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this
Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if
they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter
or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this
Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a
legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal
fees under Section 39 of R.A. 8291 necessarily fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the
GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing
another equally important institutional safeguard of the
Courts independence - fiscal autonomy.[12] Fiscal autonomy
recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy,
assess and collect fees,[13] including legal fees. Moreover,
legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance
for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF).[14] The laws which established
the JDF and SAJF[15] expressly declare the identical purpose
of these funds to guarantee the independence of the
Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.
[16]
Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source
of the Courts financial resources but also comprise an
essential element of the Courts fiscal independence. Any
exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by
Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations
and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF
and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally
infirm for it impairs the Courts guaranteed fiscal autonomy
and erodes its independence.[17]
In a decision dated 26 February 2010 in Baguio Market Vendors
Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes,
[18]
this Court reiterated its ruling in the GSIS case when it denied
the petition of the cooperative to be exempted from the payment of
legal fees under Section 7(c) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court
relative to fees in petitions for extra-judicial foreclosure.
On 10 March 2010, relying again on the GSIS ruling, the Court En
Banc issued a resolution clarifying that the National Power
Corporation is not exempt from the payment of legal fees.[19]
With the foregoing categorical pronouncements of the Supreme
Court, it is evident that the exemption of cooperatives from
payment of court and sheriffs fees no longer stands. Cooperatives
can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9520, as basis for exemption from the payment of
legal fees.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the petition of
PHCCI requesting for this Court to issue an order clarifying and
implementing the exemption of cooperatives from the payment of
court and sheriffs fees is hereby DENIED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to issue a
circular clarifying that cooperatives are not exempt from the
payment of the legal fees provided for under Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court.
SO ORDERED.
39.FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS v CA
Facts: The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended
provided that appeals from decisions of the Board of
Investments (BOI) shall be the exclusive jurisdiction of the CA.
Just a few months after the 1987 Constitution took effect (July
17, 1987), the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (EO 226)
was promulgated which provided in Art 82 thereof that such
appeals be directly filed with the SC. The SC later promulgated,
under its rule-making power, Circular No. 1-91 which confirmed
that jurisdiction of the CA over appeals from the decisions of the
BOI. SCs Second Division, relying on said Circular, accordingly
sustained the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in this present
case. Petitioner now move to reconsider and question the
Second Divisions ruling which provided:
.although the right to appeal granted by Art 82 of EO 226 is a
substantive right which cannot be modified by a rule of
procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where and in
what manner the appeal can be brought are only matters of
procedure which this Court hast he power to regulate.
They contend that Circular No. 191 (a rule of procedure) cannot
be deemed to have superseded Art 82 of EO 226 (a legislation).
Issue: Was the Court correct in sustaining the appellate
jurisdiction of the CA in decisions from the Board of
Investments?
Held: Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the 1987 Constitution
took effect February 2, 1987. Thus, Art 82 of EO 226, which
provides for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is
invalid and therefore never became effective for the
concurrence of the Court was no sought in its enactment. Thus,
the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended still
stands. The exclusive jurisdiction on appeals from decisions of
the BOI belongs to the CA.
40.LAPINID v CSC
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is
a political question involving considerations of wisdom which
only the appointing authority can decide.
The Facts:
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine
Ports Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the
Manila International Container Terminal on October 1, 1988.
This appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by
private respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his earlier
representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9,
1988, for a review of the decision of the Placement Committee
dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he should be designated
terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in
view of his preferential right thereto.
After a careful review of the records of the case,
the Commission finds the appeal meritorious. It is thus obvious
that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and Villegas (79) have an edge
over that of protestees Lapinid (75) and Dulfo (78).
Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that Appellants
Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as Terminal
Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio
Dulfo respectively who may be considered for appointment to
any position commensurate and suitable to their qualifications,
and that the Commission be notified within ten (10) days of the
implementation hereof.
Decision:
Only recently, in Gaspar v. Court of Appeals,[2] this Court
said:
The only function of the Civil Service Commission in
cases of this nature, according to Luego, is to review the
appointment in the light of the requirements of
the Civil ServiceLaw, and when it finds the appointee to be
qualified and all other legal requirements have been otherwise
satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the
appointment. Luego finally points out that the recognition by
the Commission that both the appointee and the protestant are
qualified for the position in controversy renders it functus
ofcio in the case and prevents it from acting further thereon
except to affirm the validity of the former's appointment; it has
no authority to revoke the appointment simply because it
considers another employee to be better qualified for that
would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested in
the appointing authority.
The determination of who among several candidates for
a vacant position has the best qualifications is vested in the
sound discretion of the Department Head or appointing
authority and not in the Civil Service Commission. Every
particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal
qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age, number of
academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc.,
may be valuable but so are such intangibles as
resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty,
ambition, prospects for the future, and best interests of
the service. Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it
best should be left to the Head of the Office concerned
provided the legal requirements for the office are
satisfied. The Civil Service Commission cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the Head of Office in this regard
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court
cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in proper
cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the
appointee - taking into account the totality of his qualifications,
including those abstract qualities that define his personality - is
the prerogative of the appointing authority. This is a matter
addressed only to the discretion of the appointing authority. It is
a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no
power to review under the Constitution and the applicable laws.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the
respondent Civil Service Commission dated February 14, 1990,
May 25, 1990, August 17, 1990, and October 19, 1990, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order
dated December 13, 1990, is made PERMANENT. No costs.
41.CHAVEZ v JBC
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior
decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBCs action of allowing more
than one member of the congress to represent the JBC to be
unconstitutional

FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member
was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began
sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then,
the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001,
decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the
House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph
G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It
is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it
should mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the
phrase a representative of congress refers that both houses of
congress should have one representative each, and that these two
houses are permanent and mandatory components of congress
as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have
their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8
of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7
members only with only one representative from congress.
ISSUE:
Whether the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and
the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting
members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution.
HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the
phrase a representative of congress should be construed as to
having only one representative that would come from either house,
not both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one
seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body
refers to its primary function in government to legislate. In the
passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the
role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress
non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however,
cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence,
the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed
of seven (7) members only.
42.JARDELEZA v SERENO
Facts:
Following Justice Abads compulsory retirement, the JBC announced
the application or recommendations for the position left by the
Associate Justice. Jardeleza, the incumbent Sol-Gen at the time,
was included in the list of candidates. However, he was informed
through telephone call from some Justices that the Chief Justice
herself CJ Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or
the so-called unanimity rule against him. Generally, the rule is
that an applicant is included in the shortlist when s/he obtains
affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the members of the JBC.
When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, however, is invoked because
an applicants integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is
required. Jardeleza was then directed to make himself available on
June 30, 2014 before the JBC during which he would be informed of
the objections to his integrity.
Jardeleza wrote a letter-petition asking the SC to exercise its
supervisory power and direct the JBC to, among others, give
Jardeleza a written notice and sworn written statements of his
oppositors or any documents in the JBC hearings, and to disallow CJ
Sereno from participating in the voting process for nominees on
June 30, 2014.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio
appeared and disclosed a confidential information which, to CJ
Sereno, characterized Jardelezas integrity as dubious. Jardeleza
demanded that CJ Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying her
objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in
a public hearing. He also requested deferment of the JBC
proceedings, as the SC en banc has yet to decide in his letter-
petition.
However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote
for the nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC
released the shortlist of 4 nominees. It was revealed later that
there were actually 5 nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist,
but 1 nominee could not be included because of the invocation of
the unanimity rule..
Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus via Rule 65 with prayer
for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the list of nominees on
the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of
discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient
number of votes to qualify for the position.
Political Law
Issue: W/N the right to due process is demandable as a matter of
right in JBC proceedings
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it
does not mean that an applicants access to the rights afforded
under the due process clause is discretionary on the part of JBC.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of
JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being a class of its own, the
right to be heard and to explain ones self is availing. In cases
where an objection to an applicants qualifications is raised, the
observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the
JBCs duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on
its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to
the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of
its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth
of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is
presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces,
thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious
assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of
an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of
the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness
because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount
is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should
have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for
the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence
arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-
009 per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of
procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does
the Court intend to strike down the unanimity rule as it reflects
the JBCs policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees.
Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable
defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that
Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested
right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that
the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due
process. ##
Remedial Law
Issue 1: W/N the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case
Yes. Jardelezas allegations in his petitions merits the exercise of
the Courts supervisory authority over the JBC. Under Sec 8, Art VIII
of the Constitution, the JBC shall function under the supervision of
the SC. It follows that such supervisory authority covers the
overseeing of whether the JBC complies with its own rules or not.
Issue 2: W/N a writ of mandamus is available against the JBC
No. The JBCs duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be
compelled to do something.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a
discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the
exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes
upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment
in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch
or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
43.VILLANUEVA v JBC
Facts:
After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge
Villanueva applied for the vacant position of presiding judge in
some RTC branches. The JBC however informed him that he was
not included in the list of candidates for such position because the
JBCs long-standing policy requires 5 years of service as judge of
first-level courts before one can apply as judge for second-level
courts. Before the SC, he assailed via Rule 65 and Rule 63 with
prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction the policy of JBC on the
ground that it is unconstitutional and was issued with grave abuse
of discretion. Allegedly, the policy also violates procedural due
process for lack of publication and non-submission to the UP Law
Center Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR),
adding that the policy should have been published because it will
affect all applying judges.

Issue 3: W/N a writ of certiorari under Sec 1, Rule 65 of the Rules

On the other hand, one of the JBCs arguments was that the writ of
of Court is available against the JBC (which is not exercising quasi-
certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from
judicial functions)
performing its principal function under the Constitution to

Yes. Under the expanded jurisdiction or expanded power of judicial recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a

review vested to the SC by the 1987 Constitution, a petition for tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.

certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or

Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC requiring 5-year service is
constitutional 45.IN RE: CUNANAN

Yes. As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated FACTS:

to recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those
nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President
may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary.
Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued
with public interest as it determines the men and women who will
sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided
the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not
preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures
and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar
Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix the
Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including
1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%

Issue 2: W/N JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in laying 1952 .71%
down such policy
1953..72%
No. The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are
1954..73%
necessary and incidental to the JBCs principal function of choosing
and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for
1955..74%
appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not
lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower
determining applicants qualifications. In carrying out its main
than 50%.
function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in
choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a
only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already
law for every position. The search for these long held qualities passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the
necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine computation of the general average in subsequent bar
who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient examinations.
but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
ISSUE:
44.AGOY (refer to #32)
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of
not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act
should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an
indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing,
thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence
are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared
unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force
and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under
the following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked
the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the
fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court
on the petitions of the said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to
determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore,
in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power
are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment
of the court on who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class
legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not
muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was
passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke
existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of
an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to
Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the
practice of law.
46.SALONGA v PAO
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected
right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause,
alleging that no prima facie case has been established to
warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him.
Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the
respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass,
oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic
opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in
the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and
October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of
the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those
responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the
petitioner a Notice of Preliminary Investigation in People v.
Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-
accused), stating that the preliminary investigation of the
above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 oclock p.m. on
December 12, 1980 and that petitioner was given ten (10)
days from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting
evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The
petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on
January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has
not received any copies of the charges against him nor any
copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing
complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been
1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD
1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a
2. Yes. Despite the SCs dismissal of the petition due to the
motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the
cases moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2
rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness
December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the
was clearly apparent.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City)
denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a
resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga
that no prima facie case has been established by the
prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the The fact that the case is moot and academic should not
lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and
law exists in the Philippines today. unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower
court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution
that excessive bail shall not be required.
Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural
case Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the
deserves a decision from the Supreme Court Centers new charter pursuant to the Presidents legislative
powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the
constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a
Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9,
consensus on the Courts judgment had been arrived at, and a
Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183),
opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge
the fact that the petition was moot and academic did not
Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal
prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from
Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the
promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever
petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the
printed in the Reports.
prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the
exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in
the information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and
the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from
circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once
47.DAVID v MACAPAGAL -ARROYO
again in the Courts crowded agenda for further deliberations.
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017
declaring a state of emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of
the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the
Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . .
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed
forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion
["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing
PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a
subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
They alleged direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call
unlawful search committed by police operatives pursuant to
PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the
issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and
contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full
discretionary powers to the President in determining the
necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did
not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three
important provisions, thus:
First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by
Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well any act of insurrection or rebellion
Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws
and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first
provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was
merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment
or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II
of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the
words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and
deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that.
In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did
not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a
provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17,
Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to
take over privately-owned public utility and business affected
with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of
an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be
deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is
merely an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out power for
the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing
lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on
Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that
[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos
exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority
to declarea state of national emergency and to exercise
emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants
the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional
objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold
constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers.
This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI
authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President.
Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not
be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow
Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject
to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of
the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private
business affected with public interest is just another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus,
when Section 17 states that the the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest, it
refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on whether
Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing
the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by
President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such
Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest
without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare
a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he
has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine
when such exceptional circumstances have ceased.
Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to
point out the types of businesses affected with public interest
that should be taken over. In short, the President has no
absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers
act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard
by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e.
whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures
to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering
that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made
punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared unconstitutional
48.PANGILINAN v MAGLAYA (FT)