Torts and Damages. Damages

TORTS AND DAMAGES.
DAMAGES
DEFINITION
DAMNUM ET INJURIA/ DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 83589 March 13, 1991
RAMON FAROLAN as ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, and GUILLERMO PARAYNO, as CHIEF

OF CUSTOM INTELLIGENCE and INVESTIGATION DIVISION, petitioners,
vs.
SOLMAC MARKETING CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Dakila F. Castro & Associates for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari, instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the public officers-
petitioners, seek the nullification and setting aside of the Resolution 1 dated May 25, 1988 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10509, entitled "Solmac Marketing Corporation vs. Ramon Farolan, Acting
Commissioner of Customs, and Guillermo Parayno, Chief of Customs Intelligence and Investigation
Division," which adjudged these public officers to pay solidarily and in their private personal capacities
respondent Solmac Marketing Corporation temperate damages in the sum of P100,000.00, exemplary
damages in the sum of P50,000.00, and P25,000.00, as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. This
challenged resolution of the respondent court modified its decision 2 of July 27, 1987 by reducing into
halves the original awards of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00 for exemplary damages and attorney's fees and
litigation expenses, respectively, keeping intact the original grant of P100,000.00 in the concept of
temperate damages. (Strangely, the first name of petitioner Farolan stated in the assailed resolution, as
well as in the decision, of the respondent court is "Damian" when it should be "Ramon", his correct given
name. Strictly speaking, petitioner Ramon Farolan could not be held liable under these decision and
resolution for he is not the one adjudged to pay the huge damages but a different person. Nonetheless,
that is of no moment now considering the disposition of this ponencia.)
The relevant facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
At the time of the commission of the acts complained of by the private respondent, which was the subject
of the latter's petition for mandamus and injunction filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in
Civil Case No. 84-23537, petitioner Ramon Farolan was then the Acting Commissioner of Customs while
petitioner Guillermo Parayno was then the Acting Chief, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division.
They were thus sued in their official capacities as officers in the government as clearly indicated in the title
of the case in the lower courts and even here in this Court. Nevertheless, they were both held personally
liable for the awarded damages "(s)ince the detention of the goods by the defendants (petitioners herein)
was irregular and devoid of legal basis, hence, not done in the regular performance of official duty . . . ." 3
However, as adverted to at the outset, in the dispositive portion of the challenged resolution, the one held
personally liable is a "Damian Farolan" and not the petitioner, Ramon Farolan. Also as earlier mentioned,
we will ignore that gross error.
Private respondent Solmac Marketing Corporation is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines. It was the assignee, transferee, and owner of an importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic
Products of 202,204 kilograms of what is technically known as polypropylene film, valued at US$69,250.05.
Torts and Damages. Damages. | 1

Polypropylene is a substance resembling polyethelyne which is one of a group of partially crystalline
lightweight thermoplastics used chiefly in making fibers, films, and molded and extruded products. 4
Without defect, polypropylene film is sold at a much higher price as prime quality film. Once rejected as
defective due to blemishes, discoloration, defective winding, holes, etc., polypropylene film is sold at a
relatively cheap price without guarantee or return, and the buyer takes the risk as to whether he can
recover an average 30% to 50% usable matter. 5 This latter kind of polypropylene is known as OPP film
waste/scrap and this is what respondent SOLMAC claimed the Clojus shipment to be.
The subject importation, consisting of seventeen (17) containers, arrived in December, 1981. Upon
application for entry, the Bureau of Customs asked respondent SOLMAC for its authority from any
government agency to import the goods described in the bill of lading. Respondent SOLMAC presented a
Board of Investment (BOI) authority for polypropylene film scrap. However, upon examination of the
shipment by the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), it turned out that the fibers of the
importation were oriented in such a way that the materials were stronger than OPP film scrap. 6 In other
words, the Clojus shipment was not OPP film scrap, as declared by the assignee respondent SOLMAC to the
Bureau of Customs and BOI Governor Lilia R. Bautista, but oriented polypropylene the importation of which
is restricted, if not prohibited, under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 658-B. Specifically, Sections 1 and 2 of
LOI No. 658-B provide that:
xxx xxx xxx
1. The importation of cellophane shall be allowed only for quantities and types of cellophane that
cannot be produced by Philippine Cellophane Film Corporation. The Board of Investments shall issue
guidelines regulating such importations.
2. The Collector of Customs shall see to the apprehension of all illegal importations of cellophane
and oriented polypropylene (OPP) and the dumping of imported stock lots of cellophane and OPP.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that the shipment was different from what had been authorized by the BOI and by law,
petitioners Parayno and Farolan withheld the release of the subject importation.
On June 7, 1982, petitioner Parayno, then Chief of Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division, wrote
the BOI asking for the latter's advice on whether or no t the subject importation may be released 7 A series
of exchange of correspondence between the BOI and the Bureau of Customs, on one hand, and between
the late Dakila Castro, counsel for the private respondent, and the BOI and the Bureau of Customs, on the
other, ensued, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
4. In a letter dated August 17, 1982, the BOI agreed that the subject imports may be released but
that holes may be drilled on them by the Bureau of Customs prior to their release.
5. On January 20, 1983, (the late) Atty. Dakila Castro, (then) counsel of private respondent wrote to
petitioner Commissioner Farolan of Customs asking for the release of the importation. The
importation was not released, however, on the ground that holes had to be drilled on them first.
6. Atty. Dakila Castro then wrote a letter dated October 6, 1983, to BOI Governor Hermenigildo
Zayco stressing the reasons why the subject importation should be released without drilling of
holes.
7. On November 8, 1983, BOI Governor H. Zayco wrote a letter to the Bureau of Customs stating
that the subject goods may be released without drilling of holes inasmuch as the goods arrived
prior to the endorsement on August 17, 1982 to the drilling of holes on all importations of
waste/scrap films.
8. On February 1, 1984, petitioner Commissioner Farolan wrote the BOI requesting for definite
guidelines regarding the disposition of importations of Oriented Polypropylene (OPP) and
Polypropylene (PP) then being held at the Bureau of Customs.

9. On March 12, 1984, Minister Roberto Ongpin of Trade, the BOI Chairman, wrote his reply to
petitioner Farolan . . . .8 (This reply of Minister Ongpin is copied in full infra.)
On March 26, 1984, respondent Solmac filed the action for mandamus and injunction with the RTC as
above mentioned. It prayed for the unconditional release of the subject importation. It also prayed for
actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. As prayed for, the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction.
After hearing on the merits, the RTC rendered a decision on February 5, 1985, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants to release the subject
importation immediately without drilling of holes, subject only to the normal requirements of the
customs processing for such release to be done with utmost dispatch as time is of the essence; and
the preliminary injunction hereto issued is hereby made permanent until actual physical release of
the merchandise and without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 9
From the decision of the trial court, Solmac, the plaintiff below and the private respondent herein,
appealed to the Court of Appeals only insofar as to the denial of the award of damages is concerned. On
the other hand, the petitioners did not appeal from this decision. They did not see any need to appeal
because as far as they were concerned, they had already complied with their duty. They had already
ordered the release of the importation "without drilling of holes," as in fact it was so released, in
compliance with the advice to effect such immediate release contained in a letter of BOI dated October 9,
1984, to Commissioner Farolan. Thus, to stress, even before the RTC rendered its decision on February 5,
1984, the Clojus shipment of OPP was released 10 to the private respondent in its capacity as assignee of
the same. Be that it may, the private respondent filed its appeal demanding that the petitioners be held, in
their personal and private capacities, liable for damages despite the finding of lack of bad faith on the part
of the public officers.
After due proceeding, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 11

on July 27, 1987, the dispositive portion
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified by ordering the defendants Ramon Farolan and
Guillermo Parayno solidarity, in their personal capacity, to pay the plaintiff temperate damages in
the sum of P100,000, exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000 and P50,000 as attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation. Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
On August 14, 1987, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
On May 25, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution modifying the award of damages, to wit:
temperate damages in the sum of P100,000,00, exemplary damages in the sum of P50,000.00, and
P25,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. The respondent court explained the reduction of
the awards for exemplary damages and attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in this wise:
3. In our decision of July 27, 1987, We awarded to plaintiff-appellant Pl00,000 as temperate

damages, Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation. Under Art. 2233 of the Civil Code, recovery of exemplary damages is not a matter of right
but depends upon the discretion of the court. Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation must always be reasonable. In view of these provisions of the law, and
since the award of temperate damages is only P100,000.00, the amount of exemplary damages
may not be at par as temperate damages. An award of P50,000.00, as exemplary damages may
already serve the purpose, i.e., as an example for the public good. Likewise, the attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation have to be reduced to 25% of the amount of temperate damages, or
P25,000.00, if the same have to be reasonable. The reduction in the amount of exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees and expenses of litigation would be in accord with justice and
fairness. 12

The petitioners now come to this Court, again by the Solicitor General, assigning the following errors
allegedly committed by the respondent court:
The Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the finding of the trial court that the defense of good
faith of petitioners (defendants) cannot be discredited.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging petitioners liable to pay temperate damages, exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. 13
These two issues boil down to a single question, i.e., whether or not the petitioners acted in good faith in
not immediately releasing the questioned importation, or, simply, can they be held liable, in their personal
and private capacities, for damages to the private respondent.
We rule for the petitioners.
The respondent court committed a reversible error in overruling the trial court's finding that:
. . . with reference to the claim of plaintiff to damages, actual and exemplary, and attorney's fees,
the Court finds it difficult to discredit or disregard totally the defendants' defense of good faith
premised on the excuse that they were all the time awaiting clarification of the Board of
Investments on the matter. 14
We hold that this finding of the trial court is correct for good faith is always presumed and it is upon him
who alleges the contrary that the burden of proof lies. 15 In Abando v. Lozada, 16 we defined good faith as
"refer[ring] to a state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of
the honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is
the opposite of fraud, and its absence should be established by convincing evidence."
We had reviewed the evidence on record carefully and we did not see any clear and convincing proof
showing the alleged bad faith of the petitioners. On the contrary, the record is replete with evidence
bolstering the petitioners' claim of good faith. First, there was the report of the National Institute of Science
and Technology (NIST) dated January 25, 1982 that, contrary to what the respondent claimed, the subject
importation was not OPP film scraps but oriented polypropylene, a plastic product of stronger material,
whose importation to the Philippines was restricted, if not prohibited, under LOI
658-B. 17 It was on the strength of this finding that the petitioners withheld the release of the subject
importation for being contrary to law. Second, the petitioners testified that, on many occasions, the Bureau
of Customs sought the advice of the BOI on whether the subject importation might be released. 18 Third,
petitioner Parayno also testified during the trial that up to that time (of the trial) there was no clear-cut
policy on the part of the BOI regarding the entry into the Philippines of oriented polypropylene (OPP), as
the letters of BOI Governors Tordesillas and Zayco of November 8, 1983 and September 24, 1982,
respectively, ordering the release of the subject importation did not clarify the BOI policy on the matter. He
then testified on the letter of the BOI Chairman Roberto Ongpin dated March 12, 1984, which states in full:
Thank you for your letter of 1 February 1984, on the subject of various importations of Oriented
Polypropylene (OPP) and Polypropylene (PP) withheld by Customs and the confusion over the
disposition of such imports.
I have discussed the matter with Vice-Chairman Tordesillas and Governor Zayco of the Board of
Investments and the following is their explanation:
1. On 22 June 1982, the BOI ruled that importation of OPP/PP film scraps intended for recycling or
repelletizing did not fall within the purview of LOI 658-B.
2. On 17 August l982, the BOI agreed that holes could be drilled on subject film imports to prevent
their use for other purposes.
3. For importations authorized prior to 22 June 1982, the drilling of holes should depend on purpose
for which the importations was approved by the BOI that is, for direct packaging use or for
recycling/repelletizing into raw material. The exemption from drilling of holes on Solmac Marketing's
importation under Certificates of Authority issued on 1 April 1982 and 5 May 1982 and on Clojus'
importation authorized in 1982 were endorsed by the BOI on the premise that these were not
intended for recycling/repelletizing.
Should your office have any doubts as to the authorized intended use of any imported lots of
OPP/PP film scraps that you have confiscated, we have no objection to the drilling of holes to ensure
that these are indeed recycled.
I have requested Governor Zayco to contact your office in order to offer any further assistance
which you may require. 19
It can be seen from all the foregoing that even the highest officers (Chairman Ongpin, Vice-Chairman
Tordesillas, and Governor Zayco) of the BOI themselves were not in agreement as to what proper course to
take on the subject of the various importations of Oriented Polypropylene (OPP) and Polypropylene (PP)
withheld by the Bureau of Customs. The conflicting recommendations of the BOI on this score prompted
the petitioners to seek final clarification from the former with regard to its policy on these importations.
This resulted in the inevitable delay in the release of the Clojus shipment, one of the several of such
importations. The confusion over the disposition of this particular importation obviates bad faith. Thus the
trial court's finding that the petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the Clojus
shipment pending a definitive policy of the BOI on this matter is correct. It is supported by substantial
evidence on record, independent of the presumption of good faith, which as stated earlier, was not
successfully rebutted.
When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to perform the duties of his office faithfully
and to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the
discharge of his duties, he is to use that prudence, caution, and attention which careful men use in the
management of their affairs. In the case at bar, prudence dictated that petitioners first obtain from the BOI
the latter's definite guidelines regarding the disposition of the various importations of oriented
polypropylene (OPP) and polypropylene (PP) then being withheld at the Bureau of Customs. These
cellophane/film products were competing with locally manufactured polypropylene and oriented
polypropylene as raw materials which were then already sufficient to meet local demands, hence, their
importation was restricted, if not prohibited under LOI 658-B. Consequently, the petitioners can not be said
to have acted in bad faith in not immediately releasing the import goods without first obtaining the
necessary clarificatory guidelines from the BOI. As public officers, the petitioners had the duty to see to it
that the law they were tasked to implement, i.e., LOI 658-B, was faithfully complied with.
But even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in withholding the release of the subject
importation because indeed it was composed of OPP film scraps, 20 contrary to the evidence submitted by
the National Institute of Science and Technology that the same was pure oriented OPP, nonetheless, it is
the duty of the Court to see to it that public officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties or
in making decisions for fear of personal liability for damages due to honest mistake.1wphi1 Whatever
damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature
of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable absent
any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 21 After
all, "even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of
good faith. 22
In the same vein, the presumption, disputable though it may be, that an official duty has been regularly
performed23 applies in favor of the petitioners. Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta. (All
things are presumed to be correctly and solemnly done.) It was private respondent's burden to overcome
this juris tantum presumption. We are not persuaded that it has been able to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Resolution of the respondent court, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 10509, dated May 25, 1988, is SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996]

SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA
SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court, as well as its resolution dated July 8, 1994denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.[1]
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by
Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria
Cristina C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof. [2]
The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of
Appeals, are as follows:
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the pendency of
this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos
St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said property through a contract
of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last September 1981. Said property
may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos
Street as the point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiffs property, the row of houses will be as
follows: That of defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and
then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank
(Exhibit D). As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiffs property, there are two possible
passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from
Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of
houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasas residence
to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path
through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises and who were
acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982. one of said tenants
vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there had been
built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first
constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway.
Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire
passageway was enclosed (Exhibit 1-Santoses and Custodios, Exh. D for plaintiff, Exhs. 1-C, 1-D and I -E)
And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina
Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was
dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway.
She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway such as
when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their footwear
were even lost. x x x[3] (Italics in original text; corrections in parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access - ingress and egress, to
the public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos
(P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.[4]

Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private respondents, went to
the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding
damages in their favor. On November 10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification, the decretal portion of which disposes
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION only
insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court hereby orders defendants-
appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand(P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages,
Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary
Damages. The rest of the appealed decision is affirmed to all respects. [5]
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. [6]Petitioners then
took the present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to
herein private respondents is proper, and whether or not the award of damages is in order.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners
did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence
they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the
trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain
any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That decision of the court
below has become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this
Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has
not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was
granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem
necessary to defeat the appellants claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can
assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These
assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision
on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellees favor
and giving him other affirmative reliefs.[7]
However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in
awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. A
reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on
the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when
the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover
damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong
inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom.Wrong without damage, or
damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the
remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.[8]
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal
right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.[9] in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of
which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the
person causing it.[10] The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual
was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition
of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be
tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering) [11]
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or loss
to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of
action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law
affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. [12]

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not
only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.[13] If, as may happen in many cases, a person
sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury,
that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum
absque injuria.[14]
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of
private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order
that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential
that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to
the plaintiff.[15]
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners,
hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to
enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. [16] It is within the right
of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that
(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges,
or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes.There was no
easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that
private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of
the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was
only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of
the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said
right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of
fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and
exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private
respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.[17]
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure,
for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no
cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner,
although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss
is damnum absque injuria.[18]When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary
manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can
complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a
mere consequence of community life.[19]
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie,
[20]
although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded [21] One may use
any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to
another, no cause of action arises in the latters favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby
is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from
action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful means. [22]
WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is correspondingly
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8385 March 24, 1914

LUCIO ALGARRA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SIXTO SANDEJAS, defendant-appellee.
Southworth, Hargis & Springer for appellant.

Rohde & Wright for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is a civil action for personal injuries received from a collision with the defendant's automobile due to
the negligence of the defendant, who was driving the car. The negligence of the defendant is not
questioned and this case involves only the amount of damages which should be allowed.
As a result of the injuries received, plaintiff was obliged to spend ten days in the hospital, during the first
four or five of which he could not leave his bed. After being discharged from the hospital, he received
medical attention from a private practitioner for several days. The latter testified that after the last
treatment the plaintiff described himself as being well. On the trial the plaintiff testified that he had done
no work since the accident, which occurred on July 9, 1912, and that he was not yet entirely recovered.
Plaintiff testified that his earning capacity was P50 per month. It is not clear at what time plaintiff became
entirely well again, but as to the doctor to whom he described himself as being well stated that this was
about the last of July, and the trial took place September 19, two months' pay would seem sufficient for the
actual time lost from his work. Plaintiff further testified that he paid the doctor P8 and expended P2 for
medicines. This expenses, amounting in all to P110 should also be allowed.
Plaintiff sold the products of a distillery on a 10 per cent commission and made an average of P50 per
month. He had about twenty regular customers who, it seems, purchased in small quantities, necessitating
regular and frequent deliveries. Since the accident his wife had done something in a small way to keep up
this business but the total orders taken by her would not net them over P15. He lost all his regular
customers but four, other agents filing their orders since his accident. It took him about four years to build
up the business he had at the time of the accident, and he could not say how long it would take him to get
back the business he had lost.
Under this state of facts, the lower court, while recognizing the justness of he claim, refused to allow him
anything for injury to his business due to his enforced absence therefrom, on the ground that the doctrine
of Marcelo vs. Velasco (11 Phil., Rep., 277) is opposed t such allowance. The trial court's opinion appears to
be based upon the following quotation from Viada (vol. 1 p. 539), quoted in that decision: ". . . with regard
to the offense of lesiones, for example, the civil liability is almost always limited to indemnity for damage
to the party aggrieved for the time during which he was incapacitated for work; . . ."
This statement, however, derives its force, not from any provision of the law applicable to lesiones, but is a
mere deduction from the operation of the law upon the cases arising under it. That the interpretation
placed upon this statement of Viada by the lower court is either not correct, or that it does not apply to
actions for personal injuries under article 1902 of the Civil Code, is apparent from the decisions of the
supreme court of Spain of January 8, 1906, January 15, 1902, and October 19, 1909, to which a more
extended reference will be made further on in this opinion. There is nothing said in the decision in question
prohibiting the allowance of compensatory damages, nor does there seem to be anything contained
therein opposed to the allowance of such damages occurring subsequent to the institution of the action. In
fact, it appears from the following quotation that the court would have been disposed to consider favorably
the plaintiff's claim for injury to her business had the evidence presented it.
No evidence was then offered by the plaintiff to show that this slight lameness in any way interfered
with the conduct of her business or that she could make any less amount therein than she could
make if she did not suffer from this direct. The court, therefore, did not err in allowing her no further
damages on this account,because there was no evidence that she had suffered any.
The alleged damages which the court refused to entertain in that case and under the discussion of which
appears the above quotation from Viada, were for pain and suffering the plaintiff may have experienced.
The court said: "For the profits which the plaintiff failed to obtain, spoken of in the latter part of this article,
the plaintiff was allowed to recover, and the question is, whether the value of the loss which she
suffered can be extended to pain which she experienced by reason of the accident."

Actions for damages such as the case at bar are based upon article 1902 of the Civil Code, which reads as
follows: "A person who, by act or omission, causes damage to another where there is fault or negligence
shall be obliged to repair the damage so done."
Of this article, the supreme court of Spain, in its decision of February 7, 1900, in considering the indemnity
imposed by it, said: "It is undisputed that said reparation, to be efficacious and substantial, must rationally
include the generic idea of complete indemnity, such as is defined and explained in article 1106 of the said
(Civil) Code."
Articles 1106 and 1107 of the Civil Code read as follows:
1106. Indemnity for losses and damages includes not only the amount of the loss which may have
been suffered, but also that of the profit which the creditor may have failed to realize, reserving the
provisions contained in the following articles.
1107. The losses and damages for which a debtor in good faith is liable, are those foreseen or which
may have been foreseen, at the time of constituting the obligation, and which may be a necessary
consequence of its nonfulfillment.
In case of fraud, the debtor shall be liable for all those which clearly may originate from the
nonfulfillment of the obligation.
Fraud is not an element of the present case, and we are not therefore concerned with it. The liability of the
present defendant includes only those damages which were "foreseen or may have been foreseen" at the
time of the accident, and which are the necessary and immediate consequences of his fault. In discussing
the question of damages under the civil law, Gutierrez (vol. 4, pp. 64, 65) says:
In the impossibility of laying down a surer rule, the Code understands known damages to be those
which in the prudent discernment of the judge merit such a qualification, although their
consequences may not be direct, immediate inevitable.
If it is a question of losses occasioned through other causes, except fraud, and the contracting
parties have not covenanted any indemnity for the case of nonfulfillment, then the reparation of the
losses or damages shall only comprise those that fault. This rule may not be very clear, but is the
only one possible in a matter more of the domain of prudence than of law.
In its decision of April 18, 1901, the supreme court of Spain said: "Neither were the errors incurred that are
mentioned in the third assignment, since the indemnity for damages is understood to apply to those
caused the complainant directly, and not to those which, indirectly and through more or less logical
deductions, may affect the interests of the Ayuntamiento de Viana, as occurs in the present case where
the increase of wealth concerns not only the Ayuntamiento but also the provide and the state, yet, not on
this account does any action lie in their behalf as derived from the contracts with Urioste."
This doctrine is also affirmed in the more recent decision of March 18, 1909, in the following words: "For
the calculation of the damages claimed, it is necessary, pursuant to the provisions of article 924 of the Law
of Civil Procedure, to give due regard to the nature of the obligation that was unfulfilled and to the
reasonable consequences of its nonfulfillment, because the conviction sought can be imposed only when
there exists a natural and true relation between such nonfulfillment and damages, whatever, reason there
may be to demand them on another account."
In the case of Garcia Gamo vs. Compania Madrilena de Alumbrado, etc. (101 Juris, p., 662), it appeared
that an employee of the defendant company whose duty it was to clean and light the street lamps left as
stepladder leaning against a tree which stood in a public promenade. The seven-year old son of the
plaintiff climbed the tree by means of the ladder, and while endeavoring to cut some branches fell to the
ground, sustaining severe injuries which eventually caused his death. The plaintiff lost in the lower courts
and on appeal to the supreme court the decision of those lower courts was affirmed with the following
statement;
That in this sense aside from the fitness of the judgment appealed from, inasmuch as the
acquittal of the defendant party resolves all the issues argued at the trial, if no counterclaim was
made the assignments of error in the appeal cannot be sustained, because, while the act of
placing the stepladder against the tree in the manner and for the purposes aforestated, was not
permissible it was regularly allowed by the local authorities, and that fact did not precisely
determine the injury, which was due first to the abandonment of the child by his parents and
secondly to his own imprudence, according to the findings of the trial court, not legally objected to
in the appeal; so it is beyond peradventure that the circumstances necessary for imposing the
obligations arising from guilt or negligence do not concur in the present case.
The court here simply held that the injury to the child could not be considered as the probable
consequence of an injury which could have been foreseen from the act of the company's employee in
leaving the ladder leaning against the tree.
In De Alba vs. Sociedad Anonima de Tranvias (102 Juris, p., 928), a passenger was standing on the platform
of a street car while it was in motion when, on rounding a curve, the plaintiff fell off and under the car,
thereby sustaining severe injuries which took several months to heal. He was not allowed to recover in the
lower courts and on appeal the supreme court sustained the inferior tribunals saying:
Whereas, considering the circumstances of the accident that happened to D. Antonio Morales de
Alba, such as they were held by the trail court to have been proved, the evidence does not disclose
that any liability whatever in the said accident, for acts or omissions, may be charged against the
employees of the street car, as being guilty through fault or negligence, since it was shown that the
car was not traveling at any unusual speed nor was this increased on rounding the curve, but that
the accident was solely due to the fact that the car in turning made a movement which caused the
plaintiff to lose his balance; and whereas no act whatever has been proved of any violation of the
regulations, nor can it be required of street-car employees, who have to attend to their respective
duties, that they should foresee and be on the alert to notify the possibility of danger when not
greater than that which is more or less inherent to this mode of travel; therefore the appeal can not
be upheld, and with all the more reason since the passenger who takes the risk of travelling on the
platform, especially when there is an unoccupied seat in the car, should be on his guard against a
contingency so natural as that of losing his balance to a greater or less extent when the car rounds
a curve.
In Crespo vs. Garcia (112 Jurisp., 796), the plaintiff, a servant woman, 72 years old, was injured in the
performance of her duties by the sudden and unexpected failure of the upper floor of a house in which she
was working. The owner and the architect of the building were made defendants and after due trial it was
held that no responsibility attached to them for the failure of the floor, consequently the plaintiff was not
allowed to recover. On her appeal to the supreme court that tribunal said:
Whereas the trial court held, in view of all the evidence adduced, including the expert and other
testimony, that the act which occasioned the injury suffered by Doa Maria Alonso Crespo, was
accidental, without fault of anybody, and consequently fortuitous, and that, in so considering it to
absolve the defendants, he did not incur the second error assigned on the appeal, because, without
overlooking the import and legal value of the affidavit adduced at the trial, he held that the
defendants in their conduct were not liable for any omission that might constitute such fault or
negligence as would oblige them to indemnify the plaintiff; and to support the error assigned no
legal provision whatever was cited such as would require a different finding, nor was any other
authentic document produced than the aforesaid affidavit which contained an account of the ocular
inspection and the expert's report, which, as well as the testimony of the witnesses, the trial court
was able to pass upon in accordance with its exclusive power-all points of proof which do not reveal
any mistake on the part of the judge, whose opinion the appellant would substitute with his own by
a different interpretation.
These authorities are sufficient to show that liability for acts ex delicto under the Civil Code is precisely
that embraced within the "proximate cause" of the Anglo-Saxon law of torts.
The general rule, as frequently stated, is that in order that an act omission may be the proximate
cause of an injury, the injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the act or omission
and such as might have been foreseen by an ordinarily responsible and prudent man, in the light of
the attendant circumstances, as likely to result therefrom . . .
According to the latter authorities foreseeableness, as an element of proximate cause, does not
depend upon whether an ordinarily reasonable and prudent man would or ought in advance to have
anticipated the result which happened, but whether, if such result and the chain of events
connecting it with the act complained of had occurred to his mind, the same would have seemed

natural and probable and according to the ordinary course of nature. Thus, as said in one case, "A
person guilty of negligence, or an unlawful act, should be held responsible for all the consequences
which a prudent and experienced man, fully acquainted with all the circumstances which in fact
existed, would at the time of the negligent or unlawful act have thought reasonable to follow, if
they had occurred to his mind." (Wabash R. etc. Co. vs. Coker, 81 Ill. App. 660, 664; Cooley on Torts,
sec. 15.)
The view which I shall endeavor to justify is that, for the purpose of civil liability, those
consequences, and those only, are deemed "immediate," "proximate," or, to anticipate a little,
"natural and probable," which a person of average competence and knowledge, being in the like
case with the person whose conduct is complained of, and having the like opportunities of
observation, might be expected to foresees as likely to follow upon such conduct. This is only where
the particular consequence is not known to have been intended or foreseen by the actor. If proof of
that be forthcoming, whether the consequence was "immediate" or not does not matter. That which
a man actually foresees is to him, at all events, natural and probable. (Webb's Pollock on Torts, p.
32.)
There is another line of definitions which have for their basis "the natural and probable consequences" or
"the direct and immediate consequences" of the defendant's act. (Joyce on Damages, sec. 82.)
It will be observed that the supreme court of Spain, in the above decisions, has rather inclined to this line
of definitions of what results a defendant is liable for as a consequence of his wrongful acts, while the Civil
Code uses the phraseology, "those foreseen or which may have been foreseen." From either viewpoint the
method of arriving at the liability of the wrongdoer under the Civil Code and under the Anglo Saxon law is
the same. Such was the holding of this court in Taylor vs. M. E. R. and L. Co. (16 Phil. Rep., 8, 15):
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted
doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to
establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it
must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damages.
These propositions are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty
arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under
consideration.
Parenthetically it may be said that we are not now dealing with the doctrine of comparative (contributory)
negligence which was established by Rakes vs. A. G. and P. Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359), and Eades vs. A. G. and
P. Co. (19 Phil., Rep., 561.)
The rules for the measure of damages, once that liability is determined, are, however, somewhat different.
The Civil Code requires that the defendant repair the damage caused by his fault or negligence. No
distinction is made therein between damage caused maliciously and intentionally and damages caused
through mere negligence in so far as the civil liability of the wrongdoer in concerned. Nor is the defendant
required to do more than repair the damage done, or, in other words, to put the plaintiff in the same
position, so far as pecuniary compensation can do so, that he would have been in had the damage not
been inflicted. In this respect there is a notable difference between the two systems. Under the Anglo-
SAxon law, when malicious or willful intention to cause the damage is an element of the defendant's act, it
is quite generally regarded as an aggravating circumstance for which the plaintiff is entitled to more than
mere compensation for the injury inflicted. These are called exemplary or punitive damages, and no
provision is made for them in article 1902 of the Civil Code.
Again it is quite common under the English system to award what is called nominal damages where there
is only a technical violation of the plaintiff's rights resulting in no substantial injury to him. This branch of
damages is also unknown under the Civil Code. If no damages have actually occurred there can be none to
repair and the doctrine of nominal damages is not applicable. Thus it has been often held by the supreme
court of Spain that a mere noncompliance with the obligations of a contract is not sufficient to sustain a
judgment for damages. It must be shown that damages actually existed. (Decision of February 10, 1904.)
Again, in its decision of January 9, 1897, that high tribunal said that as a logical consequence of the
requirements of articles 1101, 1718, and 1902 that he who causes damages must repair them, their
existence must be proved.
In at least one case decided by this court we held in effect that nominal damages could not be allowed.
(Mercadovs. Abangan, 10 Phil., Rep., 676.)
The purpose of the law in awarding actual damages is to repair the wrong that has been done, to
compensate for the injury inflicted, and not to impose a penalty. Actual damages are not dependent
on nor graded by the intent with which the wrongful act is done." (Field vs. Munster, 11 Tex. Civ.,
Appl., 341, 32 S. W., 417.) "The words "actual damages" shall be construed to include all damages
that the plaintiff may he has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession, or
occupation, and no other damages whatever." (Gen Stat. Minn. 1894, sec., 5418.) "Actual damages
are compensatory only." (Lord, Owen and Co. vs. Wood, 120 Iowa, 303, 94 N. W., 842.) "
`Compensatory damages' as indicated by the word employed to characterize them, simply make
good or replace the loss caused by the wrong. They proceed from a sense of natural justice, and are
designed to repair that of which one has been deprived by the wrong of another."
(Reid vs. Terwilliger, 116 N. Y., 530; 22 N. E., 1091.) "Compensatory damages' are such as awarded
to compensate the injured party for caused by the wrong, and must be only such as make just and
fair compensation, and are due when the wrong is established, whether it was committed
maliciously that is, with evil intention or not. (Wimer vs. Allbaugh, 78 Iowa, 79; 42 N. W., 587;
16 Am. St. Rep., 422.)
Finally, this court has itself held that actual damages are the extent of the recovery allowed to the plaintiff.
InMarker vs. Garcia (5 Phil., Rep., 557), which was an action for damages for breach of contract, this court
said: "Except in those cases where the law authorizes the imposition of punitive or exemplary damages,
the party claiming damages must establish by competent evidence the amount of such damages, and
courts can not give judgment for a greater amount than those actually proven."
We are of the opinion that the requirements of article 1902, that the defendant repair the damage done
can only mean what is set forth in the above definitions, Anything short of that would not repair the
damages and anything beyond that would be excessive. Actual compensatory damages are those allowed
for tortious wrongs under the Civil Code; nothing more, nothing less.
According to the text of article 1106 of the Civil Code, which, according to the decision of February 7, 1990
(referred to above), is the generic conception of what article 1902 embraces, actual damages include not
only loss already suffered, but loss of profits which may not have been realized. The allowance of loss of
prospective profits could hardly be more explicitly provided for. But it may not be amiss to refer to the
decisions of the supreme court of Spain for its interpretation of this article. The decisions are numerous
upon this point. The decisions are as epitomized by Sanchez Roman (vol. 1, 0. 281), interprets article 1106
as follows:
Pursuant to articles 1106 and 1107 of the same Code, which govern in general the matter of
indemnity due for the nonfulfillment of obligations, the indemnity comprises, not only the value of
loss suffered, but also that of the prospective profit that was not realized, and the obligation of the
debtor in good faith is limited to such losses and damages as were foreseen or might have been
foreseen at the time the obligation was incurred and which are a necessary consequence of his
failure of fulfillment. Losses and damages under such limitations and frustrated profits must,
therefore, be proved directly by means of the evidence the law authorizes.
The decisions of January 8, 1906 (published in 14 Jurisp. del Codigo Civil, 516) had to do with the following
case: The plaintiff, a painter by occupation, was engaged to paint the poles from which were suspended
the trolley wires of a traction company. While at work on February 8, 1901, the electric current was
negligently turned on by the company, whereby plaintiff received a severe shock, causing him to fall to the
ground. Plaintiff sustained injuries which took several months to heal and his right arm was permanently
disabled by the accident. The age of the plaintiff is not stated. His daily wage was four pesetas. He was
awarded 25,000 pesetas by the trial court and this judgment was affirmed on appeal to the supreme court.
This was equivalent to approximately twenty year's salary.
In its decision of January 15, 1902 (published in 10 Jurisp. del Codigo Civil., 260), the supreme court had
the following case under consideration: Plaintiff's son was a travelling salesman 48 years of age, who

received an annual salary of 2,500 pesetas and expenses. While travelling on defendant's train an accident
occurred which caused his death. The accident was held to be due to the failure of the defendant company
to keep its track and roadbed in good repair. Plaintiff was allowed 35,000 pesetas for the death of her son.
this would be equivalent to about fourteen years' salary.
in the case dated October 19, 1909 (published in 116 Jurisp. del Codigo Civil, 120), plaintiff as suing for the
death of his son caused from injuries inflicted by the defendant's bull while plaintiff and his son were
travelling along a public road. The age of the son is not given. Plaintiff was awarded 3,000 pesetas
damages.
In each of the above-mentioned cases the supreme court refused to pass on the amount of damages which
had been awarded. It appears to be the unvarying rule of the supreme court of Spain to accept the amount
of damages awarded by trial courts, its only inquiry being as to whether damages have actually occurred
as the result of the defendant's fault or negligence. (Decision of July 5, 1909.) The reason why the supreme
court of Spain refuses to consider the amount of damages awarded is to be found in the great importance
attached by it to the provision of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, articles 659 and 1692, No. 7. In its auto of
March 16, 1900 (published in 8 Jurisp. del Codigo Civil, 503), the following comment is made on these
articles:
As this supreme court has repeatedly held, the weight given by the trial judge to the testimony,
with good discernment or otherwise, can not be a matter for reversal, not even with the support of
No. 7 of article 1692 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, as it is exclusively submitted to him,
pursuant to the provisions of article 659 of the said law and article 1248 of the Code.
The practice of this court, under our Code of Civil Procedure, does not permit of our going to such lengths
in sustaining the findings of fact in trial courts. We have repeatedly held that due weight will be given in
this court to the findings of fact by trial courts by reason of their opportunities to see and hear the
witnesses testify, note their demeanor and bearing upon the stand, etc., but when the decision of the trial
court, after permitting due allowance for its superior advantages in weighing the evidence of the case,
appears to us to be against the fair preponderance of that evidence, it is our duty to reverse or set aside
the findings of fact made by the trial court and render such judgment as the facts of the same deem to us
to warrant. (Code of Civ., Proc., sec. 496.) We need go to no other branch of law than that of damages to
support this statement. In the following case the damages awarded by the lower court were reduced after
a consideration of the evidence; Sparrevohn vs. Fisher (2 Phil. Rep., 676); Campbell and Go-Tauco vs. Behn,
Meyer and Co. (3 Phil., Rep., 590); Causin vs. Jakosalem 95 Phil., Rep., 155); Marker vs. Garcia (5 Phil.,
Rep., 557); Uy Piaoco vs. Osmea (9 Phil., Rep., 299); Macleodvs. Phil. Pub. Co. (12 Phil., Rep., 427);
Orense vs. Jaucian (18 Phil. Rep., 553). In Rodriguez vs. Findlay and Co. (14 Phil. Rep., 294); and Cordoba y
Conde vs. Castle Bros. (18 Phil. Rep., 317), the damages awarded by the lower court were increased on
appeal after a consideration of the evidence. In Brodek vs. Larson (18 Phil., Rep., 425), it was held that the
damages awarded by the lower court were base on too uncertain evidence, and the case was remanded
for a new trial as to the amount of damages sustained. Also in Saldivar vs. Municipality of Talisay (18 Phil.,
Rep., 362), where the lower court exonerated the defendant from liability, this court, after a consideration
of the evidence, held that the defendant was liable and remanded the case for the purpose of a new trial in
order to ascertain the amount of damages sustained.
In this respect the law of damages under article 1902, as laid down by the decisions of the supreme court
of Spain, has been indirectly modified by the present Code of Civil Procedure so that the finding of the
lower court as to the amount of damages is not conclusive on appeal.
Actual damages, under the American system, include pecuniary recompense for pain and suffering, injured
feelings, and the like. Article 1902, as interpreted by this court in Marcelo vs. Velasco (11 Phil., Rep., 287),
does not extend to such incidents. Aside from this exception, actual damages, in this jurisdiction, in the
sense that they mean just compensation for the loss suffered, are practically synonymous with actual
damages under the American system.
This court has already gone some distance in incorporating into our jurisprudence those principles of the
American law of actual damages which are of a general and abstract nature. In Baer Senior and Co.'s
Successorsvs. Compaia Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the American principle of admiralty law that the
liability of the ship for a tow is not so great as that for her cargo was applied in determining the
responsibility of a ship, under the Code of Commerce, for her tow. In Rodriguez, vs. Findlay and Co. (14
Phil., Rep., 294), which was an action for breach of contract of warranty, the following principle, supported
entirely by American authority, was used in computing the amount of damages due the plaintiff:

The damages recoverable of a manufacturer or dealer for the breach of warranty of machinery,
which he contracts to furnish, or place in operation for a known purpose are not confined to the
difference in value of the machinery as warranted and as it proves to be, but includes such
consequential damages as are the direct, immediate, and probable result of the breach.
In Aldaz vs. Gay (7 Phil., Rep., 268), it was held that the earnings or possible earnings of a workman
wrongfully discharged should be considered in mitigation of his damages for the breach of contract by his
employer, with the remark that nothing had been brought to our attention to the contrary under Spanish
jurisprudence.
In Fernandez vs. M. E. R. and L. Co. (14 Phil., Rep., 274), a release or compromise for personal injury
sustained by negligence attributed to the defendant company was held a bar to an action for the recovery
of further damages, on the strength of American precedents.
In Taylor vs. M. E. R. and L. Co., supra, in the course of an extended reference to American case law, the
doctrine of the so-called "Turntable" and "Torpedo" cases was adopted by this court as a factor in
determining the question of liability for damages in such cases as the one the court the then had under
consideration.
In Martinez vs. Van Buskirk (18 Phil., 79), this court, after remarking that the rules under the Spanish law
by which the fact of negligence is determined are, generally speaking, the same as they are in Anglo-
Saxon countries, approved the following well-known rule of the Anglo-Saxon law of negligence, relying
exclusively upon American authorities: ". . . acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or
injurious and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so long a time as to have ripened into
a custom, cannot be held to be unreasonable or imprudent and that, under the circumstances, the driver
was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team while assisting in unloading his wagon.
This court does not, as a rule, content itself in the determination of cases brought before it, with a mere
reference to or quotation of the articles of the codes or laws applicable to the questions involved, for the
reason that it is committed to the practice of citing precedents for its rulings wherever practicable. (See
Ocampo vs. Cabangis, 15 Phil Rep., 626.) No better example of the necessity of amplifying the treatment
of a subject given in the code is afforded than article 1902 of the Civil Code. That article requires that the
defendant repair the damage done. There is, however, a world of difficulty in carrying out the legislative
will in this particular. The measure of damages is an ultimate fact, to be determined from the evidence
submitted to the court. The question is sometimes a nice one to determine, whether the offered evidence
in such as sought to be considered by the court in fixing the quantum of damages; and while the
complexity of human affairs is such that two cases are seldom exactly alike, a thorough discussion of each
case may permit of their more or less definite classification, and develop leading principles which will be of
great assistance to a court in determining the question, not only of damages, but of the prior one of
negligence. We are of the opinion that as the Code is so indefinite (even though from necessity) on the
subject of damages arising from fault or negligence, the bench and bar should have access to and avail
themselves of those great, underlying principles which have been gradually and conservatively developed
and thoroughly tested in Anglo-Saxon courts. A careful and intelligent application of these principles should
have a tendency to prevent mistakes in the rulings of the court on the evidence offered, and should assist
in determining damages, generally, with some degree of uniformity.
The law of damages has not, for some reason, proved as favorite a theme with the civil-law writers as with
those of the common-law school. The decisions of the supreme court of Spain, though numerous on
damages arising from contractual obligations, are exceedingly few upon damages for personal injuries
arising ex delicto. The reasons for this are not important to the present discussion. It is sufficient to say
that the law of damages has not received the elaborate treatment that it has at the hands of the Anglo-
Saxon jurists. If we in this jurisdiction desire to base our conclusions in damage cases upon controlling
principles, we may develop those principles and incorporate them into our jurisprudence by that difficult
and tedious process which constitutes the centuries-old history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence; or we may
avail ourselves of these principles in their present state of development without further effort than it costs
to refer to the works and writings of many eminent text-writers and jurists. We shall not attempt to say
that all these principles will be applicable in this jurisdiction. It must be constantly borne in mind that the
law of damages in this jurisdiction was conceived in the womb of the civil law and under an entirely
different form of government. These influences have had their effect upon the customs and institutions of
the country. Nor are the industrial and social conditions the same. An Act which might constitute
negligence or damage here, and vice versa. As stated in Story on Bailments, section 12, "It will thence
follow that, in different times and in different countries, the standard (of diligence) is necessary variable

with respect to the facts, although it may be uniform with respect to the principle. So that it may happen
that the same acts which in one country or in one age may be deemed negligent acts, may at another time
or in another country be justly deemed an exercise of ordinary diligence."
The abstract rules for determining negligence and the measure of damages are, however, rules of natural
justice rather than man-made law, and are applicable under any enlightened system of jurisprudence.
There is all the more reason for our adopting the abstract principles of the Anglo- Saxon law of damages,
when we consider that there are at least two important laws o n our statute books of American origin, in
the application of which we must necessarily be guided by American authorities: they are the Libel Law
(which, by the way, allows damages for injured feelings and reputation, as well as punitive damages, in a
proper case), and the Employer's Liability Act.
The case at bar involves actual incapacity of the plaintiff for two months, and loss of the greater portion of
his business. As to the damages resulting from the actual incapacity of the plaintiff to attend to his
business there is no question. They are, of course, to be allowed on the basis of his earning capacity, which
in this case, is P50 per month. the difficult question in the present case is to determine the damage which
has results to his business through his enforced absence. In Sanz vs. Lavin Bros. (6 Phil. Rep., 299), this
court, citing numerous decisions of the supreme court of Spain, held that evidence of damages "must rest
upon satisfactory proof of the existence in reality of the damages alleged to have been suffered." But,
while certainty is an essential element of an award of damages, it need not be a mathematical certainty.
That this is true is adduced not only from the personal injury cases from the supreme court of Spain which
we have discussed above, but by many cases decided by this court, reference to which has already been
made. As stated in Joyce on Damages, section 75, "But to deny the injured party the right to recover any
actual damages in cases f torts because they are of such a nature a cannot be thus certainly measured,
would be to enable parties to profit by and speculate upon their own wrongs; such is not the law."
As to the elements to be considered in estimating the damage done to plaintiff's business by reason of his
accident, this same author, citing numerous authorities, has the following to say: It is proper to consider
the business the plaintiff is engaged in, the nature and extent of such business, the importance of his
personal oversight and superintendence in conducting it, and the consequent loss arising from his inability
to prosecure it.
The business of the present plaintiff required his immediate supervision. All the profits derived therefrom
were wholly due to his own exertions. Nor are his damages confined to the actual time during which he
was physically incapacitated for work, as is the case of a person working for a stipulated daily or monthly
or yearly salary. As to persons whose labor is thus compensated and who completely recover from their
injuries, the rule may be said to be that their damages are confined to the duration of their enforced
absence from their occupation. But the present plaintiff could not resume his work at the same profit he
was making when the accident occurred. He had built up an establishing business which included some
twenty regular customers. These customers represented to him a regular income. In addition to this he
made sales to other people who were not so regular in their purchases. But he could figure on making at
least some sales each month to others besides his regular customers. Taken as a whole his average
monthly income from his business was about P50. As a result of the accident, he lost all but four of his
regular customers and his receipts dwindled down to practically nothing. Other agents had invaded his
territory, and upon becoming physically able to attend to his business, he found that would be necessary
to start with practically no regular trade, and either win back his old customers from his competitors or
else secure others. During this process of reestablishing his patronage his income would necessarily be
less than he was making at the time of the accident and would continue to be so for some time. Of course,
if it could be mathematically determined how much less he will earn during this rebuilding process than he
would have earned if the accident had not occurred, that would be the amount he would be entitled to in
this action. But manifestly this ideal compensation cannot be ascertained. The question therefore resolves
itself into whether this damage to his business can be so nearly ascertained as to justify a court in
awarding any amount whatever.
When it is shown that a plaintiff's business is a going concern with a fairly steady average profit on the
investment, it may be assumed that had the interruption to the business through defendant's wrongful act
not occurred, it would have continued producing this average income "so long as is usual with things of
that nature." When in addition to the previous average income of the business it is further shown what the
reduced receipts of the business are immediately after the cause of the interruption has been removed,
there can be no manner of doubt that a loss of profits has resulted from the wrongful act of the defendant.
In the present case, we not only have the value of plaintiff's business to him just prior to the accident, but
we also have its value to him after the accident. At the trial, he testified that his wife had earned about

fifteen pesos during the two months that he was disabled. That this almost total destruction of his business
was directly chargeable to defendant's wrongful act, there can be no manner of doubt; and the mere fact
that the loss can not be ascertained with absolute accuracy, is no reason for denying plaintiff's claim
altogether. As stated in one case, it would be a reproach to the law if he could not recover damages at all.
(Baldwin vs. Marquez, 91 Ga., 404)
Profits are not excluded from recovery because they are profits; but when excluded, it is on the
ground that there are no criteria by which to estimate the amount with the certainty on which the
adjudications of courts, and the findings of juries, should be based. (Brigham vs. Carlisle (Ala.), 56
Am. Rep., 28, as quoted in Wilson vs. Wernwag, 217 Pa., 82.)
The leading English case on the subject is Phillips vs. London and Southwestern Ry. Co. (5 Q. B. D., 788; 41
L.T., 121; 8 Eng. Rul. Cases, 447). The plaintiff was a physician with a very lucrative practice. In one case
he had received a fee of 5,000 guineas; but it appeared that his average income was between 6,000 and
7,000 pounds sterling per year. The report does not state definitely how serious plaintiff's injuries were, but
apparently he was permanently disabled. The following instruction to the jury was approved, and we think
should be set out in this opinion as applicable to the present case:
You cannot put the plaintiff back again into his original position, but you must bring your reasonable
common sense to bear, and you must always recollect that this is the only occasion on which
compensation can be given. Dr. Philips can never sue again for it. You have, therefore, not to give
him compensation a wrong at the hands of the defendants, and you must take care o give him full,
fair compensation. for that which he has suffered.
The jury's award was seven thousand pounds. Upon a new trial, on the ground of the insufficiency of the
damages awarded, plaintiff received 16,000 pounds. On the second appeal, Bramwell, L. J., put the case of
a laborer earning 25 shillings a week, who, on account of injury, was totally incapacitated for work for
twenty-six weeks, and then for ten weeks could not earn more than ten shillings a week, and was not likely
to get into full work for another twenty weeks. The proper measure of damages would be in that case 25
shillings a week twenty-six weeks, plus 15 shillings a week for the ten and twenty weeks, and damages for
bodily suffering and medical expenses. Damages for bodily suffering, of course, are not, for reasons stated
above, applicable to this jurisdiction; otherwise we believe this example to be the ideal compensation for
loss of profits which courts should strike to reach, in cases like the present.
In Joslin vs. Grand Rapids Ice and Coal Co. (53 Mich., 322), the court said: "The plaintiff, in making proof of
his damages, offered testimony to the effect that he was an attorney at law of ability and in good standing,
and the extent and value of his practice, and that, in substance, the injury had rendered him incapable of
pursuing his profession. This was objected to as irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent. We think this was
competent. It was within the declaration that his standing in his profession was such as to command
respect, and was proper to be shown, and his ability to earn, and the extent of his practice, were a portion
of the loss he had sustained by the injury complained of. There was no error in permitting this proof, and
we further think it was competent, upon the question of damages under the evidence in this case, for the
plaintiff to show, by Judge Hoyt, as was done, that an interruption in his legal business and practice for
eight months was a damage to him. It seems to have been a part of the legitimate consequences of the
plaintiff's injury."
In Luck vs. City of Ripon (52 Wis., 196), plaintiff was allowed to prevent that she was a midwife and show
the extent of her earnings prior to the accident in order to establish the damage done to her business.
The pioneer case of Gobel vs. Hough (26 Minn., 252) contains perhaps one of the clearest statements of
the rule and is generally considered as one of the leading cases on this subject. In that case the court said:
When a regular and established business, the value of which may be ascertained, has been
wrongfully interrupted, the true general rule for compensating the party injured is to ascertain how
much less valuable the business was by reason of the interruption, and allow that as damages. This
gives him only what the wrongful act deprived him of. The value of such a business depends mainly
on the ordinary profits derived from it. Such value cannot be ascertained without showing what the
usual profits are; nor are the ordinary profits incident to such a business contingent or speculative,
in the sense that excludes profits from consideration as an element of damages. What they would
have been, in the ordinary course of the business, for a period during which it was interrupted, may
be shown with reasonable certainty. What effect extraordinary circumstances would have had upon
the business might be contingent and conjectural, and any profits anticipated from such cause

would be obnoxious to the objection that they are merely speculative; but a history of the business,
for a reasonable time prior to a period of interruption, would enable the jury to determine how
much would be done under ordinary circumstances, and in the usual course, during the given
period; and the usual rate of profit being shown, of course the aggregate becomes only a matter of
calculation.
In the very recent case of Wellington vs. Spencer (Okla., 132 S. W., 675), plaintiff had rented a building
from the defendant and used it as a hotel. Defendant sued out a wrongful writ of attachment upon the
equipment of the plaintiff, which caused him to abandon his hotel business. After remarking that the
earlier cases held that no recovery could be had for prospective profits, but that the later authorities have
held that such damages may be allowed when the amount is capable of proof, the court had the following
to say:
Where the plaintiff has just made his arrangements to begin business, and he is prevented from
beginning either by tort or a breach of contract, or where the injury is to a particular subject matter,
profits of which are uncertain, evidence as to expected profits must be excluded from the jury
because of the uncertainty. There is as much reason to believe that there will be no profits as to
believe that there will be no profits, but no such argument can be made against proving a usual
profit of an established business. In this case the plaintiff, according to his testimony, had an
established business, and was earning a profit in the business, and had been doing that for a
sufficient length of time that evidence as to prospective profits was not entirely speculative. Men
who have been engaged in business calculate with a reasonable certainty the income from their
business, make their plans to live accordingly, and the value of such business is not a matter of
speculation as to exclude evidence from the jury.
A good example of a business not established for which loss of profits will be allowed may be found in the
Statesvs. Durkin (65 Kan., 101). Plaintiffs formed a partnership, and entered the plumbing business in the
city of Topeka in April. In July of the same year, they brought an action against a plumbers' association on
the ground that the latter had formed an unlawful combination in restraint of trade and prevented them
from securing supplies for their business within a reasonable time. The court said:
In the present case the plaintiffs had only been in business a short time not so long that it can be
said that they had an established business. they had contracted three jobs of plumbing, had
finished two, and lost money on both; not, however, because of any misconduct or wrongful acts on
the part of the defendants or either of them. They carried no stock in trade, and their manner of
doing business was to secure a contract and then purchase the material necessary for its
completion. It is not shown that they had any means or capital invested in the business other than
their tools. Neither of them had prior thereto managed or carried on a similar business. Nor was it
shown that they were capable of so managing this business as to make it earn a profit. There was
little of that class of business being done at the time, and little, if any, profit derived therefrom. The
plaintiffs' business lacked duration, permanency, and recognition. It was an adventure, as
distinguished from an established business. Its profits were speculative and remote, existing only in
anticipation. The law, with all its vigor and energy in its effort to right or wrongs and damages for
injuries sustained, may not enter into a domain of speculation or conjecture. In view of the
character and condition of the plaintiffs' business, the jury had not sufficient evidence from which to
ascertain profits.
Other cases which hold that the profits of an established business may be considered in calculating the
measure of damages for an interruption of it are: Wilkinson vs. Dunbar (149 N. C., 20); Kinney vs. Crocker
(18 Wis., 80); Sachra vs. Manila (120 la., 562); Kramer vs. City of Los Angeles (147 Cal., 668);
Mugge vs. Erkman (161 Ill. App., 180); Fredonia Gas Co. vs. Bailey 977 Kan., 296); Morrow vs. Mo. Pac. R.
Co. (140 Mo. App., 200); City of Indianapolis vs. Gaston (58 Ind., 24); National Fibre Board vs. Auburn
Electric Light Co. (95 Me., 318); Sutherland on Damages, sec. 70.
We have now outlined the principles which should govern the measure of damages in this case. We are of
the opinion that the lower court had before it sufficient evidence of the damage to plaintiff's business in
the way of prospective loss of profits to justify it in calculating his damages as to his item. That evidence
has been properly elevated to this court of review. Under section 496 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we are
authorized to enter final judgment or direct a new trial, as may best subserve the ends of justice. We are of
the opinion that the evidence presented as to the damage done to plaintiff's business is credible and that it
is sufficient and clear enough upon which to base a judgment for damages. Plaintiff having had four years'
experience in selling goods on commission, it must be presumed that he will be able to rebuild his business

to its former proportions; so that at some time in the future his commissions will equal those he was
receiving when the accident occurred. Aided by his experience, he should be able to rebuild this business
to its former proportions in much less time than it took to establish it as it stood just prior to the accident.
One year should be sufficient time in which to do this. The profits which plaintiff will receive from the
business in the course of its reconstruction will gradually increase. The injury to plaintiff's business begins
where these profits leave off, and, as a corollary, there is where defendant's liability begins. Upon this
basis, we fix the damages to plaintiff's business at P250.
The judgment of the lower court is set aside, and the plaintiff is awarded the following damages; ten pesos
for medical expenses; one hundred pesos for the two months of his enforced absence from his business;
and two hundred and fifty pesos for the damage done to his business in the way of loss of profits, or a total
of three hundred and sixty pesos. No costs will be allowed in this instance.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 77950 August 24, 1990
ISIDRO V. SABA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EMIL L. ONG, EMIL L. ONG CHUAN AND JOSE ONG
CHUAN, respondents.
Antonio G. Saba for petitioner.
Jose F. Falcotelo for respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 05391
dated March 17, 1987 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoang, Northern
Samar in Civil Case No. 1012 dated May 30, 1984.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Pedro de la Cruz is a grantee of a lease of a portion of marshy land in Laoang, Northern Samar awarded to
him by the Bureau of Lands under Miscellaneous Lease Application No. 810 for 2,050 square meters. The
award of lease was granted in 1934 (TSN, Nov. 8, 1976, p. 5). The award of lease to Pedro de la Cruz was
not presented in court but its existence was not disputed by the parties. In 1939, Gregoria Nalazon,wife of
Pedro de la Cruz, died and the estate became the subject of an intestate estate proceeding in Special
Proceedings No. 2 of the CFI of Laoang, Northern Samar. The leasehold (MLA No. 810) was included in this
special proceeding wherein 50% thereof was adjudicated pro-indiviso to Pedro de la Cruz while the other
50% was adjudicated pro-indiviso to the children, namely: Jesus, Alfredo, Lourdes, Amada, Josefa, Genaro,
Eufemio and Ramon, all surnamed de la Cruz. The improvements introduced by Pedro de la Cruz consisted
of rock fillings and three warehouses. In 1953, private respondent Jose Ongchuan leased the warehouse
from Pedro de la Cruz (Exhibit "K"). In 1959 or so, the seven children of Pedro de la Cruz, namely: Jesus,
Alfredo, Amada, Josefa, Genaro, Eufemio and Ramon, all surnamed de la Cruz sold their leasehold rights
(7/8 of the 50% of MLA 810) to private respondent Emil Ong, while Lourdes C. Agbayani sold her leasehold
right (118) pro-indiviso to petitioner Isidro V. Saba in March 1966 (Exhibit "J"). In 1961, the warehouse
which was being leased by private respondent Jose Ongchuan was levelled to the ground by fire (TSN, May
18, 1976, p. 13). After the fire, private respondent Emil Ong constructed a new building on the same area
formerly occupied by the burned warehouse (TSN, March 25, 1983, p. 3). Later, Lourdes C. Agbayani sent a
letter to private respondents notifying them of the sale of her 1/8 share in the leasehold to petitioner and
requested that payment of rentals be given to the new owner instead of her. Private respondents did not
heed the request. Petitioner reiterated the demand of Lourdes C. Agbayani several times yet private
respondents ignored said demand. Thus, petitioner was forced to file a case for collection of rentals against
private respondents in the Municipal Court of Laoang. For improper venue, the court dismissed the case.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of Laoang but the decision of dismissal was
affirmed. Still not satisfied, petitioner filed this case on August 6, 1974 for collection of rentals over the 1/8
share of Lourdes C. Agbayani in the amount of P8,271.12 plus interest from August, 1966 until full
payment.
On the other hand, private respondents prayed for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's
fees. They contended that the complaint is baseless and intended to harass them. Because of this
complaint, private respondent Emil Ong's reputation as a businessman, CPA, lawyer and a convention
delegate of Northern Samar was tarnished and he was exposed to ridicule. Private respondent Jose
Ongchuan contended that his reputation as a respected businessman in the community was likewise
affected.
On May 30, 1984, the trial court rendered judgment against petitioner, the dispositive portion of which
reads (p. 438, Original Record):
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiff to
pay to defendants jointly and severally, P40,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as attorney's fees. With costs against plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's decision (p. 33, Rollo). Hence, the
present petition.
The issues are, stated simply, whether or not (1) petitioner has a cause of action against private
respondents and (2) the award of damages is proper.
As aforestated, the award of lease was granted to Pedro de la Cruz in 1934. The Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce set the maximum period of his lease at fifteen (15) years (Exhibit "16"). Therefore, the
period of lease was up to 1949 only. There is no evidence on record of renewal of the term of the lease.
Evidently, when Lourdes C. Agbayani sold her "leasehold right" (1/8) pro-indiviso to petitioner in 1966,
there was no longer a leasehold right that she conveyed. Corollarily, petitioner did not acquire any right
from her that can be enforced against the private respondents or anybody for that matter. In this regard,
the affirmance of the dismissal of the complaint was correct.
With respect to the award of damages, both the trial court and the respondent court erred. It was their
opinion that (pp. 32-33, Rollo):
Indeed, has (sic) plaintiff been extra careful in analyzing the facts and circumstances, this
case could have been avoided and had never been filed at all, not to mention that one of the
heirs of Pedro de la Cruz who sold his very share to defendant Emil L. Ong and a lawyer at
that, is now the very counsel prosecuting this case for the plaintiff. This case alone has been
pending for almost 10 years now and this court is aware and not closing its eyes to the
cases previously filed one after the other by plaintiff against defendant. So, practically
defendants must have spent most of their lives (about 15 years or so) answering and
worrying about the cases filed by plaintiff against them. That feeling of antipathy and
negative intentions of plaintiff against defendants cannot be hidden, and can be felt from
reading the records of this case. Defendant Emil L. Ong has to come every now and then to
testify in this case leaving behind the management of his business in Manila. He has to
engage the services of counsels one after another because either the previous counsel is
appointed to the bench or to any government office. Defendant Jose Ongchuan is the father
of Emil L. Ong a big and progressive businessman in Laoang and Manila, while defendant
Emil Ong is a businessman, a CPA and lawyer and the delegate of N. Samar to the
Constitutional Convention, somehow the cases filed by plaintiff affected their names and
reputations, for which reason the grant of moral as well as exemplary damages is in order.
Attorney's fees can also be granted in this case considering the length of time of the
pendency of this case. (438, Records).
Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. It is however not enough that such
injuries have arisen; it is essential that they have sprung from a wrongful act or omission, fraud, malice, or
bad faith which was the proximate cause thereof (see Guita v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 60409,
November 11, 1985, 139 SCRA 576 cited in Suario v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 50459,
August 25, 1989; R & B Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 64515,
June 22, 1984,129 SCRA 736). The adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful
and subject the actor to make payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty
on the right to litigate (Rubio v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 50911, March 12, 1986, 141 SCRA 488).
One who exercises his rights does no injury. Qui jure suo utitur nullum damnum facit. If damage results
from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-28782, September 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 110 cited in the Ilocos Norte Electric
Company v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 53401, November 6, 1989).
Petitioner was in good faith when he filed the collection suit against private respondents. He thought that
by virtue of the sale of Lourdes C. Agbayani's leasehold right to him (Exhibit "J"), her right to 1/8 pro-
indiviso of the property has already been transferred to him, which includes the right to collect rentals.
Lourdes C. Agbayani even notified the private respondents that the property being rented by them has
been sold to petitioner and effective April 1, 1966, petitioner became the proprietor of her property
(Exhibit "N"). The failure by private respondents to pay the rentals prompted petitioner to file a complaint
against them. A person may have erred but error alone is not a ground for moral damages (Lagman, et al.
v. Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72281, October 28, 1988, 166 SCRA 734). And
although cases were previously filed one after another by petitioner against private respondents, no
evidence was adduced that these cases were baseless and intended merely to harass private respondents.
The acts performed by petitioner cannot be said to have disparaged the reputation of private respondents
(see Litam v. Espiritu, et al., 100 Phil. 364). Lastly, whatever worries, anxieties and expenses private
respondents may have suffered were only such as are usually caused to a party haled into court as a
defendant in a litigation (see Philippine National Bank v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-
45770, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 433). Clearly, there is no sufficient justification for the award of moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
We find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by petitioner, being extraneous to the present
case.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
MODIFIED insofar as the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is concerned,
which is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
KINDS OF DAMAGES
ACTUAL/COMPENSATORY DAMAGES (ART. 2199-2215)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114118. August 28, 2001]
HEIRS OF SIMEON BORLADO, namely, ADELAIDA BORLADO, LORETO BORLADO, REYNALDO

BORLADO, RICARDO BORLADO, FRANCISCO BORLADO and ALADINO
DORADO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SALVACION VDA. DE BULAN,
BIENVENIDO BULAN, JR., NORMA B. CLARITO and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
CAPIZ, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of
the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered dismissing plaintiffs complaint for lack of cause of action and
ordering as vacated the restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case; and

1. Plaintiffs to be jointly and solidarily liable to defendants the quantity of one hundred (100) cavans of
palay every year from 1972 until plaintiffs vacate the premises of the land in question;
2. Declaring defendants as owner of the land and entitled to possession;
3. Ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees and the sum of P5,000.00
as litigation expenses; and
4. To pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
Roxas City, Philippines, March 18, 1988.
(Sgd.) JONAS A. ABELLAR
J u d g e[2]
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The records show that plaintiffs-appellants[3] (petitioners) are the heirs of Simeon Borlado whose parents
were Serapio Borlado and Balbina Bulan. The original owner of the lot in question, Lot No. 2097 of the
Pontevedra Cadastre, Maayon, Capiz, was Serapio Borlado, grandfather of petitioners.
On 15 April 1942, Serapio sold the lot to Francisco Bacero (Exh. C, p. 247, MTC Record) for Three Hundred
Pesos (P300.00). After the death of Francsico on 26 February 1948, his widow Amparo Dionisio Vda. de
Bacero, in her capacity as legal guardian of her minor children, namely: Nicolas, Valentin and Luzviminda,
all surnamed Bacero and forced heirs of Francisco Bacero sold it (the lot) to the Spouses Bienvenido Bulan
and Salvacion Borbon, through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 August 1954 (Exh. 65, pp. 243-245, id.).
Upon the execution of the Deed of Sale and even prior thereto, actual possession of Lot No. 2057 was with
the vendees-spouses Bulans in view of a loan obtained by Francisco Bacero from them in December 1947
(Exh. 65, supra). Exercising their right of ownership under the Deed of Sale, Salvacion Borbon Vda. de
Bulan declared the lot in her name in 1900 for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2232 (Exh. F,
p. 254, Record [MTC]). She paid the corresponding taxes as evidenced by the Tax Receipts marked as
Exhibits K, J, I, G, F and H (pp. 248-253, Record, id.).Salvacion and her co-defendants-
appellees[4] possession of the lot was continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive until
November 4, 1972, when petitioners forcibly entered and wrested physical possession thereof from them.
On 23 November 1972, respondents filed with the Municipal Court of Maayon, Capiz a complaint for
ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. A-1, against petitioners (p. 1, id.). The ejectment case was decided in
favor of the respondents whereby the petitioners, their agents, tenants, privies and members of their
families were ordered to vacate Lot No. 2079 and deliver possession to the respondents together with all
improvements and standing crops; to pay said respondents One Hundred (100) cavans of palay annually
from 1972 to the present or in the total amount of One Thousand One Hundred (1,100) cavans of palay;
and to pay the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as reimbursement for the amount respondents had
paid their lawyer to protect their rights; and, the costs of suit (Exh. 57, pp. 256-261, id.). Instead of
appealing the adverse decision to the Court of First Instance (now RTC), on 8 November 1983, petitioners
filed the present case with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Roxas City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-
4887. This case was dismissed for lack of cause of action in a decision, the decretal portion of which was
quoted earlier.[5]
On 24 November 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming in toto the appealed
decision.[6]
Hence, this appeal.[7]
The Issue

The issue raised is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were the owners of
the lot in question.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition. The issue is factual. In an appeal via certiorari, we may not review the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals.[8] When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, [9] unless the
case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule.[10]
Petitioner failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions. [11] The Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts.[12] It is not our function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the
evidence presented.[13] A question of fact would arise in such event.[14] Questions of fact cannot be raised in
an appeal via certiorari before the Supreme Court and are not proper for its consideration. [15]
Nevertheless, as a matter of law, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioners
liable to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972 until they vacate the
premises of the land in question.
The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a form of damages. We cannot sustain the
award. Palay is not legal tender currency in the Philippines.
El Fallo del Tribunal
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G. R. CV No. 18980 with modification that petitioners liability to pay respondents one hundred (100)
cavans of palay every year from 1972 until petitioners vacate the land in question is deleted, for lack of
basis.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134972. March 22, 2001]
SPS. ERNESTO and MINA CATUNGAL, petitioners, vs. DORIS HAO, respondent.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 March 1998 and
Resolution dated 30 July 1998 in the case entitled Doris Hao vs. Sps. Ernesto and Mina Catungaldocketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 46158. Said decision affirmed with modification the judgment rendered by the Regional
Trial Court.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
On December 28, 1972, the original owner, Aniana Galang, leased a three-storey building situated at
Quirino Avenue, Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila, to the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) for a period of
about fifteen (15) years, to expire on June 20, 1986. During the existence of the lease, BPI subleased the
ground floor of said building to respondent Doris Hao.
On August 24, 1984, Galang and respondent executed a contract of lease on the second and third
floors of the building. The lease was for a term of four (4) years commencing on August 15, 1984 and
ending on August 15, 1988. On August 15, 1986, petitioner spouses Ernesto and Mina Catungal bought the
property from Aniana Galang.

Invoking her right of first refusal purportedly based on the lease contract between her and Aniana
Galang, respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale with Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 88-
491 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Metro Manila.
Meanwhile, the lease agreement between BPI and Galang expired.
Upon expiration of the lease agreements, petitioner spouses sent demand letters to respondent for her
to vacate the building. The demand letters were unheeded by respondent causing petitioners to file two
complaints for ejectment, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 7666 and 7667 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Paraaque, Metro Manila.
The institution of the ejectment cases prompted respondent to file an action for injunction docketed as
Civil Case No. 90-758 of the RTC of Makati, to stop the MeTC of Paraaque from proceeding therewith
pending the settlement of the issue of ownership raised in Civil Case No. 88-491. These two cases for
annulment of sale and for injunction were also consolidated before Branch 63 of the RTC of Makati which
rendered a Decision dated September 19, 1991, granting the injunction and annulling the contract of sale
between Aniana Galang and petitioners.
On appeal,[1] the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and the complaints in
Civil Cases Nos. 88-491 and 90-758 were accordingly dismissed.
Not satisfied, respondent elevated the above decision of the CA before this Court. We, however,denied
respondent's petition on April 10, 1996.[2]
The MeTC of Paraaque, after the reversal of the decision in Civil Case No. 90-758 for injunction,
proceeded with the trial of the ejectment cases.
On January 22, 1997, the MeTC of Paraaque rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Doris T. Hao who is in actual
possession of the property and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate the premises in question
and to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 a month from June 28, 1988, until she finally vacates
the premises and to pay attorneys fees of P20,000.00. With costs against the defendant.[3]
Petitioners filed a motion for clarificatory or amended judgment on the ground that although MeTC
"ordered the defendant to vacate the entire subject property, it only awarded rent or compensation for the
use of said property and attorney's fees for said ground floor and not the entire subject
property. Compensation for the use of the subject property's second and third floors and attorney's fees as
prayed for in Civil Case No. 7767 were not awarded." [4] In response to said motion, the MeTC issued an
Order dated March 3, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In view of the foregoing, the Decision of this Court is hereby clarified in such a way that the dispositive
portion would read as follows: in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant Doris T. Hao who is in actual possession of the property and all persons claiming rights under
her to vacate the premises and to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P8,000.00 a month in Civil Case No.
7666 for the use and occupancy of the first floor of the premises in question from June 28, 1998 until she
finally vacates the premises and to pay the plaintiff a rental of P5,000.00 a month in Civil Case No. 7667
from June 28, 1988, until she finally vacates the premises and to pay attorneys fees of P20,000.00. With
costs against defendant.
So ordered.[5]
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the above order, praying that respondent be ordered to pay
P20,000.00 monthly for the use and occupancy of the ground floor and P10,000.00 each monthly for the
second and third floors.
Respondent, on the other hand, filed a notice of appeal.
Instead of resolving the motion for reconsideration, on May 7, 1997, the MeTC of Paraaque issued an
Order, elevating the case to the Regional Trial Court:

Considering the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of this Court dated March 3, 1997 and the
Comment and Opposition thereto of the counsel for the defendant, the Court finds that the said Motion for
Reconsideration should already be addressed to the Regional Trial Court considering that whatever
disposition that this Court will award will still be subject to the appeal taken by the defendant and
considering further that the supersedeas bond posted by the defendant covered the increased rental. [6]
On September 30, 1997, the RTC of Paraaque, Branch 259, rendered a Decision modifying that of the
MeTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In the Light of the foregoing, the appealed decision, being in accordance with law, is hereby affirmed as to
the order to vacate the property in question and modified as to the amount of rentals which is hereby
increased to P20,000.00 a month for the ground floor starting June 28, 1988 and P10,000.00 a month for
the second floor and also P10,000.00 a month for the third floor (or) a total of P40,000.00 monthly rentals
commencing June 28, 1988 until the subject property has been vacated and possession thereof turner [sic]
over to the plaintiffs-appellees; to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00; and with costs. [7]
In her Motion dated October 6, 1997, respondent sought a reconsideration of the above ruling of the
RTC. The same was denied on November 25, 1997.
Respondent elevated her case to the Court of Appeals. The CA rendered the Decision subject of this
petition the dispositive portion thereof reads:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by reducing the amount of rentals for both the
second and third floors from P20,000.00 to P10,000.00 monthly. With this modification, the judgment
below is AFFIRMED in all other respects.[8]
The parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration to the Court of Appeals.Petitioners asked
that the decision of the Regional Trial Court fixing the total monthly rentals atP40,000.00 be sustained. On
the other hand, respondent sought a revival of the decision of the MeTC on the ground that since
petitioners did not interpose an appeal from the amended judgment of the MeTC, the RTC could not validly
increase the amount of rentals awarded by the former.
In its Resolution dated 30 July 1998, the Court of Appeals resolved the parties motions for
reconsideration in favor of the respondent. It ruled that the motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners before the MeTC was a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Summary Procedure.Such being
the case, said motion for reconsideration did not produce any legal effect and thus the amended judgment
of the MeTC had become final and executory insofar as the petitioners are concerned. The dispositive
portion of the CA's resolution reads as follows:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED by reducing the monthly rentals for the
first/ground floor from P20,000.00 to P8,000.00 and for the second and third floors from P10,000.00 each
to P5,000.00 for both floors. With this modification the judgment below is affirmed in all other respects.
No pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.[9]
Petitioners now come before this Court assigning the following errors:
A.
IN THE ASSAILED DECISION, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE
FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BY USING AS BASIS FOR REDUCING THE RENTAL ONLY THE
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES AND IGNORING CIRCUMSTANCES OF WHICH THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE.
B.
IN THE ASSAILED DECISION, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS
THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO MODIFY THE APPEALED JUDGMENT BY
INCREASING THE AWARD OF MONTHLY RENTALS FROM P13,000.00 TO P40,000.00. [10]

We required respondent to comment on the petition. [11] In her Comment/Compliance,respondent
contends that the petition should be dismissed and the resolution of the case should be based on the
following issues:
1. DID THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED [sic] ANY REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
CONSIDERED PETITIONERS' "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" (ANNEX "I" - PETITION) FILED
WITH THE MTC-COURT AS A PROHIBITVE [sic] PLEADING IN A SUMMARY PROCEDURE CASE
SUCH AS THE ONE AT BAR[?]
2. DID THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED [sic] ANY REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RESOLVED TO RESTORE, REINSTATE, AFFIRM AND UPHOLD THE MTC - AMENDED JUDGMENT OF
MARCH 3, 1997 FIXING THE TOTAL AWARD OF P13,000.00 GROUNDED ON A PROHIBITIVE [sic]
PLEADING AND FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL[?]
3. DID THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED [sic] ANY REVERSIBLEERROR WHEN IT RESOLVED TO
SUSTAIN RESPONDENT'S POSITION CONSISTENT WITH THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE THAT FOR
PETITIONERS' FAILURE TO APPEAL AND HAVING FILED A PROHIBITIVE [sic] PLEADING, THEY
CANNOT ASK FOR AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF SUCH AS INCREASE IN RENTAL[?] [12]
There is no question that after the expiration of the lease contracts which respondent contracted with
Aniana Galang and BPI, she lost her right to possess the property since, as early as the actual expiration
date of the lease contract, petitioners were not negligent in enforcing their right of ownership over the
property.
While respondent was finally evicted from the leased premises, the amount of monthly rentals which
respondent should pay the petitioners as forced lessors of said property from 20 June 1988 (for the ground
floor) and 15 August 1988 until 6 January 1998 (for the second and third floors), or a period of almost ten
years remains to be resolved.
Petitioners, in the main, posit that there should be a reinstatement of the decision of the regional trial
court which fixed the monthly rentals to be paid by herein respondent at the total
of P40,000.00,P20,000.00 for the occupancy of the first floor, and P10,000.00 each for the occupancy of
the second and third floors of the building, effective after the lapse of the original lease contract
betweenrespondent and the original owner of the building.
On the other hand, respondent insists on the ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court, which was
thereafter reinstated by the Court of Appeals in its 30 July 1998 Resolution, that the monthly rental rates of
only P8,000.00 for the first floor and P5,000.00 for each of the second and third floors should prevail.
At the outset, it should be recalled that there existed no consensual lessor-lessee relationship between
the parties. At most, what we have is a forced lessor-lessee relationship inasmuch as the respondent, by
way of detaining the property without the consent of herein petitioners, was in unlawful possession of the
property belonging to petitioner spouses.
We cannot allow the respondent to insist on the payment of a measly sum of P8,000 for the rentals of
the first floor of the property in question and P5,000.00 for each of the second and the third floors of the
leased premises. The plaintiff in an ejectment case is entitled to damages caused by his loss of the use
and possession of the premises. [13] Damages in the context of Section 17, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is limited to rent or fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation
of the property.[14] What therefore constitutes the fair rental value in the case at bench?
In ruling that the increased rental rates of P40,000.00 should be awarded the petitioners, the
regional trial court based its decision on the doctrine of judicial notice. The RTC held, thus:
While this Court is fully in agreement with the Court of Origin that plaintiffs-appellees have the better right
to the possession of the premises in question being the present owners and the contract of lease between
the former owner and herein defendant-appellant had already expired, the amount of rentals as laid down
in the Clarificatory Order dated 3 March 1997 is inadequate, if not unreasonable.
The Court a quo misappreciated the nature of the property, its location and the business practice in
the vicinity and indeed committed an error in fixing the amount of rentals in the aforementioned
Order. Said premises is situated along Quirino Avenue, a main thoroughfare in Barangay Baclaran,
Paraaque, Metro Manila, a fully developed commercial area and the place where the famous shrine of the
Mother of Perpetual Help stands. Withal, devotees, traders, tourists and practically people from all walks of
life visit said barangay making it suitable for commerce, not to mention thousand of residents
therein. Needless to say, every square meter of said community is valuable for all kinds of business or
commerce of man.
Further, considering that the questioned property has three floors and strategically located along the
main road and consistent with the prevailing rental rates in said business area which is betweenP20,000.00
and P30,000.00 as testified to by Divina Q. Roco, a real estate agent and Mina Catungal, this Court finds
the amount of P20,000.00 a month for the ground floor and P10,000.00 a month each for the second floor
and third floor or a total of P40,000.00 monthly rentals as appropriate and reasonable rentals for the use
and occupation of said premises.
Finally, worth mentioning here as parallel is [the] ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Manila Bay
Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 715 and 731-732 citing Licmay vs. Court of Appeals, 215
SCRA 1 (1992) and Commander Realty Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 181. It reads as follows:
It is worth stressing at this juncture that the trial court had the authority to fix the reasonable value for the
continued use and occupancy of the leased premises after the termination of the lease contract, and that it
was not bound by the stipulated rental in the contract of lease since it is equally settled that upon
termination or expiration of the Contract of Lease, the rental stipulated therein may no longer be the
reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a result or by reason of the change or rise
in values. Moreover, the trial court can take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of real estate
especially of business establishments like the leased building owned by the private respondents. [15]
We find that the RTC correctly applied and construed the legal concept of judicial notice in the case at
bench. Judicial knowledge may be defined as the cognizance of certain facts which a judge under rules of
legal procedure or otherwise may properly take or act upon without proof because they are already known
to him, or is assumed to have, by virtue of his office. [16] Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters
that are commonly known. The power of taking judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution;
care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should
be promptly resolved in the negative. [17] Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and
not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of jurisdiction of the court.
The RTC correctly took judicial notice of the nature of the leased property subject of the case at bench
based on its location and the commercial viability. The above quoted assessment by the RTC of the
Baclaran area, where the subject property is located, is fairly grounded.
Furthermore, the RTC also had factual basis in arriving at the said conclusion, the same being based on
testimonies of witnesses, such as real estate broker Divina Roco and the petitioner Mina Catungal.
The RTC rightly modified the rental award from P13,000.00 to P40,000.00, considering that it is settled
jurisprudence that courts may take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of lease contract
renewals much more with business establishments. Thus, We held in Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals:[18]
It is worth stressing at this juncture that the trial court had the authority to fix the reasonable value for the
continued use and occupancy of the leased premises after the termination of the lease contract, and that it
was not bound by the stipulated rental in the contract of lease since it is equally settled that upon
termination or expiration of the contract of lease, the rental stipulated therein may no longer be the
reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a result or by reason of the change or rise
in values. Moreover, the trial court can take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of real estate
especially of business establishments like the leased building owned by the private respondent. [19]
The increased award of rentals ruled by the RTC is reasonable given the circumstances of the case at
bench. We note that respondent was able to deny petitioners the benefits, including possession, of their
rightful ownership over the subject property for almost a decade.
The Court of Appeals failed to justify its reduction of the P40,000.00 fair rental value as determined by
the RTC. Neither has respondent shown that the rental pegged by the RTC is exorbitant or
unconscionable. This is because the burden of proof to show that the rental demanded is unconscionable
or exorbitant rests upon private respondent as the lessee. [20] Here, respondent neither discharged this
burden when she omitted to present any evidence at all on what she considers to be fair rental value, nor
did she controvert the evidence submitted by petitioners by way of testimonies of the real estate broker
and petitioner Mina Catungal. Thus, in Sia v. CA, we ruled:
xxx On the contrary, the records bear out that the P5,000.00 monthly rental is a reasonable amount,
considering that the subject lot is prime commercial real property whose value has significantly increased
and that P5,000.00 is within the range of prevailing rental rates in that vicinity. Moreover, petitioner has
not proffered controverting evidence to support what he believes to be the fair rental value of the leased
building since the burden of proof to show that the rental demanded is unconscionable or exorbitant rests
upon the lessee. Thus, here and now we rule, as we did in the case of Manila Bay Club v. Court of Appeals,
that petitioner having failed to prove its claim of excessive rentals, the valuation made by the Regional
Trial Court, as affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals, stands. [21]
The Court of Appeals merely anchored its decision to reduce the P40,000.00 rental on procedural
grounds. According to the Court of Appeals, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners before the
MeTC is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure and did not have any effect in stalling
the running of the period to appeal the decision nor could it be considered as notice of appeal and
consequently this affected the elevation of the case to the RTC.Not having appealed the case to the RTC,
the amended judgment of the MeTC fixing the rental rate at P13,000.00 is final and executory as far as
petitioners are concerned.
We disagree. A reading of the order issued by the MeTC will show that said court elevated the issue on
the amount of rentals raised by the petitioner to the RTC because the appeal of respondent had already
been perfected, thus:
Considering the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of this Court dated March 3, 1997 and the
Comment and Opposition thereto of the counsel for the defendant, the Court finds the said Motion for
Reconsideration should already be addressed to the Regional Trial Court considering that whatever
disposition that this Court will award will still be subject to the appeal taken by the defendant and
considering further that the supersedeas bond posted by the defendant covered the increased rental.
In order that this case will be immediately forwarded to the Regional Trial Court in view of the appeal of the
defendant, the Court deemed it wise not to act on the said motion for reconsideration and submit the
matter to the Regional Trial Court who has the final say on whether the rental or the premises in question
will be raised or not.
It will be to the advantage of both parties that this Court refrain from acting on the said Motion for
Reconsideration so as to expedite the remanding (sic) of this Court to the Regional Trial Court. [22]
When the MeTC referred petitioners motion to the RTC for its disposition, respondent could have
opposed such irregularity in the proceeding.
This respondent failed to do. Before this Court, respondent now insists that the petition should be
denied on the ground that the Motion for Reconsideration filed before the MeTC is a prohibited pleading
and hence could not be treated as a notice of appeal. Respondent is precluded by estoppel from doing
so. To grant respondents prayer will not only do injustice to the petitioners, but also it will make a mockery
of the judicial process as it will result in the nullity of the entire proceedings already had on a mere
technicality, a practice frowned upon by the Court. Our ruling in Martinez, et al. vs. De la Merced, et al.
[23]
is illustrative :
xxx In fine, these are acts amounting to a waiver of the irregularity of the proceedings. For it has been
consistently held by this Court that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active
participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such
lack of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals in the assailed Decision correctly observed that the peculiar circumstances
attendant to the ejectment cases warrant departure from the presumption that a party who did not
interject an appeal is satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower court:
As regard the issue on the propriety of the increase in the award of damages/rentals made by the RTC, the
Court notes that, while respondent spouses did not formally appeal the decision in the ejectment cases,
their motion for reconsideration assailing the clarificatory order reducing the award of damages/rentals
was, by order of the MTC, referred to the RTC for appropriate action. Reason for such action is stated in the
Order of May 7, 1997, thus:
xxx
Neither petitioner nor respondent spouses assailed the above order. In fact, in their appeal memorandum,
respondent spouses reiterated their claim, first ventilated in their motion for reconsideration dated March
24, 1997, that the MTC grievously erred in finding that plaintiffs-appellees are only entitled to a meager
monthly rental of P8,000.00 for the ground floor and P5,000.00 for the second and third floors.
Hence, while the entrenched procedure in this jurisdiction is that a party who has not himself appealed
cannot obtain from the appellate court affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the
lower court, the peculiar circumstances attendant to the ejectment cases warrant a departure
therefrom. The rule is premised on the presumption that a party who did not interpose an appeal is
satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower court. Respondent spouses, far from showing satisfaction
with the clarificatory order of March 3, 1997, assailed it in their motion for reconsideration which, however,
was referred to the RTC for appropriate action in view of the appeal taken by the petitioner. Clearly, the
increase in the damages/rentals awarded by the MTC was an issue the RTC could validly resolve in the
ejectment cases.[24]
Respondent, argues that ejectment cases are tried under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
[25]
hence, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was a prohibited pleading and could not take
the place of the required notice of appeal.
The argument by respondent is misleading. Simply because the case was one for ejectment does not
automatically mean that the same was triable under the Rules of Summary Procedure. At the time of the
filing of the complaint by petitioner in 1989, said Rules provide:
SECTION 1. SCOPE - THIS RULE SHALL GOVERN THE PROCEDURE IN THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS IN THE FOLLOWING CASES:
A. CIVIL CASES:
(1) CASES OF FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER, EXCEPT WHERE THE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP
IS INVOLVED, OR WHERE THE DAMAGES OR UNPAID RENTALS SOUGHT TO BE RECOVERED BY THE
PLAINTIFF EXCEED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF COMPLAINT. x
xx
In their complaint, petitioners prayed, among others, for rentals for the period covering June 1988 to
April 1989, at a rate of P20,000.00 for the first floor alone, as well as P10,000.00 for attorney's
fees. Clearly, considering the amount of rentals and damages claimed by petitioners, said case before the
MeTC was not governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. Said case was governed by the ordinary
rules where the general proposition is that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a final judgment is
allowed. In the interest of substantial justice, in this particular case, we rule that the MeTC did not err in
treating the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner as a notice of appeal.
Finally, respondent questions why petitioners would want to reinstate the RTC decision when in fact
they had already applied for a writ of execution of the 8 March 1997 Decision. Respondent is of the view
that since petitioners had already moved for the execution of the decision awarding a smaller amount of
damages or fair rental value, the same is inconsistent with a petition asking for a greater fair rental value
and, therefore, a possible case of unjust enrichment in favor of the petitioners. We are not persuaded.
In order to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor, an immediate execution of a judgment is

mandated and the courts duty to order such execution is practically ministerial. [26] In City of Manila, et al.
vs. CA, et al.,[27] We held that Section 8 (now Section 19), Rule 70, on execution pending appeal, also
applies even if the plaintiff-lessor appeals where, as in that case, judgment was rendered in favor of the
lessor but it was not satisfied with the increased rentals granted by the trial court, hence the appeal xxx.
As above discussed, the petitioners have long been deprived of the exercise of their proprietary rights
over the leased premises and the rightful amount of rentals at the rate of P40,000.00 a
month.Consequently, petitioners are entitled to accrued monthly rentals of P27,000.00, which is the
difference between P40,000.00 awarded by the Regional Trial Court and P13,000.00 awarded by the MeTC
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Said amount of P27,000.00 should rightly be the subject of another
writ of execution being distinct from the subject of the first writ of execution filed by petitioners.
The Court also awards interest in favor of petitioners. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, we gave the following guidelines in the award of interest:
xxx
II With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the
rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing.Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded.In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the
Civil Code.
The back rentals in this case being equivalent to a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due
thereon in twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time of extra-judicial demand on September 27,
1988.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners

byreinstating the decision of the RTC, with modifications, and ordering respondent to further pay:
1. The sum of Twenty Seven Thousand Pesos (P27,000.00), corresponding to the difference between the
P40,000.00 awarded by the Regional Trial Court and the P13,000.00 awarded by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, as monthly arrears, computed from respondents unlawful detainer, 20 June 1988 (for the ground
floor) and 15 August 1988 (for the second and third floors) of the subject property until the time she
vacated the premises on 7 January 1998;
2. Legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum on the foregoing sum from the date of notice of
demand on 27 September 1988 until fully paid;
3. The sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as and for attorneys fees and;
4. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115324. February 19, 2003]
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (now FIRST INTERNATIONAL BANK), petitioner,

vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FRANKLIN VIVES, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated June 25, 1991
in CA-G.R. CV No. 11791 and of its Resolution [2] dated May 5, 1994, denying the motion for reconsideration
of said decision filed by petitioner Producers Bank of the Philippines.
Sometime in 1979, private respondent Franklin Vives was asked by his neighbor and friend Angeles
Sanchez to help her friend and townmate, Col. Arturo Doronilla, in incorporating his business, the Sterela
Marketing and Services (Sterela for brevity).Specifically, Sanchez asked private respondent to deposit in a
bank a certain amount of money in the bank account of Sterela for purposes of its incorporation. She
assured private respondent that he could withdraw his money from said account within a months

time.Private respondent asked Sanchez to bring Doronilla to their house so that they could discuss
Sanchezs request.[3]
On May 9, 1979, private respondent, Sanchez, Doronilla and a certain Estrella Dumagpi, Doronillas
private secretary, met and discussed the matter. Thereafter, relying on the assurances and representations
of Sanchez and Doronilla, private respondent issued a check in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.00) in favor of Sterela.Private respondent instructed his wife, Mrs. Inocencia Vives, to
accompany Doronilla and Sanchez in opening a savings account in the name of Sterela in the Buendia,
Makati branch of Producers Bank of the Philippines. However, only Sanchez, Mrs. Vives and Dumagpi went
to the bank to deposit the check. They had with them an authorization letter from Doronilla authorizing
Sanchez and her companions, in coordination with Mr. Rufo Atienza, to open an account for Sterela
Marketing Services in the amount of P200,000.00.In opening the account, the authorized signatories were
Inocencia Vives and/or Angeles Sanchez. A passbook for Savings Account No. 10-1567 was thereafter
issued to Mrs. Vives.[4]
Subsequently, private respondent learned that Sterela was no longer holding office in the address
previously given to him. Alarmed, he and his wife went to the Bank to verify if their money was still
intact. The bank manager referred them to Mr. Rufo Atienza, the assistant manager, who informed them
that part of the money in Savings Account No. 10-1567 had been withdrawn by Doronilla, and that
only P90,000.00 remained therein. He likewise told them that Mrs. Vives could not withdraw said remaining
amount because it had to answer for some postdated checks issued by Doronilla. According to Atienza,
after Mrs. Vives and Sanchez opened Savings Account No. 10-1567, Doronilla opened Current Account No.
10-0320 for Sterela and authorized the Bank to debit Savings Account No. 10-1567 for the amounts
necessary to cover overdrawings in Current Account No. 10-0320. In opening said current account, Sterela,
through Doronilla, obtained a loan of P175,000.00 from the Bank. To cover payment thereof, Doronilla
issued three postdated checks, all of which were dishonored. Atienza also said that Doronilla could assign
or withdraw the money in Savings Account No. 10-1567 because he was the sole proprietor of Sterela. [5]
Private respondent tried to get in touch with Doronilla through Sanchez. On June 29, 1979, he received
a letter from Doronilla, assuring him that his money was intact and would be returned to him. On August
13, 1979, Doronilla issued a postdated check for Two Hundred Twelve Thousand Pesos (P212,000.00) in
favor of private respondent. However, upon presentment thereof by private respondent to the drawee
bank, the check was dishonored. Doronilla requested private respondent to present the same check on
September 15, 1979 but when the latter presented the check, it was again dishonored. [6]
Private respondent referred the matter to a lawyer, who made a written demand upon Doronilla for the
return of his clients money. Doronilla issued another check forP212,000.00 in private respondents favor but
the check was again dishonored for insufficiency of funds.[7]
Private respondent instituted an action for recovery of sum of money in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Pasig, Metro Manila against Doronilla, Sanchez, Dumagpi and petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 44485. He also filed criminal actions against Doronilla, Sanchez and Dumagpi in the
RTC. However, Sanchez passed away on March 16, 1985 while the case was pending before the trial
court. On October 3, 1995, the RTC of Pasig, Branch 157, promulgated its Decision in Civil Case No. 44485,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants Arturo J. Doronila,
Estrella Dumagpi and Producers Bank of the Philippines to pay plaintiff Franklin Vives jointly and severally
(a) the amount of P200,000.00, representing the money deposited, with interest at the legal rate from the
filing of the complaint until the same is fully paid;
(b) the sum of P50,000.00 for moral damages and a similar amount for exemplary damages;
(c) the amount of P40,000.00 for attorneys fees; and
(d) the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[8]

Petitioner appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated June 25,
1991, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. [9] It likewise denied with finality
petitioners motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated May 5, 1994. [10]
On June 30, 1994, petitioner filed the present petition, arguing that
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THAT THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE
DEFENDANT DORONILLA AND RESPONDENT VIVES WAS ONE OF SIMPLE LOAN AND NOT ACCOMMODATION;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THAT PETITIONERS BANK MANAGER, MR.
RUFO ATIENZA, CONNIVED WITH THE OTHER DEFENDANTS IN DEFRAUDING PETITIONER (Sic. Should be
PRIVATE RESPONDENT) AND AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE PETITIONER SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE UNDER THE
PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADOPTING THE ENTIRE RECORDS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT AND AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM, AS THE FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT WERE BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS;
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CITED DECISION IN SALUDARES VS.
MARTINEZ, 29 SCRA 745, UPHOLDING THE LIABILITY OF AN EMPLOYER FOR ACTS COMMITTED BY AN
EMPLOYEE IS APPLICABLE;
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT
HEREIN PETITIONER BANK IS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE OTHER DEFENDANTS FOR THE
AMOUNT OF P200,000.00 REPRESENTING THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT DEPOSIT, P50,000.00 FOR MORAL
DAMAGES, P50,000.00 FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, P40,000.00 FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND THE COSTS OF
SUIT.[11]
Private respondent filed his Comment on September 23, 1994. Petitioner filed its Reply thereto on
September 25, 1995. The Court then required private respondent to submit a rejoinder to the
reply. However, said rejoinder was filed only on April 21, 1997, due to petitioners delay in furnishing private
respondent with copy of the reply [12] and several substitutions of counsel on the part of private respondent.
[13]
On January 17, 2001, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.[14] Petitioner filed its memorandum on April 16, 2001 while private
respondent submitted his memorandum on March 22, 2001.
Petitioner contends that the transaction between private respondent and Doronilla is a simple loan
(mutuum) since all the elements of a mutuum are present: first, what was delivered by private respondent
to Doronilla was money, a consumable thing; and second, the transaction was onerous as Doronilla was
obliged to pay interest, as evidenced by the check issued by Doronilla in the amount of P212,000.00,
or P12,000 more than what private respondent deposited in Sterelas bank account. [15] Moreover, the fact
that private respondent sued his good friend Sanchez for his failure to recover his money from Doronilla
shows that the transaction was not merely gratuitous but had a business angle to it. Hence, petitioner
argues that it cannot be held liable for the return of private respondentsP200,000.00 because it is not privy
to the transaction between the latter and Doronilla.[16]
It argues further that petitioners Assistant Manager, Mr. Rufo Atienza, could not be faulted for allowing
Doronilla to withdraw from the savings account of Sterela since the latter was the sole proprietor of said
company. Petitioner asserts that Doronillas May 8, 1979 letter addressed to the bank, authorizing Mrs.
Vives and Sanchez to open a savings account for Sterela, did not contain any authorization for these two to
withdraw from said account. Hence, the authority to withdraw therefrom remained exclusively with
Doronilla, who was the sole proprietor of Sterela, and who alone had legal title to the savings account.
[17]
Petitioner points out that no evidence other than the testimonies of private respondent and Mrs. Vives
was presented during trial to prove that private respondent deposited his P200,000.00 in Sterelas account
for purposes of its incorporation.[18] Hence, petitioner should not be held liable for allowing Doronilla to
withdraw from Sterelas savings account.
Petitioner also asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision since the
findings of fact therein were not accord with the evidence presented by petitioner during trial to prove that
the transaction between private respondent and Doronilla was a mutuum, and that it committed no wrong
in allowing Doronilla to withdraw from Sterelas savings account. [19]
Finally, petitioner claims that since there is no wrongful act or omission on its part, it is not liable for
the actual damages suffered by private respondent, and neither may it be held liable for moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees.[20]
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that the transaction between him and Doronilla is not
a mutuum but an accommodation,[21] since he did not actually part with the ownership of his P200,000.00
and in fact asked his wife to deposit said amount in the account of Sterela so that a certification can be
issued to the effect that Sterela had sufficient funds for purposes of its incorporation but at the same time,
he retained some degree of control over his money through his wife who was made a signatory to the
savings account and in whose possession the savings account passbook was given. [22]
He likewise asserts that the trial court did not err in finding that petitioner, Atienzas employer, is liable
for the return of his money. He insists that Atienza, petitioners assistant manager, connived with Doronilla
in defrauding private respondent since it was Atienza who facilitated the opening of Sterelas current
account three days after Mrs. Vives and Sanchez opened a savings account with petitioner for said
company, as well as the approval of the authority to debit Sterelas savings account to cover any
overdrawings in its current account.[23]
There is no merit in the petition.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
filed with this Court. The Court has repeatedly held that it is not its function to analyze and weigh all over
again the evidence presented by the parties during trial. [24] The Courts jurisdiction is in principle limited to
reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the Court of Appeals. [25] Moreover, factual
findings of courts, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive on this
Court unless these findings are not supported by the evidence on record. [26] There is no showing of any
misapprehension of facts on the part of the Court of Appeals in the case at bar that would require this
Court to review and overturn the factual findings of that court, especially since the conclusions of fact of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court are not only consistent but are also amply supported by the
evidence on record.
No error was committed by the Court of Appeals when it ruled that the transaction between private
respondent and Doronilla was a commodatum and not a mutuum. A circumspect examination of the
records reveals that the transaction between them was acommodatum. Article 1933 of the Civil Code
distinguishes between the two kinds of loans in this wise:
By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to another, either something not consumable so that
the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it, in which case the contract is called a
commodatum; or money or other consumable thing, upon the condition that the same amount of the same
kind and quality shall be paid, in which case the contract is simply called a loan or mutuum.
Commodatum is essentially gratuitous.
Simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest.
In commodatum, the bailor retains the ownership of the thing loaned, while in simple loan, ownership
passes to the borrower.
The foregoing provision seems to imply that if the subject of the contract is a consumable thing, such
as money, the contract would be a mutuum. However, there are some instances where
a commodatum may have for its object a consumable thing. Article 1936 of the Civil Code provides:

Consumable goods may be the subject of commodatum if the purpose of the contract is not the
consumption of the object, as when it is merely for exhibition.
Thus, if consumable goods are loaned only for purposes of exhibition, or when the intention of the
parties is to lend consumable goods and to have the very same goods returned at the end of the period
agreed upon, the loan is a commodatum and not amutuum.
The rule is that the intention of the parties thereto shall be accorded primordial consideration in
determining the actual character of a contract. [27] In case of doubt, the contemporaneous and subsequent
acts of the parties shall be considered in such determination. [28]
As correctly pointed out by both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, the evidence shows that
private respondent agreed to deposit his money in the savings account of Sterela specifically for the
purpose of making it appear that said firm had sufficient capitalization for incorporation, with the promise
that the amount shall be returned within thirty (30) days. [29] Private respondent merely accommodated
Doronilla by lending his money without consideration, as a favor to his good friend Sanchez. It was
however clear to the parties to the transaction that the money would not be removed from Sterelas
savings account and would be returned to private respondent after thirty (30) days.
Doronillas attempts to return to private respondent the amount of P200,000.00 which the latter
deposited in Sterelas account together with an additional P12,000.00, allegedly representing interest on
the mutuum, did not convert the transaction from a commodatuminto a mutuum because such was not
the intent of the parties and because the additionalP12,000.00 corresponds to the fruits of the lending of
the P200,000.00. Article 1935 of the Civil Code expressly states that [t]he bailee in commodatum acquires
the use of the thing loaned but not its fruits. Hence, it was only proper for Doronilla to remit to private
respondent the interest accruing to the latters money deposited with petitioner.
Neither does the Court agree with petitioners contention that it is not solidarily liable for the return of
private respondents money because it was not privy to the transaction between Doronilla and private
respondent. The nature of said transaction, that is, whether it is a mutuum or a commodatum, has no
bearing on the question of petitioners liability for the return of private respondents money because the
factual circumstances of the case clearly show that petitioner, through its employee Mr. Atienza, was partly
responsible for the loss of private respondents money and is liable for its restitution.
Petitioners rules for savings deposits written on the passbook it issued Mrs. Vives on behalf of Sterela
for Savings Account No. 10-1567 expressly states that
2. Deposits and withdrawals must be made by the depositor personally or upon his written authority duly
authenticated, and neither a deposit nor a withdrawal will be permitted except upon the
production of the depositor savings bank book in which will be entered by the Bank the amount
deposited or withdrawn.[30]
Said rule notwithstanding, Doronilla was permitted by petitioner, through Atienza, the Assistant Branch
Manager for the Buendia Branch of petitioner, to withdraw therefrom even without presenting the
passbook (which Atienza very well knew was in the possession of Mrs. Vives), not just once, but several
times. Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court found that Atienza allowed said withdrawals because
he was party to Doronillas scheme of defrauding private respondent:
XXX
But the scheme could not have been executed successfully without the knowledge, help and cooperation
of Rufo Atienza, assistant manager and cashier of the Makati (Buendia) branch of the defendant
bank. Indeed, the evidence indicates that Atienza had not only facilitated the commission of the fraud but
he likewise helped in devising the means by which it can be done in such manner as to make it appear that
the transaction was in accordance with banking procedure.
To begin with, the deposit was made in defendants Buendia branch precisely because Atienza was a key
officer therein. The records show that plaintiff had suggested that the P200,000.00 be deposited in his
bank, the Manila Banking Corporation, but Doronilla and Dumagpi insisted that it must be in defendants
branch in Makati for it will be easier for them to get a certification. In fact before he was introduced
to plaintiff, Doronilla had already prepared a letter addressed to the Buendia branch manager authorizing
Angeles B. Sanchez and company to open a savings account for Sterela in the amount of P200,000.00, as
per coordination with Mr. Rufo Atienza, Assistant Manager of the Bank x x x (Exh. 1). This is a clear
manifestation that the other defendants had been in consultation with Atienza from the inception of the
scheme. Significantly, there were testimonies and admission that Atienza is the brother-in-law of a certain
Romeo Mirasol, a friend and business associate of Doronilla.
Then there is the matter of the ownership of the fund. Because of the coordination between Doronilla and
Atienza, the latter knew before hand that the money deposited did not belong to Doronilla nor to
Sterela. Aside from such foreknowledge, he was explicitly told by Inocencia Vives that the money belonged
to her and her husband and the deposit was merely to accommodate Doronilla. Atienza even declared that
the money came from Mrs. Vives.
Although the savings account was in the name of Sterela, the bank records disclose that the only ones
empowered to withdraw the same were Inocencia Vives and Angeles B. Sanchez. In the signature card
pertaining to this account (Exh. J), the authorized signatories were Inocencia Vives &/or Angeles B.
Sanchez. Atienza stated that it is the usual banking procedure that withdrawals of savings deposits could
only be made by persons whose authorized signatures are in the signature cards on file with the bank. He,
however, said that this procedure was not followed here because Sterela was owned by Doronilla. He
explained that Doronilla had the full authority to withdraw by virtue of such ownership. The Court is not
inclined to agree with Atienza. In the first place, he was all the time aware that the money came from Vives
and did not belong to Sterela. He was also told by Mrs. Vives that they were only accommodating Doronilla
so that a certification can be issued to the effect that Sterela had a deposit of so much amount to be sued
in the incorporation of the firm. In the second place, the signature of Doronilla was not authorized in so far
as that account is concerned inasmuch as he had not signed the signature card provided by the bank
whenever a deposit is opened. In the third place, neither Mrs. Vives nor Sanchez had given Doronilla the
authority to withdraw.
Moreover, the transfer of fund was done without the passbook having been presented. It is an accepted
practice that whenever a withdrawal is made in a savings deposit, the bank requires the presentation of
the passbook. In this case, such recognized practice was dispensed with. The transfer from the savings
account to the current account was without the submission of the passbook which Atienza had given to
Mrs. Vives. Instead, it was made to appear in a certification signed by Estrella Dumagpi that a duplicate
passbook was issued to Sterela because the original passbook had been surrendered to the Makati branch
in view of a loan accommodation assigning the savings account (Exh. C). Atienza, who undoubtedly had a
hand in the execution of this certification, was aware that the contents of the same are not true. He knew
that the passbook was in the hands of Mrs. Vives for he was the one who gave it to her. Besides, as
assistant manager of the branch and the bank official servicing the savings and current accounts in
question, he also was aware that the original passbook was never surrendered. He was also cognizant that
Estrella Dumagpi was not among those authorized to withdraw so her certification had no effect
whatsoever.
The circumstance surrounding the opening of the current account also demonstrate that Atienzas active
participation in the perpetration of the fraud and deception that caused the loss. The records indicate that
this account was opened three days later after the P200,000.00 was deposited. In spite of his disclaimer,
the Court believes that Atienza was mindful and posted regarding the opening of the current account
considering that Doronilla was all the while in coordination with him. That it was he who facilitated the
approval of the authority to debit the savings account to cover any overdrawings in the current account
(Exh. 2) is not hard to comprehend.
Clearly Atienza had committed wrongful acts that had resulted to the loss subject of this case. x x x.[31]
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers shall be held primarily and solidarily liable for
damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. To hold the employer
liable under this provision, it must be shown that an employer-employee relationship exists, and that the
employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the act complained of was committed.
[32]
Case law in the United States of America has it that a corporation that entrusts a general duty to its
employee is responsible to the injured party for damages flowing from the employees wrongful act done in
the course of his general authority, even though in doing such act, the employee may have failed in its
duty to the employer and disobeyed the latters instructions.[33]
There is no dispute that Atienza was an employee of petitioner. Furthermore, petitioner did not deny
that Atienza was acting within the scope of his authority as Assistant Branch Manager when he assisted
Doronilla in withdrawing funds from Sterelas Savings Account No. 10-1567, in which account private

respondents money was deposited, and in transferring the money withdrawn to Sterelas Current Account
with petitioner. Atienzas acts of helping Doronilla, a customer of the petitioner, were obviously done in
furtherance of petitioners interests[34] even though in the process, Atienza violated some of petitioners
rules such as those stipulated in its savings account passbook. [35] It was established that the transfer of
funds from Sterelas savings account to its current account could not have been accomplished by Doronilla
without the invaluable assistance of Atienza, and that it was their connivance which was the cause of
private respondents loss.
The foregoing shows that the Court of Appeals correctly held that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
petitioner is liable for private respondents loss and is solidarily liable with Doronilla and Dumagpi for the
return of the P200,000.00 since it is clear that petitioner failed to prove that it exercised due diligence to
prevent the unauthorized withdrawals from Sterelas savings account, and that it was not negligent in the
selection and supervision of Atienza. Accordingly, no error was committed by the appellate court in the
award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit to private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138431-36. September 12, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DIOSCORA M. ARABIA and FRANCISCA
L. TOMAS, accused-appellants.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102, finding
accused-appellants Dioscora M. Arabia and Francisca L. Tomas both guilty of illegal recruitment in large
scale and sentencing them to each suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to each pay a fine of
P100,000.00; and five (5) counts each of estafa for which both were sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days ofprision correccional as minimum,
to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum for each of the
four counts. In another count of estafa, they were each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term
of two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum. They were further
ordered to solidarily pay the complainants the following amounts by way of actual
damages: (1) P23,000.00 to Rolando Rustia; (2) P16,000.00 to Noel de la Cruz; (3) P16,000.00 to Teresita
Julva Lorenzo; (4) P16,000.00 to Violeta S. de la Cruz; and (5) P16,000.00 to Remelyn Nona Jacinto.
The Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale docketed as Crim. Case No. Q-93-48585 alleged
that Dioscora M. Arabia and Francisca L. Tomas, without the requisite license or authority from the POEA
recruited six (6) individuals, namely, Violeta S. De La Cruz, Noel De La Cruz, Pelagia Dela Cruz, Remelyn
Jacinto, Teresita Lorenzo and Rolando Rustia for employment abroad.It reads:
The undersigned accuses DIOSCORA M. ARABIA and FRANCISCA T. TOMAS of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale (Art. 38 (a) in relation to Art. 39 (b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended by P.D. 2018), committed as follows:
That on or about the period comprised from October 1992 to January 16, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, by
falsely representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers for
employment abroad, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to VIOLETA S. DE LA CRUZ, NOEL DE LA CRUZ, PELAGIA DE LA CRUZ,
REMELYN JACINTO, TERESITA LORENZO and ROLANDO RUSTIA, without first securing the required license or
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, in violation of said law.

That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was perpetrated against three or
more persons individually or as group as penalized under Article 38 and 39 of the Labor Code as amended
by PD 2018.
Contrary to law.[2]
Five other informations for estafa were also filed before the same court each charging Dioscora Arabia
and Francisca Tomas with estafa under par. 2, subpar. (a), of Art. 315, of the Revised Penal Code. Of the six
(6) complainants in the case for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, only one, Pelagia de la Cruz, did not file
a case for estafa.
The estafa cases (naming the complainants and stating the amounts therein involved) include: (1)
Criminal Case No. Q-93-48584 (Rolando Rustia-P23,000.00); (2) Criminal Case No. Q-93-48586 (Noel De La
Cruz-P16,000.00); (3) Criminal Case No. Q-93-48587 (Teresita Julva Lorenzo-P16,000.00); (4) Criminal Case
No. Q-93-48588 (Violeta S. De La Cruz-P16,000.00); (5) Criminal Case No. Q-93-48589 (Remelyn Nona
Jacinto-P16,000.00).
Except for the name of the offended party, the amount involved and the date of the commission of the
crime, the following information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-48584 typified the other informations for the
crime of estafa:
The undersigned accuses DIOSCORA M. ARABIA and FRANCISCA L. TOMAS of the crime of Estafa,
committed as follows:
That on or sometime in the month of October, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud ROLANDO RUSTIA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which they made to said Rolando Rustia to
the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ Rolando Rustia and could facilitate
the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Rolando Rustia to give and
deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P23,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent
and were made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of P23,000.00, which amount once
in possession, with intent to defraud Rolando Rustia, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said Rolando Rustia in the aforesaid amount of P23,000.00, Philippine Currency. [3]
As said indictments were founded on the same facts, the cases were tried jointly. On December 13,
1993, accused-appellants Dioscora Arabia and Francisca Tomas both entered a plea of not guilty to each of
the charges,[4] whereupon trial commenced.
As can be gleaned from the Informations, accused-appellants Dioscora Arabia and Francisca Tomas
promised employment to at least six (6) people, four (4) of whom, namely, Violeta De La Cruz, Remelyn
Jacinto, Teresita Lorenzo and Pelagia de la Cruz, appeared in court to testify against them.
We adopt the following summary of the evidence for the prosecution by the Office of the Solicitor
General, viz:
In October 1992, private complainants Violeta de la Cruz, Remelyn Jacinto, Teresita Lorenzo, Rolando Rustia
and Noel de la Cruz were introduced by the latters mother, private complainant Pelagia de la Cruz, to
appellant Dioscora Arabia, a recruiter of job applicants for a factory in Taiwan.
They all saw appellants at the residence of Arabia at Block 22, Lot 25, Villanova Subdivision, Quezon City
(TSN, July 13, 1994, pp. 4-6). Then and there, appellants convinced them and other applicants to apply for
jobs in Taiwan that would give them a monthly pay of P22,000.00 with two (2) months advance salary to
boot. Service fees for processing and placement, private complainants were told by appellants Arabia and
Tomas, would be P16,000.00 for each of them (Ibid., pp. 6-8).
Three (3) days later, appellants themselves went to the Dela Cruz residence where they convinced private
complainants to give the amount of P16,000.00 each so that they could leave for Taiwan by December 18,
1992. On November 6, 1992, each of the private complainants, except Roland Rustia who gave
P23,000.00, gave P16,000.00 to Arabia at the latters residence and in the presence of Tomas. Arabia,
however, did not issue any receipt upon her assurance that she would not fool them (Ibid., pp. 8-10;
August 31, 1994, p. 6).
Private complainants were told to prepare for their departure and that the P16,000.00 placement fee would
be reimbursed by their employer in Taiwan. Various requirements, such as pictures, passports and bio-
data, were submitted by private complainants (Ibid., July 13, 1994, pp. 10-11).
On December 18, 1992, however, private complainants were not able to leave for Taiwan because
appellants told them that the person who was supposed to accompany them to Taiwan did not arrive.The
departure date was thus reset to January 16, 1993, but private complainants were still unable to leave
because of the same excuse that appellants gave (Ibid., pp. 11-12).
Private complainants asked for the return of their money as they were no longer interested in working
abroad. They were informed by Arabias sister, however, that appellants were arrested by the NBI and
detained at the Quezon City Jail (Ibid., p. 12). Records also showed that appellants were neither licensed
nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment (Ibid., March 14, 1994, p. 4; May 4, 1994, p. 5).
Upon a joint complaint filed with the Quezon City Prosecutors Office, the correspondingInformations were
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC, Decision, pp. 1-4). [5]
Upon the other hand, accused-appellants denied having recruited the complainants. Dioscora Arabia
claimed that the complainants went to her house para magpahilot. She denied that she got money from
them and claimed that she herself was a victim of an illegal recruiter. She applied for employment abroad
with a certain Rebecca de Jesus who was also the recruiter of the complainants.She paid Rebecca de Jesus
P30,000.00, and consequently, she filed a complaint for estafa and illegal recruitment against Rebecca de
Jesus in February 1993. Similarly, Francisca Tomas claimed that she was a job applicant and she met
Dioscora Arabia at the house of Rebecca de Jesus. She also saw the complainants as applicants for a
job there. At the time of their arrest in March 11, 1993, she was with living with Arabia. According to her,
she also filed complaints against Rebecca de Jesus.
Assessing the evidence, the trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and found
unmeritorious accused-appellants defense. The trial found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale and of five counts of estafa. The court explained thus:
After an evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties, the court finds the evidence sufficient to prove
the quilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
xxxxxxxxx
As testified to by the complaining witnesses, accused Arabia convinced the complaining witnesses to apply
for employment in Taiwan by making representations that they will be getting a salary of P20,000.00 a
month, and upon arrival in Taiwan, they will be paid their two months salary in advance. Accused likewise
told them that they will be leaving on December 18, 1992. It was also accused Arabia who demanded the
payment of P16,000.00 placement fee from each complainant.
Undoubtedly, therefore, accused Arabia and Tomas were engaged in recruiting workers for employment
abroad.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution likewise shows that accused Arabia was neither licensed or
authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment as shown by the certification issued
by the Chief Licensing Division, POEA, Veneranda Guerrero (Exh. A).
Neither is accused Francisca Tomas licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment
(Exh. B).
It was likewise sufficiently shown that both accused recruited more than three persons the five (5)
complaining witnesses in this case.
The only defense of the accused Arabia and Tomas is denial. They claim that, like the complainants, they
too, accused Arabia and Tomas, were job applicants and their recruiter was one Rebecca de Jesus; that

they were likewise victimized by Rebecca de Jesus. As a matter of fact, according to the accused, like
them, complainants also filed a case against said illegal recruiter, Rebecca de Jesus.
However, accused Arabia and Tomas failed to present proof that they indeed filed a case against Rebecca
de Jesus for illegal recruitment. Neither did they present proof that complainants also filed a case against
said Rebecca de Jesus. Accused Arabia presented supposed complainant-affidavits against Rebecca de
Jesus, however, it was not shown that herein complainants are among those persons who executed an
affidavit-complaint.
Accused Arabia admits that sometime during the last week of November, 1992, the complainants went to
her house. However, she claimed they went there not because they wanted to see her but because one
Rebecca de Jesus, the alleged illegal recruiter told the complainants to meet her (Rebecca) there because
Rebecca happened to be a client of accused Arabia as manghihilot.Accused Arabia later on stated that she
first saw these complainants during the last week of December 1992.
Accused Arabia further stated the case they filed against Rebecca de Jesus is with the sala of then Judge
Costales of Br. 93 of Quezon City. However, the evidence showed that the case then pending in the sala of
Judge Costales was the case filed by other complainants against herein accused Arabia and Tomas (Exh. G-
1).
The allegation of accused witness, one Atty. Layaoen, who allegedly assisted herein accused in filing their
complaint against Rebecca de Jesus with the Prosecutors Office in Quezon City was belied by the
prosecutions rebuttal witness, Mr. Ronald Feliciano, an employee of the City Prosecutors Office, Quezon
City, assigned at the Records Division of said office, who testified that based on their records, there are
nine (9) cases of estafa and illegal recruitment filed in their office against Rebecca de Jesus, but not one of
them was filed by herein accused Arabia and Tomas, and/or by complainants in the present case (against
Arabia and Tomas).
Besides, if Atty. Layaoen indeed assisted the accused in filing the case against Rebecca de Jesus, how
come he does not even know what happened to said case if there was really a case filed against said
Rebecca de Jesus.
Witness Layaoen further stated that as far as he knows accused could not have been involved in any case
of estafa or illegal recruitment. However, accused Arabia and Tomas admitted that they have already been
convicted by an RTC court in Quezon City, then presided by Judge Costales, for the crimes of estafa and
illegal recruitment filed by other complainants for which they are presently confined at the Womens
Correccional.
While it may be true that complainants herein were not able to present receipts to prove that they in fact
paid the placement fee of P16,000.00 each to accused Arabia with accused Tomas witnessing the
payment, it has been ruled that the absence of receipts in a criminal case for illegal recruitment does not
warrant acquittal of the accused and is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. As long as the witnesses
had positively shown through their respective testimonies that the accused is the one involved in the
prohibited recruitment, he may be convicted of the offense despite absence of receipts. (People vs. Goce
247 SCRA 780; People vs. Senden 228 SCRA 489; People vs. Naparan 225 SCRA 714; People vs. Pabala 262
SCRA 553).[6]
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Dioscora Arabia and Francisca Tomas:
(1) CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-93-48584
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised
Penal Code and both accused Dioscora Arabia and Francisca Tomas are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate imprisonment from Two (2) years, Eleven (11) months and Eleven (11) days of prision
correccional as minimum, to six (6) years, Eight (8) months and Twenty-one (21) days ofprision
correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs.
Accused Dioscora Arabia and Francisca Tomas are solidarily liable to pay complainant Roland Rustia the
sum of P23,000.00.

Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment (in large scale) penalized under Article 39 of the
Labor Code as amended by Pres. Decree No. 2018, and both accused Dioscora Arabia and Francisca Tomas
are hereby sentenced to each suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and for each one to pay
P100,000.00 fine.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and punished under Article 315 (2) (a) of
the Revised Penal Code, and both accused Dioscora Arabia and Francisca Tomas are hereby sentenced to
each suffer an indeterminate imprisonment from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of Prision
Correccional as maximum and to pay the costs.
Accused Dioscora Arabia and Francisca Tomas are solidarily liable to pay complainant Noel de la Cruz the
amount of Sixteen thousand (P16,000) pesos.
each suffer an indeterminate imprisonment from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven days of prision
Accused Dioscora Arabia and Francisca Tomas are solidarily liable to pay complainant Teresita Julva Lorenzo
the sum of sixteen thousand (P16,000) pesos.
(5) CRIMINAL CASE Q-93-48588
each suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days
of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
Accused Dioscora Arabia and Francisca Tomas are solidarily liable to pay complainant Violeta S. de la Cruz
the sum of Sixteen thousand (P16,000) pesos.
each suffer an indeterminate imprisonment from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days
of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
Accused Dioscora Arabia and Francisca Tomas are solidarily liable to pay complainant Remelyn Nona
Jacinto the sum of Sixteen thousand (P16,000) pesos.
SO ORDERED.
Done in Quezon City, this 31st day of August, 1998.
Accused-appellants seasonably filed their appeal. In their Appellants Brief,[7] they impute to the trial
court the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE FOUR
COMPLAINANTS WHO TESTIFIED IN THIS CASE AND IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND
FIVE (5) COUNTS OF ESTAFA DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
In fine, accused-appellants question the credibility of the four complainants/witnesses and the
sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence.
Accused-appellants argue that none of the four complaining witnesses ever presented a receipt to
prove the alleged payment of a fee; that their testimonies do not corroborate one another as to the
payment to the accused of such amounts on such a date and place; and that their testimonies that
accused refused to issue receipts runs counter to the presumption that persons take ordinary care of their
concerns (Rule 131, Sec. 5 (d), Rules of Evidence). Accused-appellants insist that the illegal recruiter is one
Rebecca de Jesus and that they themselves are victims of the latter.
These arguments fail to persuade.
Large-scale illegal recruitment has the following essential elements:
(1) The accused undertook [a] recruitment activity defined under Article 13 (b) or any prohibited
practice under Art. 34 of the Labor Code.
(2) He did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers.
(3) He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group. [8]
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as follows:
xxx {A]ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers
[which] includes referrals, contact services, promis[es] or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engagement in recruitment and placement.
There is no doubt as to accused-appellants guilt for all the essential elements of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale have been established beyond reasonable doubt. Accused-appellants recruited
at least four persons, giving them the impression that they had the capability to send them to Taiwan for
employment. They collected various amounts allegedly for recruitment and placement fees without license
or authority to do so. It is settled that the fact that an accused in an illegal recruitment case did not issue
the receipts for amounts received from the complainants has no bearing on his culpability so long as
complainants show through their respective testimonies and affidavits that the accused was involved in
the prohibited recruitment.[9] It has also been held that the Statute of Frauds and the rules of evidence do
not require the presentations of receipts in order to prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and
the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases. The amounts may consequently be proved by the
testimony of witnesses.[10]
The complainants were positive and categorical in their testimonies that they personally met accused-
appellants and that the latter asked from them sums of money in exchange for the promised employment
overseas. Complainants had no motive to testify falsely against accused-appellants.Needless to state,
against the positive and categorical statements of the complainants, the mere denials of accused-
appellants and their pinpointing of the crime to one Rebecca de Jesus who was never produced in court
cannot prevail. As the Court held in another illegal recruitment case, with the accused-appellants failure to
present the person who was allegedly responsible for the recruitment of the complainants, she risked the
adverse inference and legal presumption that evidence suppressed would be adverse if produced. [11]
Large scale illegal recruitment is punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00 under
Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code,[12] hence, the trial court imposed the proper penalty.
As regards the conviction of accused-appellants for estafa on five (5) counts in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
93-48584, Q-93-4858, Q-93-48587, Q-93-48588 and Q-93-48589, we have ruled in a number of cases that
a person convicted of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code can be convicted of violation of the Revised
Penal Code provisions on estafa, provided the elements of the crime are present. The elements of estafa
are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. In
relation thereto, Art. 315 of the Revised penal Code provides for the penalty thus-
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if
the amount of the fraud is over P12,000 but does not exceed P22,000, and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional P10,000; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such a case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provision of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
We are convinced that accused-appellants defrauded complainants/witnesses Violeta de la Cruz

(Criminal Case No. Q-93-48588); Remelyn Jacinto (Criminal Case No. Q-93-48589); and Teresita Lorenzo
(Criminal Case No. Q-93-48587) through deceit. A scrutiny of their testimonies in court reveal that they
were misled into believing that accused-appellants could provide them employment in Taiwan. As a result,
the three complainants/witnesses each parted with P16, 000.00 in search of greener pastures to improve
their lot.
The RPC imposes the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum, period if the amount of the fraud is over 12, 000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos. The
amount involved in each of the said three cases for estafa is within the above range.Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to prescribed for the offense. [13] In the absence of mitigating
and aggravating circumstances, the trial court correctly imposed an indeterminate prison term of one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five
(5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum for each of the three counts of estafa.
[14]
We also sustain the award of actual damages by the trial court to complainants Violeta de la Cruz,
Remelyn Jacinto and Teresita Lorenzo even if they were unable to produce receipts, as they were able to
prove by their testimonies that the accused-appellants were involved in the entire recruitment process and
that they got their money.[15]
However, accused-appellants should be acquitted of the two counts of estafa, namely, inCriminal Case
No. Q-93-48584 with Rolando Rustia as complainant involving P23,000.00 andCriminal Case No. Q-93-
48586 with Noel De La Cruz as complainant involving P16,000.00. Both Rolando Rustia and Noel de la Cruz
did not appear in court to testify against accused-appellants.After Rolando Rustia and Noel de la Cruz
signed the Joint Complaint Affidavit accusing Dioscora Arabia and Francisco Tomas of Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale and Estafa, nothing more was heard from them. The prosecution did not present any
testimonial or documentary evidence to prove the estafa committed by accused-appellants against
Rolando Rustia and Noel de La Cruz.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court finding accused-appellants Dioscora M. Arabia and
Francisca L. Tomas guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale in Crim. Case No. Q-93-48585 and Estafa in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-93-48588, Q-93-48589 and Q-93-48587 is hereby AFFIRMED. However, accused-
appellants are ACQUITTED of the two (2) counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-93-48584 and Q-93-
48586 for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129782. June 29, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. BALWINDER SINGH, GURMOK SINGH,
DALVIR SINGH, DIAL SINGH, AMARJIT SINGH, MOHINDER SINGH, MALKIT SINGH DHILLON,
JOHINDER SINGH and KULDIP SINGH, defendant,
BALWINDER SINGH, MALKIT, SINGH, MOHINDER SINGH and DALVIR SINGH, defendants-
appellants.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Appellants Balwinder, Malkit, Mohinder and Dalvir, all surnamed Singh, were convicted of the crime of
Murder in Criminal Case No. 8683 for killing Surinder Singh, and Frustrated Murder in Criminal Cases No.
8682 for stabbing Dilbag Singh. Each of them were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for murder, and the indeterminate penalty of 8 years and one (1) day ofprision mayor as minimum, to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum for frustrated murder.
It appears that these four (4) appellants, who are Indian nationals, were charged with murder and
frustrated murder along with their six (6) compatriots, namely: Gurmok, Dalvir, Dial, Johinder, Kuldip and
Amarjit Singh. Only these four (4) appellants were prosecuted because the rest of their co-accused are at-
large, except for Dial Singh, who died while under detention.
Dilbag Singh, private complainant for frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 8682, recounts that on
November 26, 1993, at around 7:30 in the morning while he was cleaning his motorbike in front of the
Mendiola Apartment in Barangay Canlalay, Bian, Laguna, Dalvir, Balwinder, Gurmok, Jarnail, Amarjit,
Mohinder, Dial, Kuldip- all surnamed Singh-Johander Singh Dhillon, and Malkit Singh Dhillon arrived,
shouting foul remarks in their native language and demanding Surinder Singh to come out of the
apartment. When Surinder Singh came out of his apartment, Dalvir Singh tried to stab him but Surinder
Singh was able to move away. Dalvir Singh told his companions to hold Surinder Singh as he will kill
him. Thereafter, Dial Singh and Johinder Singh each held the right and left arms of Surinder Singh, with
Kuldip Singh pushing Surinder Singh on his back. Dalvir Singh then stabbed Surinder Singh, hitting him on
the right side of his stomach, and causing him to fall on the ground. Dial Singh remarked that Surinder
Singh failed to give money and if others will likewise refuse, the same fate will befall them. As Surinder
Singh tried to get up, Malkit Singh Dhillon and Jarnail Singh started hitting him with lead pipes all over his
body, while Johinder Singh and Dial Singh punched and kicked Surinder. Amarjit Singh, who was holding a
gun, warned everyone not to help Surinder Singh or else he will shoot. Thereat, when all these things were
going on, private complainant Dilbag Singh tried to stop them but Balwinder Singh stabbed him on the left
side of his back. Gurmok Singh likewise stabbed him with a bolo, but he was not hit as he was able to
move to one side. After that, the ten (10) accused Indians left.
Dilbag Singh and Surinder Singh, both injured, were brought to the Perpetual Help Hospital, Bian,
Laguna, by Jaswinder Singh, Johinder Singh Gill, Balwinder Singh Gill and Alwan Singh, for
treatment. There, Surinder Singh was pronounced dead on arrival.
From the hospital, private complainant Dilbag Singh, Jaswinder Singh, Balwinder Singh Gill, a lady
named Vilma, and other companions went to the police station in Bian, Laguna, and reported the incident.
Both Dilbag Singh and Jaswinder Singh executed a sworn statement.
On the basis of the sworn statement, the Chief Investigator of the Bian Police Station filed on
November 28, 1993, a complaint for the crime of homicide with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bian,
Laguna for purposes of preliminary investigation.
On January 7, 1994,[1] after finding probable cause, the MTC recommended to upgrade the charges to
Murder and Frustrated Murder, and forwarded the records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor. [2]
On February 17, 1994, 3rd Assistant Prosecutor of Laguna, Fernando V. Balinado, rendered a resolution
recommending that only Dalvir Singh be charged with homicide, and that frustrated homicide be filed
against Balwinder and Gurmok Singh. [3] Thereafter, the Information for homicide was filed against Dalvir
Singh, and frustrated homicide against Balwinder and Gurmok Singh [4]with the Regional Trial Court of
Laguna. Before arraignment, private complainants Dilbag Singh and their heirs of Surinder Singh, thru their
counsel, moved for reinvestigation.[5]
On June 30, 1994, a resolution on reinvestigation [6] resulted in the filing of two (2) Informations for
Murder and Frustrated Murder against all ten (10) Indian nationals, to wit:
CRIMINAL CASE No. 8683[7] For Murder
That on or about November 26, 1993, in the Municipality of Bian, Province of Laguna, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping with one another, and armed with a fan knife, hand gun and lead pipes, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and wound and hit with said knife and lead
pipes one SURINDER SINGH thereby inflicting upon him fatal wounds, with abuse of superior strength,
treachery and with evident premeditation, the said accused, having inflicted the wounds upon SURINDER
SINGH while being held by the other accused, and as a result thereof, the said wounds being necessarily

mortal/fatal, thereby causing the direct and immediate death of said SURINDER SINGH, to the damage and
prejudice of his surviving heirs.
All contrary to law and with the qualifying/aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength,
evident premeditation and alevosia, and the generic aggravating circumstance of known conspiracy.
Criminal Case No. 8682[8] Frustrated Murder
That on or about November 26, 1993 in the Municipality of Bian, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with abuse of superior
strength, treachery and evident premeditation, while armed with bolos, lead pipes, fan knife and hand-gun,
with the intent of taking the life of DILBAG SINGH, attack, assault thereby inflicting upon him mortal wound
on the left side of his body directly by overt acts thus, performing all the acts of execution which would
have nevertheless did not produce it, by reason of causes independent of their will, that is: the able and
timely medical assistance given the said DILBAG SINGH which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Initially, the case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna and was raffled to Branch 24.
Both cases were tried jointly.
Upon arraignment, on September 23, 1994, three (3) appellants, Balwinder, Malkit and Mohinder
Singh, manifested that they are not entering any plea. Thus, the court entered for them a plea of not guilty
pursuant to Section 1(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. [9] The arraignment of Dalvir and Dial Singh
followed on October 25, 1994.[10]
On October 6, 1994, appellants filed a petition for bail. [11] While hearing the petition for bail, appellants
filed a motion to inhibit and a petition for change of venue. [12] Subsequently, on May 30, 1995, the hearing
on the petition for bail was continued before the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna. On December
13, 1995, RTC of San Pedro, Laguna denied the petition for bail. [13]
The evidence presented during the bail hearings were automatically reproduced at the trial.
The events, according to appellants, happened in this wise. Appellant Dalvir Singh testified that on
November 26, 1993, at around 7:30 in the morning, he was conducting his buy and sell business along
Brgy. Canlalay, Bian, Laguna. While collecting from his customers, he was accosted by Jaswinder, Dilbag
and Surinder Singh to stop at the corner of the street. When he stopped, he alighted from his motorcycle.
Jaswinder, Dilbag and Surinder Singh accused him of squealing their status to the immigration
authorities. Then, Jaswinder Singh punched him. Appellant Dalvir Singh retaliated by slapping Jaswinder
Singh afterwhich, Jaswinder Singh, went inside his apartment to get a pipe. When Surinder Singh was
about to stab him, he wrestled the knife from him and, in the process, private complainant Dilbag Singh
was stabbed on his back with the same knife. [14] As Dalvir Singh grappled for the possession of the knife
from Surinder Singh, both of them fell down, with him landing on top of Surinder Singh and that was the
time when Surinder Singh was stabbed on the right portion of his stomach. Then, Surinder Singh lost his
grip and appellant Dalvir Singh was able to get hold of the knife. Appellant Dalvir Singh was so nervous
that he left the place on his motorcycle while holding the knife. He threw the knife along the highway of
Bian, Laguna.[15]
To bolster this version, appellants offered the testimonies of Wilfredo Rivera and SPO4 Manuel
Francisco. Wilfredo Rivera corroborated the testimonies of appellant Dalvir Singh. According to him, he
testified in court in exchange for the favor extended to him by an Indian national who is a friend of
appellant Dalvir Singh. With respect to the testimonies of SPO4 Manuel Francisco, then chief investigator of
the PNP, Bian, Laguna, the same were confined to the fact that private complainants Dilbag Singh and
Jaswinder Singh executed their respective sworn statements of the incident.
After trial, appellants were convicted of the crime charged, thus
WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused Balwinder Singh, Malkit Singh Dhillon, Mohinder Singh, Dalvir Singh and
Dial Singh having been established beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated murder in Criminal
Case No. 8282 and murder in Criminal Case 8683 defined and penalized in Articles 248 and 250 of the
Revised Penal Code, this Court hereby sentences them (except Dial Singh who died during the presentation
of defense evidence on the main case) as follows:
Criminal Case No. 8682
1. each to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporalmaximum;
2. jointly and severally, to pay private complainant Dilbag Singh the amounts of P16,000
representing his hospitalization and medical expenses, and P30,000 for and as attorneys fees;
and
3. jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.
Criminal Case No. 8683
1. each to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;

2. jointly and severally, to pay the heirs of Surinder Singh the following sums:
a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b) P41,500.00 representing funeral, wake and transportation expenses;
c) P5,760,000.00 for lost earnings/income;
d) P400.00 for hospitalization expenses;
e) P50,000.00 for moral damages; and
f) P500,000.00 for and as attorneys fees; and
3. jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.
Since accused Jarnail Singh, Gurmok Singh, Amarjit Singh, Johinder Singh and Kuldip Singh have remained
at-large to date, in order not to clog the docket of this court, let the records of these two cases be sent to
the files and warrant be issued for their immediate arrest.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Due to the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed in murder, the case is now before us on appeal.
Appellants challenge their conviction and interpose the following errors allegedly committed by the
trial court-[17]
1. The court a quo erred in sanctioning errors and irregularities of procedure which resulted in denial of due
process to accused-appellants.
2. The court a quo erred in accepting the prosecutions version of the incident which gave rise to these
cases, overlooking the testimonies of the three (3) unbiased witnesses thereto.
3. The court a quo erred in awarding excessive damages against accused-appellants.
First error
According to appellants, an irregularity attended the admission of the amended Informations.They

claim that the prosecution failed to conduct a preliminary investigation for the upgraded crime of murder
and frustrated murder. This claim lacks basis.
Evidence on record reveals that when private complainants filed a motion for re-investigation to
upgrade the charge to murder and frustrated murder, in the course thereof, the prosecutor who handled
the reinvestigation[18] conducted another preliminary investigation. Subpoenas were issued and sent to
both contending parties requiring them to appear and be present on the scheduled date and time for the
said re-investigation, and to present, or submit, their evidence in support of their complaints and defense,
respectively."[19] The prosecutor propounded clarificatory questions to the prosecution witnesses revealing
the necessity to raise the category of the criminal charge to murder and frustrated murder.
Appellants likewise alleged that the procedure followed by the trial court in resolving their petitions for
bail departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings, because the prosecution presented its
evidence ahead of appellants, and the presentation of the prosecution took 10 months from January 27 to
October 30, 1995, while the accused were afforded only two days to rebut the prosecution evidence. This
allegation is misplaced.
In hearing the petition for bail, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is
strong. Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the burden of proof in bail
application lies in the prosecution, thus-
Section 8, Burden of proof in bail application.- At the hearing of an application for admission to bail filed by
any person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death,reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence
presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon
motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the witness is
dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify.
In bail proceedings, the prosecution must be given ample opportunity to show that the evidence of
guilt is strong. While the proceeding is conducted as a regular trial, it must be limited to the determination
of the bailability of the accused. It should be brief and speedy, lest the purpose for which it is available is
rendered nugatory. Antecedents of this case show that the case was initially raffled to Branch 24, RTC,
Bian, Laguna, and then transferred to RTC San Pedro, Laguna. From the filing of the two (2) criminal
Informations, several motions and petitions were received by the trial court, which include, among others,
application for bail, motion for re-investigation, motion to inhibit and change of venue, motion to transfer
appellants from the municipal jail to Sta. Cruz provincial jail, petition for review filed with the Department
of Justice and motion for postponements. In the course of hearing the petition for bail, several petitions
and motions cluttered the records of the trial court. In fact, the records of the case were not immediately
forwarded to RTC San Pedro, Laguna when the hearing was transferred. We have scoured the records of
this case and we found that the delay was caused by these factors. These, however, did not justify the
length of time consumed by the prosecution in the presentation of its evidence because the trial court,
exercising its discretion, ought to control the course of bail proceedings, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable
minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the
hearing.[20] While the prosecution tarried too long, such fact did not amount to a denial of due process
because bail is granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, [21] which is not
attendant in this case.
Appellants also challenge their transfer from the municipal jail in Bian, Laguna, to the provincial jail in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The transfer of appellants to the Sta. Cruz provincial jail was sought for because during
the scheduled hearings, appellants were always late. [22] Considering that the jail guards in the municipal
jail at Bian reasoned that they are undermanned, thus, late in going to court, the trial court deemed it best
to transfer appellants to the provincial jail. Besides, the trial court took cognizance of the fact that
appellants complained of poor jail facilities in Bian, Laguna. [23] Circumstances surrounding this case justify
appellants transfer to the provincial jail for the purpose of insuring the speedy disposition of the case.
Appellants claim that no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove the allegations in the
amended information, and that there is nothing in the records of these cases which support the statement
of the court a quo that the documentary evidence, as well as the testimonies of the xxx witnesses
presented by the prosecution in a petition for bail, was considered as automatically reproduced at the trial
on the main cases,[24] is misleading.
On May 30, 1995, the trial court declared that the evidence presented during the bail hearings are
considered automatically reproduced at the trial of the main case. [25] In fact, Section 8, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court specifically provides that the evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be
considered automatically reproduced at the trial. The mandate of the Rules is clear and there is no need
for the trial court to issue an order so that the evidence presented in the bail proceedings may be
considered automatically reproduced at the trial.
Appellants contend that they were deprived of their rights to be heard and to present evidence with
the issuance of the trial court Order dated February 24, 1997. As culled from the records, appellants were
protracting the trial by filing motions for postponement on scheduled hearings. On February 24,1997, the
scheduled date for appellants presentation of additional evidence, appellants filed a motion for leave to file
demurrer to evidence and set the same for hearing on that same day. [26] It bears stressing that judicial
action on a motion to dismiss, or demurrer to evidence, is left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion.
[27]
The trial court, mindful of the violation of the three-day notice rule by appellants, declared that the trial
court must be given time to resolve the motion, and ordered the parties to proceed with the hearing,
without prejudice to the outcome of the motion. The trial court emphasized that there should be a
limitation or an end to unnecessary postponements.Thus, it disclosed that when the Court of Appeals
denied appellants Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for temporary restraining order, [28] no legal hindrance
existed to defer the scheduled hearings. Appellants were given all the opportunity to be heard and defend
their cause but opted not to utilize the same by its continued refusal to proceed with the
trial. Nevertheless, appellants were given time to file their formal offer of exhibits to bolster their defense.
[29]
This negates the appellants claim of denial of due process.
Second error
Appellants fault the trial court in accepting the prosecutions version. This Court is convinced that
appellants are guilty of the crime charged. Appellants Dalvir Singh admitted stabbing the deceased and
wounding Dilbag Singh, which was claimed to have been caused while grappling for the possession of the
knife. This version invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.[30] After invoking self-defense, for exculpation, appellants have the burden of proving
their allegation to substantiate such assertion, which they failed to do so. In addition, their imputation of
alleged discrepancy between the sworn statement executed by private complainants Dilbag and Jaswinder
Singh on November 26, 1993, and their joint sworn statement executed on December 13, 1993, [31] is not
impressed with merit. Reviews of both sworn statements negate any inconsistency. Immediately after the
incident, private complainants Dilbag and Jaswinder Singh, reported the circumstances surrounding the
death of Surinder Singh, and the stab wound sustained by Dilbag Singh to police authorities. [32] Both of
them revealed the presence of all the appellants and disclosed their participation in the incident. On
November 26, 1993, their narrations collectively and individually demonstrate appellants concerted action
to inflict injury upon private complainant Dilbag Singh and the deceased Surinder Singh. In fine, we quote
with approval, the trial courts findings, holding all the appellants guilty of murder and frustrated murder,
thus-
x x x prosecution evidence has established that Surinder Singh was stabbed in the stomach by accused
Dalvir Singh while the former was being held on his arms by accused Dial Singh and Johinder Singh, and
pushed on his back by accused Kuldip Singh. At that juncture, accused Malkit Singh Dhillon and Jarnail
Singh held lead pipes, accused Balwinder Singh, a big bolo-like knife, accused Gurmok Singh, a small bolo-
like knife, and Amarjit Singh, a hand gun. Also, accused Mohinder Singh shouted kill him, Im responsible, I
will bring you out of trouble in Punjabi and the rest of the accused remarked come on, kill him, kill him also
in Punjabi. While all these acts were transpiring, accused Amarjit Singh threatened to shoot anybody who
will help with the gun that he was holding. After he was stabbed, Surinder Singh was still hit with lead
pipes by accused Malkit Singh Dhillon and Jarnail Singh and boxed and kicked by Johinder Singh and Dial
Singh and pushed at his back by Kuldip Singh. When Dilbag pleaded with the accused not to hit anymore
(sic) Surinder Singh, he, too, was stabbed on his back by Balwinder Singh followed by an attempt to stab
him also by Gurmok Singh. Evidently, the foregoing concerted acts sufficiently demonstrated a common
purpose or design to kill Surinder Singh and Dilbag Singh with treachery. As held in a number of cases,
there is treachery when offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof, without risk to himself from the defense which the offended party might
make. xxx xxx xxx Thus, treachery which was alleged in the informations, qualifies the killing of Surinder
Singh to murder and the inflicting of a mortal wound on Dilbag Singh with intent to kill to frustrated
murder. Where criminal conspiracy is shown to exist, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their participation, in contemplation of law, the act of one
conspirator is the act of all xxx xxx xxx and the participation in all details of execution of the crime is not
necessary for such a finding. xxx xxx xxx Although superior strength is found to be attendant in the killing
of Surinder Singh and wounding of Dilbag Singh, it is deemed absorbed in treachery and is not appreciated
as a separate aggravating circumstances. As regards the circumstance of evident premeditation,
prosecution evidence failed to show when accused meditated and reflected upon their decision to kill their
victims. In short, it cannot also be appreciated because there is wanting of any direct evidence of the
planning and the preparation to kill.[33]
The other errors allegedly committed by the trial court call for the calibration of credibility of
witnesses, which we find no reason to disturb since it is best left to the trial court to pass upon, having had
the opportunity to observe firsthand the demeanor and actuation of the witnesses while on the witness
stand.[34]
Third error
In Criminal Case No. 8682 for frustrated murder, the trial court awarded private complainant Dilbag
Singh the amount of P16,000.00 representing his hospitalization and medical expenses, and P 30,000.00
as attorneys fees. For his hospitalization and medical expenses, the receipts submitted to support said
claim amounted only to P370.50. [35] Hence, private complainant Dilbag Singh is entitled only to the said
amount.[36] The award of attorneys fees is hereby deleted. [37] Nonetheless, private complaint is entitled to
moral damages[38] in the amount of P50,000.00 for the suffering he endured from appellants felonious acts.
In Criminal Case No. 8683 for murder, the following amount of actual damages were duly proven
P16,500.00 funeral expenses[39] and air ticket/freight of the cadaver $600.27. [40] The amount of P400.00 for
hospitalization expenses should be deleted for not being supported by evidence. The trial courts award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 moral damages are affirmed. The award of P500,000.00 as
attorneys fees[41] and P5,760,000 as compensation for loss of earning capacity, are likewise deleted for lack
of basis. Awards for loss of earning capacity partake of damages which must be proven not only by
credible and satisfactory evidence, but also by unbiased proof. [42] The testimony of Balwinder Singh Gill,
first cousin of the deceased, on the alleged income of the deceased while in the Philippines, is not
enough. The best evidence to substantiate income earned by foreigners while in the Philippines is the
payment of taxes with the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Absent such proof, bare allegation is
insufficient. Nevertheless, considering that the definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, and the
fact of loss has been established, appellants shall pay the heirs of Surinder Singh temperate damages [43] in
the amount of P200,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in accordance with the foregoing disquisition, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed subject to the following modifications-
1. In Criminal Case No. 8682 for frustrated murder, appellants shall only be liable to pay
a. P370.50 for hospitalization expenses;
b. P50,000.00, as moral damages, plus costs; and,

2. In Criminal Case No. 8683 for murder, in addition to the civil indemnity, moral damages and
attorneys fees awarded by the trial court, appellants shall pay-
a. P16,500.00, as funeral expenses;
b. $600.27, as air ticket/freight of the cadaver, to be computed at the prevailing rate of exchange
at the time of the promulgation of this decision; and,
c. P200,000.00, as temperate damages, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 142870. November 14, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DINDO PAJOTAL y FETALCORIN; RANDY
GABAY (at large) and LINDO GABAY (at large), accused.
DINDO PAJOTAL y FETALCORIN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case is here on automatic review of the decision, [1] dated February 7, 2000, of the Regional Trial
Court of Oriental Mindoro, Branch 43, finding accused-appellant Dindo Pajotal guilty of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
The Information[2] against accused-appellant and two others charged the following:
"That on or about the 21st day of October, 1996, at about 2:45 in the afternoon, at Sitio Mabaho, Barangay
Cabalwa, municipality of Mansasalay, province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Randy Gabay alias Randy Montessa, Lindo Gabay and
Dindo Pajotal, conspiring, and confederating together and helping each other, with intent to kill and to
gain, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rode a jeep owned and driven by Winefred
Espina and by means of force and violence upon their victim, take and carry away FIFTEEN THOUSAND
(P15,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, and accused, pursuant to their conspiracy during the commission
of the robbery and on the such occasion thereof and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and
carry away with them the said amount of P15,000.00, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one Winefred Espina with a bladed instrument, inflicting upon the
latter [stab] wounds on the different parts of his body thereby causing direct and immediate death of said
Winefred Espina.
"That in the commission of the crime the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation
and the aggravating circumstance - of abuse of superior strength were present.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
The facts are as follows:

On October 21, 1996, at around 2:45 p.m., Winefred Espina was driving a passenger jeepney,
accompanied by his nephew, Arnold Bugayon, who was also seated in front beside the former. They had
just come from Bulalacao where they delivered some merchandise. Just before they reached Sitio Mabaho,
Mansalay, Oriental Mindoro, three men stopped them on the road. The three men boarded the vehicle, with
one of them clinging to the left front side near Espina, while the other man sat beside Bugayon. The third
man hung at the rear of the jeepney with his feet standing on the platform or "parilla." Bugayon identified
the man who sat to his right side on the front seat as Dindo Pajotal. [3]
In Sitio Mabaho, one of the three men ordered Espina to stop the vehicle, to which the latter
replied, "Pare walang ganyanan." (Pal, don't do this.) The three men then asked for money, but Espina
refused to give it to them. Accused-appellant thus poked a knife at Bugayon and threatened to kill him if
Espina did not hand over the money. As Bugayon frantically asked his uncle to do as the men asked, Espina
handed his money to the person on his left. Although he got the money, the man stabbed Espina on the
left thigh, apparently to prevent any attempt by Espina to get the money back. Espina decided to fight
back and alighted from the jeepney.[4]

At this point, accused-appellant also alighted from the vehicle and attempted to stab Bugayon.He
missed as Bugayon got out of the vehicle by passing through the driver's side. Bugayon saw accused-
appellant and his companions ganging up on Espina. Accused-appellant stabbed Espina.Bugayon tried to
help his uncle, but one of the men, who was also holding a knife, stopped him and said "O ano, lalaban
ka?" (What? Do you want to fight?) Espina told Bugayon to run away. Upon hearing this, Bugayon, very
much afraid, retreated and did what his uncle told him. [5]
Bugayon asked for help from persons he met, but no one was willing to come to the aid of
Espina. Finally, a passenger bus bound for Roxas passed by, and Bugayon boarded it. He alighted at the
PNP station in Mansalay and reported the incident to the police. [6]
At 6:30 p.m. of the same day, Dr. Domingo Asis, Rural Health Physician of Mansalay, Oriental Mindoro,
conducted an autopsy on the body of Winefred Espina. Dr. Asis' postmortem report (Exh. C), which
revealed that the victim suffered fifteen (15) stab wounds, contained the following findings:
"(1) Wound, incised, 4.0 cm long, edges clean cut, 1.5 cm gape, 0.5 cm depth, middle forehead,
showing the bone;
"(2) Wound, incised, 4.0 cm long, edges clean cut, 1.0 cm gape, 0.5 cm depth, forehead, right, above
the eyebrow;
"(3) Wound, lacerated, triangular in shape, 1 cm. depth, above the eyebrow left;
"(4) Fracture, depressed, localized, frontal bone, base of the nose;
"(5) Wound, lacerated, 2 cm long, 1 cm depth, with fractured bone, lateral eyebrow, right;
"(6) Wound, lacerated, 1 cm. long, 0.5 cm depth, cheek, right;
"(7) Wound, stabbed, 1.5 cm long, 1.5 cm depth, posterior chest, at the level of the scapula;
"(8) Wound, incised, edges clean cut, 4.0 cm long, 5 cm depth, 1.5 cm gape, lateral distal third,
forearm, left;
"(9) Wound, incised, edges clean cut, 2 cm long, 0.5 cm gape, 0.3 cm depth, radial area, wrist, left;
"(10) Wound, stabbed, 2.0 cm long. 8 cm depth, at the level of 6th ICS, left of the sternum, directing
posteriorly, penetrating perforating the thoracic cavity;
"(11) Wound, stabbed, opening is D shape, 2 cm long, 8 cm depth, at the level of 4th ICS,
midclavicular line, anterior chest, left directing laterally and posteriorly, penetrating perforating the
cardiac cavity;
"(12) Wound, stabbed, 2 cm long, 1.5 cm depth, right of the sternum, at the level of 2nd ICS, non-
penetrating;
"(13) Wound, lacerated, 4.0 cm long, 2.0 gape, 0.5 cm depth, distal third, dorsal, medial area, arm,
right;
"(14) Wound, lacerated, 4.0 cm long, 2 cm gape, 0.5 depth, distal third, dorsal, lateral area, arm, right;
"(15) Wound, stabbed, 3 cm long, 1.5 cm gape, 8 cm depth, middle third, anterior, thigh, left directing
upward and posteriorly.[7]
Of the fifteen wounds, the fatal ones were wounds no. 10 and 11. Dr. Asis testified that based on the
location of the wounds, it was possible that the assailant or assailants were in front of or beside the
victim. Dr. Asis stated that it was likewise possible that the wounds have been caused by only one
instrument. He could not, however, state with certainty how many persons attacked the victim. [8] Dr. Asis
issued a death certificate (Exh. D) on October 28, 1996, which stated that Winefred Espina died on October
21, 1996 from hemorrhagic shock caused by multiple wounds.
Accused-appellant's defense was alibi. He claimed that on October 21, 1996, at about 2:45 p.m., he
was in their house located along the shore of Barangay Manaul, Mansalay. With him in the house were his
two brothers, his mother, and his two nephews. At that time, accused-appellant was busy repairing a
fishing device known as "tora tora," which was used by fishermen in catching bangus fries. Apart from the
members of his family, Nemie Espiritu, a barriomate, saw accused-appellant at around 3:00 p.m. of that
day. Accused-appellant claimed that he undertook the repair of the "tora tora" from 7:00 a.m. until 4:30
p.m. of that day. He insisted that he did not know his co-accused in this case, Randy and Lindo Gabay. He
also denied that he knew the victim, Winefred Espina, or the latter's nephew, Arnold Bugayon. [9]

Accused-appellant further testified that their house at Barangay Manaul, Mansalay was located along
the shore about half a kilometer from the national highway. There were no motor vehicles which regularly
plied the route from the highway to their place. He admitted, however, that the distance of their house to
the highway could be covered in fifteen minutes by foot.[10]
Nemie Espiritu, a barriomate of accused-appellant, claimed that at around 3:00 p.m. of October 21,
1996, he was looking for fish to serve to his visitors. On his way to the house of a certain Tammy Seloria,
he saw accused-appellant near his house and they nodded at each other. [11]
On the basis of the evidence presented by the parties, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"(a) The court finds accused Dindo Pajotal y Fetalcorin GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide punishable under Article 294 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by RA 7659 with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH to be executed in accordance with existing
law. In accordance with the provisions of Section 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Mariano S. Familara III is hereby directed to forward within twenty (20) days but
not earlier than fifteen (15) days after promulgation of judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new
trial or reconsideration the complete records of the case to the Honorable Supreme Court for review;
"(b) Accused Dindo Pajotal is also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Winefred Espina the sum
of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages for the loss of life of the victim, the sum of P26,000.00 as actual
damages and P500,000.00 as lost earnings;
"(c) With respect to accused Randy Gabay alias Randy Montesa and Lindo Gabay who are still at large, let
an alias warrant of arrest be issued against them in order that they could be brought to court for trial." [12]
Hence this appeal.

Accused-appellant contends that:
"I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEIR GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
"II. GRANTING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARE (SIC) GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING THEM FOR ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE SINCE THE CRIMES COMMITTED ARE ONLY
THE TWO SEPARATE CRIMES OF SIMPLE ROBBERY AND HOMICIDE WHICH WILL ENTITLE THEM
TO THE IMPOSITION OF A LESSER PENALTY FOR EACH OF THE TWO FELONIES
CORRESPONDINGLY."[13]
We find the appeal to be without merit.
First. Accused-appellant contends that the State failed to prove his guilt by strong and overwhelming
evidence. While admitting that alibi per se is a weak defense, accused-appellant nevertheless contends
that alibi can constitute a valid and plausible defense if, in the commission of the crime, there are no other
witnesses except the parties involved. In this case, accused-appellant insists no other witness was
presented to corroborate Arnold Bugayon's testimony. [14]
Accused-appellant's contention is untenable. Accused-appellant does not explain why the testimony of
the lone eyewitness Arnold Bugayon is insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Nor does
he give specific instances from the records of this case to bolster his claim of innocence.
Contrary to accused-appellant's claim, the prosecution has proved the guilt of accused-appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. The fact that Arnold Bugayon was the only eyewitness does not diminish the
force and weight of his testimony. A doctrine of long standing in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a
lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused. [15]Hence the trial court, which
heard Bugayon's testimony and had the opportunity to observe his demeanor while on the witness stand,
said:
"The robbery subject of the instant case occurred in broad daylight. The lone eyewitness to the crime,
Arnold Bugayon, categorically declared that it was accused Dindo Pajotal who clung to the right side of
their passenger jeepney then being utilized as a delivery vehicle just next to him, to his right side and that
while there was an on-going scuffle between his uncle and the two other- conspirators of Pajotal the latter
even delivered with his knife a thrusting blow on him. To the mind of the court, Arnold Bugayon could not
have failed to recognize Pajotal as he himself was assaulted by him. The natural reaction of a person in his
predicament is to exert efforts to identify the culprits.As ruled by the Supreme Court in the cases of People
vs. Melendres, 106 SCRA 575 and People vs. Amiscua, 37 SCRA 813, a truism founded on the ordinary
course of things is that victims of criminal violence often strive hard to recognize and identify their
assailants."[16]

We see no reason to disturb the trial court's evaluation and assessment of Bugayon's credibility, the
same not being tainted by any arbitrariness or palpable error. The findings of the trial court judge who tried
the case and heard the witnesses are not to be disturbed on appeal unless there are substantial facts and
circumstances which have been overlooked and which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the
case. The trial judge's evaluation of the witnesses' credibility deserves the utmost respect in the absence
of arbitrariness. Conclusions and findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and
should not be disturbed unless for strong and valid reasons because the trial court is in a better position to
examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying on the case. [17]
Arnold Bugayon's testimony is strengthened by the findings of Dr. Domingo Asis, the medico-legal
examiner who performed the autopsy on the victim's body. Bugayon testified that after the victim, Espina,
handed the money to the person on his left side, the latter, apparently aroused by Espina's uncooperative
behavior, stabbed Espina on the left thigh. Espina got out of the jeepney to confront the robbers and a
scuffle ensued, with the three men ganging up on Espina. Bugayon's testimony is consistent with the
medical findings of Dr. Asis that the victim suffered fifteen wounds, among which was a 3 cm. stab wound
on the left thigh, directed upward and posteriorly. Bugayon also testified that the men who were hanging
on the jeepney beside him and his uncle were both carrying balisong knives. When the three men ganged
up on Espina, they stabbed him with their knives and hit him with a stone. [18] Again, this testimony
coincides with Dr. Asis's findings that among the wounds suffered by the victim were incisions and
lacerations, as well as a fracture of the frontal bone on the base of the nose. As the trial court observed,
the incisions and lacerations could very well have been caused by the knives wielded by two of the
robbers, while the fracture could have been caused by the stone carried by the third robber. [19]
Despite compelling evidence against him, accused-appellant could only put up alibi in his defense. He
claimed that on the date and at the time of the incident in question, he was in his house in Barangay
Manaul, Mansalay, Oriental Mindoro repairing a fishing implement.
This defense is unavailing. For alibi to offset the evidence of the prosecution demonstrating his guilt,
the accused must establish not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed.[20] Accused-appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene
at the time of the commission of the crime. To the contrary, he testified that their house was just about
half a kilometer from the national highway, where the crime took place. Although there were no motor
vehicles which regularly plied the route from the highway to their place, the distance could be covered in
fifteen minutes by foot. Accused-appellant was an athletic person. He was in fact one of the stars of their
local basketball team.[21] It would thus have been easy for him to make the fifteen-minute walk to the
highway, commit the crime with his co-accused, and return to his house thereafter. Defense witness Nemie
Espiritu, who lived in the same sitio, testified that he saw accused-appellant working in his house after
3:00 p.m. He did not categorically state what time he saw accused-appellant, but only said that it was at
3:00 p.m., more or less.[22]
Alibi is an inherently weak defense which, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot
prevail over the positive identification of accused-appellant by an eyewitness, Arnold Bugayon, who had no
improper motive to testify falsely against him.[23]
For these reasons, we hold that the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime charged has been proven
by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Second. Accused-appellant contends that, even if he is guilty of killing Winefred Espina, the trial court
nonetheless erred in finding him liable for the crime of robbery with homicide because two separate crimes
of simple robbery and homicide were actually committed, and a lesser penalty for each should have been
imposed. Accused-appellant claims that, according to Bugayon's testimony, the injuries which caused
Espina's death were inflicted after the robbery. He thus argues that the homicide was not committed on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery within the contemplation of Art. 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides the penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death for the special complex crime of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of persons.
This contention has no merit. In order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with
homicide, it is enough that death results by reason or on the occasion of the robbery inasmuch as it is only
the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes, or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration. [24] In other words, in
the crime of robbery with homicide, it does not matter if the homicide preceded or occurred after the
robbery. For what is essential is that there is a direct relation or intimate connection between the robbery
and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes be
committed at the same time.[25] The original criminal design of the culprit must be robbery and the
homicide is perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery, by reason or on the occasion of
the robbery.[26] Thus, in People v. Guiapar,[27] it was held that the death of a guard resulting from the injury
he sustained during the robbery qualified the offense to robbery with homicide. As long as homicide
resulted during, or because of, the robbery, even if the killing is by mere accident, robbery with homicide is
committed.[28]
In the case at bar, Arnold Bugayon testified that the victim Espina was initially stabbed in the thigh by
one of the robbers because it appeared that he would fight to get back his money. In fact, after he was
stabbed, Espina got off the jeepney to run after the hold-up men to recover his money.At that point,
accused-appellant and his co-accused then stabbed Espina several times and struck him with a stone. In
view of the foregoing circumstances, we agree with the trial court when it found that the homicide in the
case at bar was committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.
The information in this case alleged that in the commission of the crime, the qualifying circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation and the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
attended the commission of the crime. The trial court was correct in not appreciating evident
premeditation as a qualifying circumstance since this is inherent in the crime of robbery. [29] The trial court
was likewise correct in not appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Although the victim was
caught by surprise when he received the first stab on his left thigh, the evidence shows that the victim was
not caught completely off guard. For the fact is that the victim, accused-appellant, and the latter's co-
accused engaged in combat for several minutes before the former received the fatal stab wounds. This
negates the existence of the first element of treachery, i.e., a sudden attack giving the victim no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. The existence of a struggle before the fatal blows were dealt on
the victim shows he was forewarned of the impending attack and that he was afforded the opportunity to
put up a defense.[30] However, despite the absence of treachery, the factual circumstances of the crime
show that the killing of the victim was qualified by abuse of superior strength, which is expressly alleged in
the Information.Accused-appellant and his co-accused did not only enjoy superiority in number but they
also used knives and a stone while their victim was unarmed. Thus, there was physical disparity between
the protagonists and abuse of superior strength was obvious. The force used by the aggressors was out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the victim.[31]
Under Art. 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death when, by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed. In this case, it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that homicide was committed by
accused-appellant and his co-accused by reason or on occasion of the robbery committed against the
victim. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, and the crime was committed with the presence of one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. Considering the presence in this case of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the penalty of death imposed by the trial court is
proper and should thus be sustained.
Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People v. Echagaray[32] that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is
unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that
the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
The civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court is sustained, the same
being in line with current case law. [33] The award of P26,000.00 as actual damages is also sustained as the
amount duly proved and supported by receipts presented during the course of the trial. However, the trial
court should have ordered accused-appellant to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount
of P15,000.00, representing the amount the victim was carrying at the time of the crime and taken by
accused-appellant and his co-accused. It was never established by any admissible evidence that any
portion of this amount had been recovered. [34]
But the award for loss of earning capacity should be disallowed. As a rule, documentary evidence
should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of
exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary
evidence, provided that there is testimony either that the victim was self-employed earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the victim's
line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or that the victim was employed as a daily wage
worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. [35] In the case at bar, the testimony
of Lea Espina, Winefred Espina's widow, was the sole basis for the award of damages for loss of earning
capacity. As it is not supported by other documentary evidence, her bare testimony cannot be made the
basis for an award of damages for loss of earning capacity. Nor do the exceptions apply so as to justify an
award of damages for loss of earning capacity despite the absence of documentary evidence. The victim
was not employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage at the time of his
death. He was in fact, as claimed by his widow, earning substantially more than the minimum wage. For
these reasons, damages for loss of earnings cannot be awarded in the absence of evidence sufficiently
showing his income.
The trial court should have awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 pursuant to Art.
2219 par. (1) in relation to Art. 2006 par. (3) of the Civil Code. This is in consonance with our recent rulings.
[36]
We also agree with the Solicitor General that the trial court should have awarded exemplary damages
pursuant to Art. 2230 of the Civil Code. Said article allows the imposition of exemplary damages when the
crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. As discussed, abuse of superior strength
aggravated the commission of the crime in the case at bar.Therefore, an award of P20,000.00 to the heirs
of the victim is in order.[37]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the legal heirs of Winefred Espina P41,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00
as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs.

In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the
finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-59311 January 31, 1985
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner,

vs.
HON. JAIME M. LANTIN, THE SHERIFF OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON CITY and
RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. L-59320 January 31, 1985
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME M. LANTIN, THE SHERIFF OF THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON CITY, AND RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
In these interrelated petitions for review on certiorari, the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI) and Globe Mackay Cable and Radio/Corporation (GLOBE) question the decision of the Court of
Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, which refused to set aside the orders of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal directing execution pending appeal of an award of P213,148.00 damages in favor of
private respondent Rufus B. Rodriguez.
On September 8, 1978, Rufus B. Rodriguez, as President of the World Association of Law Students (WALS),
sent two cablegrams overseas through RCPI, one addressed to Mohammed Elsir Taha in Khartoum, Sudan
Socialist Union, and the other to Diane Merger in Athens, Georgia, United States. The cablegrams were, in
turn, relayed to GLOBE for transmission to their foreign destinations. The telegram to Taha advised him of
Rodriguez's pending arrival in Khartoum on September 18, 1978, while the telegram to Merger advised her
of the scheduled WALS conference in Khartoum. Rodriguez left the Philippines on September 15, 1978. On
September 18, 1978, he arrived in Khartoum, Sudan at 9:30 in the evening. Nobody was at the airport to
meet him. Due to the lateness of the hour, he was forced to sleep at the airport. He lined up five (5) chairs
together and lay down with his luggages near him. Because of the non-receipt of the cablegram, Taha was
not able to meet him. Worse all preparations for the international conference had to be cancelled.
Furthermore, Fernando Barros, the Vice-President, arrived the next day from Chile, followed by the other
officers from other countries except Diane Merger, the organization's secretary. It turned out that the wire
sent by Rodriguez to Merger was delivered to the address on the message but the person who delivered it
was told that the addressee was no longer staying there. This fact was not accordingly reported to
Rodriguez in Metro Manila. The undelivered cablegram was not returned by the correspondent abroad to
Globe for disposition in the Philippines,
On December 8, 1978, Rodriguez filed a complaint for compensatory damages in the amount of
P45,147.00, moral damages in the amount of P250,000.00,' and exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 against RCPI and GLOBE.
On March 17, 1980, the then Presiding Judge Lino L. Aover of the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered
a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants jointly and severally to
pay the plaintiff the total sum of TWO HUNDRED THIRTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
FORTY EIGHT PESOS (P213,148.00) by way of damages and to pay the costs of this suit.

The above amount is broken down as follows by the trial court:
Moral damages consequent to the humiliation and embarrassment that the plaintiff suffered
under the two causes of action in the amount of P100,000.00 are adequate. Exemplary
damages under both counts are fixed reasonably at P50,000.00. On the actual damages, the
court accepts plaintiff's expenses for the preparation of the trip at P10,000.00; plane fare at
P20,000.00; stay in transit in Pakistan at P5,000.00; his hotel bills in Khartoum at P4,000.00;
his meals in Khartoum at P4,000.00 and the telegraphic toll at P78.00. The court refuses the
sum spent for the dinner that he allegedly tendered as not established by sufficient proof.
With respect to the telegram sent to Diane Merger, the court finds that the actual damages
amount to P70.00 representing the cost of the cablegram. As for attorney's fees, the court
finds that the amount of P20,000.00 including litigation of expenses are reasonable.
On May 26, 1980, Rodriguez filed a "Motion for Execution Before Expiration of Time to Appeal" relying on
Rule 39, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court alleging that the appeal is clearly dilatory and that the
lapse of time would make the ultimate judgment illusory and ineffective. An opposition to the motion was
filed by RCPI on June 3, 1980 and by GLOBE on November 18,1980.
On January 21, 1981, the respondent court of first instance granted the said motion in an order which
reads as follows:
Upon consideration of the Motion for execution pending appeal, the opposition thereto and
the arguments in open court by the parties, and finding that:
a) the appeal was for the purpose of delay, there being breach of contract, and defendants'
evidence being weak or feeble;
b) plaintiff is willing to put up a bond in the amount of P213,148.00 to answer for damages if
the decision is reversed on appeal
the Court grants the motion. Let writ of execution pending appeal be issued upon the filing
of a bond by plaintiff in the sum of P213,148.00. Said bond should be filed within ten (10)
days from receipt of this order.
On February 5, 1981, the same court issued another order which reads as follows:
The bond pursuant to the order of January 21, 1981, is approved. Let writ of execution of
judgment pending appeal be issued forthwith.
On February 10, 1981, GLOBE filed a motion for reconsideration of the above order and
expressed its desire to put up a supersedeas bond to stay immediate execution. This motion
was denied in an order dated February 17, 1981. Even before the issuance of this order
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the respondent Sheriff, on February 13,
1981, insisted on levying on the funds and assets of petitioners RCPI and GLOBE, prompting
them to file an "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution. This urgent motion was likewise
denied.
On February 17, 1981, RCPI and GLOBE filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On February 20, 1981, the
Court of Appeals issued a restraining order enjoining the lower court from further proceeding with the civil
case and from enforcing the writ of execution until further orders. On November 10, 1981, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit and the questioned
orders of January 21, 1981, February 5, 1981 and February 20, 1981 are hereby declared
valid and legal. Consequently, the restraining order issued earlier on February 2, 1981 is
hereby lifted.
With costs against the petitioners.

Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the abovequoted decision, the petitioners filed with the respondent
Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration. On December 28, 1981, petitioners received a resolution of
the Court of Appeals denying their motion for reconsideration.
On January 18, 1982, this petition entitled appeal by certiorari was filed.
The petitioners' arguments revolve around the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the Court of
Appeals when it declined to disturb the judgment of the trial court on the issuance of the writ of execution
pending appeal.
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party the court may, in its
discretion, order execution to issue even before the expiration of the time to appeal, upon
good reasons to be stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter, the
motion and the special order shall be included therein.
The rule specifically vests the court with the exercise of discretionary power. The requisites for the court's
valid exercise of the discretion to order execution pending appeal are: (1) there must be a motion by the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (2) there must be good reasons for issuing the execution,
and (3) the good reasons must be stated in a special order.
Considering the nature of the wrongful acts found by the trial court and the amount of damages
adjudicated as recoverable, both of which are stated in detail in the decisions and various orders of the
trial court and the appellate court, we are constrained to sustain the respondent courts insofar as the
award for actual or compensatory damages are concerned but to postpone the execution of the awards for
moral and exemplary damages until such time as the merits of the cases now on regular appeal before the
Court of Appeals are finally determined. The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is
dependent on the outcome of the main case. Unlike actual damages for which the petitioners may clearly
be held liable if they breach a specific contract and the amounts of which are fixed and certain, liabilities
with respect to moral and exemplary damages as wen as the exact amounts remain uncertain and
indefinite pending resolution by the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme Court. The
existence of the factual bases of these types of damages and their causal relation to the petitioners' act
will have to be determined in the light of the assignments of errors on appeal. It is possible that the
petitioners, after all, while liable for actual damages may not be liable for moral and exemplary damages.
Or as in some cases elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards may be reduced. (See Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 67034, December
3, 1984)
In its questioned decision, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the nature of execution pending appeal as
an exceptional remedy which must be interpreted restrictively, citing the many ruling cases on this point.
At the same time, what was before the appellate court was not the application of a general rule but the
exception thereto, the special reasons or circumstances warranting execution pending appeal. The Court of
Appeals quoted with approval the trial court's findings:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Execution pending appeal is discretionary. Execution pending appeal is a matter of

sound discretion on the part of the trial court. (National Marketing Corporation v. Tan, L-
17768, March 31, 1962; Ong Sit v. Piccio, 78 Phil. 232; Go Changjo v. Roldan Sy Changjo, 18
Phil. 405). The appellate court will not interfere, control or inquire into the exercise of this
discretion, unless it is shown that there has been an abuse thereof. Asturias v. Victoriano, 98
Phil. 581; Naredo v. Yatco, 80 Phil. 220;Federal Fils Inc. v. Ocampo, 78 Phil. 479; Ong Sit v.
Piccio supra; Buenaventura v. Pea 78 Phil. 798;Presbitero v. Rodas, 73 Phil. 300; Iloilo
Trading and Exchange v. Rodas, 73 Phil. 327; Hacienda Navarro, Inc. v. Labrador, 65 Phil.
536; Lusk v. Stevens, 64 Phil. 154; Gamay v. Gutierrez David, 48 Phil. 768; Gutierrez
Hermanos v. Orias Hermanos & Co., 39 Phil. 92; Case v. Metropole Hotel, 5 Phil. 49; Macke v.
Camps, 5 Phil. 185; Calvo v. De Gutierrez, 4 Phil. 203)
3. Requirement of good reasons. The requirement that execution pending appeal must
be supported by good reasons, to be stated in a special order, should be complied with
because the existence of good reasons is the element that gives validity to an order of
execution (Alcasid v. Samson, 102 Phil. 735; De la Rosa v. City of Baguio, 90 Phil. 720)
(sic) Unless the reasons are made known it would be difficult to determine whether judicial
discretion has been properly exercised in the case (Asturias v. Victoriano, supra If the
discretionary power of the court is to have any meaning, the sufficiency of the reasons for
ordering such execution is naturally to be determined by the court. (Buenaventura v.
Pea, supra; Lusk v. Stevens, supra.)
Whether the reasons are so urgent and compelling as to justify execution pending appeal
depends upon the circumstances of the case. The filing of a bond by the prevailing party, as
required by the court in its order of execution, constitutes good reason for the issuance of a
writ of execution mending appeal (Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, L-12554, May 23, 1959;
Hacienda Navarro, Inc. v. Labrador, supra; People's Bank & Trust Co. v. San Jose, 96 Phil.
895).
The court likewise noted that the questioned order made reference to the reasons averred in the motion
which appeared to it to be good and which it found to be sufficient compliance with the law (Joven v.
Boncan, 67 Phil. 252). It noted the finding of the trial court that the appeal interposed by the petitioners
was not based on strong grounds, which finding is again a good reason for execution pending appeal.
(Presbitero v. Rodas, 73 Phil. 300; Iloilo Trading Center and Exchange v. Rodas, 78 Phil. 789)
The petitioners pit their arguments against the conclusions of the Court of Appeals and the Court of First
Instance on the special nature of the circumstances warranting the exercise of discretionary power, the
weak defenses at trial and weak reasons on appeal, and the nature of the evidence upon which the
decision is based. Insofar as actual and compensatory damages are concerned, we find insufficient cause
to restrain the exercise of discretionary power.
The petitioners question the findings of the Court of Appeals that:
The respondent court had to look back at the sworn complaint that, the private respondent
in the aforesaid complaint had to sleep at the airport left alone to himself throughout the
night with nobody to talk to because in Khartoum, Sudan, only a few people if at all, could
speak English and because our country has no consulate in the said place, language barrier
was a big problem in looking for a taxicab to the hotel. To repeat, he had to sleep on the 5
chairs put together; he is a respectable man in the country who had to go to Khartoum as
President of the World Association of Law Students in the Philippines and had to make the
trip to Sudan for a conference; that he was a third year law student of the College of Law in
the University of the Philippines and the Cagayan de Oro Sangguniang Panglunsod City
where he is from, even passed a Resolution congratulating him for having been chosen or
selected the President of the World Association of Law Students or WALS, invited by the
Sudanese government for the conference on September 18, 1978: arriving at the airport at
9:30 in the evening; as he could not talk in Arabic, he was left alone to himself to repeat
until he had to wait for the next morning to have somebody to translate in Arabic language
how to find the place of Mohammed Elsir Taha who invited him as per telegrams exchanged
between him and the plaintiff, now private respondent that the latter's residence was found
to be 20 kilometers away (Office of the Secretary of the African Youth Committee, Sudan
Socialist Union); that because the telegram sent by him in Manila, Philippines on September
8, 1978 was not delivered to Mohammed Taha, the latter was not able to meet him at the
airport; on the other hand, the telegram sent to Diane Merger as Secretary of the conference
committee having been delivered to the address given by him but the person who delivered
was told that the said addressee was no longer staying there and moved out a year ago but
this fact was not informed/reported accordingly to him in Metro Manila, Philippines where the
cablegram was sent and which cablegram was not returned by the receiver abroad to Globe
for disposition in the Philippines. Evidently, there was a breach of contractual obligation
committed against him by the defendants, now private respondent Globe Mackay and RCPI,
and therefore, he is entitled to such damages which he has claimed for the humiliation,
suffering, mental anguish and besmirched reputation as a result of the non-delivery of the
cables, which damages amounted to P213,148.00.
The merits of the main case are not to be determined in a petition questioning execution pending appeal
(City of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 98). However, the facts and circumstances clearly brought out
during trial cannot help but influence whether or not an appeal appears to be dilatory and whether or not

there are sufficient reasons including considerations of justice and equity to justify a departure from the
regular procedures regarding execution.
Petitioners question the alleged presence of superior circumstances demanding urgency of execution
pending appeal. Any delay in final adjudication on the merits will be the fault of the courts and not theirs,
according to them.
Petitioner GLOBE states:
In the light of the peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, among which are that:
1. The judgment creditor does not even have a cause of action against herein petitioner;
2. The greater portion of the amount awarded in the judgment of the trial court cannot be
legally given; and
3. Herein petitioner's defenses are legal and valid and the evidence submitted to prove
them, positive and convincing.
any bond which the prevailing party might have posted cannot fully compensate for the
inconvenience and damages which petitioner will suffer by reason of such hasty execution
for the reason that the said execution will be morally, legally, equitably and outrageously
incorrect. ...
The respondent introduced evidence to show that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation. The petitioners question the extent of these
sufferings and further aver that their acts claimed to have caused the injury were not wrongful, deliberate,
wanton, and tainted with bad faith or fraud.
Our review of the records constrains us to allow execution pending appeal of actual but not the moral and
exemplary damages which must await the final determination of the main cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED PARTIAL DUE COURSE. The November 10, 1981 decision and
December 22, 1981 resolution of the appellate court are SET ASIDE and a new ORDER is ENTERED
authorizing execution pending appeal of P43,148.00 actual damages upon the private respondent's filing
of a bond in the same amount. The execution of any award for moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees is enjoined until after final resolution of the issues in the main case.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 124392. February 7, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FEDERICO ABRAZALDO @ PEDING, accused-

appellant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision[1] dated November 15, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 95-01052-D, finding accused-appellant Federico Abrazaldo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of
death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Delfin Guban the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity
and P27,000.00 as actual damages, plus costs.
In the Information dated August 3, 1995 filed with the trial court, accused-appellant was charged with
the crime of murder committed as follows:
That on or about July 15, 1995 in the evening at barangay Pogo, Municipality of Mangaldan, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
armed with a bolo, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stabbed DELFIN GUBAN Y GUINTO inflicting upon him a stab wound which
caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659. [2]
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. [3] Forthwith, trial on the merits
ensued. The prosecution presented as its witnesses Rosendo Fajardo, SPO1 Ramie Petrache, SP02 Roberto
Fernandez, Dr. Alberto Gonzales and Gregorio Guban.Accused-appellant and his sister, Marites Abrazaldo,
took the witness stand for the defense.
The facts of the case as presented by the prosecution witnesses are as follows:
On July 15, 1995, at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, at Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan,
accused-appellant, then intoxicated,[4] attempted to hack his uncle, Bernabe Quinto, but instead, hit the
post of the latters house.[5] The incident was reported to the barangay authorities, prompting Delfin Guban,
Rosendo Fajardo, Sr., Alejandro Loceste (all are members of the barangay tanod), and Cesar Manaois to
rush to the scene. Upon reaching the place, Fajardo heard accused-appellant shouting at his uncle, I will
kill you!Thereafter, he saw accused-appellant coming out of Quintos house with blood oozing from his
forehead.[6] At that time, the place was well lighted by a flourescent lamp. Guban tried to assist accused-
appellant. However, for unknown reason, accused-apellant and Guban shouted at each other and grappled
face to face. Accused-appellant pulled out his knife, stabbed Guban at the abdomen [7] and ran away. When
Fajardo got hold of Guban, the latter said, I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo.[8] Fajardo, together with the
other barangay tanod, rushed Guban to the Gov. Teofilo Sison Memorial Hospital where he was operated by
Dr. Alberto Gonzales, a Medical Officer III. But after a few hours, Guban died. Dr. Gonzales issued a Medico-
Legal Certificate stating that the cause of death was stab wound, epigastrium, massive hemothorax right. [9]
Gregorio Guban, the victims father, testified that he was the one who spent for his sons funeral
expenses. For the burial, he spent P10,000.00;[10] for the 10-day funeral wake,P10,000.00;[11] for the 9th day
novena, P3,000.00;[12] and for the hospitalization, P4,000.00,[13] or a total of P27,000.00.
On July 16, 1995, Fajardo learned that the knife used by accused-appellant in stabbing Guban was in
Salay, Pangasinan. Together with SPO2 Roberto Fernandez, Fajardo went to the house of Francisca
Velasquez, accused-appellants aunt, and recovered the knife. [14]
Invoking self-defense, accused-appellant presented a different version. On July 15, 1995 at about
10:00 in the evening, he was making fans inside his house at Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan.
[15]
His wife Lydia and children Mary Jane, Melvin and Christelle were with him. Suddenly, Delfin Guban, who
was then drunk, went to his house and shouted at him, saying, Get out Feding I will kill you! [16] When
accused-appellant went out, Guban hit him with an iron pipe. Accused-appellant ran towards his house and
got his two children. Guban, now armed with a knife, followed him and they grappled for its possession. In
the course thereof, both fell down. [17] It was then that the knife held by Guban accidentally hit
him. Accused-appellant did not know which part of Gubans body was hit. Thereafter, he got the knife in
order to surrender it to the police.[18]
Marites Abrazaldo testified that accused-appellant is his brother. [19] On July 15, 1992, at about 6:00 in
the evening, accused-appellant, Guban and Juan Quinto were engaged in a drinking spree. [20] At about
10:00 oclock in that evening, accused-appellant caused trouble at the house of his uncle, Bernabe Quinto.
[21]
He attempted to hack his uncle, but instead hit the post of the latters house. [22] While running away
from his uncles place, he bumped an artesian well, causing a wound on his forehead. [23] Afterwards,
accused-appellant killed Guban.[24]
On November 15, 1995, the trial court rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Federico Abrazaldo @ Peding guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic 7659, and in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstances that the crime was
committed while the public authorities were engaged in the discharge of their duties and that the crime
was committed at nighttime, which aggravating circumstances are not offset by any mitigating
circumstance, accused Federico Abrazaldo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death.

Accused Federico Abrazaldo is ordered to pay an indemnity of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased
Delfin Guban. Accused is also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Delfin Guban the total sum
of P27,000.00 as actual expenses, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.
In appreciating treachery and the aggravating circumstances under paragraphs (5) and (6) of Article 14,
[25]
Revised Penal Code, the trial court held:
We now come to the issue of whether or not evident premeditation was present. The prosecutions
evidence is wanting on this point. However, there is no question that there was treachery as the
accused embraced Delfin Guban and suddenly stabbed him with a knife. The victim was not in
a position to defend himself at the time of the attack. The deceased was stabbed without any
warning. He was given no chance to defend himself. Treachery, therefore, qualifies the killing
of the victim and raises it to the category of murder.
The prosecution has established thru the testimony of Gregorio Guban that at the time of the incident on
July 15, 1995, the members of the barangay tanod, namely: Rosendo Fajardo, Sr., Delfin Guban and Alfredo
Laceste were performing their duties as members of the barangay tanod. (See p. 6 tsn September 18,
1995). This is an aggravating circumstance under paragraph 5, Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code. The members of the barangay tanod who are public authorities were engaged in the
discharge of their duties at the time of the stabbing incident. Besides, the incident was committed
during nighttime, that was 10:00 in the evening. Accused took advantage of the darkness of the night for
the successful consummation of his plan to kill Delfin Guban.
Accused-appellant, in his Appellants Brief, ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE BY THE
ACCUSED TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RECOVERY OF THE ALLEGED WEAPON USED
IN STABBING VICTIM AT THE HOUSE OF THE AUNT OF ACCUSED BOLSTERED THE CASE AGAINST HIM
DESPITE LACK OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE ITS VERACITY.
III
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE TESTIMONY EXTRACTED BY THE
PROSECUTION FROM DEFENSE WITNESS MARITESS ABRAZALDO WHICH HAD NO SUFFICIENT BASIS AT ALL.
IV
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED THE STABBING OF THE
VICTIM WITHOUT SUFFICIENT BASIS TO PROVE THE SAME.
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT TOOK ADVANTAGE OF
NIGHTTIME IN CONSUMING THE ACT.
VI
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS
AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT THAT THE VICTIM WAS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY.
The Solicitor General, in the Appellees Brief, asserts that in pleading self-defense, accused-appellant
admitted he killed the victim and, therefore, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on
the weakness of that of the prosecution. Moreover, accused-appellants version of the incident is
completely contradicted by the testimony of his sister. Also, the aggravating circumstance, under par. (5)
of Article 14, Revised Penal Code, was clearly established because during the incident, Guban, as the
Assistant Chief Tanod, was on duty and engaged in the maintenance of peace and order.
The Solicitor General though agrees with accused-appellant that there was no treachery. Evidence
shows that he and Guban shouted at each other and struggled face to face before the stabbing
incident. Thus, the assault was not sudden. Likewise, the Solicitor General is convinced that accused-
appellant did not purposely and deliberately seek nighttime to perpetrate the commission of the crime.
Consistent is the jurisprudence that where self-defense is invoked, it is incumbent upon the accused to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of
sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent and repel an
aggression. On appeal, the burden becomes even more difficult as the accused must show that the court
below committed reversible error in appreciating the evidence. [26]
Accused-appellant miserably failed to discharge the burden. To show that he was not the unlawful
aggressor, he testified that it was Guban who went to his house, threatened to kill him, [27] hit him
with an iron pipe,[28] and attacked him with a knife.[29] We quote accused-appellants testimony, thus:
ATTY. CAMPOS:
xxxxxx
Q You said a while ago that on July 15, 1995 at about 10:00 in the evening you were in your house
engaging in fan making, do you know of any unusual incident that happened during that
time?
A Delfin Guban came to my house and he was under the influence of liquor and he
shouted at me, sir.
Q And what did Delfin Guban shout at you?
A He said, Get out Feding I will kill you.
Q After this Delfin Guban shouted at you, what happened next?
A When I went out of the house, I was already there infront of the house then he hit me, sir.
Q You said Delfin Guban hit you, what instrument did he use in hitting you?
A He hit me with a pipe , sir.
xxxxxx
Q After Delfin Guban hit you with that pipe, what happened next?
A I ran towards my house inside, then got my two children while Delfin Guban followed me inside
my house, sir.
Q When Delfin Guban followed you inside your house, what happened again?
A He was holding a knife and we grappled and during that time both of us fell down, sir.
Q When you grappled with Delfin Guban, who was holding a knife, what again
happened?
A We grappled for the possession of the knife then we fell down and the knife he was
then holding pointed towards him and hit him. x x x.[30] (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing testimony bears not only the vice of falsity but also isolation. It is uncorroborated and
even opposed by Marites, accused-appellants own sister and lone witness. Contrary to his testimony that
Guban hit him on his forehead with a pipe, Marites declared that accused-appellant sustained the wound
on his forehead when he accidentally bumped an artesian well. Instead of fortifying her brothers defense,
she virtually affirmed the prosecutions story by testifying that he created trouble in their compound,
attempted to kill his uncle Bernabe Quinto and killed Guban. [31]
Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably
entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but in itself is
extremely doubtful.[32] In the present case, accused-appellants tendency to invoke a melange of defenses
renders his testimony dubious. While he admitted the commission of the crime in order to preserve his own
life, he maintained that Guban accidentally stabbed himself. This shows ambivalence. Accident
presupposes lack of intention to stab the victim, while self-defense presumes voluntariness, induced only
by necessity.[33] Indeed, if there is truth to either of his claim, his natural course of action was to assist the
victim, or at the very least, report the incident to the authorities. Certainly, the justifying circumstance of
self-defense[34] or the exempting circumstance of accident cannot be appreciated considering accused-
appellants flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities of the incident. Furthermore,
that he did not surrender the knife to the authorities is inconsistent with a clean conscience and, instead,
indicates his culpability of the crime charged.[35]
In a last-ditch effort to exculpate himself, accused-appellant assails Fajardos testimony as tainted with
inconsistencies and is contrary to the normal course. Accused-appellant cannot invoke these alleged
weaknesses in view of the principle that one who pleads self-defense must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. Even if the prosecutions evidence is weak, it
is still credible considering accused-appellants admission that he killed the victim. It bears emphasis that
Fajardos testimony clearly points to him as the culprit. Not only did he pull out his knife, stabbed
Guban[36] and ran away.[37] Fajardo also reiterated what Guban uttered to him, i.e., I was stabbed by Feding
Abrazaldo.[38]
As Guban had succumbed to death and his opportunity to divulge the truth on his demise had been
lost, we cannot but cast a quizzical glance on accused-appellants uncorroborated testimony. More so, when
such testimony was contradicted by his own witness who happened to be his sister. Standing alone against
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, accused-appellants own account of the killing must
necessarily fail.We hold that his guilt has been established to a degree of moral certainty. The trial court
did not err in relying on the testimony of Fajardo, an eyewitness. Time and again, we have said that we will
not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there
appears on record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of
observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood. [39]
However, we find that the trial court erred in concluding that treachery attended the commission of
the crime. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from defense which the offended party might make. Treachery cannot be
presumed, it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing
itself. Fajardo testified that accused-appellant and Guban were grappling with each other and that prior to
the stabbing, they were shouting at each other. In this scenario, it cannot be said that Guban was
unprepared to put up a defense, such as hitting accused-appellant, or that the latters assault was sudden.
We quote in verbatim the testimony of Fajardo, thus:
ATTY. CAMPOS:
Q They were not then fighting?
A They were grappling with each other and then he stabbed Delfin Guban.
xxxxxx
Q In fact, they were shouting each other?
A Yes, sir.
Q What were they shouting against another?
A I could no longer understand because it was already night.

Q But they were shouting loudly, am I correct?
A Yes and there were many people.[40] (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court likewise erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity or
nighttime. For nocturnity to be properly appreciated, it must be shown that it facilitated the commission of
the crime and that it was purposely sought for by the offender. By and itself, nighttime is not an
aggravating circumstance.[41] In the instant case, no sufficient evidence was offered to prove that accused-
appellant deliberately sought the cover of darkness to accomplish his criminal design. In fact, Fajardo
testified that there was a fluorescent lamp sufficiently illuminating the scene of the crime. [42]
Neither can we sustain the trial courts finding that the aggravating circumstance under paragraph (5)
of Article 14, Revised Penal Code, i.e., that the crime was committed in a place where public authorities
were engaged in the discharge of their duties, is present. It must be pointed out that this aggravating
circumstance is based on the greater perversity of the offender, as shown by the place of the commission
of the crime, which must be respected. [43] In this case, the crime was committed at the compound of the
accused-appellant where no public function was being held. The arrival of the barangay authorities was
precisely due to the trouble that had commenced prior to the stabbing incident.Clearly, the said
aggravating circumstance cannot be considered. Moreover, under the present Rules,[44] aggravating
circumstances must be alleged, otherwise, they cannot be appreciated. Being favorable to the accused,
this new procedure may be given retroactive effect. [45] Except treachery, the other aggravating
circumstances mentioned have not been alleged in the Information.
In the absence of any circumstance that would qualify the crime at bar to murder, accused-appellant
can only be held liable for homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. The prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal. Considering that there was neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, the penalty has to be imposed in its
medium period, ranging from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the
minimum of which is within the range of prision mayor, or 6 years and 1 day to 12 years.The maximum
thereof is within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period, which is 14 years, 8 months and 1
day to 17 years and 4 months. [46]
On the trial courts award of actual damages in the amount of P27,000.00, we find the same to be
unsubstantiated. To be entitled to such damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to
the injured party.[47] In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to present any receipt to prove the claim for
expenses incurred.[48]Gregorio Guban, the father of the victim, who shouldered the expenses for the wake
and burial failed to submit receipts to show the amount of such expenses. [49] However, as the heirs of
Guban did actually incur funeral expenses, we are justified in awardingP25,000.00, not for purposes of
indemnification, but by way of temperate damages.[50]
Thus, we now hold that where the amount of the actual damages cannot be determined because of
the absence of receipts to prove the same, but it is shown that the heirs are entitled thereto, temperate
damages may be awarded. Such temperate damages, taking into account the current jurisprudence fixing
the indemnity for death at P 50,000.00, should be one-half thereof, or P25,000.00. This makes temperate
damages equal to the award of exemplary damages, which is likewise fixed at P25,000.00 in cases where
its award is justified.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment in Criminal Case No. 95-01052-D is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Federico Abrazaldo is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. He is ordered to
pay the heirs of the late Delfin Guban P50,000.00 as indemnity and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on official leave.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 160709. February 23, 2005]
NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband, GLENROY ALOYSUIS LAMBERT, petitioners, vs.
HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON, Represented by MARILOU T. CASTILLON and SERGIO
LABANG,respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the decision [1] of
the Court of Appeals dated October 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43734, which affirmed the June 29, 1993
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Civil Case No. 06-2086.
In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon at
Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around
Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider. [2]
At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Honas Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they
traversed the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an
accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot,
which was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the
instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to Sergio. [3]
Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer for preliminary
attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 06-2086
of the RTC of Iligan City, Branch 06. [4] The complaint was subsequently amended to include the claim by
Joel Castillon for the damages caused to the motorcycle.[5]
On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown trial, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of herein private
respondents but reduced petitioners liability by 20% in view of the contributory negligence of Ray. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, directing
the latter, jointly and severally, to pay the former the following:
1. The sum of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE THOUSAND AND NINETY-ONE (P633,091) PESOS, representing
loss of support, death indemnity, funeral and related expenses, moral damages and attorneys fees and
2. Costs of the suit.
For lack of merit, defendants counterclaim is dismissed.
On the claim of Joel Castillon, the evidence shows that he is not the real owner of the motorcycle. He is not
the real party in interest. Accordingly, his complaint is dismissed.
On the third-party complaint, the third-party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation is ordered to pay the
sum of P16,500.00 directly to the plaintiffs. This sum, if paid, should be deducted from the amount
adjudged in par. 1 above.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. [7] Hence the present petition, based on
the following arguments:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion when it
did not apply the ruling of this Honorable Court in the case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. The Honorable
Intermediate Appellate Court and Casiano Pascua, Et. Al., [189 SCRA 168, August 30, 1990], as reiterated
recently in the case of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla [306 SCRA 102, April 21,
1999], in which this Honorable Court enunciated that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another
vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident.
2. The erroneous conclusion of the Honorable Trial Court as affirmed by the Honorable Court of Appeals
that the act of tailgating, at high speed, constitutes contributory negligence only, is contrary to the rulings
of this Honorable Court in the case of Sanitary Steam Laundry, INC. vs. The Honorable Court of
Appeals [300 SCRA 20, December 10, 1998] and the case of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy
Orpilla [306 SCRA 102, April 21, 1999].
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals grossly erred in its conclusion that petitioners driver was negligent,
without taking into consideration the presumptions enunciated by this Honorable Court in the case of
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court and Casiano Pascua, Et. Al.,
[189 SCRA 168, August 30, 1990], and the case of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy
Orpilla [306 SCRA 102, April 21, 1999].
4. As an alternative relief, petitioner most respectfully assigns as error the Honorable Trial Courts
computation as to the loss of earning capacity of Ray Castillon. Such computation is contrary to the
formula enunciated by this Honorable Court in the case of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. The Honorable Court of
Appeals [31 SCRA 511 (1970)].
5. The Honorable Trial Courts award of moral damages is contrary to the pronunciation of this Honorable
Court in the case of Ace Haulers Corporation vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Abiva [338 SCRA 572,
August 23, 2000], wherein the award of moral damages was disallowed absent any evidence of bad faith
or ill-motive.[8]
Petitioner insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause of his unfortunate death
and therefore she is not liable for damages.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
put into issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained. The finding of negligence by the Court of Appeals is
a question of fact which we cannot pass upon as it would entail going into factual matters on which the
finding of negligence was based. As a rule, factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record. [9]
Our examination of the records shows that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals carefully
considered the factual backdrop of the case. No cogent reason exists for disturbing the following findings
of the trial court, which the Court of Appeals affirmed:
To the mind of the court, this is exactly what happened. When Reynaldo Gamot was approaching the side
road, he slightly veered to the right for his allowance. Ray Castillon, who was following closely behind,
instinctively veered to the left but it was also the moment when Reynaldo Gamot sharply turned to the left
towards the side road. At this juncture both were moving obliquely to the left. Thus the motorcycle sliced
into the side of the jeepney throwing the driver forward so that his forehead hit the angle bar on the left
front door of the jeepney even as the motorcycle shot forward and the jeepney veered back to the right
and sped away.
The testimonies of the witnesses Frias, Opada, Labang and Sumile show that he did not stop even for a
second, or less before making the left turn. On the contrary, he slightly veered to the right immediately
followed by the abrupt and sudden turn to the left in order to enter the side road. It is apparent that
Reynaldo Gamot did not keep a lookout for vehicles or persons following him before proceeding to turn left.
He failed to take into account the possibility that others may be following him. He did not employ the
necessary precaution to see to it that the road was clear. [10]
Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his right of way, was
the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is
defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. [11] The cause of the
collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial court correctly held, without that left
turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened.[12]
Petitioner misunderstood our ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta.[13] That case also involved a motorcycle
crashing into the left rear portion of another vehicle, and we declared therein that drivers of vehicles who
bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by
other evidence.[14] In Raynera, the death of the victim was solely attributable to his own negligence in
bumping the rear of the trailer truck which was traveling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour.
Raynera, being the driver of the rear vehicle, had full control of the situation as he was in a position to
observe the vehicle in front of him. The trailer truck therein did not make a sudden left turn as in the case
at bar. Thus, the theory that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be
the cause of the accident is, as in this case, sufficiently contradicted by evidence, which is the sudden left
turn made by Reynaldo which proximately caused the collision.
While we agree with the trial court that Ray was likewise guilty of contributory negligence as defined
under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, we find it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages
on account of the victims negligence.

Article 2179 reads as follows:
When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own
negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
negligence.[15] The determination of the mitigation of the defendants liability varies depending on the
circumstances of each case. The Court had sustained a mitigation of 50% in Rakes v. AG & P;
[16]
20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court [17] and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals;[18] and40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals [19] and Philippine Bank of
Commerce v. Court of Appeals.[20]
In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the
motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of
beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet. [21] These circumstances, although not constituting the
proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The contribution of
these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence,
pursuant toRakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award.
In other words, 50% of the damage shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be
paid by the petitioner.
Anent the award of loss of earning capacity, we agree with the petitioner that the trial court erred in
the computation of the net earnings.
In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of damages, the following factors are
considered in determining the compensable amount of lost earnings: (1) the number of years for which the
victim would otherwise have lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased.
Jurisprudence provides that the first factor,i.e., life expectancy, is computed by applying the formula (2/3 x
[80 - age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined
Experience Table of Mortality. As to the second factor, it is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by
the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such
earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily
computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus, the formula used by this Court in
computing loss of earning capacity is:Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 age at time of death) x
(gross annual income reasonable and necessary living expenses)].[22]
It was established that Ray was 35 at the time of his death and was earning a gross annual income of
P31,876.00 as a driver at the Mindanao State University. In arriving at the net earnings, the trial court
deducted from the gross annual income the annual living expenses in the amount of P9,672.00, broken
down as follows: P20.00 a day for travel or P520.00 per month; P60.00 a month for cigarettes; P26.00 for
drinks; and other personal expenses like clothing, toiletries, etc. estimated at P200.00 per month. [23] The
amount of P9,672.00, however, appears unrealistic, and constitutes only 30.34% of the gross earnings. It
even includes expenses for cigarettes which by no means can be classified as a necessary expense. Using
the cited formula with the net earnings computed at 50% of the gross earnings, a detailed computation is
as follows:
NET EARNING = LIFE EXPECTANCY [2/3 x GROSS ANNUAL - LIVING EXPENSES

CAPACITY (X) (80-age at the time of INCOME (GAI) (50% of GAI)
death)]
-50% x P31,876.00]
X = [2/3 (80-35)] x [P31,876.00
X = [2/3 (45)] x [P31,876.00 - P15,938.00]
X = 30 x 15,938.00
X = P478,140.00
We sustain the awards of P33,215.00 as funeral and burial expenses being supported with receipts;
[24]
P50,000.00 as death indemnity; and P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the award of P20,000.00
as attorneys fees must be deleted for lack of basis.
The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict used to be pegged at P3,000.00,[25]based on Article
2206 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at leastthree
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the
court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had
no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the recipient who
is not an heir called to the decedents inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may
demand support from the person causing the death, for a period of not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
However, the amount has been gradually increased through the years. At present, prevailing jurisprudence
fixes the amount at P50,000.00.[26]
Paragraph 3 of the same provision also serves as the basis for the award of moral damages in quasi-
delict. The reason for the grant of moral damages has been explained, thus:
the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The intensity of the pain
experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no
relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.[27]
While it is true that there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human life and
the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by a precise mathematical calculation, [28] we hold that the
trial courts award of moral damages of P50,000.00 for the death of Ray Castillon is in accord with the
prevailing jurisprudence.[29]
With respect to attorneys fees, it is well settled that the same should not be awarded in the absence of
stipulation except under the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. The trial court did not
indicate the basis for its award. As we have held in Rizal Surety and Insurance Company v. Court of
Appeals:[30]
Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows attorneys fess to be awarded by a court when its claimant is
compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an
unjustified act or omission of the party from whom it is sought. While judicial discretion is here extant, an
award thereof demands, nevertheless, a factual, legal or equitable justification. The matter cannot and
should not be left to speculation and conjecture (Mirasol vs. De la Cruz, 84 SCRA 337; Stronghold
Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 619).
In the case at bench, the records do not show enough basis for sustaining the award for attorneys fees and
to adjudge its payment by petitioner
Likewise, this Court held in Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals that:
In Abrogar v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 67970, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 57] the Court had
occasion to state that [t]he reason for the award of attorneys fees must be stated in the text of the courts
decision, otherwise, if it is stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same must be
disallowed on appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the net earnings is computed at 50% of the gross annual
income to conform with the prevailing jurisprudence, and the FURTHER MODIFICATION that petitioner
NELEN LAMBERT is ordered to pay the heirs of Ray Castillon only 50% of the damages herein awarded,
except attorneys fees which is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142943. April 3, 2002]

Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING, petitioners, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
(MERALCO), respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on
the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and
attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 1, 2000
Decision[1] and the April 10, 2000 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 49022. The
decretal portion of the said Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision in Civil Case No. Q-95-23219 is hereby SET ASIDE and the
complaint against defendant-appellant MERALCO is hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiffs-appellees are
hereby ORDERED to pay defendant-appellant MERALCO the differential billing ofP193,332.00 representing
the value of used but unregistered electrical consumption. [3]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
Defendant-appellant Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a private corporation, authorized by law to

charge all persons, including the government, for the consumption of electric power at rates duly
authorized and approved by the Board of Energy (now the Energy Regulatory Board).
Plaintiffs-appellees Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a house and lot located at No. 94
Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City, which they bought on April 7, 1994 from Ms. Carmina Serapio
Santos. They alleged to be business entrepreneurs engaged in the export of furnitures under the business
name Loran Industries and recipient of the 1993 Agora Award and 1994 Golden Shell Award. Mrs.
Quisumbing is a member of the Innerwheel Club while Mr. Quisumbing is a member of the Rotary Club,
Chairman of Cebu Chamber of Commerce, and Director of Chamber of Furniture.
On March 3, 1995 at around 9:00 a.m., defendant-appellants inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino
were assigned to conduct a routine-on-the-spot inspection of all single phase meters at Greenmeadows
Avenue. House no. 94 of Block 8, Lot 19 Greenmeadows Avenue owned by plaintiffs-appellees was
inspected after observing a standard operating procedure of asking permission from plaintiffs-appellees,
through their secretary which was granted. The secretary witnessed the inspection. After the inspection,
defendant-appellants inspectors discovered that the terminal seal of the meter was missing; the meter
cover seal was deformed; the meter dials of the meter was mis-aligned and there were scratches on the
meter base plate. Defendant-appellants inspectors relayed the matter to plaintiffs-appellees secretary,
who in turn relayed the same to plaintiff-appellee, Lorna Quisumbing, who was outraged of the result of
the inspection and denied liability as to the tampering of the meter. Plaintiffs-appellees were advised by
defendant-appellants inspectors that they had to detach the meter and bring it to their laboratory for
verification/confirmation of their findings. In the event the meter turned out to be tampered, defendant-
appellant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of plaintiffs-appellees. The laboratory testing
conducted on the meter has the following findings to wit:
1. Terminal seal was missing.
2. Lead cover seals (90 ERB 1-Meralco 21) were tampered by forcibly pulling out from the
sealing wire.
3. The 1000th, 100th and 10th dial pointers of the register were found out of alignment and
with circular scratches at the face of the register which indicates that the meter had been

opened to manipulate the said dial pointers and set manually to the desired reading. In
addition to this, the meter terminal blades were found full of scratches.
After an hour, defendant-appellants head inspector, E. Orlina returned to the residence of plaintiffs-
appellees and informed them that the meter had been tampered and unless they pay the amount
ofP178,875.01 representing the differential billing, their electric supply would be disconnected. Orlina
informed plaintiffs-appellees that they were just following their standard operating procedure.Plaintiffs-
appellees were further advised that questions relative to the results of the inspection as well as the
disconnection of her electrical services for Violation of Contract (VOC) may be settled with Mr. M. Manuson
of the Special Accounts, Legal Service Department. However, on the same day at around 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon defendant-appellants officer through a two-way radio instructed its service inspector headed by
Mr. Orlino to reconnect plaintiffs-appellees electric service which the latter faithfully complied.
On March 6, 1995, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, despite the immediate reconnection, to order defendant-appellant to
furnish electricity to the plaintiffs-appellees alleging that defendant-appellant acted with wanton,
capricious, malicious and malevolent manner in disconnecting their power supply which was done without
due process, and without due regard for their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business
reputation.
In its Answer, defendant-appellant admitted disconnecting the electric service at the plaintiffs-appellees
house but denied liability citing the Terms and Conditions of Service, and Republic Act No. 7832 otherwise
known as Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, ruling in favor of plaintiffs-appellees. [4]
(Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court held that Meralco (herein respondent) should have given the Quisumbing spouses
(herein petitioners) ample opportunity to dispute the alleged meter tampering.
It held that respondent had acted summarily and without procedural due process in immediately
disconnecting the electric service of petitioners. Respondents action, ruled the RTC, constituted a quasi
delict.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals overturned the trial courts ruling and dismissed the Complaint. It held that
respondents representatives had acted in good faith when they disconnected petitioners electric
service. Citing testimonial and documentary evidence, it ruled that the disconnection was made only after
observing due process. Further, it noted that petitioners had not been able to prove their claim for
damages. The appellate court likewise upheld respondents counterclaim for the billing differential in the
amount of P193,332[5]representing the value of petitioners used but unregistered electrical consumption,
which had been established without being controverted.
Hence, this Petition.[6]
The Issues
In their Memorandum,[7] petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
4.1 Whether a prima facie presumption of tampering of electrical meter enumerated under Sec. 4 (a) iv of
RA 7832 (Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994) may be had
despite the absence of an ERB representative or an officer of the law?
4.2 Whether the enumeration of instances to establish a prima facie presumption of tampering of electrical
meter enumerated under Sec. 4 (a) iv of RA 7832 (Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials
Pilferage Act of 1994) is exclusive?
4.3 What constitutes notice prior to disconnection of electricity service? Corollarily, whether the definition
of notice under Meralco v. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 243) applies to the case at bar?
4.4 Whether a prima facie presumption may contradict logic?
4.5 Whether documentary proof is pre-requisite for award of damages?[8]
In sum, this Petition raises three (3) main issues which this Court will address: (1) whether respondent
observed the requisites of law when it disconnected the electrical supply of petitioners, (2) whether such
disconnection entitled petitioners to damages, and (3) whether petitioners are liable for the billing
differential computed by respondent.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Compliance with Requisites of Law
Petitioners contend that the immediate disconnection of electrical service was not validly effected
because of respondents noncompliance with the relevant provisions of RA 7832, the Anti-Electricity and
Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994. They insist that the immediate disconnection of
electrical supply may only be validly effected only when there is prima facie evidence of its illegal use. To
constitute prima facie evidence, the discovery of the illegal use must be personally witnessed and attested
to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).
Respondent, on the other hand, points out that the issue raised by petitioners is a question of fact
which this Court cannot pass upon. It argues further that this issue, which was not raised in the court
below, can no longer be taken up for the first time on appeal.Assuming arguendo that the issue was raised
below, it also contends that petitioners were not able to specifically prove the absence of an officer of the
law or a duly authorized representative of the ERB when the discovery was made.
Prima facie Evidence of Illegal Use of Electricity
We agree with petitioners. Section 4 of RA 7832 states:
(a) The presence of any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence of
illegal use of electricity, as defined in this Act, by the person benefited thereby, and shall be
the basis for: (1) the immediate disconnection by the electric utility to such person after due
notice, x x x
xxxxxxxxx
(viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing circumstances, in order to
constitute prima facie evidence, must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a
duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).[9] (Italics supplied)
Under the above provision, the prima facie presumption that will authorize immediate disconnection
will arise only upon the satisfaction of certain requisites. One of these requisites is the personal witnessing
and attestation by an officer of the law or by an authorized ERB representative when the discovery was
made.
As a rule, this Court reviews only questions of law, not of facts. However, it may pass upon the
evidence when the factual findings of the trial court are different from those of the Court of Appeals, as in
this case.[10]
A careful review of the evidence on record negates the appellate courts holding that the actions of
defendant-appellants service inspectors were all in accord with the requirement of the law. [11]
Respondents own witnesses provided the evidence on who were actually present when the inspection
was made. Emmanuel C. Orlino, the head of the Meralco team, testified:
Q When you were conducting this inspection, and you discovered these findings you testified
earlier, who was present?
A The secretary, sir.[12]
ATTY. REYES - Who else were the members of your team that conducted this inspection at
Greenmeadows Avenue on that day, March 3, 1995?
A The composition of the team, sir?
Q Yes.
A Including me, we are about four (4) inspectors, sir.
Q You were four (4)?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who is the head of this team?
A I was the head of the team, sir.[13]
Further, Catalino A. Macaraig, the area head of the Orlino team, stated that only Meralco personnel
had been present during the inspection:
Q By the way you were not there at Green Meadows on that day, right?
A Yes, sir.
Q Only Mr. Orlino and who else were there?
A Two or three of his men.
Q All members of the inspection team?
A Yes, sir.[14]
These testimonies clearly show that at the time the alleged meter tampering was discovered, only the
Meralco inspection team and petitioners secretary were present. Plainly, there was no officer of the law or
ERB representative at that time. Because of the absence of government representatives, the prima facie
authority to disconnect, granted to Meralco by RA 7832, cannot apply.
Neither can respondent find solace in the fact that petitioners secretary was present at the time the
inspection was made. The law clearly states that for the prima facie evidence to apply, the discovery must
be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).[15] Had the law intended the presence of the owner or his/her
representative to suffice, then it should have said so. Embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that courts
may not construe a statute that is free from doubt. [16] Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be
taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.
[17]
In fact, during the Senate deliberations on RA 7832, Senator John H. Osmea, its author, stressed the
need for the presence of government officers during inspections of electric meters. He said:
Mr. President, if a utility like MERALCO finds certain circumstances or situations which are listed in Section
2 of this bill to be prima facie evidence, I think they should be prudent enough to bring in competent
authority, either the police or the NBI, to verify or substantiate their finding. If they were to summarily
proceed to disconnect on the basis of their findings and later on there would be a court case and the
customer or the user would deny the existence of what is listed in Section 2, then they could be in a lot of
trouble.[18] (Italics supplied)
Neither can we accept respondents argument that when the alleged tampered meter was brought to
Meralcos laboratory for testing, there was already an ERB representative present.

The law says that before immediate disconnection may be allowed, the discovery of the illegal use of
electricity must have been personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by an
authorized ERB representative. In this case, the disconnection was effected immediately after the
discovery of the alleged meter tampering, which was witnessed only by Meralcos employees. That the ERB
representative was allegedly present when the meter was examined in the Meralco laboratory will not cure
the defect.
It is undisputed that after members of the Meralco team conducted their inspection and found alleged
meter tampering, they immediately disconnected petitioners electrical supply.Again, this verity is culled
from the testimony of Meralcos Orlina:
A When she went inside then she came out together with Mrs. Lourdes Quis[u]mbing at that
time. We did tell our findings regarding the meter and the consequence with it. And she was
very angry with me.
Q When you say consequence of your findings, what exactly did you tell Mrs. Quisumbing?
A We told her that the service will be temporarily disconnected and that we are referring to our
Legal Department so could know the violation, sir.[19]
A Yes, sir. At that time, I referred her to Mr. Macaraig, sir.
Q What is the first name of this supervisor?
A Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, sir.
Q Then after talking to Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, this is over the telephone, what happened?
A The supervisor advised her that the service will be temporarily disconnected and she has to go
to our Legal Department where she could settle the VOC, sir.
Q You are talking of VOC, what is this all about Mr. Orlino?
A VOC is violation of contract, sir.[20]
As to respondents argument that the presence of an authorized ERB representative had not been
raised below, it is clear, however, that the issue of due process was brought up by petitioners as a valid
issue in the CA. The presence of government agents who may authorize immediate disconnections go into
the essence of due process. Indeed, we cannot allow respondent to act virtually as prosecutor and judge in
imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter tampering. That would not sit well in a
democratic country. After all, Meralco is a monopoly that derives its power from the government.Clothing it
with unilateral authority to disconnect would be equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its hapless
customers.
Besides, even if not specifically raised, this Court has already ruled that [w]here the issues already
raised also rest on other issues not specifically presented, as long as the latter issues bear relevance and
close relation to the former and as long as they arise from matters on record, the Court has the authority
to include them in its discussion of the controversy as well as to pass upon them. [21]
Contractual Right to Disconnect
Electrical Service
Neither may respondent rely on its alleged contractual right to disconnect electrical service based on
Exhibits 10[22] and 11,[23] or on Decisions of the Board of Energy (now the Energy Regulatory Board). The
relevant portion of these documents concerns discontinuance of service. It provides:
The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in case the Customer is in arrears in the payment of
bills or for failure to pay the adjusted bills in those cases where the meter stopped or failed to register the
correct amount of energy consumed, or for failure to comply with any of these terms and conditions, or in
case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company. Before disconnection is made in case of or to prevent fraud,
the Company may adjust the bill of said Customer accordingly and if the adjusted bill is not paid, the
Company may disconnect the same. In case of disconnection, the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the
former Public Service Commission (now the Board of Energy) shall be observed. Any such suspension of
service shall not terminate the contract between the Company and the Customer. [24]
Petitioners situation can fall under disconnection only in case of or to prevent fraud upon the
Company. However, this too has requisites before a disconnection may be made.An adjusted bill shall be
prepared, and only upon failure to pay it may the company discontinue service. This is also true in regard
to the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the former Public Service Commission, which requires a 48-hour
written notice before a disconnection may be justified. In the instant case, these requisites were obviously
not complied with.
Second Issue
Damages
Having ruled that the immediate disconnection effected by Meralco lacks legal, factual or contractual
basis, we will now pass upon on the right of petitioners to recover damages for the improper
disconnection.
Petitioners are asking for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision, which awarded them actual, moral
and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees. All these were overturned by the CA.
As to actual damages, we agree with the CA that competent proof is necessary before our award may
be made. The appellate court ruled as follows:
Considering further, it is a settled rule that in order for damages to be recovered, the best evidence
obtainable by the injured party must be presented. Actual and compensatory damages cannot be
presumed but must be duly proved and proved with reasonable degree and certainty. A court cannot rely
on speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon
competent proof that they have been suffered and on evidence of actual amount thereof. If the proof is
flimsy and unsubstantial, no damages will be awarded. [25]
Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the position where it
was before it was injured.[26] They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and
susceptible of measurement.[27] Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as it has duly proven. [28]
Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof;
it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or
the best evidence obtainable.[29]
Petitioners claim for actual damages was premised only upon Lorna Quisumbings bare testimony as
follows:
A Actually that da[y] I was really scheduled to go to that furniture exhibit. That furniture exhibit is
only once a year.
Q What is this furniture exhibit?
A The SITEM, that is a government agency that takes care of exporters and exclusive marketing of
our products around the world. We always have that once a year and thats the time when all
our buyers are here for us to show what we had that was exhibited to go around. So, my
husband had to [fly] from Cebu to Manila just for this occasion. So we have an appointment
with our people and our buyers with SITEM and also that evening we will have to treat them
[to] dinner.
Q Whereat?
A At our residence, we were supposed to have a dinner at our residence.
Q What happened to this occasion?

A So when they disconnected our electric power we had to get in touch with them and change the
venue.
Q Which venue did you transfer your dinner for your buyers?
A We brought them in a restaurant in Makati at Seasons Restaurant. But it was very

embar[r]assing for us because we faxed them ahead of time before they came to Manila.
Q Now as a result of this change of your schedule because of the disconnection of the electric
power on that day, Friday, what damage did you suffer?
A I cancelled the catering service and that is so much of a h[a]ssle it was so embarras[s]ing for us.
Q Can you tell us how much amount?
A Approximately P50,000.00.[30]
No other evidence has been proffered to substantiate her bare statements. She has not shown how
she arrived at the amount of P50,000; it is, at best, speculative. Her self-serving testimonial evidence, if it
may be called such, is insufficient to support alleged actual damages.
While respondent does not rebut this testimony on the expenses incurred by the spouses in moving
the dinner out of their residence due to the disconnection, no receipts covering such expenditures have
been adduced in evidence. Neither is the testimony corroborated. To reiterate, actual or compensatory
damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. It is
dependent upon competent proof of damages that petitioners have suffered and of the actual amount
thereof.[31] The award must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the
court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and unsubstantial proof. [32] Consequently, we uphold
the CA ruling denying the grant of actual damages.
Having said that, we agree with the trial court, however, that petitioners are entitled to moral
damages, albeit in a reduced amount.
The RTC opined as follows:
This Court agrees with the defendant regarding [its] right by law and equity to protect itself from any
fraud. However, such right should not be exercised arbitrarily but with great caution and with due regard to
the rights of the consumers. Meralco having a virtual monopoly of the supply of electric power should
refrain from taking drastic actions against the consumers without observing due process. Even assuming
that the subject meter has had history of meter tampering, defendant cannot simply assume that the
present occupants are the ones responsible for such tampering.Neither does it serve as a license to
deprive the plaintiffs of their right to due process. Defendant should have given the plaintiffs simple
opportunity to dispute the electric charges brought about by the alleged meter-tampering, which were not
included in the bill rendered them. Procedural due process requires reasonable notice to pay the bill and
reasonable notice to discontinue supply.Absent due process the defendant may be held liable for
damages. While this Court is aware of the practice of unscrupulous individuals of stealing electric curre[n]t
which causes thousands if not millions of pesos in lost revenue to electric companies, this does not give
the defendant the right to trample upon the rights of the consumers by denying them due process. [33]
Article 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral damages may be recovered. One such
case[34] is when the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due
process of law, are violated.[35]
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. [36] Although incapable of
pecuniary computation, such damages may be recovered if they are the proximate results of the
defendants wrongful act or omission.[37]
Case law establishes the following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury --
whether physical, mental or psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a culpable act or
omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of

the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.[38]
To reiterate, respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect petitioners electrical supply
without observing the requisites of law which, in turn, are akin to due process. Had respondent been more
circumspect and prudent, petitioners could have been given the opportunity to controvert the initial finding
of alleged meter tampering. Said the RTC:
More seriously, the action of the defendant in maliciously disconnecting the electric service constitutes a
breach of public policy. For public utilities, broad as their powers are, have a clear duty to see to it that
they do not violate nor transgress the rights of the consumers. Any act on their part that militates against
the ordinary norms of justice and fair play is considered an infraction that gives rise to an action for
damages. Such is the case at bar.[39]
Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled in Meralco v. CA[40] that respondent is required to give notice of
disconnection to an alleged delinquent customer. The Court said:
x x x One can not deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO, having a monopoly of the
supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby municipalities, plays in the life of people living
in such areas. Electricity has become a necessity to most people in these areas, justifying the exercise by
the State of its regulatory power over the business of supplying electrical service to the public, in which
petitioner MERALCO is engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it has done through Section 97 of the
Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the conditions under which and the manner by
which a public utility such as MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to a delinquent
customer. Among others, a prior written notice to the customer is required before disconnection of the
service. Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort.[41]
Observance of the rights of our people is sacred in our society. We cannot allow such rights to be
trifled with or trivialized. Although the Court sympathizes with respondents efforts to stamp out the illegal
use of electricity, such action must be done only with strict observance of the rights of our people. As has
been we succinctly said: there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason. [42]
However, the amount of moral damages, which is left largely to the sound discretion of the courts,
should be granted in reasonable amounts, considering the attendant facts and circumstances. [43] Moral
damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate the claimant for actual
injury suffered and not to impose a penalty. [44] Moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the
expense of the defendant.[45] They are awarded only to obtain a means, a diversion or an amusement that
will serve to alleviate the moral suffering the injured party has undergone by reason of the defendants
culpable action.[46] They must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[47]
It is clear from the records that respondent was able to restore the electrical supply of petitioners on
the same day. Verily, the inconvenience and anxiety they suffered as a result of the disconnection was
thereafter corrected. Thus, we reduce the RTCs grant of moral damages to the more equitable amount
of P100,000.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. [48]It is not given to enrich one
party and impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to socially
deleterious actions.[49] In this case, to serve an example -- that before a disconnection of electrical supply
can be effected by a public utility like Meralco, the requisites of law must be faithfully complied with -- we
award the amount of P50,000 to petitioners.
Finally, with the award of exemplary damages, the award of attorneys fees is likewise granted. [50] It is
readily apparent that petitioners needed the services of a lawyer to argue their cause, even to the extent
of elevating the matter to this Court;[51] thus, an award ofP50,000 is considered sufficient.
Final Issue:
Billing Differential
Finally, this Court holds that despite the basis for the award of damages -- the lack of due process in
immediately disconnecting petitioners electrical supply -- respondents counterclaim for the billing
differential is still proper. We agree with the CA that respondent should be given what it rightfully
deserves. The evidence it presented, both documentary and testimonial, sufficiently proved the amount of
the differential.
Not only did respondent show how the meter examination had been conducted by its experts, but it
also established the amount of P193,332.96 that petitioners owed respondent. The procedure through
which this amount was arrived at was testified to by Meralcos Senior Billing Computer Enrique
Katipunan. His testimony was corroborated by documentary evidence showing the accounts billing history
and the corresponding computations. Neither do we doubt the documents of inspections and examinations
presented by respondent to prove that, indeed there had been meter tampering that resulted in
unrecorded and unpaid electrical consumption.
The mere presentation by petitioners of a Contract to Sell with Assumption of Mortgage [52] does not
necessarily mean that they are no longer liable for the billing differential. There was no sufficient evidence
to show that they had not been actually residing in the house before the date of the said document. Lorna
Quisumbing herself admitted[53] that they did not have any contract for electrical service in their own
name.Hence, petitioners effectively assumed the bills of the former occupants of the premises.
Finally, the CA was correct in ruling that the convincing documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by respondent, was not controverted by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision isMODIFIED as
follows: petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96; while
respondent is ordered to pay petitioners P100,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages,
and P50,000 as attorneys fees. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-32282-83 November 26, 1970
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, CAMILO PILOTIN,
FRANCISCO PIANO, DELFIN PIANO PEDRO PATAO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, CAMILO PIANO, CAMILO
PATAO, PEDRING PIANO, ISIDRO PUGAL, ANTONIO TABULDO, LORENZO PERALTA, VENANCIO
PACLEB ANTONIO PIANO, FERMIN PUGAL, CARLITO PUGAL, FLOR PIANO, ERNING ABANO and
EIGHTY-TWO (82) JOHN DOES, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco, Solicitor
Eduardo C. Abaya and Special Attorney Juan A. Sison for petitioners.
Adaza, Adaza and Adaza for respondent Erning Abano.
Crisologo Law Office and Pedro Quadra for respondent Camilo Pilotin.
Juan T. David for respondent Vincent Crisologo.
Augusto Kalaw as private prosecutor.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed by the Solicitor General and
State Prosecutors, to annul and set aside the order of Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Sur (respondent herein), dated 20 July 1970, denying the prosecution's urgent motion to transfer
Criminal Case Nos. 47-V and 48-V of said Court of First Instance, entitled "People vs. Pilotin, et al.," to the
Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District; to direct the respondent Judge to effectuate such
transfer; and to restrain the trial of the cases aforesaid in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, sitting in
Vigan, capital of the province.
In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of
Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the
same day, in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, several residential houses were
likewise burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and in the death of an old
woman named Vicenta Balboa. After investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal, with several
state prosecutors assigned by the Department of Justice to collaborate with him, on 10 June 1970 filed in
the Court of First Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two informations (Criminal Cases 47-V for arson with
homicide and 48-V for arson) charging that the seventeen private respondents herein, together with 82
other unidentified persons, "confederating, conspiring, confabulating and helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or cause to be burned several residential houses,
knowing the said houses to be occupied" and belonging to certain persons named in the filed informations
in barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur (Petition, Annexes B and B-1). Accused Camilo Pilotin
and Vincent Crisologo furnished bail, and on 15 June 1970 voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge
Gutierrez, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was then set for 27, 28 and 29 July 1970.
It appears that on the same day, 15 June, the Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 221,
authorizing Judge Lino Anover, of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, with official
station at San Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in Ilocos Sur, from and after 1 July 1970. Three
days thereafter, on 18 June 1970, the Secretary further issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing
Judge Mario Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, "in the
interest of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by Administrative Order Nos.
258 and 274" of the Department of Justice.
On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of cases 47-V and 48-V to the
Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the Administrative Orders just mentioned and calling attention to the
circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from
Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal safety, as
shown in their affidavits. The accused vigorously opposed such transfer, and on 20 July 1970, the
respondent judge declined the transfer sought, on the ground that Administrative Order No. 258 only
provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for the
more expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had already pleaded; that if
the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a change of venue from the Supreme
Court under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5179 the same should have been done right at the very
inception of these cases.
In view of the lower court's denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, the
prosecution resorted to Us for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying
this Court to set aside the order of denial of the transfer and to compel the respondent Court of First
Instance to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, as well as to
authorize the latter to try the cases (47-V and 48-V) at either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City.
Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that the Administrative
Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below, but did not require or command it, to transfer the cases
in question to the Circuit Criminal Court, and likewise denied that the circumstances justified any such
transfer.
At petitioners' request this Court enjoined the respondent Judge Gutierrez from proceeding with the trial of
the cases until further orders.
We agree with respondents that the present laws do not confer upon the Secretary of Justice power to
determine what court should hear specific cases. Any such power, even in the guise of administrative
regulation of executive affairs, trenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and the
Judiciary; and while not directly depriving the courts of their independence, it would endanger the rights
and immunities of the accused or civil party. It could be much too easily transformed into a means of

predetermining the outcome of individual cases, so as to produce a result in harmony with the
Administration's preferences. The creation by Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts for the
purpose of alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance, and to accelerate the disposition
of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of
preselected individual cases to the circuit courts. Neither do Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274
evidence any such intention; particularly since Administrative Order No. 258, Series of 1968, in Section 2
of its Part V, as confirmed by Administrative Order No. 274 of the same year, in Section 3 of Part III thereof,
provides that the transfer to Circuit Criminal Courts of cases pending in the regular Courts of First Instance
should be effected by raffle, chance here operating to nullify any executive arbitration of what particular
cases should be apportioned to either tribunal. The very terms of Administrative Order No. 226, issued on
18 June 1970 by Secretary of Justice Makasiar, relied upon by the petitioners, in merely authorizing, and
not directing, Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to transfer Criminal
Cases Nos. 44-V and 47-V (People vs. Pilotin, et al.) to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District, reveals that the Secretary himself was aware of the impropriety of imperatively directing transfer
of specified cases. Respondent Judge Gutierrez, therefore in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as
permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the
Executive Orders heretofore mentioned.
It is unfortunate, however, that in refusing to consider Department Administrative Order No. 226 of the
Secretary of Justice as mandatory respondent Judge Gutierrez failed to act upon the contention of the
prosecuting officers that the cases against private respondents herein should be transferred to the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of
the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they felt
their lives would be endangered. This claim was buttressed by the affidavits of the injured parties and
prosecution witnesses, reaffirming their fear to appear in Vigan to testify in cases 47-V and 48-V and
expressing their willingness to testify if the cases are heard outside of Ilocos Sur, where they can be free
from tension and terrorism (Petition, Annex J). The fear thus expressed can not be considered fanciful and
unfounded when account is taken of the circumstances that the informations filed in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur show that of the one hundred armed participants in the burning of the houses at
barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Municipality of Bantay, some eighty-two (82) are still unidentified and at
large; that one of the accused, private respondent Vincent Crisologo, belongs to an influential family in the
province, being concededly the son of the Congressman for the first district of Ilocos Sur and of the lady
Governor that the reluctant witnesses are themselves the complainants in the criminal cases, and,
therefore, have reasons to fear that attempts will be made to silence them; that it is not shown that the
Executive branch is able or willing to give these witnesses full security during the trial and for a reasonable
time thereafter, that even if armed security escorts were to be provided, the same would be no guarantee
against the possibility of murderous assault against the affiant witnesses, as recent events have proved;
that Constabulary reports (Annex H) show that between 1 January and 31 May 1970 no less than 78
murders have been reported committed in said province, of which number only 21 were solved; and,
finally, that the promotion and confirmation of respondent Judge Mario Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to
Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Second Judicial District, Branch III, was actively supported by
Congressman and Governor Crisologo, parents of accused Vincent Crisologo (Annexes H, H-1, and K to N-2
to petitioner's supplemental memorandum).
This just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by the complaining witnesses, who had on a previous
occasion freely given evidence before the investigators in Manila, renders manifest the imperious necessity
of transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into
conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side
of the case.
The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer of the trial site can not be made, because it is a long
standing rule of criminal procedure in these Islands that one who commits a crime is amenable therefor
only in the jurisdiction where the crime is committed, for the reason pointed out in U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26
Phil. 376, andPeople vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665, that the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance in the
Philippines is limited to certain well-defined territory and they can not take jurisdiction of persons charged
with one offense committed outside of that limited territory, and they invoke Rule 110, Section 14 (a), of
the Revised Rules of Court providing that "in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredient thereof took place."
It is well to note that this Court has explained in Beltran vs. Ramos, 96 Phil. 149, 150, that the purpose of
the rule invoked by accused respondents herein was "not to compel the defendant to move to and appear

in a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed, as it would cause him great
inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place." Where the convenience of
the accused is opposed by that of the prosecution, as in the case at bar, it is but logical that the court
should have power to decide where the balance of convenience or inconvenience lies, and to determine
the most suitable place of the trial according to the exigencies of truth and impartial justice.
In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its
witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and
to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established. Since the rigorous application of the
general principle of Rule 110, Section 14 (a), would result here in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry
into the actual facts of the case, it must be admitted that the exigencies of justice demand that the
general rule relied upon by accused respondents should yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are
weighty reasons therefor. Otherwise, the rigor of the law would become the highest injustice "summum
jus, summa in juria."
The respondents accused can not complain that to transfer the trial to a site where the prosecution's
witnesses can feel free to reveal what they know would be equivalent to railroading them into a conviction.
Because regardless of the place where its evidence is to be heard, the prosecution will be always obligated
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The scales of justice clearly lean in favor of the
prosecution being given full opportunity to lay its case before a proper arbiter: for a dismissal of the
charges for lack of evidence is a verdict that the prosecution can neither challenge nor appeal.
We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an impasse of the kind now before Us, are to
confess themselves impotent to further the cause of justice. The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power
in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and
such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an
effective administration of justice. The courts "can by appropriate means do all things necessary to
preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government"
(Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322).
One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one
court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and
impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. This authority was early recognized in
England as inhering in the courts of justice even prior to the eighteenth century. The opinion in Crocker vs.
Justices of the Superior Court,208 Mass. 162, 21 Ann. Cases 1067, has shown how the eminent Lord Chief
Justice Mansfield, in Rex vs. Cowle(Eng.) 2 Burr 834, decided in 1759, said that, in this respect, "the law is
clear and uniform as far back as it can be traced."
And in Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507, the question was fully discussed, and all the judges appear to have
agreed as to the power of the court, Cramption, Jr., saying at page 525:
There is another common-law right, equally open to defendants and prosecutors, ... that
where it appears that either party cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the proper
county, then this court ... has jurisdiction to take the case out of the proper county, as it is
called, and to bring it into an indifferent county ... This jurisdiction to change the venue ...
has been exercised by this court from a very early period. We have reported cases, where
the doctrine is laid down in emphatic language; we have the practice of the Court of Queen's
Bench in England independently of any practice of our own court ... The general jurisdiction
of the court, in a proper case, to change the venue from one county to any other, cannot be
the subject of doubt.
This power to transfer trial of criminal cases in furtherance of justice, exercised through writs of certiorari,
has, according to the weight of authority, passed to the State Supreme Courts of the American
Union. 1 In Cochecho R. Co. vs. Farrington, 26 N.H. 428, at page 436, it was held that the power to transfer
the place of holding trials
became thoroughly engrafted upon the common law, long before the independence of this
country; and from that time forth, not only has the practice prevailed in the courts of
England, but the power is now exercised by the Courts of very many if not all of our states,
either by force of express statute or the adoption of the common law in the jurisprudence of
the same.

That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the Philippine courts admits of no doubt, because
they were organized on the American pattern with the enactment of the first judicial organic law, Act 136,
on 11 June 1901, by the Philippine Commission, then composed by a majority of able American lawyers,
fully familiar with the institutions and traditions of the common law.
In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 300, 333, this Court stated:
And it is safe to say that in every volume of the Philippine Reports, numbers of cases might
be cited wherein recourse has been had to the rules, principles and doctrines of the common
law in ascertaining the true meaning and scope of the legislation enacted in and for the
Philippine Islands since they passed under American sovereignty.
Among the earliest measures of the Philippine Commission, after the establishment of Civil
Government under American sovereignty, was the enactment on June 11, 1901, of Act No.
136, "An Act providing for the organization of courts in the Philippine Islands." This Act in
express terms abolished the then existing Audiencia or Supreme Court and Courts of First
Instance, and substituted in their place the courts provided therein. It sets out in general
terms the jurisdiction, duties, privileges, and powers of the new courts and their judges. The
majority of the members of the body which enacted it were able American lawyers. The
spirit with which it is informed, and indeed its very language and terminology would be
unintelligible without some knowledge of the judicial systems of England and the United
States. Its manifest purpose and object was to replace the old judicial system, with its
incidents and traditions drawn from Spanish sources, with a new system modeled in all its
essential characteristics upon the judicial systems of the United States. It cannot be
doubted, therefore, that any incident of the former system which conflicts with the essential
principles and settled doctrines on which the new system rests, must be held to be
abrogated by the law organizing the new system.
While not expressly conferred by Act 136, We find it difficult to believe that the framers' intent was to
deny, by silence, to the Philippine Courts, and particularly upon this Supreme Court, the inherent
jurisdiction possessed by the English and American courts under their common law heritage to transfer the
place of trial of cases in order to secure and promote the ends of justice, by providing fair and impartial
inquiry and adjudication.
Like the exemption of judges of courts of superior or general authority from liability in a civil action for acts
done by them in the exercise of their judicial functions, upheld in the Alzua case as essentially inherent in
the courts established by Act 136, even if not expressly provided for, the power to transfer the place of
trials when so demanded by the interest of justice is equally essential and possesses no inferior rank. To it
apply, mutatis mutandis, the words of this Court in the Alzua case just cited:
The grounds of public policy and the reasoning upon which the doctrine is based are not less
forceful and imperative in these Islands than in the countries from which the new judicial
system was borrowed; and an examination of the reasons assigned ... leaves no room for
doubt that a failure to recognize it as an incident to the new judicial system would materially
impair its usefulness and tend very strongly to defeat the ends for which it was established.
(21 Phil. 333-334)
Not only has there been since then no proof of any specific pronouncement, by Constitution or Congress,
against the exercise by our Courts of the power discussed heretofore: on the contrary, the law establishing
the Circuit Criminal Courts, Republic Act No. 5179, in its Section 4, provides express legislative recognition
of its existence:
SEC. 4. The Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions anywhere within their respective
districts:Provided, however, that cases shall be heard within the province where the crime
subject of the offense was committed. And provided further, that when the interest of justice
so demands, with prior approval of the Supreme Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring
province within the district ... (Emphasis supplied)
Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied by the filing of the criminal case in
question with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which province the offenses charged were
committed, according to the informations; since the holding of the trial in a particular place is more a
matter of venue, rather than jurisdiction; since the interests of truth and justice can not be subserved by

compelling the prosecution to proceed to trial in the respondent court in Ilocos Sur, because its witnesses,
for just and weighty reasons, are unwilling to testify therein, and the respondent court, ignoring their
safety, has abusively denied the motion to have the case transferred to another court, this Supreme Court,
in the exercise of judicial power possessed by it under the Constitution and the statutes, should decree
that the trial of cases 47-V and 48-V should be heard and decided by the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Second Judicial District, either in San Fernando, La Union, or in Baguio City, at the earlier available date.
This arrangement would have the advantage that the same trial judge could later be authorized to hear
the defense witnesses in Vigan, if circumstances so demanded. Furthermore, the adjudication of the case
by a judge other than respondent Gutierrez, if resulting in acquittal, would remove any doubt or suspicion
that the same was in any way influenced by the trial Judge's being beholden to the Crisologo family.
The solution thus adopted is in harmony with the ideals set by this Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, where We said:
... The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives opportunity for the
most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by
natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for
the powers of the court to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the
parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter but to give it effective facility in righteous action.
It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can be urged against
procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the court's power by technicalities that
part of its authority effective for justice between the parties is many times in inconsiderable
portion of the whole. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created
not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does
not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is
designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an
end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments.
When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of
justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism.
(Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523, 529 [1911]. Emphasis and
paragraphing supplied.)
In resume, this Court holds, and so rules:
(1) That Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does not, authorize the
Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and individual cases;
(2) That this Supreme Court, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon it and
other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of
a case pending in a Court of First Instance be transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same
district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to
believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and
impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.
(3) That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of
Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of
the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and justice.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writs of certiorari and mandamus prayed for are granted;
the order of the respondent Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, dated 20 July 1970, is
sustained in so far as it holds that the Administrative Order No. 221 of the Department of
Justice is not mandatory, but only directory; nevertheless, said order is declared in grave
abuse of discretion and set aside in so far as it declines to transfer the trial of its cases Nos.
47-V and 48-V to another court within the district; and said respondent Court is accordingly
directed and ordered to remand the two criminal cases aforesaid to the Circuit Criminal
Court of the Second Judicial District for hearing of the evidence for the prosecution either in
Baguio or San Fernando, La Union, at the earliest available date, and such other proceedings
as the Circuit Criminal Court may determine in the interest of justice.

The accused are required to file bail bonds to answer for their appearance at the trial and sentence by the
Circuit Criminal Court for the Second Judicial District, in the same amount, and under the same terms and
conditions as their present bail bonds, which will be replaced by those herein ordered, all within fifteen (15)
days from finality of this decision.
No special pronouncement as to costs.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116617 November 16, 1998
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION (MMTC), PEDRO A. MUSA, CONRADO TOLENTINO,

FELICIANA CELEBRADO and THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. RODOLFO V. ROSALES and LILY R. ROSALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 126395 November 16, 1998
RODOLFO V. ROSALES, and LILY R. ROSALES, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION, (MMTC) PEDRO A. MUSA,
CONRADO TOLENTINO, FELICIANA CELEBRADO and THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM,respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
These are appeals brought, on the one hand, by the Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC) and Pedro
Musa and, on the other, by the spouses Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily R. Rosales from the decision, 1 dated
August 5, 1994, of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City holding MMTC and Musa liable to the spouses Rosales for actual, moral, and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit for the death of the latter's daughter. MMTC and
Musa in G.R. No. 116617 appeal insofar as they are held liable for damages, while the spouses Rosales in
G.R. No. 126395 appeal insofar as the amounts awarded are concerned.
The facts are as follows:
MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro Manila area. Musa was its driver
assigned to MMTC Bus No. 27. The spouses Rosales were parents of Liza Rosalie, a third-year high school
student at the University of the Philippines Integrated School.
At around a quarter past one in the afternoon of August 9, 1986, MMTC Bus No. 27, which was driven by
Musa, hit Liza Rosalie who was then crossing Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. An eye witness said the girl
was already near the center of the street when the bus, then bound for the south, hit her. 2 She fell to the
ground upon impact, rolled between the two front wheels of the bus, and was run over by the left rear tires
thereof. 3 Her body was dragged several meters away from the point of impact. Liza Rosalie was taken to
the Philippine Heart Center, 4 but efforts to revive her proved futile.
Pedro Musa was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and sentenced to imprisonment
for a term of 2 years and 4 months, as minimum, to 6 years, as maximum, by the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon
City. 5 The trial court found:
All told, this Court, therefore, holds that the accused, who was then, the driver of MMTC Bus
No. 027, is criminally responsible for the death of the girl victim in violation of Article 365 (2)
of the Revised Penal Code. For, in the light of the evidence that the girl victim was already at
the center of the Katipunan Road when she was bumped, and, therefore, already past the
right lane when the MMTC Bus No. 027 was supposed to have passed; and, since the said
bus was then running at a speed of about 25 kilometers per hour which is inappropriate
since Katipunan road is a busy street, there is, consequently, sufficient proof to show that
the accused was careless, reckless and imprudent in the operation of his MMTC Bus No. 027,
which is made more evident by the circumstance that the accused did not blow his horn at
the time of the accident, and he did not even know that he had bumped the girl victim and
had ran over her, demonstrating thereby that he did not exercise diligence and take the
necessary precaution to avoid injury to persons in the operation of his vehicle, as, in fact, he
ran over the girl victim who died as a result thereof. 6
The spouses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages against MMTC, Musa, MMTC Acting
General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). They
subsequently amended their complaint to include Feliciana Celebrado, a dispatcher of the MMTC, as a
defendant therein. The counsel of MMTC and Musa attempted to introduce testimony that Musa was not
negligent in driving Bus No. 27 but was told by the trial judge:
COURT:
That is it. You can now limit your question to the other defendant here but to re-try again the
actual facts of the accident, this Court would not be in the position. It would be improper for
this Court to make any findings with respect to the negligence of herein driver. You ask
questions only regarding the civil aspect as to the other defendant but not as to the
accused. 7
The counsel submitted to the ruling of the court. 8
In a decision rendered on March 6, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City found MMTC and Musa
guilty of negligence and ordered them to pay damages and attorney's fees, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering

defendant Metro Manila Transit Corporation primarily and defendant Pedro Musa subsidiarily
liable to plaintiffs-spouses Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily R. Rosales as follows:
1. Actual damages in the amount of P150,000.00;
2. Moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00;
3. Exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00;
4. Attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00; and
5. Costs of suit. 9
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 5, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court with the following modification:
WHEREFORE, except for the modification deleting the award of P150,000.00 as actual
damages and awarding in lieu thereof the amount of P30,000.00 as death indemnity, the
decision appealed from is, in all other aspects, hereby AFFIRMED. 10
The spouses Rosales filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court, in a resolution, dated
September 12, 1996, partly granted by increasing the indemnity for the death of Liza Rosalie from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. Hence, these appeals.
In G.R. No. 116617, MMTC and Musa assail the decision of the Court of Appeals on the following grounds:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE COURT A

QUO'SDECISION PARTICULARLY IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPELLANT MMTC EXERCISED THE
DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS

DRIVERS. THIS BEING THE CASE, APPELLANT MMTC IS ENTITLED TO BE ABSOLVED FROM ANY
LIABILITY OR AT LEAST TO A REDUCTION OF THE RECOVERABLE DAMAGES.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, JUST LIKE THE COURT A QUO, OVERLOOKED
THE FACT THAT PETITIONER MMTC, A GOVERNMENT-OWNED CORPORATION, COMMITTED NO
FRAUD, MALICE, BAD FAITH, NOR WANTON, FRAUDULENT, OPPRESSIVE AND MALEVOLENT
ACTUATIONS AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE COURT A

QUO'SDECISION TO HOLD PETITIONER-APPELLANT MMTC PRIMARILY LIABLE TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES IN THE AMOUNT OF P500,000 AS MORAL DAMAGES, P100,000 AS
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND P30,000 BY WAY OF DEATH INDEMNITY.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE COURT A

QUO'SDECISION IN RENDERING JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF
P50,000.00 IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 126395, the spouses Rosales contend:
The Court of Appeals erred in:
First, considering that death indemnity which this Honorable Court set at P50,000.00 is akin
to actual damages;
Second, not increasing the amount of damages awarded;
Third, refusing to hold all the defendants, now private respondents, solidarily liable.
MMTC and Musa do not specifically question the findings of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City that Liza Rosalie was hit by MMTC Bus No. 27. Nonetheless, their petition contains
discussions which cast doubts on this point. 11 Not only can they not do this as the rule is that an appellant
may not be heard on a question not specifically assigned as error, but the rule giving great weight, and
even finality, to the factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of the trial court bars a
reversal of the finding of liability against petitioners MMTC and Musa. Only where it is shown that such
findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can they be overturned. To the contrary, the findings of
both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court are solidly anchored on the evidence submitted by
the parties. We, therefore, regard them as conclusive in resolving the petitions at bar. 12 Indeed, as already
stated, petitioners' counsel submitted to the ruling of the court that the finding of the trial court in the
criminal case was conclusive on them with regard to the questions of whether Liza Rosalie was hit by
MMTC Bus No. 27 and whether its driver was negligent. Rather, the issue in this case turns on Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code, which provides that "employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry." The responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees
in the performance of their duties is primary, that is, the injured party may recover from the employers
directly, regardless of the solvency of their employees. 13 The rationale for the rule on vicarious liability has
been adumbrated thus:
What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a
deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a
practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer's enterprise, are placed
upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing business. They are placed upon the
employer because, having engaged in an enterprise, which will on the basis of all past
experience involve harm to others through the tort of employees, and sought to profit by it,
it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because he
is better able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prides, rates or liability
insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the community at large. Added to
this is the makeweight argument that an employer who is held strictly liable is under the
greatest incentive to be careful in the selection, instruction and supervision of his servants,
and to take every precaution to see that the enterprise is conducted safely. 14
In Campo v. Camarote, 15
we explained the basis of the presumption of negligence in this wise:

The reason for the law is obvious. It is indeed difficult for any person injured by the
carelessness of a driver to prove the negligence or lack of due diligence of the owner of the
vehicle in the choice of the driver. Were we to require the injured party to prove the owner's
lack of diligence, the right will in many cases prove illusory, as seldom does a person in the
community, especially in the cities, have the opportunity to observe the conduct of all
possible car owners therein. So the law imposes the burden of proof of innocence on the
vehicle owner. If the driver is negligent and causes damage, the law presumes that the
owner was negligent and imposes upon him the burden of proving the contrary.
Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees within the scope of
their assigned tasks only if they can show that "they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent
damage." 16 For this purpose, they have the burden of proving that they have indeed exercised such
diligence, both in the selection of the employee who committed the quasi-delict and in the supervision of
the performance of his duties.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. 17 On the other hand, with respect to the supervision of
employees, employers should formulate standard operating, procedures, monitor their implementation,
and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. 18 To establish these factors in a trial involving the
issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence. 19
In this case, MMTC sought to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family with respect
to the selection of employees by presenting mainly testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. According
to MMTC, applicants are required to submit professional driving licenses, certifications of work experience,
and clearances from the National Bureau of Investigation; to undergo tests of their driving skills,
concentration, reflexes, and vision; and, to complete training programs on traffic rules, vehicle
maintenance, and standard operating procedures during emergency cases. 20
MMTC's evidence consists entirely of testimonial evidence (1) that transport supervisors are assigned to
oversee field operations in designated areas; (2) that the maintenance department daily inspects the
engines of the vehicles; and, (3) that for infraction of company rules there are corresponding
penalties. 21 Although testimonies were offered that in the case of Pedro Musa all these precautions were
followed, 22 the records of his interview, of the results of his examinations, and of his service were not
presented.
MMTC submitted brochures and programs of seminars for prospective employees on vehicle maintenance,
traffic regulations, and driving skills and claimed that applicants are given tests to determine driving skills,
concentration, reflexes, and vision, 23 but there is no record that Musa attended such training programs
and passed the said examinations before he was employed. No proof was presented that Musa did not
have any record of traffic violations. Nor were records of daily inspections, allegedly conducted by
supervisors, ever presented.
Normally, employers' keep files concerning the qualifications, work experience, training evaluation, and
discipline of their employees. The failure of MMTC to present such documentary proof puts in doubt the
credibility of its witnesses. What was said in Central Taxicab Corporation v. Ex-Meralco Employees
Transportation Corporation 24applies to this case:
This witness spoke of an affidavit of experience which a driver-applicant must accomplish

before he is employed by the company, a written time schedule for each bus, and a record
of the inspections and thorough checks pertaining to each bus before it leaves the car barn;
yet no attempt was ever made to present in evidence any of these documents, despite the
fact that they were obviously in the possession and control of the defendant company.
....
Albert also testified that he kept records of the preliminary and final tests given by him as
well as a record of the qualifications and experience of each of the drivers of the company. It
is rather' strange, therefore, that he failed to produce in court the all important record of
Roberto, the driver involved in this case.

The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any record or other documentary
proof tending to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its drivers and buses, notwithstanding the calls therefor
by both the trial court and the opposing counsel, argues strongly against its pretensions.
It is noteworthy that, in another case involving MMTC, testimonial evidence of identical content, which
MMTC presented to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of employees and thus avoid vicarious liability for the negligent acts of its employees, was held
to be insufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence against it. In Metro Manila Transit Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, 25 this Court said:
Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no rule which requires that testimonial
evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence, or even object
evidence for that matter, inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere
generalities, we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was
observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Petitioner's
attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of
employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any
other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of
the testimony.
Having found both MMTC and its driver Pedro Musa liable for negligence for the death of Liza Rosalie on
August 9, 1986; we now consider the question of damages which her parents, the spouses Rosales, are
entitled to recover, which is the subject of the appeal in G.R. No. 126395.
Indemnity for Death. Art. 2206 provides for the payment of indemnity for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict. Initially fixed in said article of the Civil Code at P3,000.00, the amount of the indemnity has
through the years been gradually increased based on the value of the peso. At present, it is fixed at
P50,000.00. 26 To conform to this new ruling, the Court of Appeals correctly increased the indemnity it had
originally ordered the spouses Rosales to be paid from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 in its resolution, dated
September 12, 1996.
Actual Damages. Art. 2199 provides that "except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved." The spouses
Rosales are claiming actual damages in the amount of P239,245.40. However, during the trial, they
submitted receipts showing that expenses for the funeral, wake, and interment of Liza Rosalie amounted
only to P60,226.65 itemized as follows: 27
Medical Attendance P 739.65
Funeral Services 5,100.00
Wreaths 2,500.00
Embalment 1,000.00
Obituaries 7,125.00
Interment fees 2,350.00
Expenses during wake 14,935.00
Mourning clothes 5,000.00
Photography 3,500.00
Video Coverage 10,000.00
Printing of invitation cards 7,977.00
TOTAL 60,226.65

Hence, apart from the indemnity for death, the spouses Rosales are entitled to recover the above amount
as actual damages.
Moral Damages. Under Art. 2206, the "spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."
The reason for the grant of moral damages has been explained thus:
. . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible,
of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted. The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate
to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or
means of the offender. 28
In the instant case, the spouses Rosales presented evidence of the intense moral suffering they had gone
through as a result of the loss of Liza Rosalie who was their youngest child. Rodolfo Rosales recounted the
place of Liza Rosalie in the family and their relationship with her in the following words:
Q: Mr. Rosales, how was Liza to you as a daughter?
A: Well, Liza as a daughter was the greatest joy of the family; she was our
pride, and everybody loved her all her brothers and sisters because she
was sweet and unspoiled. . . . She was soft-spoken to all of us; and she still
slept with us at night although she had her own room. Sometimes in the
middle of the night she would open our door and ask if she could sleep with
us. So we let her sleep with us, as she was the youngest. 29
The death of Liza Rosalie left a void in their lives. Rodolfo Rosales testified on the devastating effect of the
death of Liza Rosalie:
Q: And after she died, what changes, if any, did you feel in your family?
A: Well, there is something hollow in our family, something is missing. She

used to greet me when I came home and smell if I was drunk and would tell
me to dress up and take a shower before her mommy could see me. She
would call me up at the office and say: "Daddy, come home, please help me
with my homework." Now, all these things, I am missing, you know. . . I do not
feel like going home early. Sometimes my wife would complain and ask:
"Where did you go?" But I cannot explain to her how I feel. 30
Lily Rosales described life without Liza Rosalie thus:
Q: Now, your life without Liza, how would you describe it, Dr. Rosales?
A: You know it is very hard to describe. The family was broken apart. We could
not go together because we remember Liza. Every time we go to the
cemetery we try as much as possible not to go together. So, we go to the
cemetery one at a time, sometimes, my husband and I, or my son and another
one, but we never go together because we remember Liza. But before her
death we would always be together, the whole family on weekends and on our
days off. My husband works very hard, I also work very hard and my children
go to school. They study very hard. Now we cannot go together on outings
because of the absence of Liza. 31
The spouses Rosales claim moral damages in the amount of P5,000,000.00. In People v. Teehankee,
Jr., 32 this Court awarded P1 million as moral damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who was
murdered. This amount seems reasonable to us as moral damages for the loss of a minor child, whether he
or she was a victim of a crime or a quasi-delict. Hence, we hold that the MMTC and Musa are solidarily
liable to the spouses Rosales in the amount of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages for the death of Liza
Rosalie.
Exemplary Damages. Art. 2231 provides that exemplary damages may be recovered in cases involving
quasi-delicts if "the defendant acted with gross negligence." This circumstance obtains in the instant case.
The records indicate that at the time of the mishap, there was a pending criminal case against Musa for
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries with another branch of the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City. 33 The evidence also shows that he failed to stop his vehicle at once even after eye witnesses
shouted at him. The spouses Rosales claim exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000,000.00. Under the
circumstances, we deem it reasonable to award the spouses Rosales exemplary damages in the amount of
five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
Attorney's Fees. Pursuant to Art. 2208, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case,
exemplary damages are awarded. In the recent case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 34 which
involved the death of a minor child in the sinking of a vessel, we held an award of P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees to be reasonable. Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees made by the Court of Appeals to the
spouses Rosales in that amount.
Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity. Art. 2206 of the Civil Code provides that in addition to the
indemnity for death caused by a crime or quasi delict, the "defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; . . ."
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn
money. 35 Evidence must be presented that the victim, if not yet employed at the time of death, was
reasonably certain to complete training for a specific profession. 36 InPeople v. Teehankee 37 no award of
compensation for loss of earning capacity was granted to the heirs of a college freshman because there
was no sufficient evidence on record to show that the victim would eventually become a professional
pilot. 38 But compensation should be allowed for loss of earning capacity resulting from the death of a
minor who has not yet commenced employment or training for a specific profession if sufficient evidence is
presented to establish the amount thereof. In the United States it has been observed:
This raises the broader question of the proper measure of damages in death cases involving
children, housewives, the old, and others who do not have market income so that there is no
pecuniary loss to survivors or to the estate of the decedent. The traditional approach was to
award no or merely nominal damages in such cases. . . . Increasingly, however, courts allow
expert testimony to be used to project those lost earnings. 39
Thus, in Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co., 40 the court allowed the heirs of a seven-year-old boy who was killed
in a car accident to recover compensation for loss of earning capacity:
Considerable evidence was presented by plaintiffs in an effort to give the jury a foundation
on which to make an award. Briefly stated, this evidence showed Charles Haumersen was a
seven-year-old of above average characteristics. He was described as "very intelligent" and
"all-American." He received high marks in school. He was active in church affairs and
participated in recreational and athletic events, often with, children older than himself. In
addition, he had an unusual talent for creating numerous cartoons and other drawings, some
of which plaintiffs introduced at trial.
The record does not disclose passion and prejudice. The key question is whether the verdict
of $100,000 has support in the evidence.
Upon analysis of the record, we conclude that we should not disturb the award.
The argument for allowing compensation for loss of earning capacity of a minor is even stronger if he or
she was a student, whether already training for a specific profession or still engaged in general studies.
In Krohmer v. Dahl, 41 the court, in affirming the award by the jury of $85,000.00 to the heirs of an
eighteen-year-old college freshman who died of carbon monoxide poisoning, stated as follows:
There are numerous cases that have held admissible evidence of prospective earnings of a
student or trainee. . . . The appellants contend that such evidence is not admissible unless
the course under study relates to a given occupation or profession and it is shown that the
student is reasonably certain to follow that occupation or profession. It is true that the
majority of these decisions deal with students who are studying for a specific occupation or
profession. However, not one of these cases indicate that evidence of one's education as a
guide to future earnings is not admissible where the student is engaged in general studies or
whose education does not relate to a specific occupation.

In sharp contrast with the situation obtaining in People v. Teehankee, where the prosecution merely
presented evidence to show the fact of the victim's graduation from high school and the fact of his
enrollment in a flying school, spouses Rosales did not content themselves with simply establishing Liza
Rosalie's enrollment at UP Integrated School. They presented evidence to show that Liza Rosalie was a
good student, promising artist, and obedient child. She consistently performed well in her studies since
grade school. 42 A survey taken in 1984 when Liza Rosalie was twelve years old showed that she had good
study habits and attitudes. 43 Cleofe Chi, guidance counselor of the University of the Philippines Integrated
School, described Liza Rosalie as personable, well-liked, and with a balanced personality. 44 Professor
Alfredo Rebillon, a faculty member of the University of the Philippines College of Fine Arts, who organized
workshops which Liza Rosalie attended in 1982 and 1983, testified that Liza Rosalie had the potential of
eventually becoming an artist. 45 Professor Rebillon's testimony is more than sufficiently established by the
51 samples of Liza Rosalie's watercolor, charcoal, and pencil drawings submitted as exhibits by the
spouses Rosales. 46 Neither MMTC nor Pedro Musa controverted this evidence.
Considering her good academic record, extra-curricular activities, and varied interests, it is reasonable to
assume that Liza Rosalie would have enjoyed a successful professional career had it not been for her
untimely death. Hence, it is proper that compensation for loss of earning capacity should be awarded to
her heirs in accordance with the formula established in decided cases 47 for computing net earning
capacity, to wit:
Net Earning = Life [Gross Necessary
Capacity Expectancy x [Annual Living
[Income Expenses
Life expectancy is equivalent to two thirds (2/3) multiplied by the difference of eighty (80) and the age of
the deceased. 48 Since Liza Rosalie was 16 at the time of her death, her life expectancy was 44 more
years. 49 Her projected gross annual income, computed based on the minimum wage for workers in the
non-agricultural sector in effect at the time of her death, 50 then fixed at P37.00, 51 is
P14,630.46. 52 Allowing for necessary living expenses of fifty percent (50%) of her projected gross annual
income, 53 her total net earning capacity amounts to P321,870.12. 54
Finally, the spouses Rosales argue that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving Conrado Tolentino, Feliciana
Celebrado, and the GSIS of liability. The Spouses Rosales alleged that Tolentino, as Acting General Manager
of the MMTC, and Celebrado, as a dispatcher thereof, were charged with the supervision of Musa and
should, therefore, be held vicariously liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. With respect to the GSIS,
they contend that it was the insurer in a contract for third party liability it had with the MMTC.
Although the fourth paragraph of Art. 2180 mentions "managers" among those made responsible for the
negligent acts of others, it is settled that this term is used in the said provision in the sense of
"employers." 55 Thus, Tolentino and Celebrado cannot be held liable for the tort of Pedro Musa.
In Vda. de Maglana v. Consolacion, 56 it was ruled that an insurer in an indemnity contract for third party
liability is directly liable to the injured party up to the extent specified in the agreement, but it cannot be
held solidarily liable beyond that amount. The GSIS admitted in its answer that it was the insurer of the
MMTC for third party liability with respect to MMTC Bus No. 27 to the extent of P50,000.00. 57 Hence, the
spouses Rosales have the option either to claim the said amount from the GSIS and the balance of the
award from MMTC and Musa or to enforce the entire judgment against the latter, subject to reimbursement
from the former to the extent of the insurance coverage. 58
One last word. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City erred in holding MMTC primarily and Musa
secondarily liable for damages arising from the death of Liza Rosalie. It was error for the appellate court to
affirm this aspect of the trial court's decision.
As already stated, MMTC is primarily liable for damages for the negligence of its employee in view of Art.
2180. Pursuant to Art. 2181, it can recover from its employee what it may pay. This does not make the
employee's liability subsidiary. It only means that if the judgment for damages is satisfied by the common
carrier, the latter has a right to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or
negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. 59 Hence, the spouses Rosales have the
option of enforcing the judgment against either MMTC or Musa.

From another point of view, Art. 2194 provides that "the responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for aquasi-delict is solidary." We ruled in Gelisan v. Alday 60 that "the registered owner/operator of a
public service vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or
third persons as a consequence of injuries sustained in the operation of said vehicle." In Baliwag Transit
Inc. v. Court of Appeals 61 it was held that "to escape solidaryliability for a quasi-delict committed by an
employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care." Finally, we
held in the recent case of Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 62 that "the liability of the
registered owner of a public service vehicle . . . for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is
primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with the driver."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one is RENDERED holding the
Metro Manila Transit Corporation and Pedro Musa jointly and severally liable for the death of Liza Rosalie R.
Rosales and ORDERING them as such to pay to the spouses Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily R. Rosales the
following amounts:
1) death indemnity in the amount of fifty-thousand pesos (P50,000,00);
2) actual damages in the amount of sixty thousand two hundred twenty six pesos and sixty five centavos
(P60,226.65);
3) moral damages in the amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
4) exemplary damages in the amount of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00);
5) attorney's fees in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);
6) compensation for loss of earning capacity in the amount of three hundred twenty-one thousand eight
hundred seventy pesos and twelve centavos (P321,870.12); and
7) the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118777. July 28, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODRIGO MANGAHAS, accused-appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision [1] dated December 2, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 16)
in Malolos, Bulacan finding accused-appellant Rodrigo Mangahas guilty of murder under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify the heirs of
the victim the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death indemnity; to pay the heirs of the
victim the sum of FOURTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETY PESOS (p14,590.00) for funeral and burial
expenses and TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY PESOS (P28, 890.00) for food during
the vigil, the 9th day, 40th day and the 1st year anniversaries of the death of the victim; and to pay the
costs.
The Information[2] dated November 26, 1990 charging Rodrigo Mangahas with the crime of murder reads as
follows:
That on or about the 14th day of August 1990, in the municipality of San Jose del Monte, province of
Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Rodrigo Mangahas

alias Mang Rudy, armed with a gun and with intent to kill one Rufino Gestala, with evident premeditation,
treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot with the said gun the said Rufino Gestala, hitting the latter on the different parts of his
body, thereby causing him serious physical injuries which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, accused, duly assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
In support of its case, the prosecution presented two alleged witnesses to the shooting incident, as
well as the doctor who performed the autopsy on the victim. The aunt of the deceased was likewise called
to testify on the civil aspect of the case.
First to testify was Police Captain Florante Baltazar, the medico-legal officer at the PC-INP, Quezon
City, who conducted the examination of the cadaver of the deceased on August 14, 1990.He testified that
according to the results of his post-mortem examination, the victim died from cardio-respiratory arrest due
to shock and hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wounds. [3] His findings showed that the deceased
sustained 3 (three) gunshot wounds, two of which were fatal as they penetrated the thoracic cavity. [4] He
estimated the distance between the assailant and the victim at more than 24 inches as he did not find any
powder burns on the body of the deceased.[5]
The prosecution next presented Diosdado Padios, an alleged witness to the shooting incident.He
testified that he had known the victim and the accused-appellant prior to the August 14, 1990 incident. On
the said date, he saw the accused and the late Rufino Gestala drinking at a store near the latters house in
Tungkong Mangga, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. [6] He was at the store at that particular time as he was just
called by the victim to discuss some matter. While the two were drinking, he saw accused-appellant
suddenly shoot Rufino Gestala, who was then seated less than one meter away from the former. He
himself, was one meter away from the two when the incident occurred. [7]
On cross-examination, it was revealed that he left his former residence on September 1990 to live with
a certain Cristy Balatbat, an aunt of the deceased. He admitted that while he was staying with Balatbat, he
depended on her for his own subsistence. [8] He likewise admitted that he was a close friend of the
deceased for more than five (5) years prior to the incident. [9]
The prosecution next presented Renato Panoso, another alleged witness to the shooting. He testified
that he recalled the date of August 14, 1990 as that was the date that his best friend Rufino Gestala was
shot.[10] While he was on his way home from work, he stopped by the store of a certain Mr. Tiangko at the
corner of Pecsonville, Barangay Tungkong, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan to talk to the victim about the job
in Bahrain they were both applying for. [11] They had been conversing for about four (4) minutes when Rudy
Mangahas arrived. Therafter, the accused bought three (3) bottles of beer and offered one each to him and
the victim.[12] They had been drinking for only a short time when the accused suddenly approached Rufino
Gestala, pulled out a gun and shot him. [13] After the shooting and upon seeing Gestala bloodied and
clutching his chest, the witness ran away in the direction of his house and reported the matter to his uncle.
[14]
On cross-examination, it was gathered that Rufino Gestala was his best friend, having known him for
about six (6) years prior to his death. [15] Ibid., p. 21.15 He also stated that he transferred his residence to
Fort Bonifacio in the last week of October 1990 but prior to that, he, like witness Diosdado Padios, was
staying in the house of Trinidad Balatbat, the aunt of the deceased. He admitted that he depended on
Balatbat for his daily sustenance while he was staying with her and that he consulted with Trinidad
Balatbat before giving his statement to the Office of the Public Prosecutor. [16]
On questions propounded by the trial court, the witness testified that at the time of the alleged
shooting incident, he was at the left side of the victim while the accused was in front of the victim.He was
the only one sitting on the sill of the store while the victim was leaning on it. [17] He likewise stated that the
accused took only one step towards them as he was just in front of the victim and that the barrel of the
gun was less than one foot away from the chest of the victim. He likewise recalled that at the time of the
incident, he saw witness Diosdado Padios but the latter did not drink beer nor was he offered one as he
was just passing by.[18]
The aunt of the victim, Trinidad Balatbat, was likewise presented and she testified mainly on the
expenses their family incurred as a result of the death of the victim. [19]
For its part, the defense admitted that the accused shot the victim but alleged that the killing was
done in self-defense. In support, counsel for the accused presented three witnesses, namely: the accused-
appellant Rodrigo Mangahas, Nestor dela Rosa, and SP03 Mario Fernandez.
Accused-appellant narrated that on August 14, 1990 at past 1:00 p.m., he was on his was on his way
home from work to check up on his lunch. [20] When he was near the sari-sari store of Tiangco, he was called
by Renato Panoso who was then talking with the victim Gestala. [21] Gestala was then sitting on
the pasimano in front of the store while Renato Panoso was standing on the other side. [22]When he
approached them, Panoso got a gun from behind his waist, showed it to the accused and offered it to him
saying, Bilihin mo na lang ito, mahusay ito, to which the accused replied, mahirap yan. [23] Gestala, who was
standing about one (1) meter away from them suddenly raised his voice and said, Putang-ina mo mahusay
naman yong isinasanla namin sa iyo bat ayaw mong tanggapin?[24] In order to pacify them, he offered them
bottles of beer. After they had consumed one-half of the bottles of beer, Gestala, who was then about two
meters away from him, said, Putang-ina mo bat ayaw mong tanggapin yon ay mahusay
naman. Immediately thereafter, Gestala pulled out a gun from the right side of his body, poked it at him
and squeezed the trigger. The gun did not fire however. The accused then moved away from Gestala
towards the pasimano of the store and bumped Panoso. He was able to take hold of the gun which was on
the pasimano of the store and he fired the same at Gestala. [25]
The accused stressed that he fired only once at Gestala as he was only defending himself and that he
threw away the gun which he used right after the incident. [26] After he fired at Gestala, the latter, still
carrying his gun, ran away towards the back portion of the store. He himself ran way after the shooting
incident as he was confused and afraid of the group of Gestala. [27] When he had calmed down, he went to
the barangay hall of Barangay Tungkong Mangga to surrender himself and explain his side but nobody was
there when he arrived. Upon returning to his house, he was told that the group of Panoso had been looking
for him. Because of this threat on his life, he left the place and went to his in-laws at Sta. Maria, Bulacan. [28]
On cross-examination, he testified that he has known Renato Panoso for about a year and Rufino
Gestala for about 3 years before the incident. [29] He characterized Rufino Gestala as an intimidating person
and that his group is known in Pecsonville as notorious for taking drugs. [30] He further claimed that Gestalas
source of income while he was still alive was selling marijuana and drugs. [31] The accused also testified
having seen witness Diosdado Padios in the store on August 14, 1990 talking to Gestala but when the
shooting incident occured, Padios was about 3 or 4 meters away from the store. [32] He admitted that
Padioss view of the shooting was unobstructed by any barrier. [33] When asked why it was Gestala who got
angry with him when he refused to get the gun from Panoso, the accused said that Gestala and Panoso
were associates in the business of selling guns. [34] He clarified that Gestala poked the gun at him only once,
while he also shot at the victim only once while they were both standing up. He did not know that the
victim was hit and had suffered three gunshot wounds. [35] Finally, it was found out that after the accused
failed to find anyone in the barangay hall, he did not try to report the matter to the police authorities
within San Juan del Monte nor did he do so when he was in the house of his in-laws. [36]
For his part, Nestor dela Rosa collaborated the accuseds account of the incident. He testified that at
about 1:00 p.m. on August 14, 1990 he was at the Quirino Highway, San Jose del Monte some 150 meters
away from the place of his Comadre in Pecsonville. [37] He was walking towards his destination when he saw
four persons in front of a store but one was about to leave. [38] Of the four, he was only able to recognize the
accused as he had previously worked with him. As he continued walking; he saw one person whom he did
not recognize holding a gun. He saw this person squeeze the trigger of the gun although it did not fire.
[39]
He then saw the accused pick up something from the counter of the store and then he heard a shot. He
did not know what happened right after as he ran away from the scene out of fear. [40]
On cross-examination, he stated that the man on the right side of Mangahas did not do anything to
pacify the man holding the gun.[41] He testified that he heard only one shot fired by accused-appellant [42] He
admitted further that he did not report the incident to the police authorities in San Jose del Monte because
he was not advised by anyone.[43]
Finally, the defense presented SP03 Mario Fernandez who testified on the procedures undertaken by
his police detachment in investigating the shooting of Rufino Gestala. [44]
On December 2,1993,the Court a quo rendered the disputed judgment.
On January 26, 1994, accused-appellant, through counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
lower courts December 2, 1993 Decision where he urged the court to reconsider its ruling or if it should
affirm its conclusion that self-defense was not duly proven, then he should be sentenced only for homicide,
the qualifying circumstance of treachery not being present. After due hearing where accused-appellant
testified anew on his behalf, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated July 22,
1994.[45]
Hence, the present appeal where accused-appellant raises the sole assignment of error that the trial
court erred in concluding that herein accused-appellant failed to prove any basic element of self-defense.
After a thorough review of the records of the case and a careful consideration of the arguments of
accused-appellant, the Court does not find enough basis to reverse the judgment of conviction.
Accused-appellants plea of self-defense once again brings the Court to the crucial question of
credibility of witnesses and the weight that should be given to testimonial evidence. On this issue, the
Court has almost invariably ruled that the matter of assigning value to the declaration of witnesses is best
done by trial courts which, unlike appellate courts, can assess such testimony in the light of the demeanor,
conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial stage and thus, unless cogent reasons are shown, the
findings of the trial court are accorded great respect and credit. [46]
In discrediting the defense of accused-appellant that he shot the victim in self-defense, the trial court
held:
Accuseds defense is devoid of merit. At first, accused put up the defense of alibi when the instant case was
being investigated by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan (Exhs. N, N-1, and N-2). Then, he
sets up self-defense at the trial on the merits of the case. These two defenses are incompatible with each
other. They do not at all provide shield to the accused to ward off the commission of the crime charged
against him. Setting up such contradictory defenses will lead to the conclusion that the accused is
confused of what defense is for real. This being so, accuseds testimony is wanting of credence at the
outset.
Finally, however, accused adopts self-defense saying that the victim pulled out a gun from his right side
then poked it to the accused, squeezed its trigger once but misfired. Reacting to the situation, accused
picked up the gun from the pasimano of the store, fired it once to the victim and then ran away from the
scene of the incident. Analyzing the testimony of the accused, the inevitable conclusion would be that such
testimony is unreasonable and improbable. If the victim really intended to kill the accused, it is natural for
him, under the situation, to squeeze the trigger of his gun not only once if the first squeeze missed, but for
several times until his gun fired or to pick up the gun on the pasimano of the store and use it instead in
shooting the accused. It is inconceivable also that the victim would have to kill the accused just because
the latter refused to buy or accept as pledge the gun Renato Panoso was offering to the
accused. Incidentally, the alleged gun of the victim was not presented in Court. Likewise unbelievable is
the claim of the accused that he picked up the gun from the pasimano of the store then shot the victim. At
the moment of the incident, accused was facing the store and 1 meter, more or less, away from the victim
who was sitting on the said pasimano indicating that that the victim was nearer to the gun on the
pasimano than him. This being so, the victim should have picked up the gun from the pasimano ahead of
the accused or should have grappled for the gun taken by the accused after his gun misfired at first
squeeze of the trigger. This should have been the natural reaction of the victim when his life was placed in
imminent danger after his gun misfired.
Moreover, it is strange why Renato Panoso a best friend of the victim and who was much nearer to the gun
on the pasimano than the accused and the victim did not react to the situation when the life of his best
friend was in imminent danger. It is likewise strange why Renato Panoso should place and leave the gun on
the pasimano and then continued drinking beer while the transaction on the gun has already been
through.
Another doubt on the testimonies of the accused and his witness Nestor dela Rosa lies on their claims that
the accused fired his gun only once. The victim sustained 3 gunshot wounds of separate and different
entries and exits on his body. For a single shot to produce those wounds is highly irreconcilable. Further,
the accused claimed as he demonstrated in open Court, that while he was standing he pointed his gun
towards the victim at the level of his (accuseds) chest. The accused and the victim were of the same
height. If the accused fired his gun in the position demonstrated, the wounds would be through and
through straight at the level of the chest from the point of entry to the point of exit. But, as it will be noted
in Exh. B, the 2 gunshot wounds of the victim were through and through from his chest towards the lower
exit at his back, indicating that the position of the accused was higher than that of the victims when the
fatal shots were fired. In other words, the allege position of the accused is inconsistent with the location
and direction of the wounds. It is rather consistent with the established facts that the accused was
standing when he shot the victim who was then sitting and facing him. In the case of People vs. Kok Tieck
Hong, G.R. Nos. 48535-36, Dec. 21, 1990, the Supreme Court held:
As repeatedly expounded by this Court, evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a
credible source but must, in addition, be credible in itself. And by this is meant that it shall be natural,
reasonable and probable as to make it easy to believe. No better test has yet been found to determine
the value of the testimony of a witness than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience
of mankind.
By the same token, the corroborating testimony of defense witness Nestor dela Rosa likewise lacks
credence. The fact that he could not identify or name the person who pointed a gun to the accused and
squeezed its trigger once but misfired and other persons in the group, even as he has already discussed
the incident with the accused, indicates that he was not an eye witness to the incident.
It is doctrinal that the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is left largely to the trial court
because of its opportunity, unavailable to the appellate court, to see witnesses on the stand and determine
by their conduct and demeanor whether they are testifying truthfully or are simply lying.The determination
of credibility is the domain of the trail court, and the matter of assigning values to the testimonies of the
witnesses is best performed by it; thus the evaluation by the trial judge on the credibility of witnesses is
well nigh conclusive on this Court. [47]
At the onset, the trial court was correct in pointing out the inconsistent defenses put up by the
accused during the preliminary investigation and trial of the case. As noted by the prosecution, the
accused, during the preliminary investigation of the case, executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay[48] dated
October 18, 1990 wherein he alleged that at the time of the incident, he was with three other persons in
Caloocan City and not at the scene of the shooting incident. At the trial of the case however, accused
makes a complete turn-around and claims that he was at the scene of the crime but that he shot the victim
only in self-defense.
Verily, these two defenses are incompatible with each other. As such, they do not at all provide shield
to the accused to ward off the crime imputed against him. When a witness makes two statements, both
being sworn to as a witness in one case, and these statements incur in the gravest contradiction, then the
court cannot accept either the first or the second statements as proof. He himself by his own act of giving

false testimony impeaches his own testimony and the court is compelled to exclude it from all
consideration.[49]
Accused-appellant contradicts himself again in his testimony during the hearing on his Motion for
Reconsideration of the December 2, 1993 Decision. In an apparent effort to address certain perceived
discrepancies between his previous testimony and the evidence presented, accused-appellant, in the April
21, 1994 hearing on his motion for reconsideration, testified:
Q: After that when Rufino received that gun from Renato Panoso what this Rufino Gestala did the gun?
A: He put the gun in the pasimano, sir.
Q: What happened next?
A: He started cursing, sir.
Q: Can you tell to this Hon. Court what these bad words or uttered those words?
A: He uttered the words, Putang-Ina mo kaya nga kita pinatawag dahil nakasabit lang kami, sir.
Q: What was your answer?
A: I told them Im sorry I cannot accede to their request because believe that is illegal and Im afraid that
my business will be affected, sir.
Q: What was the tune of the voice of Mr. Rufino when he uttered those words?
A: He was cursing with a loud voice that is the reason why the vendors inside got afraid.
Q: When he uttered those words, what was the relative position of this Rufino Gestala?
A: He was standing, sir.
Q: When you answered that baka masabit ako dahil illegal iyan, what did you do, if any?
A: Because he was already irritated and Im also irritated, sir. I ordered two (2) bottles of beer and I gave
to them, sir.
Q: Does this Rufino remained in standing when you offered the two (2) bottles of beer?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After that what happened next if any?
A: I turned it my back.
Q: When you turned his back, what happened?
A: He cursed me, sir.
Q: What are the bad words he uttered?
A: He uttered these words Putang-Ina Mo wala ka palang silbi kaya nga kita pinatawag dahil talagang
kailangang-kailangan ko ang pera, sir.
Q: What is the tune of his voice when he uttered these words?
A: Loud voice, sir.
Q: When you heard that, what did you do, if any?
A: I faced them, sir.
Q: When you faced, what happened?
A: Rufino Gestala pulled his gun, sir.
Q: What did he do with his gun?
A: When I faced them he started shooting me but the gun did not fire me, sir he was holding the gun
tightly, sir.
Q: So you want to impress this Hon. Court, Mr. Witness that when he first squeezed the trigger he tried
again to squeeze the trigger?
A: Yes sir. He was squeezing the gun, sir. (Witness demonstrating his two hands).
Q: When he tried to squeeze the trigger of the gun, what did you do?
A: I saw the gun in the pasimano so I got it, sir.
Q: Now you said there is a Renato Panoso, can you tell what is the relative position with you this Renato
Panoso when you grabbed gun at the pasimano?
A: Renato Panoso was in my right side the gun was in front of me that is why when I took the gun from
the pasimano even if Renato Panoso, sir.
Q: You mean to say that this Renato Panoso never act or anything?
A: Both of us were trying to get possession of the gun, sir.
Q: Were you able to grab the possession of the gun which is in the pasimano, did you get the gun?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you do with the gun?
A: After getting the gun I shot Rufino Gestala of course I have to shot because he is already shot me, sir.
Q: What was the real position of Rufino Gestala when you fired the gun when you grabbed the gun in
the pasimano?
A: He was standing, sir.
Q: Still holding with that gun?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you recall how many shots did you fire the gun?
A: Twice, sir.
Q: Can you tell the exact position of the arm when he holds the gun or when you fired the gun which
you grabbed at the pasimano?
A: He was holding the gun with his two (2) hands as squeezing that trigger of the gun, sir. [50]
The discrepancies in his two testimonies are too glaring to overlook. In the trial proper of the case,
accused-appellant testified that he fired his gun at the victim only once, [51] that the victim Rufino Gestala
poked the gun at accused-appellant and squeezed the trigger only once, [52] and that Renato Panoso got the
gun from the back of his waist and offered it to him for sale. [53] However, during his testimony in his motion
for reconsideration, he contradicted himself by testifying that he fired at the victim twice; that the victim
poked his gun at him and squeezed the trigger continuously when it did not fire; and that when Renato
Panoso approached him to offer him the gun, he (Panoso) was already holding the gun. Verily, accused-
appellant corrected his testimony to address certain points raised against him by the judge in his
December 2, 1994 Decision. In doing so, however, accused-appellant raised further doubts on the
truthfulness of his allegations.
Another factor which contributes further to the doubtfulness of the veracity of the testimony of the
accused and his witness Nestor dela Rosa is their insistence that accused-appellant shot the victim only
once. As stated by the medico-legal officer in his direct examination, the victim sustained three (3)
gunshot wounds with three (3) different exit and entry points on different parts of the victims body. [54] If, as
accused-appellant insists, there was only one shot fired, it would be impossible for the single bullet to
produce such wounds. Moreover, accused-appellant claims that he pointed his gun towards the victim at
the level of his chest while the latter was standing.Considering that the accused and the victim were of the
same height, the wounds suffered by the victim would have gone straight through and through from the
point of entry on his chest up to the exit point on his back. But as noted by the medico-legal officer in his
report,[55] the 2 gunshot wounds of the victim exited on the lower back of the victim, indicating that
accused was in a higher position than the victim when he fired the fatal shots. Thus, the alleged position of
the accused as stated in his testimony is inconsistent with the location and direction of the wounds
suffered by the victim.
Likewise, the presence of several gunshot wounds on the body of the victim is physical evidence which
eloquently refutes accused-appellants allegation of self-defense. [56] As previously stated, the medico-legal
officer who conducted the post-mortem examination testified that the victim suffered three gunshot
wounds, two of which were fatal. If the appellant merely intended to defend himself from the supposed
aggression of the victim, he could have easily repelled that aggression with one or two shots on any non-
vital part of the victims body. Also, appellant could have run away from the victim at the time that the
victims gun supposedly misfired instead of shooting him 3 times.Thus, the location, number and gravity of
the wounds of the victim belie appellants pretension that he acted in self-defense. [57]
A final indication of appellants guilt is his flight after shooting. His claim that he fled because of the
threats allegedly made by the victims friends and relatives is not sufficient reason for him not to surrender
to the police since the latter could have adequately protected him if there were really threats to his
life. Indeed, flight strongly indicates a guilty mind and betrays the existence of a guilty conscience. [58]
The next issue to settle is whether treachery can be appreciated to qualify the crime into murder.In
finding the presence of treachery in the fatal shooting of Mangahas, the court a quo ruled that:
Putting the foregoing facts together will clearly show that the prosecution has fully established the basic
elements of the offense charged against herein accused. In other words, herein accused suddenly shot the
victim to death while the latter was seated on the pasimano of the store drinking beer. The victim was
entirely defenseless at all and not in a position to retaliate when he was shot.Such means employed by the
accused constitutes treachery as it directly insured the execution of the offense without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the victim might make.[59]

Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is
present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. [60]For treachery to be appreciated
as a qualifying circumstance, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution which
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution is
deliberately or consciously adopted.[61]
After a thorough perusal of the records of the case, we do not agree with the trial courts conclusion
that treachery attended the shooting of the victim. No convincing evidence supports such a finding. The
eyewitnesses accounts were unclear in details, and we cannot fairly deduce that the means of execution of
the crime used by accused-appellant were deliberately or consciously adopted or that the person attacked
had no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate.
Witness Diosdado Padios, who, according to his testimony, was at a distance of one (1) meter away
from the crime scene,[62] merely declared as follows:
Q: When you saw Rufino Gestala and Rodrigo Mangahas on that particular date and time, do you recall
having witnessed any unusual incident that happened?
A: None, sir.
Q: What were they doing at that time in the store?
A: They were drinking, sir.
Q: While drinking what happened next, if any?
A: Rodrigo Mangahas suddenly shoot him, sir.
Q: To whom did Rodrigo Mangahas shoot?
A: Rufino Gestala, sir.
Q: What happened to Rufino Gestala after he was shot?
A: I dont know, sir I ran away.[63]
For his part, witness Renato Panoso, who was with the victim when the shooting incident occurred,
testified, as follows:
Q: At the lapse of four minutes that you mentioned what happened if there is anything that happened?
A: Rudy Mangahas arrived, sir.
Q: When Mang Rudy Mangahas arrived did you notice if he has companion?
A: None, sir.
Q: When Mang Rudy Mangahas arrived what happened if there is anything that happened?
A: He bought three (3) bottles of beer and he even offered Rufino and I, sir.
Q: The beer that was offered to you were you able to consume it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: While the three of you Rufino Gestala and Rudy Mangahas were drinking up to what time was this
drinking went on?
A: For a short time, sir.
Q: You said that it is only for a short time what happened if there is anything that happened, Mr.
Witness?
A: He approached Rufino, sir.
Q: And then at about how many distance was he when you said he approached Rufino Gestala?
A: He was near because I was beside Rufino, sir.
Q: After Rudy Mangahas approached near Rufino Gestala what did you see if there is anything that you
see?
A: I saw him pulled out a gun, sir.
Q: Who pulled out a gun?
A: Mang Rudy Mangahas, sir.
Q: And then what happened after Mang Rudy Mangahas pulled out a gun if there is anything that
happened?
A: He immediately shot Rufino, sir.

Q: And did you see if Rufino Gestala was hit after he was shot by Rudy Mangahas?
A: I saw it, sir.
Q: After that what did you see happened to Rufino Gestala?
A: I saw him bloody holding his left chest, sir.
Q: You in particular what did you do after that?
A: I scampered, sir.[64]
Thus, from testimonies of the eyewitnesses, the only proof that the attack was treacherous is their
bare testimonies that the accused-appellant suddenly shot the victim. However, there is no treachery
where there is no evidence proving that the accused consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of
attack to insure execution without risk to himself - mere suddenness of attack would not, by itself,
constitute treachery.[65] In fact, the circumstances surrounding the case belie the trial courts finding that
treachery was present. The shooting occurred in broad daylight. The victim was openly conversing with
accused-appellant for several minutes before the incident. The victim himself was with his best friend who
could have come to his aid at anytime. Verily, if accused-appellant wanted to insure that no risk would
come to him, he could have chosen another time and place to shoot the victim.
The evidence then for the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused for the crime of homicide only, not murder. The penalty imposed for homicide in Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal.
Considering the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances and applying in his favor the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, we may thus sentence the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor , as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties
prescribed by law.[66]
In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00
as death indemnity to the heirs of the deceased. [67] With respect to the actual damages incurred by the
relatives of the deceased, we have previously held:
Of the expenses allegedly incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by receipt and
which appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake, or burial of the
victim. Thus, the Court cannot take account of receipts showing expenses incurred before the date of
slaying of the victim; those incurred after a considerable lapse of time from the burial of the victim and
which do not have any relation to the death, wake, or burial of the victim; those incurred for purely
aesthetic or social purposes, such as the lining of the tomb of the victim [68]
Thus, from the evidence presented before the lower court, we affirm the award of P14,590.00 for
funeral and burial expenses as these were properly supported by receipts [69] and proven during the trial of
the case. However, we reduce the amount awarded as actual damages for food served during the burial of
the victim to P7,285.00 which cover only those expenses incurred during the wake and vigil of the victim.
[70]
The other expenses relating to the 9 th day, 40th day and 1st year death anniversaries are deleted as
these were incurred after a considerable lapse of time from the burial of the victim.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED, and the accused-
appellant is found GUILTY OF HOMICIDE and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the
death indemnity of P50,000.00; and actual damages of P21,875.00.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81026 April 3, 1990
PAN MALAYAN INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ERLINDA FABIE AND HER UNKNOWN DRIVER, respondents.
Regulus E. Cabote & Associates for petitioner.

Benito P. Fabie for private respondents.

CORTES, J.:
Petitioner Pan Malayan Insurance Company (PANMALAY) seeks the reversal of a decision of the Court of
Appeals which upheld an order of the trial court dismissing for no cause of action PANMALAY's complaint
for damages against private respondents Erlinda Fabie and her driver.
The principal issue presented for resolution before this Court is whether or not the insurer PANMALAY may
institute an action to recover the amount it had paid its assured in settlement of an insurance claim
against private respondents as the parties allegedly responsible for the damage caused to the insured
vehicle.
On December 10, 1985, PANMALAY filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Makati against private
respondents Erlinda Fabie and her driver. PANMALAY averred the following: that it insured a Mitsubishi Colt
Lancer car with plate No. DDZ-431 and registered in the name of Canlubang Automotive Resources
Corporation [CANLUBANG]; that on May 26, 1985, due to the "carelessness, recklessness, and imprudence"
of the unknown driver of a pick-up with plate no. PCR-220, the insured car was hit and suffered damages in
the amount of P42,052.00; that PANMALAY defrayed the cost of repair of the insured car and, therefore,
was subrogated to the rights of CANLUBANG against the driver of the pick-up and his employer, Erlinda
Fabie; and that, despite repeated demands, defendants, failed and refused to pay the claim of PANMALAY.
Private respondents, thereafter, filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars and a supplemental motion thereto. In
compliance therewith, PANMALAY clarified, among others, that the damage caused to the insured car was
settled under the "own damage", coverage of the insurance policy, and that the driver of the insured car
was, at the time of the accident, an authorized driver duly licensed to drive the vehicle. PANMALAY also
submitted a copy of the insurance policy and the Release of Claim and Subrogation Receipt executed by
CANLUBANG in favor of PANMALAY.
On February 12, 1986, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that PANMALAY had no cause
of action against them. They argued that payment under the "own damage" clause of the insurance policy
precluded subrogation under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, since indemnification thereunder was made on
the assumption that there was no wrongdoer or no third party at fault.
After hearings conducted on the motion, opposition thereto, reply and rejoinder, the RTC issued an order
dated June 16, 1986 dismissing PANMALAY's complaint for no cause of action. On August 19, 1986, the RTC
denied PANMALAY's motion for reconsideration.
On appeal taken by PANMALAY, these orders were upheld by the Court of Appeals on November 27, 1987.
Consequently, PANMALAY filed the present petition for review.
After private respondents filed its comment to the petition, and petitioner filed its reply, the Court
considered the issues joined and the case submitted for decision.
Deliberating on the various arguments adduced in the pleadings, the Court finds merit in the petition.
PANMALAY alleged in its complaint that, pursuant to a motor vehicle insurance policy, it had indemnified
CANLUBANG for the damage to the insured car resulting from a traffic accident allegedly caused by the
negligence of the driver of private respondent, Erlinda Fabie. PANMALAY contended, therefore, that its
cause of action against private respondents was anchored upon Article 2207 of the Civil Code, which
reads:
If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance
company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the
insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the
person who has violated the contract. . . .
PANMALAY is correct.
Article 2207 of the Civil Code is founded on the well-settled principle of subrogation. If the insured property
is destroyed or damaged through the fault or negligence of a party other than the assured, then the
insurer, upon payment to the assured, will be subrogated to the rights of the assured to recover from the
wrongdoer to the extent that the insurer has been obligated to pay. Payment by the insurer to the assured
operates as an equitable assignment to the former of all remedies which the latter may have against the
third party whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. The right of subrogation is not dependent
upon, nor does it grow out of, any privity of contract or upon written assignment of claim. It accrues simply
upon payment of the insurance claim by the insurer [Compania Maritima v. Insurance Company of North

America, G.R. No. L-18965, October 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 213; Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. Jamilla
& Company, Inc., G.R. No. L-27427, April 7, 1976, 70 SCRA 323].
There are a few recognized exceptions to this rule. For instance, if the assured by his own act releases the
wrongdoer or third party liable for the loss or damage, from liability, the insurer's right of subrogation is
defeated [Phoenix Ins. Co. of Brooklyn v. Erie & Western Transport, Co., 117 US 312, 29 L. Ed. 873 (1886);
Insurance Company of North America v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co., 229 F 2d 705 (1956)]. Similarly,
where the insurer pays the assured the value of the lost goods without notifying the carrier who has in
good faith settled the assured's claim for loss, the settlement is binding on both the assured and the
insurer, and the latter cannot bring an action against the carrier on his right of subrogation [McCarthy v.
Barber Steamship Lines, Inc., 45 Phil. 488 (1923)]. And where the insurer pays the assured for a loss which
is not a risk covered by the policy, thereby effecting "voluntary payment", the former has no right of
subrogation against the third party liable for the loss [Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening v. Qua Chee
Gan, G. R. No. L-22146, September 5, 1967, 21 SCRA 12].
None of the exceptions are availing in the present case.
The lower court and Court of Appeals, however, were of the opinion that PANMALAY was not legally
subrogated under Article 2207 of the Civil Code to the rights of CANLUBANG, and therefore did not have
any cause of action against private respondents. On the one hand, the trial court held that payment by
PANMALAY of CANLUBANG's claim under the "own damage" clause of the insurance policy was an
admission by the insurer that the damage was caused by the assured and/or its representatives. On the
other hand, the Court of Appeals in applying theejusdem generis rule held that Section III-1 of the policy,
which was the basis for settlement of CANLUBANG's claim, did not cover damage arising from collision or
overturning due to the negligence of third parties as one of the insurable risks. Both tribunals concluded
that PANMALAY could not now invoke Article 2207 and claim reimbursement from private respondents as
alleged wrongdoers or parties responsible for the damage.
The above conclusion is without merit.
It must be emphasized that the lower court's ruling that the "own damage" coverage under the policy
impliesdamage to the insured car caused by the assured itself, instead of third parties, proceeds from an
incorrect comprehension of the phrase "own damage" as used by the insurer. When PANMALAY utilized the
phrase "own damage" a phrase which, incidentally, is not found in the insurance policy to define the
basis for its settlement of CANLUBANG's claim under the policy, it simply meant that it had assumed to
reimburse the costs for repairing the damage to the insured vehicle [See PANMALAY's Compliance with
Supplementary Motion for Bill of Particulars, p. 1; Record, p. 31]. It is in this sense that the so-called "own
damage" coverage under Section III of the insurance policy is differentiated from Sections I and IV-1 which
refer to "Third Party Liability" coverage (liabilities arising from the death of, or bodily injuries suffered by,
third parties) and from Section IV-2 which refer to "Property Damage" coverage (liabilities arising from
damage caused by the insured vehicle to the properties of third parties).
Neither is there merit in the Court of Appeals' ruling that the coverage of insured risks under Section III-1
of the policy does not include to the insured vehicle arising from collision or overturning due to the
negligent acts of the third party. Not only does it stem from an erroneous interpretation of the provisions of
the section, but it also violates a fundamental rule on the interpretation of property insurance contracts.
It is a basic rule in the interpretation of contracts that the terms of a contract are to be construed
according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties thereto have used. In the case of
property insurance policies, the evident intention of the contracting parties, i.e., the insurer and the
assured, determine the import of the various terms and provisions embodied in the policy. It is only when
the terms of the policy are ambiguous, equivocal or uncertain, such that the parties themselves disagree
about the meaning of particular provisions, that the courts will intervene. In such an event, the policy will
be construed by the courts liberally in favor of the assured and strictly against the insurer [Union
Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Philippine Guaranty Co., Inc., G.R., No. L-27932, October 30, 1972, 47 SCRA 271;
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43706, November 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 533;
Pacific Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41014, November 28, 1988, 168 SCRA
1. Also Articles 1370-1378 of the Civil Code].
Section III-1 of the insurance policy which refers to the conditions under which the insurer PANMALAY is
liable to indemnify the assured CANLUBANG against damage to or loss of the insured vehicle, reads as
follows:
SECTION III LOSS OR DAMAGE
1. The Company will, subject to the Limits of Liability, indemnify the Insured against loss of or
damage to the Scheduled Vehicle and its accessories and spare parts whilst thereon:

(a) by accidental collision or overturning, or collision or overturning consequent upon
mechanical breakdown or consequent upon wear and tear;
(b) by fire, external explosion, self ignition or lightning or burglary, housebreaking or theft;
(c) by malicious act;
(d) whilst in transit (including the processes of loading and unloading) incidental to such
transit by road, rail, inland, waterway, lift or elevator.
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "A-1" of PANMALAY's Compliance with Supplementary Motion for Bill of Particulars; Record,
p. 34; Emphasis supplied].
PANMALAY contends that the coverage of insured risks under the above section, specifically Section III-
1(a), is comprehensive enough to include damage to the insured vehicle arising from collision or
overturning due to the fault or negligence of a third party. CANLUBANG is apparently of the same
understanding. Based on a police report wherein the driver of the insured car reported that after the
vehicle was sideswiped by a pick-up, the driver thereof fled the scene [Record, p. 20], CANLUBANG filed its
claim with PANMALAY for indemnification of the damage caused to its car. It then accepted payment from
PANMALAY, and executed a Release of Claim and Subrogation Receipt in favor of latter.
Considering that the very parties to the policy were not shown to be in disagreement regarding the
meaning and coverage of Section III-1, specifically sub-paragraph (a) thereof, it was improper for the
appellate court to indulge in contract construction, to apply the ejusdem generis rule, and to ascribe
meaning contrary to the clear intention and understanding of these parties.
It cannot be said that the meaning given by PANMALAY and CANLUBANG to the phrase "by accidental
collision or overturning" found in the first paint of sub-paragraph (a) is untenable. Although the terms
"accident" or "accidental" as used in insurance contracts have not acquired a technical meaning, the Court
has on several occasions defined these terms to mean that which takes place "without one's foresight or
expectation, an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and,
therefore, not expected" [De la Cruz v. The Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-21574, June 30,
1966, 17 SCRA 559; Filipino Merchants Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85141, November
28, 1989]. Certainly, it cannot be inferred from jurisprudence that these terms, without qualification,
exclude events resulting in damage or loss due to the fault, recklessness or negligence of third parties. The
concept "accident" is not necessarily synonymous with the concept of "no fault". It may be utilized simply
to distinguish intentional or malicious acts from negligent or careless acts of man.
Moreover, a perusal of the provisions of the insurance policy reveals that damage to, or loss of, the insured
vehicle due to negligent or careless acts of third parties is not listed under the general and specific
exceptions to the coverage of insured risks which are enumerated in detail in the insurance policy itself
[See Annex "A-1" of PANMALAY's Compliance with Supplementary Motion for Bill of Particulars, supra.]
The Court, furthermore. finds it noteworthy that the meaning advanced by PANMALAY regarding the
coverage of Section III-1(a) of the policy is undeniably more beneficial to CANLUBANG than that insisted
upon by respondents herein. By arguing that this section covers losses or damages due not only to
malicious, but also to negligent acts of third parties, PANMALAY in effect advocates for a more
comprehensive coverage of insured risks. And this, in the final analysis, is more in keeping with the
rationale behind the various rules on the interpretation of insurance contracts favoring the assured or
beneficiary so as to effect the dominant purpose of indemnity or payment [SeeCalanoc v. Court of Appeals,
98 Phil. 79 (1955); Del Rosario v. The Equitable Insurance and Casualty Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-16215, June 29,
1963, 8 SCRA 343; Serrano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35529, July 16, 1984, 130 SCRA 327].
Parenthetically, even assuming for the sake of argument that Section III-1(a) of the insurance policy does
not cover damage to the insured vehicle caused by negligent acts of third parties, and that PANMALAY's
settlement of CANLUBANG's claim for damages allegedly arising from a collision due to private
respondents' negligence would amount to unwarranted or "voluntary payment", dismissal of PANMALAY's
complaint against private respondents for no cause of action would still be a grave error of law.
For even if under the above circumstances PANMALAY could not be deemed subrogated to the rights of its
assured under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, PANMALAY would still have a cause of action against private
respondents. In the pertinent case of Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening v. Qua Chee Gan, supra., the
Court ruled that the insurer who may have no rights of subrogation due to "voluntary" payment may
nevertheless recover from the third party responsible for the damage to the insured property under Article
1236 of the Civil Code.

In conclusion, it must be reiterated that in this present case, the insurer PANMALAY as subrogee merely
prays that it be allowed to institute an action to recover from third parties who allegedly caused damage to
the insured vehicle, the amount which it had paid its assured under the insurance policy. Having thus
shown from the above discussion that PANMALAY has a cause of action against third parties whose
negligence may have caused damage to CANLUBANG's car, the Court holds that there is no legal obstacle
to the filing by PANMALAY of a complaint for damages against private respondents as the third parties
allegedly responsible for the damage. Respondent Court of Appeals therefore committed reversible error in
sustaining the lower court's order which dismissed PANMALAY's complaint against private respondents for
no cause of action. Hence, it is now for the trial court to determine if in fact the damage caused to the
insured vehicle was due to the "carelessness, recklessness and imprudence" of the driver of private
respondent Erlinda Fabie.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the present petition is GRANTED. Petitioner's complaint for damages
against private respondents is hereby REINSTATED. Let the case be remanded to the lower court for trial on
the merits.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24043 April 25, 1968
RIZAL SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY and MANILA PORT SERVICE, defendants-appellees.
Gil R. Carlos and Associates for plaintiff-appellant.

D. F. Macaranas and M. C. Gonzales for defendants-appellees.
FERNANDO, J.:
In this suit for the recovery of the amount paid by the plaintiff, Rizal Surety and Insurance Company, to the
consignee based on the applicable Civil Code provision,1 which speak to the effect that the Insurance
Company "shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured," it is its contention that it is entitled to the
amount paid by it in full, by virtue of the insurance contract. The lower court, however, relying on the
limited liability clause on a management contract with the defendants, could not go along with such a
theory. Hence, this appeal.
The facts were stipulated. The more pertinent follows: That on or about November 29, 1960, the vessel, SS
Flying Trader, loaded on board at Genoa, Italy for shipment to Manila, Philippines, among other cargoes, 6
cases OMH, Special Single Colour Offset Press Machine, for which Bill of Lading No. 1 was issued, consigned
to Suter Inc.; that such vessel arrived at the Port of Manila, Philippines on or about January 16, 1961 and
subsequently discharged complete and in good order the aforementioned shipment into the custody of
defendant Manila Port Service as arrastre operator; that in the course of the handling, one of the six cases
identified as Case No. 2143 containing the OMH, Special Single Colour Offset Press, while the same was
being lifted and loaded by the crane of the Manila Port Service into the consignee's truck, it was dropped
by the crane and as a consequence, the machine was heavily damaged for which plaintiff as insurer paid
to the consignee, Suter Inc. the amount of P16,500.00, representing damages by way of costs of
replacement parts and repairs to put the machine in working condition, plus the sum of P180.70 which
plaintiff paid to the International Adjustment Bureau as adjuster's fee for the survey conducted on the
damaged cargo or a total of P16,680.70 representing plaintiff's liability under the insurance contract; and
that the arrastre charges in this particular shipment was paid on the weight or measurement basis
whichever is higher, and not on the value thereof.2
Clause 15 of the management contract which as admitted by the plaintiff, appeared "at the dorsal part of
the Delivery Permit" and was "used in taking delivery of the subject shipment from the defendants' (Manila
Port Service and Manila Railroad Co.) custody and control, issued in the name of consignee's broker,"
contained what was referred to as "an important notice." Such permit "is presented subject to all the terms
and conditions of the Management Contract between the Bureau of Customs and Manila Port Service and
amendments thereto or alterations thereof, particularly but not limited to paragraph 15 thereof limiting the
Company liability to P500.00 per package, unless the value of the goods is otherwise, specified, declared
or manifested and the corresponding arrastre charges have been paid. . . ." 3
On the above facts and relying on Bernabe & Co. v. Delgado Brothers, Inc.,4 the lower court rendered the
judgment "ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the amount of Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00), with legal interest thereon from January 13, 1962, the date of the filing of the complaint, with
costs against said defendants."5
As noted at the outset, in this appeal, the point is pressed that under the applicable Civil Code provision,
plaintiff-appellant Insurance Company could recover in full. The literal language of Article 2207, however,
does not warrant such an interpretation. It is there made clear that in the event that the property has been
insured and the Insurance Company has paid the indemnity for the injury or loss sustained, it "shall be
subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrong-doer or the person who has violated the
contract."
Plaintiff-appellant Insurance Company, therefore, cannot recover from defendants an amount greater than
that to which the consignee could lawfully lay claim. The management contract is clear. The amount is
limited to Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00). Such a stipulation has invariably received the approval of this
Court from the leading case of Bernabe & Co. v. Delgado Bros., Inc.6 Such a decision was quoted with
approval in the following subsequent cases: Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Manila Port
Service,7 Insurance Service Co. of North America v. Manila Port Service, 8 Insurance Company of North
America v. U.S. Lines, Co.,9 and Insurance Company of North America v. Manila Port Service.10
In one of them, Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Manila Port Service, this Court, through the then
Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion, restated the doctrine thus: "Plaintiff maintains that, not being a
party to the management contract, the consignee into whose shoes plaintiff had stepped in
consequence of said payment is not subject to the provisions of said stipulation, and that the same is
furthermore invalid. The lower court correctly rejected this pretense because, having taken delivery of the
shipment aforementioned by virtue of a delivery permit, incorporating thereto, by reference, the provisions
of said management contract, particularly paragraph 15 thereof, the gist of which was set forth in the
permit, the consignee became bound by said provisions, and because it could have avoided the application
of said maximum limit of P500.00 per package by stating the true value thereof in its claim for delivery of
the goods in question, which, admittedly, the consignee failed to do. . . ." 11
Plaintiff-appellant Rizal Surety and Insurance Company, having been subrogated merely to the rights of the
consignee, its recovery necessarily should be limited to what was recoverable by the insured. The lower
court therefore did not err when in the decision appealed from, it limited the amount which defendants
were jointly and severally to pay plaintiff-appellants to "Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) with legal interest
thereon from January 31, 1962, the date of the filing of the complaint, . . . ."
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. With costs against Rizal Surety and Insurance
Company.
ATTORNEYS FEES

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-51914 June 6, 1990
MARIA BICARME assisted by her husband JOSE BALUBAR, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CRISTINA BICARME, respondents.
Paterno Aquiao for petitioner.
Demetrio V. Pre for private respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition seeks to set aside the appealed decision of the lower court 1 as affirmed by the appellate
court on August 28, 1979, directing the amicable partition of two parcels of land between Cristina Bicarme
(private respondent) and her aunt Maria Bicarme (petitioner), as well as the Resolution, dated October 5,
1979, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The affirmed decision of the lower court, rendered on December 22, 1975, disposes as follows:
(a) That Maria Bicarme and Cristina Bicarme are the only surviving co-heirs and co-owners
and entitled in equal shares over the parcel of land in litigation and described under
paragraph 3 of the complaint;
(b) That the alleged deeds of Sale executed by Maria Bicarme covering and affecting the two
parcels of land in suit are declared null and void in so far (sic) as they affect and/or cover the
one-half undivided share and inheritance of plaintiff Cristina Bicarme;
(c) Maria Bicarme is ordered to account and/or pay the value corresponding to the one-half
() undivided shares of Cristina Bicarme in the yearly fruits of the land and to commence
from the filing of this complaint; that is seventy five bundles of palay valued at P375.00 with
legal interest fully paid;
(d) That the parties are hereby ordered within (15) days from receipt of this decision to
amicably agree upon a written partition and to submit the same for approval, parties shall
appoint a Commissioner to effect and carry out effectively the partition of the 2 parcels of
land in equal parts between the plaintiff and the defendant;
(e) Defendant and her hirelings and representatives are forever ordered to refrain from
molesting the Commissioner in the discharge of his duty to partition said two (2) parcels of
land in suit;
(f) And, Defendant to pay Attorney's fee and cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 40-41, Record on Appeal)
Petitioner-defendant Maria Bicarme appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision; hence, this petition.
The main issue in this case dwells on ownership rights over the litigated parcels of land.
As established by the trial court, Sps. Juan Bicarme and Florencia Bidaya were the original co-owners of
two parcels of land described as follows:
1. Cornland in Palao, Bangued, Abra, bounded on the North-Hill, on the East-Brono Barbers,
on the South-Casimiro Palos, and on the West-Clemente Baldozan, of about 8,721 sq. m.,
assessed at P400.00 under Tax Dee. No. 7764;
2. Riceland in Palao, Bangued, Abra, bounded on the North-Macario Bolos, East- Roberto
Bicarme, South-Juliana Baldozan, and West-Telesporo, about 1,539 sq. m., assessed at P
60.00, under Tax Dec. No. 7765;
.... (P. 10, Record on Appeal)
The spouses died intestate and were survived by three children-Victorina Bicarme, Sebastian Bicarme and
Maria Bicarme. Sebastian Bicarme died when he was a little boy and without any issue. Later, Victorina
Bicarme died intestate, survived by her only daughter, Cristina Bicarme.
Cristina claims that upon the death of her grandparents, Sps. Juan and Florencia, her mother Victorina and
her aunt, Maria, became co-owners or co-heirs of the litigated parcels of land. Upon the death of her
mother, Victorina, Cristina became co-heirs with Maria, having inherited the share and interest of her
mother corresponding to one-half of the two parcels of land.
Cristina instituted this action for partition, because her aunt, Maria, refused to share with her the yearly
fruits of the disputed parcels of land. Maria, however, maintains that "she acquired these two parcels of
land in 1925 (cornland) and 1926 (riceland) from the deceased spouses Placido Bidaya and Margarita Bose
and since then until the present, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse possession and
enjoyment and in the concept of absolute owner thereof Maria further claims that Cristina, her niece, never
shared or contributed to the payment of taxes of said two parcels of land; and, finally, that Cristina
Bicarme was presumed already dead" (p. 35, Record on Appeal).
In ruling Maria and Cristina to be co-heirs, the trial court relied on a provision separately stated in three
deeds of sale executed by Maria as follows:
That I am the sole and absolute owner over the above described cornland having acquired
the same by inheritance from my late father Juan Bicarme;" (See Exhibits '4', '5', '6', and '7'
or Exhibits 'A-1,' 'B-1,' 'C-1', and 'D-1'; (p. 37, Record on Appeal, emphasis supplied)
The trial court stated that the provision was in the nature of a trust provision in favor of Cristina as a co-
owner/co-heir.
We agree. By admitting that the cornland is inherited property, Maria, in effect, recognized Cristina's lights
thereto as a co-heir/co-owner. As the trial court theorized:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) That Victorina Bicarme and Maria Bicarme never partitioned even orally the two parcels
of lands which were then owned in common by them;
(7) . That even after the death of Victorina Bicarme, the land in suit remained undivided and
were therefore in the possession of Maria Bicarme because her niece Cristina Bicarme went
to Manila and now married and presently residing at No. 22, 11th Avenue, Grace Park,
Caloocan City.
(8) That without the knowledge and consent of Cristina Bicarme who was then of legal age,
her aunt Maria Bicarme executed on April 27, 1973 a Deed of absolute Sale (Exhibit 'A') in
favor of Marina Pizarro who acquired portion No. 3 of the cornland; on the same date she
also executed another Deed of Sale (Exhibit 'B') in favor of Saturnino Pacopia, who acquired
portion No. 2 of the cornland; and, in June 16, 1965 again Maria Bicarme executed a third
Deed of Sale (Exhibit 'C') in favor of Casimira Pacopia, who acquired portion No. 1 of the
cornland;
(9) That these three (3) separated (sic) Deeds of Sale all executed by Maria Bicarme over the
cornland have a respective total area of 740 square meters, more or less, for portion No. 3;
1,836 square meters, more or less for portion No. 2; and 1,265 square meters, more or less
for portion No. 1, or a total area of 3,481 square meters more or less;
(10) That in these three separate Deeds of Sale, Maria Bicarme expressly provided the
aforesaid trust provision. (pp. 36-37, Record on Appeal, emphasis ours)
Despite admission during the hearing on the Identity of the land in question (see p. 21, Record on Appeal),
Maria's counsel, on appeal, re-emphasized her original claim that the two parcels of land in her possession
were acquired from the Sps. Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose. However, the private document relative to
the purchase, was not produced at the trial, allegedly because "they were placed in a trunk in their house
which were burned during the Japanese Occupation." In 1945, Maria sold the riceland. No written evidence
was submitted. For all legal intents therefore, the riceland remained inherited property. The Identity of the
cornland as inherited property can no longer be disputed, in view of Maria's admission in the deeds of sale
she had executed, containing the trust provisions.
Having established Cristina's co-ownership rights, Maria nonetheless insists that Cristina's rights are barred
by prescription under Secs. 40 and 41 of Act 190 (Code of Civil Procedure, Article 1116, Civil Code) then
the applicable law, where the longest period of both acquisitive and extinctive prescription was only ten
years (Diaz v. Garricho, 103 Phil. 261, 266). In the present case, Cristina, it is alleged, asserted her claims
34 years after her right of action accrued, as follows:
... After Cristina left barrio Palao at the age of eleven (11), she never returned until she was
twenty two (22) years old and married (pp. 32-34, tsn., Nov. 4, 1974). Upon her return her
grandmother Florencia Bidaya was already dead (p. 33, Id). At that time, Cristina claimed
her hereditary share in the lands in question but her demands were ignored and repudiated
by her aunt Maria, Cristina admitted that ever since the Japanese occupation when she was
already of age, her aunt Maria refused to recognize her rights to said lands (pp. 41-42, Id.).
From that moment when Maria ignored and repudiated Cristina's hereditary rights, Cristina's
right of action already accrued and the period of prescription began to run.
The instant action was filed only in 1974 (p. 1, Record on Appeal), or some 34 years after it
accrued. If she had any rights at all, Cristina slept on her rights. The present action is
unquestionably barred by prescription. (pp. 27-28, Appellants' Brief)
Against Maria's claims of acquisitive prescription, the lower court ruled that Maria was as trustee with
respect to Cristina's share. As such, prescription, as a mode of acquiring title, could not apply:
A co-owner is a trustee for the other co-owner. No one of the co-owners may acquire
exclusive ownership of the common property thru prescription for possession by one trustee
alone is not deemed adverse to the rest (Castrillo vs. Court of Appeals, 10 SCRA 549;
Custodio vs. Casiano, 9 SCRA 841 and, Pascual vs. Meneses, 20 SCRA 219). (p. 6, Rollo)
While We agree with the trial court that Maria and Cristina are co-heirs, and that with respect to them
prescription, as a mode of acquisition, cannot apply, We hasten to elaborate on certain aspects, which
need clarification.
It is correct to say that possession by one co-owner (trustee) is not deemed adverse to the others. In this
sense, an action to compel partition will lie at any time and does not prescribe. It is, however, not legally
correct to say that by virtue of the imprescriptibility of an action for partition, prescription as a mode of
acquiring title, can never be invoked, or in the present case, that Maria, as a co-owner can never acquire
the property by prescription.
An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common. If a co-owner or co-heir holds the
property in exclusive adverse possession as owner, asserting sole and exclusive dominion for the required
period, he can acquire sole title to it as against the co-heirs or co-owners. The imprescriptibility of an
action for partition cannot thus be invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed the property as
exclusive owner, and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription. From the moment one of the co-
owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any
share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition, but of ownership. (A. Tolentino, Civil Code
of the Phil., Ann., Vol. II, pp. 192-193; Bargayo v. Comumot, 40 Phil. 856, at p. 870). In this sense, the trial
court erred in saying that there can be no prescription (as a mode of acquiring title) in favor of a co-
owner/trustee.
Having clarified this issue, the main question to be resolved is whether or not Maria has been in possession
of the lands in question under the conditions required by Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as to
uphold acquisitive prescription in her favor.
One of the conditions imposed by said section is that the possession must be adverse against the whole
world. In order that a possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust, or the other co-owner
the following must concur:
... (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust or other co-owner, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to thecestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon
must be clear and convincing. (A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phils., Ann., Vol. 11, p. 193)
In the present case, Maria Bicarme disclaims the co-ownership by denying that subject properties are the
inherited properties. Other than the tax declarations in her name, there is no written evidence that these
were acquired/purchased from Sps. Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose. Payment of land taxes does not
constitute sufficient repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is not an act adverse to Cristina's rights.
Moreover, Cristina, being a minor, until she claimed her rights, was not even aware thereof. Neither did
Maria make known her repudiation to Cristina, because all along, Maria presumed her to be dead. Her
refusal to share with Cristina the yearly profits stemmed from Cristina's failure to share in the yearly taxes.
Acquisitive prescription cannot therefore apply in this case:
Acts which are adverse to strangers may not be sufficiently adverse to the co- owners. A
mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property,
the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of
land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear,
complete and conclusive evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocally
constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners. (Mangyan v. Ilan,
28 O.G. 62; Laguna v. Levantino, 40 O.G. (14th Suppl.) 136, cited in A. Tolentino, Civil Code
of the Philippines, Ann., Vol. II, pp. 193- 194)
Additionally, it follows that neither can the doctrine on laches apply, for absent acquisitive prescription,
(i.e., where it has not been shown that the possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and
opposed to the right of the others) the case is not one of ownership, in which case, the doctrine on
imprescriptibility of an action for partition will apply. Cristina's right to partition wig therefore prosper.
Finally, We eliminate the award on attorney's fees in the absence of any specific allegation thereon in her
complaint, or that the same is covered by any of the eleven (11) exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208 of
the New Civil Code. Even if We were to concede exercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorney's
fees under Art. 2208, par. 11, this provision "demands a factual, legal or equitable justification. Without
such justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to
speculation and conjecture." (Mirasol v. De la Cruz, G.R. L-32552, July 31, 1978; 84 SCRA 337.) Likewise,
"the matter of attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the dispositive portion of the decision.
The text itself must expressly state the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded" (ibid). In the
present case, the matter of such fees was touched but once and appears only in the dispositive portion of
the decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review is DENIED and the appealed decision as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award on attorney's fees is eliminated. Costs
against petitioner. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 74125 July 31, 1990
UNIVERSAL SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT and ALLIANCE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., respondents.
Del Rosario & Del Rosario Law Office for petitioner. Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pea, Marcos & Nolasco for
private respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
In this appeal by certiorari, the petitioner seeks to set aside the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, promulgated on March 25, 1986 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69824, affirming
with modification the decision of the former Court of First Instance of Manila dated February 4, 1981,
against the herein petitioner, Universal Shipping Lines, Inc., the defendant in the trial court.

On or about March 22,1974, SEVALCO Limited, owned and operated by the petitioner, shipped from
Rotterdam Netherlands, to Bangkok, Thailand, aboard its M/V "TAIWAN", two (2) cargoes of 50 palletized
cartons consisting of 2,000 units of 25-kilogram bags of State R Brand carton black, with a declared gross
weight of 53,000 kilos each. They were respectively consigned to S. Lersen Company, Ltd. and Muang
Ngarm Retreads,Ltd., per Bills of Lading Nos. RB-15 (Exh. A) and RB-16 (Exh. B). Both shipments were
insured with the private respondent, Alliance Assurance Company, Ltd., a foreign insurance company
domiciled in London, England, which had withdrawn from the Philippine market on June 30, 1951 yet.
Despite the arrival of the vessel on June 28, 1974 at Bangkok, the cargo covered by Bill of Lading No. RB-
15 was not unloaded nor delivered to the consignee, S. Lersen Company, Ltd. The shipment under Bill of
Lading No. RB-16 was delivered to Muang Ngarm Retreads, Ltd. with a total weight shortage of 11,070 kilos
because the cargoes had been either totally or partially dissolved in saltwater which flooded Hatch No. 2 of
the vessel where they had been stored.
Upon arrival in Manila on July 4, 1974, Arturo C. Saavedra, master of M/V "TAIWAN" filed a marine protest
(Exh. H), pertinent portions of which read:
By investigation, the source of the water could not be definitely ascertained where it comes
from. However, the bilge pump was employed to pump out continue working for almost 12
hours No. 2. The bilge pump was employed every other day to pump out the water, but it
was seems to be almost same soundings. Suspecting of some leakage of suction pipes.
That the hold No. 2 cannot be inspected on account of the full cargoes inside the hold,
rendering it to be inaccessible.
Suspecting that the water comes from outside passing through some loosen rivets on
starboard side of the ship. (sic.)
That the pumping out the water from the hold was done by shore help upon arrival at
Bangkok. (sic.) (pp. 23-24, Rollo.)
The consignees, S. Lersen Co., Ltd. and Muang Ngarm Retreads, Inc., filed their respective formal claims for
loss and damage to their cargoes on August 7, 1974 (Exhs. N and N-1) and on November 12,1974 (Exh. M).
(p. 24, Rollo.) The insurer paid both claims in the amounts of I2,180 and 2,547.18 for the loss and
damage to their cargoes.
On June 25, 1976, private respondent, as insurer-subrogee, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to recover from the petitioner and its Manila agent, Carlos Go Thong & Company, what it paid the
consignees of the cargo.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment for the private respondent, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Universal

Shipping Lines, Inc. and Carlos Go Thong & Co., jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff Alliance
Asurance Co., Ltd., under the first cause of action, the sum of 12,180.00 or the peso
equivalent thereof, and under the second cause of action, the sum of 2,547.18 or the peso
equivalent thereof, both with legal interest thereon from June 25, 1976, the date of the filing
of the present action, until said obligations are fully paid, plus attorney's fees in the sum of
P10,000.00, with costs. (pp. 24-25, Rollo.)
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed after exculpating petitioner's ship-agents in
Manila (Go Thong) from any liability on the ground that it had no participation in the shipment of the cargo
which had been loaded and discharged in places other than Manila (p. 28, Rollo).itc-asl
In this appeal by certiorari, petitioner alleges that respondent court erred:
1. in holding petitioner liable for the damage/loss suffered by the subject shipments;
2. in holding that private respondent has capacity to sue in this jurisdiction;
3. in finding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed; and
4. in awarding attorney's fees without stating any factual, legal and equitable justification.
The petition is not meritorious.
The first assignment of error raises a factual issue which we decline to review as this Court may review
only legal issues which must be distinctly set forth in the petition (Sec. 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court). In any
event, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in holding, as the trial court did, that:
... It was incumbent upon the defendants to prove that the losses and damages were due to
causes other than the negligence or fault of their employees. Said defendants have not
adduced proof on this point. It having been shown that the losses and damages were
incurred while the shipments were in the custody of the M/V' Taiwan' the liability of its
owner/operator and shipping agent is clear-they must pay for the losses and damages
sustained by the consignees as a consequence of the breach of contract of water
transportation. (pp. 27-28, Rollo.)
On the issue of jurisdiction, we uphold the appellate court's ruling that the private respondent may sue in
Philippine courts upon the marine insurance policies issued by it abroad to cover international-bound
cargoes shipped by a Philippine carrier, even if it has no license to do business in this country, for it is not
the lack of the prescribed license (to do business in the Philippines) but doing business without such
license, which bars a foreign corporation from access to our courts. (Pacific Vegetable Oil Corporation vs.
Singzon L-7919, April 29, 1955; Eastboard Navigation, Ltd. vs. J. Ysmael & Co., Inc.,
L-9090, Sept. 10, 1957.)
Anent the issue of prescription of the action under Section 3(6), Title I, of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 65) which provides that:
... the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage
unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods
should have been delivered. ...
This provision of the law admits of an xception: if the one-year period is suspended by express agreement
of the parties (Chua Kay vs. Everett Steamship Corporation, L-5554, May 27,1953; Tan Liao vs. American
President Lines, Ltd., L-7280, January 20, 1956) for in such a case, their agreement becomes the law for
them. (Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. vs. United States Lines, 22 SCRA 674; Baluyot vs. Venegas, 22 SCRA
412; Lazo vs. Republic Surety & Insurance, Co., Inc., 31 SCRA 329; Philippine American General Insurance
Co., Inc. vs. Mutuc, 61 SCRA 22-23).
The exchange of correspondence between the parties and/or their associates/representatives (Exhs. R, S,
S-1, T, T-1 and T-2) shows that the parties had mutually agreed to extend the time within which the plaintiff
or its predecessors-in-interest may file suit until December 27,1976. When the complaint was filed on June
25, 1976, that deadline had not yet expired.
An award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the court and depends upon the circumstances of
each case (Medco Industrial Corp., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 167 SCRA 838).itc-asl In this case,
the award of P10,000 as attorney's fees was reasonable and justified because the defendant's rejection of
the private respondent's demand, compelled the latter to litigate and incur expenses to protect and
enforce its just and valid claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 77042-43 February 28, 1990

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CO., INC., et al., petitioners
vs.
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK AND COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Manuel R. Singson for petitioners.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the joint decision * promulgated on December 22, 1986, by the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01063 entitled "International Corporate Bank, plaintiff-appellee
vs. Radiowealth, Inc. and Domingo M. Guevara, defendants-appellants" and in CA-G.R. No. 01064 entitled
"International Corporate Bank, plaintiff-appellee vs. Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc., Radiowealth, Inc.
and D.M.G., Inc., defendants-appellants," the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the Order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in
toto, with costs against the appellants. (Rollo, p. 101).
The basic facts appear undisputed and they are as follows:
Sometime in 1978, petitioners Radiowealth, Inc. (RWI) and Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. (RFC)
applied for and obtained credit facilities from private respondent International Corporate Bank (Interbank).
Petitioners Domingo Guevara (Guevara, for short) and D.M.G., Inc., acted as sureties to the obligations
contracted by RWI and RFC. The obligations of petitioners were accordingly covered and evidenced by
promissory notes, trust receipts and agreements.
A common stipulation in the covering promissory notes, trust receipts, and continuing surety agreements
between the borrowing petitioners and the lending private respondent provided, to wit:
In the event of the bringing of any action or suit by you or any default of the undersigned
hereunder I/We shall on demand pay you reasonable attorney's fees and other fees and
costs of collection, which shall in no cases be less than ten percentum (10 %) of the value of
the property and the amount involved by the action or suit. (Rollo, p. 211).
From 1978 to 1980, petitioners were not able to comply with their obligations on time with Interbank due
to subsequent severe economic and financial reverses. Petitioners thus asked Interbank for a restructuring
of their outstanding loans, but the parties were not able to arrive at a mutually acceptable proposition.
On December 28, 1979, Interbank, constrained to seek judicial remedy, through its counsel Norberto J.
Quisumbing and Associates, lodged before the then Court of First Instance of Manila its first complaint,
docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 128744, for collection of sum of money with an application for a writ of
preliminary attachment against RWI and Guevara covering the principal sum of P1,585,933.61 plus
penalties, service charges, interests, attorney's fees, costs and exemplary damages (Rollo, pp. 31-38).
This was followed by another complaint filed on January 9, 1980 before the same trial court against RFC,
RWI and D.M.G., Inc., also with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment, docketed as Civil Case
No. 128897, for the collection of the principal sum of P2,113,444.58, plus interests, penalties, service
charges, attorney's fees, costs and exemplary damages (Rollo, pp. 39-47).
Petitioners, however, opted to amicably settle their obligations promptly. They, therefore, did not file any
answer nor any responsive pleading to the complaints, and instead entered into a compromise agreement
with Interbank shortly about four (4) months later. Said compromise agreement between the parties was
embodied in two Motions for Judgment Based on Compromise dated March 21, 1980 (Rollo, pp. 48-55)
corresponding to the separate claims in the said two complaints which were accordingly submitted to the
court a quo for approval. These motions did not however, cover the payment by the petitioners of
Interbank's claims for attorney's fees, costs of collection and expenses of litigation which were left open by
the parties for further negotiations.

In its decision in Civil Case No. 128744, dated March 28, 1980, the trial court approved the parties'
corresponding compromise agreement thereto, with the reservation that "(T)his decision does not
terminate this case because matters respecting payment of attorney's fees, costs and collection."
Similarly, the trial court, in its decision in Civil Case No. 128897 of even date, also approved the parties'
corresponding compromise agreement thereto with the Identical reservation as aforequoted (Rollo, pp. 60-
61).
Thereafter, further proceedings were conducted by the trial court particularly on the issue of the alleged
unreasonableness and unconscionableness of the attorney's fees. It appears from the records of the cases,
however, that Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing, counsel for Interbank, was able to adduce his evidence in
support for the attorney's fees due to his said client, while Attys. Reyes and Guevara, counsel for
petitioners in the trial court, were not given their request for further hearing against the claimed attorney's
fees despite some supervening events as alleged in their motion for reconsideration dated January 29,
1981 (Rollo, pp. 82-84) which was denied in the Order of January 30, 1981 (Rollo, p. 85).
At any rate, the trial court, in its Order dated January 2, 1981, had already reduced Interbank's claim for
attorney's fees, from the stipulated 10 % to 8 %, pertinent portions thereof are hereunder quoted, thus:
(T)he 'ten per cent' in the foregoing quoted provisions includes attorney's fees, other fees
and cost of collection. In paragraph No. 2 of the compromise agreement in Civil Case No.
128744 under which the defendants therein acknowledge their indebtedness of
Pl,585,933.61 as of December 28, 1979, it is provided that in paying the same there shall be
added to it 16 % per annum as interest, 2 % per annum as service charge, 2 % per month or
any fraction thereof as penalty from January 31, 1980. A similar provision is contained in
paragraph No. 2 of the compromise agreement filed in Civil Case No.. 128897 under which
the defendants therein admitted their indebtedness of P2,113,444.58, payment of which was
to commence on or before January 31, 1980. The service charge of 2 % should be deducted
from the 10 % already mentioned above, to give the rate of attorney's fees which is 8% in
accordance with the provisions already aforequoted. Eight percent (8 %) of l,585,833.61, or
P126,824.68 is the attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 128897 sums which ... are not
excessive and perhaps acceptable to plaintiff which was willing to have its claim reduced to
P73,987.57 had defendants acceded to its offer to compromise attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby orders the defendants in Civil Case No. 128744 to
pay the plaintiff jointly and severally P126,824.68 and the defendants in Civil Case No.
128897 to pay the plaintiff, also jointly and severally, P169,075.56 with interest at 12 % per
annum from this date until the same is paid.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 80-81).
Not satisfied with said trial court's order, petitioners appealed the same before the respondent appellate
court raising therewith the following assigned errors:
A. The lower court erred in not giving the defendants the opportunity to be
heard in a hearing set for the purpose of determining the amount of attorney's
fees;
B. The lower court erred in insisting that the amount of attorney's fees should
be governed by the contract signed by the parties;
C. The lower court erred in not substantially reducing the amount of attorney's
fees. (Rollo, pp. 242-243).
The respondent appellate court, however, affirmed in toto the assailed order of the trial court.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:

I. Whether or not the reasonableness of attorney's fees in the case at bar is a
question of law;
II. Whether or not the award of attorney's fees in the case at bar is
reasonable;
III. Whether or not a contracted stipulation regarding attorney's fees may be

disregarded by this Honorable Court;
IV. whether or not attorney's fees require proof (Rollo, p. 243).
Deducible from the contentions of the parties, is the sole issue of whether or not the amount equivalent to
8 % of the recovery or sums of money due from the two civil complaints adjudged as attorney's fees by the
trial court and affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is fair and reasonable under the peculiar facts
and circumstances herein. Corollarily, whether or not the court has discretion to modify the attorney's fees
previously agreed upon by the parties under a valid contractual stipulation.
Petitioners assert that the sums of P126,824.68 in Civil Case No. 128744 and P169,075.56 in Civil Case No.
128897 or 8 % of the amount involved in the respective suits, adjudged as attorney's fees due to Norberto
J. Quisumbing and Associates, counsel of record of the judgment creditor the herein private respondent
Interbank, per the order of the trial court, is unreasonable, exhorbitant and unconscionable under the
premises considering the following undisputed facts: that said cases were immediately settled with the
execution of a compromise agreement after the complaints with prayer for preliminary attachment had
been filed by the private respondent against the petitioners in the lower court, and no answer was filed by
petitioners; that pursuant to the Compromise Agreement between the parties, petitioner Radiowealth, Inc.
has fully paid to Interbank in Civil Case No. 128744 the total amount of P2,867,802.64, while petitioner
Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc. (RFC) has fully paid to Interbank in Civil Case No. 128897 the total amount of
P3,018,192.52; that of the amounts paid to Interbank, petitioner Radiowealth, Inc., has fully paid the total
sum of P118,075.84 as service charge and penalties, while petitioner Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc., had
paid the total amount of P135,526.40 as penalties and service charges, all in addition to the interests paid
by petitioners to Interbank.
Interbank, on the other hand, avers that petitioners have omitted to state certain facts and circumstances,
as follows: that the collection suits filed against petitioners involve charges of violation of the trust receipts
law for disposing of the goods they had received from Interbank on trust receipts and failing to surrender
the proceeds thereof; that Atty. Quisumbing had successfully obtained attachment against their properties;
that Atty. Quisumbing succeeded in forcing petitioners to agree in the joint motions for judgment based on
compromise to such stipulation which made them fear a default in the payment of the amortizations or
installments of the compromise amount; that the principal amount collected from petitioners totalled
P3,699,378.19, not counting the interests; that petitioners' obligations to Interbank were not evidenced by
one but many letters of credit and trust receipts; that the records were destroyed by fire and had to be
reconstituted; that Interbank had already given petitioners very substantial discounts on penalty charges;
and, despite clear contractual stipulations, the lower court had already reduced the 10 % stipulated
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation to 8 %.
As a basic premise, the contention of petitioners that this Court may alter, modify or change even an
admittedly valid stipulation between the parties regarding attorney's fees is conceded. The high standards
of the legal profession as prescribed by law and the Canons of Professional Ethics regulate if not limit the
lawyer's freedom in fixing his professional fees. The moment he takes his oath, ready to undertake his
duties first, as a practitioner in the exercise of his profession, and second, as an officer of the court in the
administration of justice, the lawyer submits himself to the authority of the court. It becomes axiomatic
therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable character of attorney's fees
stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts (Panay Electric
Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 456 [1982]; De Santos vs. City of Manila, 45 SCRA 409 [1972];
Rolando vs. Luz, 34 SCRA 337 [1970]; Cruz vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 8 SCRA 826 [1963]). And this
Court has consistently ruled that even with the presence of an agreement between the parties, the court
may nevertheless reduce attorney's fees though fixed in the contract when the amount thereof appears to
be unconscionable or unreasonable (Borcena vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 111 [1987];
Mutual Paper Inc. vs. Eastern Scott Paper Co., 110 SCRA 481 [1981]; Gorospe vs. Gochango, 106 Phil. 425
[1959]; Turner vs. Casabar, 65 Phil. 490 [1938]; F.M. Yap Tico & Co. vs. Alejano, 53 Phil. 986 [1929]). For the
law recognizes the validity of stipulations included in documents such as negotiable instruments and

mortgages with respect to attorney's fees in the form of penalty provided that they are not unreasonable
or unconscionable (Philippine Engineering Co. vs. Green, 48 Phil. 466).
There is no mistake, however, that the reasonableness of attorney's fees, though seemingly a matter of
fact which takes into account the peculiar circumstances of the case, is a question of law where the facts
are not disputed at all. For a question of law does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties (Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [1966]), and where the issue is
the construction or interpretation to be placed by the appellate court upon documentary evidence, or
when a case is submitted upon an agreed statement of facts or where all the facts are stated in the
judgment, the question is one of law where the issue is the correctness of the conclusion drawn therefrom
(Cunanan vs. Lazatin, 74 Phil. 719 [1944]; Ng Young vs. Villa, 93 Phil. 21 [1953]). In the case at bar, the
issues do not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence because the ultimate facts are
admitted by the parties and all the basic facts are stated in the judgment.
Nevertheless, a careful review of the records shows that the modified attorney's fees fixed by the trial
court and affirmed by the respondent appellate court, appears reasonable and fair under the admitted
circumstances of the case. As aptly reasoned out by the said court:
We find nothing wrong in the aforegoing disquisition of the lower court.
It is to be remembered that attorney's fees provided in contracts as recoverable against the

other party and damages are not, strictly speaking, the attorney's fees recoverable as
between attorneys and client spoken of and regulated by the Rules of Court. Rather, the
attorney's fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulations therefor is
aptly called a penal clause, So long as such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or
public order, it is strictly binding upon the defendant (Polytrade Corporation vs. Blanco, 30
SCRA 187 [1969]). However:
"Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be

equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable. For this reason, we
do not really have to strictly view the reasonableness of the attorney's fees in
the light of such facts as the amount and character of the service rendered,
the nature and importance of the litigation, and the professional character and
the social standing of the attorney. We do concede, however that these factors
may be an aid in the determination of the inequity or unconscionableness of
attorney's fees as liquidated damages. (Supra)
May the attorney's fees granted by the court be tagged as iniquitous or unconscionable? We
give the answer in the negative. The high standing of plaintiffs counsel has not been
challenged.
In the motion for judgment based on compromise agreement, defendants acknowledged and
admitted their default or failure to pay their joint and several obligations or indebtedness
arising from the credit facilities which plaintiff extended to defendants and availed of by the
latter, the punctual payment of which having been guaranteed and warranted by the other
defendants. Having admitted such default in the payment of their obligations, the filing of
the action in court and, consequently, the legal services of counsel became imperative and
thereby, set into operation the contract clause on the payment of attorney's fees.
The complaints are not simple actions for collection. They are accompanied with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, and charge defendants with violation of the
trust receipts law and they involve several letters of credit and trust receipts. The fact that
the compromise agreements were entered into after the complaints were filed against
appellants indubitably proves that the legal action taken by counsel for the plaintiff against
the defendants contributed in no measure to the early settlement of defendants' obligation.
Considering further that, apart from the reduction and waiver of penalty charges due to the
plaintiff to the extent of P79, 191.72, the service charge of 2 % was further deducted by the
lower court thereby, reducing the attorney's fees to 8 % the court is of the considered
opinion and so holds that given the prestige of plaintiff's counsel, the nature of the action
and quality of legal services rendered, the award of attorney's fees in a sum equivalent to 8
% of the judgment which is below the stipulated fees of 10 % could hardly be suggested as

iniquitous and unconscionable. On the contrary, it easily falls within the rule of conscionable
and reasonable. (Rollo, pp. 100-101).
The foregoing disquisition merits our assent.
Moreover, even if the so-called supervening event which ought to have been heard in the trial court as
alleged in petitioners' motion for reconsideration dated January 29, 1981, i.e., "that supervening events
happened from the time the trust receipt agreements were signed in which the defendants agreed to pay
10 % of the amount due as attorney's fees and costs of collection up to the actual filing of the complaint
and these events were the payments of interest in the amount of P285,341.27, as interest, P41,507.37 as
service charges and P76,568.47 as penalty by Radiowealth, Inc.; that Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc. has
paid the amount of P281,940.12 as interest, P38,721.83 as service charges and P96,804.57 as penalty
(Rollo, pp. 137-138), were to be considered, they would still be insufficient to justify a further substantial
reduction in the adjudged attorney's fees. At any rate, it would be noted that petitioners have not even
prayed for a specific reduction as to amount or percentage of the attorney's fees except for their sweeping
allegations of unreasonableness, exhorbitance and unconscionableness.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the respondent appellate court is Affirmed, with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154448. August 15, 2003]
DR. PEDRITO F. REYES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHIL. MALAY POULTRY BREEDERS,
INC. and LEONG HUP POULTRY FARM SDN, BHD., Mr. Francis T.N. Lau, President and
Chairman of the Board and Mr. Chor Tee Lim, Director, respondents.
DECISION
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court are the January 28,
2002[1] and July 22, 2002[2] Resolutions[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67431, which dismissed
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for failure to attach to the petition the duplicate original or
certified true copy of the Labor Arbiters decision as well as the relevant pleadings.
The facts show that on August 24, 1989, respondent Leong Hup Poultry Farms SDN. BHD (Leung Hup)
of Malaysia, thru its Managing Director Francis T. Lau, appointed petitioner Pedrito F. Reyes as
Technical/Sales Manager with a net salary of US$4,500.00 a month. His duties consisted of selling parent
stock day-old chicks and providing technical assistance to clients of the company in Malaysia and other
Asian countries.[4] Sometime in 1992, the company formed Philippine Malay Poultry Breeders, Inc.,
(Philmalay) in the Philippines. Petitioner was appointed General Manager thereof with a monthly salary of
US$5,500.00.
In 1996-1997, respondents suffered losses which caused them to reduce production and retrench
employees in Philmalay. On June 30, 1997, petitioner gave verbal notice to respondent Francis T. Lau that
he will serve as General Manager of Philmalay until December 31, 1997 only. [5] In a letter dated January 12,
1998, petitioner confirmed his verbal notice of resignation and requested that he be given the same
benefits granted to retrenched and resigned employees of the company, consisting of separation pay
equivalent to 1 month salary for every year of service and the monetary equivalent of his sick leave and
vacation leave. He likewise requested for the following:
1. payment of underpaid salary for the period December 1989 December 31, 1997 together with
the additional one month salary payable in December of every year which was paid at the rate
of P26.00 instead of the floating rate;
2. brand new car (Galant Super Saloon) or its equivalent;
3. life insurance policy in the amount of US$100,000.00 from December 1, 1989 to December 31,
1997, or the premiums due thereon;
4. office rentals at the rate of US$300.00 or its peso equivalent for the use of his residence as
office of Philmalay for the period December 1, 1989 to July 1996; and
5. retention of the services of the law firm Quasha Ancheta Pena and Nolasco Law Firm, which was
hired by respondents to defend him in the illegal recruitment case filed against him in
connection with his employment with respondents.[6]
In a letter dated January 19, 1998, respondent Philmalay retrenched petitioner effective January 20,
1998 and promised to pay him separation benefits pursuant to the provisions of the Labor Code. [7] He was,
however, offered a separation pay equivalent to four months only, or the total amount of P578,600.00
(P144,650 x 4). The offer was not accepted by petitioner and efforts to settle the impasse proved futile.
Petitioner filed with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission a
complaint[8] for underpayment of wages and non-payment of separation pay, sick leave, vacation leave
and other benefits against respondents.
On December 22, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision [9] in favor of petitioner, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant and against the
respondents, as follows:
1. To order respondents to pay jointly and severally the complainant, the following:
(a) Unpaid salary from January 1, 1998 to January 19, 1998, the same to be computed in the following
manner:
19 = days % 31 days of January 98
= 0.613 month x US$5,500.00
= US$3,370.00
(b) Underpayment of salary, the same to be computed at net US$5,500.00 or its peso-equivalent from July
1, 1997 to December 31, 1997, together with the additional one (1) salary payable every year, the same to
be paid at the rate of P26.30 instead of the following rate computed as follows:
July 1997 - P27.66 P1.36 - P7, 480.00
August 1997 - 29.33 3.02 - 16, 665.00
September - 32.39 - 6.09 - 33, 495.00
October 1997 - 34.46 - 8.16 - 44, 880.00
November 1997 - 34.51 - 8.21 - 45, 155.00
December 1997 - 37.17 - 10.57- 59, 785.00
P207,460.00
(c) 13th month pay for December 1997 computed as follows: December 1997 P37.17 P10.57 P59,785.00.
2. To order respondents to pay jointly and severally the complainant the following:
(a) Unused vacation and sick leaves from December 01, 1989 to December 31, 1997 based on the same
salary, to be computed as follows:
i) Vacation Leave Fifteen (15) days for every year of services x 9 years = 135 days
135 days % 26 working days a month

= 5.2 months
= US$28,600.00
ii) Sick Leave Fifteen (15) Days for every [year] of service x 9 years = 135 days
135 days % 26 working days a month
= 5.2 months x US$5,500.00 / month
= US$28,600.00
3) To order respondents to pay jointly and severally the complainant his separation pay equivalent to one
(1) month pay for very year of service at the rate of US $5,500.00 or its peso equivalent from December 1,
1989 to January 19, 1998, computed as follows:
9 years x US$5,500.00 = US$49,500.00
4) To order respondents to pay jointly and severally the complainants other claims and benefits:
a) A brand new car (Galant super saloon) or its equivalent in the sum of P945,100.00;
b) Office rentals for the use of his residence situated at No. 38 Don Wilfredo St., Don Enrique Heights
Diliman, Quezon City, [from] 01 December 1989 to July 1996 at the rate of US$300.00 or its peso
equivalent to US$23,700.00;
c) Life insurance policy for US$100,000.00 from December 1, 1989 to December 31, 1997, or if the same
was not secured the premiums due thereon for the above period, the same to be computed as follows:
US$2,736.50 x 9 years = US$24,628.50
d) The services of the Law firm of Quasha Ancheta Pea and Nolasco be continued to be retained by the two
(2) companies to represent complainant in the illegal recruitment case before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 96, docketed as Crim. Case No. Q-93-46421, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Dr.
Antonio B. Mangahas, et al., filed against him in connection with his employment by Leong Hup, or in
default thereof to pay the attorneys fees of the new counsel, that may be hired by the complainant to
defend him in the said case estimated in the sum of P200,000.00, more or less;
5) To order the respondents to pay jointly and severally the complainant moral damages in the sum of P2.5
million and exemplary damages of P2.5 million;
6) To order the respondents to pay jointly and severally the complainant in the sum equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the total claim as and for attorneys fees.
7) Respondents counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On appeal by respondents to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter was modified by deleting the awards of (1) US$3,370.00 representing unpaid salary for the
period January 1, 1998 to January 19, 1998; (2) US$28,600.00 as vacation leave; (3) brand new car or its
equivalent in the sum of P945,100.00; (4) US$23,700.00 as office rentals for the period of December 1,
1989 to July 1996; (5) US$100,000.00 life insurance policy or the equivalent premium in the amount of
US$24,628.50; (6) P2.5 million as moral damages; and (7) P2.5 million as exemplary damages. The NLRC
likewise reduced the amount of petitioners separation pay to US$44,400.00 after adjusting its computation
based on the length of service of petitioner which it lowered from 9 years to 8 years; and by limiting the
basis of the 10% attorneys fees to the total of the awards of underpayment of salary (P207,460.00),
13th month pay differential (P59,785.00) and cash equivalent of sick leave (US$28,600.00) only, and
excluding therefrom the award of separation pay in the amount of US$44,400.00. The decretal portion of
the said decision[11] states:
WHEREORE, premises considered, the Decision dated December 22, 1999 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
Respondents are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the complainant, the following:
(a) underpayment of salary as computed in the appealed Decision in the amount of P207, 460.00;
(b) 13th month pay differential as computed in the appealed Decision in the amount of P59,785.00;
(c) monetary equivalent of complainants sick leave as computed in the appealed Decision in the amount of
US$28,600.00;
(d) separation pay in the amount of US$44,000.00 as earlier computed in this Decision;
(e) attorneys fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total award based on the awards representing
underpayment of salary, 13th month pay, [and] cash equivalent of sick leave.
Respondents are likewise directed to provide legal counsel to complainant as defendant in Criminal Case
No. Q-93-46421.
The awards of unpaid wages from June 1-19, 1998, vacation leave in the amount of US$28,600, P945,000
for car, US23,700.00, for office rentals, life insurance policy in the amount of US$100,000.00 and moral
and exemplary damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos are hereby DELETED on grounds above-
discussed.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied. [13]Undaunted, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed on January 28, 2002 for failure
to attach to the petition the following: (1) complainants (petitioner) Position Paper filed before the Labor
Arbiter; (2) Decision dated 22 December 1992 penned by Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos; and (3)
Memorandum of Appeal filed by the petitioner. [14]
On February 21, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching thereto a copy of the
Labor Arbiters decision and the pleadings he failed to attach to the petition. The Court of Appeals,
however, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition based on the following
grounds:
1. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI BASED ON TECHNICALITIES, THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SEC. 1, RULE 65,
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR FAILURE TO ATTACH THREE (3) DOCUMENTS CONSISTING OF:
Complainants (petitioner) Position Paper filed before the labor arbiter;
Decision dated 22 December 1999 penned by Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos; and
Memorandum of Appeal filed by the petitioner.
WHICH RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS CONSIDERED AS MATERIAL PORTIONS OF THE RECORD

DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTS SOUGHT TO BE PRODUCED HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN
REPRODUCED OR SUBSTANTIALLY COVERED BY THE QUESTIONED JUDGMENT, ORDER OR
RESOLUTION FILED/SUBMITTED BEFORE IT.
2. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION, AND IN
DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION THEREOF ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO COGENT
REASON FOR IT TO OVERTURN ITS DISMISSAL, DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, EXTANT ON
THE RECORDS SHOWING THAT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONS (NLRC) DECISION AND
RESOLUTION WERE FLAWED, A PALPABLE OR PATENT ERROR, WHICH MAY BE SUMMARIZED, TO WIT:
(A) IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER HAD RESIGNED FROM HIS EMPLOYMENT, AND NOT
RETRENCHED OR TERMINATED DESPITE A DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE EXTANT ON THE
RECORD ISSUED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DATED JANUARY 19, 1998 GIVING FORMAL
NOTICE TO YOU (PETITIONER) OF YOUR TERMINATION DUE TO RETRENCHMENT EFFECTIVE
JANUARY 20, 1998.
(B) IN HOLDING AGAIN, AND DENYING PETITIONERS VALID CLAIMS DESPITE DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE OR THE EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT STATING THAT:
(1) EMPLOYEES (INCLUDING PETITIONER AS GENERAL MANAGER) AS A MATTER OF COMPANY POLICY

AND/OR PRACTICE) WHO ARE RETRENCHED ARE ENTITLED TO INCENTIVES INCLUDING 15-DAYS VACATION
LEAVE AND 15-DAYS SICK LEAVE WITH PAY; A FACT ADMITTED NO LESS BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OWN
WITNESS, MS. MA. ROWENA LOPEZ (FORMER PERSONNEL MANAGER OR PHILMALAY) WHO EXECUTED AN
AFFIDAVIT ADMITTING THE SAME.
(2) PETITIONERS ENTITLEMENT AS PER CONTRACT TO A BRAND NEW CAR (OR AT LEAST TO THE
CASH EQUIVALENT THEREOF); $100,000.00 LIFE INSURANCE POLICY (OR IN DEFAULT THEREOF AT LEAST
TO THE PREMIUMS THEREIN), AND OFFICE RENTALS FOR THE USE OF THE PETITIONERS PRIVATE
RESIDENCE AS OFFICE OF RESPONDENTS.
(3) PETITIONER IS ENTITLED, TO MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES DUE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
ACTS OF BAD FAITH IN REQUIRING PETITIONER TO EXECUTE A LETTER OF RESIGNATION, WHEN IN FACT HE
WAS ADMITTEDLY TERMINATED THRU RETRENCHMENT, AND ITS REFUSAL TO PAY HIM HIS VALID CLAIMS,
DESPITE HIS CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT, COMPANY POLICY, AND LETTER OF TERMINATION ISSUED BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
(4) PETITIONERS ENTITLEMENT TO 10% OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES
AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND AS PER PETITIONERS CONTRACT WITH COUNSEL, AND NOT ONLY 10% OF
THE TOTAL AWARD REPRESENTING UNDER PAYMENT OF SALARY, 13TH MONTH PAY, AND CASH EQUIVALENT
OF SICK LEAVE AND IN ORDERING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PROVIDE LEGAL COUNSEL TO PETITIONER IN
CRIM. CASE NO. Q-93-46421, WHEN THE SUBJECT CASE HAD ALREADY BEEN DISMISSED AT THE EXPENSE
OF PETITIONER WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY HIRED HIS OWN COUNSEL OF CHOICE FOR THE PURPOSE.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition;
and (2) whether or not the decision of the Labor Arbiter should be reinstated.
The allowance of the petition on the ground of substantial compliance with the Rules is not a novel
occurrence in our jurisdiction. As consistently held by the Court, rules of procedure should not be applied in
a very technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. [15] In Ramos v.
Court of Appeals,[16] the Court of Appeals dismissed a petition for review of the decision of the Regional
Trial Court because the petitioner failed to attach to the petition a certified true copy of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts decision in addition to the certified true copy of the assailed decision of the RTC.Holding that
the Court of Appeals should have given due course to the petition considering that petitioner subsequently
submitted a certified true copy of the decision of the MeTC, we held:
Petitioner is right that the MeTCs decision cannot be considered a disputed decision. The phrase is the
equivalent of ruling, order or decision appealed from in Rule 32, 2 of the 1964 Rules made applicable to
appeals from decisions of the then Courts of First Instance to the Court of Appeals by R.A. No. 296, as
amended by R.A. No. 5433. Since petitioner was not appealing from the decision of the MeTC in her favor,
she was not required to attach a certified true copy but only a true or plain copy of the aforesaid decision
of the MeTC. The reason is that inclusion of the decision is part of the requirement to attach to the petition
for review other material portion of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. Indeed,
petitioner referred to the MeTC decision in many parts of her petition for review in the Court of Appeals for
support of her theory.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals should have reconsidered its dismissal of petitioners appeal after
petitioner submitted a certified true copy of the MeTCs decision. It was clear from the petition for review
that the RTC incurred serious errors in awarding damages to private respondents which were made without
evidence to support the award and without any explanation[17]
In Jaro v. Court of Appeals,[18] we applied the rule on substantial compliance because the petitioner
amended his defective petition and attached thereto the relevant annexes certified according to the
rules. Thus
There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of an appellant may
call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that the subsequent submission of the missing documents with the
motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the
petitioners in these two cases to comply with the required attachments were no longer scrutinized. What
we found noteworthy in each case was the fact that the petitioners therein substantially complied with the
formal requirements[19]
The same leniency should be applied to the instant case considering that petitioner subsequently
submitted with his motion for reconsideration the certified true copy of the Labor Arbiters decision, the
complainants position paper and the respondents memorandum of appeal. Clearly, petitioner had
demonstrated willingness to comply with the requirements set by the rules. If we are to apply the rules of
procedure in a very rigid and technical sense, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, the ends of justice
would be defeated.
The pleadings and documents filed extensively discussed the issues raised by the parties. Such being
the case, there is sufficient basis to resolve the instant controversy. [20]Labor laws mandate the speedy
disposition of cases, with the least attention to technicalities but without sacrificing the fundamental
requisites of due process.[21]Remanding the case to the Court of Appeals will only frustrate speedy justice
and, in any event, would be a futile exercise, as in all probability the case would end up with this Court.
[22]
We shall thus rule on the substantial claims of the parties.
Was the termination of petitioners employment caused by retrenchment or by voluntary resignation?
The Court finds that petitioners dismissal from service was due to retrenchment. This is evident from
the termination letter sent by Philmalay to petitioner, to wit
We regret to inform you that in view of the prevailing market conditions and the continuous losses being
incurred by the company, the management has decided to cut down on expenses and prevent further
losses through retrenchment of some of our personnel effective January 19, 1998.
In compliance with the requirement of the law, this will serve as a formal notice to you of your termination
due to retrenchment effective January 20, 1998. To provide you with sufficient time to seek alternative
employment, you need not report for work (unless otherwise requested) starting January 20,
1998. Notwithstanding the above mentioned affectivity date, you may come down to the office and receive
your separation benefits pursuant to the Labor Code[23]
While it is true that petitioner tendered his resignation letter to respondents requesting that he be
given the same benefits granted by the company to resigned/retrenched employees, there is no showing
that respondents accepted his resignation. Acceptance of a resignation tendered by an employee is
necessary to make the resignation effective. [24]No such acceptance, however, was shown in the instant
case. What appears in the record is a letter terminating the services of petitioner due to retrenchment
effective January 20, 1998. Verily, said letter should be interpreted as a non-acceptance of petitioners
resignation effective December 31, 1997. As correctly pointed out by the Labor Arbiter, if respondents
considered petitioner resigned as of December 31, 1997, then there would be no need to retrench him.
The length of service of petitioner, which the NLRC correctly reduced to 8 years, as well as the solidary
liability of respondent corporations are no longer assailed here.Whether petitioner is considered resigned
on December 31, 1997 or retrenched on January 20, 1998, his length of employment reckoned from August
24, 1989 would still be 8 years.Moreover, respondents did not appeal from the decision of the NLRC and in
fact sought its affirmance in their Opposition to the motion for reconsideration [25] and Comment to the
motion for reconsideration[26] filed before the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, respectively.So also,
petitioner is estopped from claiming that he was illegally dismissed and that his retrenchment was without
basis. His request for benefits granted to retrenched employees during such time when respondent was in
the process of retrenching its employees is tantamount to a recognition of the existence of a valid cause
for retrenchment. What remains to be resolved by the Court is the validity of the NLRCs
deletion/modification of the awards of (1) unpaid salary; (2) vacation leave; (3) car and insurance
policy/premiums; (4) moral and exemplary damages; (5) reimbursement for expenses for legal services;
(6) rental payment; and (7) attorneys fees.
As regards the award of unpaid salary, the NLRC was correct in holding that petitioner is not entitled to
compensation from January 1, 1998 to January 19, 1998, because he was not able to prove that he
rendered services during said period. In the same vein, there is no basis in awarding moral and exemplary
damages, inasmuch as respondents were not shown to have acted in bad faith in initially refusing to award
separation pay equivalent to 1 month salary for every year of service. Respondents even offered to pay
petitioner separation pay, albeit in an amount not acceptable to petitioner. Moral damages are recoverable

only where the act complained of is tainted by bad faith or fraud, or where it is oppressive to labor, and
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded
only if the act was done in a wanton, oppressive, or malevolent manner. [27] None of these circumstances
exist in the present case.
The NLRC also correctly ruled that the car and insurance benefits are granted only during the course of
employment; hence, they should not be part of petitioners separation package. Likewise, petitioners claim
for payment of rental for the use of his house as office of Philmalay should be denied for having been
ventilated in the wrong forum. Not all money claims that may be asserted by an employee against his
employer are within the jurisdiction of the NLRC. Money claims of workers which fall within the jurisdiction
of Labor Arbiters are those which arise out of employer-employee relationship. Obviously, the demand for
rental payment is not a labor dispute; rather, it is based on contractual relations independent of employer-
employee relationship. Hence, the jurisdiction thereon is with the regular courts. [28]
Since respondents did not appeal from the decision of the NLRC, it is presumed that they are satisfied
with the adjudications therein, including the order of NLRC directing them to provide legal services to
petitioner in the illegal recruitment case filed against the latter while he was still employed by
respondents. This is in accord with the doctrine that a party who has not appealed cannot obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the appealed decision. [29] Nonetheless,
respondents cannot be ordered to reimburse the amount of P200,000.00 for the legal services of the law
firm allegedly hired by petitioner because he failed to establish that he indeed hired the services of a law
firm and that he spent P200,000.00 as a consequence thereof.
Petitioner is, however, entitled to the award of vacation leave as part of respondents retrenchment
incentives. In granting sick leave but deleting vacation leave benefits, the NLRC based its ruling on the
affidavit of one Ms. Rowena Lopez, a former personnel of Philmalay, viz:
3. That based on company policy and/or practice the rank-and-file employees are entitled to 15-days
vacation leave and 15-days sick leaves. However, the vacation leave must be availed of within the year or
applied to the remaining period of employment for those who resigned or go on terminal leave. In case of
sick leaves all unused sick leaves are also commutable to cash;
4. That employees who were retrenched are entitled to the following incentives:
(a) One (1) month additional leave with pay effective after their last day of employment to enable
them to look for a new job;
(b) Plus one (1) month separation pay for every year of service; and
(c) 15-days vacation leave and 15-days sick leave with pay as stated in paragraph 3 hereof. [30]
The foregoing expressly states that a retrenched employee is entitled to 15-day vacation
leave. Paragraph 4 is the retrenchment package granted to retrenched employees, whereas paragraph 3
refers to the feasibility of commutation of unused sick and vacation leaves. Except for the sentence
entitling employees to vacation and sick leaves, the last 2 sentences in paragraph 3 have nothing to do
with the retrenchment benefits in paragraph 4. Note that the 15-day vacation and sick leave with pay in
paragraph 4(c) are not qualified by the word unused. The 15-day vacation and sick leaves are granted to
retrenched employees as part of the retrenchment benefits regardless of whether or not they have unused
sick and vacation leaves at the time of the retrenchment. Moreover, the applicability of the said provisions
to petitioner was not disputed by respondents. They even invoked the same in manifesting conformity to
the deletion by the NLRC of the award of 15-day vacation leave for every year of service. At any rate, any
ambiguity therein must be resolved strictly against the respondents, who drafted these provisions.
[31]
Hence, petitioner is entitled not only to 15 days sick leave but also to 15 days vacation leave with pay
The Labor Arbiters computation of petitioners 15-day sick leave pay must be modified.The NLRC,
which affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision, reduced petitioners number of years of service from 9 to 8
years but it did not make the corresponding adjustment in the determination of petitioners sick leave pay
which used 9 years as the basis in the computation thereof. Accordingly, the awards of 15-day sick leave
and 15-day vacation leave for every year of service must be computed using 8 years as its basis.
Finally, the award of attorneys fees must also be modified. In Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-
Independent v. National Labor Relations Commission,[32] it was held that there are two commonly accepted
concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorneys
fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to
the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the
client. In its extraordinary concept, attorneys fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by the court
to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The instances where these may be awarded are those
enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically par. 7 thereof which pertains to actions for
recovery of wages, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the
award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. The extraordinary concept
of attorneys fees is the one contemplated in Article 111 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Art. 111. Attorneys fees. (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed
attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages recovered
The afore-quoted Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of strict construction in the
awarding of attorneys fees. Although an express finding of facts and law is still necessary to prove the
merit of the award, there need not be any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith
when it withheld the wages. There need only be a showing that the lawful wages were not paid
accordingly, as in this case.[33]
In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing regulations, the
employees welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This kind of interpretation gives
meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided in Article 4 of the
Labor Code which states that [a]ll doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of [the
Labor] Code including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor, and
Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that [i]n case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer. [34]
In the case at bar, what was withheld from petitioner was not only his salary, vacation and sick leave
pay, and 13th month pay differential, but also his separation pay. Hence, pursuant to current jurisprudence,
separation pay must be included in the basis for the computation of attorneys fees. Petitioner is entitled to
attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of his total monetary award.[35]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions
dated January 28, 2002 and July 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67431, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA 023679-2000, is
MODIFIED. In addition to the awards of underpayment of salary, 13 th month pay differential, sick leave pay
and separation pay, respondents are ordered to pay petitioner vacation leave pay and 10% attorneys fees,
the basis of which shall be the total monetary award. Petitioners vacation leave and sick leave pay shall be
computed on the basis of his 8 years of service with respondents. For this purpose, the case is ordered
REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of the amounts due petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 105774. April 25, 2002]
GREAT ASIAN SALES CENTER CORPORATION and TAN CHONG LIN,petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and BANCASIA FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure
assailing the June 9, 1992 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 20167. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the January 26, 1988 Decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52,
[4]
ordering petitioners Great Asian Sales Center Corporation (Great Asian for brevity) and Tan Chong Lin to
pay, solidarily, respondent Bancasia Finance and Investment Corporation (Bancasia for brevity) the amount

of P1,042,005.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts award of interest and costs of suit but
deleted the award of attorneys fees.
The Facts
Great Asian is engaged in the business of buying and selling general merchandise, in particular
household appliances. On March 17, 1981, the board of directors of Great Asian approved a resolution
authorizing its Treasurer and General Manager, Arsenio Lim Piat, Jr. (Arsenio for brevity) to secure a loan
from Bancasia in an amount not to exceed P1.0 million. The board resolution also authorized Arsenio to
sign all papers, documents or promissory notes necessary to secure the loan.On February 10, 1982, the
board of directors of Great Asian approved a second resolution authorizing Great Asian to secure a
discounting line with Bancasia in an amount not exceeding P2.0 million. The second board resolution also
designated Arsenio as the authorized signatory to sign all instruments, documents and checks necessary
to secure the discounting line.
On March 4, 1981, Tan Chong Lin signed a Surety Agreement in favor of Bancasia to guarantee,
solidarily, the debts of Great Asian to Bancasia. On January 29, 1982, Tan Chong Lin signed a
Comprehensive and Continuing Surety Agreement in favor of Bancasia to guarantee, solidarily, the debts
of Great Asian to Bancasia. Thus, Tan Chong Lin signed two surety agreements (Surety Agreements for
brevity) in favor of Bancasia.
Great Asian, through its Treasurer and General Manager Arsenio, signed four (4) Deeds of Assignment
of Receivables (Deeds of Assignment for brevity), assigning to Bancasia fifteen (15) postdated checks. Nine
of the checks were payable to Great Asian, three were payable to New Asian Emp., and the last three were
payable to cash. Various customers of Great Asian issued these postdated checks in payment for
appliances and other merchandise.
Great Asian and Bancasia signed the first Deed of Assignment on January 12, 1982 covering four
postdated checks with a total face value of P244,225.82, with maturity dates not later than March 17,
1982. Of these four postdated checks, two were dishonored. Great Asian and Bancasia signed the second
Deed of Assignment also on January 12, 1982 covering four postdated checks with a total face value
of P312,819.00, with maturity dates not later than April 1, 1982. All these four checks were dishonored.
Great Asian and Bancasia signed the third Deed of Assignment on February 11, 1982 covering eight
postdated checks with a total face value of P344,475.00, withmaturity dates not later than April 30,
1982. All these eight checks were dishonored. Great Asian and Bancasia signed the fourth Deed of
Assignment on March 5, 1982 covering one postdated check with a face value of P200,000.00,
with maturity date on March 18, 1982. This last check was also dishonored. Great Asian assigned the
postdated checks to Bancasia at a discount rate of less than 24% of the face value of the checks.
Arsenio endorsed all the fifteen dishonored checks by signing his name at the back of the
checks. Eight of the dishonored checks bore the endorsement of Arsenio below the stamped name of Great
Asian Sales Center, while the rest of the dishonored checks just bore the signature of Arsenio.The drawee
banks dishonored the fifteen checks on maturity when deposited for collection by Bancasia, with any of the
following as reason for the dishonor: account closed, payment stopped, account under garnishment, and
insufficiency of funds. The total amount of the fifteen dishonored checks is P1,042,005.00. Below is a table
of the fifteen dishonored checks:
Drawee Bank Check No. Amount Maturity Date
1st Deed
Solid Bank C-A097480 P137,500.00 March 16, 1982
Pacific Banking Corp. 23950 P47,211.00 March 17, 1982
2nd Deed
Metrobank 030925 P68,722.00 March 19, 1982
030926 P45,230.00 March 19, 1982
Solidbank C-A097478 P140,000.00 March 23, 1982

Pacific Banking Corp. CC 769910 P58,867.00 April 1, 1982
3rd Deed
Phil. Trust Company 060835 P21,228.00 April 21, 1982
060836 P22,187.00 April 28, 1982
Allied Banking Corp. 11251624 P41,773.00 April 22, 1982
11251625 P38,592.00 April 29, 1982
Pacific Banking Corp. 237984 P37,886.00 April 23, 1982
237988 P47,385.00 April 28, 1982
237985 P46,748.00 April 30, 1982
Security Bank & Trust Co. 22061 P88,676.00 April 30, 1982
4th Deed
Pacific Banking Corp. 860178 P200,000.00 March 18, 1982
After the drawee bank dishonored Check No. 097480 dated March 16, 1982, Bancasia referred the
matter to its lawyer, Atty. Eladia Reyes, who sent by registered mail to Tan Chong Lin a letter dated March
18, 1982, notifying him of the dishonor and demanding payment from him.Subsequently, Bancasia sent by
personal delivery a letter dated June 16, 1982 to Tan Chong Lin, notifying him of the dishonor of the fifteen
checks and demanding payment from him. Neither Great Asian nor Tan Chong Lin paid Bancasia the
dishonored checks.
On May 21, 1982, Great Asian filed with the then Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for
insolvency, verified under oath by its Corporate Secretary, Mario Tan. Attached to the verified petition was
a Schedule and Inventory of Liabilities and Creditors of Great Asian Sales Center Corporation, listing
Bancasia as one of the creditors of Great Asian in the amount of P1,243,632.00.
On June 23, 1982, Bancasia filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against Great Asian and
Tan Chong Lin. Bancasia impleaded Tan Chong Lin because of the Surety Agreements he signed in favor of
Bancasia. In its answer, Great Asian denied the material allegations of the complaint claiming it was
unfounded, malicious, baseless, and unlawfully instituted since there was already a pending insolvency
proceedings, although Great Asian subsequently withdrew its petition for voluntary insolvency. Great Asian
further raised the alleged lack of authority of Arsenio to sign the Deeds of Assignment as well as the
absence of consideration and consent of all the parties to the Surety Agreements signed by Tan Chong Lin.
The trial court rendered its decision on January 26, 1988 with the following findings and conclusions:
From the foregoing facts and circumstances, the Court finds that the plaintiff has established its causes of
action against the defendants. The Board Resolution (Exh. T), dated March 17, 1981, authorizing Arsenio
Lim Piat, Jr., general manager and treasurer of the defendant Great Asian to apply and negotiate for a loan
accommodation or credit line with the plaintiff Bancasia in an amount not exceeding One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), and the other Board Resolution approved on February 10, 1982, authorizing Arsenio Lim
Piat, Jr., to obtain for defendant Asian Center a discounting line with Bancasia at prevailing discounting
rates in an amount not to exceed Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00), both of which were intended to secure
money from the plaintiff financing firm to finance the business operations of defendant Great Asian, and
pursuant to which Arsenio Lim Piat, Jr. was able to have the aforementioned fifteen (15) checks
totaling P1,042,005.00 discounted with the plaintiff, which transactions were obviously known by the
beneficiary thereof, defendant Great Asian, as in fact, in its aforementioned Schedule and Inventory of
Liabilities and Creditors (Exh. DD, DD-1) attached to its Verified Petition for Insolvency, dated May 12, 1982
(pp. 50-56), the defendant Great Asian admitted an existing liability to the plaintiff, in the amount
ofP1,243,632.00, secured by it, by way of financing accommodation, from the said financing institution
Bancasia Finance and Investment Corporation, plaintiff herein, sufficiently establish the liability of the
defendant Great Asian to the plaintiff for the amount of P1,042,005.00 sought to be recovered by the latter
in this case.[5]
xxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the two (2) defendants
ordering the latter, jointly and severally, to pay the former:
(a) The amount of P1,042,005.00, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the
complaint until the same is fully paid;
(b) Attorneys fees equivalent to twenty per cent (20%) of the total amount due; and
(c) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the lower court, deleting only the award of
attorneys fees, as follows:
As against appellants bare denial of it, the Court is more inclined to accept the appellees version, to the
effect that the subject deeds of assignment are but individual transactions which -- being collectively
evidentiary of the loan accommodation and/or credit line it granted the appellant corporation -- should not
be taken singly and distinct therefrom. In addition to its plausibility, the proposition is, more importantly,
adequately backed by the documentary evidence on record. Aside from the aforesaid Deeds of Assignment
(Exhs. A, D, I, and R) and the Board Resolutions of the appellant corporations Board of Directors (Exhs. T, U
and V), the appellee -- consistent with its theory -- interposed the Surety Agreements the appellant Tan
Chong Lin executed (Exhs. W and X), as well as the demand letters it served upon the latter as surety
(Exhs. Y and Z). It bears emphasis that the second Resolution of the appellant corporations Board of
Directors (Exh. V) even closely coincides with the execution of the February 11, 1982 and March 5, 1982
Deeds of Assignment (Exhs. I and R). Were the appellants posturings true, it seems rather strange that the
appellant Tan Chong Lin did not even protest or, at least, make known to the appellee what he -- together
with the appellant corporation -- represented to be a corporate larceny to which all of them supposedly fell
prey. In the petition for voluntary insolvency it filed, the appellant corporation, instead, indirectly
acknowledged its indebtedness in terms of financing accommodations to the appellee, in an amount
which, while not exactly matching the sum herein sought to be collected, approximates the same (Exhs.
CC, DD and DD-1).[7]
xxx
The appellants contend that the foregoing warranties enlarged or increased the suretys risk, such that
appellant Tan Chong Lin should be released from his liabilities (pp. 37-44, Appellants Brief). Without saying
more, the appellants position is, however, soundly debunked by the undertaking expressed in the
Comprehensive and Continuing Surety Agreements (Exhs. W and X), to the effect that the xxx surety/ies,
jointly and severally among themselves and likewise with the principal, hereby agree/s and bind/s himself
to pay at maturity all the notes, drafts, bills of exchange, overdrafts and other obligations which the
principal may now or may hereafter owe the creditor xxx. With the possible exception of the fixed ceiling
for the amount of loan obtainable, the surety undertaking in the case at bar is so comprehensive as to
contemplate each and every condition, term or warranty which the principal parties may have or may be
minded to agree on. Having affixed his signature thereto, the appellant Tan Chong Lin is expected to have,
at least, read and understood the same.
xxx
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court sees little or no reason to go into the appellants remaining
assignments of error, save the matter of attorneys fees. For want of a statement of the rationale therefore
in the body of the challenged decision, the trial courts award of attorneys fees should be deleted and
disallowed (Abrogar vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 57).

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED, to delete the trial courts award of attorneys
fees. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The Issues
The petition is anchored on the following assigned errors:
1. The respondent Court erred in not holding that the proper parties against whom this action for
collection should be brought are the drawers and indorser of the checks in question, being the
real parties in interest, and not the herein petitioners.
2. The respondent Court erred in not holding that the petitioner-corporation is discharged from
liability for failure of the private respondent to comply with the provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Law on the dishonor of the checks.
3. The respondent Court erred in its appreciation and interpretation of the effect and legal
consequences of the signing of the deeds of assignment and the subsequent indorsement of
the checks by Arsenio Lim Piat, Jr. in his individual and personal capacity and without stating or
indicating the name of his supposed principal.
4. The respondent Court erred in holding that the assignment of the checks is a loan
accommodation or credit line accorded by the private respondent to petitioner-corporation, and
not a purchase and sale thereof.
5. The respondent Court erred in not holding that there was a material alteration of the risk
assumed by the petitioner-surety under his surety agreement by the terms, conditions,
warranties and obligations assumed by the assignor Arsenio Lim Piat, Jr. under the deeds of
assignment or receivables.
6. The respondent Court erred in holding that the petitioner-corporation impliedly admitted its
liability to private respondent when the former included the latter as one of its creditors in its
petition for voluntary insolvency, although no claim was filed and proved by the private
respondent in the insolvency court.
7. The respondent Court erred in holding the petitioners liable to private respondent on the
transactions in question.[9]
The issues to be resolved in this petition can be summarized into three:
1. WHETHER ARSENIO HAD AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE DEEDS OF ASSIGNMENT AND THUS BIND
GREAT ASIAN;
2. WHETHER GREAT ASIAN IS LIABLE TO BANCASIA UNDER THE DEEDS OF ASSIGNMENT FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL CODE, INDEPENDENT OF THE NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW;
3. WHETHER TAN CHONG LIN IS LIABLE TO GREAT ASIAN UNDER THE SURETY AGREEMENTS.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: Authority of Arsenio to Sign the Deeds of Assignment
Great Asian asserts that Arsenio signed the Deeds of Assignment and indorsed the checks in his
personal capacity. The primordial question that must be resolved is whether Great Asian authorized
Arsenio to sign the Deeds of Assignment. If Great Asian so authorized Arsenio, then Great Asian is bound
by the Deeds of Assignment and must honor its terms.

The Corporation Code of the Philippines vests in the board of directors the exercise of the corporate
powers of the corporation, save in those instances where the Code requires stockholders approval for
certain specific acts. Section 23 of the Code provides:
SEC. 23. The Board of Directors or Trustees. Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the corporate
powers of all corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business conducted and all
property of such corporations controlled and held by the board of directors or trustees x x x.
In the ordinary course of business, a corporation can borrow funds or dispose of assets of the corporation
only on authority of the board of directors. The board of directors normally designates one or more
corporate officers to sign loan documents or deeds of assignment for the corporation.
To secure a credit accommodation from Bancasia, the board of directors of Great Asian adopted two
board resolutions on different dates, the first on March 17, 1981, and the second on February 10,
1982. These two board resolutions, as certified under oath by Great Asians Corporate Secretary Mario K.
Tan, state:
First Board Resolution
RESOLVED, that the Treasurer of the corporation, Mr. Arsenio Lim Piat, Jr., be authorized as he is
authorized to apply for and negotiate for a loan accommodation or credit line in the amount not to
exceed ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), with Bancasia Finance and Investment Corporation, and
likewise to sign any and all papers, documents, and/or promissory notes in connection with said loan
accommodation or credit line, including the power to mortgage such properties of the corporation as
may be needed to effectuate the same.[10](Emphasis supplied)
Second Board Resolution
RESOLVED that Great Asian Sales Center Corp. obtain a discounting line with BANCASIAFINANCE &
INVESTMENT CORPORATION, at prevailing discounting rates, in an amount not to exceed** TWO
MILLION PESOS ONLY (P2,000,000),** Philippine Currency.
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the corporation secure such other forms of credit lines with BANCASIA
FINANCE & INVESTMENT CORPORATION in an amount not to exceed** TWO MILLION PESOS ONLY
(P2,000,000.00),** PESOS, under such terms and conditions as the signatories may deem fit and
proper.
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the following persons be authorized individually, jointly or collectively to
sign, execute and deliver any and all instruments, documents, checks, sureties, etc. necessary or
incidental to secure any of the foregoing obligation:
(signed)
Specimen Signature
1. ARSENIO LIM PIAT, JR._
2. _______________________
3. _______________________
4. _______________________
PROVIDED FINALLY that this authority shall be valid, binding and effective until revoked by the
Board of Directors in the manner prescribed by law, and that BANCASIA FINANCE & INVESTMENT
CORPORATION shall not be bound by any such revocation until such time as it is noticed in writing of
such revocation.[11] (Emphasis supplied)
The first board resolution expressly authorizes Arsenio, as Treasurer of Great Asian, to apply for a loan
accommodation or credit line with Bancasia for not more than P1.0 million. Also, the first resolution
explicitly authorizes Arsenio to sign any document, paper or promissory note, including mortgage deeds
over properties of Great Asian, to secure the loan or credit line from Bancasia.
The second board resolution expressly authorizes Great Asian to secure a discounting line from
Bancasia for not more than P2.0 million. The second board resolution also expressly empowers Arsenio, as
the authorized signatory of Great Asian, to sign, execute and deliver any and all
documents, checks x x x necessary or incidental to secure the discounting line. The second board
resolution specifically authorizes Arsenio to secure the discounting line under such terms and
conditions as (he) x x x may deem fit and proper.
As plain as daylight, the two board resolutions clearly authorize Great Asian to secure a loan
ordiscounting line from Bancasia. The two board resolutions also categorically designate Arsenio as the
authorized signatory to sign and deliver all the implementing documents, including checks, for Great
Asian. There is no iota of doubt whatsoever about the purpose of the two board resolutions, and about the
authority of Arsenio to act and sign for Great Asian. The second board resolution even gave Arsenio full
authority to agree with Bancasia on the terms and conditions of the discounting line. Great Asian adopted
the correct and proper board resolutions to secure a loan or discounting line from Bancasia, and Bancasia
had a right to rely on the two board resolutions of Great Asian.Significantly, the two board resolutions
specifically refer to Bancasia as the financing institution from whom Great Asian will secure the loan
accommodation or discounting line.
Armed with the two board resolutions, Arsenio signed the Deeds of Assignment selling, and endorsing,
the fifteen checks of Great Asian to Bancasia. On the face of the Deeds of Assignment, the contracting
parties are indisputably Great Asian and Bancasia as the names of these entities are expressly mentioned
therein as the assignor and assignee, respectively. Great Asian claims that Arsenio signed the Deeds of
Assignment in his personal capacity because Arsenio signed above his printed name, below which was the
word Assignor, thereby making Arsenio the assignor. Great Asian conveniently omits to state that the first
paragraph of the Deeds expressly contains the following words: the ASSIGNOR, Great Asian Sales
Center, a domestic corporation x x x herein represented by its Treasurer Arsenio Lim Piat, Jr.
The assignor is undoubtedly Great Asian, represented by its Treasurer, Arsenio. The only issue to determine
is whether the Deeds of Assignment are indeed the transactions the board of directors of Great Asian
authorized Arsenio to sign under the two board resolutions.
Under the Deeds of Assignment, Great Asian sold fifteen postdated checks at a discount, over three
months, to Bancasia. The Deeds of Assignment uniformly state that Great Asian,
x x x for valuable consideration received, does hereby SELL, TRANSFER, CONVEY, and ASSIGN, unto
the ASSIGNEE, BANCASIA FINANCE & INVESTMENT CORP., a domestic corporation x x x, the following
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLES due and payable to it, having an aggregate face value of x x x.
The Deeds of Assignment enabled Great Asian to generate instant cash from its fifteen checks, which were
still not due and demandable then. In short, instead of waiting for the maturity dates of the fifteen
postdated checks, Great Asian sold the checks to Bancasia at less than the total face value of the
checks. In exchange for receiving an amount less than the face value of the checks, Great Asian obtained
immediately much needed cash. Over three months, Great Asian entered into four transactions of this
nature with Bancasia, showing that Great Asian availed of a discounting line with Bancasia.
In the financing industry, the term discounting line means a credit facility with a financing company or
bank, which allows a business entity to sell, on a continuing basis, its accounts receivable at a discount.
[12]
The term discount means the sale of a receivable at less than its face value. The purpose of a
discounting line is to enable a business entity to generate instant cash out of its receivables which are still
to mature at future dates. The financing company or bank which buys the receivables makes its profit out
of the difference between the face value of the receivable and the discounted price. Thus, Section 3 (a) of
the Financing Company Act of 1998 provides:
Financing companies are corporations x x x primarily organized for the purpose of extending
credit facilities to consumers and to industrial, commercial or agricultural enterprises by
discounting or factoring commercial papers or accounts receivable, or by buying and
sellingcontracts, leases, chattel mortgages, or other evidences of indebtedness, or by financial
leasing of movable as well as immovable property. (Emphasis supplied)
This definition of financing companies is substantially the same definition as in the old Financing Company
Act (R.A. No. 5980).[13]

Moreover, Section 1 (h) of the New Rules and Regulations adopted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission to implement the Financing Company Act of 1998 states:
Discounting is a type of receivables financing whereby evidences of indebtedness of a third

party, such as installment contracts, promissory notes and similar instruments, are purchased by,
or assigned to, a financing company in an amount or for a consideration less than their
face value. (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, this definition of discounting is an exact reproduction of the definition of discounting in the
implementing rules of the old Finance Company Act.
Clearly, the discounting arrangements entered into by Arsenio under the Deeds of Assignment were
the very transactions envisioned in the two board resolutions of Great Asian to raise funds for its
business. Arsenio acted completely within the limits of his authority under the two board
resolutions. Arsenio did exactly what the board of directors of Great Asian directed and authorized him to
do.
Arsenio had all the proper and necessary authority from the board of directors of Great Asian to sign
the Deeds of Assignment and to endorse the fifteen postdated checks. Arsenio signed the Deeds of
Assignment as agent and authorized signatory of Great Asian under an authority expressly granted by its
board of directors. The signature of Arsenio on the Deeds of Assignment is effectively also the signature of
the board of directors of Great Asian, binding on the board of directors and on Great Asian itself. Evidently,
Great Asian shows its bad faith in disowning the Deeds of Assignment signed by its own Treasurer, after
receiving valuable consideration for the checks assigned under the Deeds.
Second Issue: Breach of Contract by Great Asian
Bancasias complaint against Great Asian is founded on the latters breach of contract under the Deeds
of Assignment. The Deeds of Assignment uniformly stipulate[14] as follows:
If for any reason the receivables or any part thereof cannot be paid by the obligor/s, the
ASSIGNOR unconditionally and irrevocably agrees to pay the same, assuming the liability to pay,
by way of penalty three per cent (3%) of the total amount unpaid, for the period of delay until the same is
fully paid.
In case of any litigation which the ASSIGNEE may institute to enforce the terms of this agreement, the
ASSIGNOR shall be liable for all the costs, plus attorneys fees equivalent to twenty-five (25%) per cent of
the total amount due. Further thereto, the ASSIGNOR agrees that any and all actions which may be
instituted relative hereto shall be filed before the proper courts of the City of Manila, all other appropriate
venues being hereby waived.
The last Deed of Assignment[15] contains the following added stipulation:
xxx Likewise, it is hereby understood that the warranties which the ASSIGNOR hereby made are deemed
part of the consideration for this transaction, such that any violation of any one, some, or all of said
warranties shall be deemed as deliberate misrepresentation on the part of the ASSIGNOR. In such event,
the monetary obligation herein conveyed unto the ASSIGNEE shall be conclusively deemed defaulted,
giving rise to the immediate responsibility on the part of the ASSIGNOR to make good said obligation, and
making the ASSIGNOR liable to pay the penalty stipulated hereinabove as if the original obligor/s of the
receivables actually defaulted. xxx
Obviously, there is one vital suspensive condition in the Deeds of Assignment. That is, in case the
drawers fail to pay the checks on maturity, Great Asian obligated itself to pay Bancasia the full face value
of the dishonored checks, including penalty and attorneys fees. The failure of the drawers to pay the
checks is a suspensive condition, [16] the happening of which gives rise to Bancasias right to demand
payment from Great Asian. This conditional obligation of Great Asian arises from its written contracts with
Bancasia as embodied in the Deeds of Assignment. Article 1157 of the Civil Code provides that -
Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts.
By express provision in the Deeds of Assignment, Great Asian unconditionally obligated itself to pay
Bancasia the full value of the dishonored checks. In short, Great Asian sold the postdated checks on with
recourse basis against itself. This is an obligation that Great Asian is bound to faithfully comply because it
has the force of law as between Great Asian and Bancasia. Article 1159 of the Civil Code further provides
that -
Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with in good faith.
Great Asian and Bancasia agreed on this specific with recourse stipulation, despite the fact that the
receivables were negotiable instruments with the endorsement of Arsenio. The contracting parties had the
right to adopt the with recourse stipulation which is separate and distinct from the warranties of an
endorser under the Negotiable Instruments Law. Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides that
The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
The explicit with recourse stipulation against Great Asian effectively enlarges, by agreement of the
parties, the liability of Great Asian beyond that of a mere endorser of a negotiable instrument. Thus,
whether or not Bancasia gives notice of dishonor to Great Asian, the latter remains liable to Bancasia
because of the with recourse stipulation which is independent of the warranties of an endorser under the
Negotiable Instruments Law.
There is nothing in the Negotiable Instruments Law or in the Financing Company Act (old or new), that
prohibits Great Asian and Bancasia parties from adopting the with recourse stipulation uniformly found in
the Deeds of Assignment. Instead of being negotiated, a negotiable instrument may be assigned.
[17]
Assignment of a negotiable instrument is actually the principal mode of conveying accounts receivable
under the Financing Company Act. Since in discounting of receivables the assignee is subrogated as
creditor of the receivable, the endorsement of the negotiable instrument becomes necessary to enable the
assignee to collect from the drawer. This is particularly true with checks because collecting banks will not
accept checks unless endorsed by the payee. The purpose of the endorsement is merely to facilitate
collection of the proceeds of the checks.
The purpose of the endorsement is not to make the assignee finance company a holder in due course
because policy considerations militate against according finance companies the rights of a holder in due
course.[18] Otherwise, consumers who purchase appliances on installment, giving their promissory notes or
checks to the seller, will have no defense against the finance company should the appliances later turn out
to be defective. Thus, the endorsement does not operate to make the finance company a holder in due
course. For its own protection, therefore, the finance company usually requires the assignor, in a separate
and distinct contract, to pay the finance company in the event of dishonor of the notes or checks.
As endorsee of Great Asian, Bancasia had the option to proceed against Great Asian under the
Negotiable Instruments Law. Had it so proceeded, the Negotiable Instruments Law would have governed
Bancasias cause of action. Bancasia, however, did not choose this route. Instead, Bancasia decided to sue
Great Asian for breach of contract under the Civil Code, a right that Bancasia had under the express with
recourse stipulation in the Deeds of Assignment.
The exercise by Bancasia of its option to sue for breach of contract under the Civil Code will not leave
Great Asian holding an empty bag. Great Asian, after paying Bancasia, is subrogated back as creditor of
the receivables. Great Asian can then proceed against the drawers who issued the checks. Even if
Bancasia failed to give timely notice of dishonor, still there would be no prejudice whatever to Great
Asian. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, notice of dishonor is not required if the drawer has no right
to expect or require the bank to honor the check, or if the drawer has countermanded payment. [19] In the
instant case, all the checks were dishonored for any of the following reasons: account closed, account
under garnishment, insufficiency of funds, or payment stopped. In the first three instances, the drawers
had no right to expect or require the bank to honor the checks, and in the last instance, the drawers had
countermanded payment.
Moreover, under common law, delay in notice of dishonor, where such notice is required, discharges
the drawer only to the extent of the loss caused by the delay. [20] This rule finds application in this
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 196 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which states, Any case not provided
for in this Act shall be governed by the provisions of existing legislation, or in default thereof, by the rules
of the Law Merchant. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, delay in the presentment of
checks discharges the drawer. However, Section 186 refers only to delay in presentment of checks but is
silent on delay in giving notice of dishonor. Consequently, the common law or Law Merchant can supply
this gap in accordance with Section 196 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
One other issue raised by Great Asian, that of lack of consideration for the Deeds of Assignment, is
completely unsubstantiated. The Deeds of Assignment uniformly provide that the fifteen postdated checks
were assigned to Bancasia for valuable consideration. Moreover, Article 1354 of the Civil Code states that,
Although the cause is not stated in the contract, it is presumed that it exists and is lawful, unless the
debtor proves the contrary. The record is devoid of any showing on the part of Great Asian rebutting this
presumption. On the other hand, Bancasias Loan Section Manager, Cynthia Maclan, testified that Bancasia
paid Great Asian a consideration at the discount rate of less than 24% of the face value of the postdated
checks.[21] Moreover, in its verified petition for voluntary insolvency, Great Asian admitted its debt to
Bancasia when it listed Bancasia as one of its creditors, an extra-judicial admission that Bancasia proved
when it formally offered in evidence the verified petition for insolvency. [22] The Insolvency Law requires the
petitioner to submit a schedule of debts that must contain a full and true statement of all his debts and
liabilities.[23] The Insolvency Law even requires the petitioner to state in his verification that the schedule of
debts contains a full, correct and true discovery of all my debts and liabilities x x x. [24] Great Asian cannot
now claim that the listing of Bancasia as a creditor was not an admission of its debt to Bancasia but merely
an acknowledgment that Bancasia had sent a demand letter to Great Asian.
Great Asian, moreover, claims that the assignment of the checks is not a loan accommodation but a
sale of the checks. With the sale, ownership of the checks passed to Bancasia, which must now, according
to Great Asian, sue the drawers and indorser of the check who are the parties primarily liable on the
checks. Great Asian forgets that under the Deeds of Assignment, Great Asian expressly undertook to pay
the full value of the checks in case of dishonor. Again, we reiterate that this obligation of Great Asian is
separate and distinct from its warranties as indorser under the Negotiable Instruments Law.
Great Asian is, however, correct in saying that the assignment of the checks is a sale, or more properly
a discounting, of the checks and not a loan accommodation. However, it is precisely because the
transaction is a sale or a discounting of receivables, embodied in separate Deeds of Assignment, that the
relevant provisions of the Civil Code are applicable and not the Negotiable Instruments Law.
At any rate, there is indeed a fine distinction between a discounting line and a loan accommodation. If
the accounts receivable, like postdated checks, are sold for a consideration less than their face value, the
transaction is one of discounting, and is subject to the provisions of the Financing Company Act. The
assignee is immediately subrogated as creditor of the accounts receivable. However, if the accounts
receivable are merely used as collateral for the loan, the transaction is only a simple loan, and the lender
is not subrogated as creditor until there is a default and the collateral is foreclosed.
In summary, Great Asians four contracts assigning its fifteen postdated checks to Bancasia expressly
stipulate the suspensive condition that in the event the drawers of the checks fail to pay, Great Asian itself
will pay Bancasia. Since the common condition in the contracts had transpired, an obligation on the part of
Great Asian arose from the four contracts, and that obligation is to pay Bancasia the full value of the
checks, including the stipulated penalty and attorneys fees.
Third Issue: The liability of surety Tan Chong Lin
Tan Chong Lin, the President of Great Asian, is being sued in his personal capacity based on the Surety
Agreements he signed wherein he solidarily held himself liable with Great Asian for the payment of its
debts to Bancasia. The Surety Agreements contain the following common condition:
Upon failure of the Principal to pay at maturity, with or without demand, any of the obligations above
mentioned, or in case of the Principals failure promptly to respond to any other lawful demand made by

the Creditor, its successors, administrators or assigns, both the Principal and the Surety/ies shall be
considered in default and the Surety/ies agree/s to pay jointly and severally to the Creditor all outstanding
obligations of the Principal, whether due or not due, and whether held by the Creditor as Principal or agent,
and it is agreed that a certified statement by the Creditor as to the amount due from the Principal shall be
accepted by the Surety/ies as correct and final for all legal intents and purposes.
Indisputably, Tan Chong Lin explicitly and unconditionally bound himself to pay Bancasia, solidarily with
Great Asian, if the drawers of the checks fail to pay on due date. The condition on which Tan Chong Lins
obligation hinged had happened. As surety, Tan Chong Lin automatically became liable for the entire
obligation to the same extent as Great Asian.
Tan Chong Lin, however, contends that the following warranties in the Deeds of Assignment enlarge or
increase his risks under the Surety Agreements:
The ASSIGNOR warrants:
1. the soundness of the receivables herein assigned;
2. that said receivables are duly noted in its books and are supported by appropriate documents;
3. that said receivables are genuine, valid and subsisting;
4. that said receivables represent bona fide sale of goods, merchandise, and/or services rendered
in the ordinary course of its business transactions;
5. that the obligors of the receivables herein assigned are solvent;
6. that it has valid and genuine title to and indefeasible right to dispose of said accounts;
7. that said receivables are free from all liens and encumbrances;
8. that the said receivables are freely and legally transferable, and that the obligor/s therein will
not interpose any objection to this assignment, and has in fact given his/their consent hereto.
Tan Chong Lin maintains that these warranties in the Deeds of Assignment materially altered his
obligations under the Surety Agreements, and therefore he is released from any liability to Bancasia. Under
Article 1215 of the Civil Code, what releases a solidary debtor is a novation, compensation, confusion or
remission of the debt made by the creditor with any of the solidary debtors. These warranties, however,
are the usual warranties made by one who discounts receivables with a financing company or bank. The
Surety Agreements, written on the letter head of Bancasia Finance & Investment Corporation, uniformly
state that Great Asian Sales Center x x x has obtained and/or desires to obtain loans,
overdrafts, discounts and/or other forms of credits from Bancasia.Tan Chong Lin was clearly on notice
that he was holding himself as surety of Great Asian which was discounting postdated checks issued by its
buyers of goods and merchandise. Moreover, Tan Chong Lin, as President of Great Asian, cannot feign
ignorance of Great Asians business activities or discounting transactions with Bancasia. Thus, the
warranties do not increase or enlarge the risks of Tan Chong Lin under the Surety Agreements. There is,
moreover, no novation of the debt of Great Asian that would warrant release of the surety.
In any event, the provisions of the Surety Agreements are broad enough to include the obligations of
Great Asian to Bancasia under the warranties. The first Surety Agreement states that:
x x x herein Surety/ies, jointly and severally among themselves and likewise with principal,
herebyagree/s and bind/s himself/themselves to pay at maturity all the notes, drafts, bills of
exchange, overdraft and other obligations of every kind which the Principal may now or may
hereafter owe the Creditor, including extensions or renewals thereof in the sum *** ONE MILLION
ONLY*** PESOS (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus stipulated interest thereon at the rate of sixteen
percent (16%) per annum, or at such increased rate of interest which the Creditor may charge on the
Principals obligations or renewals or the reduced amount thereof, plus all the costs and expenses which
the Creditor may incur in connection therewith.
xxx

Upon failure of the Principal to pay at maturity, with or without demand, any of the obligations
above mentioned, or in case of the Principals failure promptly to respond to any other lawful
demand made by the Creditor, its successors, administrators or assigns, both the Principal and the
Surety/ies shall be considered in default and the Surety/ies agree/s to pay jointly and severally to
the Creditor all outstanding obligations of the Principal, whether due or not due, and whether held
by the Creditor as Principal or agent, and it is agreed that a certified statement by the Creditor as to the
amount due from the Principal shall be accepted by the Surety/ies as correct and final for all legal intents
and purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
The second Surety Agreement contains the following provisions:
x x x herein Surety/ies, jointly and severally among themselves and likewise with PRINCIPAL,
hereby agree and bind themselves to pay at maturity all the notes, drafts, bills of exchange,
overdraft and other obligations of every kind which the PRINCIPAL may now or may hereafter
owe the Creditor, including extensions and/or renewals thereof in the principal sum not to exceed
TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, plus stipulated interest thereon, or such
increased or decreased rate of interest which the Creditor may charge on the principal sum outstanding
pursuant to the rules and regulations which the Monetary Board may from time to time promulgate,
together with all the cost and expenses which the CREDITOR may incur in connection therewith.
If for any reason whatsoever, the PRINCIPAL should fail to pay at maturity any of the obligations or
amounts due to the CREDITOR, or if for any reason whatsoever the PRINCIPAL fails to promptly respond to
and comply with any other lawful demand made by the CREDITOR, or if for any reason whatsoever any
obligation of the PRINCIPAL in favor of any person or entity should be considered as defaulted, then both
the PRINCIPAL and the SURETY/IES shall be considered in default under the terms of this
Agreement. Pursuant thereto, the SURETY/IES agree/s to pay jointly and severally with the
PRINCIPAL, all outstanding obligations of the CREDITOR, whether due or not due, and whether
owing to the PRINCIPAL in its personal capacity or as agent of any person, endorsee, assignee or
transferee. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1207 of the Civil Code provides, xxx There is a solidary liability only when the obligation
expressly so states, or when the law or nature of the obligation requires solidarity. The stipulations in the
Surety Agreements undeniably mandate the solidary liability of Tan Chong Lin with Great Asian. Moreover,
the stipulations in the Surety Agreements are sufficiently broad, expressly encompassing all the notes,
drafts, bills of exchange, overdraft and other obligations of every kind which the PRINCIPAL
may now or may hereafter owe the Creditor. Consequently, Tan Chong Lin must be held solidarily
liable with Great Asian for the nonpayment of the fifteen dishonored checks, including penalty and
attorneys fees in accordance with the Deeds of Assignment.
The Deeds of Assignment stipulate that in case of suit Great Asian shall pay attorneys fees equivalent
to 25% of the outstanding debt. The award of attorneys fees in the instant case is justified, [25] not only
because of such stipulation, but also because Great Asian and Tan Chong Lin acted in gross and evident
bad faith in refusing to pay Bancasias plainly valid, just and demandable claim. We deem it just and
equitable that the stipulated attorneys fee should be awarded to Bancasia.
The Deeds of Assignment also provide for a 3% penalty on the total amount due in case of failure to
pay, but the Deeds are silent on whether this penalty is a running monthly or annual penalty. Thus, the 3%
penalty can only be considered as a one-time penalty. Moreover, the Deeds of Assignment do not provide
for interest if Great Asian fails to pay. We can only award Bancasia legal interest at 12% interest per
annum, and only from the time it filed the complaint because the records do not show that Bancasia made
a written demand on Great Asian prior to filing the complaint. [26]Bancasia made an extrajudicial demand on
Tan Chong Lin, the surety, but not on the principal debtor, Great Asian.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 20167 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioners are ordered to pay, solidarily, private respondent the following amounts:
(a) P1,042,005.00 plus 3% penalty thereon, (b) interest on the total outstanding amount in item (a) at the
legal rate of 12% per annum from the filing of the complaint until the same is fully paid, (c) attorneys fees
equivalent to 25% of the total amount in item (a), including interest at 12% per annum on the outstanding
amount of the attorneys fees from the finality of this judgment until the same is fully paid, and (c) costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.

FIXED DAMAGES/CIVIL INDEMNITY

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 144595 August 6, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
DANTE ILAGAN, appellant.
For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21, in Criminal
Case No. 1246-M-99, convicting appellant Dante Ilagan of Qualified Rape and sentencing him to suffer the
extreme penalty of death and to pay the offended party, Mylene Ilagan, the sums of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral damages.1
The information for Rape against appellant reads:
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1998, in the municipality of Norzagaray, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs, by means of force and
intimidation, have carnal knowledge of his daughter Mylene Ilagan, 16 years old, against her will
and consent.
Contrary to law.2
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. 3 Thereafter, the trial of the case
ensued.
The facts of the case as established by the prosecution are as follows:
The offended party, Mylene Ilagan, lived with her father, appellant Dante Ilagan, and her siblings at
Barangay Bulalo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Her mother, Marietta, had gone off to live with another man. 4
On May 18, 1998, Mylene's elder sister went with her paternal grandmother, Nenita Ilagan, to Meycauayan
to attend the birthday celebration of their eldest sister. Later that evening, while Mylene was asleep beside
her other siblings, accused woke her up and told her that they would sleep in her grandmother Nenita's
house, located some fifteen meters away,5 leaving behind her other siblings in their own house.
At 3:00 in the morning of the following day, while Mylene was asleep, she was awakened by someone
taking off her shorts and panties. She saw appellant, naked from the waist down, lying on top of her.
Appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her pain. She was unable to cry for fear that appellant
might kill her since he had threatened to kill her before. Appellant stopped the sexual intrusion when a
substance, which looked like phlegm, came out of his penis. He then got up and went to the kitchen to boil
some water. He told Mylene to watch the pot and left the house. 6
On December 10, 1998, while appellant was in Quezon Province, Mylene mustered the courage to tell her
friend, Jocelyn, about the sexual assault by her father. They went to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), which brought Mylene to the Norzagaray Police where she gave her sworn
statement. Thereafter, she was brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Provincial Crime Laboratory
in Malolos, Bulacan for physical examination.7

Dr. Manuel Aves, the PNP Medico-Legal Officer who examined Mylene, found multiple healed deep
lacerations on her hymen. He concluded that Mylene was a non-virgin at the time of the examination on
December 15, 1998.8
On the same date, Mylene filed a complaint for Rape against appellant before the Norzagaray Municipal
Trial Court.9
In his defense, appellant denied the charges and claimed that he was in Alabang, Muntinlupa City on the
date that the alleged rape was committed, working at a project for Nipponville Home Gallery. Moreover, as
a furniture worker, he stayed in Manila for several days and went home to Bulacan only on weekends. 10 He
alleged that Mylene had several boyfriends, and presented in court purported love letters sent by Mylene
to Larry and Rudy, as well as letters she received from her male suitors, namely, Boy Bicol, Dondon
Hernandez, Rab and Orly.11 Her grandmother, Nenita Ilagan, and sister, Judith, corroborated appellant's
testimony. They alleged that appellant frequently scolded Mylene for coming home late, and surmised that
this may be the reason why she filed charges against her father.12
On June 9, 2000, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, ALL PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court resolves that the prosecution has successfully
undertaken his burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly,
accused Dante Ilagan is hereby found GUILTY of the crime of RAPE from having violated the
provisions of Article 266-B in relation to Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Considering the presence of aggravating circumstances that the victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and the offender is a parent of the victim in this case, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
Supreme Penalty of DEATH by lethal injection.
One final word. The Court treats the imposition of the capital punishment upon the hereby accused
as an unpleasant, if not an unenviable task. Nonetheless, the burden becomes lighter as we ponder
on what the Supreme Court stated with regard to a case of Rape of this nature. Thus: "incestuous
relations are abhorrent to the nature of man, not only to civilized men, but also to semi-civilized and
barbarous people x x x and when a man perpetrates his lascivious desires on his own direct
relative, he descends to a level lower than that of a beast. (People vs. Mandap, 244 SCRA 457)
Lastly, the accused is also ordered to indemnify Mylene Ilagan the sum of P75,000.00 and further
amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.13
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors:
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE DEATH
PENALTY.
II
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY
OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MYLENE ILAGAN.14
Well-entrenched is the rule that a conviction for rape may be made even on the testimony of the victim
herself, as long as such testimony is credible.15 It is likewise settled that when a woman says that she had
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she had been raped, and if her testimony
meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the victim's testimony. A rape
victim would not publicly disclose that she had been raped and undergo the troubles and humiliation of a
public trial if her motive was not to bring to justice the person who abused her. 16
Consequently, the issues in a rape case boil down to the credibility of the victim. In assessing her
credibility, courts are guided by the following principles:
(1) As accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution, and;
(3) The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and can not be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense.17
In the case at bar, complainant recounted her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant in this wise:
Q: My question is, where were you on May 1998 at around 3 o'clock early in the morning?
A: I was in the house of my grandmother, sir. My father asked me to undress and remove my
panty.
Q: You said that you were then at the house of your grandmother, what is the name of your
grandmother?
A: Her name is Aida Ilagan, sir.
Q: Where is this house located?
A: Near our house in Norzagaray, Bulacan, sir.
Q: What is the exact place in Norzagay where your lola's house is located?
A: Bulalo, Norzagaray, sir.
Q: Who were with you in the house of your lola at that time?
A: My father, sir.
Q: What about your lola?
A: She was in Meycauayan, Bulacan, sir together with my ate.
Q: How about your other siblings? Where were they at that time?
A: They were in our house, sir.
Q: Why did you decide to sleep at the house of your lola?
A: I was sleeping there in our house, but my father asked me to go with him and sleep at the
house of my lola because nobody was there, sir.
Q: After your panty was removed by your father, what happened next?
A: I was molested (ginalaw), sir.
Q: Tell me exactly what do you mean by "ginalaw"?
A: He placed his body on top of me and inserted his private organ on my private organ, sir.
Q: You said your clothes and panty were removed by your father. Are you saying that you were
totally naked when your father placed on top of you?
Court:
By the way, did the witness say that it was not only her panty but also her clothes were
removed?

Q: Just to clarify this, your honor. What was removed by your father from your body?
A: My shorts and panty, sir.
Court:
Was it your father or yourself who removed your shorts and panty?
A: My father, your honor.
Court: Proceed.
Q: What were you wearing on your upper apparel?
A: T-shirt, sir.
Q: What did you feel when your father inserted his private organ into yours?
A: It was painful, sir.
Q: How long did your father placed himself on top of you?
A: Half an hour, sir.
Q: While your father was on top of you, what was he doing?
A: He forcibly inserted his penis into my private organ, sir.
Q: Did you feel anything from the private organ of your father?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that, that you felt came out from the private organ if your father?
A: As if phlegm (sipon), sir.18
The aforequoted testimony of the victim is marked by spontaneity, honesty, and sincerity. When the
testimony of the victim is simple and straightforward, the same must be given full faith and credit. 19 A
young girl's revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical
examination and her willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the
details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be easily dismissed as mere concoction. It is highly
inconceivable for a daughter to publicly accuse her father of rape if it were not true. Indeed, it is highly
against human nature to fabricate a story that would expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of
dishonor, especially when her charge could mean the death of her own father. 20
Appellant claims that the victim's failure to resist the assault and the delay in reporting the case to the
authorities are sufficient to impair her credibility. We disagree. Physical resistance need not be established
in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim herself. As held in People v. Las Pinas, Jr.,21 the test
is whether the intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she resists or does
not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried out. When resistance would be futile,
offering none at all does not amount to consent to sexual assault. The law does not impose upon a rape
victim the burden of proving resistance.
Anent the delay in reporting the case to the authorities, suffice it to state that delay and the initial
reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on her virtue is neither unknown or
uncommon.22 Rape is a traumatic experience, and the shock concomitant with it may linger for a while.
Oftentimes, the victim would rather bear the ignominy and the pain in private, rather than reveal her
shame to the world or risk the rapist's carrying out his threat to harm her. 23
We find no sufficient basis for disregarding, let alone overturning, the factual assessment made by the
court a quo. Once again, we must reiterate the familiar rule that the task of taking on the issue of
credibility is a function properly lodged with the trial court, whose findings are entitled to great weight and
accorded the highest respect by the reviewing courts, unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked or misappreciated such as would alter the conviction of the appellant. 24 There is no such fact of
substance and value in this case.
Premised on the complainant's testimony, there is sufficient foundation to conclude that appellant
succeeded by force in having carnal knowledge of her own daughter on May 19, 1998. Against this
backdrop of evidence and in stark contrast to complainant's convincing recital of facts is appellant's
defense of denial and alibi. An intrinsically weak defense, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of
non-culpability in order to merit credibility. It is a negative self-serving assertion that has no weight in law if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence.25Since denial and alibi are so easy to concoct and
fabricate, the same cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that
the accused committed the crime.26
The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirement of time and place must be
strictly met.27 It is, therefore, incumbent upon appellant to prove with clear and convincing evidence that
at the time of the commission of the offense charged, he was in a place other than the situs criminis or
immediate vicinity thereof, such that it was physically impossible for him to have committed the crime
charged.28
Thus, appellant's alibi and denial must necessarily fail. The defense of denial and alibi per se, if not
substantiated by sufficient evidence, can not in any way diminish the credibility of the complainant or the
weight of her testimony.
The pertinent provisions of Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 8353, otherwise known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, state:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxx xxx xxx.
ART. 266-B. Penalties.
xxx xxx xxx.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxx xxx xxx.
The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must concur. More importantly, they must
be both alleged and proved, in order to qualify the crime of Rape and warrant the imposition of the
death penalty.29
Hence, in addition to the requirement that the qualifying and aggravating circumstance must be
specifically alleged in the information, it must be established with certainty that the victim was below
eighteen (18) years of age or that she was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be
stressed that the severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out,
makes the decision-making process in capital offense aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure
and evidence.30
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to present the birth certificate or similar authentic document,
such as the school records or baptismal certificate of the victim to prove her age. Thus, the age of the
victim cannot be determined with utmost certainty. In People v. Pruna,31 it was held:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set
the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of
the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of
the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's
mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of
the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
Hence, for failure of the prosecution to prove the age of the victim by any of the means set forth above,
appellant can only be found guilty of Simple Rape and the death penalty imposed on him by the trial court
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Consequently, the amount of civil indemnity awarded by the trial court should accordingly be reduced to
P50,000.00. The amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is mandatory only in cases involving qualified
rape where the death penalty is imposed. In cases of simple rape, the amount of civil indemnity shall be
P50,000.00.32As regards the award of moral damages, the same should likewise be reduced to P50,000.00,
consistently with controlling jurisprudence. Moral damages are awarded in rape cases without need of
pleading or proof.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 1246-M-99, finding appellant Dante Ilagan guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Rape, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and is ordered to pay the private offended party, Mylene Ilagan, the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 148056-61. October 8, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOSE DE CASTRO,appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
FOR AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the consolidated decision of the Regional Trial Court [1]of Pallocan, Batangas
City, in Crim. Cases Nos. 10242 to 10247, finding appellant Jose de Castro guilty of six (6) counts of rape
and sentencing him to suffer the maximum penalty of death in each of the six (6) cases. He is further
ordered to indemnify the three (3) complaining witnesses Gemma, Jean and Jenny, all surnamed de Castro,
in the sum of P100,000.00 each and to pay the costs.
Spouses Jose and Genoveva de Castro, residents of Barangay Pallocan, Batangas City, have three (3)
daughters, namely, Gemma, twin sisters Jean and Jenny, and two (2) sons, Luis and Jose. The father, herein
appellant Jose de Castro, earned his living by selling newspapers near the BLTB terminal in Batangas City,
while his wife Genoveva was a laundrywoman.
Private complainant Gemma de Castro, [2] seventeen (17) years old, testified that on 3 June 1998 at
around 10:00 oclock in the morning she was cleaning the house when her father Jose suddenly grabbed
her hand and dragged her towards the bedroom. Therein, Jose forced her to lie down on the bed and
peppered her body with kisses while removing her clothes. After he undressed himself, he mounted
Gemma and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. She struggled vainly and tried to shout for help but
her father immediately covered her mouth with his hand. Since all attempts at repulsing the advances of
her father proved futile, Gemma could only plead for mercy. After satisfying his lust, her father warned her
not to tell anybody otherwise he would kill her mother and a sister. [3] She revealed that the appellant again
molested her two (2) days after the first rape incident. [4]On that day, she was alone with him in their house
because her mother and her sister were at their neighbors house. With the same modus
operandi, appellant dragged her into the room and there sexually abused her against her will.
According to Gemma, it was only on 10 June 1999, or a week after the first rape incident, that she
mustered enough courage to reveal her sordid experience to her Ate Felywho accompanied her to
the barangay captain and the police authorities to report the matter.
Jean de Castro,[5] fifteen (15) years old, also testified that on 18 April 1999 at around noon she was
inside the bedroom of their house with her father when the latter forcibly removed her clothes. The
appellant, after taking off his shorts and t-shirt, placed himself on top of Jean who tried to free herself by
wriggling and pushing him away. The appellant, while kissing his daughter on different parts of her body,
put his penis on (sic) her vagina. [6]Jean testified that the sexual molestation of 18 April was repeated on 7
June 1999 when she was alone with appellant in their house at Pallocan, Batangas City. The appellant again
inserted his penis into her vagina. It was then that she went to her aunt Felisa to whom she revealed
everything.[7] Together, they went to the barangay captain and reported the incident.[8] She further stated
that her father deserved to die for what he had done to them. [9]
Jenny de Castro, fifteen (15) years old, twin sister of Jean, also narrated that the appellant sexually
abused her on two (2) occasions, i.e., on 5 June 1998 and 24 March 1999. As to the rape incident of 5 June
1998,[10] she recalled that at about noon of the same day she was alone with her father in the house when
the latter removed her clothes. After the appellant took off his clothes, he inserted his penis into her
vagina. Jenny shouted for help but nobody heard her cry. By her own account, the appellant once again
victimized her in the afternoon of 24 March 1999 in the sala of their house.[11] In answer to the query on
what her reaction was to her fathers molestations, she said she pushed him. [12] Jenny confirmed that she
was impregnated by her father and gave birth to a baby girl on 3 November 1999.
Dr. Janet B. Esguerra of the Batangas Regional Hospital, OB Gyne Department, testified that she
interviewed the private complainants on 10 June 1999 and physically examined them. Her medico-legal
certification contained the following findings:[13]
For Gemma de Castro, the findings were:

Physical Examination: No external Physical Injuries
External Genitalia: Minimal pubic hair, gaping labia majora, complete healed laceration at
5:00 oclock position.
Internal Examination: Vagina admits 2 fingers with slight difficulty, cervix close, firm, uterus
small, adnexae (-)
For Jean de Castro, the findings showed:
Physical Examination: No external physical injuries.
External Genitalia: Minimal pubic hair, gaping labia majora, complete healed laceration at
9:00 oclock position, incomplete healed laceration at 6:00 oclock position.
Internal Examination: Vagina admits 2 fingers with ease, cervix close, softish uterus, small
adnexae (-)
For Jenny de Castro, the findings were:
Physical Examination: No external physical injuries
External Genitalia: Minimal pubic hair, gaping labia majora, complete healed lacerations at 5,
6 and 7 oclock positions.
Internal Examination: Vagina admits 2 fingers with ease, cervix softish close, uterus enlarged
to 20 weeks size (-) adnexae.
In disputing the imputations against him, the appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He
asserted that on 3 June 1998 at around 10:00 oclock in the morning he was in front of his brother-in-laws
house having a drinking spree with him as it was their town fiesta. He likewise denied having raped
Gemma two (2) days later. According to him, he was at the BLTB terminal selling newspapers that day from
4:00 oclock in the morning up to 12:00 noon, and then at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon he waited for the
evening papers to arrive.
He also disputed the allegation that he sexually molested his twin daughters Jenny and Jean on 5 June
1998 and 7 June 1999, respectively. On said dates according to him, he was at the BLTB terminal selling
newspapers as usual.
The trial court completely rebuffed the attempts by the appellant to escape culpability. Instead, it gave
full credence to the positive assertions of the three (3) young victims that he did in fact commit the
offenses as alleged in the six (6) Informations. The trial court further took special note of the medico-legal
certification showing that all the private complainants had healed lacerations on their respective hymens.
For good measure, it observed that Jenny whom the appellant raped on 24 March 1999, gave birth to a
baby girl on 3 November 1999.[14]
Appellant now comes to us professing his innocence and decrying his conviction on the lone ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In his brief, appellant draws attention to the alleged inconsistencies that seriously contaminate the
veracity and render incredible the testimonies of the private complainants. He points out that Gemmas
testimony is fatally flawed as it fails to take into consideration the fact that the room where the alleged
rape took place has a grill-less window about 4 feet from the floor which can be opened to facilitate her
escape had she felt the need to do so. Moreover, according to him, Gemma had the chance to run outside
the house while he was closing the door, but failed to take advantage of such opportunity on the flimsy
and simple pretext that she was naked. Worse, according to appellant, the trial court shrugged off the
incredible claim that he was on top of Gemma for about an hour. Appellant finds mind-boggling Gemma
and Jeans insistence that they knew there were no people in the nearby houses at the time they were
being molested. To top it all, he argues that if indeed Gemma and Jenny were raped for the second time, it
defies reason why after the first assault they chose to remain at the scene of the crime and wait for their
father to repeat his sexual aggression.

The thrust of appellants arguments is essentially to discredit private complainants for their alleged
failure to escape their supposed sexual tormentor despite a myriad of chances to do so.
Time and again, we stress the verity that in incestuous rape where the father/stepfather exercises
moral dominance over his daughter/stepdaughter, the victim by the sheer force of this moral influence is
reduced to a docile creature, vulnerable and submissive to the sexual depredations of her
tormentor. People v. Matrimonio elucidates this point[15] -
In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the formers moral ascendancy and influence
over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation. That ascendancy or influence necessarily flows
from the fathers parental authority, which the Constitution and the laws recognize, support and enhance,
as well as from the childrens duty to obey and to observe reverence and respect towards their parents.
Such reverence and respect are deeply ingrained in the minds of Filipino children and are recognized by
law. Abuse of both by a father can subjugate his daughters will, thereby forcing her to do whatever he
wants (underscoring supplied).
Granting arguendo that herein private complainants had a few precious opportunities to escape,
appellant conveniently discounts the fear that his moral influence, coupled with the use of threats and
intimidation, has instilled in his minor daughters whenever he succumbed to his perverted proclivities. The
testimonies of private complainants give flesh to this conclusion. Gemma de Castros direct examination
reads in part[16] -
Pros. Suyo: And after that, what did your father do?
A: I was able to shout but, he put his hand to cover my mouth.
Q. After that, what did you do if you did anything?
A. He threatened me not to tell anybody because he would kill my sister and my mother.
And then again[17] -
Court: The question asked you is this.
Q. You said that your father threatened you that he would kill your sister and your mother if you
told this raping incident to anyone. Why did you tell eventually your cousin Ate Fely about this
raping incident?
A. I gathered enough strength to tell her.
Q. When did you tell your Ate Fely about this incident?
A. June 10, 1999, sir.
Q. Why did it take so long before you informed your Ate Fely of what happened to you?
A. I was overcome by fear, sir.
On cross-examination, private complainant Gemma de Castro also made the following disclosure [18] -
Q. You said that before the rape took place, you were undressed by your father and that he
likewise undressed himself. At the time that he was undressing himself why did you not try to
jump out of the window?
A. Because he closed the window, sir.
Q. In what particular time did he close the window before the rape took place?
A. When I was already undressed.
Q. Why did you not try to run outside the door when he was still closing the window?

A. Because I had no clothes, sir.
Q. Do you mean to say that you were ashamed to get out in your nakedness?
A. No, sir.
Court: So, why did you not run as your father was busy undressing himself?
A. Because he was staring at me.
Atty. Bravo: He was not holding a bolo?
A. He was holding a knife, sir.
Q. Do we understand that while he was undressing you he was holding that knife?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Then at the time when he put himself on top of you, he was still holding that knife?
A. Yes, sir.
Private complainant Jenny de Castro likewise revealed at the trial that she purposely did not report the
rape incidents to her mother because of fear of the appellant who warned her not to tell her mother about
his sexual abuses.[19]
Appellant scrapes the bottom of the barrel in making much of Gemmas statement that he was on top
of her for an hour. Indeed, it is too much to expect of a minor rape victim to give a precise recollection of
the rape incident when at the time of the sexual assault her tender mind was not only bombarded by a
mishmash of confusing emotions but, more so, every sinew of her young body was committed to ward off
her attacker in a vain attempt to defend her purity and honor. Understandably, Gemma might have lost all
bearings of time for the few harrowing minutes in the hands of her father seemed eternity to her.
The rule is that when a rape victims testimony is straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-
examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, the same must be
given full faith and credit. [20] It is simply too improbable for the minor victims, who are guileless and
innocent in the ways of the world, to brazenly impute a crime as serious as rape to the man, they call their
father, if it were not true.
In Crim. Cases Nos. 10242 and 10245, Gemma not only identified appellant as her abuser but
established in her narration of facts how he by force and intimidation had carnal knowledge of her against
her will.
Testifying in Crim. Cases Nos. 10243 and 10247, Jean de Castro also established that on 18 April 1999
and 7 June 1999 she was forced by appellant to engage in unwanted and illicit sexual congress.
In Crim. Case No. 10244, Jenny de Castro sufficiently proved beyond any iota of doubt that appellant
ravished her when through force and intimidation he inserted his penis into her genitalia. We cannot say
the same thing however with respect to her testimony in Crim. Case No. 10246 where she merely stated
that on 24 March 1999 the appellant raped her. Consider the following exchanges -
Q. What about on March 24, 1999, how did your father rape you?
A. It was in the afternoon when he raped me in the sala of our house, sir.
Q. And what did you do when your father raped you?
A. I pushed him, sir.
In any criminal prosecution, it is necessary that every essential ingredient of the crime charged must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional right of the accused to be
presumed innocent. Jennys simple declaration that she was raped is not evidence but simply a
conclusion. The principle that when a woman declares that she has been raped she says in effect all that is
necessary to mean that she has been raped, no longer holds. This means that the prosecution must still
prove the elements of the crime of rape, and it is not enough for a woman to claim she was raped without
showing how the crime was specifically committed.
In the earlier case of People v. Mendoza,[21] the accused was acquitted by virtue of the victims plain
statement that she was raped on 11 August 1995 without offering further details on how the alleged
incident was carried out. This Court declared therein that (w)hether or not he raped her is the fact in issue
which the court must determine based on the evidence offered. Testimony to that effect is not evidence,
but simply a conclusion, the proof of which is the very purpose of the trial x x x x It is not competent for a
witness [in this case Michelle] to express an opinion, conclusion or judgment thereon. That being so, we
cannot sustain appellants conviction in Crim. Case No. 10246.
The certificates of live birth[22] prove that at the time of the rape incidents Gemma, Jean and Jenny
were minors. With the concurrence of their minority and relationship [23] with appellant, the trial court
correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape in Crim. Cases Nos. 10242,
10243, 10244, 10245 and 10247 and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death in each case.
As earlier discussed however, the guilt of appellant was not adequately proved in Crim. Case No. 10246;
hence, his acquittal in this particular case.
As to damages, the award of P100,000.00 granted by the court a quo must likewise be modified. Since
the appellant is convicted of five (5) counts of qualified rape, he must be ordered to pay each complaining
witness P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each case proved.
Three (3) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People v. Echegaray that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court finding appellant Jose de Castro guilty of qualified rape in
Crim. Cases Nos. 10242, 10243, 10244, 10245 and 10247 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that,
insofar as Crim. Case No. 10246 is concerned, he is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant is further ordered to indemnify the three (3) complaining witnesses as follows:
1) In Crim. Cases Nos. 10242 and 10245, to pay Gemma de Castro the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, another P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in each case;
2) In Crim. Cases Nos. 10243 and 10247, to pay Jean de Castro the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, another P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in each case;
and,
3) In Crim. Case No. 10244, to pay Jenny de Castro P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, another P75,000.00
as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs against appellant Jose de Castro.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to Her Excellency, the President of the Philippines, for the
possible exercise of her pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 148139-43. October 15, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. HERMENIO (HERMINIO) CANOY, appellant.
DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Den Canoy is the eldest of four (4) children of the spouses Rebecca Roche and accused
Hermenio[1] Canoy. Den was born on 29 December 1982 as shown by her birth certificate. [2] Her father
worked as a welder at the Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PHILPHOS) while her mother was a
plain housewife. Together with her brothers Christopher and Jake and sister Richie, the family lived in a one
(1)-storey house in Brgy. Libertad, Isabel, Leyte.
In 1994, Den occupied one of the two (2) bedrooms of the house with her father, mother and younger
sister, while her two (2) brothers shared the other room. One evening that year Den woke up to find her
father, who usually slept next to her, inserting his finger into her vagina. She felt pain but did not resist;
instead, she cried and uttered Pa dont, its painful. [3] Her mother and sister were unaware of what was
happening as they were both sound asleep. The next day she did not reveal what occurred to her to her
mother. When she did so months later, her mother would not believe her.
One evening in the summer of 1996, while everyone was sleeping, her father removed her short pants
and underwear and then his own short pants and brief, and mounted her. He touched her breast and
placed his penis on top of her vagina. Again, she simply cried and did not repel the aggression. She was in
grade six (6) at that time. When her father finished abusing her, he warned her not to tell her mother or
their family would be torn apart. Den did as she was told and kept the whole incident to herself.
Subsequently, another bedroom was added to their house, which was to be occupied by her father. In
1998, Karen and Liezel, Herminio Canoys illegitimate daughters and Dens half sisters, came to live with
them in Brgy. Isabel. Sometime in April 1998, at about six oclock in the morning, her father told her mother
to buy bread. While her mother was away, he called Den to his room and undressed her. Her mother, who
found the bakery still closed at that hour, unexpectedly returned and walked into her husbands room just
as he was removing Dens panty and was staring at her vagina. When asked what he was doing to their
daughter, Herminio answered that he just wanted to see Dens vagina as she was already a lady. While her
parents quarreled, Den could do nothing but cry.
At about nine oclock that same morning, Rebecca who was exasperated with her husband, left for
Cebu taking Den with her. The two (2) stayed with Rebeccas sister. There Den confided again to her
mother the perverted acts of her father but the latter could not do anything. In fact, when they returned to
Brgy. Libertad two (2) weeks later, her parents reconciled and continued to live together.
In the morning of 31 May 1998 the accused sent his wife to the market accompanied by their sons. He
then called Den inside his room after she finished cooking for him. He held her arms and led her to his
room after which he proceeded to remove his daughters pants and underwear and touched her body. He
made her lie down and removed his pants and brief and inserted his penis into her vagina. Cowed by her
fear of him, Den did not complain nor resist him. She did not utter any word. She could only weep in pain.
Her father stayed on top of her for some time but removed his penis when he was about to ejaculate. His
lust sated, he put on Dens clothes and again warned her not to tell anyone otherwise there would be
trouble. Thus, Den kept her silence when her mother arrived home at lunchtime. Den was reluctant to tell
anyone about the ordeal she suffered in the hands of her father because of fear. Den described him as
being isog - a term in her dialect, which means brave, temperamental and belligerent. [4] He also
maltreated her and her siblings by frequently boxing, slapping, kicking and whipping them.
From the 16th to the 18th of February 1999 Den did not return home from school. Her mother had to
look for her only to find her with one of her classmates. It was also that time when Dens teachers called for
her mother and informed her that Den had revealed to them that she was raped by her father several
times.
Rebecca then confronted her husband but he completely denied Dens accusations. Upon the advice of
Dens teachers, Rebecca allowed Den to stay with her aunt but her father found this out and took her
home. Sadly, Rebecca failed to report the matter to the barangay captain or to any of her relatives and
made no other move to protect her daughter from her husband.
On 20 February 1999, Den was again subjected to her fathers lechery. It was about nine oclock in the
evening when Den found herself alone with her father in his room. He pulled her body, touched her breasts
and thereafter removed her shorts and panty.

When she protested, he pinched her back causing the skin to bleed. Her father succeeded in inserting
his penis into her vagina while she cried and tried her best to ease the pain. He was on top of her for quite
some time until he ejaculated outside her vagina. Once again, he reminded her not to tell her mother to
avoid trouble.
Finally, unable to bear her fathers abuses and finding no help from her mother, Den went alone to the
Department of Social Work and Development on 24 February 1999 to report the molestations of her father.
She was examined by the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Dr. Refelina Cerillo, that same day and was
found to have an erythema at the mid-proximal part of the posterior chest and hymenal lacerations at the
seven (7), ten (10) and eleven (11) oclock positions. [5] The examining physician was positive that she had
had previous sexual intercourse or previous trauma.[6]
On 26 February 1999 Den reported her fathers abuses to the police authorities of Isabel. [7] Soon after,
five (5) Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City against Herminio Canoy: [8] for
the act of inserting a finger inside Dens vagina which occurred in 1996 he was charged with Acts of
Lasciviousness (Crim. Case No. 5603-0); for the incident which occurred in April 1998, he was charged with
Attempted Rape (Crim. Case No. 5601-0); for the qualified rape incident which occurred in the summer of
1996 (Crim. Case No. 5602-0); for the qualified rape of 31 May 1998 (Crim. Case No. 5600-0); and, for the
qualified rape of 20 February 1998 (Crim. Case No. 5599-0).
After arraignment, the trial court conducted a joint trial on the merits. The prosecution presented Dr.
Refelina Cerilla, Municipal Health Officer of Isabel; SPO1 Lamberto Matuguina, Jr., property custodian and
designated female officer of the PNP in Isabel; Rebecca Canoy, mother of Den; Julieta Gubalane, Municipal
Civil Registrar, and Den Canoy, the victim.
The defense was denial and alibi. Accused claimed that Den merely fabricated the charges to get back
at him for the frequent beatings he gave her; for scolding her when she skipped classes and did not come
home for three (3) days; and for allowing his illegitimate daughters to live with them. He presented as his
witnesses his illegitimate daughter Liezel Canoy and his brother Gilbert Canoy as well as Ricardo Bargo,
Personnel Supervisor of PHILPHOS, who was the time-keeper of the rank-and-file employees.
In its joint Decision [9] of 9 February 2001 the trial court found the accused guilty of Acts of
Lasciviousness in Crim. Case No. 5603-0, Acts of Lasciviousness in Crim. Case No. 5601-0 instead of
Attempted Rape, and Acts of Lasciviousness also in Crim. Case No. 5602-0 instead of Qualified Rape as
charged in the Information. The trial court found him guilty only of the crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness
instead of as charged in the Information, after finding that the circumstances obtaining in both cases did
not show that there was any intent to have sexual intercourse; in Crim. Case No. 5601-0, he was fully
dressed and was found to have been only gazing at his daughters vagina, while in Crim. Case No. 5602-0,
he merely placed his genitals on top of the victims. In each of these cases, the court a quoimposed an
indeterminate sentence of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayorminimum as minimum, to six
(6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum as maximum, and pay the victim, Den Canoy,
P20,000.00 as indemnity and P20,000.00 as moral damages.[10]
The trial court also convicted the accused of two (2) counts of Qualified Rape in Crim. Cases Nos.
6500-0 and 5599-0 and sentenced him to death in each case and to pay the victim P50,000.00 as
indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages also in each case. [11]
In assailing the Decision of the court a quo, appellant Hermenio Canoy insists that the evidence of the
prosecution is weak and insufficient to establish his guilt for all the five (5) cases. Noting that the
conviction of the trial court is grounded primarily on the testimony of the complaining witness, appellant
now endeavors to show the contradictions and inconsistencies in her statements which, he contends,
undermine her credibility.
First, appellant points out that with respect to the incident in the summer of 1996, which was the
subject of Crim. Case No. 5602-0, Den Canoy testified on 2 March 2000 that appellant had already inserted
his penis into her vagina. Yet, she testified on 3 April 2000 that he merely placed his penis on top of her
vagina. Second, appellant observes that Den gave several conflicting statements as to their sleeping
arrangement in 1998 and the exact room where the sexual molestation took place in 1996. Third, he
directs our attention to the conduct of the complainant after she was molested on the evening of 20
February 1999, observing that according to her she mingled normally with her family shortly after she was
defiled by her father. Appellant argues that such conduct is improbable following a traumatic ordeal and
tends to show the falsity of his daughters accusations.

The contentions of appellant have no merit, for which reason his conviction must be affirmed. It is a
long-settled rule in criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, an
appellate court will normally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court [12] in the absence of a clear
showing that the court had failed to appreciate facts and circumstances which if taken into account, would
materially affect the result of the case. [13] The trial courts evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses is
accorded great respect because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of witnesses
on the stand.[14]
In the case before us, we find no satisfactory factual basis that would move us to doubt the
trustworthiness of the complainants recital as to abandon the findings of the trial court.The supposed
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the complainant cited by the appellant refer to minor and peripheral
details which do not go into the elements of the crime. It is an oft-repeated rule in criminal cases that
minor inconsistencies in the statement of a witness do not affect his credibility. [15] On the contrary, they
strengthen rather than weaken the witness credibility as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony.[16]
As to the first specified inconsistent or contradictory statements, we believe that the complainant
merely corrected an earlier inaccurate account when she declared that her father placed his organ on top
of hers and did not insert it during the 1996 incident. Rather than evincing a falsehood as appellant
suggests, we believe that the inconsistency does not detract from the veracity of her whole narration. We
recognize that the complainant had to testify on several incidents of molestations which occurred on
separate occasions. Considering her state of distress at having to recount each incident during trial, it is
not unusual that she would confuse the details of one incident for another. This Court has held that error-
free testimony cannot be expected of a rape victim for she may not be able to remember and recount
every ugly detail of the harrowing experience and the appalling outrage she went through especially so
since she might in fact be trying not to recall the same, as they are too traumatic and painful to remember.
[17]
Lapses in the testimony of the witness should be expected especially when the case involves a victim
who has been subjected to multiple rapes at a tender age.
Moreover, Dens clarification that no penetration occurred at this time was consistent with the
declarations she made in her sworn statement [18] before the police investigator dated 26 February 1999.
This bolsters the inference that the complainant merely had a difficult time recollecting the particulars of
her ordeal.
As regards the alleged inconsistencies in complainants testimony on their sleeping arrangement, we

find them to be totally inconsequential. The debate as to the where the occupants of the house slept
cannot negate the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which have been consistent on the fact that
the victim slept next to the appellant in 1996 when he committed the sexual abuses. Nor do they find any
relevance to the unlawful acts committed in 1998 and 1999 that were perpetrated during daytime or
before the family went to sleep.
Appellant contends that the demeanor of the complainant in the aftermath of the rape of 20 February
1999 was inconsistent with normal human conduct and behavior. We have repeatedly ruled that different
people react differently to the same situation, and not every victim of a crime can be expected to act
reasonably and conformably to the expectations of everyone. [19] It is not therefore unusual for the victim to
normally carry on after half an hour of the sexual molestation, particularly since she had been cautioned
by her father not to squeal to her mother to avoid trouble. Furthermore, an examination of the testimony
of the victim also showed that while she may have taken her dinner with the rest of her family without
displaying any peculiar reaction, she admitted she was mad at her father for what he had done to her
earlier.[20]
We must brush aside as flimsy the appellants insistence that the charges were merely concocted by
his daughter to punish him for bringing in his illegitimate daughters to live with them and for maltreating
her. It is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own father, to submit herself for examination of her most
intimate parts, put her life to public scrutiny and expose herself, along with her family, to shame, pity or
even ridicule not just for a simple offense but for a crime so serious that could mean the death sentence to
the very person to whom she owes her life,[21] had she really not have been aggrieved.[22] Nor do we believe
that the victim would fabricate a story of rape simply because she wanted to exact revenge against her
father, appellant herein, for allegedly scolding and maltreating her.
The trial court correctly disregarded appellants defense of denial and alibi as these cannot prevail over
the positive and categorical declarations of his daughter indicting him for the crimes. Besides, the alibi of

his being at his place of work does not inspire belief as it did not preclude the possibility of his being at the
crime scene at the time the molestations occurred since the distance between his house and his workplace
was only six (6) kilometers and travel time between these places was just 30 minutes by bus. [23] As we
have repeatedly held, for alibi to prevail, the accused must establish by clear and positive evidence that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it happened, not merely
that he was somewhere else.[24]
As for Den, she gave a clear and candid narration of how the sexual transgressions were committed.
Her truthfulness is more than manifest in her comportment during the trial. The record shows that she
broke down and cried on the witness stand while recounting the details of the dastardly acts her father
perpetrated upon her, prompting the court to call a recess to enable her to recover her composure and
later to order a continuance so that her examination had to be continued on another date. Also serving to
reinforce her story are the medical report and the testimony of the examining physician who found healed
lacerations in her hymen and an erythema on her back which is consistent with her testimony that
appellant pinched her back during the last sexual abuse.
We find the evidence presented by the prosecution to be adequate to support the conviction of
appellant for the three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness in Crim. Cases Nos. 5603-0, 5601-0 and 5602-0
and thus affirm the indeterminate sentence of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor minimum
as minimum, to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum as maximum imposed by
the trial court in each case.
The guilt of the appellant was likewise proved beyond reasonable doubt for the rapes committed on 31
May 1998 and 20 February 1999 which are the subject of Crim. Cases Nos. 6500 and 5599-O. Under Sec.
11 of RA 7659, however, the qualifying circumstances of minority and the relationship between the
accused and the victim must be specifically alleged in the Informations and duly proved during the trial
with equal certainty as the crime itself to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
In this case, the Informations for Crim. Cases Nos. 6500-0 and 5599-0 alleged that the complainant
was sixteen (16) years old at the time of the commission of the offenses and the daughter of the appellant.
During trial, the prosecution presented a birth certificate proving that Den was born on 29 December 1982
and so was only fifteen (15) years old on 31 May 1998 and sixteen (16) years old on 20 February 1999. The
same birth certificate also shows that appellant is the father of the complainant. In addition, the appellant
admitted at the pre-trial conference that Den was his daughter. Accordingly, the imposition of the death
penalty upon the appellant in Crim. Cases Nos. 6500-0 and 5599-0 is proper.
As for damages, this Court affirms the award of P20,000.00 in moral damages for each count of Acts of
Lasciviousness pursuant to Art. 2219 of the New Civil Code but the award of P20,000.00 in civil indemnity
is deleted for want of legal basis.
In line with recent jurisprudence on qualified rape, we increase the civil indemnity and moral
damages. Den Canoy is entitled to P75,000.00 in civil indemnity [25] and another P75,000.00 as moral
damages[26] for each count of rape considering that the crime was committed under circumstances
justifying the death penalty. Exemplary damages in each case of rape at P25,000.00 must likewise be
awarded to deter other fathers with perverse or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their
daughters.[27]
Three (3) members of this Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People v. Echegaray that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is
WHEREFORE, the joint Decision of the court a quo finding appellant Hermenio (Herminio) Canoy
guilty of three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness in Crim. Cases Nos. 5601-0, 5602-0 and 5603-0 and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate term of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor minimum as minimum, to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum as
maximum for each count of Acts of Lasciviousness, and of two (2) counts of Qualified Rape in Crim. Cases
Nos. 6500-0 and 5599-0 and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death for each count of
qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) In Crim. Cases Nos. 5601-0, 5602-0 and 5603-0, the appellant is ordered to pay the complaining
witness only moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00 for each count of Acts of Lasciviousness; and

(b) In Crim. Cases Nos. 6500-0 and 5599-0, the appellant is ordered to pay the complaining witness
p75,000.00 as civil indemnity, another P75,000.00 as moral damages, and an additional amount of
p25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of Qualified Rape.
In accordance with Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, Sec. 25, upon finality
of this Decision, let certified true copies of the records of these cases be forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for the possible exercise of her pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 151858 November 27, 2003

vs.
JOSELITO PASCUA y TEOPE, appellant.
DECISION
Appellant Joselito Pascua y Teope was charged before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch 32
in Criminal Case No. 12575-SP(00) with the crime of rape in an information 1 which reads:
That sometime in the month of August, 2000, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, with lewd design and by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
one ALMA AGAPAY, against her will and consent.
The mental disability of the victim shall be appreciated as aggravating circumstance.
Contrary to law.
Appellant pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits then ensued.
Sometime in August, 2000, complainant Alma Agapay, a 22-year old mental retardate, was on the railroad
tracks near their house at Daang Bakal, Public Market, San Pablo City when appellant approached her and
said, "I dont know you but I know your mother." He then pulled Alma and brought her inside an old
abandoned train car. He tied her hands above her head and made her lie down on the floor covered with a
flattened carton box. He removed her dress and panties, after which he also undressed. While holding a
knife with his right hand, he kissed her then inserted his penis into her vagina, causing it to bleed. Alma
felt pain. She shouted and tried to fight back but her efforts were in vain since she could not move her
right arm due to a stroke she suffered before. After raping her three or four times, appellant threatened to
kill her and her mother if she would tell anybody what happened.
A month later, Almas mother, Trinidad Agapay, noticed that her daughter was behaving strangely. When
she asked her what was wrong, the latter confessed that she had been raped by appellant. Trinidad
brought Alma to the police authorities where they filed a complaint for rape against appellant.
Alma was thereafter brought to Dr. Ma. Arlene Bicomong Cuervas, a physician at the San Pablo City District
Hospital. However, Dr. Cuervas only conducted a partial medical examination on Alma because she refused
to undergo internal examination since it was painful. Dr. Cuervas found that Alma sustained hematoma on
the hypogastric area measuring about 6 x 3 cm.

In his defense, appellant denied the charge against him. He testified that he does not know Alma or her
mother, Trinidad. However, he admitted seeing her sometimes in the public market but did not pay much
attention to her as he was always busy working at the Philippine National Railways (PNR) train station.
On August 29, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision, 2 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been established beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
Rape, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the
costs.
The accused is further ordered to indemnify the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal. In his Brief, appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE INCREDULOUS TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 3
In reviewing rape cases, the Court has always been guided by three well-entrenched principles: (a) that an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime which usually
involves two persons, the complainants testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of evidence of the defense. Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a
determination concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of the complainants testimony. 4 In rape cases,
the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided it is credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. 5
Significantly, the trial court found Alma to be credible when it observed, thus:
It is undisputed that the victim is a retardate or suffering from a sort of mental deficiency. Her manner of
testifying as well as deportment in Court bespeak of her mental defect. However, the Court has observed
that she could perceive and make known or express her perceptions to others. In the instant case, she
clearly explained her perceptions of what happened when she was ravished sexually by the accused. Her
behaviour at the witness stand pointing to the accused as the one who raped her and requested that
accused be brought to the police and be sentenced to death were clearly expressed in a straightforward
manner, thus the Court was impressed of her positive identification of the accused. x x x In the instant
case, the Court similarly considers the conduct of the victim where after the incident she was described to
have remained silent in one place of their house, unable to eat and has become thinner which invited the
attention of her mother and prompted to ask the victim why she was behaving that way and why she was
getting thinner and thinner. She was constrained to reveal to her mother what the accused had done to her
and without much ado, the mother sought the help of a neighbor to report the matter to a nearby PSAF
Office. This complaint to the PSAF Office led to the investigation of the case. 6
Appellant cites the alleged discrepancy or inconsistency between Almas testimony that she was raped
three (3) times causing her to bleed "dalawang buong dugo," on the one hand, and the medico-legal
findings and the testimony of the examining physician that there was no abrasion or spermatozoa, that the
hymen remains intact with no laceration and that there is a possibility that a penis has not touched the
labia of Almas vagina, on the other hand.
A cursory examination of the transcripts, however, shows Dr. Cuervas in fact testified that appellants
penis could have touched Almas vagina but was not inserted because there was no laceration. 7 Case law
has it that a freshly lacerated hymen is not an essential element of rape. Mere touching, no matter how

slight of the labia or lips of the female organ by the male genitalia even without rapture or laceration of the
hymen is sufficient to consummate rape.8
For the same reason, the medical finding that the hymen of the victim is still intact does not negate rape.
Full penetration is not required, as proof of entrance showing the slightest penetration of the male organ
within the labia or pudendum of the female organ is sufficient. In proving sexual intercourse, it is enough
that there is the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ. 9
In any case, Almas testimony that she bled cannot be completely disproved by the finding that her hymen
was intact with no laceration considering that there was no internal examination conducted "to determine
the vaginal canal (sic), the presence of fluid in the vaginal canal, for the uterus and ovaries to be
assessed."10 What was conducted was only a partial and external examination.
We have consistently held that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable to a prosecution
for rape. It is merely corroborative in character and not indispensable. The accused may be convicted even
solely on the basis of her testimony if credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and
the course of things.11
Besides, we have held time and again that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses referring to minor details and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime do not
impair the credibility of the witnesses. Instead of weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to
strengthen the witnesses credibility because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed. 12
It has been held in a long line of cases that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are accorded great respect. It is the trial judge who sees the behavior and demeanor of
the witness in court. The evaluation or assessment made by the trial court acquires greater significance in
rape cases because from the nature of the offense, the only evidence that can oftentimes be offered to
establish the guilt of the accused is the victims testimony. 13
In contrast, appellant could only offer denial in his defense.1wphi1 It is well-settled that denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in
law. Between the categorical and positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses and the negative
averments of the accused which are uncorroborated by reliable and independent evidence, the former
indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary weight. 14
Besides, appellants bare denial of the crime charged is inherently weak.1awp++i1 It cannot prevail over
the positive, candid and categorical testimony of the private complainant, whose credibility was upheld by
the trial court. Between the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the negative
statements of the appellant, the former deserves more credence. Denials must be buttressed by strong
evidence of non-culpability.15 Appellant failed in this regard.
Moreover, appellant cannot point to any motive as to why Alma would file a complaint for rape against
him. In the absence of any evidence to show that the witness was actuated by any improper motive, his
identification of the appellant as the author of the crime shall be given full faith and credit. 16
Rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The mental
condition of the victim cannot be appreciated to aggravate the crime and to warrant the death penalty.
Under Article 266 (10) of the Revised Penal Code, the rape shall be qualified "when the offender knew of
the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime." Being in the nature of a qualifying circumstance, this should be specifically
alleged in the Information. The allegation therein of the mental disability of the victim is insufficient. What
should be alleged is the knowledge by the offender of such mental disability. 17 Thus, appellant can only be
convicted of simple rape.
The trial court ordered appellant to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 as moral damages only. The award of
moral damages is in line with current case law. Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 are awarded in
rape cases without need of proof other than the fact of the rape itself, because it is assumed that the
victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. 18
In addition, the trial court should have also ordered appellant to pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto. In People v. Padrigone,19 citing People v. Belga,20 we held that civil indemnity is
mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral
damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound
discretion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch 32,
finding appellant Joselito Pascua y Teope guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the victim, Alma
Agapay, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant
is further ordered to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
INTEREST

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 76101-02 September 30, 1991
TIO KHE CHIO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and EASTERN ASSURANCE AND SURETY
CORPORATION,respondents.
Rodolfo M. Morelos for petitioner.
Ferrer, Mariano, Sangalang & Gatdula for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
The issue in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is the legal rate of interest to be imposed in actions
for damages arising from unpaid insurance claims. Petitioner Tio Khe Chio claims that it should be twelve
(12%) per cent pursuant to Articles 243 and 244 of the Insurance Code while private respondent Eastern
Assurance and Surety Corporation (EASCO) claims that it should be six (6%) per cent under Article 2209 of
the Civil Code.
The facts are as follows: On December 18, 1978, petitioner Tio Khe Chio imported one thousand (1,000)
bags of fishmeal valued at $36,000.30 from Agro Impex, U.S.A. Dallas, Texas, U.S.A. The goods were
insured with respondent EASCO and shipped on board the M/V Peskov, a vessel owned by Far Eastern
Shipping Company. When the goods reached Manila on January 28, 1979, they were found to have been
damaged by sea water which rendered the fishmeal useless. Petitioner filed a claim with EASCO and Far
Eastern Shipping. Both refused to pay. Whereupon, petitioner sued them before the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch II for damages. EASCO, as the insurer, filed a counterclaim against the petitioner
for the recovery of P18,387.86 representing the unpaid insurance premiums.
On June 30, 1982, the trial court rendered judgment ordering EASCO and Far Eastern Shipping to pay
petitioner solidarily the sum of P105,986.68 less the amount of P18,387.86 for unpaid premiums with
interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint, the sum of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and the
costs. 1
The judgment became final as to EASCO but the shipping company appealed to the Court of Appeals and
was absolved from liability by the said court in AC-G.R. No. 00161, entitled "Tio Khe Chio vs. Eastern
Assurance and Surety Corporation."
The trial court, upon motion by petitioner, issued a writ of execution against EASCO. The sheriff enforcing
the writ reportedly fixed the legal rate of interest at twelve (12%). Respondent EASCO moved to quash the
writ alleging that the legal interest to be computed should be six (6%) per cent per annum in accordance
with Article 2209 of the Civil Code and not twelve (12%) per cent as insisted upon by petitioner's counsel.
In its order of July 30, 1986, the trial court denied EASCO's motion. EASCO then filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
On July 30, 1986, the Appellate Court rendered the assailed judgment, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the order dated July 30, 1986 is hereby SET ASIDE in so far as it fixes the interest at 12% on
the principal amount of P87,598.82 from the date of filing of the complaint until the full payment of the
amount, and the interest that the private respondent is entitled to collect from the petitioner is hereby
reduced to 6% per annum.
No pronouncement as to costs. 2
In disputing the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner maintains that not only is it unjust
and unfair but it is also contrary to the correct interpretation of the fixing of interest rates under Sections
243 and 244 of the Insurance Code. And since petitioner's claims is based on an insurance contract, then it
is the Insurance Code which must govern and not the Civil Code.
We rule for respondent EASCO. The legal rate of interest in the case at bar is six (6%) per annum as
correctly held by the Appellate Court.
Section 243 of the Insurance Code provides:
The amount of any loss or damage for which an insurer may be liable, under any policy other
than life insurance policy, shall be paid within thirty days after proof of loss is received by
the insurer and ascertainment of the loss or damage is made either by agreement between
the insured and the insurer or by arbitration; but if such ascertainment is not had or made
within sixty days after such receipt by the insurer of the proof of loss, then the loss or
damage shall be paid within ninety days after such receipt. Refusal or failure to pay the loss
or damage within the time prescribed herein will entitle the assured to collect interest on the
proceeds of the policy for the duration of the delay at the rate of twice the ceiling prescribed
by the Monetary Board, unless such failure or refusal to pay is based on the ground that the
claim is fraudulent.
Section 244 of the aforementioned Code also provides:
In case of any litigation for the enforcement of any policy or contract of insurance, it shall be
the duty of the Commissioner or the Court, as the case may be, to make a finding as to
whether the payment of the claim of the insured has been unreasonably denied or withheld;
and in the affirmative case, the insurance company shall be adjudged to pay damages which
shall consist of attorney's fees and other expenses incurred by the insured person by reason
of such undeniable denial or withholding of payment plus interest of twice the ceiling
prescribed by the Monetary Board of the amount of the claim due the insured, from the date
following the time prescribed in section two hundred forty-two or in section two hundred
forty-three, as the case may be, until the claim is fully satisfied; Provided, That the failure to
pay any such claim within the time prescribed in said sections shall be considered prima
facie evidence of unreasonable delay in payment.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals made no finding that there was an unjustified refusal or
withholding of payment on petitioner's claim. In fact, respondent court had this to say on EASCO's refusal
to settle the claim of petitioner:
... EASCO's refusal to settle the claim to Tio Khe Chio was based on some ground which,
while not sufficient to free it from liability under its policy, nevertheless is sufficient to
negate any assertion that in refusing to pay, it acted unjustifiably.
xxx xxx xxx

The case posed some genuine issues of interpretation of the terms of the policy as to which
persons may honestly differ. This is the reason the trial court did not say EASCO's refusal
was unjustified. 3
Simply put, the aforecited sections of the Insurance Code are not pertinent to the instant case. They apply
only when the court finds an unreasonable delay or refusal in the payment of the claims.
Neither does Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank which took effect on July 29, 1974 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 116 (Usury Law) which raised the legal rate of interest from six (6%) to twelve
(12%) per cent apply to the case at bar as by the petitioner. The adjusted rate mentioned in the circular
refers only to loans or forbearances of money, goods or credits and court judgments thereon but not to
court judgments for damages arising from injury to persons and loss of property which does not involve a
loan. 4
In the case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 71017, July 28, 1986, 143 SCRA 158, the
Court declared that the legal rate of interest is six (6%) per cent per annum, and not twelve (12%) per
cent, where a judgment award is based on an action for damages for personal injury, not use or
forbearance of money, goods or credit. In the same vein, the Court held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 52478, October 30, 1986, 145 SCRA 311, that the rates under the Usury Law (amended by P.D. 116)
are applicable only to interest by way of compensation for the use or forbearance of money, interest by
way of damages is governed by Article 2209 of the Civil Code.
Clearly, the applicable law is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which reads:
If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money and the debtor incurs in delay,
the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment
of interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest which is six per
cent per annum.
And in the light of the fact that the contending parties did not allege the rate of interest stipulated in the
insurance contract, the legal interest was properly pegged by the Appellate Court at six (6%) per cent.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 128721 March 9, 1999
CRISMINA GARMENTS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA SIAPNO, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Interest shall be computed in accordance with the stipulation of the parties. In the absence of such
agreement, the rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum when the obligation arises out of a loan or a
forbearance of money, goods or credits. In other cases, it shall be six percent (6%).
The Case
On May 5, 1997, Crismina Garments, Inc. filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the December
28, 1995 Decision 2 and March 17, 1997 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 28973. On
September 24, 1997, this Court issued a minute Resolution 4 denying the petition "for its failure to show
any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals."
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 5 arguing that the interest rate should be computed at 6
percent per annum as provided under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, not 12 percent per annum as
prescribed under Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank of the Philippines. Acting on the Motion, the Court
reinstated 6 the Petition, but only with respect to the issue of which interest rate should be applied. 7
The Facts
As the facts of the case are no longer disputed, we are reproducing hereunder the findings of the appellate
court:
During the period from February 1979 to April 1979, the [herein petitioner], which was
engaged in the export of girls' denim pants, contracted the services of the [respondent], the
sole proprietress of the D'Wilmar Garments, for the sewing of 20,762 pieces of assorted
girls['] denims supplied by the [petitioner] under Purchase Orders Nos. 1404, dated February
15, 1979, 0430 dated February 1, 1979, 1453 dated April 30, 1979. The [petitioner] was
obliged to pay the [respondent], for her services, in the total amount of P76,410.00. The
[respondent] sew[ed] the materials and delivered the same to the [petitioner] which
acknowledged the same per Delivery Receipt Nos. 0030 dated February 9, 1979; 0032,
dated February 15, 1979; 0033 dated February 21, 1979; 0034, dated February 24, 1979;
0036, dated February 20, 1979; 0038, dated March 11, 1979[;] 0039, dated March 24, 1979;
0040 dated March 27, 1979; 0041, dated March 29, 1979; 0044, dated Marc[h] 25, 1979;
0101 dated May 18, 1979[;] 0037, dated March 10, 1979 and 0042 dated March 10, 1979, in
good order condition. At first, the [respondent] was told that the sewing of some of the pants
w[as] defective. She offered to take delivery of the defective pants. However, she was later
told by [petitioner]'s representative that the goods were already good. She was told to just
return for her check of P76,410.00. However, the [petitioner] failed to pay her the aforesaid
amount. This prompted her to hire the services of counsel who, on November 12, 1979,
wrote a letter to the [petitioner] demanding payment of the aforesaid amount within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof. On February 7, 1990, the [petitioner]'s [v]ice-[p]resident-
[c]omptroller, wrote a letter to [respondent]'s counsel, averring, inter alia, that the pairs of
jeans sewn by her, numbering 6,164 pairs, were defective and that she was liable to the
[petitioner] for the amount of P49,925.51 which was the value of the damaged pairs of
denim pants and demanded refund of the aforesaid amount.
On January 8, 1981, the [respondent] filed her complaint against the [petitioner] with the
[trial court] for the collection of the principal amount of P76,410.00. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
After due proceedings, the [trial court] rendered judgment, on February 28, 1989, in favor of
the [respondent] against the [petitioner], the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
ordering the latter to pay the former:
(1) The sum of P76,140.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum, to be counted from the
filing of this complaint on January 8, 1981, until fully paid;
(2) The sum of P5,000 as attorney[']s fees; and
(3) The costs of this suit;
(4) Defendant's counterclaim is hereby dismissed. 8
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the trial court's ruling, except for the award of attorney's fees which
was deleted. 9 Subsequently, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration. 10

Hence, this recourse to this Court 11
Sole Issue
In light of the Court's Resolution dated April 27, 1998, petitioner submits for our consideration this sole
issue:
Whether or not it is proper to impose interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
for an obligation that does not involve a loan or forbearance of money in the absence of
stipulation of the parties. 12
This Court's Ruling
We sustain petitioner's contention that the interest rate should be computed at six percent (6%) per
annum.
Sole Issue: Interest Rate
The controversy revolves around petitioner's payment of the price beyond the period prescribed in a
contract for a piece of work. Article 1589 on the Civil Code provides that "[t]he vendee [herein petitioner]
shall owe interest for the period between the delivery of the thing and the payment of the price . . . should
he be in default from the time of judicial or extrajudicial demand for the payment of the price." The only
issue now is the applicable rate of interest for the late payment.
Because the case before us is "an action for the enforcement of an obligation for payment of money
arising from a contract for a piece of work," 13 petitioner submits that the interest rate should be six
percent (6%), pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil Code, which states:
If the obligation consists in the payment of money and the debtor incurs in delay, the
indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of
the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six
per cent per annum." (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that the interest rate should be twelve percent (12 %)
per annum, in accordance with Central Bank (CB) Circular No. 416, which reads:
By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act No. 2655, as amended,
otherwise known as the "Usury Law", the Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated
July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any
money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express
contract as to such rate of interest, shall be twelve per cent (12%) per annum." (Emphasis
supplied.)
She argues that the circular applies, since "the money sought to be recovered by her is in the form of
forbearance." 14
We agree with the petitioner. In Reformina v. Tomol Jr., 15 this Court stressed that the interest rate under CB
Circular No. 416 applies to (1) loans; (2) forbearance of money, goods or credits; or (3) a judgment
involving a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. Cases beyond the scope of the said circular are
governed by Article 2209 of the Civil Code, 16which considers interest a form of indemnity for the delay in
the performance of an obligation. 17
In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 18 the Court gave the following guidelines for the
application of the proper interest rates:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or
quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions
under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of
recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a
loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12%
per annum to be computed from default,i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and
subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an

interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court
at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims
or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand
is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made
(at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be . . .
the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory,
the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above,
shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being
deemed to be by then an equivalent to forbearance of credit. 19
In Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. v. CA, 20 we also ruled that the monetary award shall earn interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of finality of the judgment until its satisfaction, regardless
of whether or not the case involves a loan of forbearance of money. The interim period is deemed to be
equivalent to a forbearance of a credit. 21
Because the amount due in this case arose from a contract for a piece of work, not from a loan or
forbearance of money, the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be applied. Furthermore,
since the amount of the demand could be established with certainty when the Complaint was filed, the six
percent (6%) interest should be computed from the filing of the said Complaint. But after the judgment
becomes final and exuecutory until the obligation is satisfied, the interest should be reckoned at twelve
percent (%12) per year.
Private respondent maintains that the twelve percent (12%) interest should be imposed, because the
obligation arose from a forbearance of
money. 22 This is erroneous. In Eastern Shipping, 23 the Court observed that a "forbearance" in the context
of the usury law is a "contractual obligation of lender or creditor to refrain, during a given period of time,
from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay a loan or debt then due and payable." Using this standard,
the obligation in this case was obviously not a forbearance of money, goods or credit.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED. The rate of interest shall be six percent (6%) per annum,
computed from the time of the filing of the Complaint in the trial court until the finality of the judgment. If
the adjudged principal and the interest (or any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate
shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time the judgment becomes final and
executory until it is fully satisfied. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MORAL DAMAGES (ART 2217-2220)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8721 May 23, 1957

TRANQUILINO CACHERO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
Bernardino Guerrero and J. G. Madarang for plaintiff-appellant.

Castao and Ampil for the defendant-appellant.
FELIX, J.:
There is no dispute as to the following facts: on December 13, 1952, Atty. Tranquilino F. Cachero boarded a
Yellow Taxicab, with plate No. 2159-52 driven by Gregorio Mira Abinion and owned by the Manila Yellow
Taxicab Co., Inc. On passing Oroquieta between Doroteo Jose and Lope de Vega streets, Gregorio Mira
Abinion bumped said taxicab against a Meralco post, No. 1-4/387, with the result that the cab was badly
smashed and the plaintiff fell out of the vehicle to the ground, suffering thereby physical injuries, slight in
nature.
The chauffeur was subsequently prosecuted by the City Fiscal and on February 26, 1963, upon his plea of
guilty the Municipal Court of Manila sentenced him to suffer 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor, and to
pay the costs. On December 17, 1952, Tranquilino F. Cachero addressed a letter to the Manila Yellow
Taxicab Co., Inc., which was followed by another of January 6, 1953, which reads as follows:
MANILA, January 6, 1953
The MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB CO., INC.

1338 Arlegui, Manila
Dear Sirs:
As you have been already advised by the letter dated December 17, 1952, on December 13, 1952,
while I was a passenger of your taxicab bearing plate No. 2159 and driven by your chauffeur
Gregorio Mira and through his negligence and the bad condition of the said car, he bumped the
same against the pavement on the street (Oroquieta between Doroteo Jose and Lope de Vega
streets, Manila) and hit the Meralco post on said street, resulting in the smashing of the said
taxicab, and as a result thereof I was gravely injured and suffered and is still suffering physical,
mental and moral damages and not being able to resume my daily calling.
For the said damages, I hereby make a demand for the payment of the sum of P79,245.65, covering
expenses for transportation to the hospital for medical treatment, medicines, doctors bills, actual
monetary loss, moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, etc., within 5 days from date of
receipt hereof.
I trust to hear from you on the matter within the period of 5 days above specified.
Truly yours,
(Sgd.) TRANQUILINO F. CACHERO

2256 Int. B, Misericordia St.,
Sta. Cruz, Manila
(Exhibit K)
The Taxicab Co. to avoid expenses and time of litigation offered to settle the case amicably with plaintiff
but the latter only agreed to reduce his demand to the sum of P72,050.20 as his only basis for settlement
which, of course, was not accepted by said company. So plaintiff instituted this action on February 2, 1953,
in the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying in the complaint that the defendant be condemned to pay
him:
(a) The sum of P72,050.20, the total sum of the itemized losses and/or damages under paragraph 7
of the complaint, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint;
(b) The sum of P5,000 as attorney's fee; and the costs of the suit; and

Plaintiff further respectfully prays for such other and further reliefs as the facts and the law
pertaining to the case may warrant.
The defendant answered the complaint setting forth affirmative defenses and a counterclaim for P930 as
damages and praying for the dismissal of plaintiff's action. After hearing the Court rendered decision only
July 20, 1954, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant, sentencing the latter to pay the former the following: (1) For medicine,
doctor's fees for services rendered and transportation, P700; (2) professional fee as attorney for the
defendant in Criminal Case No. 364, "People vs. Manolo Maddela et al." of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Vizcaya, P3,000; (3) professional fees as attorney for the defendant in Civil Case No.
23891 of the Municipal Court of Manila, "Virginia Tangulan vs. Leonel da Silva," and for the taking of
the deposition of Gabina Angrepan in a case against the Philippine National Bank, P200; and(4)
moral damages in the amount of P2,000.
Defendant's counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
Defendant shall also pay the costs."
From this decision both parties appealed to Us, plaintiff limiting his appeal to the part of the decision which
refers to the moral damages awarded to him which he considered inadequate, and to the failure of said
judgment to grant the attorney's fees asked for in the prayer of his complaint. Defendant in turn alleges
that the trial Court erred in awarding to the plaintiff the following:
(1) P700 for medicine, doctor's fees and transportation expenses;
(2) P3,000 as supposedly unearned full professional fees as attorney for the defendant in
Criminal Case No. 364, "People vs. Manolo Maddela et al.";
(3) P200 as supposedly unearned professional fees as attorney for the defendant in Civil Case
No. 23891 of the Manila Municipal Court, "Virginia Tangulan vs. Leonel de Silva", and for failure to
take the deposition of a certain Gabina Angrepan in an unnamed case; and
(4) P2,000 as moral damages, amounting to the grand total of P5,900, these amounts being very
much greater than what plaintiff deserves.
In connection with his appeal, plaintiff calls attention to the testimonies of Dr. Modesto S. Purisima and of
Dr. Francisco Aguilar, a member of the staff of the National Orthopedic Hospital, which he considers
necessary as a basis for ascertaining not only the physical sufferings undergone by him, but also for
determining the adequate compensation for moral damages that he should be awarded by reason of said
accident.
The exact nature of plaintiff's injuries, their degree of seriousness and the period of his involuntary
disability can be determined by the medical certificate (Exhibit D) issued by the National Orthopedic
Hospital on December 16, 1952, and the testimonies of Dr. Francisco Aguilar, physician in said hospital,
and of Dr. Modesto Purisima, a private practitioner. The medical certificate (Exhibit D) lists: (a)
a subluxation of the right shoulder joint; (b) acontusion on the right chest; and (c) a "suspicious fracture"
of the upper end of the right humerus. Dr. Aguilar who issued the medical certificate admitted, however,
with regard to the "suspicious fracture", that in his opinion with (the aid of) the x-ray there was no fracture.
According to this doctor plaintiff went to the National 0rthopedic Hospital at least six times during the
period from December 16, 1952, to April 7, 1953; that he strapped plaintiffs body (see Exhibit E), which
strap was not removed until after a period of six weeks had elapsed Dr. Modesto Purisima, a private
practitioner, testified that he advised and treated plaintiff from, December 14, 1952, to the end of March
(1953). Plaintiff was never hospitalized for treatment of the injuries he received in said accident.
Counsel for the defendant delves quite extensively on these injuries. He says in his brief the following:
Just what is a subluxation? Luxation is another term for dislocation (Dorland, W.A.N., The American
Illustrated Medical Dictionary (13th ed.), p. 652), and hence, a sublaxation is an incomplete or
partialdislocation (Ibid., p. 1115). While a dislocation is the displacement of a bone or bones from its
or their normal setting (and, therefore, applicable and occurs only to joints and not to rigid or non-
movable parts of the skeletal system) (Ibid., p. 358; Christopher, F., A Textbook of Surgery (5th ed.),
p. 342), it should be distinguished from a fracture which is a break or rupture in a bone or cartilage,
usually due to external violence (Christopher, F., A Textbook of Surgery (5th Ed.) p. 194; Dorland,
W.A.N., The American Illustrated Medical Dictionary (13th ed.), P.459). Because,
unlike fracture which may be partial (a crack in the bone) or total (a complete break in the bone),
there can be no half-way situations with regard to dislocations of the shoulder joint (the head or ball
of the humerus the humerus is the bone from the elbow to the shoulder) must be either inside
the socket of the scapula or shoulder blade (in which case there is no dislocation) or out of the
latter (in which event there is a dislocation), to denote a condition where due to external violence,
the muscles and ligaments connecting the humerus to the scapula have subjected to strain intense
enough to produce temporary distention or lessening of their tautness and consequently resulting
in the loosening or wrenching of the ball of the humerus from its snug fit in the socket of the
scapula, by using the terms subluxation or partial dislocation(as used in the medical certificate), is
to fall into a misnomer a term often used by "chiropractors" and by those who would want to
sound impressive, but generally unfavored by the medical profession. To describe the above
condition more aptly, the medical profession usually employs the expression luxatio imperfecta, or,
in simple language, a sprain (Dorland, W.A.N., The American Illustrated Medical Dictionary (13th
ed.), p. 652). The condition we have described is a paraphrase of the definition of a sprain. Plaintiff
suffered this very injury (a sprained or wrenched shoulder joint) and a cursory scrutiny of his x-ray
plates (Exhibits A and B) by a qualified orthopedic surgeon or by a layman with a picture or x-ray
plate of a normal shoulder joint (found in any standard textbook on human anatomy; the one we
used was Schemer, J.P., Morris' Human Anatomy (10 ed., p. 194) for comparison will bear out our
claim.
Treatment for a sprain is by the use of adhesive or elastic bandage, elevation of the joint, heat,
effleurage and later massage (Christopher, F., A Textbook of Surgery (5th ed., p. 116). The
treatment given to the plaintiff was just exactly that Dr. Aguilar bandaged (strapped) plaintiff's right
shoulder and chest (t.s.n., p. 31) in an elevated position (with the forearm horizontal to the chest
(see photograph, Exhibit E), and certain vitamins were prescribed for him (t.s.n., p. 131). He also
underwent massage for some time by Drs. Aguilar and Purisima. The medicines and appurtenances
to treatment purchased by plaintiff from the Orthopedic Hospital, Botica Boie and Metro Drug Store
were, by his own admission, adhesive plaster, bandage, gauze, oil and "tintura arnica" (t.s.n., p. 3
continuation of transcript ), and Dr. Purisima also prescribed "Numotizin", a beat generating
ointment (t.s.n., p. 23), all of which are indicated for a sprain, and by their nature, can cure nothing
more serious than a sprain anyway. Fractures and true dislocations cannot be cured by the kind of
treatment and medicines which plaintiff received. A true dislocation, for instance, is treated by
means of reduction through traction of the arm until the humeral head returns to the proper
position in the scapular socket (pulling the arm at a 60 degree angle and guiding the ball of the
humerus into proper position, in its socket) while the patient is under deep anaesthesia, and then,
completely immobilizing the part until the injured capsule has healed (Christopher, F., A Textbook of
Surgery, pp. 343 and 344). No evidence was submitted that plaintiff ever received the latter kind of
treatment. Dr. Purisima even declared that after the plaintiff's first visit to the Orthopedic Hospital
the latter informed him that there was no fracture or dislocation (t.s.n., p. 26). Dr. Purisima's
statement is the truth of the matter as we have already explained joints of the shoulder being
only subject to total dislocation (due to their anatomical design), not to partial ones, and any injury
approximating dislocation but not completely, it being classified as mere sprains, slight or bad.
The second and last injury plaintiff sustained was a contusion. What is a contusion? It is just a high
flown expression for a bruise or the act of bruising (Dorland, W.A.N., The American Illustrated
Medical Dictionary (13th ed. p. 290). No further discussion need be made on this particular injury
since the nature of a bruise is of common knowledge (it's a bit uncomfortable but not disabling
unless it occurs on movable parts like the fingers or elbow which is not the case, herein having
occurred in the right chest) and the kind of medical treatment or help it is also well known. (pp. 10-
14, defendant-appellant's brief).
The trial Judge undoubtedly did not give much value to the testimonies of the doctors when in the
statement of facts made in his decision he referred to the physical injuries received by the plaintiff as
slight in nature and the latter is estopped from discussing the same in order to make them appear as
serious, because in the statement of facts made in his brief as appellant, he says the following:
The facts of the case as found by the lower court in its decision, with the permission of this
Honorable Court, we respectfully quote them hereunder as our STATEMENT OF FACTS for the
purpose of this appeal.
Before entering into a discussion of the merits of plaintiff's appeal, We will say a few words as to the nature
of the action on which his demand for damages is predicated.
The nature of an action as in contract or in tort is determined from the essential elements of the
complaint, taken as a whole, in the case of doubt a construction to sustain the action being given to
it.
While the prayer for relief or measure of damages sought does not necessarily determine the
character of the action, it may be material in the determination of the question and therefore
entitled to consideration and in case of doubt will open determine character of the action and
indeed there are actions whose character is necessarily determined thereby. (1 C.J.S. 1100)

A mere perusal of plaintiff complaint will show that his action against the defendant is predicated on an
alleged breach of contract of carriage, i.e., the failure of the defendant to bring him "safely and without
mishaps" to his destination, and it is to be noted that the chauffeur of defendant's taxicab that plaintiff
used when he received the injuries involved herein, Gregorio Mira, has not even been made a party
defendant to this case.
Considering, therefore, the nature of plaintiff's action in this case, is he entitled to compensation for moral
damages? Article 2219 of the Civil Code says the following:
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
xxx xxx xxx
Of the cases enumerated in the just quoted Article 2219 only the first two may have any bearing on the
case at bar. We find, however, with regard to the first that the defendant herein has not committed in
connection with this case any "criminal offense resulting in physical injuries". The one that committed the
offense against the plaintiff is Gregorio Mira, and that is why he has been already prosecuted and punished
therefor. Although (a) owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions; (b) employers are likewise liable for damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned task (Article 2180 of the Civil Code); and (c)
employers and corporations engaged in any kind of industry are subsidiarily civilly liable for felonies
committed by their employees in the discharge of their duties (Art. 103, Revised Penal Code), plaintiff
herein does not maintain this action under the provisions of any of the articles of the codes just mentioned
and against all the persons who might be liable for the damages caused, but as a result of an admitted
breach of contract of carriage and against the defendant employer alone. We, therefore, hold that the case
at bar does not come within the exception of paragraph 1, Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
The present complaint is not based either on a "quasi delict causing physical injuries" (Art. 2219 par. 2, of
the Civil Code). From the report of the Code Commission on the new Civil Code We copy the following:
A question of nomenclature confronted the Commission. After a careful deliberation, it was agreed
to use the term "quasi-delict" for those obligations which do not arise from law, contracts quasi-
contracts or criminal offenses. They are known in Spanish legal treatises as "culpa aquiliana",
"culpa-extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delitos". The phrase "culpa-extra-contractual" or its translation
"extra-contractual fault" was eliminated because it did not exclude quasi-contractual or penal
obligations. "Aquilian fault" might have been selected, but it was thought inadvisable to refer to so
ancient a law as the "Lex Aquilia". So "quasi-delicts" was chosen, which more nearly corresponds to
the Roman Law classification of obligations, and is in harmony with the nature of this kind of
liability.
The Commission also thought of the possibility of adopting the word "tort" from Anglo-American
Law. But "tort" under that system is much broader than the Spanish-Philippine concept of
obligations arising from non-contractual negligence." "Tort" in Anglo-American jurisprudence
includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit. In the general plan of the Philippine legal system, intentional and
malicious are governed by the Penal Code, although certain exceptions are made in the Project.
(Report of the Code Commission, pp. 161-162).

In the case of Cangco vs. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768, We established the distinction between obligation
derived from negligence and obligation as a result of a breach of a contract. Thus, We said:
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at
all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its
performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially in the legal
view point from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by
Article 1903 of the Civil Code (Art. 2180 of the new), which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise
of due care in their selection or supervision. Article 1903 is not applicable to obligation arising EX
CONTRACTU, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of expression,
that article, relates only to CULPA AQUILIANA and not to CULPA CONTRACTUAL.
The decisions in the cases of Castro vs. Acro Taxicab (82 Phil., 359, 46 Off. Gaz., Na. 5, p. 2023); Lilius et
al. vs. Manila Railroad, (59 Phil. 758) and others, wherein moral damages, are awarded to the plaintiffs, are
not applicable to the case at bar because said decisions were rendered before the effectivity of the new
Civil Code (August 30, 1950) and for the further reason that the complaints filed therein were based on
different causes of action.
In view of the foregoing the sum of P2,000 awarded as moral damages by the trial Court has to be
eliminated, for under the law it is not a compensation awardable in a case like the one at bar.
As to plaintiff's demand for P5,000 as attorney's fees, the Civil Code provides the following:
ART, 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or
to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident had faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's
plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) in actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employers liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
The present case does not come under any of exceptions enumerated in the preceding article, specially of
paragraph 2 thereof, because defendant's failure to meet its responsibility was not the plaintiff to litigate
or to incur expenses to protect his interests. The present action was instituted because plaintiff an
exorbitant amount for damages (P60,000) and naturally the defendant did not and could not yield to such
demand. This is neither a case that comes under paragraph 11 of Article 2208 because the Lower Court did
not deem it just and equitable to award any amount for attorney's fees. As We agree with the trial Judge on
this point, We cannot declare that he erred for not awarding to plaintiff any such fees in this case.
Coming now to the appeal of the defendant, the Court, after due consideration of the evidence appearing
on record:
(1) Approves the award of P700 for medicine, doctors' fees and transportation expenses;

(2) Reduces the award of P3,000 as attorney's fees to the sum of P2,000, as Manolo Maddela, defendant in
Criminal Case No. 364 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya testified that he has already paid to
plaintiff part of the latter's fees of P3,000, the amount of which was not disclosed, though it was incumbent
upon the plaintiff to establish how much he had been paid of said fees;
(3) Approves the award of P200 as unearned professional fees as attorney for the defendant in Civil Case
No. 238191 of the Municipal Court of Manila whom plaintiff was unable to represent, and for the latter's
failure to take the deposition of one Agripina Angrepan due to the automobile accident referred to in this
case.
Before closing this decision We deem it convenient to quote the following passage of defendant's brief as
appellant:
Realizing its obligation under its contract of carriage with the plaintiff, and because the facts of the
case, as have been shown, mark it as more proper for the Municipal Court only, the defendant, to
avoid the expense and time of litigation, offered to settle the case amicably with plaintiff, but the
latter refused and insisted on his demand for P72,050.20 (Exhibit K) as the only basis for
settlement, thus adding a clearly petty case to the already overflowing desk of the Honorable
Members of this Court.
We admire and respect at all times a man for standing up and fighting for his rights, and when said
right consists in injuries sustained due to a breach of a contract of carriage with us, sympathy and
understanding are added thereto. But when a person starts demanding P72,050.20 for a solitary
bruise and sprain, injuries for which the trial court, even at its generous although erroneous best,
could only grant P5,900, then respect and sympathy give way to something else. It is time to fight,
for, in our humble opinion, there is nothing more loathsome nor truly worthy of condemnation than
one who uses his injuries for other purposes than just rectification. If plaintiff's claim is granted, it
would be a blessing, not a misfortune, to be injured. (p. 34-35)
This case was instituted by a lawyer who, as an officer of the courts, should be the first in helping Us in the
administration of justice, and after going over the record of this case, we do not hesitate to say that the
demand of P72,050.20 for a subluxation of the right humerus bone and an insignificant contusion in the
chest, has not even the semblance of reasonableness. As a matter of fact, Dr. Aguilar himself said that the
x-ray plates (Exhibits A, Band C) " did not show anything significant except that it shows
a slight subluxation of the right shoulder, and that there is a suspicious fracture", which ultimately he
admitted not to exist. The plaintiff himself must have felt embarrassed by his own attitude when after
receiving defendant's brief as appellant, he makes in his brief as appellee the categorical statement that
he DOES NOT NOW INSIST NOR PRETEND IN THE LEAST to Collect from the defendant all the damages he
had claimed in his complaint, but instead he is submitting his case to the sound discretion of the
Honorable Court for the award of a reasonable and equitable damages allowable by law, to compensate
the plaintiff of the suffering and losses he had undergone and incurred of the accident oftentimes
mentioned in this brief in which plaintiff was injured" (p. 17-18).This acknowledgment comes too late, for
plaintiff has already deprived the Court of Appeals of the occasion to exercise its appellate jurisdiction over
this case which he recklessly dumped to this Court. We certainly cannot look with at favor at his attitude of
plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by reducing the amount awarded as
professional fees from P3,000 to P2,000 and by eliminating the moral damages of P2,000 awarded by the
Lower Court to the plaintiff. Said decision is in all other respects affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and
Endencia, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66419 July 31, 1987
FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
IVAN MENDEZ, respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, rendered in AC-G.R. CV No. 63673 affirming in toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Branch 6, 16th Judicial District.
The factual background of this case, as summarized in the trial court's decision and adopted by the
appellate court, is as follows:
On August 6, 1974, Ivan Mendez purchased a Ford Cortina from the Davao Motor Sales Company
and to secure balance of P49,428.40 plaintiff executed and delivered a promissory note and chattel
mortgage in favor of Davao Motor Sales Company.
On August 11, 1974, Davao Motor Sales Company assigned to Filinvest Credit Corp., its rights, title
and interest in the promissory note and chattel mortgage. According to the terms of the promissory
note, the monthly installments of Pl,373.00 would begin on September 13, 1974, and on or before
the 13th day of the month thereafter until August 13, 1977, with interest and such other charges
customarily imposed by defendant on transactions of the same nature.
It appears that Ivan Mendez failed to pay the February 13, March 13, and April 13, 1976
installments due on the promissory note, Thus, defendant financing company sent written demands
to Ivan Mendez to update his account.
On May 3, 1976, Ivan Mendez paid the financing company P2,000.00 through Philippine Veteran's
Bank Check No. 58166 which was credited to payments for the following months:
Month Amount
Feb. 1976 P200.49 (full payment)
Mar. 1976 1,373.00 (full payment )
Apr. 1976 415.05 (partial)
Sub-total 1,988.54
Interest 11.46
Total P2,000.00
On May 6, 1976, the check was returned to the financing corporation on the ground of insufficient
funds by the Philippine Veterans Bank.
On May 10, 1976, defendant financing company filed an action for recovery of personal property
and/or sum of money docketed as Civil Case No. 9468 in the Court of First Instance against Ivan
Mendez, et al.
On May 13, 1976 (or May 26, 1976), the check was finally cleared and considered payment for the
February, March and April, 1976, installments.
On May 24, 1976, this Court issued Order of Seizure which states, among others:
WHEREAS, it is further alleged in the complaint that in violation of their undertakings the
defendants defaulted in complying with the terms and conditions of the said promissory note
and chattel mortgage (Annexes "A" and "B"), by failing to pay part of the installment which
fell due on February 13, 1976, as well as the subsequent two (2) consecutive installments
which fell due on March 12 April 13, 1976; (Exh. "B ").
Early in the morning of June 8, 1976, Ivan Mendez used the car to fetch a certain Col. Coronel at the
airport who came to the city to speak at a gathering of reserve officers. Ivan Mendez, a Captain in
the reserve force, brought Col. Coronel to a hotel thence to an eatery downtown where the
conference was being held. After which, Mendez instructed his driver to take the car home to the
Central Park Subdivision, Davao City. Shortly before noon, personnel of the financing company and
a deputy sheriff arrived at the house of Mendez and seized the car pursuant to the Order dated May
24, 1976. The car was driven back to the eatery where Ivan Mendez was called and he pleaded with
the FILINVEST people to release his car in the meantime. Refused, Mendez then went to the office of
the financing company and reiterated his plea. He was told by Benjamin Bontia, collection and
credit manager of the financing company that he had to pay the whole amount due in order to get

back the car. After further negotiations, Bontia relented and permitted Mendez to pay his April, May
and June installments plus repossession expenses as a condition to the release of the car.
On June 11, 1976, Mendez paid P3,000.00, which was credited to the following months: April
P957.95; May Pl,373.00; and, June P643.67 plus interest of P25.38 (Exh. "6-B"). On June 18,
1976, Mendez paid Pl,894.00 as and for repossession expenses (Exh. "C "). After payments of these
amounts, the financing company finally released the car to Ivan Mendez.
On June 21, 1976. the financing company filed a motion in court seeking the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 9468 "on the ground that defendants have updated their obligation to the plaintiff", and which
was granted by virtue of the Order of this Court dated June 24, 1976. (pp. 105-106, Rollo)
On July 14, 1976, respondent Mendez filed a complaint for Solution Indebiti and damages against the
petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch 6, 16th Judicial District. His amended
complaint dated July 28, 1976, alleged, among others, "that the seizure order was illegal, as the unpaid
installments for the months of February, March, April, 1976 subject of Civil Case No. 9468 had previously
been updated by the clearing of the PVB check, and that petitioner was therefore without any right to
claim from him the repossession expenses and, that due to the alleged unjustified repossession of the car
and the factual circumstances attendant thereto, he is entitled to moral damages." (p. 24, Rollo)
In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner countered: "that since the PVB check was only cleared
subsequent to May 10, 1976, respondent was in default of the February, March and April installments at
the time it filed its complaint for the repossession of the car on the aforesaid dated; and, that the
subsequent updating of respondent's account did not invalidate the seizure order, as the basis therefor
was the failure of respondent to pay the installments when they fell due, and not the failure to pay the
February, March and April installments in particular." (pp. 24-25, Rollo)
On December 10, 1977, the trial court rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered infavor of plaintiff Ivan Mendez, and
against the defendant Filinvest Credit Corporation:
1. Ordering the defendant Filinvest Credit Corporation, to return to plaintiff the sum of P1,894.80
representing the repossession expenses paid by Ivan Mendez to the financing company with legal
rate of interest from June 17, 1976, the date of payment up to the time the full amount is returned;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P80,000.00, as and for moral damages; and
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the amount of P80,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
The defendant Filinvest Credit Corporation shall pay the costs of suit. (pp, 101-102, Rollo)
The petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner filed the present petition.
The petitioner now comes before this Court with the following assignments of errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEIZURE OF THE CAR WAS TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED AND IN
ORDERING PETITIONER TO REIMBURSE RESPONDENT THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
NINETY FOUR PESOS & 80/100 (P1,894.80) REPRESENTING THE REPOSSESSION EXPENSES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF EIGHTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000.00)
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY RESPONDENT THE SUM OF EIGHT THOUSAND
PESOS (P8,000.00) AS AND FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO, 9621 AND IN NOT AWARDING PETITIONER ITS
LEGITIMATE COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES. (p. 28, Rollo)

The arguments of the petitioner are centered on its having a clear cause of action and a right to the
corresponding remedy at the time the complaint was filed on May 10, 1976. The respondent had not paid
the February, March, and April 1976 installments or more than two installments due on the promissory
note.
On the other hand, the respondent claims that the acceleration clause stipulated in the promissory note
and in the chattel mortgage cannot justify the action taken by the petitioner because it contravenes the
letter and the avowed public policy of the installment sales law, and, therefore, is illegal and
unenforceable.
The respondent states that since the petitioner was exacting fulfillment of the obligation it should have
desisted from repossessing the car. It cannot exercise its remedies cumulatively. It cannot pretend that it
was recovering the car preparatory to cancellation of the sale or foreclosure of the chattel mortgage
because it had elected to exact fulfillment of the obligation when it filed Civil Case No. 9468.
The respondent stresses that the PVB check bounced on May 6, 1976, but the petitioner re-deposited it
and in due course of business it cleared on May 13, 1976. Thus, as of May 13, 1976, the remaining unpaid
installment was only part of the April, 1976 installment, in the amount of P957.95. Having redeposited the
check before May 13, 1976, the petitioner should have waited until the check bounced before filing the
complaint.
According to the private respondent, the complaint in Civil Case No. 9468 not only alleged a cause of
action for specific performance but also alternatively asked for the issuance of a writ of replevin. The
petitioner, therefore, acted cumulatively in pursuing its various remedies which is against the intent and
spirit of the installment sales law.
We agree with the petitioner.
The remittance of the PVB check on May 3, 1976 could not have cured the defaults in payment because
the check bounced when it was presented for payment. The respondent's account had no funds at the time
to back up the check he used as payment.
Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile
documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through
the fault of the creditor they have been impaired.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner stresses that the seizure order was anchored on the respondent's failure to pay installments
on time and not on the mere unqualified failure to pay the February, March, and April installments. It states
that the making of timely payments was an absolute undertaking in the promissory note and the deed of
chattel mortgage. The grievance sought to be vindicated by the replevin suit was the non-compliance with
this undertaking.
The records sustain the petitioner's arguments that it had a valid cause of action when the complaint was
filed. It filed suit for the total balance of P25,597.56 in accordance with the stipulated acceleration clause
in case of default. The consideration for the seizure order prayed for by the petitioner included the non-
payment of the remaining total obligation.
With respect to the trial court's ordering the petitioner to reimburse Pl,894.80 representing the expenses
incurred because of the seizure of the car and as a condition for its release, the petitioner maintains that it
had sufficient justification to proceed with Civil Case No. 9468 and to repossess the car. It disclaims any
obligation to withdraw the replevin suit upon the clearing of the PVB check, because the fact that it was
cleared did not wipe out the bases of the proceedings.
Insofar as the P1,894.80 are concerned, the petitioner is correct that the repossession expenses must be
for the account of the respondents whose duty was to immediately surrender the car upon valid demand
and thereby prevent the necessity of the petitioner's having to spend in order to repossess it.
The petitioner also questions the award of attorney's fees. It asserts that according to decisions of this
Court, an award of attorney's fees is improper on the sole basis of an adverse decision (Ramos v. Ramos,
61 SCRA 284), or if one considers the good faith of parties in prosecuting a cause of action though declared
to be unfounded (Salao v. Salao, 70 SCRA 65), or in the absence of clear proof that an action was intended
merely to prejudice the other party (Mercader v. Manila Polo Club, L-8373, September 28, 1956). The
records sustain the contention that there is no basis for entitlement to attorney's fees.
Concerning the award of moral damages in the amount of P80,000.00, the petitioner argues that moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. The petitioner
points out that it repossessed the car as a matter of right and upon faithful compliance with all the legal
requirements. As the exercise of a right within legal bounds is not wrongful, the basic requirement for an
award of moral damages is absent. It was the respondent and not the petitioner, who was guilty of a
wrongful act. The failure to abide by one's express financial obligations is deplorable. To hold otherwise is
to reward contractual breach and penalize one who avails of contractual and legal remedies to correct the
prejudice resulting from any such breach. The petitioner argues that the respondent alone must bear the
consequences of his wrongful omission.
On the other hand, the private respondent bases his claim to moral damages on the alleged failure of the
petitioner, to act with caution and to observe honesty and good faith with due regard to the respondent's
rights under the installment sales law as wen as on the act of the petitioner in deliberately repossessing
the car in violation of law.
The award for moral damages has no factual and legal basis.
The respondent claims that it was while he was attending a seminar for home defense in Davao City that
the car was repossessed by the petitioner. When he pleaded with the petitioner not to seize the car at that
very moment because he was using it for his visitor from Manila, the petitioner chose to brandish the
seizure order as its weapon to enforce collection of his whole account. The respondent claims that he was
humiliated and embarrassed most especially before his visitor and among those attending the seminar as
well as among his friends and business associates. The shock and humiliation he suffered resulted to his
hospitalization immediately, thereafter, for about a week.
The testimony, however, of the driver of the respondent shows that the car was seized at the residence of
the respondent while the said driver was cleaning the same. It is, therefore, not true that the respondent
was humiliated and embarrassed before his visitor and among those attending the seminar,
The rule is settled that moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of a wrongful act or omission or
fraud or bad faith. (R & B Surety & Insurance Co., v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 736; and
Siasat v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 139 SCRA 238). When the action is filed in good faith there should
be no penalty on the right to litigate. (Expiritu v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 50). The petitioner may have
erred but error alone is not a ground for moral damages.1avvphi1
The petitioner filed an action for recovery of personal property and/or sum of money against the
respondent (Civil Case No. 9468) when the latter's PVB check intended for the February, March, and April
installments bounced due to insufficiency of funds. By virtue of an order of seizure issued by the court, the
car was repossessed. The check was later redeposited and credited for the months mentioned. When the
respondent negotiated with the petitioner for the release of the car, the latter demanded payment of the
total outstanding balance on the promissory note. Due to the persistent pleas of t he respondent, the
petitioner released the car to him upon payment of the installment remaining unpaid for the months of
April, May, and June, 1976, in addition to the costs incurred in repossessing the car amounting to
P1,897.80. On June 21, 1976, Civil Case No. 9468 was dismissed upon motion of the petitioner. The
willingness of the petitioner to allow the respondent to pay only the unpaid installments for April, May, and
June instead of the total outstanding balance and to release the car as well as its voluntary motion to
dismiss the case indicates lack of fraud or bad faith on the part of the petitioner. The private respondent
was not without fault. He was three months behind in his payments and he issued a bouncing check. The
dismissal of Civil Case No. 9468 rendered moot and academic the issues of whether or not the acceleration
clause in the promissory note is illegal and unenforceable as well as the other issue of whether or not the
petitioner acted cumulatively in pursuing its various remedies to effect collection.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decisions of the trial court and the Intermediate
Appellate Court are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of the respondent is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-60409 November 11, 1985
TIBURCIO GUITA, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUZ SORIANO HAGUISAN & CESAR BENEDICTO
HAGUISAN, respondents.
PLANA, J.:
Petitioner seeks review of the decision of the defunct Court of Appeals holding him liable for moral
damages for issuing, in his capacity as Administrative Officer of the Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation (MMIC), a certification to respondent Cesar Haguisan stating that the latter was employed by
MMIC as security guard from August 21, 1956 up to the date of his separation on February 23, 1971, "after
he was found mentally unfit to work."
Cesar Haguisan was employed as security guard of the MMIC in Sipalay, Negros Occidental.
Before 1970, the MMIC general manager was shot and killed by one of the Company security guards. As an
aftermath of this accident, all MMIC security guards were subjected to psychiatric examination.
The psychiatric examination of Cesar Haguisan was conducted by Dr. Rena Nora, who made the following
findings:
... He has admitted to frequent "absent minded spells" in the last few years. ... Calculating
ability is poor, indicating poor concentration and memory. ... With memory for design test,
he made six mistakes which is interpreted as borderline for motor-perceptual skill
impairment ... . His profile shows that of a poorly adjusted individual both in his personal
adjustments and his social adjustment ...
Impression: Borderline mental capacity with mild to moderate memory impairment and poor
calculating ability...
Most of above factors noted were not in satisfactory levels and tests also indicated
significant impairment of mental functioning.
Dr. Nora concluded that Haguisan was
psychiatrically unfit for the job position of security guard at the time he was examined
(1970), and that he cannot be recommended for the job position of security guard, but that
he may be gainfully employed in other departments that require less mental alertness and
jobs that do not require evening shifts.
Based on the foregoing psychiatric report, the services of Haguisan were terminated.
Subsequently, Haguisan requested from Tiburcio Guita, MMIC Administrative Officer, a certification
regarding his MMIC service, as he was then looking for another job. Guita gave this certification to
Haguisan:
This is to certify that Mr. Cesar B. Haguisan has been employed by Marinduque Mining and
Industrial Corporation as Security Guard in its Sipalay Mine, Negros Occidental, from August
21, 1956, up to the date of his separation on February 23, 1971, with a monthly rate of
P371.06, after he was found mentally unfit to work.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Cesar B. Haguisan, for whatever purpose
it may serve him best.
In 1973, Haguisan and his wife filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City a
complaint for damages against Tiburcio Guita, Dr. Rena Nora, Emilio Santos (MMIC Sipalay general
manager) and Roberto Abendao (MMIC chief security guard). The suit was based on the allegedly false
and derogatory statements regarding Haguisan's mental state which, according to plaintiffs, were not only
designed to ease Haguisan out of MMIC but also to ruin his chances of obtaining employment elsewhere.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding no malice in preparation of the psychiatric report on
Haguisan or the certification subsequently issued on the basis thereof.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal except as to herein petitioner Guita, who was
ordered to pay Cesar Haguisan the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and costs upon the finding that it
was "mean and malicious on the part of Guita to unqualifiedly certify that Haguisan was 'mentally unfit to
work', without clarifying, as Dr. Nora had done in her report (Exh. B), that Haguisan was 'psychiatrically
unfit for the job position of security guard at the time he was examined (1970)' but that 'he may be
gainfully employed in other departments that require less mental alertness and jobs that do not require
evening shifts'.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review, assailing the decision of the appellate court for
lack of basis. Haguisan did not appeal.
Ordinarily, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are accepted as conclusive by this Court. We have
repeatedly held however that this Court may make its own findings of fact and disregard those made by
the Court of Appeals when the latter are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; when
the interferance is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
when there is a misapprehension of facts; when the findings of fact are conflicting; and when the Court of
Appeals goes beyond the issues of the case and makes findings contrary to the admissions of the parties.
(Roque vs. Buan, 21 SCRA 642; Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 22.)
In the instant case, we find that the appellate court's finding that petitioner, in issuing the disputed
certification, acted with malice, is bereft of factual support.
Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. It is however not enough that such
injuries have arisen; it is essential that they have sprung from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant
which was the proximate cause thereof.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. (Civil Code, Article 2217.)
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that in the absence of a wrongful act or
omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded... (R&B Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 129 SCRA 736, 743.)
It may perhaps be conceded that private respondents have suffered mental anguish or wounded feelings
as a consequence of the statement in the certification that Haguisan was separated from MMIC " after he
was found mentally unfit to work." But was Guita's issuance of the certification wrongful or malicious?
In the trial court, Haguisan tried to prove that Guita was motivated by malice or bad faith when he made
the certification. The trial judge rejected the testimony of plaintiffs (private respondents) and their
witnesses as "without the earmarks of truth". (CFI Decision, Rollo, p. 36.) This factual finding deserves the
highest respect and ought not to be disturbed, in accordance with settled jurisprudence on the matter.
When the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb
the findings of the trial court, considering that it is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case." (People vs.
Mercado, 97 SCRA 232.)
There is nothing in the record indicating that the trial court has committed any reversible error in its
evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses.
Going to the certification itself, private respondents' claim for damages is based on the statement in
Guita's certification that Haguisan was "employed by MMIC as security guard ... from August 21, 1956 up
to the date of his separation on February 23, 1971 ..., after he was found mentally unfit to work. "It would
seem that the underlined portion is a reasonably fair statement based on the professional findings in the
psychiatric report that :

... He (Haguisan) has admitted to frequent 'absent minded spells' in the last few years ...
Calculating ability is poor, indicating poor concentration and memory ... His profile shows
that of a poorly adjusted individual both in his personal adjustment and his social
adjustment ...
Impression: Borderline mental capacity with mild to moderate memory impairment and poor
calculating ability ...
... tests also indicated subsequent impairment of mental functioning.
As to the generality of the statement of mental unfitness to work, suffice it to say that the certification
should be read and construed as a whole. So viewed, it is clear that the statement can refer only to
unfitness to work as security guard, for it was that position, and no other, from which Haguisan was
separated. The said position was the only subject matter of the certification.
Finally, the certification was made by Guita upon the request of Haguisan himself and was given to no one
but the latter.
All told, we find petitioner Guita not guilty of any wrongful act. It follows that he cannot be liable for moral
damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is set aside. The trial court's decision dismissing the complaint is
reinstated.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16396 January 31, 1963
HEIRS OF BASILISA JUSTIVA, namely, LEON GREGORIOS, DOLORES GREGORIOS,

TRINIDAD GREGORIOS, DELFIN GREGORIOS, LOLITA GREGORIOS,
for herself and as guardian ad litem of the heirs of the deceased LUCIO GREGORIOS,
the minors NIMFA GREGORIOS, PERLA GREGORIOS, ANTONIO GREGORIOS, and ROSINI
GREGORIOS,petitioners,
vs.
JESUS GUSTILO, PURIFICACION GUSTILO and THE COURT OF APPEALS (3rd Division), respondents
Claro M. Recto for petitioners.

Leon P. Gellada for respondents.
BENGZON, C.J.:
This is a petition for review of that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals awarding to the spouses
Jesus Gustilo and Purificacion Gustilo, attorney's fees plus moral and actual damages.
It appears that in December, 1952, petitioners filed against said spouses a complaint for the annulment of
two deeds of sale executed in their favor by Isidra Justiva, of whom plaintiffs claimed to be the legal heirs.
They alleged that Isidra Justiva had signed said deeds because of insidious words and machinations of the
Gustilo spouses. Later, the complaint was amended in September, 1954, to assert as basis therefor that
the same defendants "had fraudulently transferred in their names said two parcels of land belonging to
Isidra Justiva without her knowledge and consent, taking advantage of her credulity, ignorance and
illiteracy, and abusing the absolute confidence and trust she reposed on them." Again in June, 1955,
petitioners amended their complaint to add another ground of action, namely, that the signatures of Isidra
Justiva were forgeries.

Denying the charges, the defendant spouses prayed in their counterclaim for moral damages in the
amount of P10,000.00, attorney's fees in the amount of P2,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount
of P5,000.00.
Dismissing the complaint, the court sentenced the plaintiffs (above petitioners) to pay defendants (herein
respondents) P2,000.00 for moral damages, P1,000.00 for actual damages and P2,000.00 for attorney's
fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the court's decision in toto.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Petitioners here assail the propriety and legality of the damages and attorney's fees assessed against
them. They no longer question the dismissal of their complaint.
Briefly stated, their arguments rests on the alleged absence of any finding in the decisions of the lower
court and of the Court of Appeals, that their complaint was malicious or that they had acted in gross and
evident bad faith in filing the same.
Generally, the attorney's fees are not a proper element of damages, for it is not sound policy to set a
premium on the right to litigate.1 Thus, no right to such fees can accrue merely because of an adverse
decision.2 This is precisely the rationale for taxing costs, in certain cases, against the losing party. The
payment therefor, from the viewpoint of sanction, is deemed sufficient. Nonetheless, various exceptions
are provided for by law.3 Some of these are: "In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or preceeding" or
where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees be recovered. 4
Petitioners' actuations in this case were expressly found to be insincere and baseless, by both the Court of
First Instance and the Court of Appeals. There was, therefore, no error in the award of attorney's fees. 5
For the same reason, this Court must sustain the imposition of moral damages. 6 Patent indeed is the
insincerity of the petitioners' various amended complaints.
His Honor, the trial judge, F. Imperial Reyes, commented:
Antes de la demanda de fecha 13 de Diciembre de 1952, hubo otra de fecha 23 de Octubre de 1952
(Exh. 2), la cual fue sobreseida. En aquella primera demanda sa alega que la consideracion del
otorgamiento de las dos escrituras era inadecuada o insuficiente. Sin embargo, en la demanda de
fecha 13 de Diciembre de 1952, y en las dos demandas enmendadas, una de fecha 8 de
Septiembre de 1952, y otra de fecha 7 de Junio de 1955 solo se alega que las firmas de Isidra
Justiva en las dos escrituras han sido falsificadas y si son genuinas, las mismas han sido obtenidas
mediante fraude y sin ninguna consideracion. Como se vera, la teoria en la primera demanda, que
fue sobreseida ha sido abandonada. ESTO NO HABLA BIEN DE LA SINCERIDAD DEPRETENSION DE
LOS DEMANDANTES.
And the allegation of forgery of the documents is all but a defamation, which in the light of Art. 2219(7) of
the Civil Code, could by analogy be ground for payment of moral damages, considering the wounded
feelings and besmirched reputation of the defendants.
Is the award of actual damages proper? While the prayer by the respondents in their "Answer" mentions
only exemplary damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, therein also is a plea for "such further
relief ... as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable." This prayer may include "actual damages",
if and when they are proved. It is to be observed that in the course of the trial, defendants introduced
evidence of actual damages; yet petitioners failed to object to such presentation. Consequently, the
unalleged but proved matter of actual damages may be considered by the court. The trial judge mentioned
such damages. And the Court of Appeals, without going into specifics, approved the award, and declared
explicitly that the evidence sustained it. In this Court appellees quoted without contradiction portions of
the oral evidence in support of the judge's findings. So, the matter being factual, we must, in the
circumstances, affirm the appellate court's assessment of actual damages.

WHEREFORE, as this petition turns out to be without judicial foundation, the decision under review is
affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130030. June 25, 1999]
EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and RICARDO
LO, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner, Expertravel and Tours, Inc., seeks in the instant petition for review on certiorari a
modification of the decision, dated 20 March 1997, of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the 07th
November 1994 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 5) of Manila, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is rendered declaring the instant suit DISMISSED, and
hereby orders the plaintiff to pay defendant Ricardo Lo moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00;
attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00, and to pay the costs of the suit.
"No pronouncement as to other damages for lack of evidence to warrant the same." [1]
The factual and case settings of the controversy are culled from the pleadings on record and the
assailed decision of the appellate court and that of the court a quo.
On 07 October 1987, Expertravel & Tours, Inc., ("Expertravel"), a domestic corporation engaged in the
travel agency business, issued to private respondent Ricardo Lo four round-trip plane tickets for Hongkong,
together with hotel accommodations and transfers, for a total cost of P39,677.20. Alleging that Lo had
failed to pay the amount due, Expertravel caused several demands to be made. Since the demands were
ignored by Lo, Expertravel filed a court complaint for recovery of the amount claimed plus damages.
Respondent Lo explained, in his answer, that his account with Expertravel had already been fully
paid. The outstanding account was remitted to Expertravel through its then Chairperson, Ms. Ma. Rocio de
Vega, who was theretofore authorized to deal with the clients of Expertravel. The payment was evidenced
by a Monte de Piedad Check No. 291559, dated 06 October 1987, for P42,175.20 for which Ms. de Vega, in
turn, issued City Trust Check No. 417920 in favor of Expertravel for the amount of P50,000.00, with the
notation "placement advance for Ricardo Lo, etc." Per its own invoice, Expertravel received the sum on 10
October 1987.
The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, held that the payment made by Lo was valid and
binding on petitioner Expertravel. Even on the assumption that Ms. de Vega had not been specifically
authorized by Expertravel, both courts said, the fact that the amount "delivered to the latter remain(ed) in
its possession up to the present, mean(t) that the amount redounded to the benefit of petitioner
Expertravel, in view of the second paragraph of Article 1241 of the Civil Code to the effect that payment
made to a third person shall also be valid in so far as it has redounded to the benefit of the creditor.
In this recourse, petitioner confines itself to the following related legal issues; viz:
"I. Can moral damages be recovered in a clearly unfounded suit?
"II. Can moral damages be awarded for negligence or quasi-delict that did not result to physical injury to
the offended party?"[2]
There is merit in the petition.
Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate [3] and alleviate in some way
the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a person.Although incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages, nevertheless, must somehow be proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering inflicted. [4] Such damages, to be recoverable, must be the proximate result
of a wrongful act or omission the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party.
[5]
An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met; to wit: (1) First, there must be
an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there
must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of
damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. [6] Under the provisions of this law,
in culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in
bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his
contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort
resulting in physical injuries.[7] By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code,
moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a passenger results from a breach of
carriage. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b)
where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort,[8] moral damages may aptly be recovered. This rule also
applies, as aforestated, to contracts when breached by tort. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be
lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage,
illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation. Malicious prosecution can also
give rise to a claim for moral damages. The term "analogous cases," referred to in Article 2219, following
the ejusdem generis rule, must be held similar to those expressly enumerated by the law. [9]
Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal justification for an
award of attorney's fees,[10] such filing, however, has almost invariably been held not to be a ground for an
award of moral damages.[11] The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate. The anguish suffered by a person for having been made a defendant in a
civil suit would be no different from the usual worry and anxiety suffered by anyone who is haled to court,
a situation that cannot by itself be a cogent reason for the award of moral damages. [12] If the rule were
otherwise, then moral damages must every time be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against
an unsuccessful plaintiff.[13]
The Court confirms, once again, the foregoing rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the award of moral damages to respondent Ricardo Lo
under the assailed decision is DELETED. In its other aspects, the appealed decision shall remain
undisturbed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 107529-30. January 29, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PATRICIO Y. BAGCAL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Patricio Y. Bagcal appeals from the joint judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 103, on October 2, 1992, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-14152 and Q-90-14154, finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of murder. Its decretal portion reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused PATRICIO Y. BAGCAL GUILTY as principal
beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER in Q-90-14152 and 90-14154 for which he is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua in each of said cases.
On the civil aspect, Patricio Bagcal is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Leonides Cartella y Marquez
in Q-90-14152 the sum of P50,000.00 and the heirs of Marissa Domingo in Q-90-14154 the sum of
P50,000.00. The accused is also ordered to pay the heirs of both victims the sum of P100,000.00 each set
of heirs as moral damages.
Case No. Q-90-14153 (for slight illegal detention) is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. No
costs.
SO ORDERED."[1]
Appellant, a sergeant with the PC Civil Security Force based in Camp Crame, Quezon City, in the now-
defunct Philippine Constabulary (PC) was dishonorably discharged on June 12, 1990. [2]
On August 2, 1990, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged appellant with two counts of murder,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-14152 and Q-90-14154. The Information in Criminal Case No. Q-90-
14152 states:
That on or about the 27th day of April, 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one LEONIDES CARTALLA y MARQUEZ, by then
and there shooting him with an (A)rmalite rifle hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Leonides Cartalla y Marquez in such amount as may be awarded
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The charge in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14154 was virtually identical, except that the victim was
identified as Marissa Domingo.
That same day, a separate Information for slight illegal detention, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-
14153, was also filed against appellant for allegedly detaining the spouses Rolando and Adelina Velasquez,
their 4-month old son Cris Nicola, and housemaid Corazon Escote for more than two hours at their house in
1st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City.[4]
On April 30, 1991, appellant was arraigned in all three cases. He entered a plea of not guilty.Since all
of the cases stemmed from the same incident, they were consolidated and tried jointly.
The prosecutions evidence established that on April 26, 1990, Lito Camara, Jr., celebrated the first
birthday of his daughter Samantha Mae at his house in No. 45-A 1st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, with
several guests present. Close to midnight, while the merrymaking was still going on, the sound of distant
gunfire was heard coming from the direction of Camp Crame. Lito and his guests ignored it since such
sound was not unusual near the camp.[5]
A few minutes thereafter, appellant armed with an M-16 assault rifle barged into the garage of the
Camara residence. Pointing the rifle at the guests near the entrance door, he asked for the keys of a car
parked near the house. A certain Rino, a guest, tossed the key to his car to the appellant. The latter failed
to catch it, but instead of picking it up, he ran to another car near the first vehicle. Inside, on the drivers
seat was victim Leonides Cartalla, also a guest of Lito. Beside him was Marissa Domingo. Outside the car,
drinking beer, were three other guests: Joselito Arcega, Dennis Arcega, and Joseph David. Appellant aimed
his rifle at Leonides and told him to start the engine, but the victim said that he did not have the key. [6]
Lito and his other guests scampered towards the house. Once inside, Lito peeped through the window
and saw appellant firing his rifle at the occupants of the car. [7] Prosecution eyewitness Leovilgildo Cartalla,
brother of Leonides, also saw appellant firing at the car. [8] Appellant also fired four or five times at the
persons around the car causing them to either flee for safety or play dead.He next fired at the door of the
Camara house, then ran off.[9]
When Lito and his guests went outside, they found Marissa prostate. Close to her, playing possum was
Joseph. Slumped in the drivers seat, with half his body outside the car was Leonides.Marissa and Leonides
were rushed to a hospital, but Marissa was pronounced dead on arrival and Leonides died later. [10]
Appellant took refuge inside the house of Rolando Velasquez at No. 30, 1st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon
City. Acting on a report that the Velasquez family had been taken hostage by an armed man, several law
enforcers rushed to the house and surrounded it. After he was called to surrender he said he would only do
so to members of the PC SAF, his former unit. PC Captain Anthony Alcantara, appellants former
commanding officer, prevailed upon him to give up. [11] Appellant turned over a loaded M-16 rifle with Serial
No. RP 164624 to Alcantara. The rifle and several empty 5.56mm cartridges were then turned over to the
Quezon City police investigators.[12] Ballistics tests on the rifle and cartridges revealed that the empty
shells of M-16 ammunition found at the crime scene had been fired from the rifle surrendered by appellant
to Captain Alcantara.[13]
Dr. Roberto Garcia, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, autopsied the
remains of Leonides and Marissa. He reported that Leonides died from a gunshot wound at his back [14] and
Marissa also died of a gunshot wound at her back.[15]
Appellant, the sole witness for the defense, denied shooting the victims. He declared that on the
evening of April 26, 1990, he was on his way to see his mistress, Avelina Morales, who was residing at the
house of a certain Cesar Futol[16] in 2nd Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City. A group of men were drinking and one
of them, a certain Jimmy Lopez, a discharged soldier, approached him and told him to lay off Avelina
because she was already Lopezs girlfriend. Lopez and appellant had a heated argument and before a
fistfight ensued, a buddy of appellant, PC Sgt. Adolfo Darao, arrived and pulled appellant away.
Darao and appellant proceeded to a nearby restaurant where they had a meal and drank one bottle of
beer each. When they parted, appellant returned to the Futol residence. He was still some distance away,
when the group of Jimmy Lopez intercepted him. A certain Marvin, whom appellant knew was a military
man, and two Futol brothers, accompanied Lopez. Lopez and Marvin carried M-16 rifles, while the Futols
sported automatic pistols. Without warning, they fired at him, but missed. Appellant dashed off to his
house, about a kilometer away. He grabbed his service rifle and some ammunition and told his wife he was
going to Ilocos. Once outside, he hailed a taxi. However, the cab he hired broke down at 1st Avenue,
Cubao, Quezon City. Appellant then got out and walked.He saw a parked car with some occupants and told
them to help him get away since some armed men were after him. Appellant was still talking to the
occupants of the car when a shot was fired at him. He ran towards the front of the car and fired back. He
did not notice if his pursuers hit the occupants of the car, as his primary concern then was his own
safety. He sprinted towards a concrete fence, clambered over it, and entered the Velasquez residence
where he hid until the wee hours of the morning. Police and military units then surrounded the house. A
brief firefight broke out when they tried to flush him out. He then decided to surrender to his former officer
in the PC SAF.[17]
The trial court convicted appellant of two counts of murder, while acquitting him of the slight illegal
detention charge.
Hence, the instant appeal, with appellant assigning the following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT DESPITE PATENT ABSENCE OF
EVIDENCE (PROOF) BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING SUPPOSED PRESENCE OF TREACHERY AND USING
THE SAME AS BASIS TO JUSTIFY ITS JUDGMENT.
III. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE PRESENCE (OF) SUPERIOR STRENGTH.
IV. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY
EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SUBSTANTIATE SUCH AWARD.
V. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING ARTICLE 4 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO JUSTIFY
THE CONVICTION OF THE APPELLANT.
Considering the five assigned errors, we find in essence they are subsumed properly into two issues:
(1) Was appellants guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt? (2) Were the appropriate penalties imposed on
him?
Appellant faults the trial court for convicting him, notwithstanding the failure of the prosecutions
physical evidence to conclusively prove that the bullets, which killed the victims came from the M-16 rifle
which he fired that night. He avers that not only did the State fail to present the smoking gun, it likewise
did not present the person who allegedly subjected the supposed murder weapon to a ballistics test.
For conviction of an accused in criminal cases, it is enough that the prosecution proves beyond
reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused committed it. Production of the
weapon used in committing the crime is not a condition sine qua non for the discharge of that burden.[18] It
is not vital to the cause of the prosecution,[19] especially where other evidence is available to support
sufficiently the charges. As to the presentation of witnesses, the question of which witness to present and
when to present him is up to the prosecution, leaving the court thereafter to make the judgment call. [20] In
the instant case, the trial court depended on the other evidence to determine the guilt of the accused,
especially the eyewitness accounts of Lito Camara, Jr., and Leovilgildo Cartalla. While it is true that the trial
court characterized their testimonies as not too clear on what transpired, [21] the transcripts nonetheless
show that the vagueness refers only to minor or inconsequential details. What is vital is that both
eyewitnesses categorically declared that they saw appellant shoot at the occupants of the car and that
after appellant ran off, they saw the victims either dead or dying. It is settled that discrepancies in minor
details tend to bolster the credibility of witnesses and indicate veracity rather than prevarication, as they
erase any suspicion that the witnesses have been coached and the testimony rehearsed. [22]
We note that appellant could not say why the two eyewitnesses should falsely accuse him.Where there
is no evidence to show that the principal witnesses for the State were actuated by ill motive, their
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[23] Furthermore, eyewitness Leovilgildo Cartalla is the brother of
victim Leonides Cartalla. The natural interest of a witness, who is a relative of the victim, in securing the
conviction of the guilty would deter him from implicating a person other than the true culprit. [24]
Appellant contends treachery could not be present in the instant case simply because the victims were
shot in the back. He argues that for treachery to be appreciated, there must be a showing that the accused
intentionally and deliberately chose a mode of committing the crime which would insure that the accused
will be shielded from any harm that the victim may cause in defending himself. [25]He suggests that the
victims were regrettably caught in the crossfire between him and his pursuers.His firing back in self-
defense was not a deliberate choice to kill the victims without risk to himself.His use of an assault rifle was
not a deliberate intent on his part to employ deadly force out of proportion to the means available to the
person attacked. After all, he said, he was being shot at and his pursuers were armed also with the same
guns as he was. Hence, appellant avers that the trial court erred in finding that he took advantage of
superior strength and that he acted treacherously.
Treachery is the deliberate and unexpected attack on the victim without any warning and without
giving him an opportunity to defend himself or repel the assault. [26] The fact that the victims were shot in
the back does not per se indicate treachery. Nonetheless, undisputed is the fact that appellant fatally shot
the unarmed victims while seated inside a car, unaware of any impending tragedy, and without
opportunity to defend themselves. As the victims were totally unprepared for an unexpected and
deliberate attack from behind, with no weapon to resist it, the shooting could only be described as
treacherous.[27] The location of the gunshot wounds of the victims bolster the trial courts conclusion that
treachery qualified the fatal shooting into murder. Abuse of superior strength need not be further
shown. Treachery alone qualified the killing into murder and that absorbs the circumstance of abuse of
superior strength.[28]
Appellant assails the award of damages by the trial court because the heirs of the victim presented no
evidence to prove damages. Appellant was sentenced to pay the heirs of Leonides Cartalla P50,000.00 and
the heirs of Marissa Domingo another P50,000.00 as death indemnity. It further awarded P100,000.00 as
moral damages to said heirs of each victim. The P50,000.00 award as indemnity ex delicto is proper and
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.[29] Moral damages, however, can be awarded only upon sufficient
proof that the aggrieved parties are entitled thereto. [30] As correctly pointed out by appellant, the records
are devoid of any factual basis for such an award. We must therefore delete said award of moral damages.
Lastly, appellant questions the finding of the trial court that:
But even if this court, for the sake of argument, should subscribe to the defense story, still it will not avail
him any.
As clearly shown in Patricios testimony the whole tragedy was the product of his having returned to the
house of Cesar Putol despite the fact that earlier that same night Jimmy Lopez, with his barkadahad
warned Patricio not to visit Avelina Morales anymore and because of Patricios insisting he and Jimmy
almost came to blows.
xxx
From all the above, the story of Patricio shows that he was committing a felony--adultery and was guilty of
provocation and aggression and exchanging gunfire to kill which gave rise to the train of events that
ensured and ended in two deaths at least.

Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The spirit, if not the letter, of this
provision fits this case in relation to the defense version of the facts in issue. [31]
Appellant now contends that the trial court erred in anchoring a finding of guilt based on Article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code.
We find, however, the reference by the trial court to said provision is merely for the purpose of
showing the futility of appellants putting the blame on his alleged pursuers. The courts citation of Article 4
is merely for rhetorical effect or emphasis, which we deem a surplusage.
Appellant was convicted of two counts of murder on the positive identification by

eyewitnesses.Categorical, straightforward and positive identification carries great weight in determining
the guilt of the accused as against appellants bare denial. Denial is an inherently puerile defense and
crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters
identifying appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.[32]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 103, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-14152 and Q-90-14154 finding appellant Patricio Bagcal guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of murder, and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count, is AFFIRMED. The appellant is also ORDERED to pay P50,000.00 to the heirs of Leonides Cartalla and
another P50,000.00 to the heirs of Marissa Domingo as civil indemnity. The award of P100,000.00 to the
heirs of each of the victims as moral damages, however, is DELETED for lack of factual basis. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120547. January 29, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDISON PLAZO,[1]accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision[2] dated January 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines
Sur, Branch 30, convicting appellant of the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity, P15,712.00 as actual
damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The facts, based on the records, are as follows:
On August 8, 1989, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, Leonor Fabula went out of her house in May-anao,
Tigaon, Camarines Sur to buy sugar at a nearby store. When she reached the store, she saw appellant
boxing her son Romeo Fabula and banging his head on the post of the store, while asking him why he told
the police about his brother and the location of appellants house. When Leonor sought to intervene,
appellant got angry at her. She became afraid and asked for help but nobody went near them. Romeo
freed himself from the hold of appellant and ran away. Appellant chased Romeo with a small bolo known
locally as gatab. Leonor shouted at appellant to stop but the latter did not heed her pleas. Appellant
caught up with Romeo and stabbed him at the back causing Romeo to fall on the ground. Appellant
continued to stab Romeo in the upper and lower chest area. Leonor continued shouting for help and
eventually someone came to help. However, when she saw her son no longer moving, she told the people
not to touch or move him because she was going to the Poblacion of Tigaon to get a policeman.
When Patrolmen Virgilio Azucena and Jose Madera arrived at the scene of the crime, they saw the
fallen body of Romeo with a small bolo imbedded on his chest and the detached handle of the bolo on the
ground near his body. The policemen brought the body to the Municipal Building where the Municipal
Health Officer, Dr. Constancio Tam, conducted an autopsy.[3]
On June 10, 1991, appellant was charged with the crime of murder under the following Information: [4]
That on or about the 8th day of August, 1989 at Barangay May-Anao, Municipality of Tigaon, Province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a knife, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloneously (sic) attack, assault and stab one Romeo Fabula directing the blow on
the vital parts of his body which was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs in such amount as maybe awarded by the Court.
Acts Contrary To Law.
On arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.[5]
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Leonor Fabula, the mother of the
victim; (2) SPO1 Jose Madera and SPO4 Virgilio Azucena, both members of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, and (4) Dr. Constancio A. Tam, Municipal Health Officer of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur.
Leonor Fabula testified that she witnessed the stabbing incident and identified appellant as the
assailant of her son. She said that the police were looking for appellants brother who had a pending case
for robbery in Manila. The police asked her son where the house of appellants brother was. Her son, who
knew nothing of the case, pointed out the house to the police leading to the arrest of appellants
brother. This angered appellant who sought out and killed her son. She also testified on damages sustained
as a result of her sons death.[6]
SPO1 Jose Madera testified that he was present during the autopsy and that Dr. Tam turned over to
him the bolo which was imbedded in the body of the victim. He identified the same bolo in court.[7]
SPO4 Virgilio Azucena testified that upon the report of Leonor Fabula of the stabbing incident, he and
four others immediately went to the place of the incident in May-anao, Tigaon. They found the body of the
victim in the ricefield some 50 meters away from the road. The bolo was embedded in the victims chest
and the handle lying beside him.[8]
Dr. Constancio A. Tam testified that the victim sustained four stab wounds in the left upper abdomen,
right eliac part of the abdomen, upper part of the left chest, and upper part of the left back.The weapon
was still embedded in the upper left abdomen when he examined the body. [9] Dr. Tam testified that this
wound was fatal since it pierced the heart. He said that the stab wounds could have been caused by a
sharp-bladed, sharp-pointed instrument, locally known as gatab.[10]
The defense presented as its witnesses the appellant himself and his cousin, Alfredo Siso.Appellants
version is as follows:
In the afternoon of August 8, 1989, appellant was at a billiard hall in May-anao, Tigaon, serving as a
spotter in a game between Celso Plazo and Alfredo Siso. The victim suddenly arrived drunk, placed a ball
on top of the table, and said that he wanted to put a bet against Alfredo Siso. Insulted, Alfredo told
appellant to pacify the victim. However, the victim became angry and struck appellant with a billiard
stick. Alfredo and Celso helped pacify the victim who became even angrier, and then drew a bladed
weapon saying he would use it on appellant. Appellant ran away followed by the victim. Appellant slipped
and injured his foot and the victim caught up with him. The two grappled with the small bolo and suddenly,
the bolo was already imbedded in the chest of the victim. Appellant fled and eventually went to Manila
because of the threats of relatives of the victim.Appellants cousin, Alfredo, merely testified that after the
two protagonists ran away, he already went home.[11]
After trial, the trial court rendered its decision [12] finding appellant guilty of the crime of murder,
disposing thus
WHEREFORE, the accused Edison Plazo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
with the inherent accessories provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the late Romeo Fabula for the
latters death the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); the sum of Fifteen Thousand Seven Hundred
Twelve Pesos (P15,712.00) as actual damages; and the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral
damages, all of Philippine Currency and for the said accused to pay the costs.

The accused Edison Plazo shall be entitled to full credit of his preventive imprisonment if he agreed to
abide with the rules imposed upon convicted persons, otherwise, he shall only be entitled to four-fifth (4/5)
credit thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant assigns the sole error that -[13]
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
In his brief,[14] appellant assails the credibility of the testimony of Leonor Fabula, the victims mother,
considering that (1) contrary to her testimony, the medical findings did not indicate that the victim was
boxed nor his head banged on the store post; (2) her testimony that her son was stabbed dead on
a ditch did not jibe with the testimony of SPO4 Azucena that the body of the victim was recovered from
the ricefield; and (3) her actions after seeing her son dead and getting a policeman instead of comforting
him was contrary to normal human conduct. Further, appellant claims that his testimony that he acted in
self-defense was corroborated by the testimony of his cousin, Alfredo Siso. Lastly, appellant claims there
was no treachery because there was no proof as to how the attack began.
For the State,[15] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that appellant failed to establish the
elements of self-defense considering the number and location of the wounds of the deceased. Further, the
testimony of defense witness Alfredo Siso should not be given credence because he did not actually
witness the stabbing incident. The OSG asserts that treachery attended the killing because appellant
unleashed two separate attacks on the victim, the first consisted only of fist blows, and the second
consisted of the stabbing.
The issues for our consideration pertain to (1) the assessment of credibility of witnesses, (2) the
existence of valid self-defense, and (3) the sufficiency of the evidence to convict appellant of the crime of
murder.
Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses are
accorded great weight, even finality, on appeal, unless the trial court has failed to appreciate certain facts
and circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect the result of the case.Having had
the opportunity to personally observe the witnessess demeanor and manner of testifying, the trial judge is
in a better position to pass judgment on their credibility. [16] As observed by the trial court, Leonor Fabula
testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner. [17] A review of the records and transcript of
stenographic notes leads us to agree with that conclusion.
As to the alleged inconsistencies in Fabulas testimony, the fact that the medical findings did not
indicate that the victim was boxed nor his head banged does not negate the possibility of such acts.The
defense failed to question the medico-legal officer on the stand and it cannot now raise such factual
matter before this court. As to the location of the body of the victim, while Leonor Fabula testified that her
son was stabbed just by the ditch of the road of May-anao, [18] SPO4 Azucena testified that they found the
body in the ricefield. The records show, however, that on cross-examination, SPO4 Azucena clarified that
they found the body on the embankment of the rice-field (bas-og). [19] Hence, there is no inconsistency
between their testimonies on the matter.
The testimony of witnesses to a crime could not be expected to be error-free throughout.Different

persons have different impressions and recollections of the same incident. [20] Likewise, we find nothing
extraordinary or unusual about a mother seeking help from the authorities first before rushing to help her
son. As repeatedly stressed, there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling, or frightful experience. [21]Witnessing a crime is an unusual experience
that elicits different reactions from the witnesses, and for which no clear-cut standard form of behavior can
be drawn.[22]
Further, while it was only the mother of the victim who testified on the events leading to the stabbing
incident, we have held that the testimony of a single eyewitness is sufficient to support conviction so long
as it is clear, straightforward, and found worthy of credence by the trial court. [23]The mere fact that she is
the mother of the victim does not impair her credibility. Blood relationship between a witness and victim
does not, by itself, impair the credibility of the witness. [24] On the contrary, relationship strengthens
credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual
culprit.[25] The earnest desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not served should the witness abandon his
conscience and prudence and blame one who is innocent of the crime. [26] More importantly, Leonor Fabulas
version of the stabbing incident, that appellant repeatedly stabbed her son in the upper and lower chest
area,[27] is duly supported by the findings of the medico-legal officer that the victim sustained four stab
wounds in the chest and abdomen area.
As to appellants claim of self-defense, there is no evidence to support such assertion. Self-defense as a

justifying circumstance must satisfy the following requirements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused. [28] The burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the
killing was justified is on the accused. [29] In doing so, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of that of the prosecution.[30] Appellant herein failed to prove any of the elements of
self-defense. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the number of wounds on the body of the victim
negates self-defense.If indeed, the victim was stabbed while the two protagonists were grappling with the
small bolo, then why did the victim sustain four stab wounds? The nature, location and number of wounds
inflicted on the victim negate the claim of self-defense [31]and, instead, indicate a determined effort to kill
the victim.[32]
Further, the flight of the appellant after the incident betrays the existence of his guilty conscience.
[33]
According to his testimony, he went to Manila because his relatives and residents of their barangay
advised him to take care of himself because the relatives of the victim were running after him. [34] Appellant
himself admitted that he hid for several years. This conduct is inconsistent with his protestations of self-
defense.
While the information alleged the attendance of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation, these were not proven by the prosecutions evidence. Circumstances which qualify criminal
responsibility must in no case rest upon mere presumptions, no matter how reasonable or probable, but
must be based on facts of unquestioned existence. It is settled that circumstances which qualify killing to
murder must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself.[35]
There was no treachery because there was no proof in this case as to how the attack started. For
treachery to be present, two conditions must be shown: (1) the employment of means of execution that
give the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption
of the means of execution. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proven as fully and as convincingly
as the crime itself. The sole eyewitness testified that when she arrived at the scene, appellant was already
boxing her son.[36] Hence, she could not have possibly witnessed the inception of the attack. Any doubt as
to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused. Where no particulars are known
regarding the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the
victim began and developed, it cannot be established from mere supposition that an accused perpetrated
the killing with treachery.[37]
Likewise, the prosecution failed to prove the following requisites of evident premeditation: (1) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit clung
to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him
to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[38]
Hence, in the absence of any circumstance which would qualify the crime to murder, we find that
appellant should be found liable only for the crime of homicide.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of homicide is reclusion
temporal. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the penalty of reclusion
temporal should be imposed in its medium period. [39] Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which
is prision mayor.
The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity. However, the award of
actual damages in the amount of P15,712.00 was based solely on the bare assertions of the mother of the
victim. The Court can only grant such amount for expenses if they are supported by receipts. [40] In the
absence thereof, no actual damages can be awarded. However, in lieu of actual damages, temperate
damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered where it has been shown that the victims
family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. [41] We find the

award of P15,000.00 as temperate damages reasonable. Moral damages cannot be awarded in the
absence of any evidence to support its award. [42]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30, in
Criminal Case No. T-1009, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Edison Plazo is found guilty of the crime of
homicide, and sentenced to a minimum of eight (8) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prision
mayor medium as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity
and P15,000.00 as temperate damages, and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127957. February 21, 2001]
COLLIN A. MORRIS and THOMAS P. WHITTIER, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Tenth
Division) and SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES SYSTEM,respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Petitioners appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of petitioners complaint for damages against
respondent for breach of contract of air carriage.
On February 14, 1978, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 143 an action for
damages for breach of contract of air carriage against respondent airline because they were bumped off
from SAS Flight SK 893, Manila-Tokyo, on February 14, 1978, despite a confirmed booking in the first class
section of the flight.
Petitioners Collin A. Morris and Thomas P. Whittier were American citizens; the vice-president for
technical services and the director for quality assurance, respectively, of Sterling Asia, a foreign
corporation with regional headquarters at No. 8741 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.
Respondent Scandinavian Airline System (SAS for brevity) is and at times material hereto has been
engaged in the commercial air transport of passengers globally.
Petitioner Morris and co-petitioner Whittier had a series of business meetings with Japanese
businessmen in Japan from February 14 to February 22, 1978. They requested their travel agent, Staats
Travel Service, Inc. to book them as first class passengers in SAS Manila-Tokyo flight on February 14,
1978. Respondent booked them as first-class passengers on Flight SK 893, Manila-Tokyo flight on February
14, 1978, at 3:50 in the afternoon.
At 1:30 in the afternoon of February 14, 1978, a limousine service of the travel agency fetched
petitioner Morris at his house in Urdaneta Village, Makati City. Thereafter, they went to Merville Park,
Paraaque and fetched petitioner Whittier, arriving there at around 2:00 in the afternoon. From Paraaque,
they went to the Manila International Airport and arrived at 2:35 in the afternoon.
Upon arrival at the airport, representatives of the travel agency met petitioners. It took petitioners two
to three minutes to clear their bags at the customs section. After that, they proceeded to the SAS check-in
counter and presented their tickets, passports, immigration cards and travel documents to Ms. Erlinda
Ponce at the reception desk.
After about fifteen (15) minutes, petitioners noticed that their travel documents were not being
processed at the check-in counter. They were informed that there were no more seats on the plane for
which reason they could not be accommodated on the flight.
Petitioner Morris contacted Staats Travel Service and asked the latter to contact the management of
SAS to find out what was the problem. After ten (10) minutes, Staats Travel Service called and confirmed
their booking. Thereafter, petitioners Morris and Whittier returned to respondents check-in counter
anticipating that they would be allowed to check-in. However, the check-in counter was closed. When they
informed Ms. Ponce, in-charge at the check-in counter that arrangements had been made with respondents
office, she ignored them. Even respondents supervisor, Raul Basa, ignored them and refused to answer
their question why they could not be accommodated in the flight despite their confirmed booking.
When petitioners went to the supervisors desk to check the flight manifest, they saw that their names
on top of the list of the first class section had been crossed out. They pressed the supervisor to allow them
in the flight as they had confirmed tickets. Mr. Basa informed them that it could not be done because the
flight was closed and it was too late to do anything. They checked in at exactly 3:10 in the afternoon and
the flight was scheduled to leave Manila International Airport at 3:50 in the afternoon. [2]
Petitioner Morris said that they were advised to be at the airport at least an hour before departure
time. This has been respondents policy in petitioners previous travels abroad. [3]
Ms. Erlinda Ponce, SAS employee on duty at the check-in counter on February 14, 1978 testified that
the economy class of SAS Flight SK 893 was overbooked; however, the first class section was open. She
met petitioners, who were booked in the first class section, when they approached the counter to check-
in. They were not accommodated on the flight because they checked-in after the flight manifest had been
closed, forty (40) minutes prior to the planes departure.Petitioners seats were given to economy class
passengers who were upgraded to first class.[4]
Upon cross-examination, Ms. Ponce said that petitioners might have arrived at the airport earlier than
3:10 in the afternoon when the flight manifest was closed; she was sure that they arrived at the check-in
counter at past 3:10 in the afternoon. The first class seats of petitioners were given to upgraded economy
class passengers three (3) minutes before the flight manifest was closed. [5]
Raul Cruz Basa, a supervisor of respondent airline company, testified that SAS Flight SK 893 on
February 14, 1978 was overbooked in the economy class. Petitioner Morris and Whittier were among the
names listed in the first class section of the flight manifest. However, their names were crossed out and
the symbols NOSH, meaning NO SHOW, written after their names. The NO SHOW notation could mean
either that the booked passengers or his travel documents were not at the counter at the time of the
closing of the flight manifest.
Mr. Basa said that he talked to petitioners at about 3:20 in the afternoon after receiving a radio call
from the ground staff at the check-in counter about complaints from passengers.
He learned from Ms. Ponce that petitioners checked in late after the flight manifest had been closed,
after which time waitlisted passengers from the economy class had been upgraded. He explained to
petitioners that they could not be accommodated on the plane because the seats were all filled up. He
admitted that there were about six (6) passengers in the counter who were refused boarding because
waitlisted passengers had been accepted. Most of those who were refused boarding came in late.[6]
Alice Magtulac, another witness of the respondent, testified that she was supervisor of ticketing and
reservation section. She said that petitioners Morris and Whittier had confirmed reservation tickets to the
first class section of SAS Flight SK 893, Manila-Tokyo flight, on February 14, 1978.She confirmed that Ms.
Thelma Lorraine Sayer was one of the economy class passengers who was not able to leave because the
flight was overbooked on the economy class.
Ms. Magtulac said that it was not SAS policy to upgrade economy passengers to first class if
passengers booked for first class did not show up.[7]
On August 24, 1988, the trial court rendered a judgment against respondent and in favor ofpetitioners
Morris and Whittier. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and
against defendant, ordering the latter to pay the former the following:
1) Moral damages to plaintiff Collin A. Morris in the amount of P1,000,000.00 and to plaintiff Thomas P.
Whittier the sum of P750,000.00;
2) Exemplary damages in the sum of P200,00.00;

3) Attorneys fees in the amount of P300,000.00, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Makati, Metro Manila, August 24, 1988.
[ORIGINAL SIGNED]
TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR.
J u d g e[8]
On October 5, 1988, respondent filed a notice of appeal. [9]
Meanwhile, on October 6, 1988, petitioners Morris and Whittier moved for reconsideration of the
decision as regards the award of damages.
On November 2, 1988, respondent opposed the motion for reconsideration. [10]
On February 26, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting petitioners motion for reconsideration,
the decretal portion of which is quoted herein, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the Motion for Reconsideration.The
dispositive portion of the Decision is hereby amended with respect to the amount of moral damages,
ordering the defendant to pay moral damages to Collin Morris in the amount of P1,500,000.00 and to
Thomas Whittier the amount of P1,000,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Makati, Metro Manila, February 26, 1992.
[ORIGINAL SIGNED]
TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR.
J u d g e[11]
Respondents appeal rested mainly on the ground that the trial court misappreciated the facts and
evidence adduced during the trial. The thrust of its defense was petitioners lack of cause of action,
considering that they checked-in at the SAS counter at the Manila International Airport after theflight
manifest was closed and after their first class seats were given to waitlisted economy class passengers. [12]
On January 21, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reversing the decision of the
court a quo, and ordering the dismissal of the complaint for damages. The dispositive portion of the
decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one rendered
dismissing plaintiffs-appellees complaint.
SO ORDERED.[13]
In reversing the trial courts decision, the Court of Appeals found petitioners statements self-
serving. Petitioners failed to prove that they checked-in on time. The appellate court lent credence to
respondents claim that petitioners were denied boarding on SAS Flight SK 893 because of their late arrival
for check-in at the international airport. Respondents employee, Ms. Erlinda Ponce, testified that
petitioners checked in after the flight manifest was closed.
Hence, this petition.[14]
Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing their complaint for damages
and in finding their testimonies self-serving. They contend that the trial court did not act arbitrarily in
lending credence to their testimonies and finding their evidence sufficient to
warrantthe award of damages against respondent. In sum, they claim to be entitled to the award for
damages because, as found by the trial court, they were wrongfully and in bad faith, bumped-off from SAS
Flight SK 893 on February 14, 1978, despite their timely arrival at the airport for check-in and confirmed
bookings as first class passengers.[15]
The petition has no merit.
To begin with, it must be emphasized that a contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind
and degree from any other contractual relations, and this is because of the relation, which an air carrier
sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail
[themselves] of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a
relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carriers employees naturally could give
ground for an action for damages.[16]
In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton and
deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith.[17]Where in
breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad
faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of obligation
which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In that case, such liability does not
include moral and exemplary damages.[18] Moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa
contractual except when bad faith had been proven. However, the same damages may be recovered when
breach of contract of carriage results in the death of a passenger. [19]
The award of exemplary damages has likewise no factual basis. It is a requisite that the act must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner--circumstances which are
absent in this case. In addition, exemplary damages cannot be awarded as the requisite element of
compensatory damages was not present."[20]
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that breach of contract of carriage may be attributed to
respondent, petitioners travails were directly traceable to their failure to check-in on time, which led to
respondents refusal to accommodate them on the flight.
The rule is that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract
of carriage only where (a) the mishap results in the death of a passenger and (b) it is proved that the
carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith even if death does not result. [21]
For having arrived at the airport after the closure of the flight manifest, respondents employee could
not be faulted for not entertaining petitioners tickets and travel documents for processing, as the checking
in of passengers for SAS Flight SK 893 was finished. There was no fraud or bad faith as would justify the
courts award of moral damages.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, it imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or
interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.[22]
In the instant case, respondents denial of petitioners boarding on SAS Flight SK 893 was not attended
by bad faith or malice.
To the contrary, facts revealed that they were not allowed to board the plane due to their failure to
check-in on time. Petitioner Morris admitted that they were at the check-in counter at around 3:10, exactly
the same time that the flight manifest was closed, but still too late to be accommodated on the
plane. Respondents supervisor, Raul C. Basa, testified that he met petitioners at about 3:20 in the
afternoon after receiving a radio call from the ground staff regarding petitioners complaints.Clearly,
petitioners did not arrive on time for check-in.
As we find petitioners not entitled to moral damages, an award of exemplary damages is likewise
baseless.[23] Where the award of moral and exemplary damages is eliminated, so must the award for
attorneys fees be deleted.[24]
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for lack of merit. The Court AFFIRMS in totothe decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV. No. 38684.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120859. June 26, 2001]
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs.FRANCISCO Y. WONG, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
It is bad enough that the mortgagor has no choice but to yield his property in a foreclosure
proceeding. It is infinitely worse, if prior thereto, he was denied of his basic right to be informed of the
impending loss of his property. This is another instance when law and morals echo the same sentiment.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal and setting aside of the decision dated
June 13, 1994 and resolution dated June 14, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 35615 entitled
Francisco Y. Wong versus Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. [1]
The essential antecedents are:
Sometime in 1976, the Mindanao Grains, Inc. (MGI for brevity), through its officers Wenceslao
Buenaventura and Faustino Go, applied for a credit accommodation with the Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company (herein petitioner) to finance its rice and corn warehousing business. As a security for such credit
accommodation, respondent Francisco Y. Wong, and his wife Betty C. Wong executed in favor of petitioner
a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land consisting of 31, 292 square meters located at Campo 7,
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur and registered in respondents name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 11758.
On April 11, 1980, due to MGIs failure to pay the obligation secured by the real estate mortgage,
petitioner filed an application for extra-judicial foreclosure under Act No. 3135. A notice of foreclosure sale
was published in Pagadian Times once, for three consecutive weeks (May 18-25, 1980, May 26-June 2,
1980 and June 2-8, 1980), setting the auction sale of the mortgaged property on June 5, 1980. No notice
was posted in the municipality or city where the mortgaged property was situated.
As a consequence, MGI, through its president, Simeon Chang (Chang), requested petitioner to
postpone the scheduled auction sale from June 5, 1980 to July 7, 1980. Petitioner granted the
request. Thereafter, Chang and petitioner agreed that should MGI pay P20,000.00 on or before the
scheduled auction sale, the same would be postponed for a period of 60 days. Chang paid the amount on
November 3, 1981. Despite such payment, Sheriff Deo Bontia proceeded with the auction sale on
November 23, 1981. Petitioner was adjudged the sole and highest bidder. Thus, a certificate of sale was
issued to petitioner. The sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds on the same day. After the
expiration of the one (1) year redemption period, ownership over the property was consolidated and TCT
No. T-17853 was correspondingly issued in the name of petitioner.
Respondent, unaware of the foregoing developments, applied for a credit accommodation with the
Producers Bank of the Philippines, Iloilo City, using as security his TCT No. 11758. It was only then when he
learned that his property was already foreclosed by petitioner and no longer in his name.
Feeling aggrieved, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Pagadian City a complaint
for reconveyance and damages against petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del
Sur. Respondent, in his complaint, assailed the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale basically on the
ground that petitioner did not comply with the requirements of Section 3, Act No. 3135 that notice shall be
given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the
municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred
pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the municipality and city.
During the pendency of the case, petitioner sold the disputed property to a certain Betty Ong Yu.
After hearing, the trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendant
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company to pay plaintiff the following amounts:
1. Ten Million, Five Hundred Thousand (P10,500,000.00) Pesos representing the fair market value
of the property as of the promulgation of this decision, with interest of twenty four (24%)
percent per annum thereof until fully paid;
2. Moral damages of Two million (P2,000,000.00) Pesos;
3. Exemplary damages of Ten million (P10,000,000.00) Pesos;
4. Attorneys fee of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos, plus Five Hundred (P500.00)
Pesos for every hearing or court proceeding actually attended by plaintiffs counsel; and
5. Costs of suit.
No monetary judgment can be rendered against defendant Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur in
view of the absence of monetary claim in the complaint.
Defendant banks counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision with modification in the sense
that the monetary awards were reduced, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED, directing the appellant to pay appellees
the following amounts:
1. Four Million (P4,000,000.00) Pesos representing the fair market value of the subject property;
2. Moral damages of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos;
3. Exemplary damages of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos;
4. Attorney's fees of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos, plus Five Hundred (P500.00)
Pesos for every hearing or court proceeding actually attended by plaintiff's counsel; and
5. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
Twice thwarted, petitioner now comes before us imputing the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FORECLOSURE SALE
CONDUCTED ON NOVEMBER 23, 1981 WAS LEGALLY INFIRM FOR NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF POSTING AND PUBLICATION AS PROVIDED FOR IN ACT 3135, AS
AMENDED.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES
TO RESPONDENT WONG.
Petitioner places excessive reliance on the case of Olizon v. Court of Appeals[3] in justifying its
claims: (a) that its failure to comply with the posting requirement under Section 3 of Act No, 3135 did not
necessarily result in the nullification of the foreclosure sale since it complied with

the publicationrequirement; and (b) that personal notice of the foreclosure proceedings to respondent is
not a condition sine qua non for its validity. In assailing the monetary awards to respondent, petitioner
claims it was not guilty of bad faith in selling the disputed property to Betty Ong Yu, the sale having been
perfected even before respondent filed his action for reconveyance and damages with the trial court.
For its part, respondent argues that the unusual nature of the attendant facts and the peculiarity of
the confluent circumstances involved in Olizon are not present in the instant case.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Succinct and unmistakable is the consistent pronouncement of this Court that it is not a trier of
facts. And well-entrenched is the doctrine that pure questions of fact may not be the subject of appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as this mode of appeal is generally confined
to questions of law. Corollarily, non-compliance with the requirements of notice and publication in an extra-
judicial foreclosure is a factual issue. The resolution thereof by the lower courts is binding and conclusive
upon this Court.[4] Thus, disregarding all factual issues which petitioner interjected in his petition, the only
crucial legal queries in this case are: first, is personal notice to respondent a condition sine qua non to
the validity of the foreclosure proceedings? and,second, is petitioners non-compliance with the posting
requirement under Section 3, Act No. 3135 fatal to the validity of the foreclosure proceedings?
In resolving the first query, we resort to the fundamental principle that a contract is the law between
the parties and, that absent any showing that its provisions are wholly or in part contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy, it shall be enforced to the letter by the courts. Section 3, Act
No. 3135 reads:
Se. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three
public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more
than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality and city.
The Act only requires (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public places, and (2) the publication
of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. Personal notice to the mortgagor is not
necessary. Nevertheless, the parties to the mortgage contract are not precluded from exacting additional
requirements.[5] In this case, petitioner and respondent in entering into a contract of real estate mortgage,
agreed inter alia:
all correspondence relative to this mortgage, including demand letters, summonses, subpoenas, or
notifications of any judicial or extra-judicial action shall be sent to the MORTGAGOR at 40-42 Aldeguer St.
Iloilo City, or at the address that may hereafter be given in writing by the MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE.
Precisely, the purpose of the foregoing stipulation is to apprise respondent of any action which
petitioner might take on the subject property, thus according him the opportunity to safeguard his
rights. When petitioner failed to send the notice of foreclosure sale to respondent, he committed a
contractual breach sufficient to render the foreclosure sale on November 23, 1981 null and void.
The second query must be answered in the affirmative. An incisive scrutiny of Olizon shows that this
Court has not actually dispensed with the posting requirement under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, thus:
Neither can the supposed failure of respondent bank to comply with the posting requirement as provided
under the aforesaid Section 3, under the factual ambiance and circumstances which obtained in this case,
be considered a sufficient ground for annulling the aforementioned sale. We are not unaware of the rulings
in some cases that, under normal situations, the statutory provisions governing publication of notice of
extra-judicial foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with and that failure to publish the notice of
auction sale as required by the statute constitutes a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the
sale. However, the unusual nature of the attendant facts and the peculiarity of the confluent circumstances
involved in this case require that we rule otherwise.
Petitioners' cited authority on the requisite publication of notices is not so all-embracing as to deny
justified exceptions thereto under appropriate situations. x x x
xxx

Furthermore, unlike the situation in previous cases where the foreclosure sales were annulled by reason of
failure to comply with the notice requirement under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended, what is
allegedly lacking here is the posting of the notice in three public places, and not the publication thereof in
a newspaper of general circulation.
We take judicial notice of the fact that newspaper publications have more far-reaching effects than posting
on bulletin boards in public places. There is a greater probability that an announcement or notice published
in a newspaper of general circulation, which is distributed nationwide, shall have a readership of more
people than that posted in a public bulletin board, no matter how strategic its location may be, which
caters only to a limited few. Hence, the publication of the notice of sale in the newspaper of general
circulation alone is more than sufficient compliance with the notice-posting requirement of the law. By such
publication, a reasonably wide publicity had been effected such that those interested might attend the
public sale, and the purpose of the law had been thereby subserved.(Underlining added)
Obviously, as correctly pointed out by respondent, what prompted the Court to dispense with the
posting requirement is the unusual nature of the attendant facts and the peculiarity of the confluent
circumstances involved in Olizon. It bears stressing that in the said case, the extra-judicial foreclosure sale
sought to be annulled was conducted more than 15 years ago, thus, even on the equitable ground of
laches, the Olizons action for annulment of foreclosure proceedings and certificate of sale was bound to
fail.
Unlike in Olizon where there was a valid publication of the notice of foreclosure sale, the publication in
the case at bar was defective. Not only did it fail to conform with the requirement that the notice must be
published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, but also,
there were substantial errors in the notice of sale published in thePagadian Times as found by the
scrutinizing eyes of the trial court, thus:
As maybe noted, the published notice bespeaks of a Deed of Mortgage allegedly executed by Mindanao
Grains, Inc., signed by Faustino Go, Francisco Y. Wong, Wensceslao Buenaventura and Betty C. Wong on
May 9, 1978 in favor of defendant bank. The evidence, however showed that plaintiff never executed a
Real Estate Mortgage (REM) on May 9, 1978. Neither plaintiff had executed any REM whereby his co-
mortgagors are MGI, Faustino Go, Wensceslao Buenaventura and his wife Betty C. Wong. What plaintiff had
actually executed were two REMS dated January 18, 1977 and March 23, 1977 respectively. In other words
the REM adverted to in the published notice is a non-existent document, for there was no REM of the
property in question actually executed and dated May 9, 1978.
The contention of defendant bank that the erroneous date of the REM as published in the Pagadian Times
was merely a clerical error would not cure the fatal defect and invalidity of that published notice. No
further evidence was shown that the glaring error was corrected in the subsequent notice of
publication. The court is in accord with the argument of the plaintiff that the order in the date of the REM
published in the Pagadian Times is not a harmless error. It did not give proper notice to the public the
correct nature of the REM which cover the properties being sold at public auction.Considering the sizable
amount of the properties being sold, over half a million pesos, a very big amount to businessmen based in
the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, nobody would dare to buy such properties without first carefully
scrutinizing the pertinent documents, foremost of which is the REM allegedly violated by the plaintiff-
mortgagor which gave rise to the foreclosure proceedings.Simply stated, serious prospective bidders just
backed off upon knowing the non-existence of that REM published in the Pagadian Times. For who would
participate in the auction sale of the properties covered by REMS which are non-existing? It is not
surprising, therefore, to note that the defendant bank was the winning bidder, for the reason that it was
the lone bidder.
And lastly, not to be glossed over is the fact that there was no evidence in Olizon insinuating bad faith
or collusion among the Sheriff who conducted the sale, the Register of Deeds and the bank. In the present
case, collusion is evident in the precipitate manner the foreclosure sale was conducted by Sheriff Bontia as
well as in the sale made by petitioner to Betty Ong Yu during the pendency of the case.
To stress that Olizon is an exception rather than the rule, this Court in the same case held:
x x x We are not unaware of the rulings in same cases that, under normal situations, the statutory
provisions governing publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with
and that failure to publish the notice of auction sale as required by the statute constitutes a jurisdictional

defect which invalidates the sale. However, the unusual nature of the attendant facts and the peculiarity of
the confluent circumstances involved in this case require that we rule otherwise.
While the law recognizes the right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagors failure to
pay his obligation, it is imperative that such right be exercised according to its clear mandate. Each and
every requirement of the law must be complied with, lest, the valid exercise of the right would end. It must
be remembered that the exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is
abused especially to the prejudice of others.[6]
Anent the award of moral damages, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner
acted in bad faith in extra-judicially foreclosing the real estate mortgage and in selling the mortgaged
property during the pendency of the case in the trial court. To be sure, petitioner banks bad faith caused
serious anxiety, mental anguish and wounded feelings to its client, respondent herein. He is thus entitled
to moral damages.
The Court of Appeals made a commendable ratiocination on the fact that petitioner acted in bad faith,
thus:
There is no dispute that during the pendency of the reconveyance case, appellant sold the subject
property to one Betty Yu. In this regard, the trial courts observation is worth mentioning:
Conversely,defendant banks most eloquent manifestation of bad faith, deception, and fraud is its sale of
the mortgaged property subject of the reconveyance action while this case was already under trial.That
sale was without leave of court nor the knowledge of the plaintiff. At the stage of the court proceedings
when the defendants were in the process of presenting their evidence, defendant bank sold the property in
litigation to Betty Yu of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur on August 8, 1984 (Exhibits FF, FF-1,FF-2 & FF-
3). Accordingly, the title of defendant bank was cancelled and a new title, TCT No. T-19,350, was issued in
the name of Betty Ong Yu (Exhibits HH & HH-1). The transfer of ownership over the mortgaged property to
the third person (Betty Ong Yu) who is not a party in this case rendered moot and academic the
reconveyance aspect of this case, clearly to the prejudice of the plaintiff.
Appellants contention that there was no need for them to secure leave of court for the sale of the property
because there was no notice of lis pendens annotated in the title of appellant nor was there a restraining
order issued by the court enjoining them from conveying or transferring the property deserves scant
consideration.
A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in
litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over the said property does so at his own
risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property (People vs. Regional Trial Court of
Manila, 178 SCRA 299). The absence of a notice of lis pendens on the title of the appellant will not save the
day for the appellant. The latter and the Register of Deeds are being sued with regard to the property. x x
x.
Note too that no less than the deputy Register of Deeds Ramon Balinton refused to register the property
subject matter of the controversy because of the pending case as evidenced by the letter addressed to the
Register of Deeds. Even when directed by the Register of Deeds Pedro Jamero, he made a handwritten
annotation in the document which reads: Register per instruction of the Acting register of deeds this
31st day of August 1984. The manner by which appellant deprived appellee of his property through
irregular foreclosure proceedings and its well-orchestrated scheme to frustrate reconveyance of the
property by selling the same to a third person during the pendency of the case entitles appellee to moral
damages.
But while the amount of moral damages is a matter left largely to the sound discretion of the trial
court, the same when found excessive, should be reduced to more reasonable amounts considering the
attendant facts and circumstances. Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the
category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a
defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements
that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings he has undergone by reason of the defendants culpable
action. The award of moral damages must be proportionate to the sufferings inflicted. [7] Taking into
consideration the attending circumstances here, we are convinced that the amount awarded by the Court
of Appeals is exorbitant. Likewise, we find the exemplary damages and attorneys fees quite excessive.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that the awards of moral damages be reduced to P100,000.00 and
the exemplary damages to P50,000.00. The award of attorneys fees is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132159. January 18, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CESAR GIVERA y GAROTE, accused-

appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City finding
accused-appellant Cesar Givera y Garote guilty of murder of Eusebio Gardon y Arrivas and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs of the suit.
The information in this case, dated April 10, 1995, charged as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of May, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused [CESAR GIVERA],
conspiring together, confederating with EPEFANIO GAYON y GERALDE [2] and ARTURO GAYON y GERALDE,
and mutually helping one another who were charged with the same offense at the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104, and docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-93-44315, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength, with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon the person of EUSEBIO
GARDON y ARRIVAS, by then and there stabbing him with a knife hitting him on the different parts of his
body, and striking him with a piece of stone on the head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of EUSEBIO GARDON y ARRIVAS.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on April 10, 1996, whereupon he was
tried.
Accused-appellants companions, namely Epifanio Gayon, Arturo Gayon, and Maximo Givera, were
separately prosecuted and found guilty of murder by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, Quezon City in a
decision, dated June 6, 1994, in Crim. Case No. Q-93-44315. The three were sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased the sum of P100,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs of the suit. On appeal to this Court, the decision of the trial court was affirmed with modification. The
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED. We instead find accused-appellants EPIFANIO
GAYON, ARTURO GAYON and MAXIMO GIVERA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER committed with
grave abuse of superior strength and imposes upon each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
the accessory penalties provided by law, and ordering them to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Eusebio Gardon in the amount of P100,000.00. Costs against accused-appellants. [4]
For the prosecution, the victims daughter Milagros Gardon and his niece Melinda Delfin were presented
as witnesses. On the other hand, only accused-appellant testified in his defense.
The incident took place at about 4 p.m. on May 2, 1993 at Purok IV, Area 5, Laura St., Old Balara, in
Diliman, Quezon City.
Milagros Gardon testified on direct examination:[5]
Q: Particularly about 4:00 p.m., were you at your residence at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what were you doing there at that time?
A: I was in the house because I was watching my father, sir.
Q: What was your father doing at that time?
A: I let him go to sleep because he was a little bit drunk, and I was watching him so that he will not go
outside.
Q: Why do you say you were watching him so that he would not anymore go out?
A: Because he was warned by [accused-appellant Cesar Givera] that if he goes outside, he will kill my
father.
Q: At that time and place while you were watching your father, what else happened if any?
....
A: [O]ur house was being stoned.
Q: Who was stoning your house? Could you tell us who was throwing stones to your house?
....
COURT:
She mentioned that because her father was not coming out of the house, the accused started stoning
the house.
Q: Who was stoning your house?
A: Cesar Givera, sir.
Q: Was he alone at that time?
A: They were in a group, sir, but he was the only one stoning the house. And the other one, who was
already arrested, by the name of Onying went inside the house.
Q: You said a while ago that there was somebody with Cesar who went to your house, could you recall
that somebody?
A: Onying [Epifanio Gayon], sir.
Q: You said he was already nakakulong?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, what happened after this person Cesar and the other one Onying went inside the house?
A: Onying asked my father to go out of the house while Cesar was stoning the house. Onying led my
father out of the house, and when they were already outside, Cesar was waiting for them. Then
Cesar scampered away and my father followed him. Cesar caused my father to run after him until
they reached the place where there was another person, and that person stabbed my father.
Q: So how many persons in all have you seen?
A: They were four in all, sir.
....
Q: What did these 4 persons do when her father was with them if any?
....
A: Cesar was stoning the house. Then Onying got my father from the house. Turing [Arturo Gayon] told
the other one to stab my father while the one who stabbed my father was waiting under the bridge.
....
Q: What happened to your father after you said he was stabbed or mauled?
A: After he was stabbed, the person who stabbed him ran away, sir.
On cross-examination, Milagros Gardon said:[6]
Q: Who else were with you at that time?
A: My brother and sister, sir.
Q: They were Laura Gardon and Leonardo Gardon, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your father inside the house because he was already resting after having been from a drinking
spree, correct?
A: Yes, sir.

....
Q: And you were watching TV at that time, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then suddenly you heard stones being thrown on the roof of your house, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
....
Q: This Onying [Epifanio Gayon] suddenly entered your house, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: He was alone when he entered your house, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did he effect his entrance in your house?
A: He went inside directly, sir.
....
Q: At that time were you in a position so as to see him actually effect his entrance through the front
door?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why? Where were you at that time?
A: I was in the sala, sir.
Q: You were in the sala right next to your father, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And likewise with your two other companions Laura and Leonardo, they were situated right near to
your father, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
....
Q: Now, when this Onying entered the house, did he call out the name of your father if you can
remember?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your father, did he give any response thereto?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was his response if any?
A: He asked Onying if he need anything. And Onying asked him to go out with him.
....
Q: And your father stood up and joined Onying in going out of the house?
A: Yes, sir.
....
Q: Then you together with your two other companions got back to watching the television show is that
correct?
A: No, sir.
Q: But you stayed inside the house, you and your two other companions?
A: No, sir.
Q: Now, thereafter you heard stones thrown again towards your house, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But just the same, you did not peep out through any opening of your house for safety?
A: We were already outside when they were stoning the house. We followed him outside.
....
Q: Was Onying also hit by any of those stones?

A: No, sir. Only my father and my sister.
Q: What is the name of that sister of yours who was also hit?
A: Laura Gardon, sir.
....
Q: And where was Laura hit?
A: At her left shoulder, sir.
Q: And how many stones if you know hit Laura?
A: Only one, sir, because while they were stoning they were running away.
Q: Who were these people running away?
A: Onying and Cesar, sir.
Q: Are you saying that Onying also stoned your father?
A: No, sir.
Q: Because he was right next by your father at that time, that is why he was not at all stoning your
father, correct?
A: He was boxing him.
....
Q: You saw Cesar Givera actually stoning towards the direction of your father, is that what you mean?
A: Yes, sir.
....
Q: And your father followed Cesar Givera, is that what you mean?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Likewise, with Onying, he followed Cesar Givera?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And they ran quite a distance, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then you lost sight of them yes or no?
A: No, sir.
Q: But you stayed in the house, correct?
A: No, sir. I was outside the house. When the incident happened, I was already outside the house.
Q: But because you did not state that you also followed your father as he ran after Cesar, does that
mean that you just stayed in front of your house?
A: We stopped because we already saw the place where my father was stabbed, that is why we did not
follow them.
Q: How far did they get, using as reference the front door of your house? How far did they get as they
ran away?
A: About fifteen meters away, sir.
Q: Did they not turn corners?
A: It is straight, sir. They only made a turn after the stabbing incident, sir.
Q: They turned a corner after your father was stabbed?
A: Yes, sir, because they ran away, sir.
Q: Only one of the accused stabbed your father, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And who was this?
A: Bingo Givera [Maximo Givera], sir.
Q: Did you actually see him stab your father?
A: Yes, sir.

On re-direct examination, Milagros said:[7]
Q: Madam witness, you said a while ago that you saw while your father was stabbed, and the name of
that person is Onying who stabbed your father?
A: Maximo Givera, sir.
....
Q: Now, when you saw Maximo Givera stab your father, where was Cesar at that time?
....
A: He was also at the same place, sir.
Q: And the other 3 accused Arturo Gayon and Efipanio Gayon, could you tell us where they were when
Maximo was stabbing your father?
A: They were also at that place, sir.
Melinda Delfin, niece of the victim, corroborated the testimony of Milagros Gardon. She said:[8]
Q: At about 4:00 p.m. of May 4, 1993, could you tell us where you were at that time?
A: Yes, sir, I was about to reach the house of Eusebio Gardon.
Q: What was your purpose in going there?
A: Eusebio Gardon called me up because he has just come from Bicol and he will give me rice.
Q: You said you were about to arrive at the residence of Eusebio Gardon at 4:00 p.m. on May 4, 1993,
what did you notice or observe when you were about to arrived at that place of his residence?
A: I saw Onying [Epifanio Gayon] with his hand on the shoulder of Eusebio Gardon going out of their
yard.
(Nakita ko si Onying akbay akbay si Eusebio Gardon palabas sa bakuran nila.)
....
Q: What else did you notice?
A: When I came out of the gate I saw Cesar Givera boxed Eusebio Gardon.
(Paglabas ko ng bakuran nakita ko si Cesar na sinalubong ng suntok si Eusebio Gardon.)
....
Q: What else did you see aside from the fact that you saw Cesar Givera boxing Eusebio Gardon?
A: Cesar boxed him and also Onying boxed him, they both helped each other in boxing Eusebio Gardon,
and then they back to the house of Eusebio Gardon and my uncle followed them. Not quite far,
Bingo [Maximo Givera] and Turing [Arturo Gayon] were there.
....
Q: And what happened when you said this Bingo was there?
A: Onying and Cesar gave fistic blows to Eusebio Gardon and he was also stabbed by Bingo, and they
were also kicking Eusebio Gardon.
Q: Eusebio Gardon was boxed by Onying and Cesar Givera?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And stabbed by?
A: Bingo, sir.
Q: Actually, how many persons were there when [Eusebio] Gardon was stabbed and being boxed?
A: I saw four of them, sir.
Q: Would you made these four (4)?
A: Turing, Bingo, Cesar and Onying.
....
Q: And what happened to Eusebio Gardon, whom you said was boxed, mauled and then stabbed?
A: He was lying down under the bridge for about thirty (30) minutes, and then his children arrived.
....
Q: You said earlier that you saw Cesar Givera and Epifanio Givera threw stones towards the victims
house, is that true?
PROSECUTOR CONCHA:
Excuse me, Your Honor, the witness said she saw that fellow by the name of Onying and Cesar boxing - -
?
WITNESS:
Suntok, bato at sipa.
ATTY. MASCALAS:
Q: Where did you see them doing these acts on Eusebio?
A: Outside the premises, sir.
Q: Whose premises?
A: The premises of Eusebio Gardon, sir.
Q: Did you not say earlier that Onying came out with Eusebio Gardon from the latters house?
A: I saw Onying, akbay-akbay niya..
Q: You even saw Onying embracing Eusebio Gardon, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
....
Q: Were there stones being hurled to Onying and Eusebio?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you see who were throwing those stones?
A: It was Cesar, sir.
....
Q: Did you see if Gardon was hit by any of these stones?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you also saw Onying hit by stones, correct?
A: No, sir.
....
Q: Who boxed your uncle?
A: Cesar, sir.
Q: Are you saying that Cesar while throwing stones to your uncle was so close to him that he was able
to box him?
A: Because they were advancing towards my uncle and Onying. They were going towards them.
....
Q: And when they were able to come near, how near did Cesar get to your uncle?
A: Maybe three to four meters, sir.
Q: That was when Cesar boxed your uncle?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: When did Cesar box your uncle?
A: When they come near to my uncle.
....
Q: And then Cesar Givera ran away and your uncle gave chase?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And upon reaching the bridge which is about fifteen (15) meters away from the victims house, you
saw Bingo stabbed your uncle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There were only -- You said that there were only four (4) persons in that place where your uncle was
stabbed and those persons do not include Milagros Gardon?
A: No, sir.

Q: Because Milagros Gardon was still in their house?
A: She was already outside their house.
Q: She was outside their house -- although outside their house she was still inside the premises of their
lot?
A: She was still inside, but she saw the incident.
Q: And that premises of the victim was about 15 meters away from the bridge where the alleged
incident took place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were you also with Milagros Gardon at the time that stabbing was done?
A: We were not together but I was approaching their house.
....
Q: So you were also about 15 meters away from the bridge where the alleged incident took place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that is your distance when you were claiming that you saw this incident?
A: It was just a little less.
(Makalampas lang ng konti).
....
Q: It was Turing Gayon [Arturo Gayon] whom you heard shout: Sige, todasin na yan!
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it was Bingo [Maximo Givera] whom you saw stabbed your uncle?
A: Yes, sir.
....
Q: You said that it was Bingo who stabbed the victim Eusebio Gardon. You said that you saw it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was Cesar Givera doing when the victim was stabbed by Bingo?
A: They were kicking and boxing my uncle.
Q: Givera was doing that? I was asking you about Cesar Givera?
A: He was boxing and kicking my uncle.
Q: Who, Eusebio Gardon, the victim?
A: Yes, sir.
To prove the fact and cause of death of Eusebio Gardon, the prosecution presented in evidence the
testimony[9] of medico-legal officer, P/Maj. Florante Baltazar, given in Criminal Case No. Q-93-44315. The
testimony shows that the victim sustained one fatal stab wound possibly caused by a single bladed
weapon.[10] In addition, he sustained abrasions in his lower chin, possibly hitting a rough surface, as well as
an incised wound caused by a bladed weapon, on his posterior middle left arm. [11] The stab wound appears
to be fatal because it pierced the pericardium and left ventricle of the heart, which could be the immediate
effect of hemorrhage, shock and eventual death of the victim. [12] A death certificate[13] evidencing the
death of the victim was presented by the prosecution.
Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He was a resident of Laura St., Old Balara, Quezon City at the
time of the incident. He denied any involvement in the killing of the victim who was his relative by affinity.
[14]
Accused-appellant claimed that at the time of the incident on May 2, 1993, at around 4:00 p.m., he
was having a drink in his cousins house, some 30 meters away from the victims house. On the other hand,
Maximo Givera and Arturo Gayon were in the victims house also having drinks.Accused-appellant said he
was fetched by his cousin, Recto Gardon, because Maximo and the victim Eusebio Gardon were having an
altercation. He went to pacify the protagonists and then led the victim to his house. Without his
knowledge, however, Eusebio went back and again engagedMaximo in a fist fight, as a result of which the
victim Eusebio was knocked down. Accused-appellant said he was going to help the victim get up, but he
saw the victims son, Ronilo Gardon, coming with a bolo. He, therefore, ran away and left the victim
behind. He added, that he did not see if his three companions did anything more than box the victim.
[15]
Accused-appellant said he learned that the victim had died only two days after the incident. [16]

Accused-appellant was arrested on May 4, 1996 at the East Avenue Medical Center. He stated that the
children of the victim implicated him in the killing of Eusebio Gardon only because he was present when
the incident happened.[17]
On August 29, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding accused-appellant guilty of
murder. The dispositive portion of its decision reads: [18]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Cesar Givera guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder as charged.
The accused is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants sole assignment of error is that-
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT, THE COURT A QUO HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
The appeal has no merit.

First. The prosecution presented evidence which shows beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellant and his companions (Epifanio Gayon, Arturo Gayon, and Maximo Givera), all of whom were
convicted of murder in another case, were responsible for the killing of Eusebio Gardon on May 2,
1993. Milagros Gardons testimony, an excerpt from which is quoted at the beginning of this opinion, is
spontaneous, detailed, and consistent. The defense tried to discredit through cross examination, but, as
shown earlier, the defense only succeeded in enabling her to give further details of her testimony in
chief. There are apparent lapses in the testimony of Milagros, as when she testified that she knew at the
very beginning that it was accused-appellant who was stoning their house when in fact, as she admitted,
she only knew this because the victim said so. Moreover, it may be doubted whether the victims other
daughter, Laura, was hit by the stones hurled by accused-appellant as she came out of their house, since
the door of the house was so narrow that only one person at a time could pass through it. Nonetheless, a
close reading of the records will show that indeed it was accused-appellant who was stoning the house
because when the witness followed the victim outside, she saw accused-appellant throwing stones at their
house. She then saw accused-appellant hitting the victim with stones. In the process, Laura was also hit.
In any event, these discrepancies are minor and insignificant and do not detract from the substance of
her testimony. This Court has time and again said that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the
crime do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. Instead of weakening their testimonies, such
inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility because they discount the possibility of their being
rehearsed testimony.[19]
Thus, according to Milagros Gardon, accused-appellant taunted the victim and challenged him to come
out of the house. After succeeding in drawing the victim out of his house, accused-appellant and his
companions ganged up on him, kicking and pummeling him and finally stabbing him.
Milagros testimony belies accused-appellants claim that he was merely trying to pacify the victim and
Maximo Givera and that he ran away because the victims son, armed with a bolo, charged at him
(accused-appellant). There was no reason for the victims son to want to attack accused-appellant, if the
latter was merely trying to help the victim.
Nor is it probable that accused-appellant did not see what his companions did to the victim aside from
giving him fist blows and kicks, because according to accused-appellant, he ran away shortly after they
had attacked the victim. As accused-appellant said he saw the assailants run way, this could only be after
they had been done with their victim.
The defense also tries to discredit the testimony of the other prosecution witness, Melinda Delfin. It is
contended that, contrary to her claim, she was not really present at the incident. For this purpose, it is
pointed out that she failed to give a sworn statement regarding said incident to the police.
The contention has no merit. As Melinda explained, she did not give a statement to the police because
she was told they would call on her later for her statement. Melinda testified:[20]
Q: The police did not get your statement because you did not tell them that you were an eyewitness
and if it is true, correct?
A: No, sir.
Q: You were only asked by your relatives - - You testified in this case in the sala of Judge Asuncion after
the children of the victim asked you to? Correct?
A: They did not tell me. I voluntarily testified, sir, because I saw the incident.
Q: What do you mean by saying that you voluntarily testified? Did you just come to court and asked the
court to take you as witness in this case?
A: No, sir, because in the police station the police told me that they will not take my statement. They
will just ihahabol na lang ako.
Q: Did you not inquire from them why your statement will not longer be taken and what do you mean by
that ihahabol na lang ikaw?
A: I did not ask because I do not know anything about that. That was the first time that incident
happened to my life.
It is noteworthy that both Milagros Gardon and Melinda Delfin knew accused-appellant and the other
assailants, and that in fact some of them are related to the witnesses. Accused-appellant has not shown
that these witnesses were motivated by ill will against him. As correctly observed by the trial court:[21]
[T]he court has no reason to doubt the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
In the first place, accused Cesar Givera has not shown any motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses
to testify as they did against said accused.
Second, accused Cesar Givera and the other accused in this case are all residing within the vicinity where
the crime was committed, and are even related by affinity to the deceased. There is, therefore, no reason
to doubt their identification by the prosecution witnesses.
All things considered, we think the trial court correctly dismissed accused-appellants claim and gave
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. From the fact that the victim died and that
accused-appellant and his companions were the last persons seen with the victim before he died, it can be
concluded that they are responsible for the victims death.
Second. The allegations of conspiracy in the information have been established. The victim was at
home sleeping after coming from a drinking session, when the accused-appellant and his companions
stoned his house to force him to come out. When they failed, one of them, Epifanio (Onying) Gayon, went
inside the victims house and told him to come out. Disoriented because he was drunk, the victim went with
Onying. Once the victim was outside, accused-appellant pelted him with stones, while Onying started
raining fistic blows on him. Then Onying and accused-appellant ran away to lure him to go toward the
bridge where the other two, Arturo Gayon and Maximo Givera, were waiting. When the victim reached the
place, he was attacked by the gang. He was kicked and boxed by Onying and when Arturo shouted Sige
todasin na yan!, Maximo stabbed the victim.
The evidence thus clearly and convincingly shows a coordinated action by the group in the execution
of the crime. In conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the
victim. What is important is that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design to bring about the death of the
victim. The act of each conspirator in furtherance of the common purpose is in contemplation of law the
act of all. Consonant with this legal principle, accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of murder as if he
himself dealt the deathblow that sent the victim to his grave. [22]
Third. However, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case. Where conspiracy is
directly established, with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of the method, time and means
of executing the crime, the existence of evident premeditation can be appreciated. [23] But in an implied
conspiracy, such as in this case, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in the absence of proof as to
how and when the plan to kill the victim was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, so
that it cannot be determined if the accused had sufficient time between its inception and its fulfillment
dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences. There should be a showing that the accused had
the opportunity for reflection and persisted in effectuating his criminal design which the prosecution failed
to establish in the case at bar.[24]
Nor can the qualifying circumstance of treachery be taken into account. The trial court held:[25]
. . . [T]reachery will also be deduced from the evidence on record. The deceased was unarmed when he
was stabbed by on Maximo Givera and boxed and kicked by accused Cesar Givera and two other accused.
. . . From the evidence adduced, accused Givera and Epifanio Gayon taunted and provoked the deceased
by throwing stones at him and then lured him to run after them towards the bridge where the other
accused were lying in wait ready to pounce on the deceased without risk to themselves as the deceased
was then defenseless.
Treachery is the deliberate and unexpected attack on the victim, without any warning and without
giving him an opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault. For treachery to be appreciated, it
must be shown to be present at the inception of the attack, otherwise, even if present at a subsequent
stage, it cannot be considered.[26] In the instant case, the victim cannot be said to have been totally
oblivious of the impending attack by all the group of accused-appellant. He thus had every opportunity to

escape from the attack. In fact, his daughter Milagros testified that prior to the stoning incident, the victim
had been threatened with harm by accused-appellant the moment he went out of his house, which is why
she stayed beside her father to make sure he did not go out of the house. Indeed, the victim had been
forewarned of the danger posed by accused-appellant and his group.
Moreover, by coming out of his house and running after two of the assailants, the victim showed that
he was prepared for the attack by accused-appellant and his gang and could have been hardly surprised
when he was actually attacked. Treachery must be proven by convincing evidence.The fact that the victim
may have been surprised because he had not expected that he would be outnumbered when he saw two
other attackers waiting for him under the bridge is not sufficient to show that the victim was completely
unaware of the attack that might come from his assailants.[27]
However, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superiority was correctly
appreciated in this case. The victim was unarmed and was clearly outnumbered by the four assailants,
with one of them armed with a knife.[28]
Fourth. Accused-appellant claims that his arrest at the East Avenue Medical Center on May 4, 1996
was made without a warrant. This is not true. He was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the court on
April 27, 1995. However, as the records show, the warrant of arrest was returned unserved by the arresting
officer on June 7, 1995 as accused-appellant could not be found. He was finally found only on May 4,
1996. Now, no alias warrant of arrest is needed to make the arrest.Unless specifically provided in the
warrant, the same remains enforceable until it is executed, recalled or quashed. The ten-day period
provided in Rule 113, 4 is only a directive to the officer executing the warrant to make a return to the
court.[29]
At any rate, accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to object thereto because he
failed to move for the quashal of the information before the trial court, entered a plea of not guilty and
participated in the trial.[30] As this Court has held, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure
in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.[31]
On the matter of the admissibility of the testimony of the medico-legal taken in the first case,
involving the three other accused for the death of the same victim, offered in evidence in the case at bar,
this Court must declare the same inadmissible. As correctly contended by the defense, because they did
not have the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Baltazar, his testimony cannot be used in evidence against
accused-appellant. Indeed, where the opposing party failed to cross-examine a witness, this Court in
several cases held:[32]
Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly
cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of
such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes
attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.
Still and all, the fact and cause of death of the victim had been sufficiently proved by the accounts of
the two eyewitnesses, corroborated by the offer in evidence of the death certificate of the victim.
Fifth. The award of damages by the trial court in favor of the victim should be modified. Aside from
the award of P50,000.00 as indemnity, the heirs of Eusebio Gardon are entitled to an award ofP50,000.00
as moral damages irrespective of proof thereof.[33]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City finding accused-
appellant Cesar Givera y Garote guilty of murder of Eusebio Gardon y Arrivas and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by law is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that, in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 to be paid as indemnity, accused-appellant is
hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of Eusebio Gardon amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus the
costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129584. December 3, 1998]
TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, HON. LABOR ARBITER POTENCIANO S. CANIZARES, JR. and ERLINDA R.
OSDANA,respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari now before us, petitioner Triple Eight Integrated Services Inc. seeks to
annul the decision[1] of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (First Division, Quezon City)
dated March 11, 1997 affirming the August 20, 1996 decision [2] of Labor Arbiter Potenciano
Canizares. Petitioner was ordered to pay private respondent Erlinda Osdana her salaries for the unexpired
portion of her employment contract, unpaid salaries, salary differential, moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorneys fees. On April 28, 1997, the NLRC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. [3]
The antecedent facts follow.
Sometime in August 1992, private respondent Osdana was recruited by petitioner for employment
with the latters principal, Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Under the original employment contract, Osdana was engaged to work as Food Server for a period of
thirty-six (36) months with a salary of five hundred fifty Saudi rials (SR550).
Osdana claims she was required by petitioner to pay a total of eleven thousand nine hundred fifty
pesos (P11,950.00) in placement fees and other charges, for which no receipt was issued. She was likewise
asked to undergo a medical examination conducted by the Philippine Medical Tests System, a duly
accredited clinic for overseas workers, which found her to be Fit of Employment.
Subsequently, petitioner asked Osdana to sign another Contractor-Employee Agreement [4]which

provided that she would be employed as a waitress for twelve (12) months with a salary of two hundred
eighty US dollars ($280). It was this employment agreement which was approved by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
On September 16, 1992, Osdana left for Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and commenced working for GCC. She
was assigned to the College of Public Administration of the Oleysha University and, contrary to the terms
and conditions of the employment contract, was made to wash dishes, cooking pots, and utensils, perform
janitorial work and other tasks which were unrelated to her job designation as waitress. Making matters
worse was the fact that she was made to work a gruelling twelve-hour shift, from six oclock in the morning
to six oclock in the evening, without overtime pay.
Because of the long hours and the strenuous nature of her work, Osdana suffered from numbness and
pain in her arms. The pain was such that she had to be confined at the Ladies Villa, a housing facility of
GCC, from June 18 to August 22, 1993, during which period, she was not paid her salaries.
After said confinement, Osdana was allowed to resume work, this time as Food Server and Cook at the
Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, where she worked seven days a week from August 22 to October 5,
1993. Again, she was not compensated.
Then, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, Osdana was again confined at the Ladies Villa for no
apparent reason. During this period, she was still not paid her salary.
On October 24, 1993, she was re-assigned to the Oleysha University to wash dishes and do other
menial tasks. As with her previous assignment at the said University, Osdana worked long hours and under
harsh conditions. Because of this, she was diagnosed as having Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, a
condition precipitated by activities requiring repeated flexion, pronation, and supination of the wrist and
characterized by excruciating pain and numbness in the arms.[5]
As the pain became unbearable, Osdana had to be hospitalized. She underwent two surgical
operations, one in January 1994, another on April 23, 1994. Between these operations, she was not given
any work assignments even if she was willing and able to do light work in accordance with her doctors
advice. Again, Osdana was not paid any compensation for the period between February to April 22, 1994.
After her second operation, Osdana was discharged from the hospital on April 25, 1994. The medical
report stated that she had very good improvement of the symptoms and she was discharged on the
second day of the operation.[6]
Four days later, however, she was dismissed from work, allegedly on the ground of illness. She was not
given any separation pay nor was she paid her salaries for the periods when she was not allowed to work.
Upon her return to the Philippines, Osdana sought the help of petitioner, but to no avail. She was thus
constrained to file a complaint before the POEA against petitioner, praying for unpaid and underpaid
salaries, salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract, moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees, as well as the revocation, cancellation, suspension and/or imposition of administrative
sanctions against petitioner.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995, the case was transferred to the arbitration branch of the NLRC and assigned to Labor Arbiter
Canizares.
In a decision dated August 20, 1996, the labor arbiter ruled in favor of Osdana. The dispositive portion
of the decision follows:
Wherefore, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the complainant US$2,499.00 as salaries for the
unexpired portion of the contract, and US$1,076.00 as unpaid salary and salary differential, or its
equivalent in Philippine Peso.
The respondent is likewise ordered to pay the complainant P50,000 moral damages, and P20,000
exemplary damages.
The respondent is further ordered to pay the complainant 10% of the monetary award as attorneys fee.
Other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved by the labor arbiters decision, petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which affirmed the decision
in question on March 11, 1997. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the NLRC in
its order dated April 28, 1997.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondents for the following
reasons: (a) ruling in favor of Osdana even if there was no factual or legal basis for the award and, (b)
holding petitioner solely liable for her claims despite the fact that its liability is joint and several with its
principal, GCC.
At the outset, petitioner argues that public respondent Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion
when he rendered the questioned decision dated August 20, 1996 without stating the facts and the law
where he derived his conclusions. [7] In support of this argument, petitioner cites the first paragraph of
Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution: No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
On this point, it is enough to note that the decisions of both the labor arbiter and the NLRC were based
mainly on the facts and allegations in Osdanas position paper and supporting documents.We find these
sufficient to constitute substantial evidence to support the questioned decisions.Generally, findings of facts
of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are accorded great respect and, at times, even finality if supported
by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[8]
Moreover, well-settled is the rule that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer
and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. Thus, in controversies between
a worker and her employer, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or in the interpretation of
agreements should be resolved in favor of the former.
Petitioner, for its part, was given the same opportunity to file its own position paper but instead, it
opted to file a two-page Answer With Special And Affirmative Defenses, denying generally the allegations
of the complaint.[9]
As observed by the labor arbiter, The record shows the complainant filed complaint (sic), position
paper, and supporting documents, and prosecuted her case diligently; while the respondent merely tried to
settle the case amicably, failing even to file its position paper. [10] The present case being one for illegal
dismissal, it was incumbent upon petitioner employer to show by substantial evidence that the termination
was validly made. In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the
dismissal is for a just cause. [11] Having failed to file its position paper and to support its denials and
affirmative defenses in its answer, petitioner cannot now fault the labor arbiter and the NLRC for relying on
the facts as laid down by Osdana in her position paper and supported by other documents. The essence of
due process is that a party be afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he
may have in support of his defense, [12] and this is exactly what petitioner was accorded, although it chose
not to fully avail thereof.
This Court, therefore, upholds the finding of herein public respondents that the facts and the evidence
on record adduced by Osdana and taken in relation to the answer of petitioner show that indeed there was
breach of the employment contract and illegal dismissal committed by petitioners principal.
Petitioner claims that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion when they ruled that
Osdana had been illegally dismissed by GCC. It maintains that the award for salaries for the unexpired
portion of the contract was improper because Osdana was validly dismissed on the ground of illness.
The argument must fail.
In its Answer, Memorandum of Appeal, [13] Petition for Certiorari,[14] and Consolidated Reply,[15] petitioner
consistently asserted that Osdana was validly repatriated for medical reasons, but it failed to substantiate
its claim that such repatriation was justified and done in accordance with law.
Article 284 of the Labor Code is clear on the matter of termination by reason of disease or illness, viz:
Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination An employer may terminate the services of an employee who
has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or
prejudicial to his health as well as the health of his co-employees: x x x.
Specifically, Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the
employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by competent public authority
that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6)
months with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the
employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall
reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.
(Underscoring supplied)
Viewed in the light of the foregoing provisions, the manner by which Osdana was terminated was
clearly in violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations.
In the first place, Osdanas continued employment despite her illness was not prohibited by law
nor was it prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her co-employees. In fact, the medical report issued
after her second operation stated that she had very good improvement of the symptoms.Besides, Carpal
Tunnel Syndrome is not a contagious disease.
Petitioner attributes good faith on the part of its principal, claiming that It was the concern for the
welfare and physical well being (sic) of private respondent that drove her employer to take the painful
decision of terminating her from the service and having her repatriated to the Philippines at its
expense. The employer did not want to risk the aggravation of the illness of private respondent which
could have been the logical consequence were private respondent allowed to continue with her job. [16]
The Court notes, however, that aside from these bare allegations, petitioner has not presented any
medical certificate or similar document from a competent public health authority in support of its claims.
On the medical certificate requirement, petitioner erroneously argues that private respondent was
employed in Saudi Arabia and not here in the Philippines. Hence, there was a physical impossibility to
secure from a Philippine public health authority the alluded medical certificate that public respondents
illness will not be cured within a period of six months. [17]

Petitioner entirely misses the point, as counsel for private respondent states in the Comment. [18]The
rule simply prescribes a certification by a competent public health authority and not a Philippine public
health authority.
If, indeed, Osdana was physically unfit to continue her employment, her employer could have easily
obtained a certification to that effect from a competent public health authority in Saudi Arabia, thereby
heading off any complaint for illegal dismissal.
The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed
with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity
or extent of the employees illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor. As the Court
observed in Prieto v. NLRC,[19] The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas
workers in the foreign land where they have ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more
fulfilling future. Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings,
insults and other forms of debasement, are only a few of the inhumane acts to which they are subjected by
their foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they please in their country. While these workers
may indeed have relatively little defense against exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage
must not continue to burden them when they return to their own territory to voice their muted
complaint. There is no reason why, in their own land, the protection of our own laws cannot be extended to
them in full measure for the redress of their grievances.
Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by contending that since
Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the host
country. Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it appear that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not require
any certification by a competent public health authority in the dismissal of employees due to illness.
Again, petitioners argument is without merit.
First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made)
governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was
perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and
other laws affecting labor apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum
will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forums public policy. [20]Here in the Philippines,
employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII Section
3, guarantees the special protection of workers, to wit:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote
full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to
security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
x x x x x x x x x.
This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers to
determine for and by themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the ground of
illness would encourage illegal or arbitrary pre-termination of employment contracts.
As regards the monetary award of salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract,
unpaid salaries and salary differential granted by public respondents to Osdana, petitioner assails the
same for being contrary to law, evidence and existing jurisprudence, all of which therefore constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
Although this contention is without merit, the award for salaries for the unexpired portion of the
contract must, however, be reduced. Paragraph 5, Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, applies in this case, thus:
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
In the case at bar, while it would appear that the employment contract approved by the POEA was
only for a period of twelve months, Osdanas actual stint with the foreign principal lasted for one year and
seven-and-a-half months. It may be inferred, therefore, that the employer renewed her employment
contract for another year. Thus, the award for the unexpired portion of the contract should have been
US$1,260 (US$280 x 4 months) or its equivalent in Philippine pesos, not US$2,499 as adjudged by the
labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC.
As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential amounting to US$1,076 representing seven
months unpaid salaries and one month underpaid salary, the same is proper because, as correctly pointed
out by Osdana, the no work, no pay rule relied upon by petitioner does not apply in this case. In the first
place, the fact that she had not worked from June 18 to August 22, 1993 and then from January 24 to April
29, 1994, was due to her illness which was clearly work-related. Second, from August 23 to October 5,
1993, Osdana actually worked as food server and cook for seven days a week at the Hota Bani Tameem
Hospital, but was not paid any salary for the said period. Finally, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, she
was confined to quarters and was not given any work for no reason at all.
Now, with respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the same is likewise proper but
should be reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of
the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in
a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. [21] Likewise, exemplary damages may be
awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. [22]
According to the facts of the case as stated by public respondent, Osdana was made to perform such
menial chores, as dishwashing and janitorial work, among others, contrary to her job designation as
waitress. She was also made to work long hours without overtime pay. Because of such arduous working
conditions, she developed Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. Her illness was such that she had to undergo surgery
twice. Since her employer determined for itself that she was no longer fit to continue working, they sent
her home posthaste without as much as separation pay or compensation for the months when she was
unable to work because of her illness. Since the employer is deemed to have acted in bad faith, the award
for attorneys fees is likewise upheld.
Finally, petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents for holding it
solely liable for the claims of Osdana despite the fact that its liability with the principal is joint and several.
Petitioner misunderstands the decision in question. It should be noted that contrary to petitioners
interpretation, the decision of the labor arbiter which was affirmed by the NLRC did not really absolve the
foreign principal.
Petitioner was the only one held liable for Osdanas monetary claims because it was the only
respondent named in the complaint and it does not appear that petitioner took steps to have its principal
included as co-respondent. Thus, the POEA, and later the labor arbiter, did not acquire jurisdiction over the
foreign principal.
This is not to say, however, that GCC may not be held liable at all. Petitioner can still claim
reimbursement or contribution from it for the amounts awarded to the illegally-dismissed employee.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the decisions of
the labor arbiter dated August 20, 1996, and of the NLRC dated March 11, 1997, are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the award to private respondent Osdana should be one thousand two hundred sixty US
dollars (US$1,260), or its equivalent in Philippine pesos, as salaries for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract, and one thousand seventy six US dollars (US$1,076), or its equivalent in Philippine
pesos, representing unpaid salaries for seven (7) months and underpaid salary for one (1) month, plus
interest.
Petitioner is likewise ordered to pay private respondent P30,000.00 in moral damages,P10,000.00 in

exemplary damages and 10% attorneys fees.
This decision is without prejudice to any remedy or claim for reimbursement or contribution petitioner
may institute against its foreign principal, Gulf Catering Company. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143723. June 28, 2001]
LITONJUA GROUP OF COMPANIES, EDDIE LITONJUA and DANILO LITONJUA, petitioners,

vs. TERESITA VIGAN, respondent.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to annul and set aside the (1) decision [1] of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated March 20, 2000 which reversed and set aside the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent guilty of abandonment and (2) resolution [2] dated
June 19, 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The factual backdrop as found by the respondent Court of Appeals is as follows: [3]
As to the factual milieu, the contending parties have diametrically opposed versions. Vigan tells it this way;
She was hired by the Litonjua Group of Companies on February 2, 1979 as telex operator.Later, she was
assigned as accounting and payroll clerk under the supervision of Danilo Litonjua.She had been performing
well until 1995, when Danilo Litonjua who was already naturally a (sic) very ill-tempered, ill-mouthed and
violent employer, became more so due to business problems. In fact, a complaint letter (Annex I, p. 85,
rollo) was sent by the Litonjua Employees to the father and his junior regarding the boorishness of their kin
Danilo Litonjua but apparently the management just glossed over this.
Danilo Litonjua became particularly angry with Vigan and threw a stapler at her when she refused to give
him money upon the instructions of Eddie Litonjua. From then on, Danilo Litonjua had been rabid towards
her berated and bad-mouthed her, calling her a mental case psycho, sira ulo, etc. and even threatened to
hit her for some petty matters. Danilo Litonjua even went so far as to lock her up in the comfort room and
preventing others to help her out. Not contented, Danilo Litonjua would order the security guards to
forcibly eject her or prevent her entry in the office premises whenever he was angry. This occurred twice in
July of 1995, first on the 5th then on the 7th. The incidents prompted Vigan to write Danilo Litonjua letters
asking why she was treated so and what was her fault (Annexes F, G & K, pp. 82, 83 & 87, rollo). She
suspected that Danilo Litonjua wanted her out for he would not let her inside the office such that even
while abroad he would order the guards by phone to bar her. She pleaded for forgiveness or at least for
explanation but it fell on deaf ears.
Later, Danilo Litonjua changed tack and charged that Vigan had been hysterical, emotional and created
scenes at the office. He even required her to secure psychiatric assistance. (Annexes L to N, pp. 88-90,
rollo) But despite proof that she was not suffering from psychosis or organic brain syndrome as certified to
by a Psychiatrist of Danilo Litonjuas choice (Annex H, p. 84, rollo), still she was denied by the guards entry
to her work upon instructions again of Danilo Litonjua. Left with no alternative, Vigan filed this case for
illegal dismissal, alleging she was receiving a monthly salary of P8,000.00 at the time she was unlawfully
terminated.
The Litonjuas have a different version. They negate the existence of the Litonjua Group of Companies and
the connection of Eduardo Litonjua thereto. They contend that Vigan was employed by ACT Theater, Inc.,
where Danilo Litonjua is a Director. They dispute the charge of illegal dismissal for it was Vigan who ceased
to report for work despite notices and likewise contest the P8,000.00 monthly salary alleged by Vigan,
claiming it was merely P6,850.00.
They claim that Vigan was a habitual absentee specially on Tuesdays that fell within three days before and
after the 15th day and 30th day of every month. Her performance had been satisfactory, but then starting
March 15, 1996 she had become emotional, hysterical, uncontrollable and created disturbances at the
office with her crying and shouting for no reason at all. The incident was repeated on April 3, 1996, May
24, 1996 and on June 4, 1996. Thus alarmed, on July 24, 1996 Vigan was required by management to
undergo medical and psychological examination at the companys expense and naming three doctors to
attend to her. Dr. Baltazar Reyes and Dr. Tony Perlas of the Philippine General Hospital and Dr. Lourdes
Ignacio of the Medical Center Manila. But they claim that Vigan refused to comply.

On August 2, 1996, Vigan again had another breakdown, hysterical, shouting and crying as usual for about
an hour, and then she just left the premises without a word. The next day, August 3, 1996, Saturday, she
came to the office and explained she was not feeling well the day before. After that Vigan went AWOL and
did not heed telegram notices from her employer made on August 26, 1996 and on September 9, 1996
(Annexes 1 & 2, pp. 108 to 109, rollo). She instead filed the instant suit for illegal dismissal.
On June 10, 1997, Labor Arbiter Ernesto S. Dinopol rendered his decision [4] finding Vigan diseased and
unfit for work under Article 284 of the Labor Code [5]5 and awarded the corresponding separation pay as
follows:[6]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents LITONJUA GROUP OF COMPANIES, EDDIE
K. LITONJUA and DANILO LITONJUA to jointly and severally pay complainant TERESITA Y. VIGAN, the
following amounts:
Separation pay (P4,000 x 18) years.= P72,000.00
Proportionate 13th month pay
(P8,000 x 8 months over 12) = 4,666.66
TOTAL AWARD. P76,666.66
All other causes of action are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Vigan appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission which modified [7] the arbiters
decision by ruling that Art. 284 of the Labor Code is inapplicable in the instant case but affirmed the
legality of the termination of the complainant based on her having effectively abandoned her job; the rest
of the decision was affirmed. Vigan moved for a partial reconsideration which was denied in a resolution
dated August 7, 1998.
Dissatisfied, Vigan filed a petition for certiorari with the respondent Court of Appeals which rendered
its assailed decision dated March 20, 2000 reversing the NLRC Resolution. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:[8]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed NLRC Decision and Resolution are
herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its stead judgment is rendered ordering the respondents LITONJUA
GROUP OF COMPANIES, EDDIE K. LITONJUA and DANILO LITONJUA jointly and severally to:
(a) Reinstate complainant TERESITA Y. VIGAN if she so desires;
or
(b) pay her separation compensation in the sum of P8,000.00 multiplied by her years of service
counted from February 2, 1979 up to the time this Decision becomes final; and in either case to
pay Vigan;
(c) full back wages from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the date of the finality of this
Decision;
(d) moral damages in the amount of P40,000.00;
(e) exemplary damages in the amount of P15,000.00; and
(f) attorneys fees of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Litonjuas filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated June 19, 2000.
Petitioners Litonjuas filed the instant petition for review on certiorari alleging the following grounds:
I
WHETHER OR NOT LITONJUA GROUP OF COMPANIES, WHICH HAS NO JURIDICAL PERSONALITY, BUT ONLY A
GENERIC NAME TO DESCRIBE THE VARIOUS COMPANIES WHICH THE LITONJUA FAMILY HAS INTERESTS, CAN
BE LEGALLY CONSTRUED AS RESPONDENTS EMPLOYER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED FROM HER EMPLOYMENT, INSTEAD OF AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION THAT SHE HAD ABANDONED HER JOB OR THAT OF
LABOR ARBITER ERNESTO DINOPOL HOLDING THAT SHE SHOULD BE SEPARATED ON THE GROUND OF
DISEASE UNDER ARTICLE 284 OF THE LABOR CODE, CONSIDERING THAT SHE HAS EXHIBITED A PATTERN
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MENTAL DISTURBANCE WHICH ADMITTEDLY NO LONGER MADE HER PHYSICALLY
FIT TO WORK.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DIRECTING
RESPONDENTS REINSTATEMENT AT HER OWN CHOICE OR PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY OF ONE MONTH
SALARY FOR EVERY YEAR OF SERVICE AND BACKWAGES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.
Anent the first assigned error, petitioners allege that the Litonjua group of companies cannot be a
party to this suit for it is not a legal entity with juridical personality but is merely a generic name used to
describe collectively the various companies in which the Litonjua family has business interest; that the real
employer of respondent Vigan was the ACT theater Incorporated where Danilo Litonjua is a member of the
Board of Directors while Eddie Litonjua was not connected in any capacity.
Petitioners argument is meritorious. Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may
be parties to a civil action and every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
parties in interest.[9] Petitioners claim that Litonjua Group of Companies is not a legal entity with juridical
personality hence cannot be a party to this suit deserves consideration since respondent failed to prove
otherwise. In fact, respondent Vigans own allegation in her Memorandum supported petitioners claim that
Litonjua group of companies does not exist when she stated therein that instead of naming each and every
corporation of the Litonjua family where she had rendered accounting and payroll works, she simply
referred to these corporations as the Litonjua group of companies, thus, respondent merely used such
generic name to describe collectively the various corporations in which the Litonjua family has business
interest. Considering the non-existence of the Litonjua group of companies as a juridical entity and
petitioner Eddie Litonjuas denial of his connection in any capacity with the ACT Theater, the supposed
company where Vigan was employed, petitioner Eddie Litonjuas should also be excluded as a party in this
case since respondent Vigan failed to prove Eddie Litonjuas participation in the instant case. It is
respondent Vigan, being the party asserting a fact, who has the burden of proof as to such fact [10] which
however, she failed to discharge.
Next, petitioners claim that the complaint for illegal dismissal was prematurely filed since Vigan was
not dismissed, actual or constructive, from her employment as the records show that despite being absent
without official leave since August 5, 1996 and her receipt of two telegram notices sent to her by
petitioners on August 26, and September 9, 1996 for her to report for work, she failed to do so and yet
petitioners had not done any act to dismiss her. Petitioners deny Vigans claim that she had been physically
barred from entering the work premises.
Petitioners thus contend that since respondent Vigan was not illegally dismissed from employment,
the respondent courts order reinstating the latter, awarding her separation pay equivalent to one month
salary per year of service as well as backwages, damages and attorneys fees have no factual and legal
basis.
We are not persuaded.

The above arguments relate mainly to the correctness of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
and the award of damages. This Court has consistently affirmed that the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are as a rule binding upon it, subject to certain exceptions, one of which is when the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (or administrative body, as the case
may be).[11] However, it bears emphasizing that mere disagreement between the Court of Appeals and the
trial court as to the facts of a case does not of itself warrant this Court's review of the same. It has been
held that the doctrine that the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, being conclusive in nature,
are binding on this Court, applies even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as
to the weight of evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact, so long as the findings of the
Court of Appeals are borne out by the record or based on substantial evidence. [12]
We have gone over the records of this case and found no cogent reason to disagree with the
respondent courts findings that respondent Vigan did not abandon her job but was illegally
dismissed. Petitioners claim that despite two (2) telegram notices dated August 26 and September 9, 1996
respectively sent to respondent Vigan to report for work, the latter did not heed the demands and
absented herself since August 5, 1996 was belied by the respondents evidence, as it was upon instructions
of petitioner Danilo Litonjua to the guards on duty that she could not enter the premises of her
workplace. In fact, in her letter dated August 30, 1996 addressed to petitioner Danilo Litonjua, respondent
Vigan had complained of petitioner Danilos inhumane treatment in barring her from entering her
workplace, to wit:
Sukdulan na po ang pang-aaping dinaranas ko sa inyo, sir. Since August 5 etc. I was always approached by
your guard Batutay and harassed by your men to vacate my cubicle as per your strict order. Only this
August 7 that you succeeded as you order the door locked for me only. As per our agreement Aug. 27 at
Jollibee (sic) gave me assurance that I willingly undergo psychiatric test I could freely report for work
without intimidating me, you wont anymore charge me of insubordination. You wont disturb my family
anymore, so why do you advice to try to go back Aug. 30 but as always to be barred by guard Batutay? Sir,
with my 18 years of loyal service, all I need is a little respect. Tao ako sir, hindi hayop. Malaki ang
nawawala sa akin."
Notwithstanding the fact the she was refused entrance to her workplace, respondent Vigan, to show
her earnest desire to report for work, would sneak her way into the premises and punched her time card
but she could not resume work as the guards in the company gate would prevent her per petitioner Danilo
Litonjuas instructions. It appears also that respondent Vigan wrote petitioner Danilo a letter dated
September 9, 1996 notifying him that per his instructions, she had made an appointment for a psychiatric
test on September 11, 1996 and requested him to make a check payable to Dr. Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio in
the amount of P800.00 consultation fee as they agreed upon. She underwent a psychiatric examination as
a result of which Dr. Ignacio issued a medical certificate as follows: [13]
This is to certify that MISS TERESITA VIGAN has come for psychiatric evaluation on September 11 and 17,
1996. The psychiatric interview and mental status examination did not reveal any symptoms of psychosis
or organic brain syndrome. She showed anxiety but this was deemed a realistic reaction to her present job
difficulties.
Respondents actuations militate against petitioners claim that she did not heed the notices to return to
work and abandoned her job. She had been going to her workplace to report for work but was prevented
from resuming her work upon the instructions of petitioner Danilo Litonjua. It would be the height of
injustice to allow an employee to claim as a ground for abandonment a situation which he himself had
brought about.[14]
We fully agree with the respondent courts ratiocination on the illegality of Vigans dismissal, to wit: [15]
The basic issue is whether Vigans employment was terminated by illegal dismissal or by abandonment of
work, and We hold that this was a case of illegal dismissal.
Shopworn is the rule on abandonment that the immediate filing of a case for illegal dismissal negates the
same. Mark that Vigan promptly filed this suit for illegal dismissal when her attempts to enter the premises
of her workplace became futile and the efforts to bar and eject her became unmistakable. In the more
recent case of Rizada vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 96982, September 21, 1999), the Supreme Court reiterated anew
the hoary rule that:

To constitute abandonment two elements must concur (1) the failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the
second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Abandoning
ones job means the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment and the
burden of proof is on the employer to show a clear and deliberate intent on the part of the employee to
discontinue employment.
Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot be lightly inferred, much less legally presumed from
certain equivocal acts. (Shin Industrial v. National Labor Relations Commission, 164 SCRA 8).
An employee who forthwith took steps to protest his dismissal cannot be said to have abandoned his
work. (Toogue v. National Labor Relations Commission, 238 SCRA 241), as where the employee
immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to seek reinstatement (Tolong Aqua Culture Corp., et al.
V. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. 122268, November 12, 1996) (emphasis supplied).
Note that in the instant case Vigan was even pleading to be allowed to work but she was prevented by the
guards thereat upon the orders of Danilo Litonjua. These are disclosed by her letters (Annexes F, G, K, Q, R
and U, pp. 82, 83, 87, 93, 94 & 97, rollo), the entries in her time cards (Annexes P, S, W and X, pp. 92, 95,
99 & 100, rollo) and her compliance when required to see a psychiatrist (Annex H, p. 84, rollo). On the
other hand there is complete silence from the Litonjuas on these matters, including on the collective
manifesto of several employees against Danilo Litonjua and his highhanded ways (Annex I, p. 85). They
chose to ignore material and telling points. They even alleged that Vigan refused to comply with their
request for her to have medical examination (Comment, pp. 164-171, rollo and Memorandum for the
Respondents, pp. 215-222, rollo), an unmitigated falsity in the face of clear proofs that she complied with
their directive and was given a clean bill of mental health by a reputable psychiatrist of their choice.
For emphasis, We shall quote with seeming triteness the dictum laid down in Mendoza vs. NLRC (supra)
regarding the unflinching rule in illegal dismissal cases:
that the employer bears the burden of proof. To establish a case of abandonment, the employer must
prove the employees deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment without any intention of
returning. . .
mere absence from work, especially where the employee has been verbally told not to report, cannot by
itself constitute abandonment. To repeat, the employer has the burden of proving overt acts on the
employees part which demonstrate a desire or intention to abandon her work
The NLRC had erred in shifting the onus probandi to Vigan in the charge of abandonment against her, while
the Litonjuas failed to discharge their burden. Though they may not have verbally told Vigan not to report
for work but the act of ordering the guards not to let her in was just as clear a notice. Vigans plight was
akin to that of the truck helper in the case of Masagana Concrete Products, et al. vs. NLRC (G.R. No.
106916, September 3, 1999) who was likewise prevented from coming to work.
While there was no formal termination of his services, Marias, was constructively dismissed when he was
accused of tampering the vale sheet and prevented from returning to work. Constructive dismissal does
not always involve forthright dismissal or diminution in rank, compensation, benefit and privileges. For an
act of clear discrimination insensibility or disdain by an employer may become so unbearable on the part
of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. In
this case, Marias had to resign from his job because he was prevented from returning back to work unless
he admitted his mistake in writing and he was not given any opportunity to contest the charge against
him. It is a rule often repeated that unsubstantiated accusation without anything more are not
synonymous with guilt and unless a clear, valid, just or authorized ground for dismissing an employee is
established by the employer the dismissal shall be considered unfounded.
Similarly, Vigan was accused of having mental, emotional and physical disorders (Annex M, p. 89, rollo),
but per medical examination it was proven that hers was pure anxiety as a realistic reaction to her present
job difficulties. She was charged of habitual absenteeism on Tuesdays that fell within three days before and
after the 15th day and 30th day of every month (Litonjuas Position Paper, pp. 101-107, rollo). This is
preposterous for how many Tuesdays in a year would fall within three days before and after the 15th day
and 30th day of every month? By no extrapolation can this be habitual absenteeism.

Since respondent Vigan was illegally dismissed from her employment, she is entitled to: (1)either
reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and (2) backwages. [16] As
correctly disposed by the respondent Court:[17]
Thus finding that Vigan was illegally dismissed, she is entitled to the following:
1) Either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable; and 2)Backwages,
Backwages and separation pay are distinct relief given to alleviate the economicdamage by an illegally
dismissed employee. Hence, an award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement does not bar an award of
backwages, computed from the time of illegal dismissal up to the date of the finality of the Decision...
without qualification or deduction. Separation pay, equivalent to one months salary for every year of
service, is awarded as an alternative to reinstatement when the latter is no longer an option. Separation
pay is computed from the commencement of employment up to the time of termination, including the
imputed service for which the employee is entitled to backwages, with the salary rate prevailing at the end
of the period of putative service being the basis for computation (Masagana Concrete Products, et al. vs.
NLRC, supra). In case of a fraction of at least six (6) months in the length of service, the same shall be
considered as one year in computing the separation pay. With regard to backwages, it meant literal full
backwages that is inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from
the time her compensation was withheld from her up to the time of her actual reinstatement, if it is still
viable or up to the time the Decision in her favor becomes final without deducting from back wages the
earning derived elsewhere, if there is any, by Vigan during the period of her illegal dismissal. (Lopez vs.
NLRC, 297 SCRA 508).
In other words, Vigan is entitled to reinstatement, which perhaps is no longer viable due to the strained
relations between the parties, or separation pay of P8,000.00 for every year of service and backwages of
another P8,000 per month reckoned from the time she last received salary from the Litonjuas up to the
date of the finality of this Decision. Mark again that We allowed the P8,000.00 claim of Vigan as her last
salary received for again the Litonjuas failed to validly refute the same.
We likewise affirm respondent courts award of moral and exemplary damages to the respondent. As a
rule, moral damages are recoverable only where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith
or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. We find that bad faith attended respondents dismissal from her employment. Bad
faith involves a state of mind dominated by ill will or motive.It implies a conscious and intentional design to
do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity. [18] Petitioner Danilo Litonjua showed ill
will in treating respondent Vigan in a very unfair and cruel manner which made her suffer anxieties by
reason of such job difficulties. The report to work notices sent by petitioners to respondent Vigan was just
part of the ploy to make it appear that the latter abandoned her work but in reality, Vigan was barred from
entering her work premises. We fully subscribe to respondents position that petitioners action was for the
purpose of removing her from her employment. Respondent Vigan is also entitled to exemplary damages
as her dismissal was effected in an oppressive and malevolent manner. [19]
We also find that there is a basis for the award of attorneys fees. It is settled that in actions for
recovery of wages or where an employee was forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his rights
and interest, he is entitled to an award of attorneys fees.[20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 20,
2000 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Litonjua Group of Companies and Eddie Litonjua are
dropped as parties in the instant case.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148912. September 10, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. TIMOTEO ESCARLOS, alias Tomy, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

By interposing self-defense, herein appellant admits authorship of the killing. Thus, shifted to him is
the burden of proof showing that the killing was justified. Despite his failure to prove self-defense, he may
be convicted only of homicide, not murder, because of the inability of the prosecution to establish any
qualifying circumstance. Here, treachery is negated by the victims awareness of the impending attack.
The Case
For automatic review before the Court is the May 29, 2001 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Branch 46) in Criminal Case No. U-10792, finding appellant guilty of murder
beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing him to death.The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered CONVICTING beyond reasonable doubt accused Timoteo
Escarlos of the crime of Murder and the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; he is likewise
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Antonio Balisacan the sum of P28,650.00 as actual damages, the sum
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and the further sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to prepare the mittimus.
The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta City, is
hereby ordered to deliver the living body of Timoteo Escarlos to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa
City, immediately upon receipt of this Decision.[2]
The Information[3] dated August 29, 2000, charged appellant as follows:
That on or about July 1, 2000, in the evening, at Barangay Dumanpot, Asingan, Pangasinan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a sharp pointed bladed
weapon, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hold and stab from behind Brgy. Kgd. Antonio Balisacan,
inflicting upon him the following injuries:
External Findings:
(1) Stab wound located below right clavicle measuring 3 inches length and 8 inches depth.
(2) Stab wound located at left armpit measuring 4 [inches] length and 6 inches depth.
(3) Stab wound located at mid lumbar area measuring 3 inches length and 4 inches depth
(4) Stab wound located between right first and second finger measuring 3 inches length.
Internal Findings:
(1) Cutting of the upper and lower lobe of the right lung.
(2) Cutting of the lower lobe of the left lung.
which injuries directly caused the death of said Brgy. Kgd. Antonio Balisacan, to the damage and prejudice
of his heirs.
Contrary to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7659. [4]
During his arraignment on November 8, 2000, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, [5] pleaded
not guilty to the charge.[6] After trial in due course, he was found guilty by the lower court.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the factual version of the prosecution as follows:

Around 9 oclock in the evening of July 1, 2000, Antonio Balisacan went to the residence of Jaime Ulep in
Domampot, Asingan, Pangasinan to attend a benefit dance which was near the place. In the benefit dance
was his son Crisanto Balisacan, who attended the dance with his friends. Crisanto stood beside the emcee,
Ceasario Escarlos, appellants brother. While Ceasario was calling the victim, Antonio Balisacan, to come to
the the stage as he was a kagawad, Crisanto heard the people at his back shout Ay!. Five (5) to six (6)
meters at his back, with the place [illuminated] by a 50 to 100 watts bulb, he saw appellant stab his father,
Antonio, several times. Crisanto was momentarily shocked that he was not able to react. When appellant
fled, Crisanto came to his senses and ran to Antonio. Antonio was still alive so he brought him to Urdaneta
Sacred Heart Hospital where he expired a few minutes after arrival.
Jesus Dismaya was also beside Ceasario when Antonio Balisacans name was called. When he heard people
shout, he turned around and saw from a distance of four (4) meters appellant stabbing Antonio four (4)
times with a ten (10) inch-long knife. He then called Antonios brother, [Marcelo] Balisacan.
Within the vicinity was Antonios brother, Marcelo Balisacan. He was in the Asingan-Urdaneta road, which
was about fifteen (15) meters outside Uleps yard when he heard people shout and run from the benefit
dance. Wanting to know what was happening, he went to the benefit dance and saw that Antonio was
stabbed. He went near Antonio, hugged him, and asked who stabbed him. He replied, Tomy Escarlos.
Meanwhile around 9:30 of the same evening of July 1, 2000. SPO1 Patricio Badua was on duty. He received
a phone call about a stabbing incident in a benefit dance in Domampot, Asingan, Pangasinan. When he
went to the scene of the crime, the victim, Antonio Balisacan was already in the hospital and appellant had
already fled. He later learn[ed] that Antonio died.
Dr. Noemi Taganas conducted an autopsy on Antonios body and found:
External Findings:
(1) Stab wound located below the right clavicle measuring 3 inches length (in) and 8 inches
(in) depth.
(2) Stab wound located at left armpit measuring 4 inches length and 6 inches depth.
(3) Stab wound located at mid lumbar area measuring 3 inches length and 4 inches depth
(4) Stab wound located between right first and second finger measuring 3 inches length.
Internal Findings:
(1) Cutting of the upper and lower lobe of the right lung.
(2) Cutting of the lower lobe of the left lung.
She later issued a death certificate. She stated in court that out of the four (4) stab wounds, Antonios
second stab wound was fatal because the lungs were penetrated.
Dr. Ronald Bandonil, an NBI medico-legal officer confirmed Taganas autopsy report. He also conducted an
autopsy on the exhumed body of Antonio. In his autopsy he found that Antonios first and second wounds
were fatal as these caused his death due to hypovalmic shock or massive blood loss. [7] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant, on the other hand, relates his version of the facts in this manner:
On the night of July 1, 2000, accused TIMOTEO ESCARLOS together with Rexie Yabes, Fredo Ramos, Erwin
Ramos, Rowena Alamigo and others were at the yard of Jaime Ulep, in Purok Inanama, Domanpot Asingan,
Pangasinan watching a benefit dance sponsored by Mr. & Mrs. Organization. He was invited to buy lechon
during the benefit dance.
While thereat, Kgd. Antonio Balisacan who was then drunk, passed in front of accused and told him, You
are here again to create trouble. Accused was offended so he answered back saying Why do you say that
to me when I am not doing any trouble here. Antonio Balisacan told him, OKINNAM KETDI (vulva of your
Mother) and without warning boxed him. Timoteo was hit on the forehead, which left a scar on his forehead
about an inch above the right eyebrow. He intended to box back but he noticed that the victim was pulling
out a kitchen knife, so for fear of his life, he grabbed the weapon from Antonio Balisacan and used the
knife in stabbing the latter who was hit at the side below the left armpit. He stabbed him twice and when
the victim was about to fall down, he was able to hit him for the third time.
The weapon that Timoteo was able to get from Antonio was a kitchen knife about 10 to 12 inches.Antonio
drew the knife from his left side. Timoteo was able to get hold of the handle of the knife when he grappled
for the same from the victim, by taking hold of the knife with his right hand and stabbed Antonio who was
intending to stab him. Antonio was one (1) inch taller than accused.
Timoteos testimony was corroborated by an eyewitness, CESARIO ESCARLOS, the brother of Timoteo and
president of the Mr. & Mrs. Association which sponsored the benefit dance on July 1, 2000.
On the night of July 1, 2000, Cesario Escarlos was at the yard of Jaime Ulep. At about 9:00 oclock in the
evening of the said date, he saw his brother Timoteo Escarlos together with Dexie Yabis standing in a
corner watching the dance. Several minutes later Kgd. Antonio Balisacan arrived and later on, while
Cesario was on his way to urinate. He heard Antonio uttered to Timoteo ADDA CAYO MANEN NGA
AGARAMED TI NILOLOCON. While relieving himself, he heard both Timoteo and Antonio arguing and before
he could get near and pacify them, he saw them wrestling with each other. Many people were around but
nobody pacified them. Next minute he saw Antonio bloodied and lying on the ground. There were at least
100 people then and might have seen the incident. He noticed that Jesus Dismaya was there but the latter
did not do anything. Cesario, after the incident only stayed there for 3 minutes because he was looking for
his three year-old daughter.In the meantime, nobody touched the body of the victim. [8]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court believed that the prosecutions evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of murder
qualified by treachery. It rejected his plea of self-defense, because there had been no unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim.
x x x. The established facts revealed that the victim was one of the persons who filed a case of malicious
mischief against [appellant]. Said case was filed five (5) months before the instant case happened. To the
mind of the Court, the accused only found a way of avenging what he felt towards the victim. He took
advantage of that x x x particular time and place to let out his feelings in the presence of his barangay
mates. Such hidden grudge by the accused against the victim, established the motive of the former.
xxxxxxxxx
The second element of self-defense is also lacking. The nature, location and the number of wounds
inflicted on the victim belie and negate the accused[s] claim of self-defense. The post mortem findings of
the autopsy report showed that the victim sustained four stab wounds.
If there is any truth to the accused[s] claim of self-defense, he would not have stabbed him several
times. [Worse,] the location of the wounds suggested that the accused was at the back of the victim when
the wounds were inflicted. It is therefore evident from the conduct of the accused that he was determined
to kill the victim and did not just act to defend himself. In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to
discuss the third element.[9]
Hence, this automatic review.[10]
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our consideration:
1. The honorable trial court erred in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance despite
failure of the prosecution to prove its attendance.
2. The honorable trial court erred in not finding that the testimony of the supposed eyewitnesses
for the prosecution as to the attendance of treachery is flawed and unworthy of belief.

3. The honorable trial court erred in not giving exculpatory weight to the theory of self-defense
interpose[d] by the accused-appellant.
4. The honorable trial court committed a grave and serious error in not finding that the victim
[was] the first to assault accused.
5. The honorable trial court erred in considering motive to establish the guilt of the accused.
6. The honorable court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of murder instead of acquitting
him or at most convicting him of homicide.[11]
These issues boil down to four: (1) sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence, (2) viability of self-
defense, (3) appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance, and (4) propriety of the penalty and
the damages imposed by the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence
Although appellant did not directly raise the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence as an issue, this
Court nonetheless deliberated on it motu proprio, because an automatic appeal in a criminal action opens
the whole case for review. Indeed, the strength of the prosecutions evidence must be passed upon,
especially in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed by the trial court.[12] We have carefully
examined the evidence for the prosecution and found that the fact of killing and the identity of the killer
were duly established beyond reasonable doubt.
Prosecution Witness Crisanto Balisacan, son of the victim, testified on the stabbing incident, which had
occurred during a benefit dance on that fateful night of July 1, 2000.The witness testimony is as follows:
COURT:
You go to the main point.
ATTY. VELASCO:
While there, did you observe or did you see if there was any unusual incident that took place?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: What was that unusual incident you have seen and observed?
A: Stabbing incident, your Honor.
COURT:
Who was stabbed?
ATTY. VELASCO:
Who was the victim of that stabbing?
A: My father.
Q: Who stabbed him?
A: Mr. Timoteo Tomy Escarlos, the accused in this case, your Honor.

Q: Will you please focus your eyes within this Honorable Court and tell us whether the person you
said who stabbed your father by the name of Timoteo Escarlos is in the premises of this
Honorable Court?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you please stand up and point to him?
A: The first one, your Honor (Witness is pointing unto a person seated on the bench inside the
courtroom, who, when his name was asked, he answered Timoteo Escarlos).
Q: How long have you been acquainted with the accused Timoteo Escarlos?
A: About ten years, your Honor.
Q: He is also from Domampot?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: Considering that it is already about 9:20-9:30 oclock in the evening when this stabbing incident
took place, how can you be sure that it was Timoteo Escarlos who stabbed your father?
A: There was x x x light, your Honor.
Q: What kind of light are you trying to say?
A: 50100 watts bulb.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. VELASCO:
Did you see the spot where your father was actually stabbed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How far is this place where your father was stabbed in relation to the entrance of the dance
arena.
A: About 5 to 6 meters at my back, your Honor.
Q: And at that distance, what happened next while you were watching?
A: I heard shouting.
Q: These shouting that you heard, where did they come from?
A: From my back.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
What is that shouting about?
ATTY. VELASCO:
You heard shoutin[g], according to you, what did you hear, if you know?
A: About the incident.

COURT:
Tell [us] exactly what you heard[.]
A: I heard shouting, Ay!
Q: How many people shouted, Ay?
A: Many, your Honor, because that was a benefit dance.
ATTY. VELASCO:
When you heard shoutin[g], what did you do, if any?
A: I turned my head to my back.
Q: When you focused your attention and sight at your back, what happened next?
A: I saw stabbing. I saw my father stabbed by Timoteo Escarlos, your Honor. [13] (Italics supplied)
Undoubtedly, the factual premises with regard to the killing and its commission by appellant are clear
and undisputed. He did not at all deny the allegations against him and openly admitted that he had killed
the victim. However, he interposes self-defense to seek his exoneration from criminal liability.
Second Issue:
Plea of Self-Defense
In pleading self-defense, appellant asserts that it was the victim who initially approached and
assaulted him. Allegedly, the former had no choice but to defend himself under the circumstances. In his
testimony before the trial court, he described the confrontation that had led to the fatal killing as follows:
Q: And while you were there at the yard of Jaime Ulep on that night of July 1, 2000 do you
remember having seen the person of one Kgd. Antonio Balisacan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did he see you also?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did you happen to see him?
A: When he passed in front of me he uttered in a loud voice you are here again to create trouble
(ADDA KA MANEN DITOY NGA AGARAMID TI NILILOKO).
Q: To whom did Antonio Balisacan utter these words?
A: I, sir.
Q: And you said it was uttered in a loud manner, how far were you when he uttered these words?
A: More or less 3 to 4 meters, sir.
Q: What did you say?
A: I was offended, sir.
Q: And do you know the physical appearance of Antonio Balisacan when he mentioned those
words to you?

A: As if he was drunk, sir.
Q: What made you say that as if he was drunk?
A: I smell his breath, sir.
Q: How did you react later when Antonio Balisacan uttered those words to you?
A: I said: Why do you say that to me when I am not doing any trouble here.
Q: By the way, when Antonio Balisacan said those words to you, were you doing anything that
time?
A: None, sir.
Q: What happened later on when you answered Brgy. Kgd. Antonio Balisacan?
A: He said: OKINNAM KETDI (vulva of your mother) and then he boxed me, sir.
Q: Were you hit?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What part of your body was hit?
A: This one on my forehead, sir. (Witness is pointing on his forehead).
Q: Were you injured?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What injury did you suffer?
A: My forehead was injured (Witness is pointing a [to] a scar on his forehead about an inch at the
right above the right eyecrow).
Q: And what did you do after you were boxed by Antonio Balisacan?
A: When I intend to box him I noticed that he withdrew a balisong and I tried to grab and used the
balisong in stabbing, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
How many times did you stab him?
A: Two times but when he was about to fall down I was able to hit him once for the third time, sir.
Q: You said that he drew a knife, where did he draw the knife?
A: At his left side, sir.
Q: What kind of weapon did he draw?
A: I sized it to be a kitchen knife, sir.
Q: Could you tell the Honorable Court the length of that knife to include the handle?
A: 10 to 12 inches, sir.

Q: And how did you grapple for the possession of that knife?
A: I was able to hold the handle of the kitchen knife, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: What prompted you to stab him considering that you already got hold [of] the knife from him?
A: Yes, sir, because he intend[ed] to stab me, so, when I had possession of the knife I stabbed him,
sir.[14] (Italics supplied)
We stress that when the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted from the
prosecution to the defense. Thus, the latter assumes the responsibility of establishing this plea by clear
and convincing evidence.[15] Upon its shoulders rests the duty of proving, to the satisfaction of the trial
court, the justifying circumstance of self-defense.[16]
The implications of pleading self-defense insofar as the burden of proof is concerned was explained by
the Court in Macalino v. People,[17] from which we quote:
In pleading self-defense, petitioner in effect admitted that he stabbed the victim. It was then incumbent
upon him to prove that justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, relying on the strength of
his evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. The reason is that even if the prosecution
evidence were weak, such could not be disbelieved after petitioner admitted the fact of stabbing the
victim.[18]
The accused who avers that the killing arose from an impulse of self-defense has theonus probandi of
proving the elements thereof. [19] The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.
[20]
Verily, to invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack
that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant
by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.[21]
Unlawful Aggression
on the Part of the Victim
In the present case, appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
when the latter unceremoniously boxed him on the forehead in the heat of their argument. Appellant adds
that he had initially thought of hitting back when he noticed that the victim was pulling out a kitchen
knife. Hence, to save his life, the former grabbed the weapon and used it to stab the latter. Appellant
insists that under the circumstances, he was legally justified in using the knife to ward off the unlawful
aggression. For him to wait for the knife to be raised and to fall on him before acting to defend himself
would be asking too much, he argues.
The contentions of appellant are untenable. While the victim may be said to have initiated the
confrontation, we do not subscribe to the view that the former was subjected to an unlawful
aggression within the legal meaning of the phrase.
The alleged assault did not come as a surprise, as it was preceded by a heated exchange of words
between the two parties who had a history of animosity. Moreover, the alleged drawing of a knife by the
victim could not have placed the life of appellant in imminent danger. The former might have done it only
to threaten or intimidate the latter.
Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger --not merely
threatening and intimidating action.[22] Uncertain, premature and speculative was the assertion of
appellant that the victim was about to stab him, when the latter had merely drawn out his knife. There is
aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life. The peril sought to be
avoided must be imminent and actual, not just speculative.[23]
Even assuming arguendo that there was an altercation before the stabbing incident and that some
danger did in fact exist, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment appellant disarmed
the victim by wresting the knife from the latter. After the former had successfully seized it, there was no
longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill the latter. Hence,
appellant became the unlawful aggressor when he stabbed the victim. [24]
When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has
no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor. [25] To be sure, when the present victim no longer
persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no longer in peril, there
was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of appellant.
[26]
Undoubtedly, the latter went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict
excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on the latter, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had
already ceased.
Reasonable Necessity of the
Means Employed to Prevent
or Repel the Attack
Appellant argues that in the heat of the encounter, he was not in a position to calculate or determine
the effects of his blows, and that it was nevertheless necessary for him to inflict them in order to save his
own life.
As correctly held by the trial court, the nature, the number and the location of the wounds inflicted
upon the victim were important indicia disproving self-defense.[27] The claim of appellant that only two of
the four stab wounds were fatal is of no moment, inasmuch as the means he employed was glaringly
disproportionate to the perceived unlawful aggression. He admitted in his testimony that he had stabbed
the victim for the third time, even when the latter was about to fall.
The means employed by a person invoking self-defense must be reasonably commensurate to the
nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, as held by the Court in People v. Obordo:[28]
Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, accused-appellant
likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homers punch was reasonable. The means
employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of
attack and the defense. Accused-appellant claimed that the victim punched him and was trying to get
something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. His act of
immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a wound on a vital part of the victims body was unreasonable
and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by accused-appellant himself, the victim used his bare fist in
throwing a punch at him.[29]
Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to
prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.[30]
Unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of self-
defense.[31] Unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no self-
defense, complete or incomplete, on the part of the latter. If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other
two requisites of self-defense will have no basis.[32]
Third Issue:
Appreciation of Qualifying Circumstances
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim, thus depriving the latter of any real chance to put up a defense, and
thereby ensuring the commission of the attack without risk to the aggressor. [33] Treachery requires the
concurrence of two conditions: (1) the employment of a means of execution that gives the person attacked
no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means
of execution.[34]
There is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated exchange of words between the
accused and the victim; or when the victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former. [35]

In the instant case, the verbal and physical squabble prior to the attack proves that there was no
treachery, and that the victim was aware of the imminent danger to his life. [36]Moreover, the prosecution
failed to establish that appellant had deliberately adopted a treacherous mode of attack for the purpose of
depriving the victim of a chance to fight or retreat.[37]
Certainly, the victim knew that his scuffle with appellant could eventually turn into a violent physical
clash. The existence of a struggle before the fatal blows were inflicted on the victim clearly shows that he
was forewarned of the impending attack, and that he was afforded the opportunity to put up a defense.
[38]
Indeed, a killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous. Moreover, any doubt as to the
existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused. [39]
In People v. Cario,[40] we modified the trial courts decision and ruled that the crime committed was only
homicide, because the qualifying circumstance of treachery had not been clearly established. Thus, the
Court declared:
However, we agree with the OSGs recommendation that appellant be held liable only for homicide, not
murder. In this case, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not conclusively established.For
treachery to exist, the following requisites must be met: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was
not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him. The facts show that Edmundo was placed on guard concerning
a possible assault by Pedro. First, there was a heated argument between them at the place of the
wake. Second, Edmundo was not unaware that he and Rolando were followed outside by appellant, who
did not adopt any means to conceal himself or hide his intention of confronting Edmundo. Third, the
abrasions and contusions on Edmundos face show that Edmundo was able to put up a fight before he was
fatally stabbed. These circumstances negate the existence of treachery in the commission of the offense.
[41]
As in People v. Cario, the Office of the Solicitor General recommended in this case that appellant be
convicted of homicide only, inasmuch as the qualifying circumstance of treachery had not been sufficiently
established.[42]
The trial court correctly ruled that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not
present in the killing. Essentially, there is evident premeditation when the execution of a criminal act is
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out a criminal intent within a space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. [43]Obviously, the acts of appellant in the present case can
hardly be described as a product of reflective thought or deliberate planning towards a decisive resolve to
kill the victim. On the contrary, the confrontation that escalated to a violent brawl was quite spontaneous,
casual and incidental. Verily, the brutal killing was not the result of a previous plot or sinister design to end
the life of the victim.
The elements of evident premeditation are as follows: (a) the time when the accused decided to
commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to the determination to
commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of a period of time, between the determination and the subsequent
execution of the crime, sufficient to allow the accused an opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of
the act.[44] As found by the trial court, the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to establish any
of the foregoing requisites. To be sure, when there is no showing how and when the plan to kill was decided
or how much time had elapsed before the crime was carried out, there is no evident premeditation. [45]
In a criminal prosecution -- especially in cases involving the extreme penalty of death -- nothing but
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the accused is
charged must be established.[46]
Fourth Issue:
Proper Penalty and Award of Damages
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There
being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the appropriate penalty should be reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Appellant is likewise entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.

The trial court awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000, but failed to awardP50,000 as civil
indemnity for the death of the victim. Moral damages cannot be granted in the absence of proof therefor.
[47]
Unlike in rape cases, this type of award is not automatically given in murder or homicide. The
prosecution was, however, able to prove actual damages in the sum of P28,650. The award of exemplary
damages should be omitted considering that no aggravating circumstance was duly proven. [48]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is MODIFIED. Appellant is held guilty of homicide and sentenced
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor medium, as minimum; to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. He shall also pay the heirs of the victim
the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P28,650 as actual damages, consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence.[49] The grant of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 121998 March 9, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TEODORICO CLEOPAS and FLORENCIO PIRAME, accused, FLORENCIO PIRAME, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated January 5, 1995, of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 1, in
Criminal Case No. 8343 finding the accused Teodorico Cleopas and Florencio Pirame guilty of murder
beyond reasonable doubt.1
The facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
The factual findings of the Court based on the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and
the defense are, as follows, to wit:
a) That in morning of March 18, 1993 near the house of Demetrio Cleopas, father of the accused
Teodorico Cleopas and Epifanio Cleopas at Barangay Tubog, Ubay, Bohol, the eye-witness Cipriano
Supero saw the victim in the instant case Pedro Torrenueva while being held by the accused
Florencio Perame (sic) the accused Epifanio Cleopas struck him with an iron pipe and by the
accused Teodorico Cleopas with a piece of wood, hitting the aforementioned victim Pedro
Torrenueva on the forehead, which, as a consequence, fell on the ground dead;
b) That to cover the discovery of the commission of the crime the dead body of the victim Pedro
Torrenueva was buried in the well near the house of Demetrio Cleopas father of the accused
Epifanio Cleopas who is still at large and the accused Teodorico Cleopas;
c) That the testimony of the other witnesses for the prosecution SPO2 Sabeniano Atopan, Candida
Cosip, Evelyn Torrenueva and Pedro Acquiat viewed in their totality with the testimony of the eye-
witness Cipriano Supero points to the accused Teodorico Cleopas, Epifanio Cleopas and Florencio
Pirame as the perepetrators (sic) of the crime as charged. 2
On May 13, 1993, the three accused, Teodorico Cleopas, Epifanio Cleopas and Florencio Pirame, were
charged with the crime of murder under the following information:
That on or about the 18th day of March, 1993, in the municipality of Ubay, province of Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, armed with stainless pipe and a
piece of wood, with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and strike one Pedro Torrenueva who was
unarmed and unaware thereof with the said stainless pipe and piece of wood thereby inflicting fatal
injuries on the different parts of the victim's body which resulted to his immediate death; to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased to be proved during the trial of the
case.1wphi1.nt
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. 3
Upon arraignment, Florencio Pirame and Teodorico Cleopas entered a plea of not guilty. Epifanio Cleopas
was not arraigned, being at large.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) SPO2 Sabiniano Atupan, who led the police team
that conducted the investigation of the killing: (2) Dr. Arnold Cagulada, the Municipal Health Officer of
Ubay, Bohol, who examined the cavader of the victim; (3) Candida Cusip, 5 an aunt of the victim ventured
towards the house of accused Teodorico Cleopas on the day of the incident; (4) Evelyn Torrenueva, the wife
of the victim, who corroborated the testimony of Cusip and testified as to the damages incurred by her due
to her husband's death; (5) Pedro Acquiat, who joined the police in the search for the victim's body; and (6)
Cipriano Supero, the alleged eyewitness to the killing who identified all the three accused as the victim's
assailants.
In turn, the defense presented accused Teodorico Cleopas and appellant Florencio Pirame, who both
testified on their behalf.
On January 5, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch I, rendered its decision finding
Teodorico Cleopas and Florencio Pirame guilty of the crime of murder. It disposed:
PREMISES, CONSIDERED, the Court finds the accused Teodorico Cleopas and Florencio Pirame guilty
of the crime of Murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences
each one of them to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessories of the
law and to pay the cost.
The accused Teodorico Cleopas and Florencio Pirame are further ordered to indemnify the surviving
spouse of the deceased victim Pedro Torrenueva in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) each and the amount of Twenty Three Thousand Fourteen (sic) Pesos (23,214.00)
representing burial and incidental expenses and Fifty Thousand Pesos each (P50,000) representing
moral and exemplary damages and in all instances without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
It appearing that the accused in the instant case Teodorico Cleopas and Florencio Pirame have
undergone preventive imprisonment they are entitled to the full time of their preventive
imprisonment to be deducted from their term of sentence if they have not executed a waiver
otherwise they will only be entitled to 4/5 of the time have undergone preventive imprisonment to
be deducted from their term of sentence if they have not executed a waiver.
The foregoing separate Decision does not affect the accused Epifanio Cleopas who is still at large
who will be tried separately as soon as he shall have been arrested.
SO ORDERED.6
Only Florencio Pirame appealed from the decision of the trial court. He assigns the following errors in his
brief:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN RELYING ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE
EVIDENCE RATHER THAN ON THE STRENGTH OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION IN FINDING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT PIRAME GUILTY OF MURDER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES CIPRIANO SUPERO AND CANDIDA CUCIP IMPLICATING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FLORENCIO PIRAME IN THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THEIR MANIFEST
UNBELIEVABLE, IMPROBABLE AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY. 7
In his brief, appellant alleges that the declaration of Demetrio Cleopas, both in the course of police
investigation and in a sworn statement, to the effect that his two sons were responsible for the killing did
not make any mention of him, hence, he should not have been implicated. Such declaration, appellant
contends, as made in the sworn statement, should have been considered by the trial court as part of
the res gestae. In addition, he urges that the trial court should have considered the testimony of accused
Teodorico Cleopas, who testified that he did not see appellant on the date of the incident. He also contends
that contrary to the trial court's view, there was no "uniting point" or corroboration between the
testimonies of Cipriano Supero, the alleged eyewitness to the incident, and that of the other prosecution
witnesses. Supero's testimony, he further claims, should not have been considered by the trial court as this
witness was a coached and rehearsed witness, who testified only two months after the incident, and whose
testimony is allegedly not worthy of belief. Appellant also asserts that while he invokes the weak defense
of alibi, the evidence against him is likewise weak, and did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Lastly, appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding him to be a co-conspirator of the other two
accused.
In its brief, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the positive identification by prosecution
witness Cipriano Supero of appellant at the scene of the crime should prevail over appellant's denial and
alibi. It further argues that a conspiracy to kill the victim was present.
Taken together, these contentions of appellant and the appellee point to one, issue, which is the credibility
of witnesses in this case. We find that credibility preponderates in favor of the prosecution, and against the
appellant.
Appellant makes much of the testimony of prosecution witness SPO2 Atupan. This witness testified that in
the course of police investigation, Demetrio Cleopas, father of accused Teodorico and Epifanio Cleopas,
said that his two sons were responsible for the killing, Demetrio reiterated the same allegation in a sworn
statement made before the Ubay Police on March 24, 1993, 8 which appellant also relies upon to support
his claim of innocence. This particular allegation in the sworn statement, appellant urges, should be
considered as part of the res gestae, as it "grew out of the main fact, shed light upon it, and which are (sic)
unpremeditated, spontaneous, and made at a time so near, subsequent to the main act, as to exclude the
idea of deliberation and fabrication.9
This assertion made by Demetrio Cleopas in his sworn statement is not part of the res gestae. Res
gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are
such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of
the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement. 10 The allegations made by Demetrio Cleopas in his sworn statement were not made
immediately after the killing of the victim. They were made on March 24, 1993, or six days after the killing
of the victim on March 18. As we have held that a statement given a day after the incident in answer to
questions propounded in an investigation cannot be considered part of the res gestae, 11 so too with the
declarations of Demetrio Cleopas in his sworn statement.
Moreover, resort to the very sworn statement invoked by appellant would reveal that Demetrio Cleopas
himself was in no position to identify all the perpetrators of the crime. The pertinent portion of the
statement reads as follows:
Q: Do you remember where were you on March 18, 1993?
A: Yes, I was in our nipa hut near our house.
Q: What were (sic) the unusual incident that you have witness (sic) on that day; (sic)
A: On March 18, 1993 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning more or less. I heard a shout from my wife
that's why I went near to her and what I have seen was a man lying on the ground which in my
belief was already dead.
Q: What was the cause of death of that person?
A: When I asked my son Epifanio Cleopas alias "Paning" what was that incident and he answered
that they mutually struck him because he boxed one on (sic) my son named Teodorico Cleopas @
"Tidoy". 12
It is clear that Demetrio Cleopas did not see the actual killing of the victim. He only learned of the details
of the killing from his son Epifanio. Thus, SPO2 Atupan's testimony that Demetrio Cleopas named his sons
as the perpetrators of the crime, without mention of appellant Florencio Pirame, and which declaration was
based on Epifanio Cleopas' admission of guilt for the killing, is in effect hearsay twice removed. It cannot
be used to absolve appellant of his participation in the crime. Further still, the testimony of used Teodorico
Cleopas that he never saw appellant on the date of the incident, 13 does not support the declarations of
Demetrio Cleopas, as Teodorico's testimony cannot be expected to implicate a co-accused, being self-
serving as it is.
Appellant next assails the trial court's dictum to the effect that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, viewed in their totality, point to the guilt of all three accused, including appellant. 14 He claims
that it was only Cipriano Supero who testified that he saw appellant hold the arms of the victim while the
other two accused hit him on the head with a stick and a not steel pipe. This, he asserts, was not
corroborated by any other prosecution witness, hence there was no "unifying point" in their testimonies.
That the testimony of Supero was not corroborated by any other witness is no moment. It is axiomatic that
the testimonies of witnesses are weighed, not numbered, and the testimony of a single witness may suffice
for conviction if found trustworthy and reliable. That the prosecution had only one eyewitness to implicate
appellant hardly negates its cause. There is no law, which requires that the testimony of a single witness
needs corroboration except where the law expressly mandates such corroboration. 15 Indeed, the testimony
of a single witness, when positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction even of murder. Hence,
a finding of guilt may be based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness when the trial court
finds such testimony positive and credible. 16
On this score, appellant that the testimony of Cipriano Supero should not have been considered by the trial
court, as Supero is allegedly a coached and rehearsed witness. In effect, appellant assails Supero's
credibility. He points out that on direct examination, Supero initially stated that the killing took place
"inside the house of Demetrio Cleopas", but later on modified his answer to clarify that the victim was
killed "outside the house." 17 In addition, appellant emphasizes that it took Supero two months after the
death of the victim to come out and volunteer to two testify as to what he had seen transpire on the
morning of March 18, 1993. Appellant asserts that this delay further proves that Supero was a rehearsed
witness.
These contentions are without merit. The initial lapse in Supero's testimony as to whether the crime was
committed inside or outside of the house of Demetrio Cleopas was eventually settled by the trial court
when it asked clarificatory questions. Supero was nonetheless able to testify on the actual killing of the
victim, as well as identify all the perpetrators of the crime. The earlier inconsistency in his testimony, slight
as it is, cannot suffice to impeach this witness. Settled is the rule that inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of
their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Although there may be inconsistencies on
minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating
the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants. Slight contradictions in fact even
serve to strengthen the sincerity of the witness and prove that his testimony is not rehearsed. They are
safeguards against memorized perjury. 18
Further still, the delay of Supero in volunteering to testify on the incident is of little consequence. At the
time Supero witnessed the killing, all he saw was the striking of the victim by the assailants while appellant
held the victim's arms. The victim then fell to the ground, motionless. Thereafter, Supero left, fearful of
what he had seen.19 He did not divulge this to anyone else except his mother, for they were afraid of being
involved in that matter.20
At the time he witnessed the incident, Supero was not aware that the victim had died as a result of the
assault. He came to know that the victim died only two months after, when word spread that the body of
the victim was discovered in the well of Demetrio Cleopas. 21 Upon learning of the victim's fate, he came
forward to reveal what he had seen when he testified in open court. Hence, appellant cannot claim that
Supero's report and testimony on the incident was belatedly made. Thus, the two-month delay in reporting
the account of the eyewitness in this case does not give rise to any doubt on the veracity thereof. As we
have held, the belated report and the reluctance of witnesses to testify in criminal actions is a matter of
judicial notice. 22
Against Supero's positive identification of appellant as the person who held the hands of the victim while
accused Teodorico and Epifanio Cleopas struck him, appellant advanced the defense of alibi. He testified

that he was harvesting palay the whole day at Barangay Corazon, San Miguel, Bohol on March 18,
1993. 23 The distance of the house of Demetrio Cleopas from his house, which is located at the center of
Barangay Corazon, 24 was estimated by him to be seven kilometers. 25 We find this distance of seven
kilometers to be less than sufficient for purposes of an air-tight alibi. Alibi is an affirmative defense and,
considering that it is easy to conduct, when an accused relies thereon, he has the burden of proving it, i.e.,
that he could not have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. For alibi to prosper, an
accused must prove that not only was he absent at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission,
but also that it was physically impossible for him to be so situated at said instance. 26 This, appellant failed
to do, more so when his claim that he was harvesting palay on the day the killing took place was not
corroborated by anyone else.
Appellant asserts that the trial erred in finding appellant a conspirator, hence guilty of murder beyond
reasonable doubt. We find the trial court's finding of the existence of a conspiracy to kill the victim well-
taken. Cipriano Supero's testimony discloses that appellant held the victim's arms in a cross-wise manner
while Epifanio and Teodorico Cleopas struck the victim on the forehead with a steel pipe and a long piece
of wood, respectively. Thereafter, the victim fell to the ground. 27 These concurrent actions of appellant and
his co-accused reveal a mutual intention and determination to kill the victim, an indicator of conspiracy.
Conspiracy, in order to exist, does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
commission of the crime; it exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the
same purpose and was united in its execution. 28 The fact that appellant conspired in the commission of
the crime charged was sufficiently and convincingly shown by his active participation in holding the victim
to render him immobile, thus enabling the other two accused to consummate their dastardly act of killing
the victim. 29
We note, however, that the trial court in its decision did not make any definitive finding on the
circumstances which qualified the crime to murder. While the information charging appellant and the other
accused alleged that the commission of the crime was attended by treachery, evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, the court did not expound upon or point to the existence of these aggravating
circumstances in the case at bar. In other words, it did not state its basis for qualifying the crime to murder.
We are thus required to determine if the crime at bar could be qualified to murder, to resolve this appeal. It
is axiomatic that an appeal, once accepted by this Court, throws the entire case open to review, and that
this Court has the authority to review matters, not specifically raised or assigned as errors by the parties, if
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case. 30
In the present case, the prosecution alleged the attendance of treachery in the commission of the crime.
The requisites for treachery to be a qualifying circumstance are: (1) the employment means, method, or
manner of execution which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on
the part of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of execution. 31
Cipriano Supero testified that appellant Florencio Pirame held the arms of the victim while Epifanio and
Teodorico Cleopas struck the victim on the head, causing his death. The victim was defenseless during the
attack as his hands were restrained by appellant, facilitating the beating of the victim by the other
perpetrators. Clearly, the manner by which the victim was restrained and assaulted was deliberately and
consciously adopted by his assailants to ensure. Thus, there was treachery in the killing of the victim, as
the offenders employed means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tended directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the victim
might take. 32
The attendance of evident premeditation in the commission of the crime, though alleged in the
information, is not supported by the evidence, as there is no showing as to when appellant and his co-
accused determined to kill the victim. Likewise, abuse of superior strength, being absorbed by
treachery, 33 cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance in this case.
As treachery was resent when the victim as killed, we find that the crime of murder was committed by
appellant and his co-accused. At the time of the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty for
murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the killing, the applicable penalty would thus be the medium period of the
imposable penalty, which is reclusion perpetua. 34
We concur with the trial court's award of P50,000.00 each from appellant Florencio Pirame and co-accused
Teodorico Cleopas as death indemnity to the victim's heirs, which is in line with current jurisprudence. We

also find the amount of P23,214.00 awarded by the trial court as "burial and incidental expenses"
supported by the records. 35 The award of P50,000.00 from each accused as moral and exemplary
damages, however, is unsupported. The widow of the victim did not testify on any mental anguish or
emotional distress, which she suffered as a result of her husband's death. The absence of any generic
aggravating circumstance attending the crime likewise precludes the award of exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellant
Florencio Pirame of the crime of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and to pay the widow of
the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P23,214.00 as actual damages, as well as the costs is
AFFIRMED, but the award of P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is hereby DELETED, there being
no legal and factual basis therefor.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC., respondents.
PADILLA, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
dismissal of the petitioner's complaint to enforce the judgment of a Japanese court. The principal issue
here is whether a Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation doing business in
Japan by serving summons through diplomatic channels on the Philippine corporation at its principal office
in Manila after prior attempts to serve summons in Japan had failed.
Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter NORTHWEST), a corporation organized under the laws
of the State of Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to enforce in Civil Case No. 83-17637 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 54, Manila, a judgment rendered in its favor by a Japanese court against private respondent
C.F. Sharp & Company, Inc., (hereinafter SHARP), a corporation incorporated under Philippine laws.
As found by the Court of Appeals in the challenged decision of 10 November 1993, 1

the following are the
factual and procedural antecedents of this controversy:
On May 9, 1974, plaintiff Northwest Airlines and defendant C.F. Sharp & Company, through
its Japan branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby
the former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit the
proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff under the said
agreement, plaintiff on March 25, 1980 sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the
unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages.
On April 11, 1980, a writ of summons was issued by the 36th Civil Department, Tokyo District
Court of Japan against defendant at its office at the Taiheiyo Building, 3rd floor, 132,
Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohoma, Kanagawa Prefecture. The attempt to serve the
summons was unsuccessful because the bailiff was advised by a person in the office that Mr.
Dinozo, the person believed to be authorized to receive court processes was in Manila and
would be back on April 24, 1980.

On April 24, 1980, bailiff returned to the defendant's office to serve the summons. Mr.
Dinozo refused to accept the same claiming that he was no longer an employee of the
defendant.
After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the judge of the Tokyo District Court
decided to have the complaint and the writs of summons served at the head office of the
defendant in Manila. On July 11, 1980, the Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the
Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons through diplomatic channels upon the
defendant's head office in Manila.
On August 28, 1980, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of
summons (p. 276, Records). Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing. Thus, the Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the plaintiff's complaint and on
[January 29, 1981], rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum from August 28, 1980
up to and until payment is completed (pp. 12-14, Records).
On March 24, 1981, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the judgment.
Defendant not having appealed the judgment, the same became final and executory.
Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence, on May 20, 1983, a suit for
enforcement of the judgment was filed by plaintiff before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
Branch 54. 2
On July 16, 1983, defendant filed its answer averring that the judgment of the Japanese
Court sought to be enforced is null and void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having
been rendered without due and proper notice to the defendant and/or with collusion or fraud
and/or upon a clear mistake of law and fact (pp. 41-45, Rec.).
Unable to settle the case amicably, the case was tried on the merits. After the plaintiff
rested its case, defendant on April 21, 1989, filed a Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer to
Evidence based on two grounds:
(1) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction and
(2) the said judgment is contrary to Philippine law and public policy and rendered without
due process of law. Plaintiff filed its opposition after which the court a quo rendered the now
assailed decision dated June 21, 1989 granting the demurrer motion and dismissing the
complaint (Decision, pp. 376-378, Records). In granting the demurrer motion, the trial court
held that:
The foreign judgment in the Japanese Court sought in this action is null and
void for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant considering that
this is an action in personam; the Japanese Court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant because jurisprudence requires that the
defendant be served with summons in Japan in order for the Japanese Court to
acquire jurisdiction over it, the process of the Court in Japan sent to the
Philippines which is outside Japanese jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction
over the defendant in the case before the Japanese Court of the case at
bar. Boudard versus Tait 67 Phil. 170. The plaintiff contends that the Japanese
Court acquired jurisdiction because the defendant is a resident of Japan,
having four (4) branches doing business therein and in fact had a permit from
the Japanese government to conduct business in Japan (citing the exhibits
presented by the plaintiff); if this is so then service of summons should have
been made upon the defendant in Japan in any of these alleged four branches;
as admitted by the plaintiff the service of the summons issued by the
Japanese Court was made in the Philippines thru a Philippine Sheriff. This
Court agrees that if the defendant in a foreign court is a resident in the court
of that foreign court such court could acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant but it must be served upon the defendant in the territorial
jurisdiction of the foreign court. Such is not the case here because the
defendant was served with summons in the Philippines and not in Japan.

Unable to accept the said decision, plaintiff on July 11, 1989 moved for reconsideration of
the decision, filing at the same time a conditional Notice of Appeal, asking the court to treat
the said notice of appeal "as in effect after and upon issuance of the court's denial of the
motion for reconsideration."
Defendant opposed the motion for reconsideration to which a Reply dated August 28, 1989
was filed by the plaintiff.
On October 16, 1989, the lower court disregarded the Motion for Reconsideration and gave
due course to the plaintiff's Notice of Appeal. 3
In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. It agreed with the latter in its reliance
upon Boudard vs. Tait 4 wherein it was held that "the process of the court has no extraterritorial effect and
no jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the
state." To support its position, the Court of Appeals further stated:
In an action strictly in personam, such as the instant case, personal service of summons
within the forum is required for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant
(Magdalena Estate Inc. vs. Nieto, 125 SCRA 230). To confer jurisdiction on the court, personal
or substituted service of summons on the defendant not extraterritorial service is necessary
(Dial Corp vs. Soriano, 161 SCRA 739).
But while plaintiff-appellant concedes that the collection suit filed is an action in personam,
it is its theory that a distinction must be made between an action in personam against a
resident defendant and an action in personam against a non-resident defendant. Jurisdiction
is acquired over a non-resident defendant only if he is served personally within the
jurisdiction of the court and over a resident defendant if by personal, substituted or
constructive service conformably to statutory authorization. Plaintiff-appellant argues that
since the defendant-appellee maintains branches in Japan it is considered a resident
defendant. Corollarily, personal, substituted or constructive service of summons when made
in compliance with the procedural rules is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to render
judgment in personam.
Such an argument does not persuade.
It is a general rule that processes of the court cannot lawfully be served outside the
territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the court from which it issues (Carter vs. Carter; 41 S.E.
2d 532, 201) and this isregardless of the residence or citizenship of the party thus served
(Iowa-Rahr vs. Rahr, 129 NW 494, 150 Iowa 511, 35 LRC, NS, 292, Am. Case 1912 D680).
There must be actual service within the proper territorial limits on defendant or someone
authorized to accept service for him. Thus, a defendant, whether a resident or not in the
forum where the action is filed, must be served with summons within that forum.
But even assuming a distinction between a resident defendant and non-resident defendant
were to be adopted, such distinction applies only to natural persons and not in the
corporations. This finds support in the concept that "a corporation has no home or residence
in the sense in which those terms are applied to natural persons" (Claude Neon Lights vs.
Phil. Advertising Corp., 57 Phil. 607). Thus, as cited by the defendant-appellee in its brief:
Residence is said to be an attribute of a natural person, and can be predicated on an

artificial being only by more or less imperfect analogy. Strictly speaking, therefore, a
corporation can have no local residence or habitation. It has been said that a corporation is a
mere ideal existence, subsisting only in contemplation of law an invisible being which can
have, in fact, no locality and can occupy no space, and therefore cannot have a dwelling
place. (18 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 693 citing Kimmerle v. Topeka, 88 370, 128 p. 367; Wood v.
Hartfold F. Ins. Co., 13 Conn 202)
Jurisprudence so holds that the foreign or domestic character of a corporation is to be

determined by the place of its origin where its charter was granted and not by the location
of its business activities (Jennings v. Idaho Rail Light & P. Co., 26 Idaho 703, 146 p. 101), A
corporation is a "resident" and an inhabitant of the state in which it is incorporated and no
other (36 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 49).
Defendant-appellee is a Philippine Corporation duly organized under the Philippine laws.
Clearly, its residence is the Philippines, the place of its incorporation, and not Japan. While
defendant-appellee maintains branches in Japan, this will not make it a resident of Japan. A
corporation does not become a resident of another by engaging in business there even
though licensed by that state and in terms given all the rights and privileges of a domestic
corporation (Galveston H. & S.A.R. Co. vs. Gonzales, 151 US 496, 38 L ed. 248, 4 S Ct. 401).
On this premise, defendant appellee is a non-resident corporation. As such, court processes

must be served upon it at a place within the state in which the action is brought and not
elsewhere (St. Clair vs. Cox, 106 US 350, 27 L ed. 222, 1 S. Ct. 354). 5
It then concluded that the service of summons effected in Manila or beyond the territorial boundaries of
Japan was null and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Tokyo District Court over the person of SHARP;
hence, its decision was void.
Unable to obtain a reconsideration of the decision, NORTHWEST elevated the case to this Court contending
that the respondent court erred in holding that SHARP was not a resident of Japan and that summons on
SHARP could only be validly served within that country.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the
contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due
notice therein. 6
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a
foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed
by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the
presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official
duty.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its
validity.7 Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to
demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the
extraterritorial service of summons effected at its home office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual
but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore acquire jurisdiction over it.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a
defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. 8 In this case, it is the procedural
law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of
process on SHARP. As to what this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice
of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. 9 Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy
thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is
and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the
presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by
the Japanese court must stand.
Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese

law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption 10 may be invoked.
Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of
summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines,
service may be made: (1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2)
if there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect; or (3) on any
of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the designation is exclusive, and
service of summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him. 11
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government official designated by
law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance company; (b) the
Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Whenever service of process is so made, the government office or official served shall transmit by mail a
copy of the summons or other legal proccess to the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending
of such copy is a necessary part of the service. 12
SHARP contends that the laws authorizing service of process upon the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Superintendent of Banks, and the Insurance Commissioner, as the case may be,
presuppose a situation wherein the foreign corporation doing business in the country no longer has any
branches or offices within the Philippines. Such contention is belied by the pertinent provisions of the said
laws. Thus, Section 128 of the Corporation Code13 and Section 190 of the Insurance Code 14 clearly
contemplate two situations: (1) if the corporation had left the Philippines or had ceased to transact
business therein, and (2) if the corporation has no designated agent. Section 17 of the General Banking
Act 15 does not even speak a corporation which had ceased to transact business in the Philippines.
Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent authorized to receive court
processes in Japan. This silence could only mean, or least create an impression, that it had none. Hence,
service on the designated government official or on any of SHARP's officers or agents in Japan could be
availed of. The respondent, however, insists that only service of any of its officers or employees in its
branches in Japan could be resorted to. We do not agree. As found by the respondent court, two attempts
at service were made at SHARP's Yokohama branch. Both were unsuccessful. On the first attempt, Mr.
Dinozo, who was believed to be the person authorized to accept court process, was in Manila. On the
second, Mr. Dinozo was present, but to accept the summons because, according to him, he was no longer
an employee of SHARP. While it may be true that service could have been made upon any of the officers or
agents of SHARP at its three other branches in Japan, the availability of such a recourse would not preclude
service upon the proper government official, as stated above.
As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo District Court which ordered that summons for SHARP
be served at its head office in the Philippine's after the two attempts of service had failed. 16 The Tokyo
District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery of the summons and other legal
documents to the Philippines. Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons
together with the other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in turn, forwarded
the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila . Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the
Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, then to the Executive Judge of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to
serve the same on SHARP at its principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the proper
government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the
Corporation Code. Hence, SHARP's contention that such manner of service is not valid under Philippine
laws holds no water. 17
In deciding against the petitioner, the respondent court sustained the trial court's reliance on Boudard
vs. Tait 18where this Court held:
The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents, so as to sustain a

money judgment, must be based upon personal service within the state which renders the
judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
The process of a court, has no extraterritorial effect, and no jurisdiction is acquired over the
person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state. Nor has a
judgment of a court of a foreign country against a resident of this country having no
property in such foreign country based on process served here, any effect here against
either the defendant personally or his property situated here.
Process issuing from the courts of one state or country cannot run into another, and
although a nonresident defendant may have been personally served with such process in
the state or country of his domicile, it will not give such jurisdiction as to authorize a
personal judgment against him.
It further availed of the ruling in Magdalena Estate, Inc. vs. Nieto 19 and Dial Corp. vs. Soriano, 20
as well as
the principle laid down by the Iowa Supreme Court in the 1911 case of Raher vs. Raher. 21

The first three cases are, however, inapplicable. Boudard involved the enforcement of a judgment of the
civil division of the Court of First Instance of Hanoi, French Indo-China. The trial court dismissed the case
because the Hanoi court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant considering that
"[t]he, evidence adduced at the trial conclusively proves that neither the appellee [the defendant] nor his
agent or employees were ever in Hanoi, French Indo-China; and that the deceased Marie Theodore Jerome
Boudard had never, at any time, been his employee." In Magdalena Estate, what was declared invalid
resulting in the failure of the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendants in an action in
personam was the service of summons through publication against non-appearing resident defendants. It
was claimed that the latter concealed themselves to avoid personal service of summons upon them.
In Dial, the defendants were foreign corporations which were not, domiciled and licensed to engage in
business in the Philippines and which did not have officers or agents, places of business, or properties
here. On the other hand, in the instant case, SHARP was doing business in Japan and was maintaining four
branches therein.
Insofar as to the Philippines is concerned, Raher is a thing of the past. In that case, a divided Supreme
Court of Iowa declared that the principle that there can be no jurisdiction in a court of a territory to render
a personal judgment against anyone upon service made outside its limits was applicable alike to cases of
residents and non-residents. The principle was put at rest by the United States Supreme Court when it
ruled in the 1940 case ofMilliken vs. Meyer 22 that domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an
absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means
of appropriate substituted service or personal service without the state. This principle is embodied in
section 18, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which allows service of summons on residents temporarily out of
the Philippines to be made out of the country. The rationale for this rule was explained inMilliken as follows:
[T]he authority of a state over one of its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his
absence from the state. The state which accords him privileges and affords protection to him
and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties. "Enjoyment of the
privileges of residence within the state, and the attendant right to invoke the protection of
its laws, are inseparable" from the various incidences of state citizenship. The
responsibilities of that citizenship arise out of the relationship to the state which domicile
creates. That relationship is not dissolved by mere absence from the state. The attendant
duties, like the rights and privileges incident to domicile, are not dependent on continuous
presence in the state. One such incident of domicile is amenability to suit within the state
even during sojourns without the state, where the state has provided and employed a
reasonable method for apprising such an absent party of the proceedings against him. 23
The domicile of a corporation belongs to the state where it was incorporated. 24 In a strict technical sense,
such domicile as a corporation may have is single in its essence and a corporation can have only one
domicile which is the state of its creation. 25
Nonetheless, a corporation formed in one-state may, for certain purposes, be regarded a resident in
another state in which it has offices and transacts business. This is the rule in our jurisdiction
and apropos thereto, it may be necessery to quote what we stated in State Investment House,
Inc, vs. Citibank, N.A., 26 to wit:
The issue is whether these Philippine branches or units may be considered "residents of the
Philippine Islands" as that term is used in Section 20 of the Insolvency Law . . . or residents
of the state under the laws of which they were respectively incorporated. The answer cannot
be found in the Insolvency Law itself, which contains no definition of the term, resident, or
any clear indication of its meaning. There are however other statutes, albeit of subsequent
enactment and effectivity, from which enlightening notions of the term may be derived.
The National Internal Revenue Code declares that the term "'resident foreign corporation'
applies to a foreign corporation engaged in trade or business within the Philippines," as
distinguished from a "'non-resident foreign corporation' . . . (which is one) not engaged in
trade or bussiness within the Philippines." [Sec. 20, pars. (h) and (i)].
The Offshore Banking Law, Presidential Decree No. 1034, states "that branches, subsidiaries,
affiliation, extension offices or any other units of corporation or juridical person organized
under the laws of any foreign country operating in the Philippines shall be considered
residents of the Philippines. [Sec. 1(e)].

The General Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, places "branches and agencies in the
Philippines of foreign banks . . . (which are) called Philippine branches," in the same category
as "commercial banks, savings associations, mortgage banks, development banks, rural
banks, stock savings and loan associations" (which have been formed and organized under
Philippine laws), making no distinction between the former and the latter in so far as the
terms "banking institutions" and "bank" are used in the Act [Sec. 2], declaring on the
contrary that in "all matters not specifically covered by special provisions applicable only to
foreign banks, or their branches and agencies in the Philippines, said foreign banks or their
branches and agencies lawfully doing business in the Philippines "shall be bound by all laws,
rules, and regulations applicable to domestic banking corporations of the same class, except
such laws, rules and regulations as provided for the creation, formation, organization, or
dissolution of corporations or as fix the relation, liabilities, responsibilities, or duties of
members, stockholders or officers of corporation. [Sec. 18].
This court itself has already had occasion to hold [Claude Neon Lights, Fed. Inc. vs. Philippine
Advertising Corp., 57 Phil. 607] that a foreign corporation licitly doing business in the
Philippines, which is a defendant in a civil suit, may not be considered a non-resident within
the scope of the legal provision authorizing attachment against a defendant not residing in
the Philippine Islands; [Sec. 424, in relation to Sec. 412 of Act No. 190, the Code of Civil
Procedure; Sec. 1(f), Rule 59 of the Rules of 1940, Sec. 1(f), Rule 57, Rules of 1964] in other
words, a preliminary attachment may not be applied for and granted solely on the asserted
fact that the defendant is a foreign corporation authorized to do business in the Philippines
and is consequently and necessarily, "a party who resides out of the Philippines."
Parenthetically, if it may not be considered as a party not residing in the Philippines, or as a
party who resides out of the country, then, logically, it must be considered a party who does
reside in the Philippines, who is a resident of the country. Be this as it may, this Court
pointed out that:
. . . Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign

corporations, duly licensed to do business here, to the status of domestic
corporations. (Cf. Section 73, Act No. 1459, and Marshall Wells Co. vs. Henry
W. Elser & Co., 46 Phil. 70, 76; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 411) We
think it would be entirely out of line with this policy should we make a
discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the petitioner, and subject its
property to the harsh writ of seizure by attachment when it has complied not
only with every requirement of law made specially of foreign corporations, but
in addition with every requirement of law made of domestic corporations. . . .
Obviously, the assimilation of foreign corporations authorized to do business in the

Philippines "to the status of domestic corporations, subsumes their being found and
operating as corporations, hence,residing, in the country.
The same principle is recognized in American law: that the residence of a corporation, if it
can be said to have a residence, is necessarily where it exercises corporate functions . . .;"
that it is considered as dwelling "in the place where its business is done . . .," as being
"located where its franchises are exercised . . .," and as being "present where it is engaged
in the prosecution of the corporate enterprise;" that a "foreign corporation licensed to do
business in a state is a resident of any country where it maintains an office or agent for
transaction of its usual and customary business for venue purposes;" and that the
"necessary element in its signification is locality of existence." [Words and Phrases,
Permanent Ed., vol. 37, pp. 394, 412, 493].
In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly registered branches at
the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP may
be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and
may be deemed to have assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process. 27
Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only under
the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty.

We find NORTHWEST's claim for attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages to be without
merit. We find no evidence that would justify an award for attorney's fees and litigation expenses under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Nor is an award for exemplary damages warranted. Under
Article 2234 of the Civil Code, before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or
compensatory damaged. There being no such proof presented by NORTHWEST, no exemplary damages
may be adjudged in its favor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it
denied NORTHWEST's claims for attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages but
REVERSED insofar as in sustained the trial court's dismissal of NORTHWEST's complaint in Civil Case No.
83-17637 of Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and another in its stead is hereby rendered
ORDERING private respondent C.F. SHARP L COMPANY, INC. to pay to NORTHWEST the amounts adjudged
in the foreign judgment subject of said case, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the
complaint therein until the said foreign judgment is fully satisfied.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66274 September 30, 1984
BAGUMBAYAN CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, LELISA SEA and ARTURO SEA respondents.
De Santos, Balgos & Perez Law Office for petitioner.
Quiason, Ermitano, Makalintal & Barot Law Office for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the customer's claims for moral and exemplary damages due to the alleged negligence
of a waiter. The spouses Lelisa Sea and Arturo Sea and their four children went to the Tropical Palace
Hotel, Paraaque, Metro Manila in the evening of December 20, 1976 to see the Reycard Duet Show they
occupied a table and ordered drinks before the show the hall was crowded and as anyone who attended
such show can attest, excitement and confusion prevailed (8, 40-41 tsn, January 19, 1978).
Lelisa's version was that when a waiter named Baez was going to serve the tray containing the drinks was
overturned and fell on her. She was drenched. Later, she felt some chill. The drinks and the splinters from
the broken glasses allegedly destroyed her dress which, with her handbag and shoes, cost one thousand
pesos (32-33 tsn November 29, 1977).
She was shocked. She sensed that some persons were laughing at or pitying her. Lawyer Francisco
Gatchalian, who was at the same table, commented that it was one of those unavoidable things (24 tsn
November 29, 1977).
A waitress took Lelisa to the ladies' room. She had to remove her dress and underwear which were wet She
was not given any towel to cover herself. She remained standing as there was no chair (27-28 tsn). Two of
her daughters followed her to the ladies' room (31 tsn). She returned to the hag after about thirty minutes
later when the show had started (28, 5152 tsn). The lower court erred in concluding that she missed the
show.

Lelisa testified that she was claiming moral damages of P100,000 for herself and her husband due
toembarrassment and the fact that the management did not even offer any apology on that night (34-37
tsn). She was claiming exemplary damages in the same amount to teach the management a lesson. The
husband, Arturo Seta, testified that the incident infuriated him. There was no apology from the
management.
Rudy Tanchanco, the food and beverage manager, was one of three persons in charge of the show. He
testified that the admission was on a "first come, first served" basis. An the waiters were extras performing
under twelve supervisors. In open court, Tanchanco apologized to the plaintiffs in behalf of the
management for the inconvenience caused to them, meaning that the management was sorry for what
happened to Mrs. Seta (38-39 February 27, 1978).
The Seas sued the corporation, as employer of the waiter, for actual damages of P200,000 plus attorney's
fees of P10,000 and such moral and exemplary damages as might be fixed by the court. The action
involves a quasi-delict. It was based on articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
The corporation in its answer alleged that it came to know of the incident only when it was served with
summons. Had the incident been brought to its attention on that same night, it would have apologized
immediately to the plaintiffs, made appropriate amends and taken steps to discipline the waiter and his
supervisor.
In fact, in its answer it apologized to the plaintiffs. It labelled the incident as a fortuitous event. It alleged
that it observed diligentissimi patris-familias to prevent the damage. It reiterated that it was sorry for what
had happened. It manifested its desire to make the proper amends in any reasonable manner or form.
After hearing, the trial court awarded the Seas P1,540 as actual damages consisting of the value of Mrs.
Sea's outfit and P540, the cost of the six tickets used by the Sea family which was considered a loss
because of their alleged failure to enjoy the show. It also awarded the Seas P50,000 as moral damages,
P10,000 as exemplary damages and P5,000 as attorney's fees.
The corporation appealed. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the judgment with the modification
that the moral and exemplary damages were reduced to P15,000 and P5,000, respectively. Hence, this
appeal.
The trial court sensibly noted that court action could have been avoided had the matter been taken up
directly with the corporation before the action was filed. No extrajudicial demand preceded the action.
While the award for actual damages has some basis, the grant of moral and exemplary damages is devoid
of legal justification because it was not predicated upon any of the cases enumerated in the Civil Code
(Ventanina vs. Centeno, 110 Phil. 811, 816). The Civil Code provides:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this
article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
ART. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same
rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
The instant case is not specifically mentioned in article 2219 which refers to quasi-delicts causing physical
injuries. The Appellate Court erred in considering it as analogous to the cases mentioned therein without
indicating what specific case the instant case resembles or is analogous to. For example, an unfounded
complaint with a baseless imputation of forgery is analogous to defamation mentioned in article 2219 (7).
It justified an award of P2,000 as moral damages (Justiva vs. Gustilo, 117 Phil. 71).
Generally, there can be no recovery of moral damages if the case is not mentioned in articles 2219 and
2220 (Malonzo vs. Galang, 109 Phil. 16; Ventanilla vs. Centeno, 110 Phil. 811).
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory damages awarded
for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S. 815).
"Mental suffering means distress or serious pain as distinguished from annoyance, regret or vexation.
Mental anguish is intense mental suffering" (Johnson vs. Western Union Telegraph Co., 81 S.C. 235, 238, 62
SE 244, Note 35, 17 C.J. 829.)
"Generally, damages for mental anguish are limited to cases in which there has been a personal physical
injury or where the defendant wilfully, wantonly, recklessly, or intentionally caused the mental anguish (22
Am Jur 2nd 275). "Nor will damages generally be awarded for mental anguish which is not accompanied by
a physical injury, at least where maliciousness, wantonness, or intentional conduct is not involved" (22 Am
Jur 2nd 276).
"Damages for mental anguish and suffering have been held recoverable where the act complained of was
done with such gross carelessness or recklessness as to show an utter indifference to the consequences"
(25 C.J.S. 820).
"Under Ohio law, damages for emotional distress consisting of embarrassment and mental suffering and
dire threats, are not recoverable unless intentionally caused" (Parmelee vs. E.A. Ackerman 252 Fed. 2nd
721).
In Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry Co. vs. Caple, 179 S.W. 2nd 151, it was held that where the act is wanton or
willful there may be a recovery for humiliation and mental suffering without any physical injury. It was
further held that in negligence cases, where there is no willful or wanton wrong, there can be no recovery
for mental suffering unless there is also physical injury.
We hold that the "embarrassment" to which Mrs. Sea was exposed by the incident is not the mental
anguish contemplated in article 2217 for which moral damages can be recovered.
Parenthetically, the case of People vs. Plaza, CA 52 OG 6609, 6612, a case decided by Justice Sanchez,
may be cited. In that case, Genoveva de Soriano was a passenger in a riverboat which was bumped by
another boat manned by Berchman Plaza and caused the first boat to capsize and sink but did not drown
Genoveva. She did not know how to swim Her life was endangered. She suffered fright and mental anguish
during those moments when her fate was uncertain. Her claim for P500 as moral damages was not
allowed.

In this case, it would not be just and proper to include moral damages in the corporation's vicarious liability
as employer. The award of P5,000 as exemplary or corrective damages cannot also be sustained because
there was no gross negligence in this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Appellate Court is modified. The petitioner is ordered to pay Lelisa Sea
the sum of P5,000 to cover her actual damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees. The award of
moral and exemplary damages is eliminated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-64515 June 22, 1984
R & B SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ANGELINA USON, respondents.
Raul A. Mora for petitioner.
Celedonio Tiongson for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on centiorari, seeking to set aside the decision of the in Intermediate Appellate
Court which awarded the private respondent moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees, after
finding that the petitioner acted in bad faith in filing an action against said respondent.
The facts are stated in the desision of the appellate court:
xxx xxx xxx
... On January 3, 1969, defendant Maria Isabel Diaz was granted a loan of P20,000.00 by the
Philippine National Bank. To secure the repayment of the loan, Maria Isabel Diaz submitted a
surety bond (Exh. B) of plaintiff R & B Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. for the sum of P20,000.00
in favor of the Philippine National Bank. In turn, defendants executed an indemnity
agreement with the chattel mortgage (Exh. C) to indemnify the plaintiff surety "for any
damage, prejudice, loss, costs, payments, advances and expenses of whatever kind and
nature, including attorney's fees, which the corporation may, at any time, become liable for,
sustain or incur as a consequence of having executed the above-mentioned Bond, its
renewals, extensions, or substitutions and said attorney's fees not to be less than twenty
(20%) per cent of the total amount claimed by the corporation in each action, the same to
be due, demandable and payable, irrespective of whether the case is settled judicially or
extra-judicially and whether the amount has been actually paid or not."
Maria Isabel Diaz did not file her answer to the complaint or the crossclaim of defendant
Angelina Uson, and she was declared in default in both cases. Defendant Eliseo Santos filed
his answer to the complaint wherein he admits signing the indemnity agreement but claims
that "all the time he thought he was and actually intended to be a character witness only." In
his counterclaim, he asks for attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and other damages in
unspecified amounts against the plaintiff. Defendant Angelina Uson filed a separate answer,
stating her signatures appearing on the indemnity agreement are all forgeries. By way of
counterclaim against the plaintiff, she asks for P100,000.00 as moral damages and a sum
equivalent to 25% of the amount of damages she may recover as and for counsel fees. By
way of crossclaim against defendant Maria Isabel Diaz, she asks for the payment of moral

damages and attorney's fees in like amounts for forging or causing to be forged her
signature in the indemnity agreement.
After due trial, judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against

the defendants Maria Isabel Diaz and Eliseo Santos, ordering them, jointly and
severally, to pay the former the sum of P20,000.00, with interest thereon at
the rate of 13-l/2% from January 16, 1974, the date when plaintiff paid the
Philippine National Bank; a sum equal to 20% thereof as and for attorney's
fees; and the costs of suit. The complaint is dismissed as against the
defendant Angelina Uson.
The counterclaims of the defendants Eliseo Santos and Angelina Uson are
hereby dismissed.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent appealed the dismissal of her counterclaim. On April 29, 1982, the Intermediate Appellate
Court** modified the decision of the lower court and ordered the plaintiff-appellee R & B Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. R & B), to pay "the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, twenty five (25%) per cent
of said amount as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages ..." on a finding that R & B acted
in bad faith when it filed the action against defendant-appellant Uson. A motion for reconsideration was
filed by R & B but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner R & B assigns the following errors:
1. The respondent appellate Court has committed grievous error in drawing from the established facts a
conclusion that herein Petitioner is guilty of bad faith and negligence, and, therefore liable to private
respondent for moral and exemplary damages, attomey's fees and costs;
2. The respondent appellate Court has committed grave error in overriding legal presumptions of law by
and with conjectural, illogical, flimsy and misleading deductions not supported by the established facts;
3. The respondent appellate Court has awarded a kind of damage (exemplary damage) which is not within
the contemplation of the pleadings and which, even the private respondent had not conceived and asked
for; and
4. Generally, the respondent appellate Court had rendered a decision which, in a way, is not in accord with
law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court.
The only issue raised in the above assignments of errors is whether or not, on the basis of the evidence
found in the records, the respondent court correctly adjudged the petitioner guilty of bad faith and
negligence in filing the complaint against respondent Uson sufficiently to warrant an award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P135,000.00.
The appellate court tried to justify the award by stating:
The plaintiff did not appeal from the findings of the lower court that the signatures
appearing in the indemnity agreement (Exh. C), purporting to be those of Miss Uson, are all
forgeries, which meant that some other person, upon the inducement of Maria Isabel Diaz,
signed the names of Uson in said Exhibit C. This could only be done if Exhibit C was signed in
the absence of the representative of the plaintiff corporation, or because the corporation
entrusted blank copies or forms of the indemnity agreement to Maria Isabel Diaz to be
signed and accomplished. Herein lies the plaintiff's bad faith. The perpetration of the
forgeries was made possible due to the negligence of plaintiff. Yet, the plaintiff presented
Crisoforo Lopez, its Assistant Manager, who had the temerity to claim that Miss Uson signed
Exhibit C. On top of all this is the uncontradicted testimony of Uson that before the case was
filed in court she personally informed Atty. Armando Abad, an official of plaintiff, that the
signatures appearing to be hers in Exhibit C are forgeries (pp. 13-15, t.s.n., Nov. 6, 1974).
Plaintiff's negligence is also demonstrated by its omission to request, as required of it by
Commonwealth Act No. 465, otherwise known as the Residence Certificate Law, Uson, if she
was really present, to exhibit her latest residence certificate before it signed said indemnity
agreement. This circumstance likewise shows that Uson was not present during the
execution of Exhibit C.
Petitioner contends that bad faith and negligence cannot be deduced from the fact that it handed out
blank forms of the indemnity agreement to Maria Isabel Diaz for her and her co-signatories to accomplish
without any representative from the petitioner corporation being present and to return the same to the
latter already duly notarized. Petitioner also maintains that neither can bad faith be presumed from the
fact that it pursued the filing of an action against Uson notwithstanding the fact that the latter had already
informed petitioner beforehand that her signatures on the said agreement were forged.
We find merit in the petition.
While petitioner might have been negligent in not verifying the authenticity of the signatures in the
indemnity agreement, still the same does not amount to bad faith as to justify the award of damages and
the conclusion that the act of filing the complaint against respondent Uson amounts to malicious
prosecution In filing the action, the petitioner was only protecting its business interests by trying to recover
the amount it had already paid to the Philippine National Bank.
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that in the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of
fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not
per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not
have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. (Salao v. Salao, 70 SCRA 86, 87, citing Barreto v.
Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771, 779; Herrera v. Luy Kim Guan, 110 Phil. 1020, 1028; Heirs of Justina v. Gustilo, 61
O.G. 6959; Castillo v. Castillo, 95 SCRA 68; Mirasol v. De la Cruz, 84 SCRA 342, 343; citing Pacific
Merchandising Corporation v. Diestro Logging Development Corporation, 34 SCRA 704; Octot v. Ybaez 111
SCRA 84, 85; citing Ong Yiu v. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 223 and Inhelder Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
122 SCRA 584-585, citing Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239).lwphl@it
In the case at bar, the act of filing the complaint against respondent Uson was not at all motivated by ill
will or by any desire to vex and humiliate the respondent. This can be gleaned from the fact that after the
termination of the case before the trial court, the petitioner did not appeal the dismissal of the case
against the respondent even though it knew that it would have a greater chance of collecting what it paid
for if all the defendants were adjudged to pay the amount in the indemnity agreement especially since the
main signatory to the agreement had already been declared in default and was nowhere to be found.
We agree with the trial court in its finding that:
As regards Uson's counterclaim against the plaintiff, the evidence does not support a finding
that the filing of the complaint against this defendant was done in bad faith and with malice.
The plaintiff, it must be assumed was guided solely by the records in its possession in the
firing of this case and it cannot be faulted if the defendant Uson was impleaded as a
defendant since her name appears in the indemnity agreement and other supporting
papers. It must be borne in mind that this case was filed more than four years after the said
document was executed and, considering the volume of business done by the plaintiff of the
same nature, defendant Angelina Uson was only a name as far as it is concerned.
Neither can bad faith be presumed from the fact that inspite of the respondent's declaration outside the
court that her signatures were forged, the petitioner still included her in the complaint. There is no reason
why such declaration should be given full faith and credit by herein petitioner as to totally exclude
respondent from the complaint. It is natural for a prospective defendant to deny any participation or
involvement in the subject matter of the litigation. Precisely, the very purpose of going to trial was to
ascertain whether or not her signatures were indeed forged. And as stated earlier, the mere fact that an
action is later found to be based on an erroneous ground does not per se make its initiator guilty of bad
faith and liable for damages, much less in the amount of P110,000.00. Sound principles of justice and
public policy demand that persons shall have free resort to courts of law for redress of wrongs and
vindication of their rights without fear of later on standing trial for damages should their actions lose
ground. (Inhelder Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra citing Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil.
239). In one case, we held that the award of moral and exemplary damages was uncalled for on the ground
that the petitioner had not acted with malice, fraud or in bad faith despite the fact that petitioner in
instituting the action, solely relied on a letter of the accounting firm which it knew was still unverified,

undetailed, and incomplete. (Panay Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 459). We reiterate the
reminder to lower courts "to guard against the award of exhorbitant damages that are way out of
proportion to the environmental circumstances of a case and which time and again, this Court has reduced
or eliminated. Judicial discretion granted to the courts in the assessment of damages must always be
exercised with balanced restraint and measured objectivity." Inhelder Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
supra). In the case at bar, even if the respondent were entitled to damages, the award of a total amount of
P135,000.00 as damages and attorney's fees was entirely way out of proportion.
In any case, we hold that the award of damages was erroneous. Moral damages are emphatically not
intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant; they are awarded only to enable the
injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he
has undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. In other words, the award of moral damages
is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible of the spiritual status quo ante, and it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted. (Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., 94 SCRA 966, citing
the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Pangasinan Transportation Company, Inc. v.
Legaspi, 12 SCRA 598) In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, petitioner
cannot be adjudged to pay moral damages. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees are
likewise untenable for they can only be given in case the petitioner acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner and if the action instituted by it was clearly unfounded and so untenable
as to amount to gross and evident bad faith. (See Ong Yiu v. Court of Appeals, supra and Mirasol v. De la
Cruz, supra, citing Rizal Surety & Insurance Co. v. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 61). The records are bereft of
proof to support any finding of bad faith on the part of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVI is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 91201 December 5, 1991
EUSTAQUIO MAYO Y AGPAOA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
The petition seeks to review the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 57, awarding the amount of Seven Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) as moral damages in favor of Linda Navarette, complainant in Criminal
Case No. 5633, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Eustaquio Mayo y Agpaoa."
Petitioner Eustaquio Mayo y Agpaoa was charged withthe crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Multiple Serious, Less Serious, and Slight Physical Injuries" in an information filed
by the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1982, at more or less 4:10 o'clock in the afternoon,
along the MacArthur Highway, at barangay Mamatitang, in the municipality of Mabalacat,
province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused EUSTAQUIO MAYO Y AGPAOA, being the driver and person in charge of
a Philippine Rabbit bus bearing Plate No. 888 FG PUB Pilipinas, without observing traffic
rules, regulations and ordinances, without exercising due precaution to avoid accident to
persons and damage to property, by giving the said bus a speed far greater than is allowed
by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously drive, operate and manage
said vehicle in a careless, reckless and imprudent manner, causing as a result of his
carelessness, recklessness and imprudence to bump and hit a Lancer car bearing Plate No.
NSJ 720 L Pilipinas, thereby causing damage to the said Lancer car in the total amount of
SIXTY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE PESOS AND FORTY ONE CENTAVOS
(P67,925.41) and belonging to June Navarette, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner, in the total amount of P67,925.41, Philippine Currency, likewise causing injuries
causing partial disfigurement on the facial portion of the said Linda Navarette, a total loss of
vision on her right, also causing physical injuries upon Narciso Yandan, which needed and
will need medical attendance for a period of from ten (10) to fifteen (15) days, and
incapacitated and will incapacitate said victim from performing his customary labor for the
same period of time, and also causing physical injuries upon Mae Custodio, which needed
and will need medical attendance for a period of from three (3) to four (4) weeks, and
incapacitated and will incapacitate said victim from performing his (sic) customary labor for
the same period of time, likewise causing physical injuries upon June Navarette, Noel
Reynaldo Navarette, Legionaria Panopio, Mercy Panopio and Raymond Asprer, which needed
and did need medical attendance for a period of from seven (7) to eight (8) days and
incapacitated and will incapacitate said victims from performing their customary labor for
the same period of time.
All contrary to law. (Rollo, pp. 40-42; Original Records, pp. 46-47)
The facts as found by the trial court and quoted by the Court of Appeals are not disputed. These are:
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on August 7, 1982, between 4:00 to 4:30
o'clock in the afternoon, June Navarette was driving a Mitsubishi Lancer, owned by Linda
Navarette, her sister, along MacArthur Highway in Bo. Mamatitang, travelling towards the
general direction of Manila on board the Lancer car were Linda Navarette, Legionaria
Panopio, Mae Custodio, Noel Reynaldo Navarette, Raymond Asprer (aged 6 years), Antonette
Asprer (aged 4 years), and Mercy Panopio. Noel Reynaldo Navarette and Raymond Asprer
were seated on the front seat at the right side of the driver. Linda and the rest of the
passengers were all seated at the back seat.
The Lancer car was then cruising steadily at the right lane of the road in Bo. Mamatitang,
Mabalacat, Pampanga at a rate of speed of about forty kilometers per hour (40 kph),
southbound for Manila. No other vehicle was preceding the Lancer car. There was, however,
the Philippine Rabbit bus driven by accused Eustaquio Mayo, Jr. trailing closely behind the
Lancer car. Behind the Philippine Rabbit bus was a Tamaraw jeep driven by Danilo Miranda
Concepcion.
As the vehicles approached the vicinity of Mabalacat Institute, the Rabbit bus picked up
speed and swerved to the left lane to overtake the Lancer car which was running on the
right lane of the highway. When the Rabbit bus was abreast with the Lancer, an oncoming
vehicle from the opposite direction appeared and flashed its headlights to warn the Rabbit
bus to give way. The Rabbit bus swerved to its right in an effort to return to the right lane to
avoid collision with the oncoming vehicle, and in the process it hit and bumped the left rear
side portion of the Lancer car wih its right front bumper. Because of the impact the driver of
the Lancer car lost control of the wheel and the car swerved across to the left and hit
Narciso Yandan, a bystander, and thereafter crashed against the concrete fence of Mr. Bernie
Reyes. (p. 221, orig. rec.)
xxx xxx xxx
It was established that before the accident took place, the Tamaraw jeep was first ahead,
followed by the Lancer car, and behind the Lancer car was the Rabbit bus, travelling towards
the direction of Manila. The Lancer car as well as the Rabbit bus following one after the other
overtook the Tamaraw jeep. The Rabbit bus, still trailing behind the Lancer car, then tried to
overtake the Lancer car. And when the Rabbit bus, was abreast with the Lancer car, there
was an oncoming vehicle approaching and signalling through the flash of its headlights from
the opposite direction. The Rabbit bus, to avoid a head-on collision with the vehicle, tried to
get back to its lane to the right, and in the process it bumped the left rear portion of the
Lancer car (Exhibit `H-1-A'), which was then cruising on the right lane of the road. Thus

because of the impact, precipitated by the reckless imprudence of the accused, a chain
reaction occurred; the driver of the Lancer car lost control of the wheel and the car swerved
to the left and darted across the road, hitting thereat Narciso Yandan, a pedestrian, and
stopped only when it crashed against the concrete fence of Mr. Bernie Reyes.
The Lancer car was heavily damaged. It was almost a total wreck; the passengers, including
the driver, sustained physical injuries in varying degrees.
xxx xxx xxx
(p. 234, orig. rec.) (Rollo, pp. 42-44)
On the basis of these factual findings, the petitioner was convicted as charged. The civil aspect of the case
was heard in the criminal case. Hence, the complainants in the criminal case were awarded damages. The
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Eustaquio

Mayo Jr. y Agpaoa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Multiple Serious, Less Serious, and Slight Physical
Injuries as charged in the information, and the Court sentences the said accused Eustaquio
Mayo Jr. y Agpaoa to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor
as minimum to four (4) months of Arresto Mayor as maximum, and to indemnify:
1. Linda Navarette the sum of
(a) P192,236.07 as actual damages;
(b) P700,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P67,925.41 for the repair of the Lancer car; and
(d) P80,000.00 as attorney's fees.
2. Noel Reynaldo Navarette the sum of P60,000.00 as moral damages.
3. Mae Custodio the sum of
(a) P2,032.00 as actual damages; and
(b) P50,000.00 as moral damages.
4. June Navarette the sum of
(a) P495.00 as actual damages; and
(b) P5,000.00 as moral damages.
And in case of insolvency, the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. is subsidiarily liable to pay or
indemnify the aforenamed injured passengers of the Lancer car.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 235-236, orig. rec.) (Rollo, pp. 39-40)
The petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The trial court's decision was affirmed with the
modification that the appellant suffer a straight penalty of three months which was recommended by the
Solicitor General on the ground that the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable in the instant case,
the maximum penalty imposable not exceeding one year (Sec. 2, Art. No. 4103, as amended)
A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.

In a resolution dated April 22, 1991, we gave due course to the petition.
As stated earlier, the instant petition is limited to the moral damages in the amount of P700,000.00.
Initially, the petitioner alleged the amount of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages awarded to Linda
Navarette. The amount was later clarified to be P700,000.00 awarded to complainant Linda Navarette as a
result of the vehicular accident.
The petitioner summarizes its objections to the award of moral damages in favor of Linda Navarette as
follows:
1. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion and seriously erred in
awarding moral damages to the private complainant without citing the factual
basis for such an award and without giving the justification for granting such
an arbitrary and exorbitant amount of over One Million Pesos.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion and seriously erred in
awarding an exorbitant amount of One Million Pesos to complainant Linda
Navarette by way of moral damages despite the fact that: a) the complainant
had placed a value of only P500,000.00 for her mental, psychological and
moral sufferings, and b) the complainant's claim for moral damages for the
loss of her boyfriend in the amount of P1,000.000.00 can have no legal or
factual basis. (Rollo, p. 16-17)
xxx xxx xxx
As alleged by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals did not discuss specific factual circumstances which
would justify the award of moral damages in favor of Navarette. Instead, the appellate court in general
terms stated that:
The Court has gone over decision appealed from and finds it replete with facts, with the
details, the anguish, the fright, the anxieties, the shock and loss, that the victims had gone
through and suffered. As to legal provisions, the law is specific concerning the award of
moral damages. ... (Rollo, p. 46)
The appellate court then cited the provisions of the Civil Code, specifically Articles 2217 and 2219 to justify
the legal basis for the award of moral damages. It then concluded that "The record shows ample proof
introduced in support of the award of damages in this case. The Court is satisfied that the amount of award
is not excessive and is in accord with the law and the facts of the case." (Rollo, p. 48)
We examine the decision of the trial court as regards the propriety of the award of moral damages in favor
of Linda Navarette
Extant from the trial court's decision are the following findings of the said court:
Linda R. Navarette is 32 years old, single, Assistant Vice-President and Resident Manager of
Club Solviento, Quezon City.
xxx xxx xxx
As a result of the bumping incident the car was severely damaged, its passengers sustained
physical injuries and Linda Navarette suffered the most among them:
xxx xxx xxx
As to her injuries, she claimed that she was first brought to the Central Luzon Hospital in San
Fernando, Pampanga for treatment. A medical certificate was issued to her by Dr. Ramon B.
Po (Exhibit "M"). She was also brought to the U.S.T. Hospital (Exhibits "N" and "N-1") and at
the Makati Medical Center for further treatment of her injuries (Exhibits "CC" and "EE"). That
in her medical certificate (Exhibits "N" and "N-1") the doctor concluded that `Permanent
partial facial disfigurement and total loss of vision of the right eye will result'; that Linda
Navarette showed to the Court the ugly scar on her forehead and the total loss of vision of
her right eye, now replaced by a false eye. She also presented for appreciation five (5)
copies of her pictures depicting the permanent partial facial disfigurement and damage of
the right eye (Exhibits "O", "O-1", "O-2", "O-3" and "O-4").
Linda Navarette declared that she had a boyfriend. She lost him after the accident. She
broke down and couldn't help but cry and between sobs she bewailed over her misfortune.
According to her she had worked for so many years thirteen (13) long years that it took
her time to get her career, and couldn't bear losing her eye simply because of a reckless
driver.
xxx xxx xxx
On advice of Dr. Carlos L. Sevilla, Eye Specialist of the Makati Medical Center (Exhibit "G")
Linda Navarette went to San Francisco, U.S.A. for further treatment. ..."
xxx xxx xxx
She was examined and treated by Dr. William Danz an Eye Specialist, at the Dental Building,
Posch Street, in San Francisco, California. After her check-up and treatment, she was asked
by Dr. Danz to return to the U.S. after eight (8) months for another round of examination
because the doctor noticed some changes in her ruptured right eye. ...
xxx xxx xxx
She expressed her desire to go back to the United States for another round of check-up and
examination for which she expects to spend from P60,000.00 to P80,000.00 because she
willalso undergo plastic surgery (Exhibit "II").
Linda Navarette is an Economist by profession. She is a graduate of Bachelor of Science in

Home Economics at the University of the Philippines. She is at present the Assistant Vice-
President as well as the Resident Manager of Club Solviento, and as such she received a
gross take-home pay of P10,000.00 a month (Exhibit "B"). And prior to her mishap she was
also the Food Consultant of Food City for which she received a monthly salary of P7,000.00.
She lost her consultancy job because of her prolonged absence and because of her physical
handicap she suffered as a result of the accident, that she had to resign (Exhibit "U").
For four (4) months immediately following the accident she was unable to report for work
and she had to avail of her vacations and sick leaves from the two (2) companies, which in
the past, if the same were not availed of, she converted them into cash. But because of the
accident, and having been forced to use them, she was not able to avail herself of the cash
equivalent amounting to P32,000.00.
Were it not for the accident and the injuries she sustained, she could, according to her,
continue performing her job as Consultant for ten (10) to twenty (20) years more.
xxx xxx xxx
Linda Navarette claimed that the general anaesthesia applied to her has greatly impaired
her memory. She declared that she easily forgets what she is supposed to say and what she
is supposed to do. According to her it has negatively affected her job as Assistant Vice-
President and Resident Manager of Club Solviento. She claimed that she lost her other work
and salary of P7,000.00 a month as consultant of Food City.
xxx xxx xxx
She placed a value of her mental, psychological and moral sufferings in the amount of
P500,000.00 as moral damages, and for the loss of her boyfriend she asked to double the
amount giving as a reason that her boyfriend would have been her lifetime partner and her
guide of her eye forever had she not lost him.
xxx xxx xxx

Dr. Brion is a physician and lawyer by profession. From 1939 up to the present, he has been
the medico-legal consultant of the U.S.T. Hospital. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Dr. Brion is certain that permanent facial disfigurement and total loss of vision of the right
eye would inevitably result from the injuries sustained by Linda Navarette. He further
declared that after the wounds in the face of Linda Navarette had healed, they would surely
leave a permanent scar in her face.
According to Dr. Brion, there is no way or medical process by which the loss of vision of Linda
Navarette's right eye could be saved because, necessarily, the right eyeball, which was
injured, had to be removed. It had to be removed for the reason that the contused-laceration
of the right eyeball involving the cornea, ciliary body, sclera with extension to vitreus, retina
and choroid destroyed the right eyeball; that it cannot be saved and there is a necessity of
artificial eye placement on the socket. He said he has treated and observed considerable
number of cases similar to Linda Navarette's and in all those cases, total loss of vision had
resulted. (Rollo, pp. 71-75)
The foregoing findings form the only basis for the award of moral damages in favor of Linda Navarette.
These were adopted by the appellate court in affirming the trial court's decision as regards the award of
moral damages in favor of Linda Navarette.
The vital question now is whether or not the said findings of the trial court justify the award of moral
damages in the amount of P700,000.00 in favor of complainant Linda Navarette.
There is no question that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. (Article 2217, New Civil Code; People v. Baylon, 129
SCRA 62 [1984]; Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440 [1987]). Moreover, Article
2219 of the New Civil Code provides that:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries.
(2) Quasi-delicto causing physical injuries.
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
(4) Adultery or concubinage.
(5) Illegal search.
(6) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
(7) Malicious prosecution.
(8) Acts mentioned in article 309.
(9) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and
35.
xxx xxx xxx
We agree that complainant Linda Navarette is entitled to moral damages. She suffered injuries as a result
of the criminal offense of the petitioner. Moreover, her injuries resulting in a permanent scar at her
forehead and the loss of her right eye undoubtedly gave her mental anguish, wounded feelings and shock.
The psychological effect on her as regards the scar on her forehead and her false eye must have
devastated her considering that women in general are fastidious on how they look.

More important, however, was the loss of vision of her right eye which was severely injured as a result of
the accident. Since the accident, Linda Navarette had to contend with the loss of her eyesight on her right
eye which necessarily hampers her not only physically but also professionally for the rest of her life. Before
the accident, Linda Navarette who is a home economist by profession was doing well in her career. A
graduate of the University of the Philippines with the degree of Home Economics, she is the Assistant-Vice
President as well as Resident Manager of Club Solviento receiving a gross income of P10,000.00 a month.
Simultaneously with her work at Club Solviento, she served as Food Consultant of Food City where she
received a monthly salary of P7,000.00. She, however, had to give up her consultancy job after the
accident not only because of her prolonged absences but because of the physical handicap she suffered.
Nevertheless, we find no justification to award moral damages in favor of Linda Navarette for the lossof her
boyfriend. No doubt, the loss of her boyfriend after the accident added to her mental and emotional
sufferings and psychologically affected and disturbed her. However, there is no clear evidence on record to
show that her boyfriend left her after the accident due to her physical injuries. He may have left her even if
she did not suffer the slightest injury. The reasons for the break-up of a courtship are too many and too
complicated such that they should not form the basis of damages arising from a vehicular accident.
Moreover, granting that her boyfriend left her due to her physical injuries, we still find no legal basis for the
award of moral damages in favor of complainant Navarette because of the loss of a boyfriend. Article 2719
of the New Civil Code quoted earlier enumerates cases wherein moral damages may be granted. Loss of a
boyfriend as a result of physical injuries suffered after an accident is not one of them. Neither can it be
categorized as an analogous case.
With the foregoing findings we now resolve the issue as regards the amount of moral damages to which
Linda Navarette is entitled.
The well-entrenched principle is that moral damages depend upon the discretion of the trial courts based
on the facts and circumstances of each case. (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, supra; Pleno v.
Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 208 [1988]). This discretion is, however, conditioned in that the "amount
awarded should not be palpably and scandalously excessive" so as to indicate that it was the result of
prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court." (Gellada v. Warner Barnes & Co., Inc., 57 O.G. [4]
7347, 7358; Sadie v. Bachrach Motors Co., Inc. 57 O.G. [4] 636; Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System,
Inc. supra; Pleno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 570 [1985]). In
determining the amount of moral damages, the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party and the
gravity of the injuries must be considered. (Pleno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Prudenciado v. Alliance
Transport System, Inc. supra; Siguenza v. Court of Appeals; supra) Finally, "moral damages are
emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only
to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action." (R & B Surety & Insurance Co.,
Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 736 [1984]; citing Grand Union Super- market, Inc. v.
Espino, Jr., 94 SCRA 953 [1979], citedin Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc. supra)
Applying these principles in the instant case, we rule that the award of P700,000.00 as moral damages in
favor of complainant Linda Navarette is unconscionable and excessive. We rejected Navarette's claim for
the amount of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages for the loss of her boyfriend. We note that she asked for
the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages due to her personal injuries. Therefore, the award for moral
damages should not exceed the amount of P500,000.00 (Makabali v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 253
[1988]) We rule that under the circumstances of the instant case, the amount of P200,000.00 as moral
damages in favor of complainant Linda Navarette is reasonable, just and fair.
One final consideration.
In a resolution dated September 25, 1991, we required Atty. Evelyn Balgos-Guballa of the Acosta and Rico
Law Offices, counsel for the private respondent, to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
against her for failure to file the required memorandum within the extended period which expired on July
22, 1991 within ten days from notice.
In her "COMPLIANCE", Atty. Evelyn Balgos-Guballa stated that she finished the draft of the memorandum
as early as the first week of July and submitted it to the partner-in-charge, Atty. Rex G. Rico; that it was
only recently, that she discovered that the memorandum was inadvertently inserted by one of their
secretaries (while fixing the table of Atty. Rex G. Rico) among the files of other cases of the law firm; that
this unfortunate incident precluded the partner-in-charge to review, correct or modify the draft of the

memorandum; and that after discovery of the incident they immediately finalized and filed the
memorandum on October 8, 1991.
We find the explanation of Atty. Balgos-Guballa unsatisfactory. The law firm should have adopted a more
systematic procedure to handle pleadings required to be filed in court. In the instant case, the
memorandum was due on July 22, 1991 yet and it would seem that the law firm, if believed, discovered the
secretary's blunder two (2) months or more thereafter. Such inaction on the part of the law firm,
specifically Atty. Rico and Atty. Balgos-Guballa to check whether or not the required memorandum has
been filed with the Court within the reglementary period is equivalent to gross negligence on their part to
comply with the directive of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is
MODIFIED in that the amount of P700,000.00 as moral damages granted to complainant Linda Navarette is
reduced to P200,000.00.
Atty. Rex G. Rico and Atty. Evelyn Balgos-Guballa are hereby REPRIMANDED for non-compliance with
theResolution dated September 25, 1991 with the warning that further gross negligence of this nature
committed by them would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 137519 March 16, 2004

vs.
ANGELITO MARTINEZ and DEXTER TAGLE, appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review is the decision1 of Branch 259 of the Regional Trial Court in Paraaque City finding
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by RA
7659, and imposing upon them the death penalty and moral damages of P1,000,000. This case is now
before us on automatic review.
In an amended information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, appellants Angelito
Martinez and Dexter Tagle, together with accused Rosita Yu, Genaro de Jesus, Rigor Aguilar, Rico Basa and
Dennis Rivera, were charged with kidnapping for ransom:
That at about 10:30 oclock in the evening of 4 August 1996 along Quirino Avenue, Paraaque City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another together with some other persons whose liabilities are still being determined
in a preliminary investigation, did then and there, by force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, carry away and kidnap ATTY. AQUILES LOPEZ against his will, and thereafter detain him,
thereby depriving ATTY. AQUILES LOPEZ of his liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release.
Records show that on August 2, 1996, appellants Martinez and Tagle met with accused Aguilar, Rivera and
Basa at the Emilio Aguinaldo College along Taft Avenue, Manila. The group conjured up a plan to kidnap
any person for ransom on August 5, 1996.
On August 4, 1996 at around 6:00 p.m., on board a red Toyota Corolla with tinted windows and bearing a
California plate, appellant Tagle and accused Aguilar and Rivera first proceeded to appellant Martinez
house in Valenzuela City. Wearing military and police uniforms, they then went to SM Mega Mall in Ortigas
where they planned to intercept classy cars violating traffic rules as a prelude to spotting a suitable kidnap
victim. Unable to find one, the group drove to Paraaque City. At around 10:30 p.m., the group spotted a
black Honda Accord with plate no. TPA-762 along Quirino Avenue, Paraaque City. The driver of said car
was later identified as the kidnap victim, Atty. Aquiles Lopez. Overtaking Lopez on the left (drivers side),
appellant Martinez who was occupying the front seat, brandished a long firearm at him. Lopez tried to
speed away but the red car succeeded in blocking his path. As Lopez brought his car to a stop, the group
alighted from the red car and introduced themselves as members of the police Narcotics Command. He
was able to see their faces clearly because the headlights of his car were on. Accused Aguilar approached
him and demanded to see his car registration papers while appellant Tagle searched the trunk of his car.
Realizing that Lopez was the president of a company, appellant Martinez ordered appellant Tagle and
accused Aguilar to transfer him to the backseat of the black Honda Accord where he was handcuffed and
blindfolded. The group drove to the North Expressway with appellant Tagle at the wheel of the black
Honda. Accused Basa was seated at the front seat while appellant Martinez, victim Lopez and accused
Aguilar were at the back. Accused Rivera drove the kidnappers red Toyota Corolla. Upon reaching the Sta.
Rita exit, Lopez was transferred to the red car. They proceeded to appellant Martinez house where the
victim was hold captive for four nights and three days.
During his detention, Lopez conveyed to his daughter Rosalinda Lopez Medina his abductors demand for
ransom of P10,000,000 which was later reduced to P2,000,000.
In the meantime, on August 5, 1996, the family of Lopez reported his disappearance to the Presidential
Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) after his daughter received several phone calls early in the morning
informing her of her fathers kidnapping. After receiving the report, Senior Supt. Roberto Calinisan, head of
the Task Force Habagat, immediately dispatched his men to ascertain the whereabouts of Lopez. On
August 6, 1996, the monitoring team assigned to the northern sector of the metropolis spotted the black
Honda Accord with plate no. TPA-762 parked inside a residence in Yakal Street, Fortune Village, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. At around 11:00 p.m. the next day, August 7, 1996, after surveillance operations confirmed
that the victim was indeed being detained inside one of the rooms of the house, operatives of the PACC
Task Force Habagat raided the said residence and successfully rescued Lopez. While the PACC agents were
still inside the house, about three persons outside and on board a red Toyota Corolla traded shots with
perimeter security personnel of the PACC Task Force. The occupants of the red car were able to elude
arrest but appellant Martinez and accused Yu and de Jesus were arrested during the raid. Several items
were recovered from the scene.2
In a subsequent report by the members of the Valenzuela Police, the same red Toyota Corolla with
California plates was found abandoned inside Fortune Village Subdivision. Several items were likewise
recovered inside the abandoned vehicle.3
On August 9, 1996, accused Aguilar and, on August 10, 1996, appellant Tagle surrendered to the
authorities after learning that they were being implicated in the kidnapping of Lopez. Appellant Tagle even
accompanied the operatives of the PNP-CIU in a follow-up operation at Fortune 7, Parada St., Valenzuela.
The operation resulted as well in the recovery of some items. 4
On arraignment and with the assistance of their respective counsels, appellants Martinez and Tagle,
accused Yu, de Jesus and Aguilar all pleaded not guilty to the charge against them while accused Rivera
and Basa remained at large. Pre-trial was terminated and trial proceeded accordingly.
The prosecution presented eight witnesses: kidnap victim Atty. Aquiles Lopez, the kidnap victims daughter
Rosalinda Lopez Medina, Sr. Insp. Narciso Ouano, Jr., SPO Jesus C. Sagisi, PNP member Romeo Biete, Chief
Insp. Gilbert Cruz, Sr. Insp. Ronaldo Mendoza, and accused turned state witness Rigor Aguilar. For the
defense, appellant Martinez testified in his behalf and presented as witnesses Felicidad Condino, Perla
Condino and co-accused Rosita Yu. Appellant Tagle, on the other hand, testified in his own behalf and
presented his mother, Manuela Tagle, as his other witness. Accused Yu and de Jesus did not present any
witnesses but relied solely on their own respective testimonies.
On April 29, 1997, the prosecution filed a motion to discharge accused Aguilar from the information for
utilization as state witness. The trial court granted the motion despite opposition from the accused and
also denied their joint motion for reconsideration.
On July 1, 1997, appellant Martinez and accused de Jesus filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayers for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order, to nullify the trial courts order discharging accused Aguilar as state witness and denying

their joint motion for reconsideration. After their petition was denied, a petition for review under Rule 45
was filed with this Court. We denied said petition.
On December 7, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding accused Angelito Martinez and Dexter Tagle GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt [of] the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention as defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659, both accused Martinez and
Tagle are hereby sentenced to the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection and to suffer the accessory
penalties provided by law specifically Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. They are also ordered to pay
moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 each.
As earlier pronounced, accused Rosita Yu and Genaro de Jesus are declared NOT GUILTY for insufficiency of
evidence while the case against Dennis Rivera and Rico Basa is ordered archived pending their
apprehension.
Rigor Aguilar, having been discharged to testify as a witness for the prosecution, is hereby set free
pursuant to Section[s] 9 and 11 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and towards this end, the PACC is
directed to immediately release him from custody unless there by (sic) some other reasons for his further
detention.
The Jail Warden of Paraaque is also ordered to release Rosita Yu and Genaro de Jesus unless there be
some reasons also for their further detention.
The Clerk of Court of this Court is directed to prepare the MITTIMUS for the immediate transfer of Angelito
Martinez and Dexter Tagle to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City and finally forward all the
records of the case to the Supreme Court for automatic review in accordance with Section 8 Rule 122 of
the Rules of Court and Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 22 of RA 7659. 5
In his brief,6 appellant Tagle raises the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM

NOTWITHSTANDING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISCHARGE OF STATE WITNESS RIGOR AGUILAR FROM THE
INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 9 [now Section 17], RULE 119 OF THE RULES OF COURT
DESPITE HIS INADMISSIBLE AND INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DEXTER TAGLE DESPITE THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY AMONG THE PERPETRATORS WITH
CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT DEXTER TAGLE ON THE BASIS OF THE
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION BY THE VICTIM DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WAS NOT ASSISTED BY COUNSEL
DURING THE POLICE LINE-UP WHEN IDENTIFIED.
Appellant Martinez, on the other hand, assigns the following errors: 7
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING MARTINEZ GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT MARTINEZ WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY
THE (SIC) LOPEZ, THE KIDNAP VICTIM.
(THE) TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE WITNESS, RIGOR
AGUILAR.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING ACCUSED APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF ALIBI.
The issue in this case boils down to ascertaining whether or not the guilt of both appellants Martinez and
Tagle was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The defense stresses that, due to the doubtful identification and description by Lopez, there was a lack of
ample evidence positively pinpointing appellants as the abductors. Appellant Martinez alleges that it was
impossible for Lopez to clearly see his abductors and therefore his description of his kidnappers was too
general and vague. On the other hand, appellant Tagle claims that the identification made by the victim
during the police line-up was inadmissible because he stood there without the assistance of counsel.
We disagree. Lopez described the man who brandished a rifle at his left as "tall, well-built, slightly dark and
wearing a police uniform," while the man who opened the trunk of his car "was wearing a white t-shirt, not
very tall, fair complexioned but pretty well-built," and the man who ordered the others to put him at the
back seat of the car "was tall, well-built, husky and wearing a camouflage uniform." The description given
by the victim was acceptable as it sufficiently identified his abductors. In addition, Lopez stated in open
court that he could recognize his kidnappers if he saw them again. Thus, even if the description he gave
was allegedly general in character, recognition and description are two different processes that do not
necessarily jibe. Description presupposes a facility of communication that many persons do not possess. 8
The most important evidence was the positive testimony of Lopez recognizing appellants as his abductors.
Common human experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances take place, it is natural for
persons to remember many of the important details. This Court has held that the most natural reaction of
victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their assailants and observe the
manner in which the crime is committed. Lopez positively identified appellant Martinez as one of his
captors. He testified that he saw the faces of his abductors because the headlights of his car were focused
on them when they alighted from their car. This enabled him to clearly see their faces. All too often, the
face of the assailant and his body movements create a lasting impression on the victim's mind and cannot
thus be easily erased from his memory.
On the allegation of appellant Tagle that his identification by the victim during the line-up without his
counsel violated his constitutional right (to counsel), suffice it to say that such right attaches only upon the
start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information,
confession or admission from the accused. In this case, when appellant Tagle was identified by Lopez in the
police line-up, he had not yet been held to answer for the criminal offense for which he has since been
charged and convicted. Thus, appellant Tagles right to counsel could not have been violated as the
confrontation between the State and the accused had not yet begun. This Court has consistently held that
the prohibition against custodial investigation conducted without the assistance of counsel does not
extend to a person in a police line-up. This particular stage of an investigation where a person is asked to
stand in a police line-up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel
because it as yet involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It
has also been held that an identification without the presence of counsel at a police line-up does not
preclude the admissibility of an in-court identification. 9
Appellant Tagle claims that, when the police line-up was conducted, he was already indicted for the offense
charged and thus had the right to counsel. This is not correct for it has been ruled that a persons right to
counsel while under custodial investigation cannot be invoked until such time as the police investigators
start questioning, interrogating or exacting a confession from the person under investigation. 10 During the
police line-up, appellant Tagle was not interrogated at all and no statement or confession was extracted
from him. Therefore, there was no deprivation of his right to counsel because the accusatory process had
not yet begun nor had the police, at that stage, exacted a confession from him.
Moreover, the appellants have not shown any ill-motive on the part of the victim to fabricate charges
against them. It is well-settled that when there is no evidence to show that the prosecution witness is
actuated by an improper motive, identification of the appellants as the offenders should be given full faith
and credit.11
Furthermore, appellant Tagle avers that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of conspiracy. On this
point, we have time and again held that conspiracy need not be established by direct proof of prior
agreement by the parties to commit a crime but that it may be inferred from the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to a joint purpose, concerted
action and community of interest.12The conspiracy in this case was clear from the overt acts of the accused
which facilitated the kidnapping of Lopez.
The group of Tagle, masterminded by appellant Martinez, armed with high-powered weapons and
simulating public authority, carried out their plan to commit kidnapping for ransom. Contrary to appellant
Tagles contention, his complicity in the kidnapping was established not only by the testimony of state

witness Rigor Aguilar but also by the testimony of victim Lopez himself. Both Aguilar and Lopez positively
identified him. It is well-settled that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses must be
accorded great respect owing to its opportunity to observe and examine the witnesses conduct and
demeanor on the witness stand.13 In this case, the trial court found the testimonies of Aguilar and Lopez
totally credible.14 This Court finds no reason to depart from the findings of the court a quo.
The appellants also fault the trial court for not giving credence to their defense of alibi, claiming that where
the evidence of the prosecution is weak, the defense of alibi assumes importance and bears looking into.
This contention, however, must fail in the face of the positive identification of the appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime by the victim himself and state witness Aguilar.
Tagle averred that on August 4, 1996, he was at home helping his mother prepare for the death
anniversary of his father. He accompanied her to Divisoria and later, at around 7:00 p.m., he went to the
house of accused Rivera who wanted to borrow his car. Thereafter, he visited to his girlfriend and went
home at around 11:00 p.m. His mother, Manuela Tagle, corroborated his story. On the other hand,
appellant Martinez stated that on August 2, 1996, he was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport in
Paraaque to fetch one Perla Condino. Perla and her mother, Felicidad Condino, attested that Martinez
accompanied Felicidad in fetching Perla from the airport. Further, appellant Martinez alleged that, in the
evening of August 4, 1996, he was with his girlfriend, accused Rosita Yu, in Valenzuela. He was awakened
when the group of accused Aguilar arrived at around 1:00 a.m. on August 5, 1996 and asked to spend the
night in his house.
Both appellants failed to establish that it was impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime. In the
case of Tagle, the fact that he accompanied and helped his mother prepare for his fathers death
anniversary was of no moment for he admitted that he left their house in the evening of August 4, 1996. It
was therefore not impossible for him to join the other accused to commit the crime and still be back home
immediately thereafter. In the case of Martinez, his claim that he was then sleeping at home in Valenzuela
at the time the crime was committed deserves scant consideration. Since both Ortigas and Paraaque City
are no more than a few hours drive from Valenzuela, it was not impossible for Martinez to be physically
present at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
The alibis proffered by the appellants cannot prevail over the unequivocal testimony of the victim
categorically and positively pointing to them as his abductors. The defense of alibi, to be given full credit,
must be clearly established and must not leave room for doubt.
The contention of both appellants that the discharge of Aguilar as state witness was erroneous as it
allegedly failed to comply with the conditions set forth under Rule 119, Section 17 of the Rules of
Court15 lacks merit. The discharge of an accused as a state witness is at the discretion of the court. The
prosecution can only propose such discharge and the court can refuse it if the objective of the prosecution
will not be served thereby. Absolute certainty is not required in the determination of whether the
conditions for discharge are present since the trial court has perforce to rely in large part on the
representations of the prosecution. In this case, there was no other direct evidence available to prove the
conspiracy to commit kidnapping and to establish the circumstances leading to Lopez abduction. Hence,
the necessity of discharging Aguilar as state witness. In any event, Aguilars testimony was substantially
corroborated by those of the other prosecution witnesses. Furthermore, Aguilar did not appear to be the
most guilty among the accused since it was clear that he was not the leader of the group. In addition,
there was no showing that Aguilar had ever been previously convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
Appellant Tagle likewise contends that Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure (now Section
17 of the Revised Rules, as amended on October 3, 2000) requires that the sworn statement of the
accused intended to be discharged must be presented in court. Since Aguilars sworn statement was
obtained without the assistance of an independent counsel (he secured the services of the assisting lawyer
in the execution of his sworn statement), it was made in violation of his constitutional rights. Hence, it was
inadmissible and could not be made the basis of his discharge as state witness.
It can be gleaned, however, from the sworn statement of Aguilar that he was the one who obtained the
services of the lawyer who assisted him in the execution of his sworn statement. It was also significant that
Aguilar was duly informed of his constitutional rights. He was warned that any statement he made could
be used against him and that he was entitled to be assisted by a lawyer of his choice. At this point, Aguilar,
on his own accord, chose the assisting counsel to act as his lawyer. Considering the foregoing
circumstances, this Court is of the view that Aguilars admissions in his sworn statement, voluntarily made

and later confirmed by him in open court during the trial, negated the challenge now interposed as to the
admissibility of such sworn statement.
Furthermore, appellant Tagle alleges that since the pieces of evidence presented were inadmissible for
having been obtained without a search warrant, his conviction based thereon was erroneous. This
argument does not hold water either. The extraordinary circumstances leading to the rescue of Lopez did
not require a search warrant. The PACC had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was then being
committed. Its agents conducted a series of surveillance operations to confirm and ascertain that the
victim was indeed being detained inside one of the rooms in the house where the Black Honda Accord was
parked.
There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant the action they undertook. In such
an urgent situation, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. Furthermore, appellant Tagles
conviction was based not solely on the items recovered during the raid but also on the testimony and
positive identification by victim Lopez and state witness Aguilar.
Also, in his futile attempt to secure exculpation, appellant Martinez would have us believe that the
testimonies of Lopez and state witness Aguilar on the manner the abduction was carried out conflicted
with each other. Lopez allegedly testified that a firearm was poked at him to make him stop but Aguilar
mentioned that a siren blast was used to make him stop. He further alleged that Lopez tried to speed away
while Aguilar testified that Lopez slowed down. Furthermore, the victim stated that three armed men
alighted from the red car while Aguilar testified that all five of them get down therefrom. In addition,
appellant Martinez averred that the testimonies of Lopez and Aguilar contradicted each other as to the
roles the accused played, the clothes they wore and the abductors seating arrangement inside the black
Honda car.
Appellants attempts to destroy the prosecution witnesses testimonies are futile. The inconsistencies cited
refer to minor details. The rule is that inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses on minor
details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight
of their testimonies. The inconsistencies and discrepancies pointed out by appellant Martinez are not of
such nature as would warrant the reversal of the decision appealed from.
Appellants were charged with and convicted by the trial court of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the RPC as amended by RA 7659. 16 To warrant the imposition
of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, the prosecution
must prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b)
the actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty and (c) the motive of the accused to exact ransom for the
release of the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which
may be proved by words or overt acts before, during or after the kidnapping and detention of the
victim.17 Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be
committed.18
Based on the evidence on record, the following facts were indisputably established: (1) Lopez was
abducted on August 4, 1996 by five men including appellants Martinez and Tagle; (2) the victim was
detained in the house of appellant Martinez against his will and was deprived of his liberty, and (3) the
kidnappers demanded payment of ransom, initially in the amount of P10,000,000, for the release of the
victim. After several negotiations, it was reduced to P2,000,000. The daughter of Lopez testified that she
received several phone calls demanding the aforesaid amounts for the release of her father. Clearly, all the
elements and qualifying circumstance to warrant conviction for the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
serious illegal detention were established beyond reasonable doubt. As provided in Article 267 of the RPC,
the penalty of death is imposable where the detention is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.
The award by the trial court of P1,000,000 as moral damages should be modified. Under Article 2219,
paragraph 5 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded to a victim of illegal detention or arrest.
The appellants brandished a firearm at the victim, blindfolded him and took him captive in Valenzuela. The
victim suffered mental, physical and psychological trauma. Under the circumstances, there is sufficient
basis for an award of moral damages in the amount of P300,000.19
We also note that an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party
to exemplary damages within the meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 20 This requisite has been met
in this case. A band of five men, using a motor vehicle, abducted the victim and demanded ransom for his
liberty. Article 2234 of the Civil Code provides that, while the amount of the exemplary damages need not

be proved, the Court may impose exemplary damages in addition to moral damages. In this case, we have
already awarded the latter. In order to serve as a deterrent against socially deleterious acts, we hold that
the victim is entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000 by way of example or correction, in
addition to the moral damages herein awarded.21
In the light of these premises, the Court finds no reversible error in the decision of the trial court.
Consequently, it is left with no alternative but to sustain the imposition of the death penalty on the
appellants.
Three members of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty
is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should be accordingly imposed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 259 of the Regional Trial Court in Paraaque
City in Criminal Case No. 96-739 finding appellants Angelito Martinez and Dexter Tagle guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and imposing upon
them the death penalty is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that they shall pay the victim in
solidum the amount ofP300,000 as moral damages and an additional amount of P100,000 as exemplary
damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of RA 7659 amending Section 83 of the Revised Penal Code, let the records
of this case be forthwith forwarded, upon finality of this decision, to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT G.R. No. 150304

and Engineer RAMIR J. TIAMZON,
Petitioners, Present:
Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus - Corona,
Carpio Morales, and
Garcia, JJ
Promulgated:
FULGENCIO DACARA,*
Respondent. June 15, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
T
he review of cases under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to errors of law. Unless there is a showing
that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous, this Court will
not analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Under the circumstance, the factual findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial courts will be conclusive upon the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, well-entrenched is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal or certiorari. Finally,
this Court reiterates the principle that moral damages are designed to compensate the claimant for actual
injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. Hence, absent any definite finding as to what
they consist of, the alleged moral damages suffered would become a penalty rather than a compensation
for actual injury suffered.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 21,
2001 Decision[2] and the October 9, 2001 Resolution [3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 29392.
The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated June 29, 1990 in Civil Case
No. Q-88-233 should be AFFIRMED, with costs against the appellants.[4]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA summarized the facts in this manner:
Sometime on February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P.
Dacara, Sr. and owner of 87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan with Plate No. 877 (sic), while
driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St.,
Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result,
Dacarra (sic), Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive
damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
Indemnification was sought from the city government (Record, p. 22), which however,
yielded negative results. Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara (hereinafter referred to as
FULGENCIO), for and in behalf of his minor son, Jr., filed a Complaint (Record, p. 1) for
damages against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, as defendants, before the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 101, Quezon City, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-88-233. FULGENCIO prayed that the amount of not less than P20,000.00
actual or compensatory damages, P150,000.00 moral damages, P30,000.00 exemplary
damages, and P20,000.00 attorneys fees and costs of the suit be awarded to him.
In an Answer with Affirmative and/or Special Defenses (Record, p. 11), defendants admitted
the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a
moun[d] of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or
after it which was visible during the incident on February 28, 1988 at 1:00 A.M. In short,
defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all
necessary measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into
the diggings was precisely because of the latters negligence and failure to exercise due care.
[5]
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 101, Quezon City, rendered its
Decision[6] dated June 29, 1990. The evidence proffered by the complainant (herein respondent) was found
to be sufficient proof of the negligence of herein petitioners. Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, [7] the
latter were held liable as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, based on the quantum of evidence

presented by the plaintiff which tilts in their favor elucidating the negligent acts of the city
government together with its employees when considered in the light of Article 2189,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of
twenty thousand pesos as actual/compensatory damages,P10,000.00 as moral
damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages,P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and other costs of
suit.[8]
In their appeal to the CA, petitioners maintained that they had observed due diligence and care in
installing preventive warning devices, and that it was in fact the plaintiff who had failed to exercise
prudence by driving too fast to avoid the diggings. Moreover, the lower court allegedly erred in using
Article 2189 of the Civil Code, which supposedly applied only to liability for the death or injuries suffered by
a person, not for damage to property.
The CA agreed with the RTCs finding that petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the
damage suffered by respondent.[9] Noting the failure of petitioners to present evidence to support their
contention that precautionary measures had indeed been observed, it ruled thus:

x x x. Sadly, the evidence indicates that [petitioners] failed to show that they placed
sufficient and adequate precautionary signs at Matahimik Street to minimize or prevent the
dangers to life and limb under the circumstances. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses
for the [petitioners], namely Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, Ernesto Landrito and Eduardo Castillo,
that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the
wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress and prove the sufficiency and
adequacy of said contention.[10]
Further upholding the trial courts finding of negligence on the part of herein petitioners, the CA gave this
opinion:
x x x. As observed by the trial court, the negligence of [petitioners] was clear based
on the investigation report of Pfc. William P. Villafranca stating to the effect that the subject
vehicle rammed into a pile of earth from a deep excavation thereat without any warning
devi[c]e whatsoever and as a consequence thereof, Dacara, Jr. lost control of his driven car
and finally turned-turtle causing substantial damage to the same. As a defense against
liability on the basis of quasi-delict, one must have exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family which [petitioners] failed to establish in the instant case. [11]
Whether Article 2189 is applicable to cases in which there has been no death or physical injury, the
CA ruled in the affirmative:
x x x. More importantly, we find it illogical to limit the liability to death or personal

injury only as argued by appellants in the case at bar applying the foregoing provisions. For,
injury is an act that damages, harms or hurts and mean in common as the act or result of
inflicting on a person or thing something that causes loss, pain, distress, or impairment.
Injury is the most comprehensive, applying to an act or result involving an impairment or
destruction of right, health, freedom, soundness, or loss of something of value. [12]
Hence, this Petition.[13]
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of law/substance contrary to

applicable law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the award of moral damage suit (sic) the
amount ofP10,000.00.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of law/substance contrary to

applicable law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the award of exemplary damage sin (sic)
the amount ofP5,000.00 and attorneys fee in the [a]mount of P10,000.00.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred and/;or (sic) had acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to hold that
respondents son in the person of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. was negligent at the time of incident.
[14]
Because the issues regarding the liability of petitioners for moral and exemplary damages presuppose that
their negligence caused the vehicular accident, we first resolve the question of negligence or the
proximate cause of the incident.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Negligence

Maintaining that they were not negligent, petitioners insist that they placed all the necessary
precautionary signs to alert the public of a roadside construction. They argue that the driver (Fulgencio
Dacara Jr.) of respondents car was overspeeding, and that his own negligence was therefore the sole cause
of the incident.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise.
[15]
Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic,
common sense, policy and precedent.[16]
What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon,
absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that
they lacked any basis for their conclusions. [17] The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual
ascertainment that petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars us from
supplanting their findings and substituting these with our own. The function of this Court is limited to the
review of the appellate courts alleged errors of law. It is not required to weigh all over again the factual
evidence already considered in the proceedings below. [18]Petitioners have not shown that they are entitled
to an exception to this rule. [19] They have not sufficiently demonstrated any special circumstances to justify
a factual review.
That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the
lower courts finding, which we quote:
Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28, 1988 which
caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was the
existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik
Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have
served as an adequate warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night where
darkness is pervasive.
Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera
which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and
barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate
precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat,
how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman which for
clarity is quoted again, none was found at the scene of the accident.
xxxxxxxxx
Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events is

transfixed by the attending circumstances so that the greater the danger known or
reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care required to be observed.
xxxxxxxxx
The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of
the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the
control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory
provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the
City government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof but the state
assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and
neither exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just and equitable. [20] (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour
(kph) when he met the accident. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed
on city streets with light traffic, when not designated through streets, as provided under the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code (Republic Act 4136). Thus, petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr., having
violated a traffic regulation, should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 [21] of the Civil Code.[22]
These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. It is evident
from the records that they brought up for the first time the matter of violation of RA 4136 in their Motion
for Reconsideration[23] of the CA Decision dated February 21, 2001. It is too late in the day for them to raise
this new issue. It is well-settled that points of law, theories or arguments not brought out in the original
proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal. [24] To consider their belatedly raised arguments at
this stage of the proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process. [25]
Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts findings, which are amply substantiated by the
evidence on record, clearly point to petitioners negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered
by respondents car. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion.
Second Issue:
Moral Damages
Petitioners argue that moral damages are recoverable only in the instances specified in Article 2219 [26] of
the Civil Code. Although the instant case is an action for quasi-delict, petitioners contend that moral
damages are not recoverable, because no evidence of physical injury were presented before the trial court.
[27]
To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites: (1) an
injury -- whether physical, mental, or psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act
or omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause
of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219.[28]
Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasi-delicts, provided that
the act or omission caused physical injuries. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-
delict resulted in physical injury. [29] This rule was enunciated in Malonzo v. Galang[30] as follows:
x x x. Besides, Article 2219 specifically mentions quasi-delicts causing physical

injuries, as an instance when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all
other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded, excepting of course, the
special torts referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).
In the present case, the Complaint alleged that respondents son Fulgencio Jr. sustained physical injuries.
The son testified that he suffered a deep cut on his left arm when the car overturned after hitting a pile of
earth that had been left in the open without any warning device whatsoever.
It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts, however, that no other evidence
(such as a medical certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.s bare
assertion of physical injury. Thus, there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral
damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the Decisions are conspicuously silent with respect to the claim of respondent that his
moral sufferings were due to the negligence of petitioners. The Decision of the trial court, which
summarizes the testimony of respondents four witnesses, makes no mention of any statement regarding
moral suffering, such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, social humiliation and
the like.
Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person. [31] Intended for the restoration of
the psychological or emotional status quo ante, the award of moral damages is designed to compensate
emotional injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
For the court to arrive upon a judicious approximation of emotional or moral injury, competent and
substantial proof of the
suffering experienced must be laid before it. Essential to this approximation are definite findings as to what
the supposed moral damages suffered consisted of; otherwise, such damages would become a penalty
rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered.[32]
Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded -- whether in a civil [33] or a
criminal case[34] -- in the absence of proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar injury. [35] The award of
moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually experienced
emotional and mental sufferings. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and
convincing proof.[36]
Third Issue:
Exemplary Damages

Petitioners argue that exemplary damages and attorneys fees are not recoverable. Allegedly, the
RTC and the CA did not find that petitioners were guilty of gross negligence in the performance of their
duty and responsibilities.[37]
Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. [38] While granting them is subject to
the discretion of the court, they can be awarded only after claimants have shown their entitlement to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages.[39] In the case before us, respondent sufficiently proved
before the courts a quo that petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the incident, thereby
establishing his right to actual or compensatory damages. He has adduced adequate proof to justify his
claim for the damages caused his car. The question that remains, therefore, is whether exemplary
damages may be awarded in addition to compensatory damages.
Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence. [40] Gross negligence means such utter want of care
as to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable
consequences of their carelessness, and that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to
the danger of injury to the person or property of others. [41] The negligence must amount to a reckless
disregard for the safety of persons or property. Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case.
A finding of gross negligence can be discerned from the Decisions of both the CA and the trial court.
We quote from the RTC Decision:
Sad to state that the City Government through its instrumentalities have (sic) failed
to show the modicum of responsibility, much less, care expected of them (sic) by the
constituents of this City. It is even more deplorable that it was a case of a street digging in a
side street which caused the accident in the so-called premier city. [42]
The CA reiterated the finding of the trial court that petitioners negligence was clear, considering
that there was no warning devicewhatsoever[43] at the excavation site.
The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any adverse consequence of their failure
to install even a single warning device at the area under renovation. Considering further that the street
was dimly lit,[44] the need for adequate precautionary measures was even greater. By carrying on the road
diggings without any warning or barricade, petitioners demonstrated a wanton disregard for public safety.
Indeed, the February 28, 1988 incident was bound to happen due to their gross negligence. It is clear that
under the circumstances, there is sufficient factual basis for a finding of gross negligence on their part.
Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good. The award of these damages is meant to be a deterrent to
socially deleterious actions.[45]Public policy requires such imposition to suppress wanton acts of an offender.
[46]
It must be emphasized that local governments and their employees should be responsible not only for
the maintenance of roads and streets, but also for the safety of the public. Thus, they must secure
construction areas with adequate precautionary measures.
Not only is the work of petitioners impressed with public interest; their very existence is justified
only by public service. Hence, local governments have the paramount responsibility of keeping the
interests of the public foremost in their agenda. For these reasons, it is most disturbing to note that the
present petitioners are the very parties responsible for endangering the public through such a rash and
reckless act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 172870
Appellee,

Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
JUNIOR BANG-AYAN,
Appellant. Promulgated:
September 22, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
For review is the Court of Appeals decision [1] in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01566, which affirmed the
joint judgment[2] rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 62, in Crim.
Case Nos. 98-CR-3053, 98-CR-3054, and 98-CR-3055, convicting appellant Junior Bang-ayan, a.k.a.
Hipngaton Namolngo Bang-ayan, Jr., of three counts of rape committed against XYZ, [3]sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordering him to pay XYZ the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
for each count plus costs.
In three separate Informations,[4] similarly worded except for the date of commission, appellant
was charged with rape committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of January 1998, at x x x Benguet Province, Philippines,
[5]
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of force, violence, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one XYZ, a minor being fourteen (14) years of age,
against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. The three cases were consolidated and
jointly tried.
The evidence shows that 14-year old XYZ was born on September 9, 1983 to AAA[6] and BBB.
[7]
When her parents separated, she lived with her mother who cohabited with CCC. [8] She studied first
and second year high school at x x x Benguet [9] and stayed during school days at the dormitory of said
school together with the family of her cousin, DDD. [10] On her third year, she transferred to another
school in xxx City but continued to live at the dormitory in Benguet until January 1998 when she
transferred to the newly constructed house of her relatives in xxx City.[11] Appellant, on the other hand,
was an acquaintance of XYZs family and a former conductor of her uncles vehicle. [12]
During the 1997 Christmas vacation, XYZ went home to Ifugao. [13] As classes was to resume
on January 5, 1998, her mother convinced her to hitch a ride on the jeepney of appellant who was then
bound for xxx City. Hence, at around 6 a.m. ofJanuary 3, 1998, XYZ together with several others, rode
the jeepney of appellant.[14]

Upon reaching xxx, xxx City around 4:30 p.m. of the same day, several passengers alighted the
jeepney. It was only XYZ and her former classmate who were left when they finally reached xxx
Road, xxx City. She was about to alight after her former classmate got off the jeepney but appellant
told her that he would drive her to the dormitory at Benguet. Before XYZ could refuse the offer,
appellant sped off and reached the place at around 7:00 p.m.[15] She did not feel alarmed because
appellant told her not to be afraid nor embarrassed because he is her uncle anyway.
At the dormitory, XYZ bought a bottled water from the schools librarian who was occupying the
first door on the second floor of the building, while the appellant went to the sala. At that night, it was
only XYZ, the schools librarian and appellant who were in the dormitory. After giving the bottled water
to appellant, XYZ went inside the room but appellant surreptitiously followed her and locked the door
behind them.[16] He pushed her to bed and held both her hands above her head with his left hand and
then used his right hand to remove her pants, t-shirt and underwear. She resisted by kicking his legs
but he was strong and was holding her hands tightly. He lowered his pants and underwear, placed
himself on top of her and used his knees to spread her legs. Appellant inserted his penis into XYZs
vagina causing her to experience tremendous pain. After satisfying his lust, appellant lay down beside
her,[17] and locked her in a tight embrace to prevent her from escaping.
The two subsequent rapes were carried out in the same manner as the first, only that the third
one happened at dawn the following day. XYZ cried, struggled, kicked and pinched appellant during
and even after each rape when appellant kept her locked in his arms and legs, but her efforts were
useless.[18] At around 5:00 a.m. of the following day, appellant left with a warning not to tell anyone,
especially her uncle.[19]
XYZ kept her ordeal to herself until after the regular classes were over in March 1998 when her
mother confronted her about appellants marriage proposal. At this point, XYZ disclosed that she was
raped by appellant prompting her mother to report the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation-
Cordillera Administrative Region (NBI-CAR).[20] Thereafter, Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, a Medico-Legal
Officer of the NBI conducted the physical and genital examination on XYZ, which yielded the following
results:
GENITAL EXAMINATION
* PUBIC HAIR: fully grown, sparsely distributed. LABIA MAJORA and MINORA:
both slightly gaping. FOURCHETTE: moderately lax. VESTIBULAR MUCOSA: pinkish.
* HYMEN: originally annular, thick, fleshy, with old-healed, complete

lacerations at 6:00 oclock and 8:00 oclock positions and an old-healed incomplete
laceration at 3:00 oclock position, corresponding to the face of a watch, edges
rounded, with coaptible borders.
HYMENAL ORIFICE: admits a tube 2.5 cms. in diameter with slight difficulty.
* VAGINAL WALLS: tight. VAGINAL RUGOSITIES:

prominent.
CONCLUSIONS:
1) No extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of
the examination.
2) Old-healed, complete and incomplete hymenal lacerations noted. [21]
For his defense, appellant denied the accusations against him. During the trial, he testified that
on January 1, 1998, he was invited by CCC to celebrate the New Year in their house in xxx. Appellant
had been married for 8 years but remained childless.He proposed marriage to XYZ because their
tradition allows spouses to separate and look for another partner if they remain childless. [22]
On January 3, 1998, appellant offered XYZ a ride to xxx City. Seated behind him, she and several
others reached xxx City at around 4:30 p.m. After all the passengers alighted, XYZ transferred to the
front seat and asked him to bring her to Benguet so she can deposit her bag at the dormitory. As it was
already dark when they reached the place, he heeded XYZs advice to spend the night at the
dormitory. He followed, and saw her got a key from a female teacher. Inside, he was offered water and
skyflakes. They talked for about two hours and nothing untoward happened between them because he
slept in the sala while she stayed in her bedroom. The following day, he dropped her off at xxx
Road, xxx City.[23]
On May 6, 2003, the RTC rendered the joint judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, the dispostive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds Junior Bang-ayan also
known as Hipngaton Nalmongo Bang-ayan, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable of the crime of
simple rape in the three (3) Informations, defined and penalized by Article 266-A, paragraph
1 (a) and Article 266-B, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 8353, and sentences him to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua including all accessory penalties imposed by law for each
count of rape as charged. He shall indemnify XYZ: the sum of P50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity in each count of rape; the sum of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages in each
count of rape; and the sum of P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages in each count of
rape; and to pay the costs.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[24]
After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, appellant appealed to this Court. Pursuant to
our decision in People v. Mateo[25] modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure insofar as direct appeals from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court in cases where
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was transferred to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.[26]
On February 28, 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we AFFIRM the decision of the trial court
finding herein accused-appellant Junior Bang-ayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three
(3) counts of rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua for each count
of rape and ordering him to indemnify victim XYZ the sum of P50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity for each count of rape, P50,000.00 by way of moral damages for each count of
rape, and P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages for each count of rape.
SO ORDERED.[27]
Hence, this appeal.
The issue for resolution is whether the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, erred in finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
In the review of rape cases, the credibility of the private complainant is the single most
important factor for consideration. The case of the prosecution stands or falls on the credibility of the
victim. This rule is in accordance with the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two parties,
namely the victim and the accused, are usually involved. In this regard, the appellate court will
generally not disturb the assessment of the trial court on matters of credibility owing to its unique
opportunity to observe the deportment and manner of testifying of witnesses firsthand during the trial
unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case.[28]
While appellant recognizes the above-settled rules, however, he pleads to this Court to take an
exception thereof as XYZs narration of rape was allegedly riddled with inconsistencies and
improbabilities.
Indeed, in the exercise of the Courts review power, it seeks justice not merely for the victim but
for the accused as well to guarantee that his constitutional rights are safeguarded. [29] Thus, we
painstakingly sifted through the evidence presented in order to make our own determination as to
appellants guilt or innocence. But, we find no cogent reason to overturn the conclusion of the RTC that
the prosecution sufficiently proved appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Finding XYZs testimony of the sexual assaults perpetrated by the appellant against her worthy
of belief, the RTC held:
On the witness stand, she did not hesitate nor waver in her answers which were candid,
plain and spontaneous. At one point in the course of her testimony, on questions about what
Junior Bang-ayan did to her, she stiffened, her eyes became misty, and a teardrop fell on her
cheek. Her demeanor added poignancy to verity born out of human nature and
experience. She went through a long and rigorous cross-examination interspersed with
subtle questions designed to trap her into inconsistencies and contradictories.
xxxx
The Court reviewed the testimony of XYZ, not on any particular segment but in its entirety to
ascertain whether it has overlooked facts and circumstances of weight, influence and
significance, or has misapprehended, or misunderstood or misapplied certain facts and
circumstances which could be resolved in favor of the accused. The Court found none. XYZ is
a credible witness, and her testimony is worthy of belief.Her sole testimony indeed bears the
hallmarks of truth. It is sufficient to hold Junior Bang-ayan responsible for the three counts of
rape charged against him.[30]
A rape victim, who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner,
and remains consistent, is a credible witness.[31] Her genuine cries of anguish for several times[32] while
recounting the sexual assault is evidence of the truth of the rape charges. [33] Besides, it being
instinctive for a very young, unmarried woman to protect her honor, it is difficult to believe that she
would fabricate a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, reveal her shame to
the small town where she grew up and permit herself to be the subject of gossip and public trial if she
had not really been ravished.[34]
Appellant cannot successfully impugn XYZs credibility on account of her alleged behavior prior,
during or after the sexual assaults. He claims that it was XYZ who invited him to Benguet as he did not
know that she lived in a dormitory during school days. Further, he argues that if it was true that they
had been inside the room for seven hours, practically naked, it is incredible why XYZ neither tried to
escape nor shout for help knowing that the schools librarian and her family were just few doors
away. He contended that she did not exert the kind of resistance expected from a rape victim, hence,
he concluded that the rape charges against him were mere fabrications.
We are not persuaded.
The factual question raised by appellant as to whether it was XYZ herself who invited him to the
dormitory is an inconsequential matter that does not bear upon the elements of the crime. What is
decisive in a prosecution for rape is whether the commission of the crime has been sufficiently
proven. For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as basis for acquittal,
it must refer to the significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused for the crime charged.
[35]
As the inconsistencies alleged by appellant had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of
rape, they cannot be used as grounds for his acquittal.
As regards the lack of resistance, or attempt to escape and shout for help when the sexual
transgressions were being committed against her or immediately thereafter, XYZ can hardly be faulted
for behaving as she did because reaction to a given situation or type of situation differ from one person
to another and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange
or startling experience.[36] Being in her early teens, she was obviously cowed into silence by her fear
and confusion. As disclosed by XYZ, she was raped by her stepfather when she was 9 years old and the
trauma and fright she experienced then, recurred when appellant ravished her. [37]
We do not agree with appellants contention that the old healed laceration in the genitalia of XYZ
could not have been attributed to him, but to XYZs stepfather who raped her when she was 9 years
old. Appellant alleged that it would take at least three months for lacerations to completely heal, thus,
having been examined on March 10, 1998, the old-healed lacerations could not have been caused by
him. Suffice it to state in the crime of rape, the testimony of the victim, and not the findings of the
medico-legal officer, is the most important element to prove that the felony had been committed. Even
without a medical report, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for
rape; the victims testimony alone if credible is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime.
[38]
Moreover, Dr. Bandonill admitted that there are individuals, only few they may be, whose lacerations
heal faster than others.[39]
Appellant could only offer denial in his defense. It is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in
law. Between the positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the
accused, the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary
weight.[40]
Lastly, we quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the affidavit of
desistance executed by XYZ, thus:
Finally, the subsequent execution by the victim of an affidavit of desistance is not

fatal to the prosecutions cause. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of People v.
Bation:
We have consistently ruled, however, that this Court looks with

disfavor on affidavits of desistance because they can easily be secured from
poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary considerations and because
it is quite incredible that after going through the process of having the
accused apprehended by the police, positively identifying him as his rapist,
and enduring the humiliation and examination of her private parts, the victim
would suddenly declare that the wrongful act of the accused does not merit
prosecution.
When the victim testified in court, she admitted having executed the affidavit of
desistance. We stress however that despite the execution of the affidavit, the victim did not
disprove her previous statements on the commission by the accused-appellant of the crime
of rape against her. Moreover, she admitted that she was merely pressured, although not
forced, to sign the affidavit.[41]
Rape committed by using force and intimidation is punishable by reclusion perpetua, pursuant
to Article 226-B of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC correctly convicted appellant of three counts of
rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua for each count.
Anent the award of damages, the RTC correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape. Civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and
compensatory damages, and is obligatory upon conviction for rape. As to moral damages, it is
automatically awarded to rape victims without the necessity of proof, for it is assumed that she
suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. Such award is separate and distinct from civil
indemnity.[42] However, we delete the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of
rape. Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides that (i)n criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part
of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. The records show that no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the
crime rape; hence the award of exemplary damages has no factual and legal basis. [43]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 01566, which affirmed the joint judgment of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch
62, in Crim. Case Nos. 98-CR-3053, 98-CR-3054, and 98-CR-3055, convicting appellant Junior Bang-
ayan, a.k.a. Hipngaton Namolngo Bang-ayan, Jr., of three counts of rape committed against XYZ,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordering him to pay the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each
count is DELETED for lack of factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA, G.R. No. 171951

Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent.
August 28, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision [1] dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R.-CR No. 27544 affirming the Decision [2] dated July 2, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9,
Aparri, Cagayan, which found petitioner Amado Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide. Contested as well is the appellate courts Resolution [3] dated March 13, 2006 denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.[4]
On February 10, 2000, petitioner was charged with murder in an Information that alleges as follows:
The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor accuses AMADO GARCIA @ Manding of the

crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article [248] of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about September 29, 1999, in the municipality of Aparri, province of

Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a bottle, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, box, club and maul one
Manuel K. Chy, inflicting upon the latter fatal injuries which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on September 26, 1999, petitioner, Fidel Foz, Jr. and Armando Foz had a
drinking spree at the apartment unit of Bogie Tacuboy, which was adjacent to the house of Manuel K. Chy. At
around 7:00 p.m., Chy appealed for the group to quiet down as the noise from the videoke machine was
blaring. It was not until Chy requested a second time that the group acceded. Unknown to Chy, this left
petitioner irate and petitioner was heard to have said in the Ilocano vernacular, Dayta a Manny napangas
makaala caniac dayta. (This Manny is arrogant, I will lay a hand on him.)[6]
On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the marriage of Ador Tacuboy not far
from Chys apartment. Maya Mabbun advised the group to stop singing lest they be told off again. This
further infuriated petitioner who remarked,Talaga a napangas ni Manny saan ko a pagbayagen daytoy,
meaning, This Manny is really arrogant, I will not let him live long. [7]
Yet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the group convened at the house of Foz and
Garcia. There, petitioner, Foz, Jr. and Fred Rillon mused over the drinking session on the 26 th and 28th of
September and the confrontation with Chy.Enraged at the memory, petitioner blurted out Talaga a napangas
dayta a day[t]oy a Manny ikabbut ko ita. (This Manny is really arrogant, I will finish him off today.) [8]Later that
afternoon, the group headed to the store of Adela dela Cruz where they drank until petitioner proposed that
they move to Punta. On their way to Punta, the group passed by the store of Aurelia Esquibel, Chys sister, and
there, decided to have some drinks.
At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who, incidentally, was coming out of his
house at the time. Upon being summoned, the latter approached petitioner who suddenly punched him in
the face. Chy cried out, Bakit mo ako sinuntok hindi ka naman [inaano]? (Why did you box me[?] Im not
doing anything to you.)[9] But petitioner kept on assaulting him. Foz attempted to pacify petitioner but was
himself hit on the nose while Chy continued to parry the blows. Petitioner reached for a bottle of beer, and
with it, struck the lower back portion of Chys head.Then, Foz shoved Chy causing the latter to fall.
When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his house and phoned his wife Josefina
to call the police. Chy told Josefina about the mauling and complained of difficulty in breathing. Upon
reaching Chys house, the policemen knocked five times but nobody answered. Josefina arrived minutes
later, unlocked the door and found Chy lying unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating. He was
pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The autopsy confirmed that Chy died of myocardial infarction.
After trial in due course, the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan (Branch 9) found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:
1) Finding AMADO GARCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
HOMICIDE defined and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and after
applying in his favor the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of TEN (10) YEARS OF PRISION
MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL as maximum;
2) Ordering him to pay the heirs of Manuel Chy the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS, as death indemnity; TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P200,000.00) PESOS, representing expenses for the wake and burial; THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS, as moral damages; and THREE
HUNDRED THIRTY[-]TWO THOUSAND (P332,000.00] PESOS, as loss of earning, plus
the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a Decision datedDecember 20, 2005,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby [DENIED] and the July 2, 2003
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch [9], in Criminal Case No. 08-
1185, is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.[11]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied in a Resolution dated March 13,
2006.
Hence, the instant appeal of petitioner on the following grounds:

I.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
PETITIONER IS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR INFLICTING THE SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES
SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED MANUEL CHY.
II.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT FINDING
PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF MANUEL CHY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CAUSE OF
DEATH IS MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION, A NON-VIOLENT RELATED CAUSE OF DEATH.
III.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH
CONCLUDED THAT THE HEART FAILURE OF MANUEL CHY WAS DUE TO FRIGHT OR SHOCK
CAUSED BY THE MALTREATMENT.
IV.
BOTH THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.[12]
In essence, the issue is whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of Manuel Chy.
In his undated Memorandum,[13] petitioner insists on a review of the factual findings of the trial
court because the judge who penned the decision was not the same judge who heard the prosecution
evidence. He adds that the Court of Appeals had wrongly inferred from, misread and overlooked certain
relevant and undisputed facts, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. [14]
At the onset, petitioner denies laying a hand on Manuel Chy. Instead, he implicates Armando Foz as
the author of the victims injuries. Corollarily, he challenges the credibility of Armandos brother, Fidel, who
testified concerning his sole culpability. Basically, petitioner disowns responsibility for Chys demise since
the latter was found to have died of myocardial infarction. In support, he amplifies the testimony of Dr.
Cleofas C. Antonio[15] that Chys medical condition could have resulted in his death anytime. Petitioner
asserts that, at most, he could be held liable for slight physical injuries because none of the blows he
inflicted on Chy was fatal.
The Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the trial courts assessment of the witnesses and its
conclusion that the beating of Chy was the proximate cause of his death.
Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution as well as the defense in
this case, we are unable to consider the petitioners appeal with favor.
The present petition was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, yet, petitioner raises
questions of fact. Indeed, it is opportune to reiterate that this Court is not the proper forum from which to
secure a re-evaluation of factual issues, save where the factual findings of the trial court do not find
support in the evidence on record or where the judgment appealed from was based on a misapprehension
of facts.[16] Neither exception applies in the instant case as would justify a departure from the established
rule.
Further, petitioner invokes a recognized exception to the rule on non-interference with the
determination of the credibility of witnesses. He points out that the judge who penned the decision is not the
judge who received the evidence and heard the witnesses.But while the situation obtains in this case, the
exception does not. The records reveal that Judge Conrado F. Manauis inhibited from the proceedings upon
motion of no less than the petitioner himself. Consequently, petitioner cannot seek protection from the
alleged adverse consequence his own doing might have caused. For us to allow petitioner relief based on this
argument would be to sanction a travesty of the Rules which was designed to further, rather than subdue,
the ends of justice.
We reiterate, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only
took over from a colleague who had earlier presided over the trial. It does not follow that the judge who was
not present during the trial, or a fraction thereof, cannot render a valid and just decision. [17] Here, Judge
Andres Q. Cipriano took over the case after Judge Manauis recused himself from the proceedings. Even so,
Judge Cipriano not only heard the evidence for the defense, he also had an opportunity to observe Dr.

Cleofas Antonio who was recalled to clarify certain points in his testimony.Worth mentioning, too, is the fact
that Judge Cipriano presided during the taking of the testimonies of Fidel Foz, Jr. and Alvin Pascua on rebuttal.
In any case, it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case in its entirety to decide it on the
basis of the records on hand.[18] He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes and calibrate the
testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their conformity to common experience, knowledge and
observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process of law.
[19]
The Autopsy Report on the body of Manuel Chy disclosed the following injuries:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body embalmed, well preserved.

Cyanotic lips and nailbeds.
Contusions, dark bluish red: 4.5 x 3.0 cms., lower portion of the left ear; 4.0 x
2.8 cms., left inferior mastoid region; 2.5 x 1.1 cms., upper lip; 2.7 x 1.0 cms., lower lip; 5.8
x 5.5 cms., dorsum of left hand.
Lacerated wound, 0.8 cm., involving mucosal surface of the upper lip on the
right side.
No fractures noted.
Brain with tortuous vessels. Cut sections show congestion. No hemorrhage noted.
Heart, with abundant fat adherent on its epicardial surface. Cut sections show a
reddish brown myocardium with an area of hyperemia on the whole posterior wall, the lower
portion of the anterior wall and the inferior portion of the septum. Coronary arteries, gritty,
with the caliber of the lumen reduced by approximately thirty (30%)
percent. Histopathological findings show mild fibrosis of the myocardium.
Lungs, pleural surfaces, shiny; with color ranging from dark red to dark purple. Cut
sections show a gray periphery with reddish brown central portion with fluid oozing on
pressure with some reddish frothy materials noted. Histopathological examinations show
pulmonary edema and hemorrhages.
Kidneys, purplish with glistening capsule. Cut sections show
congestion.Histopathological examinations show mild lymphocytic infiltration.
Stomach, one-half (1/2) full with brownish and whitish materials and other partially
digested food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: - Myocardial Infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]
At first, petitioner denied employing violence against Chy. In his undated Memorandum, however,
he admitted inflicting injuries on the deceased, albeit, limited his liability to slight physical injuries. He
argues that the superficial wounds sustained by Chy did not cause his death. [21] Quite the opposite,
however, a conscientious analysis of the records would acquaint us with the causal connection between
the death of the victim and the mauling that preceded it. In open court, Dr. Antonio identified the
immediate cause of Chys myocardial infarction:
ATTY. TUMARU:
Q: You diagnose[d] the cause of death to be myocardial infarction that is because there was
an occlusion in the artery that prevented the flowing of blood into the heart?
A: That was not exactly seen at the autopsy table but it changes, the hyperemic changes [in]
the heart muscle were the one[s] that made us [think] or gave strong conclusion that
it was myocardial infarction, and most likely the cause is occlusion of the blood
vessels itself. (Emphasis supplied.)[22]
By definition, coronary occlusion[23] is the complete obstruction of an artery of the heart, usually
from progressive arteriosclerosis[24] or the thickening and loss of elasticity of the arterial walls. This can
result from sudden emotion in a person with an existing arteriosclerosis; otherwise, a heart attack will not
occur.[25] Dr. Jessica Romero testified on direct examination relative to this point:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: Could an excitement trigger a myocardial infarction?

A: Excitement, I cannot say that if the patient is normal[;] that is[,] considering that the patient
[does] not have any previous [illness] of hypertension, no previous history of
myocardial [ischemia], no previous [arteriosis] or hardening of the arteries,
then excitement [cannot] cause myocardial infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)[26]
The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild fibrosis of the myocardium[27] caused by a previous
heart attack. Said fibrosis[28] or formation of fibrous tissue or scar tissue rendered the middle and thickest
layer of the victims heart less elastic and vulnerable to coronary occlusion from sudden emotion. This
causation is elucidated by the testimony of Dr. Antonio:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: You said that the physical injuries will cause no crisis on the part of the victim, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And [these] physical injuries [were] caused by the [boxing] on the mouth and[/]or hitting
on the nape by a bottle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On the part of the deceased, that [was] caused definitely by emotional crisis, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And because of this emotional crisis the heart palpitated so fast, so much so, that there
was less oxygen being pumped by the heart?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And definitely that caused his death, Doctor?

A: Yes, sir, it could be.[29]
In concurrence, Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan also testified as follows:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: I will repeat the question Dr. Antonio testified that the deceased died because of the blow
that was inflicted, it triggered the death of the deceased, do you agree with his
findings, Doctor?
A: Not probably the blow but the reaction sir.
Q: So you agree with him, Doctor?

A: It could be, sir.
Q: You agree with him on that point, Doctor?

A: Yes, sir.[30]
It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the emotional strain from the
beating aggravated Chys delicate constitution and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion then surfaces
that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
felony that petitioner had intended to commit.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The
essential requisites for the application of this provision are: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the
resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the
actors wrongful acts.[31]
In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him with a
bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter petitioners
liability for his death. Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine laid down in the case of United States
v. Brobst[32] that:
x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the
mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his
death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility. [33]
In the same vein, United States v. Rodriguez[34] enunciates that:
x x x although the assaulted party was previously affected by some internal malady,
if, because of a blow given with the hand or the foot, his death was hastened, beyond
peradventure he is responsible therefor who produced the cause for such acceleration as the
result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury.(Emphasis supplied.) [35]
In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different from the one he intended;
[36]
el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of
the evil caused).[37] Thus, the circumstance that petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of
the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited
by law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) [38] of the Revised Penal
Code.[39]Nevertheless, we must appreciate as mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that
the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim, could not have resulted naturally and logically, in the actual
death of the victim, if the latters heart was in good condition.
Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the
imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period,[40]or
anywhere from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen years (14) years and eight (8)
months.Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, [41] the trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prisin mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
We shall, however, modify the award of damages to the heirs of Manuel Chy for his loss of earning
capacity in the amount of P332,000. In fixing the indemnity, the victims actual income at the time of death
and probable life expectancy are taken into account. For this purpose, the Court adopts the formula used
in People v. Malinao:[42]
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of x a reasonable portion of the

the victim at the annual net income which time of this death) would have been received
by the heirs for support.[43]
Branch 9 of the Aparri, Cagayan RTC took judicial notice of the salary which Manuel Chy was receiving
as a sheriff of the court. At the time of his death, Chy was 51 years old and was earning a gross monthly
income of P10,600 or a gross annual income of P127,200. But, in view of the victims delicate condition, the
trial court reduced his life expectancy to 10 years. It also deducted P7,000 from Chys salary as reasonable
living expense. However, the records are bereft of showing that the heirs of Chy submitted evidence to
substantiate actual living expenses. And in the absence of proof of living expenses,
jurisprudence[44] approximates net income to be 50% of the gross income.Accordingly, by reason of his death,
the heirs of Manuel Chy should be awardedP1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity, computed as follows:
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-51) x [P127,200 - (P127,200)]

= 2/3 x (29) x P63,600
= 19 1/3 x P63,600
= P1,229,600
We sustain the trial courts grant of funerary expense of P200,000 as stipulated by the
parties[45] and civil indemnity of P50,000.[46] Anent moral damages, the same is mandatory in cases of
murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. [47] However,
in obedience to the controlling case law, the amount of moral damages should be reduced to P50,000.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2005 and the Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 areAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of
moral damages is reduced to P50,000. Petitioner is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Manuel K.
ChyP50,000 as civil indemnity; P200,000, representing expenses for the wake and burial; and P1,229,600 as
loss of earning capacity.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 186379
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES,* J.,
CHICO-NAZARIO,**
Acting Chairperson,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
BIENVENIDO LAZARO @ Bening,

August 19, 2009
Accused -Appellant.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision [1] dated 14 August 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
02381, which affirmed with modification the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan,
Romblon, Branch 82, finding appellant Bienvenido Lazaro alias Benny (Bienvenido) guilty of the crime of
rape in Criminal Case No. OD-875.
Bienvenido was charged before the RTC with the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with
Rape. The accusatory portion of the Complaint reads:
That on or about the 31st day of August, 1995 at around 6:00 oclock in the morning,
in Barangay XXX, Municipality of Odiongan, Province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with lewd design, did then and there
willfully and feloniously take by force and abduct the undersigned offended party by then
and there taking and bringing her to the house of said accused, against her consent and by
means of violence, and had carnal knowledge with her, against the latters will. [3]
Upon arraignment on 4 March 1996, Bienvenido, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.[4]
The evidence of the prosecution, as gathered from the testimonies of the victim AAA [5], the victims
uncle BBB, and Dr. Aida Dusaban Atienza, the government physician who examined AAA, are as follows:

AAA, an eleven-year-old girl, was born on 24 December 1984.[6] She lived with her grandmother at
the latters house in Barangay XXX, Odiongan, Romblon. At6:00 oclock in the morning of 31 August 1995,
while AAA was walking on her way to school, Bienvenido, whom AAA called Lolo, stopped her and brought
her to his house.[7] There, Bienvenido removed AAAs panties and made her lie down on the floor, with her
face up. Beienvenido took off his pants and inserted his penis into AAAs vagina and made the push and
pull movement.[8] Thereafter, Bienvenido donned his pants and threatened to kill AAA if she divulged his
bestial act to anyone. Afraid of Bienvenidos threatening words, AAA cried. She went back to her
grandmothers house. When AAA arrived, her aunt was there, but she did not tell her aunt about the
incident. On 29 September 1995, worried about AAAs changing demeanor, AAAs uncle, BBB, insistently
questioned her. It was then that AAA revealed her ordeal. BBB wasted no time and brought her to the
health center where she was examined by Dr. Aida Atienza. Dr. Atienzas examination showed that AAAs
breast was still on its pre-puberty stage. AAAs vaginal wall had been penetrated possibly by fingers or by a
penis, and there were healed complete lacerations at the4:00, 5:00 and 9:00 oclock positions.
The defense interposed the defense of denial and alibi and presented the testimonies of Bienvenido
and his niece, Yolanda Forcadas.
Bienvenido denied molesting AAA. He said that at 5:00 in the morning of 31 August 1995, he went
to the port of Poctoy, Odiongan, Romblon to sell his crops. At around 12:00 noon when his goods were sold,
he went to the house of his nephew, Rolando Forcadas, which was situated near the port, where he stayed
until 6:00 in the morning of the following day.
At around 9:00 a.m. of 31 August 1995, he saw AAA together with a certain Felmor Perater, Jr.
embracing each other. He called the attention of the two, saying that he would report the incident to AAAs
grandmother. He did not report the said incident to AAAs grandmother.
However, on re-direct examination, Bienvenido made another declaration that at around 6:00 in the
morning of 31 August 1995, he was in Barangay XXX, Odiongan, Romblon, harvesting corn. Thereafter, he
went back to his house and took a rest. The next day, while he was in the field, he caught AAA and Felmor
Perater, Jr. engaged in sexual intercourse. He scolded the two and reported the matter to AAAs
grandmother. He also claimed he was the one who accompanied AAA to the Rural Health Officer for a
medical examination.[9]
For her part, Yolanda Forcadas testified that on 11 August 1995, Bienvenido visited her in Barangay
Batiano, Odiongan, Romblon. In the morning of 12 August 1995, Bienvenido returned to his place.
The RTC, in a decision dated 24 July 2001, convicted Bienvenido of the crime of rape only. The RTC
ruled out forcible abduction, since evidence tended to show that the victim was lured by the perpetrator to
go with him to his house. This was buttressed by AAAs admission that she had been given money by
Bienvenido twice, and that she had been to the house of the former once. The RTC imposed upon
Bienvenido the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to indemnify the victim in the amount
of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused BIENVENIDO LAZARO is hereby found

GUILTY of rape and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties of the law, to indemnify the victim in the amount ofP50,000.00 and to pay the
costs.
Accused is entitled to full time of his preventive imprisonment pursuant to Art. 29 of

the Revised Penal Code.[10]
Bienvenido appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated 14
August 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the guilty verdict and the sentence imposed by the RTC. In

addition to the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the Court of Appeals ordered Bienvenido to pay the
victim P75,000.00 as moral damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the assailed decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 82, in Odiongan, Romblon in Crim. Case No. OD-875, finding accused-
appellant Bienvenido Lazaro guilty of the crime of rape and imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is
further ordered to pay the victimP75,000.00 as moral damages.[11]
Hence, the instant recourse.
Bienvenido claims that it was witness BBB, the victims uncle, who initiated the filing of the criminal
complaint against him. Since Article 344 [12] of the Revised Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110 [13] of the
Revised Rules of Court require that the right to file an action be given to the parents, grandparents or
guardians of the minor, the filing by BBB of the complaint renders the same defective.
In a bid to be exculpated from the charge, Bienvenido contends that AAAs testimony had material
inconsistency as to the date of the commission, since at one point AAA declared that the rape happened
on 12 August 1995; and in the rest of her testimony, she said it occurred on 31 August of the same year.
In determining the guilt or innocence of the accused in cases of rape, the courts have been
traditionally guided by three settled principles, namely: (a) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult
to prove, and even more difficult to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and (c) the evidence of the prosecution must
stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. [14]
Since the crime of rape is essentially one committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is
usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced coitus.[15] In its prosecution,
therefore, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with.
[16]
If her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis
thereof; otherwise, he should be acquitted of the crime.[17]
In this case, upon assessing the victims testimony, the RTC found her credible, thus:
There is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why the victim in the
case would testify falsely against the accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime.
xxxx
The laceration on the vagina of the girl who was examined weeks after the incident by Dra.
Atienza is indicative of some object having entered it. Adding to this is the testimony of AAA
that accused rode on her body and made a pull and push movement. [18]
This Court itself has diligently pored over the transcripts of stenographic notes of this case and, like
the RTC, it finds the victims testimony on the incident forthright or straightforward, consistent with an
honest and realistic account of the tragedy that befell her. She narrated the incident and the
circumstances immediately after it in this manner:

Q: Upon arriving in his house, where did he bring you?
A: In the upper part of his house.
Q: Upon reaching there, what did he do to you?
A: He took off my panty.
Q: After he took off your panty, what did he do to you?
A: He made me lie down.
Q: Face up or face down?
A: Face up.
Q: Where did you lie down?
A: On the floor.
Q: After making you lie down on the floor of his house, what did the accused do?
A: He took off his pants.
Q: After taking off his pants, what did he do to you?
A: He put his penis in my vagina.
Q: How did you feel when his penis was placed in your vagina?
A: It was painful.
Q: After placing his penis to your vagina, what did the accused do?
A: He made the push and pull movement.
Q: How long is this push and pull movement last?
A: About two minutes.

Q: After that push and pull movement, what did the accused do?
A: He stood up.
Q: And what did he do since he had taken off his pants?
A: He put on his pants.
Q: According to you, your panty was taken off by the accused, what did you do after that
push and pull?
A: I put on my panty.
Q: After putting on your panty, what did the accused tell you, if any?
A: Dont tell anybody, if you tell I will kill you.
Q: After warning you not to tell anybody otherwise you will be killed, what did you do?
A: I cried.
xxxx
Q: On 29 September 1995, do you know where was uncle Rolly Venus?
A: In their house.
Q: Did you see him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you saw your uncle on that date, what if any transpired between you and your
uncle?
A: He asked me why I am lonely and weak.
Q: What did you answer him?
A: I relayed the incident.

Q: That incident of August 31, 1995?
Q: Yes, sir. [19]
On cross examination, AAA held fast to her declaration that she was molested by Bienvenido, thus:
Q: During this time your Lolo Bening was giving you money x x x?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Now, you were telling us that when your panty was taken off by your Lolo Bening, you
were made to lie down on the floor, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And there, he immediately also took off his pants and ride over you for a period of two
minutes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: This was all he did to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: He was making the push and pull movement on your body at the same time holding your
both hands with his both hands also, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.[20]
From the foregoing, the prosecution satisfactorily established in vivid detail that during the incident
in question, Bienvenido, whom AAA called Lolo, enticed her with monetary favor to go with him to his
house. Unaware of the plot hatched by the person she treated as a grandfather and at some point a
provider, AAA went along with him. Taking advantage of the trust and the tender age of AAA, Bienvenido
was able to consummate his evil design. Ignorant of the ways of men, AAA did not protest or agree to the
sexual advances of the malefactor. As Bienvenido inserted his penis and made a push and pull movement,
AAA could only feel the pain of the insertion, not knowing that molestation had more far-reaching
consequences on her emotional growth and social development.

Although the evidence is bereft of any indication that AAA, 11 years old during the incident, was
coerced by the perpetrator, this fact cannot be utilized by the latter.This Court has held that if the woman
is under twelve (12) years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial, not only because force
is not an element of statutory rape, but also because the absence of free consent is presumed when the
woman is below 12 years old.[21] The two elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age. [22] Sexual congress with a girl
under 12 years old is always rape.[23]
Medical findings revealed that the victims vagina had old lacerations that were consistent with her
claim that she was molested. Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution, what appellant
could only muster is a barefaced denial.Unfortunately for him, his defense is much too flaccid to stay firm
against the weighty evidence for the prosecution. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence, which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value over the testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
[24]
Between the self-serving testimony of Bienvenido and the positive declaration of the victim, the latter
deserves greater credence.[25]
Also unavailing is Bienvenidos insinuation that it was a certain Felmor Perater, Jr. who might have
violated AAAs womanhood and not he. Again, this was simply a futile attempt on the part of the accused,
unsubstantiated by any thread of evidence, to extricate himself from the charge. His differing declarations
on this matter (at one point, he said AAA and Felmor were just embracing each other, then at another he
said the two were engaged in sexual intercourse) expose the fallacy of his claim of innocence.
Bienvenidos defense of alibi cannot be believed. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the following
must be established: (a) the presence of the accused-appellant in another place at the time of the
commission of the offense; and (b) the physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime.
[26]
Bienvenido testified that he was in the same barangay when the incident took place. This testimony
destroys his alibi. Assuming arguendo that Bienvenido was in Barangay Poctoy, a neighboringbarangay,
when the questioned event took place, still there is a great possibility that he could have traveled from
there to the locus criminis in no time. Thus, his defense of alibi cannot prosper.
Although AAA reported the incident to her uncle only on 29 September 1995, almost a month after
she was ravished, this cannot be taken against her. She was seriously threatened by the malefactor if she
told the said occurrence to anyone.Naturally, as a very young girl, she must have had an overpowering
fear that prevented her from telling her uncle of her grueling experience in the hands of Bienvenido. It is
not uncommon for a young girl to conceal for some time the assault on her virtue. [27] Her initial hesitation
may be due to her youth and the molesters threat against her. Besides, rape victims, especially child
victims, should not be expected to act the way mature individuals would when placed in such a situation.
[28]
It is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone traumatic experience by the norms
of behavior expected from adults under similar circumstances. [29] The range of emotions shown by rape
victims is yet to be captured even by calculus. [30] It is, thus, unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from
them.Certainly, the Court has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately
after she has been violated.[31] This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim
depending on the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of
doubt. Indeed, different people react differently to a given stimulus or type of situation, and there is no
standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling or frightful
experience.[32] It would be insensitive to expect the victim to act with equanimity and to have the courage
and the intelligence to disregard the threat made by Bienvenido. When a rape victim is paralyzed with
fear, she cannot be expected to think and act coherently. This is especially true in this case, since AAA was
threatened by appellant that she would be killed if ever she would tell anybody about the rape incident.
We go now to the allegation that the complaint filed was defective.
The pertinent laws existing at the time the crime was committed in 1995 were Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code (prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 835319, otherwise known as The Anti-
Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on 22 October 1997) and Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.Under the said laws, rape was considered as a private crime, the prosecution of which
must be initiated by the minor victim or her parents, grandparents or guardian. Bienvenido asserts that it
was AAAs uncle BBB who filed the complaint, rendering the same defective. This assertion is baseless. It
remains an allegation, since Bienvenido failed to present any proof thereof. On the contrary, a thorough
examination of the complaint and the sworn affidavit would establish that the same were duly signed by
private offended party AAA. There is no indication these documents were initiated by AAAs uncle. As
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, AAAs statements were only reduced into writing by the
authorities; but, at the end part of the documents, her signature was affixed thereto conforming to the
contents of AAAs affidavit and the fact that she personally initiated the complaint.The affidavit was
executed by AAA in the presence of the police officers and other witnesses and was countersigned by the
public prosecutor.
As to Bienvenidos claim that AAAs testimony was riddled with material inconsistencies, since she
gave varying dates of the commission of the crime, the same cannot be taken in his favor.
Firstly, the exact date of the commission of rape is not material. In rape cases, the time of
commission of the crime is not a material ingredient of the offense. [33] In this connection, this Court also
ruled that in rape cases, victims of rape hardly retain in their memories the dates, number of times, and
manner in which they were violated. In the same vein, to be material, discrepancies in the testimony of the
victim should refer to significant facts that are determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused, not
to mere details that are irrelevant to the elements of the crime, such as the exact time of its commission in
a case of rape.[34]
Secondly, the mention of 12 August 1995 as the date of commission of the crime was a mere
inadvertence on the part of the public prosecutor. The complaint-affidavit mentions 31 August 1995 as the
date when AAA was raped. There was only one instance in her whole testimony when 12 August 1995 was
mentioned, on page 3 of the transcript of records taken on 1 January 1996, viz:
PROS. VICTORIANO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:
xxxx
Q: On August 12, 1995 at about six (6:00) oclock in the morning, where were you?
A: I was going to school.[35]
Later, the public prosecutor corrected himself by saying:
Q: Did you reveal to your aunt what was done to you by the accused?
A: No, sir.
xxxx
Q: When you saw your uncle on that date, what if any transpired between you and your
uncle?
A: He asked me why I am lonely and weak.
Q: What did you answer him?
A: I relayed the incident.

Q: That incident of August 31, 1995?
A: Yes, sir.[36] (Emphasis supplied.)
The rest of the transcript of records referred to 31 August 1995 as the date of the rape incident. On
cross-examination, this was AAAs testimony:
Q: Now, you were telling us that when your panty was taken off by your Lolo Bening, you
were made to lie down on the floor, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And there, he immediately also took off his pants and ride over you for a period of two
minutes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: This was all that he did to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: He was making the push and pull movement on your body at the same time holding your
both hands with his both hands also, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: His hand therefore was not able to hold your vagina because he was holding your both
hands while making the push and pull movement?
A: It was held by him.
Q: When did he hold your vagina?
A: On August 31.[37] (Emphasis supplied.)
In sum, the Court finds that the RTC, as well as the Court of Appeals, committed no error in giving
credence to the evidence of the prosecution and finding appellant Bienvenido guilty of the charge. The
Court has long adhered to the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are accorded great respect, unless the trial court overlooked substantial facts and
circumstances, which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case. [38]In rape cases, the

evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose
conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect, because the judge has the direct opportunity to
observe them on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not. [39] This deference to the trial
courts appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses is consistent with the principle that when
the testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility, that alone is sufficient to convict the accused.
[40]
This is especially true when the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed by the appellate court. [41]
As to the penalty imposed, the RTC correctly sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua. Statutory
rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Since there was no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attendant to the crime, reclusion perpetuais the proper penalty.
Also affirmed is the award of the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the same being in conformity
with the recent jurisprudence. [42] However, the Court of Appeals award of moral damages in the amount
of P75,000 must be modified toP50,000.00. In People v. Sambrano,[43] the Court decreed that the award
of P75,000 as moral damages is only warranted when the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending
qualifying aggravating circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty. The instant case
involves a simple rape. Hence, the amount ofP50,000.00 as moral damages is in order.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 14
August 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02381, finding Bienvenido Lazaro a.k.a. Bening GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt on one count of statutory rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and ordering him to pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185711
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:
CARPIO MORALES,* J.,
CHICO-NAZARIO,**
- versus - Acting Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,***and
PERALTA, JJ.
REYNALDO SANZ LABOA,

Promulgated:
Accused-Appellant.
August 24, 2009
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DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision[1] dated 31 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00211-
MIN, which affirmed with modification the Decision [2]dated 22 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No. 2838, finding herein appellant Reynaldo Sanz Laboa
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against AAA [3] and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant Reynaldo Sanz Laboa was charged before the RTC of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat with raping AAA in an
Information which reads:
That on or about in the afternoon of [26 June 2001], at Barangay XXX, Municipality of XXX, Province
of XXX, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said [appellant]
with lewd and unchaste design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there,
willfully and feloniously lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of one AAA, a minor,
under twelve (12) years old against her will and consent. [4]
Upon arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime
charged. After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: Dr. Alfredo Calingin (Dr. Calingin),
Municipal Health Officer of Sen. Ninoy Aquino, Sultan Kudarat, who conducted the physical examination on
AAA; Police Inspector (PO) 1 Melinda Dedoro Rosal (PO1 Rosal), Women and Children Protection Desk
Officer at Sen. Ninoy Aquino Municipal Police Station, who conducted the investigation on the complaint of
AAA; Ariel Estabillo (Ariel), laborer at the corn drier of the victims parents; BBB, the mother of AAA; and
AAA, the private complainant herself.
The evidence for the prosecution, culled from the testimonies of the aforesaid witnesses, established the
following facts:
On 26 June 2001, AAA, then nine years old, was helping her parents at their corn drier located in XXX, XXX,
XXX, which is about 300 meters away from their house.At around 5:00 p.m., AAA was instructed by her
father to go home and to cook rice.Before going home, AAA gathered firewood. When she reached their
house, she was already tired, so she decided to lie down on a long bench where she eventually fell
asleep. At that time, the appellant was already outside their house making a divider, because he was hired
by AAAs mother to make a divider for them.[5]
While AAA was sleeping on a long bench inside their house, the appellant entered, went directly to where
she was and started removing her short pants and underwear.AAA was awakened, but the appellant still
proceeded to undress her. The appellant then placed saliva on her vagina, spread her legs and went on top
of her. Thereafter, the appellant unzipped his pants, held his penis and placed it in AAAs vagina. AAA felt
that the penis of the appellant was hard. She also felt pain when the appellant tried to insert his penis into
her vagina. She tried to resist but to no avail. After a while, AAA felt something wet in her vagina. [6]
At this juncture, Ariel arrived; he went there in order to return an adjustable tool that he borrowed from the
parents of AAA. Ariel was so shocked seeing the appellant, whose pants zipper was open, on top of AAA,
who was naked from the waist down.At once, Ariel struck the appellant at the back with the tool he was
holding. The appellant immediately stood up, fixed his long pants, closed his zipper, gathered his carpentry
tools and left. AAA was then crying and asked Ariel to punch the appellant.Subsequently, Ariel brought
AAA to her parents, who were at their corn drier. AAA was silent but teary-eyed when Ariel informed her
mother about her ordeal.[7]
Upon being informed, BBB, together with AAA, immediately reported the rape incident to
the barangay chairman. As the latter was unavailable, they reported the said incident to the officer-in-
charge, who ordered to look for the appellant. With the help of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU), the appellant was picked up in the house of one Bartoloy Dema. He was then brought to
the barangayhall.[8]
AAA and her parents also went at the Municipal Police Station of Sen. Ninoy Aquino to report the rape
incident. It was PO1 Rosal, the Women and Children Protection Desk Officer assigned to that Police Station,
who conducted the investigation on the said rape incident. She took AAAs sworn statement on how the
appellant ravished her. Then, she referred AAA to the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) and to the Municipal Health Office for medical examination. [9]
AAA was examined by Dr. Calingin, the Municipal Health Officer of Sen. Ninoy Aquino. Dr. Calingin
found incomplete fresh hymenal lacerations on AAAs vagina at the 2:00 oclock and 7:00
oclock positions. The findings were contained in the Medical Certificate dated 28 June 2001,[10] which he
issued. According to Dr. Calingin, said lacerations could have been possibly caused by bicycle riding, horse
riding or an attempt to sexually penetrate AAAs private part.[11]
Thereafter, a Criminal Information for Rape was filed against the appellant.After an Order of
Detention was issued, the appellant was arrested by the Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel. [12]
For its part, the defense presented the lone testimony of the appellant, who interposed the defense of
denial.
The appellant claimed that on 26 June 2001, at around 5:00 p.m., he entered the house of AAAs parents to
get the bench, which he would use in attaching the door of the divider he was making. Since AAA was lying
on the said bench, he kicked the bench to wake her up, but AAA refused to get up. He then pushed the
bench. At such instance, Ariel arrived. The appellant averred that Ariel touched him on his back with the
tool the latter was carrying. The appellant told Ariel to assist him in making the divider; however, as it was
already late in the afternoon, the appellant just gathered his carpentry tools and left the house of AAAs
parents. On cross-examination, however, the appellant testified that after kicking the bench, AAA was still
asleep, and this prompted him to shake the bench to wake her up. He also admitted that he was bending
over the bench, as he was holding the two legs of AAA when suddenly Ariel arrived. The appellant asserted
that Ariel merely misinterpreted such position of him as having sexual intercourse with AAA. [13]
After trial, a Decision was rendered by the court a quo on 22 July 2003 finding the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The trial court found AAAs testimony on how she was raped by the
appellant on 26 June 2001 to be straightforward, credible, truthful and convincing. Moreover, AAAs positive
identification of the appellant as her ravisher completely overturned appellants defense of denial. The trial
court thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the [appellant],
Reynaldo Sanz Laboa, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Accordingly, the Court hereby sentences the [appellant], Reynaldo Sanz Laboa:
(a) to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;

(b) to indemnify the private offended party, AAA;
1. the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS,

as moral damages
2. the amount of SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND

(P75,000.00) PESOS, by way of civil indemnity, consistent
with current prevailing jurisprudence;
3. the amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND

(P25,000.00) PESOS, as exemplary damages; and
(c) to pay the costs.
Being a detention prisoner, the [appellant] Reynaldo Sanz Laboa, is entitled to full
credit of the entire period of his preventive imprisonment, in accordance with Article 27 of
the Revised Penal code, as amended by R.A. No. 6127, provided he had agreed in writing to
abide by the same disciplinary rules and regulations imposed upon convicted prisoners,
otherwise, with only four-fifths (4/5) thereof. [14]
The records of this case were originally transmitted to this Court on appeal. Pursuant to People v. Mateo,
[15]
the records were transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
In his brief, the appellant raised his lone assigned error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE [APPELLANT] OF THE CRIME OF

CONSUMMATED RAPE WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. [16]
On 31 January 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the conviction of the appellant for
the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the modification
reducing the amount of civil indemnity awarded by the trial court to AAA from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00.
The appellant appealed to this Court, contending that his conviction for the crime charged was based
mainly on the testimonies of AAA, Dr. Calingin and Ariel.Appellant claimed that the testimonies of the
aforesaid witnesses showed uncertainty as to his participation or how he consummated the crime
charged. According to the appellant, AAA herself admitted that she did not know whether the appellants
penis penetrated her vagina. Similarly, Dr. Calingin testified that the fresh hymenal lacerations on AAAs
vagina could have been possibly caused by bicycle riding, horse riding or an attempt to sexually penetrate
AAAs vagina. In the same way, Ariel admitted that he failed to see neither the penis of the appellant nor
the actual penetration of the same on AAAs vagina. With the foregoing circumstances, the appellant claims
that penetration of AAAs vagina by his penis was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, he may only
be held guilty of the crime of attempted rape and not of consummated rape.
Appellants contentions are bereft of merit.
It is a fundamental rule that the trial courts factual findings, especially its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and are binding upon this Court, particularly when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. [17] This is so because the trial court is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial. The appellate courts will generally not disturb such findings, unless it plainly overlooked certain facts
of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. [18]
In this case, this Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that, indeed, appellant is guilty of the crime of consummated rape and not merely of attempted
rape.
As it has been repeatedly said, no woman would want to go through the process, the trouble and the
humiliation of trial for such a debasing offense, unless she actually has been a victim of abuse and her
motive is but a response to the compelling need to seek and obtain justice. [19]
As observed by the trial court, AAA had testified in a straightforward, candid and convincing
manner on how she was raped by the appellant. Truly, AAA did not know whether the penis of the
appellant penetrated her vagina or not. But, it does not mean that the appellant did not consummate the
crime of rape. Settled is the rule that in order to establish rape, it is not necessary to show that the hymen
was ruptured, as full penetration of the penis is not an indispensable requirement. What is
fundamental is that the entrance, or at least the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the
pudendum, is proved. The mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of the
victims genitalia, and not the full penetration of the complainants private part, consummates the
crime. Hence, the touching or entry of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the
pudendum of the victims genitalia constitutes consummated rape. [20]
In this case, AAA categorically stated that the appellant raped her by having sexual intercourse with
her. She vividly described that after the appellant removed her shorts and underwear, the appellant, in
turn, opened his pants and unzipped it. Thereafter, the appellant spread her legs, held his penis and placed
it in her vagina. At such instance, she felt pain in her private part. [21] From the said testimony of AAA, there
can be no doubt that there was at least a partial entry, so as to make the crime consummated rape,
considering the pain the entry caused.
The fact that the rape was consummated was also supported by the medical findings of the
examining physician, Dr. Calingin, who found incomplete fresh hymenal lacerations at the 2:00
oclock and 7:00 oclock positions on AAAs vagina.According to him, said lacerations were possibly caused
by an attempt to sexually penetrate AAAs private part. As the Court of Appeals stated in its Decision, while
Dr. Calingin said that the lacerations could have also been possibly caused by bicycle riding or horse
riding, said circumstance was not however shown to be the usual activities of AAA. Thus, when the
testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, sufficient basis exists to warrant a
conclusion that the essential requisite of carnal knowledge has thereby been established. [22]
Although Ariel, one of the prosecution witnesses, failed to see the penis of the appellant or its
actual penetration on AAAs vagina, still, his testimony clearly established and corroborated AAAs
testimony that, indeed, she was raped by the appellant. Records revealed that Ariel declared before the
court a quo that when he saw the appellant on top of AAA, who was naked from the waist down, the
appellants pants were lowered down to his buttocks while doing the push and pull movement. [23] Such
action of the appellant cannot be interpreted in any way other than having sexual intercourse with AAA.
In contrast, the evidence presented by the defense consisted mainly of bare denials. Denial, like
alibi, is inherently a weak defense. Unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot
prevail over the positive declaration of the victim, [24] who, in a simple and straightforward manner,
convincingly identified the appellant as the one who had sexually molested her in the afternoon of 26 June
2001.
Clearly from the foregoing, the prosecution witnesses persuasively established beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of the appellant of the crime of consummated rape.Thus, this Court is convinced that the
trial court and the appellate court correctly convicted him of the crime of rape, [25] which is punishable
by reclusion perpetua.[26]

This Court affirms the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity given by the Court of Appeals to the
victim. Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory
upon the finding of the fact of rape.[27]
Moral damages in rape cases should be awarded without need of showing that the victim suffered
trauma of mental, physical, and psychological sufferings constituting the basis thereof. These are too
obvious to still require the victims recital thereof at the trial, since we even assume and acknowledge such
agony as a gauge of her credibility. [28] Thus, this Court finds the award of moral damages by both lower
courts in the amount of P50,000.00, proper.
As to the award of exemplary damages, the same must be deleted. Article 2231 of the Civil Code
provides that exemplary damages may be awarded if the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.[29] Thus, this Court is constrained not to award exemplary damages in this
case, since no aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00211-MIN dated 31 January 2008 finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of exemplary damages is deleted. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
NOMINAL DAMAGES (ART. 2221-2225)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41093 October 30, 1978
ROBES-FRANCISCO REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (BRANCH XXXIV), and LOLITA MILLAN, respondents.
Purugganan & Bersamin for petitioner.
Salvador N. Beltran for respondent.
MUOZ PALMA, J.:
This is a direct appeal on questions of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXXIV, presided by the Honorable Bernardo P. Pardo, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered commanding the defendant to register the deed
of absolute sale it had executed in favor of plaintiff with the Register of Deeds of Caloocan
City and secure the corresponding title in the name of plaintiff within ten (10) days after
finality of this decision; if, for any reason, this not possible, defendant is hereby sentenced to
pay plaintiff the sum of P5,193.63 with interest at 4% per annum from June 22, 1972 until
fully paid.
In either case, defendant is sentenced to pay plaintiff nominal damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 plus attorney's fee in the amount of P5,000.00 and costs.
SO ORDERED.
Caloocan City, February 11, 1975. (rollo, p. 21)
Petitioner corporation questions the award for nominal damages of P20,000.00 and attorney's fee of
P5,000.00 which are allegedly excessive and unjustified.
In the Court's resolution of October 20, 1975, We gave due course to the Petition only as regards the
portion of the decision awarding nominal damages. 1
The following incidents are not in dispute:
In May 1962 Robes-Francisco Realty & Development Corporation, now petitioner, agreed to sell to private
respondent Lolita Millan for and in consideration of the sum of P3,864.00, payable in installments, a parcel
of land containing an area of approximately 276 square meters, situated in Barrio Camarin, Caloocan City,
known as Lot No. 20, Block No. 11 of its Franville Subdivision. 2
Millan complied with her obligation under the contract and paid the installments stipulated therein, the
final payment having been made on December 22, 1971. The vendee made a total payment of P5,193.63
including interests and expenses for registration of title. 3
Thereafter, Lolita Millan made repeated demands upon the corporation for the execution of the final deed
of sale and the issuance to her of the transfer certificate of title over the lot. On March 2, 1973, the parties
executed a deed of absolute sale of the aforementioned parcel of land. The deed of absolute sale
contained, among others, this particular provision:
That the VENDOR further warrants that the transfer certificate of title of the above-described
parcel of land shall be transferred in the name of the VENDEE within the period of six (6)
months from the date of full payment and in case the VENDOR fails to issue said transfer
certificate of title, it shall bear the obligation to refund to the VENDEE the total amount
already paid for, plus an interest at the rate of 4% per annum. (record on appeal, p. 9)
Notwithstanding the lapse of the above-mentioned stipulated period of six (6) months, the corporation
failed to cause the issuance of the corresponding transfer certificate of title over the lot sold to Millan,
hence, the latter filed on August 14, 1974 a complaint for specific performance and damages against
Robes-Francisco Realty & Development Corporation in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV,
Caloocan City, docketed therein as Civil Case No. C-3268. 4
The complaint prayed for judgment (1) ordering the reformation of the deed of absolute sale; (2) ordering
the defendant to deliver to plaintiff the certificate of title over the lot free from any lien or encumbrance;
or, should this be not possible, to pay plaintiff the value of the lot which should not be less than
P27,600.00 (allegedly the present estimated value of the lot); and (3) ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiff damages, corrective and actual in the sum of P15 000.00. 5
The corporation in its answer prayed that the complaint be dismissed alleging that the deed of absolute
sale was voluntarily executed between the parties and the interest of the plaintiff was amply protected by
the provision in said contract for payment of interest at 4% per annum of the total amount paid, for the
delay in the issuance of the title. 6
At the pretrial conference the parties agreed to submit the case for decision on the pleadings after
defendant further made certain admissions of facts not contained in its answer. 7
Finding that the realty corporation failed to cause the issuance of the corresponding transfer certificate of
title because the parcel of land conveyed to Millan was included among other properties of the corporation
mortgaged to the GSIS to secure an obligation of P10 million and that the owner's duplicate certificate of
title of the subdivision was in the possession of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), the trial
court, on February 11, 1975, rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which is quoted in pages 1 and 2
of this Decision. We hold that the trial court did not err in awarding nominal damages; however, the
circumstances of the case warrant a reduction of the amount of P20,000.00 granted to private respondent
Millan.
There can be no dispute in this case under the pleadings and the admitted facts that petitioner corporation
was guilty of delay, amounting to nonperformance of its obligation, in issuing the transfer certificate of title
to vendee Millan who had fully paid up her installments on the lot bought by her. Article 170 of the Civil
Code expressly provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Petitioner contends that the deed of absolute sale executed between the parties stipulates that should the
vendor fail to issue the transfer certificate of title within six months from the date of full payment, it shall
refund to the vendee the total amount paid for with interest at the rate of 4% per annum, hence, the
vendee is bound by the terms of the provision and cannot recover more than what is agreed upon.
Presumably, petitioner in invoking Article 1226 of the Civil Code which provides that in obligations with a
penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case
of noncompliance, if there is no stipulation to the contrary.
The foregoing argument of petitioner is totally devoid of merit. We would agree with petitioner if the clause
in question were to be considered as a penal clause. Nevertheless, for very obvious reasons, said clause
does not convey any penalty, for even without it, pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil Code, the vendee
would be entitled to recover the amount paid by her with legal rate of interest which is even more than the
4% provided for in the clause. 7-A
It is therefore inconceivable that the aforecited provision in the deed of sale is a penal clause which will
preclude an award of damages to the vendee Millan. In fact the clause is so worded as to work to the
advantage of petitioner corporation.
Unfortunately, the vendee, now private respondent, submitted her case below without presenting evidence
on the actual damages suffered by her as a result of the nonperformance of petitioner's obligation under
the deed of sale. Nonetheless, the facts show that the right of the vendee to acquire title to the lot bought
by her was violated by petitioner and this entitles her at the very least to nominal damages.
The pertinent provisions of our Civil Code follow:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Art. 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any
source enumerated in article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been
invaded.
Under the foregoing provisions nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of loss suffered but
for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded. They are recoverable where some injury
has been done the amount of which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages being left to
the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case. 8
It is true as petitioner claims that under American jurisprudence nominal damages by their very nature are
small sums fixed by the court without regard to the extent of the harm done to the injured party.
It is generally held that a nominal damage is a substantial claim, if based upon the violation
of a legal right; in such case, the law presumes a damage, although actual or compensatory
damages are not proven; in truth nominal damages are damages in name only and not in
fact, and are allowed, not as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted, but simply in recogniton of
the existence of a technical injury. (Fouraker v. Kidd Springs Boating and Fishing Club, 65 S.
W. 2d 796-797, citing 17 C.J. 720, and a number of authorities). 9
In this jurisdiction, in Vda. de Medina, et al. v. Cresencia, et al. 1956, which was an action for damages
arising out of a vehicular accident, this Court had occasion to eliminate an award of P10,000.00 imposed
by way of nominal damages, the Court stating inter alia that the amount cannot, in common sense, be
demeed "nominal". 10
In a subsequent case, viz: Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Nicolas L. Cuenca, 1965, this Court, however, through
then Justice Roberto Concepcion who later became Chief Justice of this Court, sustained an award of
P20,000.00 as nominal damages in favor of respnodent Cuenca. The Court there found special reasons for
considering P20,000.00 as "nominal". Cuenca who was the holder of a first class ticket from Manila to
Tokyo was rudely compelled by an agent of petitioner Airlines to move to the tourist class notwithstanding

its knowledge that Cuenca as Commissioner of Public Highways of the Republic of the Philippines was
travelling in his official capacity as a delegate of the country to a conference in Tokyo." 11
Actually, as explained in the Court's decision in Northwest Airlines, there is no conflict between that case
and Medina, for in the latter, the P10,000.00 award for nominal damages was eliminated principally
because the aggrieved party had already been awarded P6,000.00 as compensatory damages, P30,000.00
as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and "nominal damages cannot coexist with
compensatory damages," while in the case of Commissioner Cuenca, no such compensatory, moral, or
exemplary damages were granted to the latter. 12
At any rate, the circumstances of a particular case will determine whether or not the amount assessed as
nominal damages is within the scope or intent of the law, more particularly, Article 2221 of the Civil Code.
In the situation now before Us, We are of the view that the amount of P20,000.00 is excessive. The
admitted fact that petitioner corporation failed to convey a transfer certificate of title to respondent Millan
because the subdivision property was mortgaged to the GSIS does not in itself show that there was bad
faith or fraud. Bad faith is not to be presumed. Moreover, there was the expectation of the vendor that
arrangements were possible for the GSIS to make partial releases of the subdivision lots from the overall
real estate mortgage. It was simply unfortunate that petitioner did not succeed in that regard.
For that reason We cannot agree with respondent Millan Chat the P20,000.00 award may be considered in
the nature of exemplary damages.
In case of breach of contract, exemplary damages may be awarded if the guilty party acted in wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. 13 Furthermore, exemplary or corrective damages
are to be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, only if the injured party has shown
that he is entitled to recover moral, temperate or compensatory damages."
Here, respondent Millan did not submit below any evidence to prove that she suffered actual or
compensatory damages. 14
To conclude, We hold that the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) by way of nominal damages is fair
and just under the following circumstances, viz: respondent Millan bought the lot from petitioner in May,
1962, and paid in full her installments on December 22, 1971, but it was only on March 2, 1973, that a
deed of absolute sale was executed in her favor, and notwithstanding the lapse of almost three years since
she made her last payment, petitioner still failed to convey the corresponding transfer certificate of title to
Millan who accordingly was compelled to file the instant complaint in August of 1974.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We modify the decision of the trial court and reduce the nominal damages to Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). In all other respects the aforesaid decision stands.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123404. February 26, 1997]
AURELIO SUMALPONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
The petitioner AURELIO SUMALPONG was charged with the crime of attempted homicide allegedly
committed as follows:
"That on or about August 6, 1982, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a .38 caliber revolver and with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully end feloniously attack, assault and shot (sic) one Arsolo Ramos, thus the said
accused having commenced the commission of Homicide directly by overt acts and did not perform all acts
of execution which should have produced the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance."[1]
After the petitioner pleaded not guilty on arraignment, trial on the merits followed. The prosecution
presented the complainant Arsolo Ramos, and his wife, Leonarda who both testified to the following facts:
At around 10:00 o'clock in the evening of August 6, 1992, while complainant and his wife were on their
way home from their ricefield in the interior, they saw the petitioner standing by the road beside a house
under construction. When they came near him, the petitioner inquired from Leonarda if she knew the
identity of the persons who had stoned his house, and when the latter denied any knowledge thereof, the
petitioner told her that the people from the interior were abusive. To that comment Leonarda retorted that
the petitioner should first identify the persons responsible for stoning his house, otherwise, she will bring
the matter to the attention of the Barangay Captain. [2]Angered by Leonarda's reply, the petitioner asked,
"why are you angry, are you the wife of that person"? [3], and simultaneously slapped Leonarda's face
causing the latter to fall to the ground. While Leonarda was on her hands and knees, the petitioner drew
his gun and shot her at the back of her head. The complainant then rushed towards the petitioner who
shot him twice but missed. The petitioner and the complainant grappled for the possession of the gun and
fell into a nearby canal. In the course of the struggle, the petitioner bit the complainant's right forearm and
left ear thereby causing a mutilation of the latter.[4]
The foregoing was corroborated by another witness for the prosecution, Francisco Manugas, who
happened to be in a nearby waiting shed when the incident occurred. Manugas testified that he was
resting and talking to one Alberto Vilasan in the waiting shed when he saw the petitioner station himself by
an electric post while the complainant and Leonarda were nearing the vicinity of the latter. According to
Manugas, the petitioner approached Leonarda and shortly thereafter, he saw the former slap the latter's
left cheek causing her to stagger. Manugas then saw the petitioner shoot Leonarda prompting the
complainant to rush to her aid. The petitioner aimed his gun at the complainant and fired twice but missed.
A scuffle between the petitioner and the complainant ensued, and it was at this juncture that Manugas and
Vilasan approached Leonarda who was then lying on the ground. Their efforts to help Leonarda were
thwarted by two unknown persons, both armed with guns, who appeared from the dark and ordered them
not to move. Threatened, Manugas and Vilasan retreated and ran away. They went to the Barangay
Captain to report the incident to him, and the latter immediately responded by going to the scene of the
crime.[5]
On the other hand, the defense would have us believe that it was the complainant who had a gun
which he intended to use against the petitioner after the latter's heated altercation with Leonarda. The
defense's version of the incident relied heavily on the testimony of the petitioner, the substance of which
was succinctly summarized in the trial court's decision as follows:
"According to him (petitioner), on August 6, 1992, at around 6:00 P.M. he went to the upper part of the
place where his house is located to inquire from the four housing contractors who were in the carport of a
vacant housing unit if they have any knowledge of the identity of the persons who stoned his house and
was informed that some drunken youths from the interior would pass by and throw stones. He then noticed
a couple approaching from a distance and one of the contractors called the couple, whom he identified as
the complainant and his wife, and the two approached them. He then asked the complainant if he knows
the youths throwing stones at his house but was told by the complainant that he does not. He then asked
the complainant that if he knows these youths to advise them not to throw stones. However, he was told
that he could not catch these youths in the act of throwing stones as they would be in the upper level of
the place. He then retorted that 'perhaps you know these people by the way you talk' and the wife of the
complainant intervened saying 'you better identify these people before you make any accusation or I'll go
to the barangay captain.' Their discussion became heated and the four contractors went inside the house.
He was then threatened by the complainant to leave, otherwise something would happen to him with the
complainant further telling him that he has a gun inside his bag and he is not afraid since he even had a
fight a month before. He did not leave and their discussion continued and the complainant then got a gun
inside his bag. The accused then took hold of the hand of Leonarda Ramos and using her as a shield
brought her to the road. The complainant followed and grabbed his wife and the accused then grabbed the
hand of the complainant holding the gun and the gun fired. He pushed the wife aside and they grappled
with each other with his right hand holding the right hand of the complainant holding the gun and with his
left arm encircling the neck of the complainant. He was bitten by the complainant on the left arm and he
also bit the left ear and the right forearm of the complainant. While they were grappling with each other,
the gun fired four times and when they fell with the complainant underneath him, he noticed someone

whom he came to know as the wife of the complainant kicking him on the head several times. Later,
someone whom he identified as Rogelio Omiter separated them and brought him home. x x x" [6]
In an attempt to lend some degree of persuasiveness to the petitioner's story, Rogelio Omiter was
presented as a witness for the defense. Rogelio testified that on the said date and time of the incident, he
was at his house when he heard a discussion taking place some ten meters away. He listened to the
conversation and was able to identify one of the voices as that of the petitioner's. Suddenly, he heard a
gunshot which propelled him to run towards the place where the voices were coming from. While running,
he again heard successive gunshots. From a distance he could see the petitioner and the complainant
wrestling with each other. He then approached and tried to separate the two from each other's hold, and
while doing so, he observed that Leonarda was repeatedly kicking the petitioner's head. [7]
According full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court
rendered a decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of attempted homicide and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment from six (6) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofprision correccional as maximum. The petitioner was
likewise ordered to indemnify the complainant in the amount of: (a) P16,800.00 for the loss of his crops
due to his failure to attend to his farmwork because of the injuries inflicted upon him by the petitioner;
(b)P2,000.00 for hospitalization expenses; and (c) P5,000.00 by way of moral damages. [8]The petitioner's
conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, however, modified the award of damages
to the complainant, deleting the awards for loss of crops and hospitalization expenses, increasing the
moral damages to P10,000.00, and awarding nominal damages in the same amount.
Before this Court is the petitioner's appeal where he endeavors to weaken the complainant's credibility
by pointing out an alleged inconsistency between the latter's sworn statement and his testimony in open
court. The petitioner contends that a material discrepancy exists between the complainant's sworn
statement that the petitioner fired at him first before shooting Leonarda, and his oral testimony that the
petitioner shot his wife, Leonarda, before firing at him twice.
Time and again this Court has held that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when referring
only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their
veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such inconsistencies reinforce rather than weaken their
credibility and suggest that they are telling the truth. [9] The aforesaid rule finds application to the case at
bench for the matter of who was shot first by the petitioner is clearly insignificant and does not change the
established fact that the petitioner had indeed fired at both the complainant and the latter's wife. Although
there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witness where
there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant. [10]
Furthermore, a contradiction between a witness' affidavit and his testimony in open court may almost
always be explained by the fact that being taken ex parte, an affidavit is often incomplete and inaccurate,
sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes from the want of suggestions and inquiries. An
affidavit is not a complete reproduction of what the declarant has in mind because it is generally prepared
by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs it after it has been read to him. [11] The same is
especially true when after having prepared the affidavit, the administering officer falls to translate the
statements contained therein in the vernacular for the full comprehension of the affiant who is not well
versed in the English language. On this point, the Court of Appeals noted that the complainant's sworn
statement which was written in English was never translated or interpreted to the complainant in the
Visayan dialect, the language known and spoken by him, before the latter affixed his signature thereto.
[12]
This is, manifest from the following testimony of the complainant:
"Q. And this sworn statement is written in the English language and this was translated to you
prior to your signature?
A. This was not translated to me in Visayan dialect.
Q. Where did you sign this sworn statement?
A. At the police headquarters, sir.
Q. In other words, this sworn statement was made in the police headquarters and the
investigating officer were (sic) asking you questions at that time?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And your answers were translated or typewritten by that investigating officer?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How was the questioning done, was it in the Visayan dialect (or) in English language?
A. Visayan dialect, sir.
Q. And after the questioning by the police officer, you were asked to sign your name at the bottom
portion of this statement?
A. Yes, sir." [13]
In any event, the complainant's open court declaration that the petitioner shot Leonarda prior to shooting
him should already be deemed a clarification or a rectification of the contradictory statement in his
affidavit. During cross-examination, the complainant unhesitatingly clarified the correct sequence of
events:
"Q. In your testimony, Mr. Ramos, you said the accused first shot your wife and later shot you for
(sic) two times?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is it not the reverse that you were first shot by the accused and later your wife was shot by said
accused?
A. First my wife was shot, then later on I was the one.
Q. Are you sure of that, Mr. Ramos?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you would not change your answer whatsoever?
A. No, sir.
Q. I am again confronting (sic) your statement you have given in the police station and I would like
to quote question No. 9 of this statement of yours. I quote: 'What happened after then (sic)?'
Answer: He pinpointed me to be the person who stoned his house, at that juncture a heated
argument ensued end immediately took his handgun and shot me for (sic) two times, but
luckily I was not hit.' Is that not a fact that this was your (sic) statement you have given in the
police station?
A. What I can say is my wife was the one first shot and then I was the one shot later on.
Q. But in this sworn statement of yours, it appears that your wife was the (sic) first shot-that you
were shot first and then your wife?
A. What I said is that my wife was first shot and later on I was shot." [14]
As the issue raised ultimately boils down to a question of credibility, it bears reiterating that findings
and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect for the reason
that trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. [15] Entitled to
great weight and respect, therefore, is the following observation of the trial court:
"x x x The complainant and his wife are simple farmers and could not be prone to violence as insinuated by
the accused. Their demeanor and appearance impressed the court as people dedicated more to their
livelihood, as shown by the fact that they had to go home as late as 10:00 P.M. in working their farm. Their
meekness and docility is shown, if accused's version is to be believed, by the fact that when allegedly
called, they readily approached. x x x
"On the other hand, from the evidence presented, the court finds the accused (herein petitioner) to be hot
tempered, prone to sudden anger and impulsiveness which lead (sic) to his shooting the couple even on a
trifling matter. It was apparent that the accused that evening was very angry and ready for trouble. He was
looking for persons who had thrown stones at his house x x x" [16]
In view of the foregoing, this Court cannot but concur with the trial court and the Court of Appeals in
finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Anent the award of damages,
however, this Court upholds the Court of Appeals' ruling on the matter. Eliminating the award of actual or
compensatory damages in the form of hospitalization expenses and loss of income, the Court of Appeals
cited the failure of the complainant to offer any proof of the same. To justify a grant of actual or
compensatory damages, it is necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party, the actual amount of loss. [17]
The petitioner belabors the increase in the amount of moral damages to P10,000.00 and the award of
nominal damages in an equivalent amount when the complainant did not appeal the decision of the trial
court to the Court of Appeals. This contention deserves scant consideration. An appeal in a criminal case
opens the whole case for review and this includes the review of the penalty, indemnity and damages.
[18]
Squarely applicable to the instant case is this Court's pronouncement in Quemel vs. Court of Appeals,
[19]
that.
"[a]lthough the authority to assess damages or indemnity in criminal cases is vested in trial courts, it
is only in the first instance. On appeal, such authority passes to the appellate court. Thus, this Court has, in
many cases, increased the damages awarded by the trial court, although the offended party had not
appealed from said award, and the only party who sought a review of the decision of said court was the
accused."[20]
The Court finds the award of nominal and moral damages both in the amount of P10,000.00 justified under
the circumstances. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.[21] In other words, whenever there has been a
violation of an ascertained legal right, although no actual damages resulted or none are shown, the award
of nominal damages is proper.[22] There is no room to doubt that some species of injury was caused to the
complainant because of the medical expenses he incurred in having his wounds treated, and the loss of
income due to his failure to work during his hospitalization. However, in the absence of competent proof of
the amount of actual damages, the complainant is entitled only to nominal damages.[23]
Anent the increase in the amount of moral damages suffice it to state that the nature of the injuries
and the degree of physical suffering endured by the complainant warrants the same. The tragic incident
caused a mutilation of complainant's left ear and a permanent scar on his right forearm. These injuries
have left indelible marks on the complainant's body and will serve as a constant reminder of this traumatic
experience.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118664. August 7, 1998]
JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS ENRIQUE AGANA, MARIA ANGELA NINA
AGANA, ADALIA B. FRANCISCO and JOSE MIRANDA, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is an appeal by certiorari filed by petitioner Japan Airlines, Inc. (JAL) seeking the reversal of
the decision of the Court of Appeals, [1] which affirmed with modification the award of damages made by
the trial court in favor of herein private respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana, Adelia
Francisco and Jose Miranda.

On June 13, 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded JAL flight No. JL 001 in San Francisco,
California bound for Manila. Likewise, on the same day private respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela
Nina Agana and Adelia Francisco left Los Angeles, California for Manila via JAL flight No. JL 061. As an
incentive for travelling on the said airline, both flights were to make an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan,
at the airlines expense, thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day.
Upon arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14, 1991, private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita
for the night. The next day, private respondents, on the final leg of their journey, went to the airport to
take their flight to Manila. However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting ashfall blanketed Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA), rendering it inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private respondents
trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely.
To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound passengers
on flight No. 741 due to depart on June 16, 1991 and also paid for the hotel expenses for their unexpected
overnight stay. On June 16, 1991, much to the dismay of the private respondents, their long anticipated
flight to Manila was again cancelled due to NAIAs indefinite closure. At this point, JAL informed the private
respondents that it would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in
Narita.
Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991, private respondents were forced to
pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June 21,
1991. Their unexpected stay in Narita ended on June 22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on board JL
flight No. 741.
Obviously, still reeling from the experience, private respondents, on July 25, 1991, commenced an
action for damages against JAL before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. [2] To support
their claim, private respondents asserted that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide care and comfort to
its stranded passengers when it refused to pay for their hotel and accommodation expenses from June 16
to 21, 1991 at Narita, Japan. In other words, they insisted that JAL was obligated to shoulder their expenses
as long as they were still stranded in Narita. On the other hand, JAL denied this allegation and averred that
airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to force
majeure.
On June 18, 1992, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents holding
JAL liable for damages, viz.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs ordering the defendant Japan Airlines to pay the
plaintiffs Enrique Agana, Adalia B. Francisco and Maria Angela Nina Agana the sum of One million Two
Hundred forty-six Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Six Pesos (P1,246,936.00) and Jose Miranda the sum of
Three Hundred Twenty Thousand Six Hundred sixteen and 31/100 (P320,616.31) as actual, moral and
exemplary damages and pay attorneys fees in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00),
and to pay the costs of suit.
Undaunted, JAL appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals, which, however, with the exception
of lowering the damages awarded affirmed the trial courts finding, [3]thus:
Thus, the award of moral damages should be as it is hereby reduced to P200,000.00 for each of the
plaintiffs, the exemplary damages to P300,000.00 and the attorneys fees toP100,000.00 plus the costs.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing Modification, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other
respects.
JAL filed a motion for reconsideration which proved futile and unavailing. [4]
Failing in its bid to reconsider the decision, JAL has now filed this instant petition.
The issue to be resolved is whether JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the hotel
and meal expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination, even if the
delay were caused by force majeure.

To begin with, there is no dispute that the Mt. Pinatubo eruption prevented JAL from proceeding to
Manila on schedule. Likewise, private respondents concede that such event can be considered as force
majeure since their delayed arrival in Manila was not imputable to JAL. [5]
However, private respondents contend that while JAL cannot be held responsible for the delayed
arrival in Manila, it was nevertheless liable for their living expenses during their unexpected stay in Narita
since airlines have the obligation to ensure the comfort and convenience of its passengers. While we
sympathize with the private respondents plight, we are unable to accept this contention.
We are not unmindful of the fact that in a plethora of cases we have consistently ruled that a contract
to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. It is safe
to conclude that it is a relationship imbued with public interest. Failure on the part of the common carrier
to live up to the exacting standards ofcare and diligence renders it liable for any damages that may be
sustained by its passengers. However, this is not to say that common carriers are absolutely responsible
for all injuries or damages even if the same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise would
render the defense of force majeure, as an exception from any liability, illusory and ineffective.
Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force
majeure, the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. [6] Corollarily,
when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption,
whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred,
cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their
unexpected overnight stay on June 15, 1991.
Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an exasperating experience for the
private respondents. To be sure, they underwent distress and anxiety during their unanticipated stay in
Narita, but their predicament was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL but the closure of NAIA to
international flights. Indeed, to hold JAL, in the absence of bad faith or negligence, liable for the amenities
of its stranded passengers by reason of a fortuitous event is too much of a burden to assume.
Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of
travel.[7] In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils
involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. After all, common
carriers are not the insurer of all risks.[8]
Paradoxically, the Court of Appeals, despite the presence of force majeure, still ruledagainst JAL relying
in our decision in PAL v. Court of Appeals,[9] thus:
The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its failure to grasp the exacting standard required
by law. Undisputably, PALs diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous
event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PALs contract with its passengers. Being in the
business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with
situations as in the case at bar. What we said in one case once again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of
carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has left the
carriers premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in
safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their
final destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle between government
forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the
place.
The reliance is misplaced. The factual background of the PAL case is different from the instant
petition. In that case there was indeed a fortuitous event resulting in the diversion of the PAL
flight. However, the unforeseen diversion was worsened when private respondents (passenger) was left at
the airport and could not even hitch a ride in a Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel, [10] not to mention the
apparent apathy of the PAL station manager as to the predicament of the stranded passengers. [11] In light
of these circumstances, we held that if the fortuitous event was accompanied by neglect and malfeasance
by the carriers employees, an action for damages against the carrier is permissible. Unfortunately, for
private respondents, none of these conditions are present in the instant petition.
We are not prepared, however, to completely absolve petitioner JAL from any liability. It must be noted
that private respondents bought tickets from the United States with Manila as their final destination. While
JAL was no longer required to defray private respondents living expenses during their stay in Narita on

account of the fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport private
respondents on the first available connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to
look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it declassified private respondents from
transit passengers to new passengers as a result of which private respondents were obliged to make the
necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila.Private respondents were placed on the
waiting list from June 20 to June 24. To assure themselves of a seat on an available flight, they were
compelled to stay in the airport the whole day of June 22, 1991 and it was only at 8:00 p.m. of the
aforesaid date that they were advised that they could be accommodated in said flight which flew at about
9:00 a.m. the next day.
We are not oblivious to the fact that the cancellation of JAL flights to Manila from June 15 to June 21,
1991 caused considerable disruption in passenger booking and reservation.In fact, it would be
unreasonable to expect, considering NAIAs closure, that JAL flight operations would be normal on the days
affected. Nevertheless, this does not excuse JAL from its obligation to make the necessary arrangements to
transport private respondents on its first available flight to Manila. After all, it had a contract to transport
private respondents from the United States to Manila as their final destination.
Consequently, the award of nominal damages is in order. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of a plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered by him. [12] The court may award
nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case
where any property right has been invaded.[13]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 22, 1993
is hereby MODIFIED. The award of actual, moral and exemplary damages is hereby DELETED. Petitioner JAL
is ordered to pay each of the private respondents nominal damages in the sum of P100,000.00 each
including attorneys fees ofP50,000.00 plus costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8194. July 11, 1956.]
EMERENCIANA M. VDA. DE MEDINA, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, vs. GUILLERMO CRESENCIA, ET
AL., Defendants. GUILLERMO CRESENCIA, Appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal by Defendant Guillermo Cresencia from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its
civil case No. 19890, sentencing Appellant, jointly and severally with his co-Defendant Brigido Avorque, to
pay Plaintiffs Emerencia M. Vda. de Medina and her minor children damages in the total amount of
P56,000, P5,000 attorneys fees, and costs.
It appears that on May 31, 1953, passenger jeepney bearing plate No. TPU-2232 (Manila), driven by Brigido
Avorque, smashed into a Meralco post on Azcarraga Street, resulting in the death of Vicente Medina, one of
its passengers. A criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence was filed against Avorque
(criminal case No. 22775 of the Court of First Instance of Manila), to which he pleaded guilty on September
9, 1953. The heirs of the deceased, however, reserved their right to file a separate action for damages,
and on June 16, 1953, brought suit against the driver Brigido Avorque and Appellant Guillermo Cresencia,
the registered owner and operator of the jeepney in question. Defendant Brigido Avorque did not file any
answer; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarywhile DefendantCresencia answered, disclaiming liability on the ground
that he had sold the jeepney in question on October 14, 1950 to one Maria A. Cudiamat; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the jeepney had been repeatedly sold by one buyer after another, until the
vehicle was purchased on January 29, 1953 by Rosario Avorque, the absolute owner thereof at the time of
the accident. In view of Cresencias answer, Plaintiffsfiled leave, and was allowed, to amend their
complaint making Rosario Avorque a co-Defendant; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand the latter, by way of
answer, admitted having purchased the aforesaid jeepney on May 31, 1953, but alleged in defense that
she was never the public utility operator thereof. The case then proceeded to trial, during which, after
the Plaintiffs had presented their evidence, DefendantsGuillermo Cresencia and Rosario Avorque made
manifestations admitting that the former was still the registered operator of the jeepney in question in the
records of the Motor Vehicles Office and the Public Service Commission, while the latter was the owner
thereof at the time of the accident;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand submitted the case for the decision on
the question of who, as between the two, should be held liable to Plaintiffs for damages. The lower court,
by Judge Jose Zulueta, held that as far as the public is concerned, Defendant Cresencia, in the eyes of the
law, continued to be the legal owner of the jeepney in question; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand rendered

judgment against him, jointly and severally with the driver Brigido Avorque, for P6,000 compensatory
damages, P30,000 moral damages, P10,000 exemplary damages, P10,000 nominal damages, P5,000
attorneys fees, and costs, whileDefendant Rosario Avorque was absolved from liability. From this
judgment, Defendant Cresencia appealed.
We have already held in the case of Montoya vs. Ignacio, 94 Phil., 182 (December 29, 1953), which the
court below cited, that the law (section 20 [g], C. A. No. 146 as amended) requires the approval of the
Public Service Commission in order that a franchise, or any privilege pertaining thereto, may be sold or
leased without infringing the certificate issued to the grantee; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that if
property covered by the franchise is transferred or leased without this requisite approval, the transfer is
not binding against the public or the Service Commission; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand in contemplation
of law, the grantee of record continues to be responsible under the franchise in relation to the Commission
and to the public. There we gave the reason for this rule to be as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw Since a franchise is personal in nature any transfer or lease thereof should be notified to the
Public Service Commission so that the latter may take proper safeguards to protect the interest of the
public. In fact, the law requires that, before the approval is granted, there should be a public hearing, with
notice to all interested parties, in order that the Commission may determine if there are good and
reasonable grounds justifying the transfer or lease of the property covered by the franchise, or if the sale
or lease is detrimental to public interest cralaw .
The above ruling was later reiterated in the cases of Timbol vs. Osias, L-7547, April 30, 1955 and Roque vs.
Malibay Transit Inc., L- 8561, November 18, 1955.
As the sale of the jeepney here in question was admittedly without the approval of the Public Service
Commission, Appellant herein, Guillermo Cresencia, who is the registered owner and operator thereof,
continued to be liable to the Commission and the public for the consequences incident to its operation.
Wherefore, the lower court did not err in holding him, and not the buyer Rosario Avorque, responsible for
the damages sustained by Plaintiff by reason of the death of Vicente Medina resulting from the reckless
negligence of the jeepneys driver, Brigido Avorque.
Appellant also argues that the basis of Plaintiffs action being the employers subsidiary liability under the
Revised Penal Code for damages arising from his employees criminal acts, it isDefendant Rosario Avorque
who should answer subsidiarily for the damages sustained byPlaintiffs, since she admits that she, and
not Appellant, is the employer of the negligent driver Brigido Avorque. The argument is untenable,
because Plaintiffs action for damages is independent of the criminal case filed against Brigido Avorque,
and based, not on the employers subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code, but on a breach of the
carriers contractual obligation to carry his passengers safely to their destination (culpa contractual). And it
is also for this reason that there is no need of first proving the insolvency of the driver Brigido Avorque
before damages can be recovered from the carrier, for in culpa contractual, the liability of the carrier is not
merely subsidiary or secondary, but direct and immediate (Articles 1755, 1756, and 1759, New Civil Code).
The propriety of the damages awarded has not been questioned, Nevertheless, it is patent upon the record
that the award of P10,000 by way of nominal damages is untenable as a matter of law, since nominal
damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages. The purpose of nominal damages is to vindicate or
recognize a right that has been violated, in order to preclude further contest thereon; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand not for the purpose of indemnifying the Plaintiff for any loss suffered by him
(Articles 2221, 2223, new Civil Code.) Since the court below has already awarded compensatory and
exemplary damages that are in themselves a judicial recognition that Plaintiffs right was violated, the
award of nominal damages is unnecessary and improper. Anyway, ten thousand pesos cannot, in common
sense, be deemed nominal.
With the modification that the award of P10,000 nominal damages be eliminated, the decision appealed
from is affirmed. Costs against Appellant. SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 90983 September 27, 1991
LAW FIRM OF RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT, petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE GENARO C. GINES, Presiding Judge of Branch XXVI, Regional Trial
Court, First Judicial Region, San Fernando, La Union, and BENGSON COMMERCIAL BUILDING,
INC.,respondents.
Raymundo A. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit for petitioner.
Pacifico C. Yadao for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:p
Before the Court is Atty. Raymundo Armovit's claim for attorney's fees against the private respondent.
It appears that Atty. Armovit was engaged as counsel for the private respondent in a complaint to have an
extrajudicial foreclosure of certain properties by the Government Service Insurance System declared null
and void; that the parties allegedly agreed that the private respondent shall pay P15,000.00 as initial
compensation and twenty percent in contingent fees; that after trial, the defunct Court of First Instance
rendered judgment annulling foreclosure and ordering the Government Service Insurance System to
restructure the private respondent's loan; that thereafter, the System appealed; the on appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of lower court; and that the Appellate Court's judgment has since attained
finality.
It also appears that when Atty. Armovit sought execution with the court a quo, he was informed by
Romualdo Bengson president of the respondent corporation, that the firm has retained the services of Atty.
Pacifico Yadao. He was also informed that the company would pay him the agreed compensation and that
Atty. Yadao's fees were covered by a separate agreement. The private respondent, however, later ignored
his billings and over the phone, directed him allegedly not to take part in the execution proceedings.
Forthwith, he sought the entry of an attorney's lien in the records of the case. The lower court allegedly
refused to make the entry and on the contrary issued an order ordering the Philippine National Bank to
"release to the custody of Mr. Romualdo F. Bengzon and/or Atty Pacifico Yadao" 1 the sum of P2,760,000.00
(ordered by the Court of Appeals as rentals payable by the Government Service Insurance System).
Atty. Armovit then moved, apparently for the hearing of hi motion to recognize attorney's lien, and
thereafter, the trial court. issued an order in the tenor as follows:
When this case was called for hearing on the petition to record attorney's charging lien,
Attys. Armovit and Aglipay appeared for the petitioners.
Atty. Armovit informed the Court that they are withdrawing the petition considering that they
are in the process of amicably settling their differences with the plaintiff, which
manifestation was confirmed by Atty. Yadao as well as the plaintiffs, Romualdo Bengson and
Brenda Bengson, who are present today.
In view of this development, the petition to record attorney charging lien, the same being in
order and not contrary to law, moral and public policy, as prayed for by Attys. Armovit and
Aglipay, it hereby withdrawn. The parties, therefore are hereby directed to co ply faithfully
with their respective obligations.
SO ORDERED. 2
However, upon the turnover of the money to the private respondent, Mrs. Brenda Bengson (wife of
Romualdo Bengzon delivered to Atty. Armovit the sum of P300,000.00 only. Armovit protested and
demanded the amount of P552,000.0 twenty percent of P2,760,000.00), for which Mrs. Bengzon made
assurances that he will be paid the balance.
On November 4, 1988, however, Atty. Armovit received a order emanating from the trial court in the tenor
as follows:
During the hearing on the petition to record attorney's charge lien on October 11, 1988,
Attys. Armovit and Aglipay withdrew their petition to record attorney's charging lien, which
was duly approve petition to recordby the Court, after which the Court directed the parties to
comp faithfully with their respective obligations.
In compliance with the Order of this Court, the plaintiff submitted a pleading denominated as
compliance alleging that petition (Atty. Armovit) has already received from the plaintiff the
sum P300,000.00, Philippine Currency, as and by way of attorney's fees With the receipt by
the petitioner from the plaintiff of this amount, the latter has faithfully complied with its
obligation.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated October 11, 1988 approving the withdrawal of
the petition to record attorney's charging lien, on motion of the petitioner, is now final.
SO ORDERED. 3
Reconsideration having been denied, Atty. Armovit went the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari
and prohibition.
On August 25, 1989, the Court of Appeals 4 rendered judgment dismissing the petition. Reconsideration
having been likewise denied by the Appellate Court, Atty. Armovit instituted the instant appeal.
Shortly thereafter, we required the private respondent comment.
The private respondent did not materially traverse Atty. Armorvit's chronicle of events but added: that the
private respondent hired the petitioner after the Government Service Insurance System had answered and
that it was Atty. Benjam Bernardino who prepared the complaint; that for his appearances, Atty. Armovit
was paid a total of P108,000.00, not to mention "beach resort accommodations"; 5 that Atty. Armovit did
not inform the private respondent that the court had rendered judgment which they would have appealed;
that they lost an appeal on account of Atty. Armovit's indiscretion; that the forthwith engaged the services
of another lawyer, Atty. Yadao; and that it was the latter who prepared the brief in the Court Appeals (on
GSIS's appeal).
The private respondent also alleged that it opposed Atty. Armovit's effort to record his attorney's lien on
grounds of allege nullity of the retainer agreement, Atty. Armovit's negligence and because of excessive
fees demanded.
The private respondent also insisted that the retainer agreement was signed by only one of seven
directors, and it could no bind the corporation. Atty. Armovit, in any event, had also been allegedly more
than sufficiently compensated.
The private respondent alleged that Atty. Armovit had bee paid P300,000.00 an amount approved by the
court, and an amount he accepted and for which he is allegedly estoppel from claiming a higher amount.
The order of the court has the effect of res judicata, the private respondent claimed, as well as a
compromise agreement which is immediately executory.
The disposition of the Court of Appeals was that since the receipt evidencing payment to Atty. Armovit of
the sum P300,000.00 "was without any qualification as 'advance' 'partial' or 'incomplete'," 6 the intention
of the parties was that was full payment. The Appellate Court also noted Atty. Armorvit's withdrawal of his
motion to record attorney's lien and figured that Atty. Armovit was satisfied with the payment P300,000,00.
The only issue is whether or not Atty. Armovit is entitled to the sum of P252,000.00 more, in addition to the
sum P300,000.00 already paid him by the private respondent.There is no question that the parties had
agreed on a compensation as follows:
a) P15,000.00 by way of acceptance and study fee, payable within five (5) days from date;
b) 20% contingent fee computed on the value to be recovered b favorable judgment in the
cases; and
c) the execution and signing of a final retainer agreement complete with all necessary
details. 7
(While the parties' agreement speaks of "a final retain agreement" 8 to be executed later, it does not
appear that the parties did enter into a "final" agreement thereafter.)
The private respondent's version however is that while it may be true that the agreed compensation was
twenty percent of all recoveries, the parties later agreed on a compromise sum approved allegedly by the
trial court, per its Order of October 11, 1988.
The Court is inclined to believe that Atty. Armovit never agreed on the compromise sum of P300,000.00. It
is true that he did agree to withdraw his motion to annotate attorney's lien, but because the parties were
"in the process of amicably settling their differences" 9 and not because Atty. Armovit had agreed to accept
a lower amount as full payment. There is nothing, on top of that, Atty. Armovit's manifestation that would
suggest that he was accepting the sum of P300,00.00 as agreed final payment, other than the fact that an
agreement was supposedly certain. We quote:
ATTY. ARMOVIT:
Your Honor, we would like to manifest in Court that we served notice to the
counsel of the plaintiff, Bengson Commercial Building, a copy of the petition to
record attorney's charging lien, and together with the president of the
corporation, Mr. Romualdo Bengson, and his wife, Mrs. Brenda Bengson, we
have discussed the problem and we all agreed upon is an earnest one at this
time, this representation is withdrawing his petition to record charging lien.
ATTY. YADAO:
No objection, Your Honor, because we have to agree with Atty. Armovit. I am in

full accord with this. 10
There is nothing there that would indicate Atty. Armovit's willingness to accept, in fact, a lower figure in
consideration of his withdrawal of his request to enter attorney's lien. What the Court takes his statement
to mean is that he was withdrawing his request on the certainty that the private respondent would pay him
the money, presumably, under more becoming circumstances.
The Court does not therefore see how the private respondent can hold Atty. Armovit to have been in
estoppel.
The fact that Atty. Armovit did not, after all, accept the sum of P300,000.00 as final compensation is indeed
indicated by the behavior of the private respondent, through Mrs. Romualdo Bengson, when she assured
Atty. Armovit that the balance was forthcoming. 11 According to Mrs. Bengson, she wished the rest of the
Bengsons to witness the final payment and when the occasion was present, wished for a postponement on
account of "All Saints Day."12
The parties never therefore amended their original agreement, and what appears to the Court is a clear
effort on the part of a client, with the apparent approval of the trial court, to renege on a valid agreement
with its lawyer.
The Court believes that the trial court, in accepting the private respondent's "compliance" as a final
payment of Atty. Armovit's fees, was guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. The private respondent had
nothing with which to comply, and the parties, as manifested by Atty. Armovit, were "in the process
[merely] of amicably settling their differences." 13
It is apparent furthermore that the trial judge himself was out to deny Atty. Armovit the agreed
compensation. In his order of October 4, 1988, he commanded:
The PNB is hereby ordered and directed to release to the custody of Mr. Romualdo F.
Bengson and /or Atty. Pacifico Yadao, counsel for the plaintiff, the sum of Two Million Seven
Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P2,760,000.00), Philippine Currency for the satisfaction of
the rentals of the Bengson Building against the GSIS. 14
in spite of the fact that Atty. Armovit had remained the private respondent's counsel of record. It is
fundamental that unless a lawyer has been validly discharged, his authority to act for his client continues
and should be recognized by the court. 15
The fact that the receipt evidencing payment by the private respondent of the amount of P300,000.00
"was without any qualification as 'advance' or 'partial' or 'incomplete'," 16 as the Court of Appeals noted
and the Court of Appeals took to mean "full payment", will not weaken Atty. Armovit's demand for the
balance. There is nothing in the receipt that will suggest that will suggest that it was full payment either,
and the fact that Atty. Armovit accepted it does not mean that he was satisfied that it was final payment.
The fact of the matter is that the private respondent had assured him that the balance was forthcoming.
The private respondent can not justifiably downplay Atty. Armovit as negligent (for failing to appeal) or his
demand for fees excessive (that he had been paid enough). Atty. Armovit, after all, succeeded in obtaining
a favorable decision for his client, an although his prayer for various damages were denied, he secceeded
in obtaining a substantial award (P1,900,00.00 in unpaid rentals) for his client. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals sustained his theory. It should be noted that the private respondent had in fact stood to lose
substantial properties on foreclosure Atty. Armovit not only restored to the private respondent its
foreclosured properties, he succeeded in having the private respondent's loans restructed and the
Government Service Insurance System pay rentals. No client can ask a better result from a lawyer.
Obviously, the private respondent's effort to downgrade Atty. Armovit's performance is a wild, if not cheap,
shot of a client out to evade its obligations to its lawyer. The fact that Atty. Armovit may have been paid
substantially (in initial fees) while the case was dragging is no justification for denying him the full amount
under their agreement. It has been held that initial fees and fees paid in the progress of litigation are
independent of the contingent fees.17
That the retainer agreement was never approved by the board of the corporation is also a poor excuse
because the fact of the matter is that the private respondent did deliver to Atty. Armovit the sum of
P300,000.00 in partial payment, and the private respondent can not now deny him the balance bay
alleging lack of authority of the Bengson spouses.
Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction. 18 It is true that attorney's fees must at all times be
reasonable; 19however, we do not find Atty. Armovit's claim for "twenty percent of all recoveries" to be
unreasonable. In the case of Aro v. Naawa, 20 decided in 1969, this Court awarded the agreed fees amid
the efforts of the client to deny him fees by terminating his services. In parallel vein, we are upholding Atty.
Armovit's claim for P252,000.00 more pursuant to the contingent fee agreement amid the private
respondent's own endeavours to evade its obligations.
Several times, we have come down hard on erring practitioners. We will not however be slow either, in
coming to the rescue of aggrieved brother-lawyers in protecting the integrity of the bar from unscrupulous
litigants.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The private respondent is ORDERED to pay
the petitioner the sum of P252,000.00. Costs against the private respondent.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
EMMA VER REYES and RAMON G. R . N o. 1 66 51 6

REYES,
Petitioners, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
IRENE MONTEMAYOR and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OFCAVITE, Promulgated:
Re s pon de nts.
September 3, 2009
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision [1] dated
20 May 2004, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54517, which affirmed the
Decision[2] dated 7 October 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, of Imus, Cavite, in Civil Case
No. 878-94, dismissing the Complaint for Reconveyance of petitioners, spouses Emma Ver-Reyes (Emma)
and Ramon Reyes (Ramon), and declaring private respondent Irene Montemayor as the owner of the
subject property.

On 18 February 1994, petitioners filed before the RTC a Complaint for Reconveyance [3] against
private respondent and the Register of Deeds of Cavite. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 878-
94. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they were the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-58459 [4] situated in Paliparan, Dasmarias, Cavite(subject property). They
bought the subject property from the previous owner, Marciano Cuevas (Marciano), as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8 October 1976.[5] Thereafter, Marciano surrendered to petitioners the Owners
Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-58459. Petitioners accordingly paid the taxes on the sale of the subject
property. However, they were unable to register the sale and effect the transfer of the certificate of title to
the subject property to their names.
Petitioners claimed that they had consistently paid the real estate taxes on the subject property
since their acquisition of the same in 1976 until 1991. In 1993, when they went to the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Cavite to pay their real estate taxes for the years 1992 and 1993, they were informed
that the subject property was sold by Marciano to private respondent on 10 November 1992, and TCT No.
T-369793 covering it was issued in private respondents name on 4 January 1993.
Petitioners asserted that private respondent was able to cause the issuance of TCT No. T-369793 in
her name by presenting a simulated and fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992. The
signatures of the sellers, spouses Virginia (Virginia) and Marciano Cuevas (spouses Cuevas), were forged in
the said Deed.[6]
Hence, petitioners prayed for the cancellation of TCT No. T-369793 in private respondents name;
the issuance of a new certificate of title in petitioners names; the award of nominal damages of P50,000.00
and exemplary damages of P100,000.00, by reason of the fraud employed by private respondent in having
the subject property registered in her name; the award of attorneys fees of not less than P50,000; and the
costs of suit. [7]
On 18 April 1994, private respondent filed with the RTC her Answer with Counterclaim, wherein she
denied petitioners allegation that the signatures of the spouses Cuevas in the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 10 November 1992 were forged.Private respondent averred that the subject property was offered to
her for sale, but she did not disclose who actually made the offer. She discovered that there was no
adverse claim or any kind of encumbrance annotated on the certificate of title of the spouses Cuevas
covering the subject property. She had purchased the subject property for value and in good faith and had
been in possession thereof. Private respondent insisted that she had a better title to the subject property,
since she was the first registrant of its sale. Private respondent thus prayed for the award of moral
damages in the amount of not less than P100,000.00 for the mental anguish, serious anxiety, and
besmirched reputation she suffered by reason of the unjustified filing by petitioners of the case; the award
of exemplary damages in the amount ofP100,000.00 for petitioners malicious filing of the case; and the
award of attorneys fees, and costs of suit. [8]
After the conduct of pre-trial, petitioners offered the testimonies of Marciano, petitioner Emma, and
Carolyn Moldez-Pitoy (Carolyn).
Marciano testified that he and his wife Virginia signed, on 8 October 1976, a Deed of Absolute Sale
covering the subject property in petitioner Emmas favor. He denied selling the subject property to any
other person, including private respondent.Marciano, when shown the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10
November 1992, involving the same property, in private respondents favor, flatly stated that the
signatures found therein were not his or his wifes. [9]
Petitioner Emma personally confirmed that Marciano sold the subject property to her in 1976. She
had faithfully paid the real property taxes on it from 1976 until 1993, when she learned that it had been
registered in private respondents name. Upon examining the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November
1992, supposedly executed by the spouses Cuevas over the subject property in private respondents favor,
petitioner Emma observed that the spouses Cuevas signatures found therein appeared to have been
forged. She further claimed that after finding that the subject property had been registered in private
respondents name, she suffered from nervousness and the aggravation of her rheumatoid arthritis. She
was compelled to engage the services of a lawyer to prosecute her case against private respondent, which
could cost herP100,000.00 or more. During the cross-examination and re-direct examination, petitioner
Emma explained that she had not been able to register the subject property in her name because of her
diabetes and rheumatoid arthritis.[10]
Carolyn introduced herself as a Senior Document Examiner in the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), performing, among her other duties, handwriting analysis. She admitted to preparing Questioned
Documents Report No. 548-795, dated 18 July 1995.[11]
Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795, prepared by Carolyn, was submitted by petitioners as
evidence and was marked as Exhibit G. [12] They had obtained the report for the purpose of finding out
whether (1) the signatures of the spouses Cuevas in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992,
which they purportedly executed in private respondents favor; and (2) the signature of Escolastico Cuevas
(Escolastico), Registrar of Deeds (ROD) of Cavite, in the Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-58459, which
Mariano surrendered to petitioners in 1972, were forged, by comparing them with the specimen signatures
given by the spouses Cuevas and ROD Escolastico. As stated in her Report, Carolyn found that:
1. The questioned and the standard/specimen signatures VIRGINIA M. CUEVASwere
not written by one and the same person.
2. The questioned and the standard /specimen signatures of ESCOLASTICO CUEVAS were
written by one and the same person.
3. No definite opinion on MARCIANO CUEVAS per above stated findings no. 3. [13]
On the other hand, private respondent offered the testimonies of Jaime Laudato (Jaime) and
Angelina Cortez (Angelina) in support of her version of events.
Jaime disclosed that it was Vice-Mayor Lauro Carungcong (Carungcong) of Dasmarias who
supposedly brokered the sale of the subject property, and who instructed Jaime to verify with the Register
of Deeds the existence of the Original Copy of TCT No. T-58459, and to check for any encumbrances
thereon. Three weeks thereafter, Vice-Mayor Carungcong gave Jaime a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 10 November 1992 executed by the spouses Cuevas over the subject property in private
respondents favor, and directed Jaime to pay the obligatory taxes and to register the subject property in
private respondents name. On cross-examination, Jaime admitted that he had never met nor was he
acquainted with either of the spouses Cuevas, the alleged vendors of the subject property. [14]
Angelina, employed as a Deeds Examiner in the Register of Deeds of Cavite, was tasked, as part of
her duties, to examine the documents related to the transfer of the subject property in private respondents
name before issuing the corresponding certificate of title. However, she admitted during cross-examination
that she was not in a position to determine the authenticity of the documents presented to her. [15]
The RTC rendered a Decision[16] in Civil Case No. 878-94 on 7 October 1996, dismissing petitioners
Complaint. The RTC found that the statements of their witness Marciano and the results of Questioned
Documents Report No. 548-795 issued by the NBI were contradictory. The RTC noted that Marciano testified
that the signatures found in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8 October 1976 and the Kasunduan sa Bilihan
ng Lupa[17] dated 15 June 1971 were Virginias; but the NBI Report stated that the questioned and the
standard/specimen signatures VIRGINIA M. CUEVAS were not written by one and the same person. The RTC
also gave little credence to Marcianos denial of the sale of the subject property to private respondent, on
the ground that it was self-serving. Although the RTC did observe differences in Marcianos signature in
the Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Lupa dated 15 June 1971 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November
1992, the trial court dismissed the same as mere changes in a persons penmanship or signature that could
occur over the years.The RTC concluded that Civil Case No. 878-94 involved a double sale of the subject
property, wherein private respondent, an innocent purchaser for value who first registered the property in
her name, should be adjudged to have a better title. The dispositive part of the RTC Decision dated 7
October 1996 reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing this case and declaring that
the true and lawful owner of the subject property as described in, and covered by, TCT No. T-
369793 is [herein respondent] Irene Montemayor.
All other claims of the parties are dismissed for inadequate substantiation. [18]
On 11 July 1997, petitioners filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
54517, which challenged the afore-mentioned RTC judgment.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. CV No. 54517, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent
Manifestation[19] on 20 October 1998. According to them, they obtained information that private
respondents TCT No. T-369793 covering the subject property had already been canceled; that a new
certificate of title, TCT No. T-784707, had been issued in the name of another person, Engracia Isip
(Engracia); and that a mortgage was constituted on the subject property. It began with private respondent
executing a Waiver and Quitclaim on 15 January 1998, wherein she confessed to obtaining TCT No. T-
369793 over the subject property in bad faith. In the same document, private respondent recognized
Engracias title to the subject property and, thus, private respondent relinquished her right over it to
Engracia and the latters heirs and successors-in-interest. The Register of Deeds, impleaded as a party in
CA-G.R. CV No. 54517, canceled TCT No. T-369793 in private respondents name; issued TCT No. T-784707
in the names of Engracias heirs; and annotated on the latest certificate of title private respondents Waiver
and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998.
On 18 November 1998, Perfecto Dumay-as, Deputy ROD of Trece Martires City, Cavite, filed a
Comment/Manifestation stating that Civil Case No. 878-94 was not inscribed on private respondents TCT
No. T-369793, since the case before the RTC had already been resolved in favor of private respondent,
thus, the presentation of the owners original certificate of title along with the Waiver/Quitclaim, dated 15
January 1998, complied with the requirements of a voluntary transaction, justifying the issuance of TCT No.
T-784707 in the name of Engracias heirs.[20]

In its Decision dated 20 May 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54517, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners
appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision dated 7 October 1996 in Civil Case No. 878-94. The appellate court
held that petitioners were negligent in failing to register the subject property in their names. And, just like
the RTC, the Court of Appeals declared Marcianos denial of the sale of the subject property in private
respondents favor as self-serving. The appellate court also pointed out that the findings of the NBI were
not definite as regards the alleged forgery of Marcianos signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10
November 1992. Lastly, the Court of Appeals took judicial notice of the Comment/Manifestation of Perfecto
Dumay-as, Deputy ROD of Trece Martires City, Cavite, stating that Civil Case No. 878-94 was not inscribed
on private respondents TCT No. T-369793, since the case before the RTC had already been resolved in
favor of private respondent, and the acquisition by Engracias heirs of the subject property and TCT No. T-
784707 over the same was in good faith and, therefore, valid. The Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated October 7, 1996 of

the Regional Trial Court of Cavite is hereby AFFIRMED.[21]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration [22] of the foregoing Decision on25 June 2004, which the
Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution[23] dated 28 December 2004.
Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners made the following assignment of errors:
I
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE DECISION AND
RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE BY
SUSTAINING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BRANCH 21) OF CAVITE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE CLEAR AND AUTHENTIC RECORDS PRESENTED DURING TRIAL
WHICH NEGATE AND CONTRADICT ITS FINDINGS.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RENDERING THE

DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE BY
SUSTAINING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BRANCH 21) OF CAVITE THEREBY
IGNORING THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWING THE PETITIONERS CLEAR RIGHTS OF
OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
III
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN AFFIRMING THAT THE TRUE AND
LAWFUL OWNER OVER (sic) THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS DESCRIBED IN AND COVERED BY TCT
NO. T-369793 IS PRIVATE RESPONDENT IRENE MONTEMAYOR DESPITE DOCUMENTARY AND
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.[24]
The fundamental issue for resolution of this Court in this case is who has better right to the subject
property. Before the Court can settle the same, it must first determine the question of whether there was a
double sale of the subject property to both petitioners and private respondent, which is essentially a
question of fact requiring the Court to review, examine and evaluate, or weigh the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law shall be raised in a Petition for
Review before this Court. This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, namely, (1) when the findings
are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its
findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. [25]
While as a general rule appellate courts do not usually disturb the lower court's findings of fact,
unless said findings are not supported by or are totally devoid of or inconsistent with the evidence on
record, such finding must of necessity be modified to conform with the evidence if the reviewing tribunal
were to arrive at the proper and just resolution of the controversy. [26] Thus, although the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts, if said factual
findings do not conform to the evidence on record, this Court will not hesitate to review and reverse the
factual findings of the lower courts. In the instant case, the Court finds sufficient basis to deviate from the
rule since the extant evidence and prevailing law support a finding different from the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals and the RTC.[27]

Contrary to the findings of both the Court of Appeals and the RTC, the evidence on record reveals
that the spouses Cuevas, the previous owners of the subject property, did not sell the said property to
private respondent.
Marcianos explicit statements, made under oath before the trial court, that he did not sell the
subject property to anyone other than petitioners, and that the signatures of the vendors appearing in the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992 were not made by him and his wife, were not
refuted. Private respondents witness, Jaime, who was tasked to verify if there was no encumbrance on the
spouses Cuevas title to the subject property and to register it in private respondents name after the
alleged sale, admitted that he had never met the supposed vendors of the subject property and, thus,
could not competently testify on whether it was actually the spouses Cuevas who executed the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992 in private respondents favor.
The pronouncement of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Marcianos testimony was
self-serving was utterly baseless. Neither the RTC nor the Court of Appeals explained how Marcianos
confirmation of the sale of the subject property to petitioners, and his renunciation of the supposed sale of
the same property to private respondent, would accrue to Marcianos benefit. In giving such a testimony in
1994, Marciano did not stand to gain back the subject property, which he had already admitted to selling
to petitioners 18 years prior, in 1976. On the other hand, if Marciano falsely testified in open court that he
and his wife did not sell the subject property to private respondent, Marciano was risking prosecution for
the crime of perjury and liability for damages.
Additionally, although Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795 of the NBI did not make a
definitive finding on whether Marcianos purported signature on the Deed of Sale dated 10 November 1992
was actually his or a forgery, the same Report did unqualifiedly state that the signature that Virginia
supposedly affixed to the said Deed and the specimen signatures that she provided the NBI were not
written by the same person. Clearly, Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795 of the NBIestablished that
her purported signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992 was forged.
It is true that a finding of forgery does not depend exclusively on the testimonies of expert
witnesses and that judges must use their own judgment, through an independent examination of the
questioned signature, in determining the authenticity of the handwriting. [28] However, it is important to
note that in this case neither the RTC nor the Court of Appeals made any finding through an independent
examination of Virginias signatures. The RTC gave credence to Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795
of the NBI, but misread it as saying that the two specimen signatures given by Virginia were not written by
the same person. Hence,Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795 of the NBI, finding that the signature
ofVirginia in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992 is a forgery, stands unquestioned.
That at least one of the signatures of the alleged vendors was indubitably established as a forgery
should have already raised serious doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 10 November 1992. This, taken together with Marcianos candid and categorical testimony that he
and his wife did not sell the subject property to private respondent or executed any deed to evidence the
same, strongly militates against the existence of a second sale of the subject property to private
respondent.
In comparison, the circumstances surrounding the alleged second sale of the subject property by
the spouses Cuevas to private respondent are sketchy at best. Vice Mayor Carungcong, who allegedly
brokered the sale, had already died during the pendency of the case and was not presented as witness. It
was not made clear whether he was duly authorized by the spouses Cuevas to broker such sale. Private
respondents witness, Jaime, did not claim to have been present during the negotiations or in any part of
the sale transaction, and had not even met the spouses Cuevas. All he was able to testify on was that he
verified with the Register of Deeds that there was no encumbrance annotated on TCT No. T-58459 of the
spouses Cuevas, and eventually, he was able to cause the cancellation of TCT No. T-58459 in the spouses
Cuevas names and the issuance of TCT No. T-369793 in private respondents name based on the
questionable Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992. Similarly ambiguous was how Jaime was
able to have TCT No. T-58459 of the spouses Cuevas cancelled when the Owners Duplicate Copy thereof
was with petitioners. When a certificate of title is cancelled, the owners duplicate must also be surrendered
to the Register of Deeds for cancellation, in accordance with Section 53 [29] of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended.
Other than the forged Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992, private respondents bad
faith in registering the subject property in her name and her dishonest scheme in appropriating the land
for herself are further evidenced by her own admissions in the Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January
1998, which she executed in favor of Engracias heirs, to wit [30]:
1. That, I am the holder of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 369793 covering a parcel of
land (Lot No. 6961-N) with an area of Forty One Thousand Eight Hundred and Thirty
Seven square meters (41, 837 sq. m.) situated in Barangay Paliparan, Dasmarias, Cavite
and declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 151746 Dasmarias,
Cavite;

2. That, I know (sic) from the very beginning the dubiousness of my title to
the above described roperty (sic);
3. That, I have neither legal or equitable title to the said property as the previous
document (Deed of Conveyance) which is the basis of immediate transfer from OCT No.
1002 is of questionable origin;
4. That, all documents relative to the issuance of subsequent transfer certificate of titles
including TCT No. 369793 under my name were in reality, entirely simulated and
fictitious;
5. That, I am recognizing the genuineness of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 769357-

3911 in the name of ENGRACIA ISIP with Tax Declaration No. 151745, which has been
transferred to her heirs, APOLONIA I.R. ALCARAZ, ELIZA I. REYES-GLORIA, VICTOR ISIP
REYES and EPITACIO ISIP REYES, covered by TCT. No. T-784707;
6. That, in the light of the foregoing, I do hereby waive and renounce, now and forever,
all claims of whatever nature to the said property in favor of the said ENGRACIA ISIP, her
heirs, executors, administrator or assigns.
Private respondents unabashed confession that she knew of the dubiousness of her title from the
very beginning is contrary to the concept of good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of the possessors
that the persons from whom they received the thing are its rightful owners who could convey their title. [31]
Based on the foregoing, the preponderance of evidence in this case is in petitioners favor. The
spouses Cuevas only sold the subject property to them in 1976, and did not sell it a second time to private
respondent in 1992. As a consequence, the rules on the double sale of registered property are not relevant
herein. The Court then proceeds to rule on the consequence of private respondents fraudulent registration
of the subject property in her name.
The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992, a forged deed, is a nullity and conveys no
title.[32] Paragraph 2 of Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 reads:
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and
equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the
rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. After the entry of the decree of
registration on the original petition or application, any subsequent registration procured by
the presentation of a forged duplicate certificate of title, or of a forged deed or other
instrument, shall be null and void.
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of the
property in said persons name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the property. A
certificate of title merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of
the Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real
property. Good faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be an exercise in
futility.[33] A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that
registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if the
registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere
trustee.[34]
It has long been established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in an ordinary court of
justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value,
for damages. It is one thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one
devoid of justification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his
nefarious deed.[35] Reconveyance is all about the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereto,
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal
owner, or to one with a better right. [36]Evidently, petitioners, being the rightful owners of the subject
property, are entitled to the reconveyance of the title over the same.
However, as a further demonstration of private respondents continuing bad faith and persistent
effort to unlawfully deprive petitioners of the subject property, private respondent executed the Waiver
and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998, in which she admitted that her title to the said property was void
and, instead, recognized the title of Engracia, who owned the subject property prior to the spouses
Cuevas. Pursuant to said Waiver and Quitclaim, the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. T-369793 in
private respondents name and issued TCT No. T-784707 in the names of Engracias heirs.
It must be stressed that Engracia, whose TCT No. T-13105 over the subject property was already
cancelled on 26 April 1965, had never filed a case questioning the cancellation of said certificate of title
during her lifetime.[37] There is also nothing in the records that would show that after Engracias death in
1981, her heirs attempted to recover title to the subject property.
The Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998 deserves little evidentiary weight as to the truth
or veracity of the statements contained therein, considering that they were unilaterally made by private
respondent. There is no independent evidence that all certificates of title subsequent to OCT No. 1002
covering the subject property were simulated and fictitious. In fact, private respondent contradicted
herself by acknowledging in the very same document that Engracias title, which was transferred to her
heirs, was genuine. The only fact that said Waiver and Quitclaim established was private respondents bad
faith in having the subject property registered in her name. For the Court to make such finding of bad faith
on private respondents part, it need not actually be true that all titles to the subject property, prior to
private respondents, were simulated and fictitious, only, private respondent believed them to be so, but
still persisted in acquiring and registering in her name what she already knew was a dubious title.
What is apparent to this Court is that private respondent executed the Waiver and Quitclaim
dated 15 January 1998 so as to effect the transfer of the subject property to third persons, i.e., Engracias
heirs, and defeat any judgment granting the petitioners the remedy of reconveyance of the subject
property.
In connection therewith, this Court expresses its disfavor over the cavalier attitude of the Register
of Deeds of Cavite in canceling TCT No. T-369793 in private respondents name and issuing TCT No. T-
784707 in the names of Engracias heirs, on the sole basis of the Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January
1998, executed by private respondent. The Register of Deeds of Cavite, who was a party to petitioners
case for reconveyance, and was undoubtedly aware of the issues involved in the said case and the
pendency of the same. Yet it blindly allowed the registration of the alleged title to the subject property of
Engracia and her heirs, in effect, reviving a title that had already been cancelled way back in 1965, and
disregarding all other titles issued in between, based entirely on the unilateral claims of a self-confessed
fraud. Moreover, in placing its faith in the unsupported statements of the private respondent, who had
confessed to having acquired and registered the property in bad faith, against the presumed good faith of
the former owners, the Register of Deeds acted in a manner that was highly irregular.
This having been said, an action for reconveyance is an action in personamavailable to a person
whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrenssystem in anothers name. Reconveyance
is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent person for value. [38]
Engracias heirs cannot be considered innocent persons or persons who acquired the subject
property for value. Engracias heirs re-acquired the subject property by virtue of the private
respondents Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998. That the said document was executed by
private respondent, who admitted to holding a dubious title to the subject property, should be sufficient to
put Engracias heirs on notice and to cause the latter to investigate the other transfers and titles issued for
the subject property. The Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998 also does not establish that the
subject property was transferred to Engracias heirs for value, it appearing to have been executed by
private respondent in favor of Engracias heirs without any consideration at all. Hence, the cancellation
of TCT No. T-369793 in private respondents name and the issuance of TCT No. T-784707 in the names of
Engracias heirs cannot bar the reconveyance of the subject property to petitioners.
A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it

is binding only against the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action. [39] The Court may deem Engracias heirs as private respondents successors-
in-interest, having acquired title to the subject property through private respondent after the
commencement of petitioners action for reconveyance of the same property.
Since private respondents fraudulent registration of the subject property in her name violated
petitioners right to remain in peaceful possession of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to
nominal damages under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and
not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
This Court finds that petitioners prayer for nominal damages in the amount ofP50,000.00 is proper and
reasonable.
The award of attorneys fees is also in order because private respondent acted in gross and evident
bad faith in refusing to satisfy petitioners plainly valid, just and demandable claim. [40] Given the time spent
on the present case, which lasted for more than 15 years, the extent of services rendered by petitioners
lawyers, the benefits resulting in favor of the client, as well as said lawyers professional standing, the
award of P100,000.00 is proper.[41]
However, exemplary damages cannot be imposed in this case, where petitioners only prayed for
the award of nominal damages and attorneys fees, but not for moral, temperate, liquidated, or
compensatory damages. Article 2229 of the Civil Code imposes exemplary damages only under the
following circumstances:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or
correction for public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 20
May 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54517 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Register of
Deeds is ORDERED to (1)CANCEL TCT No. T-784707 over the subject property in the name of Engracias
heirs, which was derived, not in good faith or for value, but from the fraudulently procured TCT No. T-
369793 in private respondents name; and (2) ISSUE a new certificate of title over the subject property in
the name of petitioners, the rightful owners thereof. Private respondent is ORDERED to PAY petitioners
nominal damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount ofP100,000.00. Costs
against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
TEMPERATE DAMAGES (ART. 2224-2225)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56505 May 9, 1988
MAXIMO PLENO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE PAPER PRODUCTS, INC., and FLORANTE DE
LUNArespondents.
Oben, Oben & Fruto Law Office for petitioner.
Poblador, Azada, Tomacruz, Cacanindin & Orbos Law Office for respondents.
GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64497 which
modified the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a vehicular accident case and reduced by
one-half the award for temperate damages, moral damages, and attorney's fees from a total of
P430,000.00 to P215,000.00. The awards for actual damages in the amount of P48,244.08 and exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 were affirmed.
The facts of the case are summarized as follows:
On April 11, 1972, plaintiff commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Pasig) against defendants Philippine Paper Products, Inc., and Florante de Luna.
The material allegations of the complaint are to the following effect. That the Philippine
Paper Products, Inc., is the owner of a delivery truck (Ford Stake) with Plate No. 30-51 Y/Y T-
Rizal '71, having in its regular employ in conducting business several motor vehicle drivers,
one of them being Florante de Luna who, on December 21, 1971, at about 12:45 P.M., was in
charge of and driving said delivery truck (Ford Stake) on the right lane of the South Super
Highway in Taguig, Rizal, in a careless, reckless and imprudent manner, by driving the
vehicle at a speed greater than what is reasonable and proper at the time without taking
necessary precaution to avoid accident to persons and damage to property, that as a
consequence of the said driver's reckless and imprudent driving, said vehicle of the
defendant Philippine Paper Products, Inc., hit, bumped and sideswiped plaintiffs Volkswagen
Delivery Van, with Plate No. 52-50 Y/Y, Manila '71, driven by said plaintiff causing the

Volkswagen Delivery Van to swerve to the right that it rammed into the rear part of a truck
with Plate No. 8157W T-Manila '71 parked at the shoulder of the road; that as a result of the
vehicular accident, plaintiff suffered various serious injuries, was hospitalized, and because
he suffered injuries affecting his brain, he acted beyond normalcy at times, that as a
consequence he suffered actual and compensatory damages of approximately P100,000.00;
moral damages of P500,000.00 for suffering from bodily pain, mental anguish, serious
anxiety for Florante de Luna's wanton and brazen disregard of traffic laws and regulations
aggravated by his running away from the scene of the accident, without rendering aid to the
victim, plaintiff should be adjudged as exemplary or corrective damages of P 300,000.00 as
an example to all, owners, operators and drivers of motor vehicles and in the interest of
public safety and welfare, as well as the sum of P100,000.00 for the payment of attorney's
fees. Plaintiff prays that defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay him P100,000.00
for actual and compensatory damages; for moral damages P500,000.00; P300,000.00 as
exemplary damages; for attorney's fees P100,000.00, interest at the rate of 6% on the
actual and moral damage ages and loss of earnings computed from the filing of the
complaint until the P100,000.00 and the P500,000.00 are fully paid and the costs of suit.
On May 19, 1972, defendant Philippine Paper Products., Inc., filed its answer with
counterclaim. While it admits the allegation of paragraph 1 of the complaint pertaining to it,
the Id defendant denies the substantial allegations of the complaint and alleges as defenses
that it exercises and continues to exercise the requisite diligence in the employment and
supervision of its employees and laborers as well as in keeping in constant repair and in
good condition all its vehicles; and that plaintiff is the one grossly negligent, careless and
imprudent in driving and operating his vehicle who has neither the license nor the permit to
drive the said vehicle. It prays that plaintiffs complaint be dismissed with cost against him;
and on the counterclaim, that plaintiff be ordered to pay to the herein defendant actual
damages and other expenses of litigation as shall be proved in the course of the proceedings
as well as exemplary damages sufficient for the purposes sought to be attained thereby
apart from reasonable attorney's fees.
On May 24, 1972, plaintiff filed his Answer to Counterclaim denying the allegations of the
counterclaim of defendant.
On May 25, 1972, defendant Florante de Luna filed his answer with counterclaim. While he
admits the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the complaint, he denies the substantial
allegations of the same and, as affirmative and/or special defenses, avers that plaintiff
without proper license to drive a Volkswagen Kombi delivery van drove said vehicle along a
portion of the east service road of the South Super Highway in Taguig, Rizal in a reckless and
imprudent manner by operating and driving said kombi delivery van at a speed very much
more than reasonable without taking the precautions to prevent injury to persons and
damage to property and without considering the traffic condition at the place and time that
as a consequence the delivery van titled to its left side of the road following its travel
direction that somewhere in the front part of the vehicle being driven by him made a slight
contact with the rear left side of the vehicle driven by plaintiff and despite the same, plaintiff
did not bother to put to a stop his vehicle instead and continued to drive that his vehicle
smashed against another vehicle driven by a certain Ruben Rivera and that in view of the
circumstance plaintiff is not entitled from defendant even if only attorney's fees. As
counterclaim, he avers that as a result of the filing of the unwarranted complaint he suffered
mental anguish, serious anxiety besides forcing himself to retain the services of counsel. He
prays for the dismiss of the complaint in addition for payment for moral damages and
attorney's fees and costs of suit.
On June 1, 1972, plaintiff filed his answer to defendant Florante de Luna's counterclaim by
denying the substantial allegations of said counterclaim with the averment that the
complaint was initiated and filed for a just cause.
After due trial, on August 30, 1977, the Court a quo rendered its decision sentencing jointly
and severally defendants to pay plaintiff (1) P 48,244.08 actual damages: (2) temperate or
moderate damage of P200,000.00; (3) moral damages of P200,000.00; (4) exemplary
damages of P50,000.00; (5) attorney's fees of P30,000.00; and (6) costs of suit.
The facts, as related by the trial court and as borne out by the records, are as follows:

As brought out in the trial, the incident which is the basis of this complaint
involves a three vehicle collision which happened about past noon of
December 21,1971 at the South Super Highway in the portion of Taguig, Rizal.
At about 12:45 in the afternoon of said date, a snub-nosed volkswagen kombi
with plate No. 52-50, Manila '71, was cruising towards Manila along the
asphalt pavement of the service road of the South Super Highway. The kombi
had two passengers, Maximo Pleno who was at the wheel, and, a New
Zealander, James Arthur Longley, who was sitting beside Mr. Pleno on the front
seat. The volkswagen was suddenly and without warning hit on its left rear
corner by a red colored cargo truck. Due to the impact, the volkswagen moved
faster veering to the right and smashing unto the right rear portion of a truck
with plate No. 81-87, T-Manila '71, parked along the shoulder of the road in
front of the National Manpower Building. The parked truck was also moved
forward when it was hit on its back by the Volkswagen and the driver of the
parked truck, Ruben Rivera who was at that time standing in front of his
parked truck urinating was bumped by his own truck. Witness to all these was
Diego Orca, a gardener, who at such time, was watering his plants in front of
the National Manpower Building.
Having been hit from behind by the red colored cargo truck and having
smashed into the rear portion of the parked truck, the right front portion of
the volkswagen on the driver's side was reduced to a pulp. At impact, the
front door on the right side burst open and Langley, who was seated on that
side, was thrown out of the vehicle and landed on a ditch. Pleno, the driver of
the volkswagen was crushed in the driver's seat since the kombi's front
portion offered no protection, being the snub-nosed type, with the motor at
the back. His legs were trapped in the wreckage. The red cargo truck stopped
for a while and then spead away. Ruben Rivera, the driver of the parked truck,
was brought by a passing jeepney to the hospital. Langley who was thrown
out of the volkswagen but was not seriously hurt, with the help of a few
persons nearby, extricated Pleno from the volkswagen after pushing the truck
away and thereafter took him to the Makati Medical Center. Pleno suffered
extensive injuries on his head and legs and affected his eyesight and stayed in
the hospital for almost five (5) months.
The hit and run incident was reported to the Taguig Police Department several
hours later or about 3:15 in the afternoon of the same day by Manuel Pleno,
son of plaintiff Maximo Pleno. An investigator was sent by the Taguig Police
Department at the scene of the incident where an initial report was submitted
containing a description of the suspect vehicle as a delivery truck colored red
all over with yellow, canvass at the top. A team to investigate this hit and run
incident was formed thereafter by Patrolman Maximo de Guzman of the Taguig
Police Department.
Days later or on January 8, 1972, a certain Atty. Tagumpay Eusebio, who is

connected with the Philippine Paper Products, Inc., went to Pat. de Guzman's
precinct at Taguig, Rizal inquiring why one of the Taguig's Police Traffic Officers
at the service road of the South Super Highway stopped and investigated
Florante de Luna, driver of the said company. Pat. de Guzman told Atty.
Eusebio that De Luna was stopped and investigated because the delivery
truck he was driving matched the description of the delivery truck in a hit and
run incident which occured at about 12:45 p.m. of December 21, 1971. Atty.
Eusebio promised to bring De Luna to the police precinct. After receiving such
information, Pat. de Guzman and his team proceeded to the compound of the
Philippine Paper Products, Inc., at Sun Valley Subdivision, South Super
Highway, Paranaque, Rizal on the same day, January 8, 1972. Pat. de Guzman
and his team made further visits at said compound and during these visits,
they discovered that the suspect vehicle exmbited plate No. 3- 51 Taguig,
Rizal, T-Manila '71 and was painted red all over. The team also discovered
a'dented'or'depressed'portion of the right front portion of the vehicle. The
distance from the ground to the 'denied' or 'depressed' portion of the truck
was three feet and 3 inches, the same distance from the ground to the

depressed portion of the volkswagen on its left rear portion. The paint was
scratched off and there were blue colored stains. The volkswagen was blue
colored. On one of the visits by Pat. de Guzman, he brought with him Dr. Diego
Orca, the gardener who, at the time of the incident on December 21, 1971,
was tending to his plants in front of the National Manpower Corporation and
who witnessed the 3 vehicle collision, Orca positively Identified the vehicle of
the defendant corporation as the one involved in the incident. Also brought
along the team in one of their visits was a photographer, Bernardo Beduya
who took photographs of the suspect vehicle (Exhibits "D-l" to "D- 2").<re||
an1w> Pat. de Guzman was also able to look into the logbook of the
Philippine Paper Products, Inc., which showed that the suspect vehicle with
Florante de Luna driving it, left the compound of the company on December
21, 1971 at 12:00 p.m. or barely 25 minutes before the incident. A photograph
of the log book with a finger pointing at the above entry was taken by
photographer Beduya (Exh. "F-a").
On January 12, 1972, while Patrolman de Guzman and his team were in the
compound of the Philippine Paper Products, Inc., they met Atty. Eusebio with
two companions who later turned out to be Florante de Luna and an insurance
adjuster. Atty. Eusebio invited Pat. de Guzman in Ms office and asked him
about the progress of the investigation to which de Guzman informed him that
99% of the evidence in their hands pointed to the delivery truck of the
defendant company as the vehicle involved in the accident. Atty. Eusebio then
took Pat. de Guzman aside and revealed to him that it was only sometime that
their driver, Florante de Luna, admitted to him the involvement of the
company truck in the incident and that was the reason why a representative
or adjuster of the insurance company was with them so that they can settle
the case. Thereafter, Pat. de Guzman, together with Atty. Eusebio, Florante de
Luna and the adjuster, went to De Guzman's precinct where De Luna executed
a written statement (Exhibits "G" and "G-l"). De Luna's statement, although
admitting that the delivery truck of the company was involved in the incident,
however, claimed that the fault lay in Mr. Pleno because while a truck was
moving on its way to the main road, Pleno who was driving the volkswagen
applied his brakes and his left rear portion veered towards the right and came
in contact with the delivery truck being driven by De Luna. Thereafter, the
volkswagen accelerated and went out of control veering further towards the
right and hitting the truck which was then moving towards the direction of the
highway. In other words, De Guzman claimed that the braked track was no
longer parked at the time of the collision but that it was already moving, and
the fault in the collision was on the part of Mr. Maximo Pleno. Before the
written statement of Pleno was sub-scribed before the mayor of Taguig, Rizal,
an incident transpired as testified by Pat. De Guzman:
WITNESS (Pat. de Guzman)
A. Before you went to the Municipal Building of Taguig, Rizal, for

the subscription of the statement of Mr. de Luna, while I was
along inside your investigation room, Atty. Eusebio with a
certain adjuster of the insurance company approached me and
offered me something.
ATTY. OBEN:
Q. What is that something?
A. He told me in vernacular, to wit ;
Tsip, iyon pala naman ay hindi pa nalalaman ng pamilya ng

victim ang pagkakadeskobre ninyo nito tungkol sa involvement
ni De Luna sa kasong ito. Kung maari ay pag-usapan na lang
natin ito.' And I answered: Ano ang ibig mong sabihin ng
pagusapan?

Q. What did Atty. Eusebio tell you?
A. He told me that if you will not divulge this incident to the

family of the victim, we will just give you the amount, all the
expenses that may be incurred by the Philippine Paper Products,
Inc., in this case.
Q. If Atty. Eusebio is in the courtroom, can you point to him up

in the courtroom?
A. He is in the middle. (witness pointing to Atty. Eusebio who is

seated in the courtroom). (TSN., Nov. 21, 1972, pp. 5-9).
As regards the injuries suffered by Maximo Pleno, it may be seen from the exhibits shown
particularly the photographs of the volkswagen that it is the driver's side which was severely
damaged considering that the vehicle is the snub-nosed type with its motor at the back. Due
to the impact, Pleno's head was dashed and he lost consciousness with his legs trapped in
the wreckage. It took several persons to extricate him therefrom. And they have to push the
parked truck away before they could do so. Pleno was brought to the Makati Medical Center
in the afternoon of December 21, 1971 and he left the hospital almost five (5) months later
or on May 9, 1972. The orthopedic surgeon who treated Pleno at the emergency room of the
Makati Medical Hospital testified that Pleno sustained multiple fractures of both thigh bones
and the left shin bone or tibia He sustained multiple lacerations in his forehead and left
thigh. There was evidence of head injury, according to the surgeon. Pleno was incoherent in
pain and disabled, Pleno had to undergo about five surgical operations of his thighs one of
which involving the insertion of these many operations, he still finds it difficult to stand up
even with the aid of crutches or a cane. He walks with a limp and his left is shorter than the
right.
As regards his eyesight, Pleno complained that his left eye suffers from double vision so that
whenever he looks to the left, he sees two objects of the same thing The injuries above
mentioned affected his social and business life for he could not longer attend social
gatherings nor could he concentrate on his business ventures.'(at pp. 30-39, Panted
Amended Joint Record on Appeal). (pp. 39-47)
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the lower court, to wit:
We find the findings of the lower court after hearing the parties to be more in consonance to
the truth and what actually occurred. We fully agree that the Kombi delivery panel was hit by
the cargo truck driven by the driver at the left rear corner when the cargo truck of the driver
was overtaking it. Naturally, when one overtakes another vehicle the overtaking vehicle
must run faster than the vehicle to be overtaken. The impact caused the Kombi delivery
panel upon being hit to swerve to the light at the same time due to the force and
suddenness of impact Pleno lost control of his vehicle, as it happened in this case it
accelerated towards the parked cargo truck with chairs.
A table re-enactment of the incident convinces us that the claim of the driver that he saw a
cargo truck moving out from the curve into the road a moment before the collision is false. It
is a fact that the driver appellant was about to overtake the Kombi delivery panel momentt
before the accident. Therefore, he must have been only about 2 to 5 meters to the left
behind the Kombi delivery panel. At this position and distance, it is impossible for the driver
to see the cargo truck with chairs he claimed to be moving out of the curve as his vision or
view to the right is covered by the Kombi delivery panel which he was about to overtake.
We likewise refuse to behave the driver's claim that the Kombi delivery panel swerved to the
left towards his (driver's) lane to avoid the cargo truck with chairs then moving out of the
shoulder of the road. Ruben Rivera, driver of the cargo truck with chairs, testified that his
truck was parked and was not about to move out of the showder. Rivera testified that he was
standing in front of his truck. Witness Diego Orca corroborated Ruben Rivera.

Efforts of appellants to discredit Rivera notwithstanding, we are convinced that the driver
hitting the left rear corner of the Kombi delivery panel in the manner to overtake it was the
proximate cause of the accident.
It is also unbelievable that the driver did not feel or notice any contact between his cargo
truck and the Kombi delivery panel. After all, it has been established and admitted after
police investigation that the protruding front right edge of the loading platform of the cargo
truck, establishrd by the telltale marks and measurement, hit the left rear corner of the
Kombi delivery panel.
Considering the accelerated speed of the cargo truck of the driver in attempting to overtake
the Kombi delivery panel, in all probability upon contact there would have emitted an impact
sound similar to a sound of a hard object hit by another hard object. This kind of sound one
cannot miss to feel or notice. We are not, therefore, persuaded by the pretense of the driver.
We are in full accord with the Court a quo when it said:
Having been hit from behind by the red colored cargo truck and having
smashed unto the rear portion of the parked car the right front portion of the
volkswagen on the driver's truck side was reduced to a pulp. At impact, the
front door on the right side burst open and Langley, who was seated on that
side, was thrown out of the vehicle and landed on a ditch. Pleno, the driver of
the volkswagen was crushed in the driver's seat since the Kombi's front
portion offered no protection being the snub-nosed type, with the motor at the
back. His legs were trapped in the wreckage. The red cargo truck stopped for
a while and then sped away. Ruben Rivera, the driver of the parked truck, was
brought by a passing jeepney to the hospital. Langley who was thrown out of
the volkswagen but was not seriously hurt, with the help of a few persons
nearby, extricated Pleno from the volkswagen after pushing the truck away
and thereafter took him to the Makati Medical Center. Pleno suffered extensive
injuries on his head and legs and affected his eyesight and stayed in the
hospital for almost five (5) months. (at pp. 31-32, Printed Record on Appeal).
The immediately preceding discussion disposes of the second, third, fourth, and fifth errors
assigned by appellant driver.
From the reconstruction of the incident, we find the driver the one negligent and not the
plaintiff-appellee as assailed by the appellants. Neither do we find any contributory
negligence attributable to plaintiff-appellee. The proximate cause as hereintofore discussed
above was the recklessness of the driver De Luna in miscalculate his distance to and from
the Kombi delivery panel on overtaking. So much so that the front right edge of his loading
platform hit the left rear corner of the Kombi delivery panel Causing the Kombi delivery
panel to swerve to the right forcing it to run smack into the parked cargo truck with chairs.
Having been found negligent, which negligence resulted to serious injuries, the lower court
did not err in sentencing defendant driver De Luna to pay actual, moral, temperate and
exemplary damages, likewise to pay attorney's fees.
To justify these awards, we consider the established fact that it is beyond dispute, despite
driver's protestation that he did not hit the Kombi delivery panel at the left rear corner; that
he did not attempt to evade responsibility; even knowingly realizing that he caused the
accident, he merely stopped a while (which we doubt if he did); and, upon seeing the
extensiveness of the resulting damage and the seriousness of the injury, left the scene of
the accident and kept quiet all about it until discovered thru police investigation thus
making it a hit and run case, pure and simple.
Appellant chiver De Luna's seventh, eight and ninth errors will be treated together with the
errors assigned by appellant corporation.
Appellant Corporation asserts that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its employees. Therefore, it claimed it was error for the trial court not to so hold and
further claimed that it erred in holding the Corporation able to plaintiff appellee.

Contending that at the time of the accident its employee driver De Luna, a duly licensed
professional driver, had been driving for five years before his employment with the
Corporation in 1970; that he was given examination in driving and found fit; that he was
assigned to drive small vehicles before being assigned to drive cargo trucks for two months
and after being tested for his driving ability, appellant Corporation professes that it had
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employee driver De Luna. One of the overriding circumstances considered by the court a
quo in disregarding the defense of exercise of due diligence interposed by appellant
Corporation is the record of defendant driver De Luna that he was once accused of serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. Appellant Corporation argued that in that case
driver De Luna was acquitted. True. But the records did not show that his acquittal was in a
trial on the merits. The case may have been dismissed and he was acquitted for failure of
the prosecution to prosecute thru desistance of the aggrieved party. his innocence was not
therefore proven. It is not enough that defendant Corporation hold high and waves driver's
acquittal of that charge but Corporation should have presented evidence that in the trial on
the merits his employed defendant driver was declared innocent. A diligent and thorough
inquiry of the background of driver De Luna was not undertaken. Otherwise, defendant-
appellant Corporation should not have hired De Luna had it exercised the due diligence it is
required by law in hiring the driver, the accident would not have occurred in the manner it
happened and would have been avoided.
The lower court, as we are, was not satisfied with the testimonies of Manuel Zurbano and
Benjamin Francisco, both employees of appellant Corporation. Their testimonies, aside from
dealing merely on generalities and mere observations on defendant driver De Luna's driving
were not thorough. It war, not enough. They should have declared on the different company
procedures in hiring its employees, particularly its drivers. There are steps, manual of
procedures to be followed strictly by employers before hiring its employees. In the case at
bar, evidence has it that there was unexcusable laxity in the supervision of its driver by the
Corporation. Proof of this is that the accident happened on December 21, 1972 and not until
January 8, 1972 when the defendant-appellant Corporation, thru Atty. Tagumpay Eusebio,
came to know that one of its vehicles was involved in an accident. Indeed, if there was close
supervision exercised by the defendant-appellant Corporation on its employees and proper
care of its equipments, it would have known of the involvement of its driver De Luna in the
accident in question. As it was lax in its supervision, it did not know until confronted that its
cargo truck met an accident and caused the damage and injury in question. It is very
difficult for us to believe the claim of the appellant that it did not report the accident
because no one in its company knew about the accident. That even De Luna himself did not
realize that the truck he was driving came in contact with the plaintiffs Kombi delivery panel.
We have discarded driver De Luna's pretense that he did not realize that his truck came in
contact with the Kombi delivery panel of plaintiff. His pretense is contrary to human and
factual experience. A carefull driver can even detect a small pebble hitting his vehicle. Even
a slight nudge becomes discernible. How much more with the contact and impact which
have been established beyond doubt and ultimately admitted by driver De Luna that his
truck, after all, hit the Kombi at its rear left corner which sent the Kombi delivery panel
careening to the right smack against the parked cargo truck with chairs. Not only did the
defendant-appellant corporation not report the accident to the authorities, but we are
convinced by the conclusion arrived at by the trial court that defendant-appellant
Corporation thru its representative and counsel, Atty. Eusebio, attempted to cover up the
involvement of its driver and truck in the accident from the victim's family (Testimony of Pat.
de Guzman). (pp. 49-54, Rollo)
The court, however, modified the award on damages such that temperate damages were reduced from
P200,000.00 to P100,000.00; moral damages were reduced from P200,000.00 to Pl00,000.00; and
attorney's fees were reduced from P30,000.00 to P15,000.00. It further ruled that the employer's ability is
subsidiary.
All the parties assailed the decision by filing two separate petitions before us. Philippine Paper Products,
Inc., sought the reversal of the factual findings of the appellate court as regards their lialibility The case
was docketed as G.R. No. 56511. On the other hand, Maximo Pleno filed G.R. No. 56505 questioning the
reduction of the damages awarded to him and the court's ruling that the ability of Philippine Paper
Products, Inc., as employer is only subsidiary.

On May 20, 1981, we issued a resolution in both petitions. G.R. No. 56511 was denied, "the questions
raised being factual and for insufficient showing that findings of facts by respondent court are unsupported
by substantial evidence." G.R. No. 56505, was given due course and it is the petition which we now
resolve. In this same resolution, we declared "that with respect to the affirmed judgment of the Court of
Appeals ordering respondents to pay jointly and severally the petitioner P48,244.08, actual damages,
P100,000.00 temperate or moderate damages, P100,000.00 moral damages, P50,000.00 exemplary
damages, and P15,000.00 attorney's fees, and the costs of suit, (with reduction of a total of P215,000.00)
wherein the petition for review in G.R. No. 56511 has been herein DENIED, execution may issue
immediately by the court a quo upon receipt of this resolution." (p. 79, Rollo)
The resolution became final and executory on September 7, 1981 and an entry of judgment was made.
The issues raised in this petition are two-fold. They are: (1) whether or not the employer's liability in quasi-
delict is subsidiary, and (2) whether or not the appellant court was correct in reducing the amount of
damages awarded to the petitioner.
We sustain the view of the petitioner that the ability of an employer in quasi-delict
is primary and solidary and not subsidiary. This, we have ruled in a long line of cases. (See Bachrach Motor
Co. v. Gamboa, L-110296, May 21, 1957; Malipol v. Tan, 55 SCRA 202; Barredo v. Garcia and Almario, 73
Phil. 607; Vinluan v. Court of Appeals, et al., 16 SCRA 742; Anuran, et al. v. Buno, et al., 17 SCRA 224;
Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA 20; Lanuzo v. Ping, 100 SCRA 205; Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System,
Inc., 148 SCRA 440)
The Court of Appeals affirmed the awards of damages based on its findings, as follows:
Both appellants assailed the awards of damages. Appellant Corporation claims that damages
were not alleged in the complaint nor competent evidence adduced to prove the damages
awarded. This is a sweeping statement. We find on record sufficient evidence supporting the
adjudication of damages in favor of the plaintiff-appellee. Maximo Pleno is a mechanical
engineer, a topnotcher, and at the time of the accident was a director, vice-president and
general manager of Mayon Ceramics Corporation. He was confined from the date of the
accident up to May, 1972. He could not work immediately. He sustained serious wounds on
his forehead and legs. In short, he became an invalid. According to Dr. Ramon Borromeo,
plaintiff-appellee Maximo Pleno sustained multiple fractures involving both thigh bones and
the left shin bone or tibia and there is evidence of head imjury. Dr. Borromeo conducted a
series of operations. In order to be more detailed, we quote from the brief of the appellee
the condition of the plaintiff-appellee Mr. Pleno, borne by the records and remained
unrefuted as follows:
Dr. Ramon Borromeo, the orthopedic surgeon who treated Mr. Pleno and saw
him at the emergency room of the Makati Medical Center on the day of the
accident, testified that Mr. Pleno sustained multiple fractures involving both
thigh bones and the left shin bone or tibia multiple laceration involving wound
in his forehead and left thigh; and, evidence of head injury (t.s.n. Borromeo,
February 22, 1974, p. 10 and 11). Mr. Pleno was incoherent when he first saw
him (ibid, p. 11). He was in pain (ibid); limited in leg motion because of the
fractures and disabled (ibid, pp. 11-12). On that same day, Mr. Pleno's wound
in the thighs were cleaned followed by skeletal traction to both legs by which
a wire is inserted to the bone to obtain more or less sittisfactory ent a
temporary procedure, Dr. Borromeo explained, to relieved swelling and spasm
of the muscles (ibid, pp. 13 and 14). Two weeks thereafter, Dr. Borromeo
conducted another operation, this time what he described to be an open
surgery on the left thigh bone, the purpose of which was to obtain an accurate
alignment of the fractures (ibid, p. 15). Dr. Borromeo performed still another
operation three weeks thereafter, this time on the right thigh bone (ibid, p.
16). This was not to be the last of the operations Mr. Pleno underwent. A year
later, Mr. Pleno developed foreign body reaction, which according to Dr.
Borromeo, necessitated another surgery, this time the action of the metallic
appliance (Exh. I) on both thighs (ibid, P. 16). Then, again, several months
later he developed rejection of the metallic appliance with secondary infection
of the bones which required another operation (ibid, p. 17).<re||
an1w> The metallic appliance, the surgeon explained, is inserted

throughout the whole canal of the thigh bone to obtain adequate alignment
and in the case of Mr. Pleno, the appliance was inserted on both thigh bones
(ibid, p. 18). Mr. Pleno had to use crutches because the fracture was not just
an ordinary fracture; it was what the doctor called 'comminute fractures,'
meaning the bone was broken up into several fragments, multiple fragments
which naturally would prolong the healing period (ibid, p. 19). After Identifying
the various x-ray Films presented (Exhibits M, M-1, M-2 and M-4), Dr. Borromeo
testified that definitely there is shortening of oneleg of Mr. Pleno, the left leg,
despite the surgery (ibid, pp. 23 and 24).
Mr. Pleno had complained of defective eyesight (t.s.n., Pleno, July 13,1973, pp.
28 and 29). On the witness stand, an eye specialist, Dr. Reynaldo Bordador
testified that Mr. Pleno was suffering from horizontal deplopia or double vision
of the left eye which can be caused by injury resulting from a blunt instrument
hitting the forehead or any part of the head (t.s.n. Bordador, April looks to the
left, he would be seeing two objects (ibid, p. 8). Prolonged reading Will result
in headache (ibid). Dr. Bordador described Mr. Pleno's eye condition as one
which resulted from paralysis of one of the occular musde (ibid, p. 9). While
surgery could be performed, the outcome is not guaranteed there will also be
double vision no matter how good the surgery is, the doctor concluded (ibid,
p. 9). (at pp. 14-17)
There is clear and convinced evidence establishing actual and compensatory damages.
The gravity of the injuries Mr. Pleno received and the result pain and mental suffer is very
much evident from the medical diaganosis and prognosis initated above. pp. 54-57, Rollo)
Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the appellate court reduced the amount of temperate and moral damages
as well as the amount of attorney's fees on the ground that the awards were "too high" .The award of
temperate damages was reduced by the appellate court on the ground that the amount of P200,000.00 is
rather "too high" especially considering the fact that the driver De Luna is a mere driver and defendant-
appellant Corporation is only subsidiarily liable thereof. The award was reduced to P100,000.00.
The petitioner now assails the reduction of the damages as without justification. It specifically mentions
the findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the appellate court regarding the gravity of the
injuries suffered by the petitioner, the effect of the injuries upon him as a person, and his business as well
as his standing in society. And yet, it reduced the amount of damages.
As stated earlier, the employer's liability in quasi-delict is primary and solidary. The award of temperate,
moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees lies upon the discretion of the court based on the
facts and circumstances of each case. (See Magbanua v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 137 SCRA 328;
Siquenza v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 570; San Andres v. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 81; Sarkies Tours
Phil., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 124 SCRA 588; Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System,
Inc., supra.).
The court's discretion is, of course, subject to the condition that the award for damages is not excessive
under the attendant facts and circumstance of the case.
Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory damages (Radio Communications of
the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) v. Court of Appeals, supra.). In arriving at a reasonable level of temperate
damages to be awarded, trial courts are guided by our ruling that:
... There are cases where from the nature of the case, defenite proof of pecuniary loss
cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss. For
instance, injury to one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard
to show certainty in terms of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The judge
should be empowered to calculate moderate damages in such cases, rather than that the
plaintiff should suffer, without redress from the defendant's wrongful act. (Araneta v. Bank of
America, 40 SCRA 144,145)
In the case of moral damages, the yardstick shaould be that the "amount awarded should not be palpably
and scandalously excessive" so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on
the part of the trial court (Gerada v. Warner Barnes & Co., Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 7347, 7358; Sadie v. Bachrach
Motor Co., Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 636; Adone v. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., 656 cited in Prudenciado v. Alliance
Transport System, Inc.,supra.).<re||an1w> Moreover, the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved
parties and the gravity of the injuries must be considered in arriving at reasonable levels (Siquenza v.
Court of Appeals, supra, cited in Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra.).
The trial court based the amounts of damages awarded to the petitioner on the following circumstances:
Coming now to the damages suffered by plaintiff Maximo Pleno, it is not controverted that
Pleno was hospitalized for about five months beginning December 21, 1971, the day of the
incident, up to May 9, 1972. While in the hospital, he underwent several major operations on
his legs and in spite of Id operations, a deformity still resulted and that his left leg is shorter
than the right. The medical expenses, hospital bills and doctor's fees were properly exhibited
and not rebutted by defendants. This being the case, actual expenses of P48,244.08 may be
awarded.
As to the loss or impairment of earning capacity, there is no doubt that Pleno is an

enterpreneur and the founder of his own corporation, the Mayon Ceramics Corporation. It
appears also that he is an industrious and resourceful person with several projects in line
and were it not for the incident, might have pushed them through. On the day of the
incident, Pleno was driving homeward with geologist Langley after an ocular inspection of
the site of the Mayon Ceramics Corporation. His actual income however has not been
sufficiently established so that this Court cannot award actual damages, but, an award of
temperate or moderate damages may still be made on loss or impairment of earning
capacity. That Pleno sustained a permanent deformity due to a shortened left leg and that
he also suffers from double vision in his left eye is also established. Because of this, he
suffers from some inferiority complex and is no longer active in business as well as in social
life. In similar cases as in Borromeo v. Manila Electric Railroad Co., 44 Phil 165; Cordage, et
al. v. LTB Co., et al., L-11037, Dec. 29,1960, and in Araneta, et al. v. Arreglado, et al., L-
11394, Sept. 9, 1958, the proper award of damages were given.
There is also no doubt that due to the incident, Pleno underwent physical suffering, mental
anguish, fight, severe arudety and that he also underwent several major operations. As
previously stated, Pleno is the founder of Mayon Ceramics Corporation, manufacturer of the
now famous Crown Lynn ceramic wares. He is a mechanical engineer and the topnotcher of
the professional examination for mechanical engineering in 1938. From the record, most if
not all of his children excelled in academic studies here and abroad. The suffering, both
mental and physical, which he experienced, the anxiety and fright that he underwent are
sufficiently proved, if not patent. He is therefore entitled to moral damages. Pleno is also
entitled to exemplary damages since it appears that gross negligence was committed in the
hiring of driver de Luna. In spite of his past record, he was still hired by the corporation. As
regards de Luna, the very fact that he left the scene of the incident without assisting the
victims and without reporting to the authorities entitles an award of exemplary damages, so
as to serve as an example that in cases of accidents of this kind, the drivers involved should
not leave their victims behind but should stop to assist the victims or if this is not possible,
to report the matter immediately to the authorities. That the corporation did not also report
the matter to the authorities and that their lawyer would attempt to bribe the police officers
in order that the incident would be kept a secret shows that the corporation ratified the act
of their employees and such act also shows bad faith. Hence, Id corporation is able to pay
exemplary damages.
The award of attorney's fees is also proper in this case considering the circumstances and
that it took more than five years of trial to finish this case. Also, plaintiffs counsel prepared
lengthy and exhausive memorandum. (pp- 48-50, Amended Joint Record on Appeal)
We rule that the lower court's awards of damages are more consonant with the factual circumstances of
the instant case. The trial court's findings of facts are clear and well-developed. Each item of damages is
adequately supported by evidence on record. On the other hand, there are no substantial reasons and no
references to any misimpressions of facts in the appellate decision. The Court of Appeals has shown no
sufficient reasons for altering factual findings which appear correct. We, therefore, affirm the lower court's
awards of damages and hold that the appellate court's reduction of the amounts of temperate and moral

damages is not justified. However, we modify the award of attorney's fees to P20,000.00 which we deem
to be just and equitable under the circumstances of the case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) in Civil Case No. 16024 is AFFIRMED in all respects,
except for the award of attorney's fees which is reduced to P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999
ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural guardians of the
minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS and RON RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DRA.
PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to the health and welfare of
their patients. If a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is made accountable for his acts. A mistake,
through gross negligence or incompetence or plain human error, may spell the difference between life and
death. In this sense, the doctor plays God on his patient's fate. 1
In the case at bar, the Court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist and a hospital
should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy. 2
Petitioners seek the reversal of the decision 3 of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 May 1995, which
overturned the decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court, dated 30 January 1992, finding private respondents
liable for damages arising from negligence in the performance of their professional duties towards
petitioner Erlinda Ramos resulting in her comatose condition.
The antecedent facts as summarized by the trial court are reproduced hereunder:
Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was, until the afternoon of June 17, 1985, a 47-year old (Exh. "A")
robust woman (TSN, October 19, 1989, p. 10). Except for occasional complaints of
discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder (TSN,
January 13, 1988, pp. 4-5), she was as normal as any other woman. Married to Rogelio E.
Ramos, an executive of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, she has three children
whose names are Rommel Ramos, Roy Roderick Ramos and Ron Raymond Ramos (TSN,
October 19, 1989, pp. 5-6).
Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways, she sought professional
advice. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall
bladder (TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 5). She underwent a series of examinations which
included blood and urine tests (Exhs. "A" and "C") which indicated she was fit for surgery.
Through the intercession of a mutual friend, Dr. Buenviaje (TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 7), she
and her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. Orlino Hozaka (should be
Hosaka; see TSN, February 20, 1990, p. 3), one of the defendants in this case, on June 10,
1985. They agreed that their date at the operating table at the DLSMC (another defendant),
would be on June 17, 1985 at 9:00 A.M.. Dr. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a
"cholecystectomy" operation after examining the documents (findings from the Capitol
Medical Center, FEU Hospital and DLSMC) presented to him. Rogelio E. Ramos, however,
asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka, in turn, assured Rogelio
that he will get a good anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of P16,000.00, which was
to include the anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid after the operation (TSN,
October 19, 1989, pp. 14-15, 22-23, 31-33; TSN, February 27, 1990, p. 13; and TSN,
November 9, 1989, pp. 3-4, 10, 17).
A day before the scheduled date of operation, she was admitted at one of the rooms of the
DLSMC, located along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City (TSN, October 19,1989, p. 11).
At around 7:30 A.M. of June 17, 1985 and while still in her room, she was prepared for the
operation by the hospital staff. Her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was the Dean of the
College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was also there for moral support. She
reiterated her previous request for Herminda to be with her even during the operation. After
praying, she was given injections. Her hands were held by Herminda as they went down
from her room to the operating room (TSN, January 13, 1988, pp. 9-11). Her husband,
Rogelio, was also with her (TSN, October 19, 1989, p. 18). At the operating room, Herminda
saw about two or three nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to
administer anesthesia. Although not a member of the hospital staff, Herminda introduced
herself as Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center who was to provide
moral support to the patient, to them. Herminda was allowed to stay inside the operating
room.
At around 9:30 A.M., Dr. Gutierrez reached a nearby phone to look for Dr. Hosaka who was
not yet in (TSN, January 13, 1988, pp. 11-12). Dr. Gutierrez thereafter informed Herminda
Cruz about the prospect of a delay in the arrival of Dr. Hosaka. Herminda then went back to
the patient who asked, "Mindy, wala pa ba ang Doctor"? The former replied, "Huwag kang
mag-alaala, darating na iyon" (Ibid.).
Thereafter, Herminda went out of the operating room and informed the patient's husband,
Rogelio, that the doctor was not yet around (id., p. 13). When she returned to the operating
room, the patient told her, "Mindy, inip na inip na ako, ikuha mo ako ng ibang Doctor." So,
she went out again and told Rogelio about what the patient said (id., p. 15). Thereafter, she
returned to the operating room.
At around 10:00 A.M., Rogelio E. Ramos was "already dying [and] waiting for the arrival of
the doctor" even as he did his best to find somebody who will allow him to pull out his wife
from the operating room (TSN, October 19, 1989, pp. 19-20). He also thought of the feeling
of his wife, who was inside the operating room waiting for the doctor to arrive (ibid.). At
almost 12:00 noon, he met Dr. Garcia who remarked that he (Dr. Garcia) was also tired of
waiting for Dr. Hosaka to arrive (id., p. 21). While talking to Dr. Garcia at around 12:10 P.M.,
he came to know that Dr. Hosaka arrived as a nurse remarked, "Nandiyan na si Dr. Hosaka,
dumating na raw." Upon hearing those words, he went down to the lobby and waited for the
operation to be completed (id., pp. 16, 29-30).
At about 12:15 P.M., Herminda Cruz, who was inside the operating room with the patient,
heard somebody say that "Dr. Hosaka is already here." She then saw people inside the
operating room "moving, doing this and that, [and] preparing the patient for the operation"
(TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 16). As she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos, she then saw Dr.
Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, "ang hirap
ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan" (id., p. 17). Because of
the remarks of Dra. Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what Dr. Gutierrez was doing.
She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless
Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her. She then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for
someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist (id., p. 19). After Dr. Calderon arrived
at the operating room, she saw this anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient. The
patient's nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position a
position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her feet which is an
indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to the patient's brain (Id., pp. 19-20).
Immediately thereafter, she went out of the operating room, and she told Rogelio E. Ramos

"that something wrong was . . . happening" (Ibid.). Dr. Calderon was then able to intubate
the patient (TSN, July 25, 1991, p. 9).
Meanwhile, Rogelio, who was outside the operating room, saw a respiratory machine being
rushed towards the door of the operating room. He also saw several doctors rushing towards
the operating room. When informed by Herminda Cruz that something wrong was
happening, he told her (Herminda) to be back with the patient inside the operating room
(TSN, October 19, 1989, pp. 25-28).
Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back, and saw that the patient was still in trendelenburg
position (TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 20). At almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful day, she saw the
patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
About two days thereafter, Rogelio E. Ramos was able to talk to Dr. Hosaka. The latter
informed the former that something went wrong during the intubation. Reacting to what was
told to him, Rogelio reminded the doctor that the condition of his wife would not have
happened, had he (Dr. Hosaka) looked for a good anesthesiologist (TSN, October 19, 1989, p.
31).
Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the hospital to explain what happened to
the patient. The doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm (TSN, November 15,
1990, pp. 26-27).
Erlinda Ramos stayed at the ICU for a month. About four months thereafter or on November
15, 1985, the patient was released from the hospital.
During the whole period of her confinement, she incurred hospital bills amounting to
P93,542.25 which is the subject of a promissory note and affidavit of undertaking executed
by Rogelio E. Ramos in favor of DLSMC. Since that fateful afternoon of June 17, 1985, she
has been in a comatose condition. She cannot do anything. She cannot move any part of her
body. She cannot see or hear. She is living on mechanical means. She suffered brain damage
as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes (TSN, November 9,
1989, pp. 21-22). After being discharged from the hospital, she has been staying in their
residence, still needing constant medical attention, with her husband Rogelio incurring a
monthly expense ranging from P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 (TSN, October 19, 1989, pp. 32-34).
She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage" (Exh.
"G"; see also TSN, December 21, 1989,
p. 6). 5
Thus, on 8 January 1986, petitioners filed a civil case 6 for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City against herein private respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos.
During the trial, both parties presented evidence as to the possible cause of Erlinda's injury. Plaintiff
presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and Dr. Mariano Gavino to prove that the sustained by
Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by private
respondents during the anesthesia phase. On the other hand, private respondents primarily relied on the
expert testimony of Dr. Eduardo Jamora, a pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain damage was
Erlinda's allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).
After considering the evidence from both sides, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners, to wit:
After evaluating the evidence as shown in the finding of facts set forth earlier, and applying
the aforecited provisions of law and jurisprudence to the case at bar, this Court finds and so
holds that defendants are liable to plaintiffs for damages. The defendants were guilty of, at
the very least, negligence in the performance of their duty to plaintiff-patient Erlinda Ramos.
On the part of Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, this Court finds that she omitted to exercise reasonable
care in not only intubating the patient, but also in not repeating the administration of
atropine (TSN, August 20, 1991, pp. 5-10), without due regard to the fact that the patient
was inside the operating room for almost three (3) hours. For after she committed a mistake
in intubating [the] patient, the patient's nailbed became bluish and the patient, thereafter,
was placed in trendelenburg position, because of the decrease of blood supply to the
patient's brain. The evidence further shows that the hapless patient suffered brain damage
because of the absence of oxygen in her (patient's) brain for approximately four to five
minutes which, in turn, caused the patient to become comatose.
On the part of Dr. Orlino Hosaka, this Court finds that he is liable for the acts of Dr. Perfecta
Gutierrez whom he had chosen to administer anesthesia on the patient as part of his
obligation to provide the patient a good anesthesiologist', and for arriving for the scheduled
operation almost three (3) hours late.
On the part of DLSMC (the hospital), this Court finds that it is liable for the acts of negligence
of the doctors in their "practice of medicine" in the operating room. Moreover, the hospital is
liable for failing through its responsible officials, to cancel the scheduled operation after Dr.
Hosaka inexcusably failed to arrive on time.
In having held thus, this Court rejects the defense raised by defendants that they have acted
with due care and prudence in rendering medical services to plaintiff-patient. For if the
patient was properly intubated as claimed by them, the patient would not have become
comatose. And, the fact that another anesthesiologist was called to try to intubate the
patient after her (the patient's) nailbed turned bluish, belie their claim. Furthermore, the
defendants should have rescheduled the operation to a later date. This, they should have
done, if defendants acted with due care and prudence as the patient's case was an elective,
not an emergency case.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants. Accordingly, the latter are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the
former the following sums of money, to wit:
1) the sum of P8,000.00 as actual monthly expenses for the plaintiff Erlinda
Ramos reckoned from November 15, 1985 or in the total sum of P632,000.00
as of April 15, 1992, subject to its being updated;
2) the sum of P100,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees;
3) the sum of P800,000.00 by way of moral damages and the further sum of
P200,000,00 by way of exemplary damages; and,
4) the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 7
Private respondents seasonably interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
rendered a Decision, dated 29 May 1995, reversing the findings of the trial court. The decretal portion of
the decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing premises the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED, and the
complaint below against the appellants is hereby ordered DISMISSED. The counterclaim of
appellant De Los Santos Medical Center is GRANTED but only insofar as appellees are hereby
ordered to pay the unpaid hospital bills amounting to P93,542.25, plus legal interest for
justice must be tempered with mercy.
SO ORDERED. 8
The decision of the Court of Appeals was received on 9 June 1995 by petitioner Rogelio Ramos who was
mistakenly addressed as "Atty. Rogelio Ramos." No copy of the decision, however, was sent nor received
by the Coronel Law Office, then counsel on record of petitioners. Rogelio referred the decision of the
appellate court to a new lawyer, Atty. Ligsay, only on 20 June 1995, or four (4) days before the expiration
of the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. On the same day, Atty. Ligsay, filed with
the appellate court a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. The motion for
reconsideration was submitted on 4 July 1995. However, the appellate court denied the motion for
extension of time in its Resolution dated 25 July 1995. 9Meanwhile, petitioners engaged the services of
another counsel, Atty. Sillano, to replace Atty. Ligsay. Atty. Sillano filed on 7 August 1995 a motion to admit
the motion for reconsideration contending that the period to file the appropriate pleading on the assailed
decision had not yet commenced to run as the Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals had not yet
served a copy thereof to the counsel on record. Despite this explanation, the appellate court still denied
the motion to admit the motion for reconsideration of petitioners in its Resolution, dated 29 March 1996,
primarily on the ground that the fifteen-day (15) period for filing a motion for reconsideration had already
expired, to wit:
We said in our Resolution on July 25, 1995, that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration
cannot be extended; precisely, the Motion for Extension (Rollo, p. 12) was denied. It is, on
the other hand, admitted in the latter Motion that plaintiffs/appellees received a copy of the
decision as early as June 9, 1995. Computation wise, the period to file a Motion for
Reconsideration expired on June 24. The Motion for Reconsideration, in turn, was received by
the Court of Appeals already on July 4, necessarily, the 15-day period already passed. For
that alone, the latter should be denied.
Even assuming admissibility of the Motion for the Reconsideration, but after considering the
Comment/Opposition, the former, for lack of merit, is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 10
A copy of the above resolution was received by Atty. Sillano on 11 April 1996. The next day, or on 12 April
1996, Atty. Sillano filed before this Court a motion for extension of time to file the present petition
for certiorari under Rule 45. The Court granted the motion for extension of time and gave petitioners
additional thirty (30) days after the expiration of the fifteen-day (15) period counted from the receipt of the
resolution of the Court of Appeals within which to submit the petition. The due date fell on 27 May 1996.
The petition was filed on 9 May 1996, well within the extended period given by the Court.
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals on the following grounds:
IN PUTTING MUCH RELIANCE ON THE TESTIMONIES OF RESPONDENTS DRA. GUTIERREZ,

DRA. CALDERON AND DR. JAMORA;
II
IN FINDING THAT THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RESPONDENTS DID NOT CAUSE THE
UNFORTUNATE COMATOSE CONDITION OF PETITIONER ERLINDA RAMOS;
III
IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 11
Before we discuss the merits of the case, we shall first dispose of the procedural issue on the timeliness of
the petition in relation to the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners with the Court of Appeals. In
their
Comment, 12 private respondents contend that the petition should not be given due course since the
motion for reconsideration of the petitioners on the decision of the Court of Appeals was validly dismissed
by the appellate court for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. We do not agree.
A careful review of the records reveals that the reason behind the delay in filing the motion for
reconsideration is attributable to the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals was not sent to then
counsel on record of petitioners, the Coronel Law Office. In fact, a copy of the decision of the appellate
court was instead sent to and received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos on 9 June 1995 wherein he was
mistakenly addressed as Atty. Rogelio Ramos. Based on the other communications received by petitioner
Rogelio Ramos, the appellate court apparently mistook him for the counsel on record. Thus, no copy of the
decision of the counsel on record. Petitioner, not being a lawyer and unaware of the prescriptive period for
filing a motion for reconsideration, referred the same to a legal counsel only on 20 June 1995.

It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel, all notices should be sent to the party's
lawyer at his given address. With a few exceptions, notice to a litigant without notice to his counsel on
record is no notice at all. In the present case, since a copy of the decision of the appellate court was not
sent to the counsel on record of petitioner, there can be no sufficient notice to speak of. Hence, the delay
in the filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot be taken against petitioner. Moreover, since the Court
of Appeals already issued a second Resolution, dated 29 March 1996, which superseded the earlier
resolution issued on 25 July 1995, and denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner, we believed that
the receipt of the former should be considered in determining the timeliness of the filing of the present
petition. Based on this, the petition before us was submitted on time.
After resolving the foregoing procedural issue, we shall now look into the merits of the case. For a more
logical presentation of the discussion we shall first consider the issue on the applicability of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur to the instant case. Thereafter, the first two assigned errors shall be tackled in relation
to the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." The
phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with
the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out
a plaintiff's prima faciecase, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an
explanation. 13 Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence,
in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the
defendant's want of care. 14
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common
knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of
negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of
some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. 15 It is grounded in the superior logic
of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may
be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. 16 Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in
conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not
create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. 17 Instead, it is considered as merely
evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. 18 It is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural
of convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing
specific proof of negligence. 19 In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof,
permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending
circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and to thereby
place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. 20 Still, before resort to the doctrine
may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the

defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff

responsible is eliminated. 21
In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the "control of instrumentality" which caused the
damage. 22Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. In order to
have the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or damage, must show a situation
where it is applicable, and must establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a
particular incident. 23
Medical malpractice 24 cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has
been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to
justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm. 25 The application of res ipsa loquitur in

medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a judicial function to determine whether a
certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a given inference. 26
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician
has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with
because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. 27 The reason is that the general rule on the
necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science,
and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone
familiar with the facts. 28 Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to
testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and
care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances,
and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. 29 Hence,
in cases where theres ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon
proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of
common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. 30 Where common knowledge and
experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been
exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and
why it occurred. 31 When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between
the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and
management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard
of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary
conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving of a foreign
object in the body of the patient after an operation, 32 injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body
which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, 33 removal of the wrong part of the body when another
part was intended, 34 knocking out a tooth while a patient's jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his
tonsils, 35 and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under the influence of anesthetic, during or
following an operation for appendicitis, 36 among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it does
not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to
the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or
ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the
circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is
able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional
care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been
exercised. 37 A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of
something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual
procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a
diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. 38 The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why
any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the
desired result. 39 Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the
desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished. 40 The real question, therefore, is
whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the
routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such
operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent
cause or causes of the untoward consequence. 41 If there was such extraneous interventions, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of
exculpation, if he could. 42
We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. As will hereinafter be explained, the
damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for
the application of res ipsa loquitur.
A case strikingly similar to the one before us is Voss vs. Bridwell, 43

where the Kansas Supreme Court in
applying theres ipsa loquitur stated:

The plaintiff herein submitted himself for a mastoid operation and delivered his person over
to the care, custody and control of his physician who had complete and exclusive control
over him, but the operation was never performed. At the time of submission he was
neurologically sound and physically fit in mind and body, but he suffered irreparable damage
and injury rendering him decerebrate and totally incapacitated. The injury was one which
does not ordinarily occur in the process of a mastoid operation or in the absence of
negligence in the administration of an anesthetic, and in the use and employment of an
endoctracheal tube. Ordinarily a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered
decerebrate as a consequence of administering such anesthesia in the absence of
negligence. Upon these facts and under these circumstances a layman would be able to say,
as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional
treatment were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been
exercised.
Here the plaintiff could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because he was
under the influence of anesthetics and unconscious, and the circumstances are such that the
true explanation of event is more accessible to the defendants than to the plaintiff for they
had the exclusive control of the instrumentalities of anesthesia.
Upon all the facts, conditions and circumstances alleged in Count II it is held that a cause of
action is stated under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 44
Indeed, the principles enunciated in the aforequoted case apply with equal force here. In the present case,
Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general surgery to be performed on
her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her person over to the care, custody and control of
private respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control over her. At the time of submission,
Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in
mind and body. However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of
cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she
went out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage,
which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder
operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not in the absence of negligence of someone in the
administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Normally, a person being put under
anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a consequence of administering such anesthesia if the proper
procedure was followed. Furthermore, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including
the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the physicians-
in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because she
was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious.
Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the
patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a
practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. Upon these facts and under
these circumstances the Court would be able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, if
negligence attended the management and care of the patient. Moreover, the liability of the physicians and
the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired results of an
operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment
was ever performed on Erlinda. Thus, upon all these initial determination a case is made out for the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Nonetheless, in holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case we are not saying that the
doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia, or to
any and all anesthesia cases. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to be
within the res ipsa loquitur coverage.
Having in mind the applicability of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and the presumption of negligence
allowed therein, the Court now comes to the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
private respondents were not negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase of the operation
and, if in the affirmative, whether the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Erlinda's comatose
condition. Corollary thereto, we shall also determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the
testimonies of the witnesses for the private respondents.

In sustaining the position of private respondents, the Court of Appeals relied on the testimonies of Dra.
Gutierrez, Dra. Calderon and Dr. Jamora. In giving weight to the testimony of Dra. Gutierrez, the Court of
Appeals rationalized that she was candid enough to admit that she experienced some difficulty in the
endotracheal intubation 45 of the patient and thus, cannot be said to be covering her negligence with
falsehood. The appellate court likewise opined that private respondents were able to show that the brain
damage sustained by Erlinda was not caused by the alleged faulty intubation but was due to the allergic
reaction of the patient to the drug Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal), a short-acting barbiturate, as testified on
by their expert witness, Dr. Jamora. On the other hand, the appellate court rejected the testimony of Dean
Herminda Cruz offered in favor of petitioners that the cause of the brain injury was traceable to the
wrongful insertion of the tube since the latter, being a nurse, was allegedly not knowledgeable in the
process of intubation. In so holding, the appellate court returned a verdict in favor of respondents
physicians and hospital and absolved them of any liability towards Erlinda and her family.
We disagree with the findings of the Court of Appeals. We hold that private respondents were unable to
disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the
proximate cause of her piteous condition.
In the instant case, the records are helpful in furnishing not only the logical scientific evidence of the
pathogenesis of the injury but also in providing the Court the legal nexus upon which liability is based. As
will be shown hereinafter, private respondents' own testimonies which are reflected in the transcript of
stenographic notes are replete of signposts indicative of their negligence in the care and management of
Erlinda.
With regard to Dra. Gutierrez, we find her negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase. As
borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. This fact was
attested to by Prof. Herminda Cruz, Dean of the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing and petitioner's
sister-in-law, who was in the operating room right beside the patient when the tragic event occurred.
Witness Cruz testified to this effect:
ATTY. PAJARES:
Q: In particular, what did Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez do, if any on the patient?
A: In particular, I could see that she was intubating the patient.
Q: Do you know what happened to that intubation process administered by

Dra. Gutierrez?
ATTY. ALCERA:
She will be incompetent Your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer if she knows.
A: As have said, I was with the patient, I was beside the stretcher holding the
left hand of the patient and all of a sudden heard some remarks coming from
Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez herself. She was saying "Ang hirap ma-intubate nito,
mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. PAJARES:
Q: From whom did you hear those words "lumalaki ang tiyan"?
A: From Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: After hearing the phrase "lumalaki ang tiyan," what did you notice on the
person of the patient?
A: I notice (sic) some bluish discoloration on the nailbeds of the left hand
where I was at.
Q: Where was Dr. Orlino Ho[s]aka then at that particular time?
A: I saw him approaching the patient during that time.
Q: When he approached the patient, what did he do, if any?
A: He made an order to call on the anesthesiologist in the person of Dr.

Calderon.
Q: Did Dr. Calderon, upon being called, arrive inside the operating room?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What did [s]he do, if any?
A: [S]he tried to intubate the patient.
Q: What happened to the patient?
A: When Dr. Calderon try (sic) to intubate the patient, after a while the
patient's nailbed became bluish and I saw the patient was placed in
trendelenburg position.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Do you know the reason why the patient was placed in that trendelenburg
position?
A: As far as I know, when a patient is in that position, there is a decrease of

blood supply to the brain. 46
xxx xxx xxx
The appellate court, however, disbelieved Dean Cruz's testimony in the trial court by declaring that:
A perusal of the standard nursing curriculum in our country will show that intubation is not
taught as part of nursing procedures and techniques. Indeed, we take judicial notice of the
fact that nurses do not, and cannot, intubate. Even on the assumption that she is fully
capable of determining whether or not a patient is properly intubated, witness Herminda
Cruz, admittedly, did not peep into the throat of the patient. (TSN, July 25, 1991, p. 13).
More importantly, there is no evidence that she ever auscultated the patient or that she
conducted any type of examination to check if the endotracheal tube was in its proper place,
and to determine the condition of the heart, lungs, and other organs. Thus, witness Cruz's
categorical statements that appellant Dra. Gutierrez failed to intubate the appellee Erlinda
Ramos and that it was Dra. Calderon who succeeded in doing so clearly suffer from lack of
sufficient factual bases. 47
In other words, what the Court of Appeals is trying to impress is that being a nurse, and considered a
layman in the process of intubation, witness Cruz is not competent to testify on whether or not the
intubation was a success.
We do not agree with the above reasoning of the appellate court. Although witness Cruz is not an
anesthesiologist, she can very well testify upon matters on which she is capable of observing such as, the
statements and acts of the physician and surgeon, external appearances, and manifest conditions which
are observable by any one. 48 This is precisely allowed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where the
testimony of expert witnesses is not required. It is the accepted rule that expert testimony is not necessary
for the proof of negligence in non-technical matters or those of which an ordinary person may be expected
to have knowledge, or where the lack of skill or want of care is so obvious as to render expert testimony
unnecessary. 49 We take judicial notice of the fact that anesthesia procedures have become so common,
that even an ordinary person can tell if it was administered properly. As such, it would not be too difficult to
tell if the tube was properly inserted. This kind of observation, we believe, does not require a medical
degree to be acceptable.
At any rate, without doubt, petitioner's witness, an experienced clinical nurse whose long experience and
scholarship led to her appointment as Dean of the Capitol Medical Center School at Nursing, was fully
capable of determining whether or not the intubation was a success. She had extensive clinical experience
starting as a staff nurse in Chicago, Illinois; staff nurse and clinical instructor in a teaching hospital, the
FEU-NRMF; Dean of the Laguna College of Nursing in San Pablo City; and then Dean of the Capitol Medical
Center School of Nursing. 50Reviewing witness Cruz' statements, we find that the same were delivered in a
straightforward manner, with the kind of detail, clarity, consistency and spontaneity which would have
been difficult to fabricate. With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied that she was able
to demonstrate through her testimony what truly transpired on that fateful day.
Most of all, her testimony was affirmed by no less than respondent Dra. Gutierrez who admitted that she
experienced difficulty in inserting the tube into Erlinda's trachea, to wit:
ATTY. LIGSAY:
Q: In this particular case, Doctora, while you were intubating at your first
attempt (sic), you did not immediately see the trachea?
DRA. GUTIERREZ:
A: Yes sir.
Q: Did you pull away the tube immediately?
A: You do not pull the . . .
Q: Did you or did you not?
A: I did not pull the tube.
Q: When you said "mahirap yata ito," what were you referring to?
A: "Mahirap yata itong i-intubate," that was the patient.
Q: So, you found some difficulty in inserting the tube?
A: Yes, because of (sic) my first attempt, I did not see right away. 51
Curiously in the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez made the haphazard defense that she encountered
hardship in the insertion of the tube in the trachea of Erlinda because it was positioned more anteriorly
(slightly deviated from the normal anatomy of a person) 52 making it harder to locate and, since Erlinda is
obese and has a short neck and protruding teeth, it made intubation even more difficult.
The argument does not convince us. If this was indeed observed, private respondents adduced no
evidence demonstrating that they proceeded to make a thorough assessment of Erlinda's airway, prior to
the induction of anesthesia, even if this would mean postponing the procedure. From their testimonies, it
appears that the observation was made only as an afterthought, as a means of defense.
The pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration of anesthesia is universally observed
to lessen the possibility of anesthetic accidents. Pre-operative evaluation and preparation for anesthesia
begins when the anesthesiologist reviews the patient's medical records and visits with the patient,
traditionally, the day before elective surgery. 53 It includes taking the patient's medical history, review of
current drug therapy, physical examination and interpretation of laboratory data. 54 The physical
examination performed by the anesthesiologist is directed primarily toward the central nervous system,
cardiovascular system, lungs and upper airway. 55 A thorough analysis of the patient's airway normally
involves investigating the following: cervical spine mobility, temporomandibular mobility, prominent
central incisors, diseased or artificial teeth, ability to visualize uvula and the thyromental distance. 56 Thus,
physical characteristics of the patient's upper airway that could make tracheal intubation difficult should
be studied. 57 Where the need arises, as when initial assessment indicates possible problems (such as the
alleged short neck and protruding teeth of Erlinda) a thorough examination of the patient's airway would
go a long way towards decreasing patient morbidity and mortality.
In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of
the operation itself, on 17 June 1985. Before this date, no prior consultations with, or pre-operative
evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. Until the day of the operation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez was
unaware of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. She was likewise not properly informed of the
possible difficulties she would face during the administration of anesthesia to Erlinda. Respondent Dra.
Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative
procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. The measures
cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the physician's centuries-
old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of her
negligence.
Respondent Dra. Gutierrez, however, attempts to gloss over this omission by playing around with the trial
court's ignorance of clinical procedure, hoping that she could get away with it. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez
tried to muddle the difference between an elective surgery and an emergency surgery just so her failure to
perform the required pre-operative evaluation would escape unnoticed. In her testimony she asserted:
ATTY. LIGSAY:
Q: Would you agree, Doctor, that it is good medical practice to see the patient
a day before so you can introduce yourself to establish good doctor-patient
relationship and gain the trust and confidence of the patient?
DRA. GUTIERREZ:
A: As I said in my previous statement, it depends on the operative procedure

of the anesthesiologist and in my case, with elective cases and normal cardio-
pulmonary clearance like that, I usually don't do it except on emergency and
on cases that have an abnormalities (sic). 58
However, the exact opposite is true. In an emergency procedure, there is hardly enough time available for
the fastidious demands of pre-operative procedure so that an anesthesiologist is able to see the patient
only a few minutes before surgery, if at all. Elective procedures, on the other hand, are operative
procedures that can wait for days, weeks or even months. Hence, in these cases, the anesthesiologist
possesses the luxury of time to be at the patient's beside to do a proper interview and clinical evaluation.
There is ample time to explain the method of anesthesia, the drugs to be used, and their possible hazards
for purposes of informed consent. Usually, the pre-operative assessment is conducted at least one day
before the intended surgery, when the patient is relaxed and cooperative.
Erlinda's case was elective and this was known to respondent Dra. Gutierrez. Thus, she had all the time to
make a thorough evaluation of Erlinda's case prior to the operation and prepare her for anesthesia.
However, she never saw the patient at the bedside. She herself admitted that she had seen petitioner only
in the operating room, and only on the actual date of the cholecystectomy. She negligently failed to take
advantage of this important opportunity. As such, her attempt to exculpate herself must fail.
Having established that respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to perform pre-operative evaluation of the patient
which, in turn, resulted to a wrongful intubation, we now determine if the faulty intubation is truly the
proximate cause of Erlinda's comatose condition.
Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view that the cerebral anoxia which led to Erlinda's coma
was due to bronchospasm 59 mediated by her allergic response to the drug, Thiopental Sodium, introduced
into her system. Towards this end, they presented Dr. Jamora, a Fellow of the Philippine College of
Physicians and Diplomate of the Philippine Specialty Board of Internal Medicine, who advanced private
respondents' theory that the oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic encephalopathy, 60 was due to an
unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate. We find the theory of private respondents
unacceptable.
First of all, Dr. Jamora cannot be considered an authority in the field of anesthesiology simply because he is
not an anesthesiologist. Since Dr. Jamora is a pulmonologist, he could not have been capable of properly
enlightening the court about anesthesia practice and procedure and their complications. Dr. Jamora is
likewise not an allergologist and could not therefore properly advance expert opinion on allergic-mediated
processes. Moreover, he is not a pharmacologist and, as such, could not have been capable, as an expert
would, of explaining to the court the pharmacologic and toxic effects of the supposed culprit, Thiopental
Sodium (Pentothal).
The inappropriateness and absurdity of accepting Dr. Jamora's testimony as an expert witness in the
anesthetic practice of Pentothal administration is further supported by his own admission that he
formulated his opinions on the drug not from the practical experience gained by a specialist or expert in
the administration and use of Sodium Pentothal on patients, but only from reading certain references, to
wit:
ATTY. LIGSAY:
Q: In your line of expertise on pulmonology, did you have any occasion to use
pentothal as a method of management?
DR. JAMORA:
A: We do it in conjunction with the anesthesiologist when they have to

intubate our patient.
Q: But not in particular when you practice pulmonology?
A: No.
Q: In other words, your knowledge about pentothal is based only on what you
have read from books and not by your own personal application of the
medicine pentothal?
A: Based on my personal experience also on pentothal.
Q: How many times have you used pentothal?
A: They used it on me. I went into bronchospasm during my appendectomy.
Q: And because they have used it on you and on account of your own personal
experience you feel that you can testify on pentothal here with medical
authority?
A: No. That is why I used references to support my claims. 61
An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly falls within the fields of
anesthesia, internal medicine-allergy, and clinical pharmacology. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy
belongs to the field of neurology. While admittedly, many bronchospastic-mediated pulmonary diseases
are within the expertise of pulmonary medicine, Dr. Jamora's field, the anesthetic drug-induced, allergic
mediated bronchospasm alleged in this case is within the disciplines of anesthesiology, allergology and
pharmacology. On the basis of the foregoing transcript, in which the pulmonologist himself admitted that
he could not testify about the drug with medical authority, it is clear that the appellate court erred in
giving weight to Dr. Jamora's testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium.
The provision in the rules of evidence 62

regarding expert witnesses states:
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.
Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject
matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or
by practical experience.63 Clearly, Dr. Jamora does not qualify as an expert witness based on the above
standard since he lacks the necessary knowledge, skill, and training in the field of anesthesiology. Oddly,
apart from submitting testimony from a specialist in the wrong field, private respondents' intentionally
avoided providing testimony by competent and independent experts in the proper areas.
Moreover, private respondents' theory, that Thiopental Sodium may have produced Erlinda's coma by
triggering an allergic mediated response, has no support in evidence. No evidence of stridor, skin
reactions, or wheezing some of the more common accompanying signs of an allergic reaction appears
on record. No laboratory data were ever presented to the court.
In any case, private respondents themselves admit that Thiopental induced, allergic-mediated
bronchospasm happens only very rarely. If courts were to accept private respondents' hypothesis without
supporting medical proof, and against the weight of available evidence, then every anesthetic accident
would be an act of God. Evidently, the Thiopental-allergy theory vigorously asserted by private
respondents was a mere afterthought. Such an explanation was advanced in order to advanced in order to
absolve them of any and all responsibility for the patient's condition.
In view of the evidence at hand, we are inclined to believe petitioners' stand that it was the faulty
intubation which was the proximate cause of Erlinda's comatose condition.
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. 64 An
injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually
causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably
probable consequence of the act or omission. 65 It is the dominant, moving or producing cause.
Applying the above definition in relation to the evidence at hand, faulty intubation is undeniably the
proximate cause which triggered the chain of events leading to Erlinda's brain damage and, ultimately, her
comatosed condition.
Private respondents themselves admitted in their testimony that the first intubation was a failure. This fact
was likewise observed by witness Cruz when she heard respondent Dra. Gutierrez remarked, "Ang hirap
ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan." Thereafter, witness Cruz noticed
abdominal distention on the body of Erlinda. The development of abdominal distention, together with
respiratory embarrassment indicates that the endotracheal tube entered the esophagus instead of the
respiratory tree. In other words, instead of the intended endotracheal intubation what actually took place
was an esophageal intubation. During intubation, such distention indicates that air has entered the
gastrointestinal tract through the esophagus instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the
esophagus would certainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which carries
oxygen is in the wrong place. That abdominal distention had been observed during the first intubation
suggests that the length of time utilized in inserting the endotracheal tube (up to the time the tube was
withdrawn for the second attempt) was fairly significant. Due to the delay in the delivery of oxygen in her
lungs Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis. 66 As stated in the testimony of Dr. Hosaka, the lack of oxygen
became apparent only after he noticed that the nailbeds of Erlinda were already blue. 67 However, private
respondents contend that a second intubation was executed on Erlinda and this one was successfully
done. We do not think so. No evidence exists on record, beyond private respondents' bare claims, which
supports the contention that the second intubation was successful. Assuming that the endotracheal tube
finally found its way into the proper orifice of the trachea, the same gave no guarantee of oxygen delivery,
the hallmark of a successful intubation. In fact, cyanosis was again observed immediately after the second
intubation. Proceeding from this event (cyanosis), it could not be claimed, as private respondents insist,
that the second intubation was accomplished. Even granting that the tube was successfully inserted during
the second attempt, it was obviously too late. As aptly explained by the trial court, Erlinda already suffered
brain damage as a result of the inadequate oxygenation of her brain for about four to five minutes. 68
The above conclusion is not without basis. Scientific studies point out that intubation problems are
responsible for one-third (1/3) of deaths and serious injuries associated with anesthesia. 69 Nevertheless,
ninety-eight percent (98%) or the vast majority of difficult intubations may be anticipated by performing a
thorough evaluation of the patient's airway prior to the operation. 70 As stated beforehand, respondent Dra.
Gutierrez failed to observe the proper pre-operative protocol which could have prevented this unfortunate
incident. Had appropriate diligence and reasonable care been used in the pre-operative evaluation,
respondent physician could have been much more prepared to meet the contingency brought about by the
perceived anatomic variations in the patient's neck and oral area, defects which would have been easily

overcome by a prior knowledge of those variations together with a change in technique. 71 In other words,
an experienced anesthesiologist, adequately alerted by a thorough pre-operative evaluation, would have
had little difficulty going around the short neck and protruding teeth. 72 Having failed to observe common
medical standards in pre-operative management and intubation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez' negligence
resulted in cerebral anoxia and eventual coma of Erlinda.
We now determine the responsibility of respondent Dr. Orlino Hosaka as the head of the surgical team. As
the so-called "captain of the ship," 73 it is the surgeon's responsibility to see to it that those under him
perform their task in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to
exercise the proper authority (as the "captain" of the operative team) in not determining if his
anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that
respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it
does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at
the same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's
operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the
anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus,
he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition.
We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular incident. The unique practice (among
private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting "consultants," 74 who are allegedly
not hospital employees, presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical
malpractice cases. However, the difficulty is only more apparent than real.
In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the
conduct of their work within the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for "consultant" slots, visiting or
attending, are required to submit proof of completion of residency, their educational qualifications;
generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most
cases, and references. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital
administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the
application. 75 This is particularly true with respondent hospital.
After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending consultant, he is normally required to attend
clinico-pathological conferences, conduct bedside rounds for clerks, interns and residents, moderate grand
rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities, for the privilege of being able to
maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. In addition
to these, the physician's performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on
the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics, and feedback from patients, nurses, interns and residents. A
consultant remiss in his duties, or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards
acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee, is normally politely terminated.
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
"consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital
asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the
right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with
the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control
test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now arises as to
whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner's condition. 76
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for
those of others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. 77 Such
responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of
a good father of the family to prevent damage.78 In other words, while the burden of proving negligence
rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents (parent, guardian,
teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent
physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of

supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar
nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180.
Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for
Erlinda's condition.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in accepting and relying on the
testimonies of the witnesses for the private respondents. Indeed, as shown by the above discussions,
private respondents were unable to rebut the presumption of negligence. Upon these disquisitions we hold
that private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 79 of the Civil Code.
We now come to the amount of damages due petitioners. The trial court awarded a total of P632,000.00
pesos (should be P616,000.00) in compensatory damages to the plaintiff, "subject to its being updated"
covering the period from 15 November 1985 up to 15 April 1992, based on monthly expenses for the care
of the patient estimated at P8,000.00.
At current levels, the P8000/monthly amount established by the trial court at the time of its decision would
be grossly inadequate to cover the actual costs of home-based care for a comatose individual. The
calculated amount was not even arrived at by looking at the actual cost of proper hospice care for the
patient. What it reflected were the actual expenses incurred and proved by the petitioners after they were
forced to bring home the patient to avoid mounting hospital bills.
And yet ideally, a comatose patient should remain in a hospital or be transferred to a hospice specializing
in the care of the chronically ill for the purpose of providing a proper milieu adequate to meet minimum
standards of care. In the instant case for instance, Erlinda has to be constantly turned from side to side to
prevent bedsores and hypostatic pneumonia. Feeding is done by nasogastric tube. Food preparation should
be normally made by a dietitian to provide her with the correct daily caloric requirements and vitamin
supplements. Furthermore, she has to be seen on a regular basis by a physical therapist to avoid muscle
atrophy, and by a pulmonary therapist to prevent the accumulation of secretions which can lead to
respiratory complications.
Given these considerations, the amount of actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence
should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of the care the family is
usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. However, the provisions of the Civil Code on
actual or compensatory damages present us with some difficulties.
Well-settled is the rule that actual damages which may be claimed by the plaintiff are those suffered by
him as he has duly proved. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate

compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury
suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated.
However, these provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case, where the resulting
injury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury, while certain
to occur, are difficult to predict.
In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly
respond to the injury caused, should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up
to the time of trial; and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not,
from the nature of the case, be made with certainty. 80 In other words, temperate damages can and should
be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual
and temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
As it would not be equitable and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice for
the victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments
to the compensatory damages previously awarded temperate damages are appropriate. The amount
given as temperate damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take into account the cost of
proper care.

In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient
who has remained in that condition for over a decade. Having premised our award for compensatory
damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would be now much more in
step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to
provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. They should
not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of
professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of
P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable. 81
In Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 82 this Court was confronted with a situation where the injury suffered
by the plaintiff would have led to expenses which were difficult to estimate because while they would have
been a direct result of the injury (amputation), and were certain to be incurred by the plaintiff, they were
likely to arise only in the future. We awarded P1,000,000.00 in moral damages in that case.
Describing the nature of the injury, the Court therein stated:
As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela underwent a traumatic amputation of her
left lower extremity at the distal left thigh just above the knee. Because of this, Valenzuela
will forever be deprived of the full ambulatory functions of her left extremity, even with the
use of state of the art prosthetic technology. Well beyond the period of hospitalization (which
was paid for by Li), she will be required to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due
to the shrinkage of the stump from the process of healing.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and months of physical and
occupational rehabilitation and therapy. During the lifetime, the prosthetic devise will have
to be replaced and readjusted to changes in the size of her lower limb effected by the
biological changes of middle-age, menopause and aging. Assuming she reaches menopause,
for example, the prosthetic will have to be adjusted to respond to the changes in bone
resulting from a precipitate decrease in calcium levels observed in the bones of all post-
menopausal women. In other words, the damage done to her would not only be permanent
and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes
which her body would normally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes, and
adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of
these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.
xxx xxx xxx
A prosthetic devise, however technologically advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount
of functional restoration of the motor functions of the lower limb. The sensory functions are
forever lost. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and physical
pain are inestimable.83
The injury suffered by Erlinda as a consequence of private respondents' negligence is certainly much more
serious than the amputation in the Valenzuela case.
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been in a comatose
state for over fourteen years now. The burden of care has so far been heroically shouldered by her
husband and children, who, in the intervening years have been deprived of the love of a wife and a
mother.
Meanwhile, the actual physical, emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually
impossible to quantify. Even the temperate damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner's
condition remains unchanged for the next ten years.
We recognized, in Valenzuela that a discussion of the victim's actual injury would not even scratch the
surface of the resulting moral damage because it would be highly speculative to estimate the amount of
emotional and moral pain, psychological damage and injury suffered by the victim or those actually
affected by the victim's condition. 84The husband and the children, all petitioners in this case, will have to
live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient's illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil.
They have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long term goals to
take into account their life with a comatose patient. They, not the respondents, are charged with the moral

responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real
one. For the foregoing reasons, an award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be appropriate.
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded.
Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at
P100,000.00 are likewise proper.
Our courts face unique difficulty in adjudicating medical negligence cases because physicians are not
insurers of life and, they rarely set out to intentionally cause injury or death to their patients. However,
intent is immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence exists and is proven, the same
automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the damage caused.
Established medical procedures and practices, though in constant flux are devised for the purpose of
preventing complications. A physician's experience with his patients would sometimes tempt him to
deviate from established community practices, and he may end a distinguished career using unorthodox
methods without incident. However, when failure to follow established procedure results in the evil
precisely sought to be averted by observance of the procedure and a nexus is made between the deviation
and the injury or damage, the physician would necessarily be called to account for it. In the case at bar,
the failure to observe pre-operative assessment protocol which would have influenced the intubation in a
salutary way was fatal to private respondents' case.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are hereby modified so as to
award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as
actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of
P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00
as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages
and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135644. September 17, 2001]
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES GONZALO and MATILDE
LABUNG-DEANG, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The petitioner in the case is the Government Service Insurance System (hereafter, GSIS).Having lost
the case in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, it now comes to this Court for redress.
At the onset, we state that the issue is not suability or whether GSIS may be sued despite the doctrine
of state immunity from suit, but liability, whether or not GSIS may be liable to pay damages to respondent
spouses given the applicable law and the circumstances of the case. [1]
The Case
The case is a petition[2] for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals [3]affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Angeles City [4] ordering GSIS to pay respondents Gonzalo (now
deceased)[5] and Matilde Labung-Deang (hereafter, spouses Deang) temperate damages, attorneys fees,
legal interests and costs of suit for the loss of their title to real property mortgaged to the GSIS.
The Facts
Sometime in December 1969, the spouses Deang obtained a housing loan from the GSIS in the
amount of eight thousand five hundred pesos (P8,500.00). Under the agreement, the loan was to mature
on December 23, 1979. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage constituted over the spouses
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14926-R issued by the Register of Deeds of Pampanga.

[6]
As required by the mortgage deed, the spouses Daeng deposited the owners duplicate copy of the title
with the GSIS.[7]
On January 19, 1979, eleven (11) months before the maturity of the loan, the spouses Deang settled
their debt with the GSIS[8] and requested for the release of the owners duplicate copy of the title since they
intended to secure a loan from a private lender and use the land covered by it as collateral security for the
loan of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) [9] which they applied for with one Milagros Runes. [10] They would
use the proceeds of the loan applied for the renovation of the spouses residential house and for business.
[11]
However, personnel of the GSIS were not able to release the owners duplicate of the title as it could
not be found despite diligent search. [12] As stated earlier, the spouses as mortgagors deposited the owners
duplicate copy of the title with the GSIS located at its office in San Fernando, Pampanga. [13]
Satisfied that the owners duplicate copy of the title was really lost, in 1979, GSIS commenced the
reconstitution proceedings with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the issuance of a new owners
copy of the same.[14]
On June 22, 1979, GSIS issued a certificate of release of mortgage. [15]
On June 26, 1979, after the completion of judicial proceedings, GSIS finally secured and released the
reconstituted copy of the owners duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14926-R to the spouses
Deang.[16]
On July 6, 1979, the spouses Deang filed with the Court of First Instance, Angeles City a complaint
against GSIS for damages, claiming that as result of the delay in releasing the duplicate copy of the owners
title, they were unable to secure a loan from Milagros Runes, the proceeds of which could have been used
in defraying the estimated cost of the renovation of their residential house and which could have been
invested in some profitable business undertaking.[17]
In its defense, GSIS explained that the owners duplicate copy of the title was released within a
reasonable time since it had to conduct standard pre-audit and post-audit procedures to verify if the
spouses Deangs account had been fully settled.[18]
On July 31, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision ruling for the spouses Deang. The trial court
reasoned that the loss of the owners duplicate copy of the title in the possession of GSIS as security for the
mortgage... without justifiable cause constitutes negligence on the part of the employee of GSIS who lost
it, making GSIS liable for damages.[19] We quote the dispositive portion of the decision:[20]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment ordering the GSIS:
a) To pay the plaintiffs-spouses the amount of P20,000.00 as temperate damages;
b) To pay plaintiffs-spouses the amount of P15,000.00 as attorneys fees;
c) To pay legal interest on the award in paragraphs a) and b) from the filing of the complaint; and,
d) To pay cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
On August 30, 1995, GSIS appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. [21]
On September 21, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision affirming the appealed
judgment, ruling: First, since government owned and controlled corporations (hereafter, GOCCs) whose
charters provide that they can sue and be sued have a legal personality separate and distinct from the
government, GSIS is not covered by Article 2180[22] of the Civil Code, and it is liable for damages caused by
their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Second, the GSIS is liable to pay a
reasonable amount of damages and attorneys fees, which the appellate court will not disturb. We quote
the dispositive portion:[23]
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed judgment, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.[24]
The Issue
Whether the GSIS, as a GOCC primarily performing governmental functions, is liable for a negligent act
of its employee acting within the scope of his assigned tasks. [25]
The Courts Ruling
We rule that the GSIS is liable for damages. We deny the petition for lack of merit.
GSIS, citing the sixth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code argues that as a GOCC, it falls within
the term State and cannot be held vicariously liable for negligence committed by its employee acting
within his functions.[26]
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business of industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts though a special agent, but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task was done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
Article 2176 shall be applicable.
xxx (underscoring ours)
The argument is untenable. The cited provision of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at
bar. However, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in citing it as the applicable law.Nonetheless,
the conclusion is the same. As heretofore stated, we find that GSIS is liable for damages.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals treated the obligation of GSIS as one springing fromquasi-
delict.[27] We do not agree. Article 2176 of the Civil Code defines quasi-delict as follows:
Whoever by act or omission causes damages to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter (underscoring ours).
Under the facts, there was a pre-existing contract between the parties. GSIS and the spouses Deang
had a loan agreement secured by a real estate mortgage. The duty to return the owners duplicate copy of
title arose as soon as the mortgage was released. [28] GSIS insists that it was under no obligation to return
the owners duplicate copy of the title immediately. This insistence is not warranted. Negligence is obvious
as the owners duplicate copy could not be returned to the owners.Thus, the more applicable provisions of
the Civil Code are:
Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages.
Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is
liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and
which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted xxx.
Since good faith is presumed and bad faith is a matter of fact which should be proved, [29] we shall treat
GSIS as a party who defaulted in its obligation to return the owners duplicate copy of the title. As an
obligor in good faith, GSIS is liable for all the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation. The inability of the spouses Deang to secure another loan and the damages they suffered
thereby has its roots in the failure of the GSIS to return the owners duplicate copy of the title.
We come now to the amount of damages. In a breach of contract, moral damages are not awarded if
the defendant is not shown to have acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. [30] The fact that the
complainant suffered economic hardship[31] or worries and mental anxiety[32] is not enough.
There is likewise no factual basis for an award of actual damages. Actual damages to be compensable
must be proven by clear evidence.[33] A court can not rely on speculation, conjecture or guess work as to
the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on actual proof. [34]
However, it is also apparent that the spouses Deang suffered financial damage because of the loss of
the owners duplicate copy of the title. Temperate damages may be granted.
Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory
damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
GSIS submits that there must be proof of pecuniary loss. This is untenable. The rationale
behindtemperate damages is precisely that from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss
cannot be offered. When the court is convinced that there has been such loss, the judge is empowered to
calculate moderate damages, rather than let the complainant suffer without redress from the defendants
wrongful act.[35]
The award of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) in temperate damages is reasonable considering
that GSIS spent for the reconstitution of the owners duplicate copy of the title.
Next, the attorneys fees. Attorneys fees which are granted as an item of damages are generally not
recoverable.[36] The award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule and counsels fees are not
to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The award of attorneys fees demands factual, legal and
equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture. [37]
We find no circumstance to justify the award of attorneys fees. We delete the same.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51240 with the MODIFICATION that award of attorneys fees is DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 152176. October 1, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROGER DELA CRUZ y DOE,appellant.
DECISION
This is an appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Calabanga, Camarines Sur, Branch
63, in Criminal Case No. RTC 99-323, finding appellant Roger Dela Cruz y Doe guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and to pay the costs.
On December 28, 1998, an Information for Murder was filed against Roger Dela Cruz y Doe. The
Information reads:
That on or about 10:00 oclock in the evening of August 29, 1998 at Bgy. Cabanbanan, Calabanga,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to kill, and with treachery, while armed with a deadly weapon - an icepick, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one, Mark Lester Resterio
Suarez, inflicting upon the latter one (1) fatal wound on his chest, which injury he sustained caused his
death, to the prejudice of his heirs.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Appellant was arraigned on June 30, 2000 and pleaded not guilty.[3] Trial on the merits thereafter
ensued.
Prosecution witness Joseph Sanchez testified that at 10:00 p.m. of August 29, 1998, he was walking
along Barangay Cabanbanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur together with his friends, Mark Lester Suarez and
Edgar delos Santos, on their way towards Barangay Cagsao, Calabanga, Camarines Sur. He stopped at a
store to buy a cigarette. Suddenly, he heard Mark shout that he was stabbed. When he looked over his
shoulder, he saw appellant, running away. Mark told him that it was appellant who stabbed him. Sanchez
ran to the house of Marks mother, Milagros Suarez, to tell her that Mark had been stabbed by Roger dela
Cruz. Together, he and Milagros rushed Mark to the Bicol Medical Center but he died on the way.
Milagros testified that she incurred P8,500.00 for the funeral expenses, P2,000.00 for the wake and
P750.00 for church rites.
Chief Tanod Felix delos Santos of Barangay Cabanbanan, who responded to the stabbing incident,
narrated that he was awakened by the shouts of Sanchez that somebody had been stabbed. He and the
other tanods went with Sanchez to the place where Mark was lying about fifteen meters from his
residence. He saw Marks wound on the right side of his chest and ordered somebody to call the police from
the Cabanbanan Kababayan Center. He asked Mark who stabbed him, and the latter answered, Roger.
After several days, he learned that Mark died.
Dr. Daniel Y. Tan, who performed the necropsy on the cadaver, found that the cause of the victims
death was hypovolemic shock secondary to mortal stab wound. He testified that the victim sustained a
stab wound which pierced into the right lobe of the liver, diaphragm, right lung lobe and right ventricle of
the heart. The wound was fatal.[4]
In his defense, appellant testified that on August 23, 1998, he went to Manila with his friend, Victorio
Delfin, to look for a job. Prior to that, he worked as operator of JBL Mobile Disco for one week before he left
for Manila. When he failed to obtain employment in Manila, he went to his sister and brother-in-laws house
at Barangay Buck Estate, Alfonso, Cavite on August 27, 1998. His mother also stayed in his sisters
house. On August 29, 1998, he started working as a construction worker in Sta. Lucia, Tagaytay. The
project lasted for three weeks. He looked for another job but he was not able to find one.
When appellant learned that a case was filed against him, he returned to Cabanbanan, Calabanga,
Camarines Sur. On June 9, 2000, he was arrested. He testified that he knew the victim Mark, who was his
friend.
Zenaida dela Cruz, appellants mother, and Victorio Delfin corroborated appellants testimony.
On October 13, 2001, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, accused Roger dela Cruz y Doe is hereby convicted of the crime of Murder as charged.
He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Mark Lester Suarez the
following damages:
1. P50,000.00 as civil liability for his death;
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Hence this appeal, based on the following assignment of errors:

I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES JOSEPH SANCHEZ AND FELIX DELOS SANTOS.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY ON
THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS THE ONE WHO STABBED THE VICTIM.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.[6]
We agree with the trial court that the anti mortem statement of the victim cannot be considered a
dying declaration as the same was not made with awareness of his impending death. In People v. Bautista,
et al.,[7] we held that it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief
of an impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying
declaration admissible.
Nonetheless, his declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae. A declaration is deemed part of
the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. [8] All these requisites are present in
this case. The principal act, i.e., the stabbing, was a startling occurrence. The declaration was made right
after the stabbing while the victim was still under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, without
any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating the appellant. The declaration concerns the one who
stabbed the victim. Thus, the trial court correctly appreciated the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Sanchez and Delos Santos on what the victim told them as part of the res gestae.
Basic is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, in the absence of any clear showing
that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which would have affected the result of the case. [9] None of the aforesaid exceptions obtains in the case at
bar.
We cannot sustain appellants defenses of denial and alibi. Denial is intrinsically a weak defense. It
must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability in order to be credible. Correspondingly, courts
view the defense of alibi with suspicion and caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable,
but also because it can be fabricated easily.[10]
In the case at bar, appellant claimed that on August 23, 1998, he went to Manila with Victorio Delfin to
look for a job. When he was not able to find any job, he went to his sisters house in Cavite on August 27,
1998. He started working as a construction worker in Sta. Lucia, Tagaytay on August 29, 1998. Appellant,
however admitted that it was his first time to look for a job outside Cabanbanan, Camarines Sur. On the
other hand, prosecution witness Sanchez testified that he saw appellant leaving the scene of the crime on
that fateful night. Time-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of prosecution witness and
the negative averments of appellant, the former indisputably deserve more credence and evidentiary
weight.[11]
Moreover, appellant fled from the scene of the crime after the stabbing incident. The trial judge had
issued a warrant for his arrest on February 17, 1999 but the authorities arrested him only on June 9,
2000. The flight of an accused is an indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind. [12] Indeed, the wicked man
flees though no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion. [13]
We agree with appellant that the crime committed was not murder. The qualifying circumstance of
treachery was not sufficiently established by the prosecution. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to
defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim.[14]
The prosecution witness did not see the actual stabbing of the victim. Therefore, there is no way of
determining on how the attack was initiated. In the same way that no testimony would prove that the
appellant contemplated upon the mode to insure the killing.
Therefore, the crime committed by appellant is homicide. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
homicide is punished by reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Appellant is entitled to the benefits under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and may thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum term
of which shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, namely, prision mayor. Thus, appellant may
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In keeping with prevailing jurisprudence, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity ex delicto. The moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00
is affirmed, there being proof that because of Mark Lesters death, his mother Milagros Suarez suffered
wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety and similar injury.
However, the trial court failed to award actual damages. To be entitled to such damages, it is
necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party. [15] In the case at bar, the
prosecution was able to substantiate the claim for funeral expenses in the amount of P8,500.00 with
receipts.[16]
In the case of People v. Villanueva,[17] it was held that when actual damages proven by receipts during
the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, as in the present case, the award of temperate damages for
P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount. This Court ratiocinated that it was
anomalous and unfair that the heirs of the victim who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages
amounting to less than P25,000.00 would be in a worse situation than those who might have presented no
receipts at all but would be entitled to P25,000.00 temperate damages.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calabanga,
Camarines Sur, Branch 63 in Criminal Case No. RTC 99-323, is MODIFIED. As modified, appellant Roger dela
Cruz y Doe is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Homicide and is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 180594

Appellee,
Present:
- versus -
CARPIO MORALES, J.,*
ISMAEL MOKAMMAD, CAIRODEN CHICO-NAZARIO,**
MOKAMMAD, HADJI AMER MOKAMMAD and Acting Chairperson,
TARATINGAN MOKAMMAD, VELASCO, JR.,
Accused, NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
ISMAEL MOKAMMAD and CAIRODEN
MOKAMMAD, Promulgated:
Appellants.
August 19, 2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the August 17, 2007 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00357 which affirmed with modification the decision [2]rendered by Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Lanao del Sur, finding appellants Ismael Mokammad and Cairoden Mokammad (appellants) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and three (3) counts of frustrated murder.
On September 25, 1996, an information[3] for the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder was filed
against appellants and other accused Hadji Amer Mokammad (Amer) and Taratingan Mokammad
(Taratingan). The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about August 3, 1996 at around 8:00 oclock in the morning at Barangay Tangkal,
Municipality of Tubaran, Province of Lanao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping each other with intent to kill, armed with assorted high powered firearms and by
means of treachery and evident premeditation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, ambush and shot upon (sic) Hadji Nasser Kasim [Amerol],
Olomoddin Abbas, Calauto [Radiamoda] Kamid, Lito Mabandos and Mizangkad Atal [Hadji
Yusoph], and hitting them on the different part[s] of their body, thereby inflicting upon said
Olommodin Abbas serious and fatal wounds which caused his instantaneous death, and
perform all the acts of execution which should have produce[d] the crime of murder as a
consequence with respect to victims Hadji Nasser Kasim [Amerol], Calauto [Radiamoda]
Kamid, Lito Mabandus and Mizangkad Atal [Hadji Yusoph], but nevertheless did not produce
it by r[e]ason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrators, that is, by the timely and
able medical attendance rendered to said victims which prevented their death.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 248 in relation to Article[s] 48 and 6 of the Revised
Penal Code with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery and a generic
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.[4]
When arraigned on June 3, 1997, appellants, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered their
respective pleas of not guilty. Accused Amer and Taratingan remained at large. Trial on the merits then
ensued.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summed up the prosecutions version as follows:
On August 3, 1996, about 7 oclock in the morning, the incumbent vice-mayor of

Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, Hadji Nasser Kasim [Amerol] was on his way to the Tangkal
Market. He was in the company of Calauto Radiamoda [Kamid], Mizangkad [Atal Hadji]
Yusoph, Bangcola Rasad and [Olomoddin] Hadji Abbas. Upon reaching the Poblacion of
Tangkal, a few meters from the market, the group was ambushed by four (4) persons. The
attackers, who were in a prostrate position, fired their armalite and carbine rifles at Hadji
Nasser and his companions. Hadji [Nasser] did not move from his position and, instead,
invoked the help of Allah. Hadji Nasser saw Olomoddin wounded by the gunfire (TSN, June 3,
1997, pp. 3-4, 6).
After finishing one magazine of bullets, the ambushers stood up to reload.The

ambushers stepped backwards and again opened fire while backing away. Hadji Nasser was
able to recognize the ambushers to be some of his relatives namely: the brothers, appellant
Ismael, Hadji Taratingan and Hadji Amer Mokammad and their nephew Cairoden (TSN, June
3, 1997, p. 5). During the second barrage of gunfire, Hadji Nasser was hit in his left thigh and
right ankle. Hadji [Nassers] other companions were likewise hit. [Calauto Radiamoda Kamid]
was hit in his thigh and left leg, Mizangkad [Atal Hadji] Yusoph in his right arm and Bangcola
Rasad in his thigh (TSN, June 3, 1997, pp. 6-7, 9). The ambushers stopped firing when they
were about ten (10) fathoms away from their victims. After the dust had settled, the
relatives of the victims came to their rescue and brought them to the hospital.[Olomoddin]
was found dead. Hadji Nasser was brought to the Iligan City MedicalCenter where he was
confined for ten (10) days (TSN, June 3, 1997, pp. 6-12, 6, 33-34; July 8, 1997, p. 21).
Mizangkad [Atal] Hadji Yusoph was treated at the Cagayan de Oro GeneralHospital for
five (5) days. Bangcola Madid Rasad was brought to the Iligan CityMedical Center where he
was confined for seven (7) days. [Calauto Radiamoda Kamid] was brought to the Mercy
Clinic and was confined therein for six (6) days; afterwards, he was transferred to a public
hospital where he was confined for twenty-six (26) days. [Calauto Radiamoda Kamid] was
not able to completely recover as he can no longer walk. He also needs assistance to stand
or sit. Olommodim was buried after Muslim rites were held (TSN, June 3, 1996, p. 8; July 8,
1997, pp. 21-22, 25-27).[5]

Appellants defense consists of denial and alibi. Ismael Mokammad (Ismael) averred that on August
3, 1996, from 5:00 a.m. until 8:00 a.m., he was at his farm pasturing his cows. He returned home at around
8:45 in the morning and stayed there the whole day. [6] According to Ismael, it would take 2 hours before he
could reach Tangkal, Tubaran.[7] Thus, he denied participation in the ambush staged against Vice Mayor
Hadji Nasser Kasim Amerol and the latters companions. Ismael added that on August 4, 1996, fifty (50)
persons, headed by a certain Linog, went to his house looking for the perpetrators of the ambush against
the Vice Mayor. The group destroyed his house; and thereafter brought him and Cairoden Mokammad
(Cairoden) to the residence of Mayor Lomiloda of Binidayan, Lanao del Sur. Subsequently, they were
brought to Lancaf, Marawi City, where they were detained for twenty-eight (28) days.[8]
Cairoden, for his part, also denied participation in the ambush. He claimed that he was in his house
in Cabasaran doing carpentry work. [9] He also confirmed Ismaels testimony on the incident that transpired
on August 4, 1996 that caused the destruction of the latters house.
Noraisa Ongca, Ismaels wife,[10] and Omairah Macarangat,[11] appellants neighbor, also took the
witness stand to corroborate appellants testimonies.
The trial court, however, disbelieved appellants defense and rendered a judgment of conviction. It
ruled that their defense of alibi could not prevail over the positive identification by the victims. It found
that there was no physical impossibility for appellants to be present at the scene of the crime. It added
that appellants admitted that the victims had no grudge against them; thus, the latters testimonies were
entitled to full faith and credit. The RTC, however, found that appellants could not be held liable for the
injuries sustained by Bangcola Rasad, because his name was not reflected in the information as one of the
victims who sustained injuries during the ambush; that there was no showing that Lito Mabandos, as
reflected in the information, and Bangcola Rasad refer to one and the same person. Thus, the RTC
absolved appellants from any liability arising from the injuries sustained by Bangcola Rasad. The RTC
further held that appellants guilt, as established, did not warrant their conviction for the complex crime of
murder with frustrated murder, but for separate crimes of murder and three (3) counts of frustrated
murder.
The RTC disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Ismael Mokammad and Cairoden Mokammad guilty of

the crimes lodged against them beyond reasonable doubt, they are hereby sentenced to
suffer the following:
1. For the crime of Murder (killing of Olomoddin Abbas), the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua;
2. As to the [offense] of Frustrated Murder:
a) The mortal wounds inflicted on Hadji Nasser Kasim Amerol, imprisonment of

8 years, 1 day to 10 years;
b) The mortal wounds inflicted on Radiamoda Calauto (Calauto [Radiamoda]

Kamid), imprisonment of 8 years, 1 day to 10 years; and
c) The wounds of Mizangkad [Atal] Hadji Yusoph, same imprisonment of 8

years, 1 day to 10 years.
3. Both accused are further ordered to pay the heirs of Olomoddin Hadji Abbas the
sum of P20,000.00 as actual damages; moral damages of P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Initially, this case was brought to this Court for review, docketed as G.R. No. 146104.
In their brief, appellants assigned the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
[I]
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ISMAEL

MOKAMMAD AND CAIRODEN MOKAMMAD GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIMES OF MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.[13]
The OSG, on behalf of the People, also filed its brief [14] with a recommendation for the modification
of the penalty. It asserted that the trial court correctly gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses and rejected appellants defense of alibi. The OSG insisted that appellants guilt for murder and
three (3) counts of frustrated murder was proven beyond reasonable doubt. It added that the maximum
penalty of ten (10) years imposed by the trial court was erroneous.The maximum penalty, it argued,
should be anywhere between fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17)
years and four months of Reclusion Temporal. Thus, it moved for the modification of the penalty.
On December 15, 2005, this Court transferred this case to the CA for intermediate review,
consistent with its ruling in People v. Mateo.[15]
On August 17, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming appellants conviction and
modifying the maximum penalty imposed upon them. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA,
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is dismissed and the Decision dated
20 September 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malabang, Lanao del Sur
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that the appellants shall each suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of [Prision] Mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal Medium, as maximum[,]
on three (3) counts, together with the accessory penalties imposed by law.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Appellants are now before the Court reiterating their contentions. Both the OSG and the Public
Attorney's Office, counsel for appellants, replicated the arguments in their respective briefs filed during the
pendency of this case for review and prior to its transfer to the CA. Essentially, appellants dispute the
surviving victims identification of them as among the perpetrators of the ambush. They argue that, in a
surprise attack, positive identification is highly impossible. The normal tendency of the persons attacked is
to seek cover, and not to look at the perpetrators. They further contend that the testimonies of the victims
were incredible and were pure concoctions; and, thus, insufficient to establish appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
After a thorough evaluation and scrutiny of the evidence on record, we arrive at the conclusion that
the guilt of appellants was established beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellants were positively identified by three (3) of the surviving victims as among the perpetrators
of the ambush against them. Both the trial court and the appellate court found their testimonies credible. It
is doctrinal that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, which could reverse a judgment of
conviction. In fact, in some instances, such findings are even accorded finality. This is so because the
assignment of value to a witness testimony is essentially the domain of the trial court, not to mention that
it is the trial judge who has the direct opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness on the stand, thus
providing him unique facility in determining whether or not to accord credence to the testimony or whether
the witness is telling the truth or not.[17]
This Court is not the proper forum from which to secure a re-evaluation of factual issues, except
only where the factual findings of the trial court do not find support in the evidence on record or where the
judgment appealed from was based on a misapprehension of facts. [18] None of the exceptions obtains in
this case; thus, we find no compelling reason to depart from this rule.
The alibi offered by appellants does not deserve credence. To be believed, an alibi must be
supported by the most convincing evidence, as it is an inherently weak, though paradoxically volatile, if
allowed to go unchecked, human argument that can be easily fabricated to suit the ends of those who seek
its recourse. [19]
We agree with the courts below that the alibi resorted to by appellants is worthless in the face of
the positive identification by the victims. The surviving victims were found not to have any reason to
falsely testify against appellants.Admittedly, the surviving victims had no grudge against appellants. It is
unnatural for victims interested in vindicating a crime to accuse somebody other than the real
culprits. Human nature tells us that the aggrieved parties would want the real culprits punished, and not
accept a mere scapegoat to take the rap for the real malefactors. [20]
As aptly said by the RTC:

[T]he parties have all admitted in open court that they have no grudge against each
other. Hence, there is no reason why private complainants should point to the accused as
the culprits if the latter were not the perpetrators of the crime. In a very recent ruling of the
Highest Tribunal, it held that time and again, proof of motive is not indispensable to
conviction especially if the accused has been positively identified by an [eyewitness] and his
participation therein has been definitely established.
The victims would have no credible reason to point to the accused as the culprits if it
is not the truth. The Court assiduously scrutinized the records to find out if the complainants
were actuated by improper motives. There is none. Where there is nothing to indicate that a
principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is
that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. [21]
Likewise, for alibi to prosper, an accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at
the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. [22] Apart from testifying that they were in their respective
houses in the morning of August 3, 1996, appellants were unable to show that it was physically impossible
for them to be at the scene of the crime. Their respective houses were only an hours drive away from the
scene of the crime. We, therefore, sustain the RTC and the CA in ruling that no physical impossibility
existed for appellants to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
Appellants alibi was further demolished by the fact that it was corroborated by their relatives and friends
who may not have been impartial witnesses. Thus, in the light of the positive identification of appellants as
among the perpetrators of the crime, their defense of alibi and denial cannot be sustained.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that between the categorical statements of the
prosecution witnesses, on one hand, and the bare denial of appellants, on the other, the former must
perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative one, especially when it comes
from the mouth of credible witnesses. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are considered with
suspicion and always received with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable, but
also because they are easily fabricated and concocted. [23]Accordingly, we affirm the RTC and the CA in
giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the surviving victims.
This Court also agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance. As
we have consistently ruled, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to
ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might
make. Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely: (a) the employment of means of
execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or
method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. [24]
In the case at bar, the attack on the victim was deliberate, sudden and unexpected. Appellants,
surreptitiously and without warning, fired at the victims who were at that time unarmed and completely
unaware of any impending danger to their lives. They had no opportunity to offer any defense at all
against the surprise attack by appellants and their co-accused with armalite and carbine rifles. All these
indicate that appellants employed means and methods that tended directly and specially to ensure the
execution of the offense without risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victims might
make. Thus, treachery was correctly appreciated as a circumstance to qualify the crime to murder.
This Court notes that the information filed with the RTC was for the complex crime of murder with
frustrated murder. Evidence on record, however, established that the injuries sustained by the victims
were the consequences of volleys of gunshots.Thus, the murder and each act of frustrated murder should
have been charged in separate informations because they were not covered by Article 48 [25] of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).
Nevertheless, appellants did not, within the prescribed period, file a motion to quash the
information on the ground of duplicity. They are, therefore, deemed to have waived the defect in the
information. It is axiomatic that when an accused fails, before arraignment, to move for the quashal of
such information, and goes to trial thereunder, he thereby waives the objection, and may be found guilty
of as many offenses as those charged in the information and proved during the trial. [26] Thus, appellants
conviction for murder and three (3) counts of frustrated murder cannot be considered a reversible error.
Under Article 248[27] of the RPC, as amended, the penalty imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed on
appellants is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2,[28] of the RPC. The prison term
imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the CA for the death of Olommodin Abbas is, therefore, correct.
We also affirm the CAs modification of the penalty imposed for frustrated murder from 8 years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Under
Article 61, paragraph 2,[29] of the RPC, the penalty for frustrated murder is one degree lower than reclusion

perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal. Reclusion temporal has a range of 12 years and 1 day to
20 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be
taken from reclusion temporal, the penalty for the crime taking into account any modifying circumstances
in the commission of the crime. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full
range of prision mayor which is one degree lower than reclusion temporal.[30] Since there is no modifying
circumstance in the commission of the frustrated murder, an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is appropriate for the frustrated murder under the facts of this case.
Thus, we sustain the penalty for frustrated murder as modified by the CA.
And now, the award of damages. The RTC awarded, and the CA affirmed, the award of P20,000.00
as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, andP20,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of
Olommodin Abbas.
When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for
the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages;
(5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. [31]
In murder, the grant of civil indemnity, which has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00,
requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of an accused's
responsibility therefor.[32] Thus, the heirs of Olomoddin Abbas should be awarded civil indemnity
of P50,000.00.
This Court sustains the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Olomoddin Abbas.
Moral damages are awarded in view of the violent death of the victim. These do not require allegation and
proof of the emotional sufferings of the heirs. [33]
Likewise, the award of exemplary damages is warranted when the commission of the offense is
attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, [34] as in this case. Accordingly,
we sustain the RTC for awarding exemplary damages to the heirs, but we increase the award
to P30,000.00.
However, the award of P20,000.00 as actual damages should be deleted as the prosecution failed to
present any receipt to substantiate its claim. In lieu of actual damages for funeral and burial expenses, we
award the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages since it cannot be denied that the heirs suffered
some pecuniary loss as a result of the death of Olomoddin Abbas.
Similarly, the surviving victims are entitled to temperate, moral and exemplary damages.
Indisputably, the surviving victims were hospitalized and operated on. They, however, failed to
present any receipt for their hospitalization expenses. Nevertheless, it could not be denied that they
suffered pecuniary loss; thus, we deem it prudent to award P25,000.00 to each of the surviving victims, as
temperate damages.
The surviving victims are also entitled to moral damages which this Court hereby awards in the
amount of P40,000.00 to each of them. Ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that the
wounds inflicted upon the surviving victims would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious
anxiety, moral shock, and similar injuries. Finally, the award in the amount of P20,000.00 each, as
exemplary damages, is also in order considering that the crime was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.[35]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00357 is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS. Appellants Ismael Mokammad and Cairoden
Mokammad are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellants are also ordered to jointly and severally pay the heirs of
Olomoddin Abbas the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, andP30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Ismael Mokammad and Cairoden Mokammad are also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three (3) counts of FRUSTRATED MURDER and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, on each count, with all the accessory penalties imposed by
law. Appellants are further ordered to jointly and severally pay each of the surviving victims Hadji Nasser
Kasim Amerol, Calauto Radiamoda Kamid and Mizangkad Atal Hadji Yusoph P25,000.00 as temperate
damages, P40,000.00 as moral damages, andP20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES (ART. 2226-2228)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138739. July 6, 2000]
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Spouses VICENTE and MA. SUMILANG DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When a demurrer to evidence granted by a trial court is reversed on appeal, the reviewing court
cannot remand the case for further proceedings. Rather, it should render judgment on the basis of the
evidence proffered by the plaintiff. Inasmuch as defendants in the present case admitted the due
execution of the Promissory Note both in their Answer and during the pretrial, the appellate court should
have rendered judgment on the bases of that Note and on the other pieces of evidence adduced during the
trial.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the December 9, 1997 Decision[1]and the May 3, 1999
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 47737. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed order (dated November 4, 1994) of the Regional Trial
Court (Branch XIV) in the City of Manila in Civil Case No. 93-66507 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let
the records of this case be remanded to the courta quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to
costs.[3]
The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration. [4]
The Facts
The facts of this case are undisputed. On March 2, 1991, Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del
Rosario (herein respondents), jointly and severally executed, signed and delivered in favor of Radiowealth
Finance Company (herein petitioner), a Promissory Note [5] for P138,948. Pertinent provisions of the
Promissory Note read:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, on or before the date listed below, I/We promise to pay jointly and
severally Radiowealth Finance Co. or order the sum of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT Pesos (P138,948.00) without need of notice or demand, in installments as follows:
P11,579.00 payable for 12 consecutive months starting on ________ 19__ until the amount
of P11,579.00 is fully paid. Each installment shall be due every ____ day of each month. A late
payment penalty charge of two and a half (2.5%) percent per month shall be added to each unpaid
installment from due date thereof until fully paid.
xxxxxxxxx
It is hereby agreed that if default be made in the payment of any of the installments or late payment
charges thereon as and when the same becomes due and payable as specified above, the total principal
sum then remaining unpaid, together with the agreed late payment charges thereon, shall at once become
due and payable without need of notice or demand.
xxxxxxxxx
If any amount due on this Note is not paid at its maturity and this Note is placed in the hands of an
attorney or collection agency for collection, I/We jointly and severally agree to pay, in addition to the
aggregate of the principal amount and interest due, a sum equivalent to ten (10%) per cent thereof as
attorneys and/or collection fees, in case no legal action is filed, otherwise, the sum will be equivalent to
twenty-five (25%) percent of the amount due which shall not in any case be less than FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P500.00) plus the cost of suit and other litigation expenses and, in addition, a further sum of ten
per cent (10%) of said amount which in no case shall be less than FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00), as and
for liquidated damages.[6]
Thereafter, respondents defaulted on the monthly installments. Despite repeated demands, they failed
to pay their obligations under their Promissory Note.
On June 7, 1993, petitioner filed a Complaint [7] for the collection of a sum of money before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 14.[8] During the trial, Jasmer Famatico, the credit and collection officer of
petitioner, presented in evidence the respondents check payments, the demand letter dated July 12, 1991,
the customers ledger card for the respondents, another demand letter and Metropolitan Bank dishonor
slips. Famatico admitted that he did not have personal knowledge of the transaction or the execution of
any of these pieces of documentary evidence, which had merely been endorsed to him.
On July 4, 1994, the trial court issued an Order terminating the presentation of evidence for the
petitioner.[9] Thus, the latter formally offered its evidence and exhibits and rested its case on July 5, 1994.
Respondents filed on July 29, 1994 a Demurrer to Evidence [10] for alleged lack of cause of action. On
November 4, 1994, the trial court dismissed [11] the complaint for failure of petitioner to substantiate its
claims, the evidence it had presented being merely hearsay.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Hence, this recourse.[12]
According to the appellate court, the judicial admissions of respondents established their indebtedness
to the petitioner, on the grounds that they admitted the due execution of the Promissory Note, and that
their only defense was the absence of an agreement on when the installment payments were to
begin. Indeed, during the pretrial, they admitted the genuineness not only of the Promissory Note, but also
of the demand letter dated July 12, 1991. Even if the petitioners witness had no personal knowledge of
these documents, they would still be admissible if the purpose for which [they are] produced is merely to
establish the fact that the statement or document was in fact made or to show its tenor[,] and such fact or
tenor is of independent relevance.
Besides, Articles 19 and 22 of the Civil Code require that every person must -- in the exercise of rights
and in the performance of duties -- act with justice, give all else their due, and observe honesty and good
faith. Further, the rules on evidence are to be liberally construed in order to promote their objective and to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of an action.
Issue
The petitioner raises this lone issue:
The Honorable Court of Appeals patently erred in ordering the remand of this case to the trial court instead
of rendering judgment on the basis of petitioners evidence. [13]
For an orderly discussion, we shall divide the issue into two parts: (a) legal effect of the Demurrer to
Evidence, and (b) the date when the obligation became due and demandable.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has merit. While the CA correctly reversed the trial court, it erred in remanding the case
"for further proceedings."
Consequences of a Reversal, on Appeal, of a Demurrer to Evidence
Petitioner contends that if a demurrer to evidence is reversed on appeal, the defendant should be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence, and the appellate court should render judgment on

the basis of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. A remand to the trial court "for further proceedings"
would be an outright defiance of Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
On the other hand, respondents argue that the petitioner was not necessarily entitled to its claim,
simply on the ground that they lost their right to present evidence in support of their defense when the
Demurrer to Evidence was reversed on appeal. They stress that the CA merely found them indebted to
petitioner, but was silent on when their obligation became due and demandable.
The old Rule 35 of the Rules of Court was reworded under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules, but the
consequence on appeal of a demurrer to evidence was not changed. As amended, the pertinent provision
of Rule 33 reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.[14]
Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v.

Javellana[15] pronounced:
The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is permitted, without
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal (i.e.,
demur to the plaintiffs evidence) on the ground that upon the facts as thus established and the applicable
law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that
plaintiffs evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still
remains before the trial court which should then proceed to hear and receive the defendants evidence so
that all the facts and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication
as well as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine is but in line with the
established procedural precepts in the conduct of trials that the trial court liberally receive all proffered
evidence at the trial to enable it to render its decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record, thus
assuring that the appellate courts upon appeal have all the material before them necessary to make a
correct judgment, and avoiding the need of remanding the case for retrial or reception of improperly
excluded evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still another appeal, with all the concomitant
delays. The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that if his demurrer is granted by the
trial court, and the order of dismissal isreversed on appeal, the movant losses his right to present evidence
in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiffs case
and evidence. In such event, the appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to
render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiffs evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiffs evidence retain the right to
present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but
on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the
defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. [16] The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve
the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged
litigations.[17]
In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on respondents demurrer to evidence, dismissed the
Complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the
appellate court reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the disputed
pieces of evidence had in fact been admitted by defendants.
Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA should have rendered judgment on the
basis of the evidence submitted by the petitioner. While the appellate court correctly ruled that the
documentary evidence submitted by the [petitioner] should have been allowed and appreciated xxx, and
that the petitioner presented quite a number of documentary exhibits xxx enumerated in the appealed
order,[18] we agree with petitioner that the CA had sufficient evidence on record to decide the collection
suit. A remand is not only frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on the basis of the
facts on record.
Due and Demandable Obligation

Petitioner claims that respondents are liable for the whole amount of their debt and the interest
thereon, after they defaulted on the monthly installments.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the installments were not yet due and
demandable. Petitioner had allegedly allowed them to apply their promotion services for its financing
business as payment of the Promissory Note. This was supposedly evidenced by the blank space left for
the date on which the installments should have commenced. [19] In other words, respondents theorize that
the action for immediate enforcement of their obligation is premature because its fulfillment is dependent
on the sole will of the debtor.Hence, they consider that the proper court should first fix a period for
payment, pursuant to Articles 1180 and 1197 of the Civil Code.
This contention is untenable. The act of leaving blank the due date of the first installment did not
necessarily mean that the debtors were allowed to pay as and when they could. If this was the intention of
the parties, they should have so indicated in the Promissory Note. However, it did not reflect any such
intention.
On the contrary, the Note expressly stipulated that the debt should be amortized monthly in
installments of P11,579 for twelve consecutive months. While the specific date on which each installment
would be due was left blank, the Note clearly provided that each installment should be payable each
month.
Furthermore, it also provided for an acceleration clause and a late payment penalty, both of which
showed the intention of the parties that the installments should be paid at a definite date. Had they
intended that the debtors could pay as and when they could, there would have been no need for these two
clauses.
Verily, the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties manifest their intention and
knowledge that the monthly installments would be due and demandable each month. [20] In this case, the
conclusion that the installments had already became due and demandable is bolstered by the fact that
respondents started paying installments on the Promissory Note, even if the checks were dishonored by
their drawee bank. We are convinced neither by their avowals that the obligation had not yet matured nor
by their claim that a period for payment should be fixed by a court.
Convincingly, petitioner has established not only a cause of action against the respondents, but also a
due and demandable obligation. The obligation of the respondents had matured and they clearly defaulted
when their checks bounced. Per the acceleration clause, the whole debt became due one month (April 2,
1991) after the date of the Note because the check representing their first installment bounced.
As for the disputed documents submitted by the petitioner, the CA ruling in favor of their admissibility,
which was not challenged by the respondents, stands. A party who did not appeal cannot obtain
affirmative relief other than that granted in the appealed decision. [21]
It should be stressed that respondents do not contest the amount of the principal obligation. Their
liability as expressly stated in the Promissory Note and found by the CA isP13[8],948.00[22] which is payable
in twelve (12) installments at P11,579.00 a month for twelve (12) consecutive months. As correctly found
by the CA, the "ambiguity" in the Promissory Note is clearly attributable to human error. [23]
Petitioner, in its Complaint, prayed for 14% interest per annum from May 6, 1993 until fully paid. We
disagree. The Note already stipulated a late payment penalty of 2.5 percent monthly to be added to each
unpaid installment until fully paid. Payment of interest was not expressly stipulated in the Note. Thus, it
should be deemed included in such penalty.
In addition, the Note also provided that the debtors would be liable for attorneys fees equivalent to 25
percent of the amount due in case a legal action was instituted and 10 percent of the same amount as
liquidated damages. Liquidated damages, however, should no longer be imposed for being
unconscionable.[24] Such damages should also be deemed included in the 2.5 percent monthly
penalty. Furthermore, we hold that petitioner is entitled to attorneys fees, but only in a sum equal to 10
percent of the amount due which we deem reasonable under the proven facts. [25]
The Court deems it improper to discuss respondents' claim for moral and other damages. Not having
appealed the CA Decision, they are not entitled to affirmative relief, as already explained earlier. [26]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is MODIFIED in that the remand is SET
ASIDE and respondents are ordered TO PAY P138,948, plus 2.5 percent penalty charge per month
beginning April 2, 1991 until fully paid, and 10 percent of the amount due as attorneys fees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
FILINVEST LAND, INC., G.R. No.138980
P e t i t i o n e r,
Present:
PUNO,
- versus - Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA and
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, and PACIFIC EQUIPMENT
CORPORATION,
R e s p o n d e n t s.
Promulgated:
September 20, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 27 May
1999 affirming the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 65, [2] of the complaint for
damages filed by Filinvest Land, Inc. (Filinvest) against herein private respondents Pacific Equipment
Corporation (Pecorp) and Philippine American General Insurance Company.
The essential facts of the case, as recounted by the trial court, are as follows:
On 26 April 1978, Filinvest Land, Inc. (FILINVEST, for brevity), a corporation engaged
in the development and sale of residential subdivisions, awarded to defendant Pacific
Equipment Corporation (PACIFIC, for brevity) the development of its residential subdivisions
consisting of two (2) parcels of land located at Payatas, Quezon City, the terms and
conditions of which are contained in an Agreement. (Annex A, Complaint). To guarantee its
faithful compliance and pursuant to the agreement, defendant Pacific posted two (2) Surety
Bonds in favor of plaintiff which were issued by defendant Philippine American General
Insurance (PHILAMGEN, for brevity). (Annexes B and C, Complaint).
Notwithstanding three extensions granted by plaintiff to defendant Pacific, the latter

failed to finish the contracted works. (Annexes G, I and K, Complaint). On 16 October 1979,
plaintiff wrote defendant Pacific advising the latter of its intention to takeover the project
and to hold said defendant liable for all damages which it had incurred and will incur to finish
the project. (Annex L, Complaint).
On 26 October 1979, plaintiff submitted its claim against defendant Philamgen under
its performance and guarantee bond (Annex M, Complaint) but Philamgen refused to
acknowledge its liability for the simple reason that its principal, defendant Pacific, refused to
acknowledge liability therefore. Hence, this action.
In defense, defendant Pacific claims that its failure to finish the contracted work was
due to inclement weather and the fact that several items of finished work and change order
which plaintiff refused to accept and pay for caused the disruption of work. Since the
contractual relation between plaintiff and defendant Pacific created a reciprocal obligation,
the failure of the plaintiff to pay its progressing bills estops it from demanding fulfillment of
what is incumbent upon defendant Pacific. The acquiescence by plaintiff in granting three
extensions to defendant Pacific is likewise a waiver of the formers right to claim any
damages for the delay. Further, the unilateral and voluntary action of plaintiff in preventing
defendant Pacific from completing the work has relieved the latter from the obligation of
completing the same.
On the other hand, Philamgen contends that the various amendments made on the
principal contract and the deviations in the implementation thereof which were resorted to
by plaintiff and co-defendant Pacific without its (defendant Philamgens) written consent
thereto, have automatically released the latter from any or all liability within the purview
and contemplation of the coverage of the surety bonds it has issued. Upon agreement of the
parties to appoint a commissioner to assist the court in resolving the issues confronting the
parties, on 7 July 1981, an order was issued by then Presiding Judge Segundo M. Zosa
naming Architect Antonio Dimalanta as Court Commissioner from among the nominees
submitted by the parties to conduct an ocular inspection and to determine the amount of
work accomplished by the defendant Pacific and the amount of work done by plaintiff to
complete the project.
On 28 November 1984, the Court received the findings made by the Court
Commissioner. In arriving at his findings, the Commissioner used the construction
documents pertaining to the project as basis. According to him, no better basis in the work
done or undone could be made other than the contract billings and payments made by both
parties as there was no proper procedure followed in terminating the contract, lack of
inventory of work accomplished, absence of appropriate record of work progress (logbook)
and inadequate documentation and system of construction management.
Based on the billings of defendant Pacific and the payments made by plaintiff, the
work accomplished by the former amounted to P11,788,282.40 with the exception of the last
billing (which was not acted upon or processed by plaintiff) in the amount of P844,396.42.
The total amount of work left to be accomplished by plaintiff was based on the original
contract amount less value of work accomplished by defendant Pacific in the amount
of P681,717.58 (12,470,000-11,788,282.42).
As regards the alleged repairs made by plaintiff on the construction deficiencies, the
Court Commissioner found no sufficient basis to justify the same. On the other hand, he
found the additional work done by defendant Pacific in the amount of P477,000.00 to be in
order.
On 01 April 1985, plaintiff filed its objections to the Commissioners Resolution on the
following grounds:
a) Failure of the commissioner to conduct a joint survey which according to

the latter is indispensable to arrive at an equitable and fair resolution of the issues between
the parties;

b) The cost estimates of the commissioner were based on pure conjectures
and contrary to the evidence; and,
c) The commissioner made conclusions of law which were beyond his

assignment or capabilities.
In its comment, defendant Pacific alleged that the failure to conduct joint survey was
due to plaintiffs refusal to cooperate. In fact, it was defendant Pacific who initiated the idea
of conducting a joint survey and inventory dating back 27 November 1983. And even
assuming that a joint survey were conducted, it would have been an exercise in futility
because all physical traces of the actual conditions then obtaining at the time relevant to
the case had already been obliterated by plaintiff.
On 15 August 1990, a Motion for Judgment Based on the Commissioners Resolution

was filed by defendant Pacific.
On 11 October 1990, plaintiff filed its opposition thereto which was but a rehash of
objections to the commissioners report earlier filed by said plaintiff. [3]
On the basis of the commissioners report, the trial court dismissed Filinvests complaint as well as
Pecorps counterclaim. It held:
In resolving this case, the court observes that the appointment of a Commissioner
was a joint undertaking among the parties. The findings of facts of the Commissioner should
therefore not only be conclusive but final among the parties. The court therefore agrees with
the commissioners findings with respect to
1. Cost to repair deficiency or defect P532,324.02
2. Unpaid balance of work done by defendant - P1,939,191.67
3. Additional work/change order (due to defendant) P475,000.00
The unpaid balance due defendant therefore is P1,939,191.67. To this amount should
be added additional work performed by defendant at plaintiffs instance in the sum
of P475,000.00. And from this total of P2,414,191.67 should be deducted the sum
of P532,324.01 which is the cost to repair the deficiency or defect in the work done by
defendant. The commissioner arrived at the figure of P532,324.01 by getting the average
between plaintiffs claim ofP758,080.37 and defendants allegation of P306,567.67. The
amount due to defendant per the commissioners report is therefore P1,881,867.66.
Although the said amount of P1,881,867.66 would be owing to defendant Pacific, the
fact remains that said defendant was in delay since April 25, 1979. The third extension
agreement of September 15, 1979 is very clear in this regard. The pertinent paragraphs
read:
a) You will complete all the unfinished works not later than Oct. 15, 1979. It
is agreed and understood that this date shall DEFINITELY be the LAST and

FINAL extension & there will be no further extension for any cause
whatsoever.
b) We are willing to waive all penalties for delay which have accrued since
April 25, 1979 provided that you are able to finish all the items of the
contracted works as per revised CPM; otherwise you shall continue to be
liable to pay the penalty up to the time that all the contracted works shall
have been actually finished, in addition to other damages which we may
suffer by reason of the delays incurred.
Defendant Pacific therefore became liable for delay when it did not finish the project on the
date agreed on October 15, 1979. The court however, finds the claim of P3,990,000.00 in
the form of penalty by reason of delay (P15,000.00/day from April 25, 1979 to Jan. 15, 1980)
to be excessive. A forfeiture of the amount due defendant from plaintiff appears to be a
reasonable penalty for the delay in finishing the project considering the amount of work
already performed and the fact that plaintiff consented to three prior extensions.
The foregoing considered, this case is dismissed. The counterclaim is likewise dismissed.
No Costs.[4]
The Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision, affirmed the same.
Hence, the instant petition grounded solely on the issue of whether or not the liquidated damages
agreed upon by the parties should be reduced considering that: (a) time is of the essence of the contract;
(b) the liquidated damages was fixed by the parties to serve not only as penalty in case Pecorp fails to
fulfill its obligation on time, but also as indemnity for actual and anticipated damages which Filinvest may
suffer by reason of such failure; and (c) the total liquidated damages sought is only 32% of the total
contract price, and the same was freely and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties.
At the outset, it should be stressed that as only the issue of liquidated damages has been elevated
to this Court, petitioner Filinvest is deemed to have acquiesced to the other matters taken up by the courts
below. Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court states in no uncertain terms that this Courts
jurisdiction in petitions for review on certiorari is limited to questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth.[5] By assigning only one legal issue, Filinvest has effectively cordoned off any discussion into the
factual issue raised before the Court of Appeals. [6] In effect, Filinvest has yielded to the decision of the
Court of Appeals, affirming that of the trial court, in deferring to the factual findings of the commissioner
assigned to the parties case. Besides, as a general rule, factual matters cannot be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari. This Court at this stage is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been
committed by the lower courts. [7] We do not perceive here any of the exceptions to this rule; hence, we are
restrained from conducting further scrutiny of the findings of fact made by the trial court which have been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Verily, factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court. [8] Thus, it is settled that:
(a) Based on Pecorps billings and the payments made by Filinvest, the balance of work to be
accomplished by Pecorp amounts toP681,717.58 representing 5.47% of the contract
work. This means to say that Pecorp, at the time of the termination of its contract,
accomplished 94.53% of the contract work;
(b) The unpaid balance of work done by Pecorp amounts toP1,939,191.67;

(c) The additional work/change order due Pecorp amounts toP475,000.00;
(d) The cost to repair deficiency or defect, which is for the account of Pecorp,
is P532,324.02; and
(e) The total amount due Pecorp is P1,881,867.66.
Coming now to the main matter, Filinvest argues that the penalty in its entirety should be respected as it
was a product of mutual agreement and it represents only 32% of the P12,470,000.00 contract price, thus,
not shocking and unconscionable under the circumstances. Moreover, the penalty was fixed to provide for
actual or anticipated liquidated damages and not simply to ensure compliance with the terms of the
contract; hence, pursuant to Laureano v. Kilayco,[9] courts should be slow in exercising the authority
conferred by Art. 1229 of the Civil Code.
We are not swayed.
There is no question that the penalty of P15,000.00 per day of delay was mutually agreed upon by
the parties and that the same is sanctioned by law. A penal clause is an accessory undertaking to assume
greater liability in case of breach. [10] It is attached to an obligation in order to insure performance [11] and
has a double function: (1) to provide for liquidated damages, and (2) to strengthen the coercive force of
the obligation by the threat of greater responsibility in the event of breach. [12] Article 1226 of the Civil Code
states:
Art. 1226. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the
indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of noncompliance, if there is no
stipulation to the contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor refuses to pay
the penalty or is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation.
The penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in accordance with the
provisions of this Code.
As a general rule, courts are not at liberty to ignore the freedom of the parties to agree on such
terms and conditions as they see fit as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy.[13] Nevertheless, courts may equitably reduce a stipulated penalty in the contract in
two instances: (1) if the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied; and (2) even if there
has been no compliance if the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable in accordance with Article 1229 of
the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation
has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no
performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable.

In herein case, the trial court ruled that the penalty charge for delay pegged atP15,000.00 per day
of delay in the aggregate amount of P3,990,000.00 -- was excessive and accordingly reduced it
to P1,881,867.66 considering the amount of work already performed and the fact that [Filinvest] consented
to three (3) prior extensions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling but added as well that the penalty
was unconscionable as the construction was already not far from completion. Said the Court of Appeals:
Turning now to plaintiffs appeal, We likewise agree with the trial court that a penalty
interest of P15,000.00 per day of delay as liquidated damages orP3,990,000.00
(representing 32% penalty of the P12,470,000.00 contract price) is unconscionable
considering that the construction was already not far from completion. Penalty interests are
in the nature of liquidated damages and may be equitably reduced by the courts if they are
iniquitous or unconscionable (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 815, Lambert v. Fox, 26
Phil. 588). The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has
been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no
unconscionable (Art. 1229, New Civil Code). Moreover, plaintiffs right to indemnity due to
defendants delay has been cancelled by its obligations to the latter consisting of unpaid
works.
This Court finds no fault in the cost estimates of the court-appointed commissioner as
to the cost to repair deficiency or defect in the works which was based on the average
between plaintiffs claim of P758,080.37 and defendants P306,567.67 considering the
following factors: that plaintiff did not follow the standard practice of joint survey upon take
over to establish work already accomplished, balance of work per contract still to be done,
and estimate and inventory of repair (Exhibit H). As for the cost to finish the remaining
works, plaintiffs estimates were brushed aside by the commissioner on the reasoned
observation that plaintiffs cost estimate for work (to be) done by the plaintiff to complete
the project is based on a contract awarded to another contractor (JPT), the nature and
magnitude of which appears to be inconsistent with the basic contract between defendant
PECORP and plaintiff FILINVEST.[14]
We are hamstrung to reverse the Court of Appeals as it is rudimentary that the application of Article
1229 is essentially addressed to the sound discretion of the court. [15] As it is settled that the project was
already 94.53% complete and that Filinvest did agree to extend the period for completion of the project,
which extensions Filinvest included in computing the amount of the penalty, the reduction thereof is clearly
warranted.
Filinvest, however, hammers on the case of Laureano v. Kilayco,[16] decided in 1915, which cautions
courts to distinguish between two kinds of penalty clauses in order to better apply their authority in
reducing the amount recoverable. We held therein that:
. . . [I]n any case wherein there has been a partial or irregular compliance with the
provisions in a contract for special indemnification in the event of failure to comply with its
terms, courts will rigidly apply the doctrine of strict construction against the
enforcement in its entirety of the indemnification, where it is clear from the terms
of the contract that the amount or character of the indemnity is fixed without regard to the
probable damages which might be anticipated as a result of a breach of the terms of the
contract; or, in other words, where the indemnity provided for is essentially a mere penalty
having for its principal object the enforcement of compliance with the contract. But the
courts will be slow in exercising the jurisdiction conferred upon them in article
1154[17] so as to modify the terms of an agreed upon indemnification where it appears that
in fixing such indemnification the parties had in mind a fair and reasonable compensation for
actual damages anticipated as a result of a breach of the contract, or, in other words, where
the principal purpose of the indemnification agreed upon appears to have been to provide
for the payment of actual anticipated and liquidated damages rather than the penalization
of a breach of the contract. (Emphases supplied)

Filinvest contends that the subject penalty clause falls under the second type,i.e., the principal
purpose for its inclusion was to provide for payment of actual anticipated and liquidated damages rather
than the penalization of a breach of the contract. Thus, Filinvest argues that had Pecorp completed the
project on time, it (Filinvest) could have sold the lots sooner and earned its projected income that would
have been used for its other projects.
Unfortunately for Filinvest, the above-quoted doctrine is inapplicable to herein case. The Supreme Court
in Laureano instructed that a distinction between a penalty clause imposed essentially as penalty in case
of breach and a penalty clause imposed as indemnity for damages should be made in cases where there
has been neither partial nor irregular compliance with the terms of the contract. In cases where there has
been partial or irregular compliance, as in this case, there will be no substantial difference between a
penalty and liquidated damages insofar as legal results are concerned. [18]The distinction is thus more
apparent than real especially in the light of certain provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides in Articles 2226 and Article 2227 thereof:
Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract to
be paid in case of breach thereof.
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall

be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
Thus, we lamented in one case that (t)here is no justification for the Civil Code to make an apparent
distinction between a penalty and liquidated damages because the settled rule is that there is no
difference between penalty and liquidated damages insofar as legal results are concerned and that either
may be recovered without the necessity of proving actual damages and both may be reduced when proper.
[19]
Finally, Filinvest advances the argument that while it may be true that courts may mitigate the amount of
liquidated damages agreed upon by the parties on the basis of the extent of the work done, this
contemplates a situation where the full amount of damages is payable in case of total breach of contract.
In the instant case, as the penalty clause was agreed upon to answer for delay in the completion of the
project considering that time is of the essence, the parties thus clearly contemplated the payment of
accumulated liquidated damages despite, and precisely because of, partial performance. [20] In effect, it is
Filinvests position that the first part of Article 1229 on partial performance should not apply precisely
because, in all likelihood, the penalty clause would kick in in situations where Pecorp had already begun
work but could not finish it on time, thus, it is being penalized for delay in its completion.
The above argument, albeit sound,[21] is insufficient to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals. It must be
remembered that the Court of Appeals not only held that the penalty should be reduced because there was
partial compliance but categorically stated as well that the penalty was unconscionable. Otherwise stated,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the reduction of the penalty not simply because there was partial
compliance per se on the part of Pecorp with what was incumbent upon it but, more fundamentally,
because it deemed the penalty unconscionable in the light of Pecorps94.53% completion rate.
In Ligutan v. Court of Appeals,[22] we pointed out that the question of whether a penalty is
reasonable or iniquitous can be partly subjective and partly objective as its resolution would depend on
such factors as, but not necessarily confined to, the type, extent and purpose of the penalty, the nature of
the obligation, the mode of breach and its consequences, the supervening realities, the standing and
relationship of the parties, and the like, the application of which, by and large, is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court.[23]
In herein case, there has been substantial compliance in good faith on the part of Pecorp which renders
unconscionable the application of the full force of the penalty especially if we consider that in 1979 the
amount of P15,000.00 as penalty for delay per day was quite steep indeed. Nothing in the records
suggests that Pecorps delay in the performance of 5.47% of the contract was due to it having acted
negligently or in bad faith. Finally, we factor in the fact that Filinvest is not free of blame either as it
likewise failed to do that which was incumbent upon it, i.e., it failed to pay Pecorp for work actually
performed by the latter in the total amount of P1,881,867.66. Thus, all things considered, we find no
reversible error in the Court of Appeals exercise of discretion in the instant case.
Before we write finis to this legal contest that had spanned across two and a half decades, we take
note of Pecorps own grievance. From its Comment and Memorandum, Pecorp, likewise, seeks affirmative
relief from this Court by praying that not only should the instant case be dismissed for lack of merit, but
that Filinvest should likewise be made to pay what the Court Commissioner found was due defendant in
the total amount of P2,976,663.65 plus 12% interest from 1979 until full payment thereof plus attorneys
fees.[24] Pecorp, however, cannot recover that which it seeks as we had already denied, in a Resolution
dated 21 June 2000, its own petition for review of the 27 May 1999 decision of the Court of Appeals. Thus,
as far as Pecorp is concerned, the ruling of the Court of Appeals has already attained finality and can no
longer be disturbed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 May 1999 is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
URBAN CONSOLIDATED G.R. No. 180824

CONSTRUCTORS PHILIPPINES,
INC.,
Petitioner, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, and
Peralta, JJ.
THE INSULAR LIFE
ASSURANCE CO., INC., Promulgated:
Respondent.
August 28, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
The only issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether petitioner Urban Consolidated
Constructors Philippines, Inc. (Urban) is liable to pay liquidated damages to respondent Insular Life
Assurance Co., Inc. (Insular).
The facts show that on October 13, 1989, respondent Insular engaged the services of Urban to
construct a six-storey building within a period not to exceed 365 days at a contract price of
P30,498,689.00. On February 19, 1991, the parties executed a General Construction Agreement (GCA),
[1]
which, among others, extended the deadline for the completion of the project to June 30, 1991, and
increased the contract price to P38,885,000.00. The parties thereafter agreed to move the deadline to
September 30, 1991, but the construction was beset by several delays.When Urban tendered the building
for acceptance on July 21, 1992, Insular refused to accept the same.
On February 11, 1993, Urban filed an action for collection of sum of money and damages [2] against
Insular contending that Insular caused the delay in the completion of the project and that, as a
consequence of said delay, Urban suffered damages. Insular allegedly failed to inform Urban about the
government road widening project which necessitated alterations/revisions in the plans and specifications
and delayed the issuance of the building permit, as well as the boundary dispute which Insular had with
the adjoining lot owner. Insular also allegedly incurred delay in the approval/payment of monthly billings; in
the delivery of materials to the construction site; and in the execution of a formal written construction
agreement.
Urban also alleged that on September 7, 1992, Insular took over the project and occupied the
building without justifiable cause. Urban thus prayed that it be awarded (1) P4 Million as excess
construction costs for the increase in the cost of materials during the period of the delay; (2) P250,000.00
for increase in financing costs; (3) P250,000.00 for the illegal take over of the project; (4) P1,454,799.50
for unpaid change orders or additional works; (5) P554,972.51 for unpaid progress billings; (6)
P2,134,908.80 representing the amount retained by Insular; (7) P1 Million for lost opportunities to enter
into other construction contracts; (8) P1 Million as attorneys fees; (9) liquidated damages to be determined
by the court; and (10) the costs of suit.
In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, [3] Insular alleged that the delay in the construction of
the building was due to Urbans failure to timely procure the building permit and not the road widening
project and the boundary dispute with the adjacent owner. Insular further averred that although it agreed
to directly pay the suppliers of material by way of accommodation to Urban which always lacked funds,
however the obligation to have the materials delivered to the construction site still remained with
Urban. Moreover, the obligation to directly pay the suppliers arise only after the delivery of the materials,
and evaluation by Insulars project manager.
Insular claimed that in the execution of the GCA on February 19, 1991, the parties took into
consideration the problems that arose after October 13, 1989. Thus, (1) the deadline for the completion of
the project was moved to June 30, 1991 and the contract price was increased to P38,885,000.00; (2)
Insular extended financial assistance to Urban by directly paying the suppliers of construction materials;
and (3) the construction deadline was further extended to September 30, 1991. However, Urban still failed
to meet the target completion date.
As regards the change orders, Insular explained that these were freely agreed upon by the parties and the
resultant delays were sufficiently compensated by the extension of the completion date. Insular also
averred that when it took over the construction of the building on September 3, 1992, Urban was already
behind the original schedule by one year; and that it applied the retention money to the expenses it
incurred in the completion of the substandard and unfinished work of Urban. By way of compulsory
counterclaim, Insular claimed liquidated damages in the amount of P19,014,765.00; moral damages;
exemplary damages; attorneys fees; and litigation costs.
On May 5, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 145 rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Urban

Consolidated Constructors Phils., Inc. and as against defendant, Insular Life Assurance Co.,
Ltd., ordering the latter to pay the former the following actual damages:
[a.] P4,000,000.00 as amount representing the excess construction costs;
[b.] P1,454,799.90 representing the unpaid construction costs of all completed change
orders;
[c.] P2,134,908.80 representing the amount for over-due and unpaid retention money;
[d.] P500,000.00 as the amount representing opportunity losses; and
[e.] P100,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees.
Cost against defendant.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Insular appealed to the Court of Appeals which found that the increase in the costs claimed by
Urban was already covered and taken into consideration when the parties executed the GCA, which among
others, increased the contract price from P30,498,689.00 to P38,885,000.00. The appellate court
debunked the claim of Urban that Insular caused the delay in the completion of the project, holding that it
was Urban, as contractor, which has the obligation to procure the construction materials and that Insulars
commitment was only to give financial assistance.
The appellate court thus found Insular entitled to an award of liquidated damages. Under the GCA,
the liquidated damages is set at 1/10 of 1% of P38,885,000.00, which is P38,885.00 per day or
P11,432,190.00 for the 294 days of delay from October 1, 1991 to July 21, 1992 when Urban turned over
the building.For equitable considerations, however, the Court of Appeals reduced the same to
P2,940,000.00 computed at a penalty of P10,000.00 per day.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals directed Insular to pay Urban P1,144,030.94 representing the
balance of the costs of several change orders or modification of the plan for which no payment was proven
to have been made. Insular was also ordered to release to Urban the P2,134,908.80 retention money,
considering that it failed to substantiate the works it purportedly performed to improve the building.
Offsetting[5] the amounts decreed against Urban with the amount payable by Insular, the latter is
still liable to pay Urban P338,939.40. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals, reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the above considerations, the instant appeal is

GRANTED. The assailed decision dated May 5, 1999 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one is hereby rendered ORDERING:
I. Insular Life Assurance, Co., Ltd TO PAY Urban Consolidated Contractors

Philippines, Inc.
1) P1,144,030.94 representing the balance on the change orders;
and
2) P2,134,908.80 representing the unpaid retention money.
II. Urban Consolidated Contractors Philippines, Inc. TO PAY Insular Life

Assurance, Co., Ltd. P2,940,000.00 as liquidated damages.
The amounts due from both parties shall be subject to offsetting

pursuant to Section 2, Article XIV of the General Construction Agreement.
ORDERED.[6]
Both parties respectively filed motions for reconsideration but were denied on December 5, 2007.
[7]
Insular no longer assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals directing it to pay the balance of the
change orders and to return to Urban the balance of the retention money.
On the other hand, Urban filed the present petition contending that it cannot be made liable for
liquidated damages for the completion of the project beyond the September 30, 1991 deadline because
the delay was caused by Insular who requested several change orders and who failed to procure all the
major construction materials it undertook to provide.
The sole issue for resolution is whether Urban is liable to pay liquidated damages.
We rule in the affirmative.
The Court sustains the finding of the Court of Appeals that the communications between Insular and
Urban prior to and after the execution of the GCA on February 19, 1991 never varied the obligation of
Urban to provide the materials for the construction of the building. Section 1, Article V of the GCA reads:
Section 1 x x x For this purpose, the CONTRACTOR [Urban] shall furnish and
supply all necessary materials, labor, equipment and tools, plant, supervision for the
complete works and all other facilities needed, and shall accordingly perform everything
necessary for the complete and successful construction of the aforesaid office building and
facilities.[8] (Emphasis supplied)
While Insulars January 14, 1991 letter [9] to Urban stated that the former will purchase in advance
the major construction materials, the same was never reflected in the January 28, 1991 minutes of the
meeting which culminated in the execution of the aforequoted provision vesting Urban the obligation
to supply and furnish all the construction materials. Pertinent portion of said minutes of meeting
provides:
9. It was also agreed that cost of major materials purchase[d] by Urban shall be paid directly
by Insular Life upon presentation of Invoice duly certified and verified by TAP Resident
Engineer.[10]
It was never agreed that Insular would assume the obligation of procuring the materials from the suppliers
and delivering them at the construction site. Moreover, Insulars March 14, 1991 letter[11] to Urban approved
only a direct payment scheme and not an undertaking to provide the construction materials. As explained
by Insular in its September 30, 1991 letter, the support it extended to Urban was not a commitment to
furnish the materials but merely to pay the same in the agreed scheme.Thus:
We would like to point out that the above extension of deadline and financial assistance on
the part of Insular Life are mere accommodations and are extended to Urban in our desire to
have the building completed as early as possible. This should not be misconstrued that
Insular Life is committed to supply all major materials in order finish the building. [12]
Moreover, the nature of said accommodation of Insular as a financial assistance was confirmed by
Urbans president, Benjamin F. Almario in his letters dated
(1) February 14, 1991:
Thank you for granting us price adjustment of P8,386,302.00 and agreeing to provide
financial assistance in the form of direct payment to suppliers for major materials required
for the project.[13]
(2) October 11, 1991:
In view of our common interest to complete the above subject project soonest, we wish to
appeal to your good office to provide us with financial assistance through direct payments to
our suppliers for the remaining major materials to complete the project in the amount of
P1,963,920.83.[14]
As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, Urban as the contractor, has the obligation to furnish the
materials and Insulars commitment is to provide financial assistance only by way of direct payment to the
suppliers after the materials have been procured by Urban and delivered to construction site.
As for the change orders of Insular which allegedly delayed the construction of the building, suffice
it to state that the trial court (which attributed the delay, although erroneously, to the alleged failure of
Insular, to procure the construction materials), never pronounced that the cause of such delay was the
change orders of Insular. At any rate, the period for completion for said change orders was already
considered by the parties when they moved the deadline from June 30, 1991 to September 30, 1991.Also,
the delay in the construction of the building was caused by Urbans lack of necessary funds and its failure
to facilitate the delivery of materials at the construction site as provided in the GCA.
The Court of Appeals therefore correctly held that the delay in the completion of the construction of
the subject building cannot be attributed to Insular.
Anent the award of liquidated damages, Article 2227 of the Civil Code provides that liquidated
damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous
or unconscionable. In the case at bar, the liquidated damages computed on the basis of the GCA is
P11,432,190 (1/10 of 1% of P38,885,000.00, which is P38,885.00 per day for the 294 days from October 1,
1991 to July 21, 1992). However, finding said amount to be unconscionable and citingFilinvest Land, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,[15] the appellate court set the liquidated damages at P2,940,000.00 or at P10,000.00 per
day.
In Filinvest, the penalty for the delay in the completion of the project was P3,990,000.00 or
P15,000.00 per day but the Court affirmed the reduction of said amount to P1,881,867.66 considering that
the project was already 94.53% complete and that Filinvest agreed to extend the period of completion,
which extensions Filinvest included in computing the amount of the penalty. The Court also noted that the
contractor did not act in bad faith and that Filinvest was not free of blame as it failed to pay the costs of
work actually performed by the contractor in the amount of P1,881,867.66. Thus
In herein case, the trial court ruled that the penalty charge for delay pegged
atP15,000.00 per day of delay in the aggregate amount of P3,990,000.00 -- was excessive
and accordingly reduced it to P1,881,867.66 considering the amount of work already
performed and the fact that [Filinvest] consented to three (3) prior extensions. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling but added as well that the penalty was unconscionable as the
construction was already not far from completion. x x x
xxxx
We are hamstrung to reverse the Court of Appeals as it is rudimentary that the

application of Article 1229 is essentially addressed to the sound discretion of the court. As it
is settled that the project was already 94.53% complete and that Filinvest did agree to
extend the period for completion of the project, which extensions Filinvest included in
computing the amount of the penalty, the reduction thereof is clearly warranted.
xxxx
Finally, Filinvest advances the argument that while it may be true that courts may
mitigate the amount of liquidated damages agreed upon by the parties on the basis of the
extent of the work done, this contemplates a situation where the full amount of damages is
payable in case of total breach of contract. In the instant case, as the penalty clause was
agreed upon to answer for delay in the completion of the project considering that time is of
the essence, the parties thus clearly contemplated the payment of accumulated liquidated
damages despite, and precisely because of, partial performance. In effect, it is Filinvests
position that the first part of Article 1229 on partial performance should not apply precisely
because, in all likelihood, the penalty clause would kick in in situations where Pecorp had
already begun work but could not finish it on time, thus, it is being penalized for delay in its
completion.
The above argument, albeit sound, is insufficient to reverse the ruling of the Court of
Appeals. It must be remembered that the Court of Appeals not only held that the penalty
should be reduced because there was partial compliance but categorically stated as well
that the penalty was unconscionable. Otherwise stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
reduction of the penalty not simply because there was partial compliance per se on the part
of Pecorp with what was incumbent upon it but, more fundamentally, because it deemed the
penalty unconscionable in the light of Pecorps 94.53% completion rate.
In Ligutan v. Court of Appeals, we pointed out that the question of whether a penalty
is reasonable or iniquitous can be partly subjective and partly objective as its resolution
would depend on such factors as, but not necessarily confined to, the type, extent and
purpose of the penalty, the nature of the obligation, the mode of breach and its
consequences, the supervening realities, the standing and relationship of the parties, and
the like, the application of which, by and large, is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court.
In herein case, there has been substantial compliance in good faith on the part of
Pecorp which renders unconscionable the application of the full force of the penalty
especially if we consider that in 1979 the amount of P15,000.00 as penalty for delay per day
was quite steep indeed. Nothing in the records suggests that Pecorps delay in the
performance of 5.47% of the contract was due to it having acted negligently or in bad faith.
Finally, we factor in the fact that Filinvest is not free of blame either as it likewise failed to do
that which was incumbent upon it, i.e., it failed to pay Pecorp for work actually performed by
the latter in the total amount ofP1,881,867.66. Thus, all things considered, we find no
reversible error in the Court of Appeals exercise of discretion in the instant case. [16]
In the present case, the factors considered by the Court of Appeals were the absence of bad faith
on the part of Urban and the fact that the project was 97% complete at the time it was turned over to
Insular. In addition, we noted that Insular is likewise not entirely blameless considering that it failed to pay
Urban P1,144,030.94 representing the balance of unpaid change orders and to return the retention money
in the amount of P2,134,908.80, or a total of P3,578,939.74. Had Insular released said amount upon
demand, the same could have been used by Urban to comply with its obligation to purchase the needed
construction materials and to expedite the completion of the project. Under the circumstances, we find
that this omission on the part of Insular justifies a further reduction of the liquidated damages decreed
against Urban from P2,940,000.00 to P1,940,000.00.
As a general rule, courts are not at liberty to ignore the freedom of the parties to agree on such
terms and conditions as they see fit as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, and good custom,
public policy or public order. Nevertheless courts may equitably reduce a stipulated penalty in the contract
where, as in the instant case, the principal obligation has been partly performed (97%) and where the
penalty is iniquitous.[17] Article 1229 of the Civil Code, states:
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation
has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no
unconscionable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 8, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 652332 which reversed and set aside the May 5, 1999 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 145, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of liquidated
damages isREDUCED from P2,940,000.00 to P1,940,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES (ART. 2229-2235)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139962-66. March 7, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUGENIO MANGOMPIT, JR., accused-

appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte[2] convicting accused-appellant of five (5) counts of rape committed against Marites
Quirante, his sixteen year old niece, and imposing on him the supreme penalty of death.
The five (5) informations[3] charging accused-appellant of the crime of rape, except for the specific
dates and time when the crimes of rape were allegedly committed, uniformly read, as follows:
The undersigned, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, upon a sworn complaint originally filed by the
private offended party, accuses EUGENIO MANGOMPIT, JR., of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:

That, at dawn, on or about the 20th day of July 1994, in the municipality of Siayan, Zamboanga del Norte,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, moved by lewd and unchaste design and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously
succeed in having sexual intercourse with one MARITES QUIRANTE, 16 years old, single and of good
reputation, against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 335, Revised Penal Code). [4]
The other informations[5] charge accused-appellant with the crime of rape allegedly committed on the
following dates: at midnight on 9 September 1994, in the afternoon of 12 September 1994, in the
afternoon of 15 September 1994, and in the evening of 20 September 1994.
Accused-appellant was arraigned on 17 November 1995. With the assistance of counsel, he pleaded
not guilty to the charges leveled against him[6].
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely Marites Quirante, the private complainant,
Bienvenido Quirante, the father of the victim, and Dr. Raymund Nadela, the medico-legal officer who
examined the victim. The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following:
In 1994, accused-appellant stayed at the house of Bienvenido Quirante, the father of the victim, in
Balok, Siayan, Zamboanga del Norte. Bienvenido Quirante was accused-appellants brother-in-law as he
was married to accused-appellants sister. The victim, Marites Quirante, was accused-appellants niece and
she was fifteen years old at that time[7].
At around 1:00 a.m. of 20 July 1994, Marites was sleeping with her siblings and parents inside a room
in their house. Accused-appellant was also sleeping with them in the same room. With a bolo in one hand,
accused-appellant suddenly held Maritess hands, took off her underwear, laid on top of her, and inserted
his penis into her vagina[8]. Accused-appellant then made a push and pull movement while on top of
Marites. Marites shouted for help while all this was happening but her parents and other siblings remained
in deep slumber[9]. This went on for about five minutes and after satisfying his lust, accused-appellant
threatened to kill Marites if she told anybody about the incident.
Accused-appellant allegedly raped the victim again on 9 September 1994 at around 12:00
midnight. The incident allegedly happened in the same room of their house while her parents and other
siblings were sound asleep. Accused-appellant again threatened her with a bolo and he then proceeded to
have carnal knowledge with her. She again shouted for help but her parents and siblings did not wake
up. Accused-appellant again threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the incident. [10]
The last three incidents allegedly also took place at the house of the victim. During these incidents
however, the parents and siblings of the victim were not at home. The third incident allegedly occurred on
12 September 1994 at around 5:00 p.m. This was followed by a fourth rape incident three days later on 15
September 1994 at around 5:00 p.m. The last rape allegedly occurred on 20 September 1994 at around
6:00 p.m. In these three instances, the other family members were allegedly still at the family farm and
had not yet returned home. Accused-appellant again threatened her with a bolo before having his way with
her and, afterwards, threatened to kill her and her parents if she reported the incidents to anyone, [11]
Because of her fear that accused-appellant would make good his threats, Marites did not tell anyone
about her harrowing experience with her uncle. It was only on 5 December 1994 when her parents noticed
that she was pregnant that she told them that accused-appellant had raped her five (5) times [12]. Three
days later, she had herself examined at the Siayan Main Health Center. On that same date, she filed a
complaint for rape against her uncle, accused-appellant Eugenio Mangompit, Jr. On 13 April 1995, Marites
gave birth to a baby girl.[13]
Bienvenido Quirante, the father of the victim, told the court that accused-appellant first came to live
with them in June of 1994. He claimed that accused-appellant had no job and that he did not even help in
their farm.[14] He testified that he first asked Marites about the rape incidents when he saw that her
stomach was already bulging and upon learning about it, he immediately reported the matter to the police.
[15]
On cross-examination, the witness described their house as a regular sized one measuring two
fathoms in width and two and a half fathoms in length. He stated that there were no divisions inside the
house except for the kitchen which was separated by a small divider. [16] At the time of the alleged
incidents, there were nine (9) people staying at the house who all slept together inside the house. [17] He
admitted that at the time of the first two rape incidents, neither he, his wife, nor their children woke up or
heard Marites scream for help. He claimed that they were in deep slumber as they were all too tired from
work.[18] He likewise stated that prior to the time that he noticed that the stomach of his daughter was
bulging, she did not inform him or any member of the family about her rape at the hands of accused-
appellant.[19]
The last witness for the prosecution, Dr. Raymund Nadela, testified on the results of the medical
examination he conducted on Marites Quirante on 8 December 1994. He stated that based on his findings,
there is a possibility that Marites had been raped as her hymen was no longer intact although there was no
sign of any laceration.[20]
For its part, the defense presented three witnesses namely accused-appellant himself, his brother
Primitivo Mangumpit, and Miraflor Acopiado.
Primitivo Mangumpit testified that his brother could not have committed the crimes of rape charged
against him because during the dates when the alleged rapes were committed, accused-appellant was
with him in Paraiso, Kalawit, Zamboanga del Norte. During the month of July when the first rape incident
allegedly occurred, accused-appellant was working with him on his farm. He claimed that accused-
appellant stayed at his farm until January 1995 when accused-appellant became sick with malaria and he
had to be brought to the hospital.[21]
On cross-examination and on questions propounded by the court, he admitted that the place where his
niece, Marites, lived was about six (6) hours away from his place by public transportation. [22] He likewise
admitted that he can no longer recall the days of the week when the alleged rapes occurred because of the
lapse of time.[23] He asserted, however, that accused-appellant never stayed with his sister, the mother of
Marites, during the dates when the incidents of rape were allegedly committed.
For his part, accused-appellant denied ever having committed the crimes for which he was being
held[24]. He claimed that from 1993 to 1994, he was staying at El Paraiso, Kalawit, Zamboanga del Norte in
the house of his brother, Primitivo Mangumpit[25]. He admitted that he stayed in the house of his mother in
Siayan, Zamboanga del Norte from 1980-1983 but he denied ever having stayed at the house of Marites
Quirante in Baloc, Siayan, Zamboanga del Norte in 1994 [26]. He also claimed that in 1994, he became
afflicted with malaria which necessitated his treatment at the District Hospital in Labason, Zamboanga del
Norte in January of 1995[27]. He surmised that the reason why the cases were filed against him is because
of the interest of his sister, the mother of the complainant, in acquiring his coconut plantation in Sapang
Dalaga, Misamis Occidental.[28]
The last witness, Miraflor Acopiado, stated that she is the daughter of witness Primitivo Mangumpit
and, as such, she is the niece of accused-appellant. She testified that from July 18 to 25, 1994, she was
visiting her father at his home in Kalawit, Zamboanga del Norte. She stated that accused-appellant could
not have committed the rape incident on 20 July 1994 as she personally saw accused-appellant at the
house of her father and he was sick with malaria. In fact, she stated that the reason why she went to
Kalawit was because her father needed money for the treatment of accused-appellants sickness [29]. On
cross-examination, however, she admitted that she went back home to Dapitan City on 25 July 1994 and
that she did not know the whereabouts of accused-appellant in September of 1994 when the other alleged
rapes occurred.[30]
On 6 August 1999, the trial court rendered its decision convicting accused-appellant of five (5) counts
of rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, accused Eugenio Mangumpit, Jr., is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of five (5) Counts
of Rape and is sentenced to suffer the mandatory penalty of DEATH for each count. In addition, accused is
ordered to indemnify the offended party Marites Quirante P250,000.00 plus P125,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
ACCUSED is further ordered to acknowledge and support the offspring born of the rape.
COSTS de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[31]

Hence, this appeal with accused-appellant raising the following assignment of errors [32]:
I.
THE COURT OF ORIGIN ERRED SERIOUSLY IN NOT ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIMES CHARGED DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED GRAVELY IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH AGAINST THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSIDERING FULLY THE PRONOUNCEMENTS IN THE RECENT AND RELEVANT
CASES OF PEOPLE VERSUS GARCIA (281 SCRA 463), PEOPLE VS. RAMOS (G.R. NO. 129439, SEPT. 25,
1998) AND PEOPLE VS. OMAR MEDINA (G.R. NO. 126575, DEC. 11, 1998)
After a conscientious review of the records of the case, we agree with the lower court that the crimes
of rape have indeed been committed and that accused-appellant is the author thereof.
The trial court drew its conclusions from the direct, positive and categorical statements made by
complainant Marites Quirante on the witness stand on the material circumstances regarding the
commission of the crimes committed against her person. Marites did not waver during her testimony when
asked by the judge, the public prosecutor and the defense counsel to narrate the specific instances when
accused-appellant raped her.
On direct examination, Marites candidly answered the questions of the public prosecutor on her
harrowing experience at the hands of accused-appellant. She told the court how she was sexually
assaulted by accused-appellant on five occasions and how the accused-appellant always threatened her
with a bolo.[33] She likewise recalled how she finally had to tell her parents about the rape incidents as she
had become pregnant with accused-appellants child.
On questions propounded by the trial court, Marites gave the details on her ordeal. Thus:
COURT: I have a few questions.
Q: Are you familiar with Eugenio Mangompit, Jr.?
A: Yes, sir. Because he is the brother of my mother.
Q: In other words he is your uncle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said a while ago that on July 20, 1994 at about 1:00 a.m. you were allegedly sexually abused by
your uncle Eugenio Mangompit, Jr., am I right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At that time he was holding a bolo, am I right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said a while ago that you were sleeping together with your father, mother, brothers and sisters
including Eugenio Mangompit in one room, am I right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And at that time Eugenio Mangompit, Jr. went near you, am I right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said a while ago that Eugenio Mangompit, Jr. sexually abused you. Before he abused you, you
were wearing a panty?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened to your panty at that time when Eugenio Mangompit went near you?
A: He took off my panty.
Q: Who took off your panty?
A: Eugenio Mangompit, Jr.
Q: When Eugenio Mangompit, Jr. took off your panty, you shouted, am I right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But at that time, you said, your parents including your brothers and sister sleeping inside the room
were in deep slumber?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That is the reason why they failed to hear your shout?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When Eugenio Mangompit, Jr. removed your panty, what happened next?
A: He placed himself on top of me and do the push and pull movement.
Q: You mean to say at that time also Eugenio Mangompit, Jr. removed his brief and mounted on top of
you and make (sic) a push and pull movement?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you feel when Eugenio Mangompit, Jr. mounted on top of you and make the push and pull
movement, did you feel his private organ entered (sic) into your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After that, how many minutes Eugenio Mangompit, Jr. was on top of you making push and pull
movement and then withdrew?
A: Five minutes.
Q: After that five minutes, did you feel something hot inside your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In the following morning did you discover that your panty was stained with blood or your private part
was injured or there was blood?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But then you said you did not reveal this incident to your mother because Eugenio Mangompit, Jr.
threatened you to kill you if you reveal the incident that happened that night?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you remember what happened to you at about the same hour, 1:00 a.m. of September 9, 1994
inside the room?
A: Eugenio Mangompit, Jr. again raped me.

Q: Do you mean to say what had happened to you on July 20, 1994 was repeated at dawn of September
9, 1994?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At that time, as you said, Eugenio Mangompit, Jr. was still holding a bolo and threatened you that if
you reveal the incident that took place between you at dawn of September 9, 1994, he will kill you,
am I right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that dawn, Eugenio Mangompit, Jr. was able to penetrate you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you did not reveal this incident to your parents because he always threatened your life, am I
right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you remember then, as you have said, that the same incident took place at dawn of September
12, 1994, inside the same the room while your brothers, sister and parents were in deep slumber,
am I right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At that time you have seen also that at that time Eugenio Mangompit, Jr. was holding a bolo?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that time he was able to penetrate you, am I right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At about 5:00 p.m. of September 15, 1994 the same fellow sexually abused you while your parents,
brothers and sisters were not around, am I right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At that time he was satisfied because he was able to penetrate you, am I right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After which he still continued threatening your life that if you will reveal the incidents to your parents
or to somebody, he will kill you, am I right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said likewise that at about 6:00 oclock in the evening of September 20, 1994 Eugenio
Mangompit, Jr. abused you, am I right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The same he was able to penetrate you and he was satisfied?
A: Yes, sir.[34]
The testimony of the complainant about the incidents is straightforward, categorical and free from any
serious flaw. By her testimony, she has adequately shown that accused-appellant succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her on five (5) different occasions without her consent and with the use of force

and intimidation. No compelling reason is presented to the Court to warrant a conclusion that the trial
court has erred in giving due weight and credence to the testimony of Marites.
For his defense, accused-appellant merely denied ever having lived with accused-appellant at her
home in Siayan, Zamboanga del Norte and claimed that in 1997, he lived with his brother Primitivo
Mangumpit in Kalawit, Zamboanga del Norte. For this reason, accused-appellant argues that he could
never have committed the acts charged against him. His claim is corroborated by his brother and his niece
who both testified that accused-appellant could not have committed the crimes as he was in Kalawit,
Zamboanga del Norte at the time of the commission of the crimes.
We are hard put to treat the foregoing as credible and convincing proof that accused-appellant could
not have been the perpetrator of the crimes charged against him. Considering that alibis are easy to
fabricate with the aid of immediate family members or relatives, they assume no importance in the face of
positive identification, as in the instant case, by the victim herself. [35]
Moreover, it is well-settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must establish that he
was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate
vicinity, at the time of its commission. [36] Where there is even the least chance that for the accused to be
present at the crime scene, the alibi seldom will hold water. [37] In the instant case, accused-appellants
assertions that he was in El Paraiso, Kalawit, Zamboanga del Norte when the incidents of rape were
committed does not indubitably establish that he could not have been present at the scene of the crime at
the time the same was committed. By his own admission and the admissions of his witnesses, the town of
Siayan, Zamboanga del Norte, the place where the alleged crimes occurred, is easily accessible from
where he was allegedly staying in Kalawit, Zamboanga del Norte. They declared that it will not take more
than a few hours to traverse the distance.
Accused-appellant likewise raised but failed to prove that Marites was prompted by his sister, the
victims mother, to charge him with the rape as the latter was allegedly interested in acquiring his coconut
plantation in Misamis Occidental. Aside from the fact that accused-appellant failed to adduce evidence,
other that his own self-serving testimony, of his ownership of said property, there is absolutely no showing
that any relative of the victim actually raised the matter with him as a means of settling the case. More
importantly, such alleged motives have never swayed the Court from lending full credence to the
testimony of a victim who remained steadfast throughout her testimony in court, especially a minor, as in
this case.[38] It is well-settled doctrine that no parent would expose his or her own daughter to the shame
and scandal of having undergone such a debasing defilement of her chastity if the charges filed were not
true.[39]
It is further asserted by accused-appellant that that it was highly unlikely and improbable that he
would commit the crimes of rape against the victim in the same small room where members of her family
were sleeping. He likewise finds unbelievable and ridiculous the testimony of Marites that she shouted for
help while the sexual assaults were happening and yet no member of her family woke up to help her.
It must be noted at this point that accused-appellant was charged with five counts of rape, each rape
happening on different dates and times. In three of these incidents, namely those on the 12 th, 15th, and
20th of September 1994, the victim was alone in their house as her parents and siblings had not returned
from working in their fields. Considering that their nearest neighbor was about half a kilometer away [40], it
is not highly improbable that no one could have heard her cries for help during these three occasions.
During the other two (2) occasions, the crimes admittedly were committed while the members of her
family were sleeping in the same room. Accused-appellants contention cannot exculpate him, however,
from the acts imputed to him. It must be stressed that these crimes were committed in the dead of night,
the first at around 1:00 a.m. on 20 July 1994 and the second at around 12:00 midnight on 9 September
1994. At these late hours, the members of her family were already in deep slumber after a hard days
work. It is thus not improbable that the members of her family, who were sleeping beside her could not
have been awakened by the victims shouting and struggling while being ravished. [41] It is not impossible
nor incredible for the members of the complainants family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened
while the brutish sexual assault on her was being committed. [42] Lust is no respecter of time and place.
[43]
Several times, the Court has held that rape can be committed even in places where people congregate,
in parks, along the roadsides, in school premises, in a house where there are other occupants, in the same
room where other members of the family are also sleeping [44], and even in places which to many, would
appear unlikely and high risk venues for its commission[45].

The trial court thus committed no error in convicting accused-appellant of the five (5) counts of
rape. What remains to be determined is whether the supreme penalty of death was correctly imposed by
the trial court.
Accused-appellant, in his brief, contends that the trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of
death considering that the qualifying circumstance of his blood relationship with private complainant, as
uncle and niece, was not alleged in the information.
There is merit in this contention of accused-appellant.
The crime of rape at the time of the incidents complained of was governed by article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 [46]. Said article, provides, as follows:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim;
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities;
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives
within the third degree of consanguinity;
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old;
5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
disease;
6. When committed by any member of the member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine
National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
We have previously declared that that the seven (7) special circumstances of rape introduced by R.A.
7659 which call for the automatic imposition of the death penalty partake of the nature of qualifying
circumstances since these increase the penalty of rape by one degree. As such, these circumstances
should be pleaded in the information or complaint in order to be appreciated in the imposition of the
proper penalty.[47]

In the case at bench, the trial court apparently relied on the 1 st special circumstance introduced by
R.A. 7659, that of minority of the victim and relationship with the offender, in imposing the death
penalty. However, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender should
be specifically alleged in the information conformably with the right of an accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. [48] Even though the minority of Marites and her
relationship with accused-appellant were proven beyond doubt, the death penalty cannot be imposed
because both of these qualifying circumstances were not alleged in the information. It would be a denial of
the right of accused-appellant to be informed of the charges against him, and consequently, a denial of
due process, if he is charged with simple rape and is subsequently convicted of its qualified form
punishable by death although the attendant circumstances qualifying the offense and resulting in the
imposition of capital punishment were not set forth in the indictment on which he was arraigned.
[49]
Therefore, despite the five (5) counts of rape committed by accused-appellant, he cannot be sentenced
to the supreme penalty of death.Accordingly, the penalty of death imposed by the trial court should be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The Solicitor-General, in his Appellees Brief, cites the paragraph in Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that (w)henever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or
by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death in justifying the imposition of the
death penalty on accused-appellant. He argues that since it was proven during the trial that accused-
appellant used a bolo during the occasions he raped the complainant and considering further that the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling was appreciated by the trial court, the greater penalty imposed by
the cited paragraph should be meted out.
There is no merit in the argument.
For the same reasons mentioned previously, the fact that a deadly weapon was used in the
commission of the rape should likewise be pleaded in the complaint or information. In People vs. Garcia[50],
the Court declared:
One further observation. Article 335 provided only for simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua, but
Republic Act No. 4111 introduced amendments thereto by providing for qualified forms of rape carrying the
death penalty, that is, when committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, when
by reason or on the occasion of the rape the victim becomes insane, or, under the same circumstances, a
homicide is committed. The homicide in the last two instances in effect created a complex crime of rape
with homicide. The first two attendant circumstances are considered as equivalent to qualifying
circumstances since they increase the penalties by degrees, and not merely as aggravating circumstances
which affect only the period of the penalty but do not increase it to a higher degree. The original provisions
of the Article 335 and Republic Act No. 4111 are still maintained.
xxxxxxxxx
Now, it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If
the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances since
the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. xxx (citations omitted) [51]
Accordingly, accused-appellant may only be convicted of simple rape, the crime for which he was
indicted. Simple rape is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, even if the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling was proven to have attended the commission of the crime, the
appropriate penalty under the law would still be reclusion perpetua. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission
of the deed.
As regards the civil indemnity, this Court has ruled that if the crime of rape is committed or effectively
qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by law, the indemnity
for the victim shall be increased to P75,000.00. However, since the death penalty is not imposable due to
the deficiency in the allegations of the information against the accused-appellant, the victim is only
entitled to P50,000.00 as indemnity for each count of rape. [52] The trial court thus correctly awarded the
amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape or a total of P250,000.00 as civil indemnity to the victim. The
trial court failed, however, to award moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for
each count of rape. In rape cases, the victims injury is inherently concomitant with the odious crime to

warrant per se an award for moral damages without the requirement of proof of mental and physical
suffering.[53] Thus, the total amount of P250,000.00 as moral damages should likewise be awarded.
The trial court likewise correctly imposed the amount of P25,000 for each count of rape, or a total of
P125,000.00, as and by way of exemplary damages. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, (I)n criminal
offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In the case at bench, the aggravating
circumstances of relationship, dwelling, and, for two of the charges, nighttime were proven to have
attended the commission of the crime. Relationship, that of uncle and niece, was proven by the testimony
of the victim and by the admission of accused-appellant himself. Dwelling was likewise proven as it was
shown that the five incidents of rape were all committed inside the house of the family of the victim where
accused-appellant was staying as a houseguest. Finally, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime was
likewise proven in two of the five rape incidents as it was shown that accused-appellant waited until late in
the night when the other family members were in deep slumber before consummating his carnal desire for
the victim.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Eugenio Mangompit, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of five (5) counts of rape is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of the five (5) criminal
cases. Accused-appellant is likewise sentenced to pay the victim Marites Quirante, the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each
count of rape or a total of P250,000.00 as civil indemnity, P250,000.00 as moral damages and P125,000.00
as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137268. March 26, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUTIQUIA CARMEN @ Mother

Perpetuala, CELEDONIA FABIE @ Isabel Fabie, DELIA SIBONGA @ Deding Sibonga,
ALEXANDER SIBONGA @ Nonoy Sibonga, and REYNARIO NUEZ @ Rey Nuez, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, finding accused-
appellants Eutiquia Carmen @ Mother Perpetuala, Celedonia Fabie @ Isabel Fabie, Delia Sibonga @ Deding
Sibonga, Alexander Sibonga @ Nonoy Sibonga, and Reynario Nuez @ Rey Nuez guilty of murder and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount
of P50,000.00 as indemnity as well as the costs.
The information[2] against accused-appellants alleged:
That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997 at about 2:00 oclock p.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there inflict fatal physical injuries on one Randy Luntayao which injuries
caused the death of the said Randy Luntayao.
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon they were tried.
The prosecution presented evidence showing the following: At around 2 oclock in the afternoon of
January 27, 1997, Honey Fe Abella, 10, and her friend Frances Claire Rivera, 7, were playing takyan in front
of the house of one Bebing Lastimoso in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City, when suddenly they heard a child
shout, Tabang ma! (Help mother!). The cry came from the direction of the house of accused-appellant
Carmen, who is also known in their neighborhood as Mother Perpetuala. The two children ran towards
Mother Perpetualas house.[3] What Honey Fe saw on which she testified in court, is summarized in the
decision of the trial court, to wit:
While there[,] she saw a boy, whose name . . . she [later] came to know as one Randy Luntayao, . . . being
immersed head first in a drum of water. Accused Alexander Sibonga was holding the waist of the body
while accused Reynario Nuez held the hands of the boy at the back. Accused Eutiquia Carmen, Delia
Sibonga, and Celedonia Fabie were pushing down the boys head into the water. She heard the boy
shouting Ma, help for two times. Later, she saw accused Reynario or Rey Nuez tie the boy on the bench
with a green rope as big as her little finger. . . . After that Eutiquia Carmen poured [water from] a plastic
container (galon) . . . into the mouth of the boy. Each time the boy struggled to raise his head, accused
Alexander Sibonga banged the boys head against the bench [to] which the boy was tied down. She even
heard the banging sound everytime the boys head hit the bench. For about five times she heard
it. According to this witness after forcing the boy to drink water, Eutiquia Carmen and accused Celedonia
Fabie alias Isabel Fabie took turns in pounding the boys chest with their clenched fists. All the time Rey
Nuez held down the boys feet to the bench. She also witnessed . . . Celedonia Fabie dropped her weight,
buttocks first, on the body of the boy. Later on, Eutiquia Carmen ordered Delia or Deding Sibonga to get a
knife from the kitchen. Eutiquia Carmen then slowly plunged the stainless knife on the left side of the boys
body and with the use of a plastic gallon container, the top portion of which was cut out, Eutiquia Carmen
[caught] the blood dripping from the left side of the boys body. Honey Fe heard the moaning coming from
the tortured boy.Much later she saw Nonoy or Alexander Sibonga, Reynario Nuez, Delia Sibonga, Celedonia
Fabie, and Eutiquia Carmen carry the boy into the house.[4]
Eddie Luntayao, father of the victim, testified that he has five children, the eldest of whom, Randy,
was 13 years old at the time of the incident. On November 20, 1996, Randy had a nervous breakdown
which Eddie thought was due to Randy having to skip meals whenever he took the boy with him to the
farm. According to Eddie, his son started talking to himself and laughing. On January 26, 1997, upon the
suggestion of accused-appellant Reynario Nuez, Eddie and his wife Perlita and their three children (Randy,
Jesrel, 7, and Lesyl, 1) went with accused-appellant Nuez to Cebu. They arrived in Cebu at around 1 oclock
in the afternoon of the same day and spent the night in Nuezs house in Tangke, Talisay.
The following day, they went to the house of accused-appellant Carmen in Quiot, Pardo, [5]where all of
the accused-appellants were present. Eddie talked to accused-appellant Carmen regarding his sons
condition. He was told that the boy was possessed by a bad spirit, which accused-appellant Carmen said
she could exorcise. She warned, however, that as the spirit might transfer to Eddie, it was best to conduct
the healing prayer without him. Accused-appellants then led Randy out of the house, while Eddie and his
wife and two daughters were locked inside a room in the house. [6]
After a while, Eddie heard his son twice shout Ma, tabang! (Mother, help!). Eddie tried to go out of the
room to find out what was happening to his son, but the door was locked. After about an hour, the
Luntayaos were transferred to the prayer room which was located near the main door of the house. [7]
A few hours later, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, accused-appellants carried Randy into the
prayer room and placed him on the altar. Eddie was shocked by what he saw. Randys face was bluish and
contused, while his tongue was sticking out of his mouth. It was clear to Eddie that his son was already
dead. He wanted to see his sons body, but he was stopped from doing so by accused-appellant Eutiquia
Carmen who told him not to go near his son because the latter would be resurrected at 7 oclock that
evening.[8]
After 7 oclock that evening, accused-appellant Carmen asked a member of her group to call the
funeral parlor and bring a coffin as the child was already dead. It was arranged that the body would be
transferred to the house of accused-appellant Nuez. Thus, that night, the Luntayao family, accompanied by
accused-appellant Nuez, took Randys body to Nunezs house in Tangke, Talisay.The following day, January
28, 1997, accused-appellant Nuez told Eddie to go with him to the Talisay Municipal Health Office to report
Randys death and told him to keep quiet or they might not be able to get the necessary papers for his sons
burial. Nuez took care of securing the death certificate which Eddie signed.[9]
At around 3 oclock in the afternoon of January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Carmen went to Tangke,
Talisay to ensure that the body was buried. Eddie and his wife told her that they preferred to bring their
sons body with them to Sikatuna, Isabela, Negros Occidental but they were told by accused-appellant
Carmen that this was not possible as she and the other accused-appellants might be arrested. That same
afternoon, Randy Luntayao was buried in Tangke, Talisay. [10]
After Eddie and his family had returned home to Negros Occidental, Eddie sought assistance from the
Bombo Radyo station in Bacolod City which referred him to the regional office of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in the city. On February 3, 1997, Eddie filed a complaint for murder against accused-

appellant Nuez and the other members of his group. [11] He also asked for the exhumation and autopsy of
the remains of his son.[12] As the incident took place in Cebu, his complaint was referred to the NBI office in
Cebu City.
Modesto Cajita, head of NBI, Region VII (Cebu), took over the investigation of the case. He testified
that he met with Eddie Luntayao and supervised the exhumation and autopsy of the body of Randy
Luntayao.[13] Cajita testified that he also met with accused-appellant Carmen and after admitting that she
and the other accused-appellants conducted a pray-over healing session on the victim on January 27,
1997, accused-appellant Carmen refused to give any further statement. Cajita noticed a wooden bench in
the kitchen of Carmens house, which, with Carmens permission, he took with him to the NBI office for
examination. Cajita admitted he did not know the results of the examination.[14]
Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, the NBI medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on Randy Luntayao,
testified that he, the victims father, and some NBI agents, exhumed the victims body on February 20, 1997
at Tangke Catholic Cemetery in the Tangke, Talisay, Cebu. He conducted the autopsy on the same day and
later submitted the following report (Exhs. E and F):[15]
FINDINGS
Body in advanced stage of decomposition wearing a white shirt and shorts wrapped in printed blanket
(white and orange) placed in white wooden coffin and buried underground about 4 feet deep.
Contusion, 3.0 x 4.0 cms. chest, anterior, left side.
Fracture, 3rd rib, left, mid-clavicular line.
Fracture, linear, occipital bone right side extending to the bases of middle cranial fossae right to left down
to the occipital bone, left side.
Fracture, diastatic, lamboidal suture, bilateral.
Internal organs in advanced stage of decomposition.
Cranial vault almost empty.
CAUSE OF DEATH: [The victim] could have died due to the internal effects of a traumatic head injury
and/or traumatic chest injury.
Dr. Mendez testified that the contusion on the victims chest was caused by contact with a hard blunt
instrument. He added that the fracture on the rib was complete while that found on the base of the skull
followed a serrated or uneven pattern. He said that the latter injury could have been caused by the forcible
contact of that part of the body with a blunt object such as a wooden bench. [16]
On cross-examination, Dr. Mendez admitted that he did not find any stab wound on the victims body
but explained that this could be due to the fact that at the time the body was exhumed and examined, it
was already in an advanced state of decomposition rendering such wound, if present, unrecognizable. [17]
Accused-appellants did not testify. Instead, the defense presented: (a) Ritsel Blase, an alleged
eyewitness to the incident; (b) Maria Lilina Jimenez, Visitacion Seniega, and Josefina Abing, alleged former
patients of accused-appellant Carmen; (c) Dr. Milagros Carloto, the municipal health officer of Talisay, Cebu
and; (d) Atty. Salvador Solima of the Cebu City Prosecutors Office.
Ritsel Blase, 21, testified that since 1987 she had been with the group of accused-appellant Carmen,
whom she calls Mother Perpetuala. She recounted that at around 2 oclock in the afternoon of January 27,
1997, while she was in the house of accused-appellant Carmen, she saw Eddie Luntayao talking with the
latter regarding the treatment of his son. The boy was later led to the kitchen and given a bath prior to
treatment. After water was poured on the boy, he became unruly prompting accused-appellant Carmen to
decide not to continue with the treatment, but the boys parents allegedly prevailed upon her to
continue. As the boy continued to resist, accused-appellant Carmen told accused-appellants Delia Sibonga
and Celedonia Fabie to help her (Carmen) lay the boy on a bench. As the child resisted all the more, Eddie
Luntayao allegedly told the group to tie the boy to the bench. Accused-appellant Delia Sibonga got hold of
a nylon rope which was used to tie the child to the bench. Then Carmen, Delia Sibonga, and Fabie prayed
over the child, but as the latter started hitting his head against the bench, Carmen asked Nuez to place his
hands under the boys head to cushion the impact of the blow everytime the child brought down his
head. To stop the boy from struggling, accused-appellant Fabie held the boys legs, while accused-appellant
Nuez held his shoulders. After praying over the boy, the latter was released and carried inside the
house.Accused-appellant Alexander Sibonga, who had arrived, helped carry the boy inside. After this, Blase
said she no longer knew what happened inside the house as she stayed outside to finish the laundry. [18]
Blase testified that the parents of Randy Luntayao witnessed the pray-over of their son from beginning
to end. She denied that accused-appellants Fabie and Delia Sibonga struck the victim on his chest with
their fists. According to her, neither did accused-appellant Carmen stab the boy. She claimed that Randy
was still alive when he was taken inside the house.[19]
The defense presented Maria Lilia Jimenez, 20, Visitacion Seniega, 39, and Josefina Abing, 39, who
testified that accused-appellant Carmen had cured them of their illnesses by merely praying over them
and without applying any form of physical violence on them.[20]
Milagros Carloto, Municipal Health Officer of Talisay, Cebu, was also presented by the defense to testify
on the death certificate she issued in which she indicated that Randy Luntayao died of
pneumonia. According to her, Eddie Luntayao came to her office on January 28, 1997 to ask for the
issuance of a death certificate for his son Randy Luntayao who had allegedly suffered from cough and
fever.[21]
On cross-examination, Dr. Carloto admitted that she never saw the body of the victim as she merely
relied on what she had been told by Eddie Luntayao. She said that it was a midwife, Mrs. Revina Laviosa,
who examined the victims body.[22]
The last witness for the defense, Assistant City Prosecutor Salvador Solima, was presented to identify
the resolution he had prepared (Exh. 8) [23] on the re-investigation of the case in which he recommended
the dismissal of the charge against accused-appellants. His testimony was dispensed with, however, as the
prosecution stipulated on the matters Solima was going to testify with the qualification that Solimas
recommendation was disapproved by City Prosecutor Primo Miro.[24]
The prosecution recalled Eddie Luntayao to the stand to rebut the testimonies of Ritsel Blase and Dr.
Milagros Carloto. Eddie denied having witnessed what accused-appellants did to his son. He reiterated his
earlier claim that after accused-appellants had taken Randy, he and his wife and two daughters were
locked inside a room. He disputed Blases statement that his son was still alive when he was brought into
the prayer room. He said he saw that his sons head slumped while being carried by accused-appellants. [25]
As for the testimony of Dr. Carloto, Eddie admitted having talked with her when he and accused-
appellant Nuez went to her office on January 28, 1997. However, he denied having told her that his son
was suffering from fever and cough as he told her that Randy had a nervous breakdown.He took exception
to Dr. Carlotos statement that he was alone when he went to her office because it was Nuez who insisted
that he (Eddie) accompany him in order to secure the death certificate. [26]
On November 18, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, [the] accused are all found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are hereby [sentenced] to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased Randy Luntayao in the sum of P50,000.00; and to pay the costs. The accused, are, however,
credited in full during the whole period of their detention provided they will signify in writing that they will
abide by all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary. [27]
In finding accused-appellants guilty of murder, the trial court stated:
Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. When death occurs, it is
presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted. Since the defendant did commit the
crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the voluntary presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery (P v. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 530). All the accused in the case at bar had contributed
different acts in mercilessly inflicting injuries to the victim. For having immersed the head of the victim into
the barrel of water, all the herein accused should be held responsible for all the consequences even if the
result be different from that which was intended (Art. 4, par. 1, RPC). It is pointed out that in P. v. Cagoco,
58 Phil. 524, even if there was no intent to kill[,] in inflicting physical injuries with treachery, the accused in
that case was convicted of murder. In murder qualified by treachery, it is required only that there is
treachery in the attack, and this is true even if the offender has no intent to kill the person
assaulted. Under the guise of a ritual or treatment, the accused should not have intentionally immersed
upside down the head of Randy Luntayao into a barrel of water; banged his head against the bench;
pounded his chest with fists, or plunged a kitchen knife to his side so that blood would come out for these
acts would surely cause death to the victim. . . .
One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and
logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. Ordinarily, when a person commits a felony
with malice, he intends the consequences of his felonious act. In view of paragraph 1 of Art. 4, a person
committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious acts are not intended
by him. . . .
....
Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. The presumption of criminal intent may arise
from the proof of the criminal act and it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. In the case at bar,
there is enough evidence that the accused confederated with one another in inflicting physical harm to the
victim (an illegal act). These acts were intentional, and the wrong done resulted in the death of their
victim. Hence, they are liable for all the direct and natural consequences of their unlawful act, even if the
ultimate result had not been intended.[28]
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants allege that the trial court erred in convicting them of murder.
[29]
First. It would appear that accused-appellants are members of a cult and that the bizarre ritual
performed over the victim was consented to by the victims parents. With the permission of the victims
parents, accused-appellant Carmen, together with the other accused-appellants, proceeded to subject the
boy to a treatment calculated to drive the bad spirit from the boys body. Unfortunately, the strange
procedure resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-appellants had no criminal intent to kill the
boy. Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought that to know their actions
would not bring about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and not of murder.
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in
voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason
of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. Compared to intentional
felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or intention to commit
a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his
employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding
persons, time, and place.
The elements of reckless imprudence are apparent in the acts done by accused-appellants which,
because of their lack of medical skill in treating the victim of his alleged ailment, resulted in the latters
death. As already stated, accused-appellants, none of whom is a medical practitioner, belong to a religious
group, known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima, which is engaged in faith healing.
In United States v. Divino,[30] the accused, who was not a licensed physician, in an attempt to cure the
victim of ulcers in her feet, wrapped a piece of clothing which had been soaked in petroleum around the
victims feet and then lighted the clothing, thereby causing injuries to the victim. The Court held the
accused liable for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. It was noted that the accused had no
intention to cause an evil but rather to remedy the victims ailment.
In another case, People v. Vda. de Golez,[31] the Court ruled that the proper charge to file against a
non-medical practitioner, who had treated the victim despite the fact that she did not possess the
necessary technical knowledge or skill to do so and caused the latters death, was homicide through
reckless imprudence.
The trial courts reliance on the rule that criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an
unlawful act is untenable because such presumption only holds in the absence of proof to the contrary.
[32]
The facts of the case indubitably show the absence of intent to kill on the part of the accused-
appellants. Indeed, the trial courts findings can be sustained only if the circumstances of the case are
ignored and the Court limits itself to the time when accused-appellants undertook their unauthorized
treatment of the victim. Obviously, such an evaluation of the case cannot be allowed.
Consequently, treachery cannot be appreciated for in the absence of intent to kill, there is no
treachery or the deliberate employment of means, methods, and manner of execution to ensure the safety
of the accused from the defensive or retaliatory attacks coming from the victim. [33] Viewed in this light, the
acts which the trial court saw as manifestations of treachery in fact relate to efforts by accused-appellants
to restrain Randy Luntayao so that they can effect the cure on him.
On the other hand, there is no merit in accused-appellants contention that the testimony of
prosecution eyewitness Honey Fe Abella is not credible. The Court is more than convinced of Honey Fes
credibility. Her testimony is clear, straightforward, and is far from having been coached or contrived. She
was only a few meters away from the kitchen where accused-appellants conducted their pray-over healing
session not to mention that she had a good vantage point as the kitchen had no roof nor walls but only a
pantry. Her testimony was corroborated by the autopsy findings of Dr. Mendez who, consistent with Honey
Fes testimony, noted fractures on the third left rib and on the base of the victims skull. With regard to Dr.
Mendezs failure to find any stab wound in the victims body, he himself had explained that such could be
due to the fact that at the time the autopsy was conducted, the cadaver was already in an advanced state
of decomposition. Randy Luntayaos cadaver was exhumed 24 days after it had been buried. Considering
the length of time which had elapsed and the fact that the cadaver had not been embalmed, it was very
likely that the soft tissues had so decomposed that, as Dr. Mendez said, it was no longer possible to
determine whether there was a stab wound. As for the other points raised by accused-appellants to detract
the credibility of Honey Fes testimony, the same appear to be only minor and trivial at best.
Accused-appellants contend that the failure of the prosecution to present the testimony of Frances
Claire Rivera as well as the knife used in stabbing Randy Luntayao puts in doubt the prosecutions
evidence. We do not think so. The presentation of the knife in evidence is not indispensable. [34]
Finally, accused-appellants make much of the fact that although the case was tried under Judge
Renato C. Dacudao, the decision was rendered by Judge Galicano Arriesgado who took over the case after
the prosecution and the defense had rested their cases. [35] However, the fact that the judge who wrote the
decision did not hear the testimonies of the witnesses does not make him less competent to render a
decision, since his ruling is based on the records of the case and the transcript of stenographic notes of the
testimonies of the witnesses.[36]
Second. The question now is whether accused-appellants can be held liable for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, considering that the information charges them with murder. We hold that they can.
Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent parts:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in
or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.
In Samson v. Court of Appeals,[37] the accused were charged with, and convicted of, estafa through
falsification of public document. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment and held one of the
accused liable for estafa through falsification by negligence. On appeal, it was contended that the appeals
court erred in holding the accused liable for estafa through negligence because the information charged
him with having wilfully committed estafa. In overruling this contention, the Court held:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon v. Justice of
the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi
offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater
includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged
with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in
effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act
with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity
of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts
which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered
by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof. . . .
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence is of no
moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and the
result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would
be incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal
intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence.
In People v. Fernando,[38] the accused was charged with, and convicted of, murder by the trial
court. On appeal, this Court modified the judgment and held the accused liable for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide after finding that he did not act with criminal intent.
Third. Coming now to the imposable penalty, under Art. 365, reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period. In this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
accused-appellants should suffer the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
As to their civil liability, accused-appellants should pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao an indemnity in
the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount of P50,000.00.[39] In addition, they
should pay exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 in view of accused-appellants gross
negligence in attempting to cure the victim without a license to practice medicine and to give an example
or correction for the public good.[40]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months ofprision correccional, as maximum. In addition,
accused-appellants are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 134540-41. July 18, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DIONISIO BATALLER yVARGAS, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
To justify the imposition of the capital punishment on a father accused of raping his own minor
daughter, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, not only that he committed the heinous
act, but also that the victim was indeed below eighteen years of age when the dastardly deed took place.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the Joint Decision [1] dated June 4, 1998, promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, Branch 13. The Decision found Dionisio Bataller y Vargas guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of twice raping his 17-year-old daughter, acts for which the supreme penalty of death
was meted out to him twice also. The decretal portion of the Decision is worded as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration and finding the accused Dionisio Bataller y Vargas
guilty beyond any reasonable doubt of the crime of rape against his 17-year old daughter, Precila B.
Bataller, the Court hereby:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 3577 sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of DEATH; and
(b) In Criminal Case No. 3578 sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
The accused is ordered to inde[m]nify the offended party [in] the amount of P100,000.00 and to pay the
costs.
In compliance with the existing constitutional provision the records of these cases together with all the
exhibits and stenographic notes are hereby ordered immediately elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court
for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On the basis of a Complaint subscribed to by his daughter Precila Bataller, appellant was charged
before the court a quo with two (2) counts of rape in two separate Informations (Criminal Case Nos. 3577
and 3578)[3] both dated June 25, 1997. Except as to the date of the commission of the crimes, both
Informations are similarly worded as follows:
That at or about 12:00 oclock midnight of March 2, 1997 at Sta. Ana Street, Barangay Tinago, Municipality
of Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd design, and with grave abuse of his parental authority, did then and there
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously ha[ve] sexual intercourse with his daughter, Precila B. Bataller, a 17
year old girl, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. [4]
When arraigned on August 1, 1997, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio,[5]pleaded
not guilty.[6] Thereafter ensued pretrial and trial on the merits, culminating in the conviction of appellant as
earlier stated.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general summarizes the evidence for the prosecution in this wise: [7]
The victim Precila Bataller was 17 years old when she was raped by her own father, the appellant Dionisio
Bataller. She was single, an out of school youth and a resident of Sta. Ana, Tinago, Ligao[,] Albay. Her
highest educational attainment then was Grade IV. She did not know the date [on which] she was born or
the number of months in a year. She did not also know the age of her brother Freddie.
On March 1, 1997, at about 12:00 oclock in the evening, Precila Bataller was in their house sleeping
together with her brothers Benedict and Jomar and sister Miche[l]le. Their bedroom was about 2 meters in
width and 7 meters in length. Their sleeping arrangement that night starting from her was as follows:
Benedict to her right and to her left was Michel[l]e followed by Jomar. Her mother and her eldest brother
Freddie were then in Manila. Appellant slept in the balcony, four (4) meters away from their room.
On said date and time, while they were sleeping, appellant [turned] off the light in their bedroom.Appellant
then went up to their bedroom, ordered her to remove her clothes. Appellant also removed his clothes and
then [lay] on top of her. He inserted his organ [into] her private part and had carnal knowledge [of]
her. She felt pain. She cried but she did not shout or do anything because appellant threatened to kill them
all. After[wards], appellant went to the toilet to urinate. She then put on her clothes.
The following day, March 2, 1997, at about 12:00 oclock in the evening, the same thing happened.After
[turning] off the light, appellant went to their bedroom. He ordered her to undress. Appellant also removed
his clothes. After undressing, appellant had carnal knowledge [of] her. It was also painful. She cried but she
did not shout because appellant threatened to kill them. After having carnal knowledge [of] her, appellant
went to the comfort room. She put on her clothes and cried.
She revealed what happened to her Tia Glo who then informed her Tia Azon.

Her Tia Azon accompanied her to the police station where she prepared her criminal complaint.After going
to the police station, they went to a doctor for medical examination.
Jomar Bataller, the nine (9) year old son of the appellant and a Grade II pupil corroborated his sisters story
that at about midnight of March 1, 1997, he was suffering from asthma when his father [turned] off the
light. His mother and elder brother were in Manila. Aside from him, the members of the family who were
left at home were the appellant, his Ate Precila, Benedict and Michele. [8] After [turning] off the light,
appellant removed his clothes. He told x x x Precila to undress too.After[wards], appellant had carnal
knowledge [of] her x x x. [Jomar] heard a creaking sound in the bedroom and heard his sister crying.
The same incident happened on March 2, 1997 at about the same time. He was sleeping with his brother
Benedict and sisters Precila and Michele. As in the previous night he slept beside his sister
Precila. Appellant again [turned] off the light. He removed his clothes and made x x x Precila undress
also. [Jomar] heard a creaking sound and his Ate Precila crying. Later, appellant went down.
Dr. Maria Nimfa Joji Quinones examined Precila. She found that Precilas labia majora was slightly
gaping. The labia minora [had a] whitish discharge [and was] slightly gaping[,] exposing partly the
hymenal caruncle, hymen healed, and la[c]erations at 11:00 and 6:00 oclock with slight redness on both
sides. (citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellants version of the incident is as follows: [9]
DIONISIO BATALLER the accused-appellant in the case at bar admitted that he is the father of the private
complainant[,] however, he denied the accusation that he raped his daughter, Precila Bataller on March 1
and 2, 1997. He submitted that the accusation was hurled against him because his sister-in-law, Corazon
Omanga, who ha[d] a personal grudge [against] him, used her niece (Precila) and fabricated the stories of
rape. Also, his son Jomar testified against him because he was instructed by the fiscal.
DOMINGO QUITO, testified that on September 8, 1997, Marta, accused-appellants wife, went to his house
and told him that she (Marta) wanted to reinvestigate Precila whether it was her father or another man
who abused her. When Precila was asked whether it was her father or another man who abused her, Precila
remained silent to the question which was posed [to] her thrice. However, after a while, Precila broke her
silence and said that it was her brother (Si Kuya man sana), referring to Freddie. He (Domingo) told Marta
he could not believe what Precila said but he [could] not do anything about it. (citations omitted)
After a full-blown trial, the court a quo found appellant guilty of incestuous rape on two (2) counts, for
each of which he was sentenced to death. Wrote the trial judge:[10]
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution there is not an iota of doubt that Dionisio Bataller as
charged sexually abused his own 17-year old daughter, Precila Bataller, in the evening about midnight
successively on March 1 & 2, 1997, when his wife Marta was in Metro Manila employed as household
help. Only 46 years old and deprived of his conjugal privil[e]ge over his wife who had to work in Manila, the
accused went down [to] the level of a beast and turned to his own daughter to satisfy his carnal lust. No
child would fabricate a charge so serious against his/her own father especially if that charge carried with it
the maximum penalty of death unless such c[ha]rge is true.Against this serious accusation by his own
daughter, Dionisio Bataller has only a denial to offer explaining that he cannot do such a thing to his own
flesh and blood. Such denial cannot prevail over [or] against the positive testimony of Precila that it was
her own father on both occasions who sexually attacked her. Beside[s] this bestial act was witnessed by no
less than another child, 9-year old x x x asthmatic son, Jomar, who posit[i]vely declared he heard the
bedroom [creak] as his father did the push and pull on his own flesh and blood. The Court can just imagine
how pitiable the sight must have been [both] for x x x Jomar [who was] apparently pretending he was
asleep and controlling his asthmatic attacks lest his father discover he was awake[;] and for Precila who,
could do nothing but only cringe in fear and cry since the very person upon whom they [could] turn to for
protection [was] blinded by lust [and had] all of a sudden turned out to be a monster.
The accused charges Corazon Omanga, his sister-in-law, [with] having fabricated the charges because they
are business competitors. This Court is totally unconvinced. It is simply inconc[ei]vable that Corazon for
that reason alone would invent and Precila, already 17 years old would willingly agree to be a party to such
trump[ed]-up charges so serious that would merit no lessthan death [for] her brother-in-law and further x x
x. But if Corazon did testify the way she did, it [was] because she found revolting her brother-in-laws acts.

Devoid of defense, the accused attempted to show through Domingo Quitos testimony that Precilas
attacker was in fact her own brother Freddie. Allegedly Precila told Boy Quito later that it was Freddie who
sexually abused her. The testimony of Domingo Quito is total[l]y unreliable to sa[y] the least if not
[preposterous]. No less than the accused himself and his wife corroborated Precilas and Jomars
testimon[ies] that on March 1 and 2, 1997 Freddie was in Cavite in the same household working as cook
where Marta was herself employed. Twice Jomar was extensively cross-examined by two (2) different
lawyers from the Public Attorneys Office, an oversight which x x x escaped the notice of [both] this Court
as well as the Public Prosecutors, but on both [occasions] Jomar stuck to his testimony that when his sister
was sexually abused by his father both his mother and his eldest brother were in Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
Thus, this automatic review. [11]
Issue
In his Brief, appellant submits for our consideration this sole error: [12]
The lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime charged in the information despite
insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Courts Ruling
The conviction of appellant on two counts of rape is affirmed. However, due to the prosecutions failure
to prove sufficiently that the victim was a minor when the rape acts were committed,reclusion perpetua,
not death, is the proper penalty in each case.
Sole Issue: Sufficiency of the Evidence
After a thorough review of the pleadings, transcript of stenographic notes and other records of the
case, we are convinced that the court a quo did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of the victim
and the other prosecution witnesses.
In prosecutions for rape, the Court is always guided by the following principles: (a) an accusation of
rape can be made with facility, but to disprove it is difficult though the accused may be innocent; (b) in
view of the nature of the crime which usually involves only two persons, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merits and not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. [13]
The testimony of the victim, detailing how she was raped by her own father, was clear and
convincing. We quote at length:
PROSECUTOR VASQUEZ:
Q Where were you last March 1, 1997 at about 12:00 oclock in the evening?
A In the house.
Q Where is your house situated?
A In Sta. Ana.
Q What barangay?
A Tinago.
Q What municipality?
A Ligao.
Q What were you doing on the said date and time in your house?
A Sleeping.
Q Where were you sleeping?
A In the bedroom.
Q Were you alone when you were sleeping on March 1, 1997?
A No, sir.
Q Who were your companions?
A My siblings.
Q Can you describe before this Honorable Court your sleeping arrangement on the said date and time?
Do you still remember your sleeping arrangement?
A Yes, sir.
Q As you were sleeping who was on your right portion or right side portion?
A Benedict.
Q How about on your left side?
A Michele.
Q Now, who followed Michele?
A Jomar.
Q And then who followed Jomar?
A No one.
Q You said on your right side [was] Benedict. Who followed Benedict?
A No one.
Q Now, how big is your room?
WITNESS:
From this wall to that corner.
COURT:
What is the stipulation?
PROSECUTOR:
It is about 2 meters.
COURT:
What is that 2 meters, is that the width or the length?
PROSECUTOR:
Is that the width or the length of your room?
A The width.
Q How about the length?
INTERPRETER:
Witness is demonstrating the length.
COURT:
That is how many meters?
PROSECUTOR:
About seven (7) meters more or less your Honor.
Q Now, aside from your siblings who were then sleeping on March 1, 1997, who were the other persons
who were in your house at that time?
A Papa.
Q Where [did] your father sleep?
A In the balcony.
Q By the way, is your papa here in court?
A Yes, sir.
Q If he is here, will you please point to him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please point to him[.]
INTERPRETER:

Witness pointed to a sole person in the courtroom and said person x x x upon asked answered to the
name Dionisio Bataller.
PROSECUTOR:
Q You said that your father was sleeping in a balcony[;] how far is this balcony where your father was
sleeping to the room where you were then sleeping?
INTERPRETER:
Witness is indicating the appearance, apparently the entire area which is about four (4) meters.
PROSECUTOR:
Q Now, while sleeping do you remember whether there was an unusual incident that happened?
COURT:
Who was with your father in the balcony?
WITNESS:
No one your Honor.
PROSECUTOR:
Q Now, how about your mother, where was she on March 1, 1997?
A In Manila.
Q How about your brother, Freddie, where was he at that time?
A In Manila.
Q While sleeping on March 1, 1997 at about 12:00 oclock midnight, do your remember as to whether
there was an unusual incident that happened?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that incident?
A Papa put out the light.
Q And where was that light situated insofar as your father is concerned?
A Up.
Q In your room?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, after putting out the light, what happened next?
A He went up.
Q Went up where?
A In the bedroom.
Q In your bedroom where you were sleeping?
A Yes, sir.
Q And while inside your bedroom what did your father do if any?
A He made me strip off my clothes.
Q Specifically what clothes were you ordered to strip?
A My pants.
Q What else?
A My panty.
Q What else?
A T-shirt.
Q And then after undressing what followed next?
A My Papa also strip[ped] off his clothes.
Q And after that what happened next?
A My father [lay] on top of me.
Q After [lying] on top of you, what else did your father do?
A He inserted.
Q [W]hat did he insert?
A Papas organ.
Q Where?
A In my organ.
Q And after inserting his organ into yours what did your father do if any?
A He made the push and pull motion.
Q For how long did your father [do] that to you?
A Quite a time.
COURT:
What did you feel when your father inserted his organ into yours? What did you feel?
WITNESS:
Painful.
COURT:
And what did you feel when your father made the push and pull?
WITNESS:
Painful.
COURT:
So, what did you do when you felt pain?
WITNESS:
I cried.
PROSECUTOR:
Q Aside from crying what did you do?
A Nothing.
Q You did not shout?
A I did not.
Q Why?
A Because Papa threaten[ed] that he [would] kill us.
Q Now, just before your father disengaged [from] you, what did you notice from his penis?
A None.
COURT:
After your father disengaged from you where did he go?
A To the bathroom.
Q And what did he do there?
A He urinated.
Q After that what happened next?
A He sat in the balcony.
Q How about you, what did you do after your father went to the toilet and urinated?
A None.
Q You just [lay] still without your panty and pants and T-shirt after your father left?
A I put on my clothes.
Q When did you put on all your clothes, was it when your father was on top of you or when your father
went to the toilet to urinate x x x?
A When he went to the comfort room.
PROSECUTOR:
Q Aside from that, on March 2, 1997 in the evening where were you?
A In the house.
Q What were you doing at that time?
A Sleeping.
Q Who were with you while you were sleeping?
A My brothers and sisters.
Q And what was your sleeping arrangement, the same as that when you were sleeping last March 1,
1997?
A Yes, sir.
Q And how about your father, where was your father at that time?
A Sleeping.
Q Where?
A In the balcony.
Q How about your mother, where was your mother on March 2, 1997?
A In Manila.
Q How about your brother, Freddie, where was he [on] that date? and [at that] time?
A In Manila.
Q Now, while then sleeping, can you recall x x x any unusual incident that happened?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that unusual incident that happened?
A My Papa [turned] off the light.
Q And after [turning] off the light what else happened?
A Papa went inside my bedroom.
Q After getting inside what did your father do?
A Again, he made me undress.
Q And after undressing, what else happened?
A He also undressed himself.
Q And after undressing himself what did he do?
A He [lay] on top of me.
Q And after lying on top of you, what did your father do?
A He inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q And after inser[t]ing his penis inside your vagina what else did he do?
A He again made the push and pull motion.
Q For how long did your father do that push and pull motion?
A Long.
Q And what did you feel when your father inserted his penis inside your vagina?
A Painful.
Q And what did you do?
A I cried.
Q Did you not shout?
A I did not.
Q Why?
A Because Papa threatened that he [would kill] us.
Q Now, you said that your father mounted on top of you and ha[d] sexual intercourse with you. What
did you notice in his penis after he disengaged himself?

A None.
Q Now, after your father was through doing the sexual act, where did he go?
A [To] the comfort room.
Q How about you, what did you do?
A I [p]ut on my clothes.
Q And after putting on your clothes, what did you do next?
A I cried.
Q And after crying what else did you do?
A No more.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, do you remember having executed a sworn statement in connection [with] these cases?
A Yes, sir.
Q Attached to the record[,] page 2 of the record[,] is a sworn statement of one Precila Bataller. Will you
please see x x x if this is the sworn statement you have executed?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know whose signature is this which appears above the type written name Precila Bataller?
A Mine.
Q Where was this taken?
A At the other end.
Q At the police station?
A Yes, sir.
Q There is also a signature above the type written name Precila Bataller appearing in the criminal
complaint[;] do you know whose signature is this?
A Mine.
Q Now, there is here a signature above the typewritten name Corazon Omanga[;] do you know whose
signature is this?
A Tiyas signature.
Q You mean you were with her when this criminal complaint was prepared?
A Yes, sir.
Q She was also with you when this sworn statement of yours was taken by the police?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now after going to the police where else did you go?
A To the doctor.
Q Were you medically examined?
A Yes, sir.[14]
For his defense, appellant relies on prosecution witnesses alleged inconsistencies regarding how
Precila was raped. But these purported inconsistencies pertain only to minor details and strengthen rather
than weaken her credibility. Well-settled is the rule that little inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of
their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimony. [15] We note that the victim had an
interpreter when she testified in open court. Translations from the vernacular are not always fully accurate.
Moreover, Precilas testimony was corroborated by her nine-year-old brother Jomar who, unable to
sleep because of an asthma attack, witnessed how his elder sister had been sexually assaulted by their
father for two consecutive nights. The boy testified in this wise:
PROSECUTOR VASQUEZ:
Q On March 1, 1997 at about 12:00 oclock in the evening where were you?
A Sleeping.
Q Sleeping where?

A In the bedroom.
Q Bedroom of your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And where is your house situated?
A In Sta. Ana, Ligao, Albay.
Q Now, you said you were sleeping. Who were with you while you were sleeping?
A Ate.
Q When you said Ate, to whom [were] you referring?
A (Witness pointed to the same girl who answered to the name of Precila Bataller)
Q Aside from Precila, your Ate, do you have any brothers or sisters sleeping on that said date in
question?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A Michelle.
Q Who else?
A Benedict.
Q This Benedict, who is older[,] you or Benedict?
A I.
Q Do you know how old is Benedict?
A I do not know.
Q How about Michelle, who is older[,] Michelle or you?
A I.
Q Now, where was your mother at that time?
A In Manila.
Q How about your father, where was he at that time?
A In the house.
Q You said that you were sleeping together with your Ate, meaning, Precila and also Michelle and
Benedict. While you were sleeping, what happened?
A My father put off the light.
Q Who is your father?
A (Again witness pointed to a man who a while ago answered or identified himself as the accused
Dionisio Bataller)
Q Now, after your father [turned] off the light, what did he do?
A He undressed himself.
Q After undressing himself, what did he do?
A He made Ate undress also.
Q And after that, what happened next?
A He [lay] on top of Ate.
Q After [lying] on top of your Ate, meaning, Precila, what else did your father do?
A After that Papa went down.
Q Before your father went down, you said that your father [lay] on top of your sister[;] what else did you
notice?
A I heard a cr[ea]king sound [in] the bedroom.
Q Aside from cr[ea]king sound, what else did you notice?
A Papa went down.

Q Before your father went down and you heard the cr[ea]king sound [in] the bedroom, what else did
you hear if any?
A That night I was suffering from asthma attack.
Q What did you notice from your sister [--] according to you your father [lay] on top of her?
A I heard my sister crying.
Q And then can you estimate more or less how many minutes your father [lay] on top of your sister?
ATTY. DE JESUS:
Leading.
COURT:
Allowed.
WITNESS:
A It took a while.
PROSECUTOR:
A And after that your father went down?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, on March 2, 1997 at about same time, where were you?
A Sleeping.
Q Who were with you at that time while you were sleeping?
A Michelle, Benedict.
Q Who else?
A And Ate.
Q When you said Ate you [were] referring to Precila?
A Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR:
Q Now, you said that on March 2, 1997 about the same time, 12:00 oclock in the evening you were
sleeping and you already explained your sleeping arrangement. What happened when you were
sleeping at that time?
WITNESS:
A Papa [turned] off the light.
Q After [turning] off the light, what did your father do?
A He undressed himself.
Q And then afterwards, what happened next?
A Papa made Ate undress herself.
Q And then after that what happened next?
A Papa [lay] on top of Ate.
Q After your father [lay] on top of your sister, Ate, what else did your father do if any?
A I heard our bedroom cr[ea]king.
Q For how long?
A For quite a time.
Q How about your sister, your Ate, what did she do, what did you notice from her?
A Ate was crying.
Q After that what happened next?
A After that Papa went down.[16]

Jomars straightforward and candid testimony lends credence to the charges that appellant really raped
his own daughter.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are further strengthened by the medical findings of Dr.
Maria Nimfa Joji Quiones, rural health physician of the Ligao Municipal Health Office. The medical
examination of the rape victim yielded the following findings:
HEENT: L eye deformity
GENITALIA: LMP February 1997
Pregnancy test (-) negative
Labia Majora slightly gaping

Labia Minora with whitish discharge, slightly gaping exposing partly the hymenal caruncle
Hymen healed laceration at 11:00 and with slight redness on both sides
Vaginal Orifice able to admit two examining [f]ingers, corrugations noted at the anterior and
posterior wall[17]
Clearly, the condition of the victims genitalia supports the fact of sexual intercourse.
Appellants denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the victim, who identified him as her
malefactor. Elementary is the rule that a bare denial is a negative declaration which deserves no
consideration and cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of the victim which is corroborated by
more evidence. It cannot survive the positive identification of the malefactor by the victim. Affirmative
testimony is far stronger than a negative one, especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible
witness.[18]
Moreover, in cases of incestuous rape, this Court usually gives more weight to the testimonies of
young rape victims, especially a barrio lass like private complainant. No woman would cry rape, undergo a
public trial and relate the details of her defilement, unless motivated by her quest to right an injustice
done to her.[19]
Time and time again the Court has held that appellate courts will not disturb the evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses by the trial court because, having observed their deportment and manner of
testifying, it was in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies. This rule stands, unless the trial
judge overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case.[20] We do not find any exceptions here to justify a deviation from the general rule.
Proper Penalty
Although the prosecution was able to prove that appellant indeed raped his own daughter, we believe
that its failure to prove sufficiently that she was a minor when the rape took place is fatal to the imposition
of the capital punishment.
As held recently in various cases, the age of the victim at the time she was raped needs to be credibly
proven with moral certainty. In People v. Javier,[21] the Court unanimously held as follows:
"x x x Although the victim's age was not contested by the defense, proof of age of the victim is
particularly, necessary in this case considering that the victim's age which was then 16-years old [was] just
two years less than the majority age of 18. In this age of modernism, there is hardly any difference
between a 16-year old girl and an 18-year old one insofar as physical features and attributes are
concerned. A physically developed 16-year old lass may be mistaken for an 18-year old young woman, in
the same manner that a frail and young looking 18-year old lady may pass [for] a 16-year old minor. Thus,
it is in this context that independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so
as to remove an[y] iota of doubt that the victim [was] indeed under 18 years of age as to fall under the
qualifying circumstances enumerated in Republic Act No. 7659. In a criminal prosecution especially of
cases involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must be established by the
prosecution in order for said penalty to be upheld. x x x. Verily, the minority of the victim must be proved
with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Otherwise, failure to sufficiently establish the
victim's age is fatal and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form."
Ruling that the burden of proving the age of the victim fell on the prosecution, the Court inPeople v.
Cula[22] said:
At all events, it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below
18 when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The record of the

case is bereft of any independent evidence, such as the victim's duly certified Certificate of Live Birth,
accurately showing private complainant's age. The fact that accused-appellant Manuel has not denied the
allegation in the complaint that Maricel was 16 years old when the crime was committed cannot make up
for the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden in this regard. Because of this lapse, as well as the
corresponding failure of the trial court to make a categorical finding as to the minority of the victim, we
hold that the qualifying circumstance of minority under Republic Act No. 7659 cannot be appreciated in
this case, and accordingly the death penalty cannot be imposed.
In People v. Tabanggay,[23] the minority of the victims was not sufficiently proven by the bare
testimonies, which they and their mother had given. The Court ruled thus:
"x x x [W]e find insufficient the bare testimony of private complainants and their mother as to their ages
as well as their kinship to the appellant. We note that a photocopy of Genalyn's Birth Certificate is included
in the records of the case. But it was neither duly certified nor formally offered in evidence. Therefore, no
probative value can be given to it. Furthermore, we cannot agree with the solicitor general that appellant's
admission of his relationship with his victims would suffice.Elementary is the rule that the prosecution
bears the burden of proving all the elements of a crime, including the qualifying circumstances. In sum, the
death penalty cannot be imposed upon appellant."
In the instant case, the records are bereft of any birth certificate or any other authentic document or
record establishing the exact age of the victim. Moreover, the victim herself did not even know the date
she was born or the number of months in a year or the age of her eldest brother, Freddie, as shown by her
testimony:
PROSECUTOR VASQUEZ:
Q Do you know the accused in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is the name of the accused in this case?
A Dionisio Bataller.
Q Are you in any way related to him?
A He is my father.
Q Your natural father?
A Yes, sir.
Q Your mother and father are legally married?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, when were you born?
A I do not know.
Q Now, how many siblings do you have?
A Six (6).
Q Who is the eldest?
A Freddie.
Q Do you know how old Freddie was? Last March 1 & 2, 1997?
A I do not know.
Q Who is next to Freddie?
A I.
Q And who followed you?
A Michele.
Q After Michele?
A Benedict.
Q After Jomar?
A Jolina.
Q Did you ever attend school or classes?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is your highest educational attainment?
A Grade IV.
Q Do you know how many months [there are] in a year?
A I do not know.
Q Do you know how many days are there in a month?
A I do not know.
Q Do you know how many days are there in a week?
A I do not know.[24]
Given this uncertainty as to the victims age, the supreme penalty of death cannot be imposed on
appellant, because the prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was
indeed below 18 years when the defilement took place.
Damages
The trial court did not award moral or exemplary damages to the victim. This Court, in accordance with
current jurisprudence,[25] deems it proper to grant both reliefs. Moral damages are awarded to rape victims
without need of pleading or proof of the basis thereof. [26] Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are
granted when an aggravating circumstance, which is not offset by a mitigating one, attended the
commission of the crime. In several cases, we have held that the relationship between appellant and the
rape victim justifies the award of exemplary damages, in order to deter fathers with perverse sexual
behavior from sexually abusing their daughters.[27]
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision dated June 4, 1998, issued by the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay,
Branch 13, is hereby AFFIRMED, with the following modifications: (1) appellant is found guilty of simple
rape on two counts; and, (2) for each count, he is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the
victim P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary
damages. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 141702-03. August 2, 2001]
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
MARTHA Z. SINGSON, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the 20 September 1999 Decision [1] of the Court
of Appeals declaring respondent Martha Z. Singson illegally dismissed by petitioner Cathay Pacific Airways,
Ltd., and thus should be reinstated with full back wages and awarded moral as well as exemplary
damages.
This petition traces its origin to two (2) petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 initially filed with the
Supreme Court: Martha Z. Singson v. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and Cathay Pacific
Airways Ltd., SP Case No. 52104, and Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. National Labor Relations Commission
and Martha Z. Singson, SP Case No. 52105, which were consolidated [2] and referred[3] to the Court of
Appeals in consonance with the St. Martin Funeral Homes doctrine.
Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (CATHAY), is an international airline company engaged in providing
international flight services while Martha Z. Singson was a cabin attendant of CATHAY hired in the
Philippines on 24 September 1990 with home base in Hongkong.
On 26 August 1991 Singson was scheduled on a five (5)-day flight to London but was unable to take
the flights as she was feeling fatigued and exhausted from her transfer to a new apartment with her
husband. On 29 August 1991 she visited the company doctor, Dr. Emer Fahy, who examined and
diagnosed her to be suffering from a moderately severe asthma attack. She was advised to take a Ventolin
nebulizer and increase the medication she was currently taking, an oral Prednisone (steroid). Dr Fahy

thereafter conveyed to Dr. John G. Fowler, Principal Medical Officer, her findings regarding Singsons
medical condition as a result of which she was evaluated as unfit for flying due to her medical condition.
On 3 September 1991 Singson again visited Dr. Fahy during which time the latter declared her
condition to have vastly improved. However, later that day, Cabin Crew Manager Robert J. Nipperess
informed Singson that CATHAY had decided to retire her on medical grounds effective immediately based
on the recommendation of Dr. Fowler and Dr. Fahy.
Martha Z. Singson was surprised with the suddenness of the notification but nonetheless
acknowledged it. Later, she met with Nipperess and inquired of possible employment that entailed only
ground duties within the company. She was advised to meet with certain personnel who knew of the
employment requirements in other departments in the company, and to await a possible offer from the
company.
On 20 December 1991 Singson filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint against CATHAY for illegal
dismissal, with prayer for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Efforts on initial
settlement having failed, trial followed.
Robert J. Nipperress and Dr. John G. Fowler appeared as witnesses for CATHAY. Nipperess confirmed
that the decision to retire respondent was made upon the recommendation of Dr. Fowler.In turn, Dr. Fowler
testified that the affliction of respondent with asthma rendered her unfit to fly as it posed aviation risks,
i.e., asthma disabled her from properly performing her cabin crew functions, specifically her air safety
functions.
On the other hand, Singson presented herself and Dr. Benjamin Lazo, a doctor in the country
specializing in internal medicine and pulmonary diseases. She denied being afflicted with asthma at any
point in her life, while Dr. Lazo confirmed the same declaring that at the time of his examination of Singson
he found her to be of normal condition.
On the basis of the evidence presented before him, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu Jr. declared CATHAY
liable for illegal dismissal and ordered the airline to pay Singson HK$531,150.80 representing full back
wages and privileges, HK$54,137.70 for undisputed benefits due her, HK$100,000.00 as actual damages,
HK$500.00 as moral damages, HK$500.00 as exemplary damages, and HK$168,528.85 as attorneys
fees. Furthermore, CATHAY was ordered to reinstate Singson to her former position as airline stewardess
without loss of seniority rights, benefits and privileges.
On 19 March 1993 CATHAY appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the National Labor Relations
Commission. On 29 December 1994 the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and declared valid
Singsons dismissal from service.[4] Relying on the testimony of Dr. Fowler and the affidavit and medical
records submitted by Dr. Fahy, admitted as newly-discovered evidence, the NLRC found Singson to be
indeed afflicted with asthma that rendered her unfit to fly and perform cabin crew functions. Consequently,
the NLRC withdrew the back wages, moral and exemplary damages awarded to Singson for lack of factual
or legal basis. It however ordered CATHAY to retain her services as ground stewardess, with salaries and
benefits, noting that she had been reinstated therein since 12 March 1993. In turn, Singson was granted
the option to continue her employment with CATHAY.
Thereafter, both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration [5] before the NLRC which on
31 August 1995 were denied for lack of merit. Petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 were subsequently filed
by both parties before the Supreme Court which, after consolidation, were referred to the Court of Appeals
for resolution.[6]
Meanwhile, pursuant to the decision of the NLRC, Singson was reinstated as cabin stewardess with
ground duties on 12 March 1993 pending the resolution of the petitions.
On 20 September 1999 the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the NLRC and reinstated the
decision of the Labor Arbiter declaring Singson to have been illegally terminated. The appellate court
anchored its judgment on the following findings: First, Dr. Fowlers opinion about Singsons medical
condition was based on the personal examination of Dr. Fahy, and not his own. The appellate court held
that a personal and prolonged examination of a patient was necessary and crucial before he or she could
be properly diagnosed as afflicted with asthma,[7] and thus Dr. Fowlers expert opinion was unreliable and
mere hearsay. Second, CATHAY disregarded Sec. 8, Rule I, Book VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code[8] which requires a certification by a competent public health authority when disease is the
reason for an employees separation from service, since it relied merely on the diagnosis of its company
doctors, Dr. Fowler and Dr. Fahy.Third, the NLRC erroneously relied on the affidavit executed by Dr. Fahy
since she was not personally presented as a witness to identify and testify on its
contents. Fourth, respondent passed the medical examination required of prospective flight cabin
attendants, the International Labor Organizations Occupational Health and Safety in Civil Aviation
examination, prior to her employment and found to be fit for flight-related service. Fifth, CATHAY failed to
adequately prove the health standards required in aviation, particularly the non-qualification of flight
attendants afflicted with asthma to flight-related service.[9]
Consequently, the appellate court awarded respondent full back wages with reinstatement, as well as
moral exemplary damages, while deleting the award of actual damages reasoning that no undue damage
inured to her since her husband nonetheless remained in Hongkong managing two (2) corporations. The
appellate court however declared the option given to respondent to continue her employment as a ground
stewardess with CATHAY to have been erroneously issued and consequently nullified the same.
CATHAY now argues that the Court of Appeals should have confined its inquiry to issues of want or
excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion and not into the factual findings of the NLRC since the
petition before it was made under Rule 65.
This Court is not persuaded. CATHAYs petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals assailed
specifically the judgment of the NLRC granting respondent the choice to continue her employment with
CATHAY as ground stewardess as, in fact, she had been reinstated as such since 12 March 1993. On the
other hand, respondents petition attacked the NLRC decision declaring her dismissal valid and nullifying
the award of damages in her favor on the basis of Dr. Fowlers testimony and not Dr. Lazos. Consequently,
it was inevitable for the Court of Appeals to examine the evidence anew to determine whether the factual
findings of the NLRC were supported by the evidence presented and the conclusions derived therefrom
accurately ascertained. As pointed out by the appellate court, this became even more essential in view of
the fact that there was a conflict of decision between the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. We thus find no error
in the appellate courts evaluation of the evidence despite the pleadings being petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65.
CATHAY next argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting as evidence the affidavit of Dr.
Fahy. We agree. The appellate court may have overlooked the principle in labor cases that the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not always controlling. [10] It is not necessary that
affidavits and other documents presented conform to the technical rules of evidence as the Court
maintains a liberal stance regarding procedural deficiencies in labor case. [11] Section 3, Rule V, of the New
Rules of procedure of the NLRC specifically allows parties to submit position papers accompanied by all
supporting documents including affidavits of their respective witnesses which take the place of their
testimonies.[12] Thus, the fact that Dr. Fahy was not presented as witness to identify and testify on the
contents of her affidavit was not a fatal procedural flaw that affected the admissibility of her affidavit as
evidence.
The non-presentation of Dr. Fahy during the trial was duly explained she was no longer connected with
CATHAY and had transferred residence to Ireland. It is for this same reason that we find no error in the
NLRCs admission of Dr. Fahys written medical notes as newly-discovered evidence. Moreover, the
submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by theNew Rule of Procedure of the
NLRC, such submissions not being prejudicial to the party for the latter could submit counter-evidence. [13]
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we find Singson to have been illegally dismissed from the
service. Granting without admitting that indeed respondent was suffering from asthma, this alone would
not be valid ground for CATHAY to dismiss her summarily. Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code requires a certification by a competent public health authority that the
disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even
with proper medical treatment.
In the instant case, no certification by competent public health authority was presented by CATHAY. It
dismissed Singson based only on the recommendation of its company doctors who concluded that she was
afflicted with asthma. It did not likewise show proof that Singsons asthma could not be cured in six (6)
months even with proper medical treatment. On the contrary, when Singson returned to the company
clinic on 3 September 1991 or five (5) days after her initial examination on 29 August 1991, Dr. Fahy
diagnosed her condition to have vastly improved.

CATHAY could not take refuge in Clause 22 of the Conditions of Service it entered into with
Singson. Although a certification by a competent public health authority is not required, still CATHAY is
obliged to follow several steps under the Conditions of Service before terminating its employee. The
pertinent part of Clause 22 thereof provides
Clause 22. Sick Leave. xxxx In case of serious illness the Company will grant sick leave with full pay for the
first three months and with 2/3 of pay for the fourth month. Consideration will be given to granting the
cabin crew further sick leave, either with pay or off pay up to a further two months, or retiring the cabin
crew on medical ground xxxx
Thus, even on the assumption that asthma is a serious illness, this again would not excuse CATHAY
from ignoring procedure specified in its employment contract with Singson. Under the contract, Cathay
must first allow Singson to take a leave of absence and not to terminate her services right there and
then. It is only after the employee has enjoyed four (4) months of sick leave that the option to retire the
employee based on medical ground arises. In the instant case, Singson went to the company clinic on 29
August 1991. On 3 September 1991 she returned to the company clinic only to be told that effective
immediately she was dismissed on medical grounds.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in its award of moral and exemplary damages to
respondent. CATHAY summarily dismissed Singson from the service based only on the recommendation of
its medical officers, in effect, failing to observe the provision of the Labor Code which requires a
certification by a competent public health authority. Notably, the decision to dismiss Singson was reached
after a single examination only. CATHAYs medical officers recommended Singsons dismissal even after
having diagnosed her condition to have vastly improved. It did not make even a token offer for Singson to
take a leave of absence as what it provided in its Contract of Service. CATHAY is presumed to know the law
and the stipulation in its Contract of Service with Singson.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 September 1999 declaring the dismissal
of respondent Martha Z. Singson by petitioner CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD. as illegal and ordering her
reinstatement to her former or an equivalent position without loss of seniority rights, with full back wages
and benefits, and to pay her HK$500.00 as moral damages, HK$500.00 as exemplary damages plus ten
percent (10%) of the total monetary award as attorneys fees, is AFFIRMED. The amounts received by
respondent representing her six (6) months retirement gratuity and one (1) month pay in lieu of notice
should be DEDUCTED from respondents computed back wages, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127905. August 30, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO REMUDO Y SIRAY, accused-

appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 7659[1], is the 16 December 1996 Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95,
Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-96-67462, finding accused-appellant Danilo Remudo y Siray (hereafter
DANILO) guilty of the crime of rape committed against his own sister Marissa Remudo y Siray (hereafter
MARISSA), and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify MARISSA the amounts of
P50,000 as moral damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
On 26 August 1996, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City filed before the court below a
complaint[3] charging DANILO with rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659. The accusatory portion of the information reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of June 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, brother
of herein complainant, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with complainant MARISSA REMUDO y SIRAY, a
minor 13 years of age, without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said
MARISSA REMUDO y SIRAY in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-67462.
Upon arraignment on 16 September 1996, DANILO entered a plea of not guilty. On the same occasion,
the trial court denied the prosecutions motion for the consolidation of Criminal Case No. Q-96-67461 and
Criminal Case No. Q-96-67462 on the ground that while in the two cases MARISSA is the complainant, the
accused are not the same and the crimes charged in both were committed on different dates. The accused
in the first case is Pedro Hilario y Sirnicola.[4]
The first witness for the prosecution was Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra. However, on 14 October 1996, the
parties agreed to dispense with her testimony and entered into a stipulation that her testimony in Criminal
Case No. Q-96-67461 including all documentary evidence she testified on shall be deemed reproduced in,
and shall form part of, the record of Criminal case No. Q-96-67462.The parties likewise stipulated that
MARISSA was born on 12 July 1983.[5]
On 6 November 1996, MARISSA took the witness stand. She testified that she was born on 12 July
1983. At about 1:00 p.m. of 3 June 1996, at their residence at No. 87-K 6th Street, Kamuning, Quezon City,
her brother DANILO suddenly and forcefully pulled her by the arm and made her lie down on the
floor. While she was in that position, DANILO removed her undergarments and kissed her neck. Thereafter,
DANILO inserted his organ into her vagina and performed several pumping motions. MARISSA tried to
resist DANILOs advances by kicking him, but her efforts were in vain.It was only after he consummated his
bestial desire that he left her.[6]
MARISSA kept to herself her sad ordeal, as she was afraid of her Kuya DANILO. However, after a
month, MARISSA finally mustered enough courage and revealed DANILOs dastardly act to her teacher Mrs.
Batacan. The latter then brought MARISSA to an office of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) located at Kamuning, Quezon City.[7]
On 18 July 1996, DSWD Social Worker Felisa Amar brought MARISSA to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory Services for genital and medical examinations. [8] Upon examination, Dra. Freyra
found deep healed hymenal lacerations at 3, 6, and 9 oclock positions and concluded that MARISSA was no
longer a virgin.[9]
On 22 August 1996, MARISSA, accompanied by Barbara Garcia of the DSWD office in Marilac Hills,
Alabang, Muntinlupa,[10] reported to the police her defilement and executed herSinumpaang Salaysay.
[11]
Thereupon, MARISSA, assisted by her mother, filed a complaint for rape against DANILO. Likewise, Felisa
Amar and Barbara Garcia executed their respective Sinumpaang Salaysay,[12] but their testimonies were
dispensed with upon agreement by the parties.[13]
DANILO, the sole witness for the defense, invoked denial and alibi. According to him, on 3 July 1996, he
was at Cambridge, Cubao, Quezon City, working as a construction worker. As a construction worker he was
mostly out of their house, leaving at 7:00 a.m. and returning thereto only at 6:00 p.m. His relationship with
his sister MARISSA was fine, and he did not know of any reason why she implicated him in the commission
of an odious crime.[14] On cross-examination, DANILO stated that his place of work at the time of incident
was not at Cambridge, Cubao, but at Makabayan, Roces Avenue, Quezon City. [15]
In its decision,[16] the trial court found DANILO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It
observed that despite MARISSAs shyness and naivety she was able to positively testify in detail the
material circumstances of her defilement. It found no ulterior motive why MARISSA would file a serious
charge of rape against her own brother if her story of sexual ravishment were not true. Finally it ruled that
DANILOs self-serving negative evidence cannot stand against the prosecutions positive evidence.
In imposing the death penalty, the trial court appreciated the presence of the special circumstances of
relationship and minority provided for in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11
of R.A. No. 7659. It was not disputed that MARISSA was born on 12 July 1983, as testified to by her and as
admitted by the defense as part of the stipulation of facts; hence she was only almost 13 years old at the
time of the commission of the crime. It was likewise undisputed that DANILO is MARISSAs full-blood
brother.
On 9 September 1997, DANILO terminated the services of the Public Assistance Office (PAO) as his
counsel. After DANILO failed to inform us of the name and address of his counsel, we appointed Atty. Arthur
Lim as his counsel de oficio.
After several motions for extension of time to file the Appellants Brief, Atty. Lim filed on 9 August 1999
a Motion for Leave to File Petition for New Trial, which we denied in the Resolution of 31 August
1999. Despite the denial, a Verified Motion for New Trial was filed on 2 September 1999. In the Resolution
of 28 September 1999, the motion was denied.
On 8 September 2000, DANILO filed his Appellants Brief. He alleged therein that the trial court erred in
convicting him of the crime of rape and in sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death despite the fact
that
... THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF THE RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE COUNSEL.
II
... ASSUMING ARGUENDO THE ACCUSED DID HAVE CARNAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE COMPLAINANT, NO
FORCE OR VIOLENCE WAS EMPLOYED; FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WAS A
CONSENSUAL ACT OF THE PARTIES.
In support thereof DANILO now questions the dedication and effectiveness of Atty. Trebonian Tabang,
his counsel de oficio, during the trial. He alleges that Atty. Tabang failed to prove the impossibility of
consummating the sexual act in the presence of at least ten persons then residing at their house and to tie
up all loose ends by making sure that DANILO would remember the name of his employer, which could
have made his defense of alibi more acceptable. He further asserts that Atty. Tabang did not exert efforts
to interview DANILO and other vital witnesses whose testimonies could help him arrive at the conclusion
that the sexual congress between MARISSA and DANILO was a case of consensual act. Thus, having been
deprived of the adequate legal defense and representation, DANILO humbly submits that he be afforded
the opportunity to ventilate fully his defense in a new trial called for this purpose.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supports the trial courts finding and
conclusion that DANILO is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping MARISSA, his own sister. His bare
denial and alibi cannot overcome the categorical testimony of MARISSA that he violated her. Moreover,
there was no evidence of ulterior motive on the part of MARISSA to implicate DANILO in the commission of
the crime. Finally, the OSG finds that there is no need to meet anew the submissions of the appellant for
new trial based on his alleged newly discovered evidence, Marissas affidavit of retraction, because the
same had already been denied by us.
We find no reason to depart from our previous ruling denying DANILOs motion for new trial. It has been
ruled that the error of the defense counsel in the conduct of the trial is neither an error of law nor an
irregularity upon which a motion for new trial may be presented. Generally, the client is bound by the
action of his counsel in the conduct of his case and cannot be heard to complain that the result of the
litigation might have been different had his counsel proceeded differently. In criminal cases, as well as in
civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that blunders and mistakes may have been made in
the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence
of counsel does not furnish a ground for a new trial. If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for
reopening cases, there would never be an end to suits so long as a new counsel could be employed who
could allege and show that the prior counsel has not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned. To
do so would be to put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by accused persons
and their counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction. [17]
Moreover, DANILOs submission that Atty. Tabang fell short of the principles of advocacy towards his
clients cause does not persuade us. First, DANILO testified and insisted that he was not at the house at the
time of the alleged rape; he was out working at the construction site. Whether there were other persons in
the house is totally irrelevant to his defense. Second, the testimony of DANILOs employer would be
corroborative; hence it could be dispensed with. That Atty. Tabang did not get the name of the employer
and present him as witness is not proof of neglect of duty. All told, Atty. Tabang could not be faulted. For
while a lawyer owes fidelity to his clients cause, that fidelity should not, however, be at the expense of
truth and the administration of justice.[18]
The second assigned error is an alternative argument, with DANILO proposing that if indeed he had sex
with MARISSA it was with her full consent because no proof of force or intimidation was presented by the
prosecution.
Such theory is unavailing, as it is belied by the testimony of MARISSA that she resisted DANILOs sexual
acts by kicking him.[19] Undoubtedly, such offer of resistance negates consent.Besides, it is highly
inconceivable that MARISSA would simply yield to the bestial desire of her eldest brother had not her
resistance been overpowered. Moreover, in rape committed by a close kin, such as the victims father,
[20]
step-father,[21] uncle,[22] or the common-law-spouse of her mother, [23] it is not necessary that actual force
or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation. In
this case, DANILO, the eldest brother of MARISSA who was seven years her senior and whom she called
KUYA, had apparent moral ascendancy, not to mention physical superiority, over her. Hence, the absence
of force or intimidation in the perpetration of the crime would not earn him acquittal.
MARISSAs affidavit of retraction also deserves scant consideration. It has been held in so many cases
that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. [24] It
is quite incredible that after going through the process of having DANILO arrested by the police, positively
identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of physical examination of her
private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by recounting her anguish MARISSA would
suddenly turn around on appeal and declare that what transpired between her and DANILO was a
consensual sexual act.
Likewise, MARISSAs affidavit of retraction, as well as the affidavits of her mother Carmelita and sister
Nerissa, can hardly qualify as newly discovered evidence to justify new trial based on newly discovered
evidence. To justify new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the followingrequisites must concur: (a)
the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) such evidence is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably
change the judgment.[25]
The issue of credibility should also be resolved against DANILO. Time and again, we have said that we
will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of the witnesses unless
there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked
or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.[26]
In the instant case, we find no compelling reason to depart from the established rule. MARISSA clearly
testified that DANILO raped her. She recounted the details of her harrowing experience in a credible,
convincing and straightforward manner. In her direct examination, MARISSA testified as follows:
Q As your brother kissed your neck, what followed next...?
A He inserted his private organ into my private organ.
Q After your brother Danny inserted his private organ into your private organ, what transpired next...?
COURT: Put on record that the witness [is] having a hard time answering the question as she is now
crying.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Now the court will ask you, Madam witness what did your brother do if there was any when he
inserted his private organ into your private organ?
A He made a movement as if his organ was moved out and then moved in.
PROS: (to the witness)
Q And while your brother accused was making the in and out movement while atop you, what were you
doing at that time?
A I was resisting, sir.

COURT: (to the witness)
Q How did you resist your brother?
A I am [sic] kicking him your Honor.[27]
Thus, contrary to the claim of the defense, the prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty
the fact of rape and the identity of the culprit. Furthermore, there is absolutely no showing that MARISSA
was actuated by any sinister motive to falsely charge her own brother with such a serious crime. If she
admitted the ignominy she had undergone, allowed her private parts to be examined, exposed herself to
the trouble and inconvenience of a public trial, and endured the embarrassment and humiliation attached
to the revelation of that which ought to be suffered in silence, this Court is convinced that she had nothing
in mind except to obtain justice.[28] A victim of rape would not come out in the open if her motive were
anything other than to obtain justice.[29]
In light of the positive testimony of MARISSA proving DANILOs criminal accountability, his bare denial
must fail. A mere denial, like alibi is inherently a weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative
evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of a credible witness
who testifies on affirmative matters.[30]
Consequently, we affirm the trial courts imposition of the death penalty. In qualified rape, the
concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must both be alleged and
proved with certainty, otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed.
In the instant case, the information alleged that the victim was a 13-year-old minor and the accused
was the victims brother. While no birth certificate or any official document was presented to prove
MARISSAs age, we uphold the trial courts appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of
minority. MARISSAs testimony as to her date of birth coupled with DANILOs admission that MARISSA was
born on 12 July 1983 sufficiently established her minority. Hence, a birth certificate or any other official
document is no longer necessary to establish the minority of the victim, since the same is admitted and
undisputed by the accused himself.
The qualifying circumstance of relationship was also undisputedly proved by the prosecution.Moreover,
DANILO categorically admitted that MARISSA is his sister. Thus, on direct examination he declared:
Q Mr. Witness do you know the private complainant in this case, Marissa Remudo?
A Yes sir.
Q Why do you know Marissa Remudo?
A She is my sister.[31]
Four Members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes
the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the Court, by majority
vote, that the law is constitutional and the death penalty should be accordingly imposed.
With regard to the civil liability of the accused, we affirm the trial courts award of P50,000 for moral
damages. In this jurisdiction, moral damages in rape cases may be awarded to the victim in such amount
as the court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.Conformably with
recent case law, we reduce the lower courts award of exemplary damages from P30,000 to P25,000 in
order to deter brothers with perverse tendencies and aberrant sexual behaviors from sexually abusing
their siblings. Additionally, in line with current jurisprudence, [32]DANILO should be ordered to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P75,000.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, in Criminal Case
No. Q-96-67462 finding accused-appellant DANILO REMUDO y SIRAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No.
7659, and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty and to pay the victim MARISSA REMUDO P50,000 as
moral damages is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the amount awarded for exemplary
damages is reduced from P30,000 to P25,000 and said accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the
victim an additional amount of P75,000 as indemnity.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659,
upon finality of this decision, let certified true copies thereof and the record of this case be forwarded
forthwith to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the clemency and pardoning power.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 142602-05. October 3, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BONIFACIO ARIOLA,accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These cases are here on automatic appeal from the decision, [1] dated September 30, 1999, of the
Regional Trial Court, branch 36, Santiago City, Isabela, in view of the penalty imposed on accused-
appellant who was found guilty of four counts of rape and sentenced to suffer in each case the penalty of
death and to pay the victim, Maribel Ariola, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity and the costs of suit,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Except as to the dates of commission of the crime, four informations [2] filed against accused-appellant
identically charged-
That on or about ____,[3] in the City of Santiago, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, by means of force, intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lay with and have carnal knowledge with one MARIBEL ARIOLA against her will
and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on July 14, 1997, [5] whereupon a joint
trial of the cases against him was held.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, Maribel Ariola, Zenny Ariola, [6] Maximo Palalay, and
Dr. Jeffrey Demano, whose testimonies show the following facts:
On December 16, 1994, Maribel Ariola was alone with her father, accused-appellant Bonifacio Ariola, in
their house in Sapang Palay, Mabini, Santiago City, Isabela. Maribel went to sleep at around 8 o'clock that
evening, but she was awakened when she felt someone kissing her on the lips. She found it was her father,
herein accused-appellant. Maribel tried to push accused-appellant away, but he hit her right leg. He
mashed her breasts and later had sexual intercourse with her.
On December 17, 1994, Maribel was again raped by her father. She said she wanted to fight back, but
she felt helpless. The next day, December 18, 1994, accused-appellant raped Maribel for the third
time. Maribel was completely helpless. All she could do was cry. She was raped by her father a fourth time
at around 1 o'clock in the morning of December 19, 1994 in their house.
Maribel said she was afraid her father might kill her if she did not give in to his desires.Accused-
appellant was a violent person who once hit her with the scabbard of his bolo and boxed her brother.
At the time of the incidents, Zenny Ariola, Maribel's mother, was working in Madadamian, Echague,
Isabela. Her brother and sister were also not at home during those times. Although her mother and siblings
returned home towards Christmas, it was only on March 31, 1997 that Maribel finally told her mother what
had happened to her. Maribel was afraid accused-appellant would hurt her again. [7]
When Zenny Ariola learned about her daughter's fate, she immediately took her to the police station
at the old city hall. They took the tricycle driven by Maximo Palalay and went to Santiago City. Zenny then

accompanied her daughter to the Southern Isabela District in Rosario, Santiago City where she was
examined by Dr. Jeffrey Demano. Dr. Demanos findings, as contained in his report, are as follows:
There were fully developed pubic hair noted. The hymen shows old hymenal lacerations at several
positions giving a serrated appearance. The vagina admits 2 fingers with difficulty.
There was minimal whitish vaginal discharge noted.[8]
Dr. Demano explained that the serrated appearance of the hymenal lacerations could be due to the
forcible entry of a foreign object into the vagina. However, he said these could also be caused by the
passage of large clotted blood during menstruation, by falling on hard and sharp objects, by jumping or
running, by the insertion of a medical instrument, by masturbation, the insertion of a foreign object into
the vagina, or by a previous operation. Dr. Demano admitted that he could not categorically state whether
the lacerations were due to sexual intercourse. He also explained that when the vagina was able to admit
two fingers with difficulty, this meant that it was possible that there had been no previous entrance of an
object into the vagina or there had been a few, from one to four instances. There could not have been
repeated entrance because such would cause the vaginal canal to become loose.
The defense presented accused-appellant as its sole witness. He testified that he had been a tenant-
farmer in Batal for the past five years. He acknowledged that Maribel Ariola and Zenny Ariola were his
daughter and wife, respectively. He testified that he lived in Sapang Palay, Mabini, Santiago City with his
wife and children, namely, Celso, Imelda, Almario, and Maribel. He said that Maribel was 16 years old at
the time of his testimony.
Accused-appellant claimed that he was in his farm on December 16, 1994 and that he went home only
for lunch. He admitted that he went home that night and that only he and Maribel were staying in their
house at that time. His wife was in Madadamian, Echague, Isabela, while his son was in Raniag. His other
daughter, Imelda, was working in the town proper. However, accused-appellant denied that he raped
Maribel on December 16, 17, 18, and 19, 1994. He said that his wife instigated the filing of these cases
against him because he wanted to separate from her. He also testified that Maribel filed charges against
him because he whipped her for disobeying him and because he scolded her on March 31,1997. Maribel
threatened him on that day that she would charge him with rape. He was incarcerated that same day. He
said that his wife visited him and brought him food in prison, but Maribel did not visit him. He had no
criminal record prior to the filing of rape charges against him.
On cross-examination, accused-appellant stated that he told his wife to leave him after she said that
she felt only pity, not love, for him. He admitted that his love for his wife was also waning at that time, but
he denied that it was because he was attracted to Maribel. He never felt any physical attraction towards
his daughter despite the fact that she was a beautiful young woman, he said.Although he was alone with
his daughter on December 16 to 19, 1994, accused-appellant said they slept apart from each
other. However, he admitted that their house had only one room.[9]
On September 30, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which stated:
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused "GUILTY" beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of rape provided for and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to pay the victim the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for each of the four (4) rapes committed against her, or the total
sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS, without, however, subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that-
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION IT APPEARING TO BE INSUFFICIENT, IMPROBABLE AND INCREDIBLE.
II. ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT [THE] ACCUSED RAPE[D] THE COMPLAINANT, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH CONSIDERING THAT THE FOUR
INFORMATIONS DID NOT CHARGE HIM WITH COMMITTING FOUR COUNTS OF QUALIFIED RAPE. [11]

First. Accused-appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. He argues that it is
improbable for the rapes to have occurred only on December 16 to 19, 1994 and not thereafter. He insists
that even complainant did not know the dates of the alleged rapes. Accused-appellant further questions
the delay of three years before complainant reported the alleged rapes to her mother.Finally, he contends
that the testimonies of Zenny Ariola and Maximo Palalay as regards the manner in which the rape incidents
were reported to the police authorities are doubtful and inconsistent.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the conclusions of the trial court with respect to the credibility of
the witnesses are generally accorded great respect by this Court because the trial court is in a unique
position to observe their demeanor on the witness stand. Only if it is shown that the trial court's evaluation
is arbitrary or that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which, if properly considered, would affect the outcome of the case
would its findings be overturned.[12] That is not so in these cases.
Indeed, Maribel's testimony is straightforward, categorical, and convincing. Recounting her ordeal at
the hands of accused-appellant, Maribel told the trial court:
Q Madam witness, we would like to recall your attention to the last statement when you [were] presented
before this court for your direct examination, the question was after mashing your breast what other
things did the accused do and your answer was no[ne] sir, the question is what do you mean by your
answer nothing more or no more sir?
A I was just afraid Your Honor.
Q When you said that you are afraid with whom were you afraid at that time when you made your
answer?
A Bonifacio Ariola, sir.
Q Now will you tell us if you are still afraid at this particular hour of trial?
A No more sir.
Q So, feeling now secured madam witness will you explain then what did your father do after mashing
your breast?
A After that he took my virginity.
COURT:
What do you mean by your virginity?
A No answer from the witness.
ATTY. DELA CRUZ:
We would like to make on record that the witness cannot answer the question.
COURT:
Put it on record that the court also observed that the witness cannot answer the question.
A He fucked me sir.
Q You said that the accused fucked you, how did he do that to you?

A No answer from the witness.
COURT:
She refused to answer the question, ask another question.
Q What part of your body was used by him in fucking you madam witness?
A My vagina sir.
Q Do you know the reason why he did that to you?
A I do not know sir.
COURT:
When you said that he fucked you did he use his private part?
A Yes sir.
Q When he was doing that what did you do then?
A I was crying sir and when I try to fight back he boxed me.
Q What part of your body [did] he box?
A My legs sir.
Q What leg?
A My right leg sir.
Q How many times did he box you on December 16, 1994?
A Once only sir.
Q And how many times did he fuck you on that night of December 16, 1994?
A Once only sir.
Q On December 17, 1994, according to you, he raped you again, is that correct?
A Yes sir.
Q How many times did he fuck you?
A Once only sir.
Q Did you give [in] to him voluntarily or not?
A No sir.
Q What do you mean by no, what did you do?
A I wanted to fight back but I cannot really fight back.
Q Why can you not fight back what did he do to you?

A He suddenly went over me so I cannot fight back.
Q What did you feel then at that moment when he was engaging [in] sexual intercourse with you?
A No answer.
ATTY. DELA CRUZ:
Witness refuse to answer.
COURT:
Make it on record that the witness refused to give her answer.
Q Again, on December 18, madam witness, what did he do to you on that time?
A Just the same, he fucked me sir.
Q Now, how did he engage in the sexual intercourse with you on that day?
A I just cried and cried because I cannot do anything.
COURT:
What do you mean by that you cannot do anything?
A He held my arms, sir.
Q When he was holding your arm was his private part inside your vagina?
A Yes sir.
Q And what did you do if you did nothing to fight that sexual intercourse on December 18, 1994?
A I pushed him sir.
Q Despite that pushing tell us if he succeeded madam witness?
A Yes sir.
Q Now we go again on December 19, 1994, madam witness what did your father [do] to you on
December 19, 1994?
A Just the same sir, he engaged me in sexual intercourse.
Q Where?
A Inside our house sir.
Q At what time?
A At about 1:00 o'clock in the morning?
Q All these [consecutive] dates from December 16 to 19, 1994 why you did not shout for help madam
witness?
A I was afraid because he might kill me.
Q Why you said that he might kill you?

A Because he is fearless or [a] tyrant (Matapang).
Q What other thing that makes you candid that he was fearless/tyrant, what did he do to make him
fearless/tyrant?
A Because everytime he hurt us his children it was serious.
COURT:
You mean children you are included among those he punished is that correct?
A Yes sir.
Q What are the things, specific things, that he used to do to you and to the other children?
A He used to box my brother and when he [h]it me he used the scabbard of the bolo. [13]
We have long since held that the lone testimony of the offended party in a rape case, if free from
serious and material contradictions, is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.[14] For, in truth, no woman, especially one of tender age, would contrive a charge of sexual abuse
and undergo the degradation and humiliation of a public trial, where she would be forced to reveal the
lurid details of how she was violated, if she had not actually been raped or been moved by a desire to
obtain justice and vindicate her honor. This particularly holds true where, as in these cases, the accusation
is directed by the complainant against her own father. Considering the Filipino values, so deeply ingrained
in our culture, of respect and reverence for our elders, it is unthinkable for a daughter to invent a sordid
tale of incest if such were not true.[15]
In these cases, Maribel's testimony leaves no doubt as to what accused-appellant had done to her. She
narrated how accused-appellant repeatedly raped her from December 16 to 19, 1994 when they were
alone in their house. To be sure, she once stated in her testimony that accused-appellant did nothing else
on December 16, 1994 after he mashed her breasts. [16] But, such lapse in her testimony may be attributed
more to fear and shame than to the fact that accused-appellant did not rape her. We note that Maribel
refused to answer during her direct examination several questions which were embarrassing or shameful
to her. As we observed in another case, [17] the failure of the complainant to give direct answers to some
questions may be attributed to her innocence and naivet.Minor lapses in a testimony is to be expected
when the victim is narrating a debasing and degrading experience such as rape. Not only may she be
unable to remember every detail of her sordid experience but she may choose not to recount it at all as
the same may be too painful.
Accused-appellant argues that complainant's testimony should not be given credence because she
could not give the exact dates when accused-appellant allegedly raped her. This argument has no
merit. The exact date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime. What is
important is that the prosecution was able to prove that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the
victim without her consent.[18] In these cases, Maribel's testimony established that accused-appellant
forced her to have sex with him for four consecutive nights in December 1994 when she was alone with
him in their house. It bears emphasis that accused-appellant himself admitted that he was left alone in the
house with Maribel on December 16 to 19, 1994.[19]
Nor can the three-year delay in reporting the crimes committed by accused-appellant be taken against
Maribel. Delay in revealing the commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily render such
charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her
defilement to the harsh glare of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it
work to discredit the complainant.[20]
Maribel's reluctance to reveal to her mother or to the authorities the atrocities committed against her
has been sufficiently explained. She knew her father to be violent. She described him as a tyrant who once
hit her with the scabbard of his bolo.
Nor is it probable that Maribel filed these cases against accused-appellant because the latter had
scolded her for disobeying him. This is not enough to make a young woman fabricate a charge as serious
as rape against her father. It would take a certain kind of psychological depravity for a woman to invent a
shameful story of incest that would put the life of her own father at stake simply because he scolded her. [21]
Accused-appellant also makes much of the fact that no other rapes took place after December 16 to
19, 1994. This, however, does not negate Maribel's claim that accused-appellant raped her on those
dates. It is probable that she was not raped anymore after those dates because her mother and her
siblings had by then arrived for the Christmas holidays.
Accused-appellant points out alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of Zenny Ariola and Maximo
Palalay. He attempts to cast doubt on when Zenny supposedly learned from Maribel about the abuse she
suffered at the hands of accused-appellant. He claims that he only wanted to separate from his wife,
Zenny, and the latter, out of spite, then instigated Maribel to file the rape charges against him.
Maribel and Zenny Ariola's testimonies were corroborated by Maximo Palalay, the tricycle driver. Both
said that it was on March 31, 1997 when Maribel finally decided to tell her mother about the
rapes. Whether Zenny Ariola learned of the rapes from Maribel while they were on board the tricycle or
beforehand is of no moment. What is important is that, upon learning what her husband had done to their
daughter, Zenny Ariola immediately reported the matter to the authorities and accompanied Maribel to a
hospital for physical examination. Other alleged inconsistencies pointed out by accused-appellant refer
only to minor details and collateral matters that do not affect the veracity and credibility of Zenny Ariola
and Maximo Palalay.[22]
Moreover, accused-appellant's insistence that Zenny Ariola instigated the filing of charges against him
because he wanted to leave her cannot be believed. No mother would subject her own daughter to the
humiliation, not to mention the inconvenience, trauma, and scandal, of a public trial had not her intention
been to bring the offender to justice. It is highly unnatural for a parent to use her own offspring as an
engine of malice, especially if it will further expose her to shame and dishonor. [23]
Finally, accused-appellant contends that the medical findings of Dr. Jeffrey Demano do not support
complainant's claim that she had been raped. This argument must likewise fail. Dr. Demano found hymenal
lacerations in complainant's vagina.[24] His finding that the laxity of complainant's vaginal canal is
consistent with a few instances of entrance therein, from one to four, [25] confirms Maribel's testimony that
she had been raped by accused-appellant four times, from December 16 to 19, 1994.
In contrast to the evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellant's only defense is denial. A bare
denial, if unsupported by clear and convincing evidence, is self-serving and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight than the positive declarations of the complainant. [26]
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court correctly found accused-appellant guilty of four
counts of rape against his daughter, Maribel.
Second. We likewise hold, however, that the trial court erred in sentencing accused-appellant to
death. To warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the minority of the victim and her relationship to the
offender must be both alleged and proved. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to due process
and to be informed of the charges against him if he is charged with simple rape and thereafter convicted of
rape in its qualified form. [27] It is the concurrence of the victim's minority and her relationship to the
accused which qualifies the rape as a heinous crime and warrants the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death.[28]
In these cases, the informations alleged neither the minority of complainant nor her relationship to
accused-appellant. Hence, accused-appellant can only be found guilty of simple rape punishable under Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, with reclusion perpetua.
With respect to the award of damages, we find the P50,000.00 indemnity given by the trial court in
favor of Maribel Ariola for each count of rape to be in accordance with current case law. [29] In addition,
however, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape should likewise be awarded
to Maribel. In rape cases, the moral sufferings of the victim are presumed and need not be proved. [30] On
the other hand, the generic aggravating circumstance of relationship, although proven by the prosecution
and admitted by accused-appellant in these cases, cannot justify the award of exemplary damages for lack
of allegation of this fact in the informations.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Santiago City, finding accused-
appellant Bonifacio Ariola guilty of four counts of rape, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim, Maribel Ariola, the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD dIVISION
G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988
JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as private
respondents),respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Luzel D. Demasu-ay for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which afirmed the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, adjudging the petitioner, who was then the President of the West
Visayas College liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for failure to
graduate a student with honors.
The facts are not disputed.
An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the West Visayas
College. They elected the late Violets Delmo as the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans from
the funds of the club to some of the students of the school. "the petitioner claims that the said act of
extending loans was against school rules and regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the School,
sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that
she would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school.
Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus, appealed to the
Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools.
The Director after due investigation, rendered a decison on April 13, 1966 which provided:
Records of the preliminary investigation conducted by one of the legal officers of this Office
disclosed the following: That Violeta Delmo was the treasurer of the Student Leadership
Club, an exclusive student organization; that pursuant to Article IX of the of the Constitution
and By-Laws of the club, it passed Resolution No. 2, authorizing the treasurer to disburse
funds of the Club to student for financial aid and other humanitarian purposes; that in
compliance with said resolution and as treasurer of the Club, Violeta Delmo extended loans
to some officers and members of the Club upon proper application duly approved by the
majority of the members of the Executive Board; and that upon receiving the report from Mr.
Jesse Dagoon, adviser of the funds of the Club, that Office conducted an investigation on the
matter and having been convinced of the guilt of Violets Delmo and the other officers and
members of the Club, that Office rendered the order or decision in question. In justifying that
Office's order or decision, it is contended that approval by that Office of the Constitution and
By-Laws of the Club is necessary for its effectivity and validity and since it was never
submitted to that Office, the Club had no valid constitution and By-Laws and that as a
consequence, Resolution No. 2 which was passed based on the Constitution and By-Laws- is
without any force and effect and the treasurer, Violeta Delmo, who extended loans to some
officers and members of the Club pursuant thereto are illegal (sic), hence, she and the other
students involved are deemed guilty of misappropriating the funds of the Club. On the other
hand, Raclito Castaneda, Nestor Golez and Violeta Delmo, President, Secretary and Treasurer
of the Club, respectively, testified that the Club had adopted its Constitution and By-Laws in
a meeting held last October 3, 1965, and that pursuant to Article I of said Constitution and
By-Laws, the majority of the members of the Executive Board passed Resolution No. 2, which
resolution became the basis for the extension on of loans to some officers and members of
the Club, that the Club honestly believed that its Constitution and By-Laws has been
approved by the superintendent because the adviser of the Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, assured
the President of the Club that he will cause the approval of the Constitution and By-Laws by
the Superintendent; the officers of the Club have been inducted to office on October 9,1965
by the Superintendent and that the Club had been likewise allowed to cosponsor the
Education Week Celebration.
After a careful study of the records, this Office sustains the action taken by the
Superintendent in penalizing the adviser of the Club as well as the officers and members
thereof by dropping them from membership therein. However, this Office is convinced that
Violets M. Delmo had acted in good faith, in her capacity as Club Treasurer, in extending
loans to the officers and members of the Student partnership Club. Resolution No. 2
authorizing the Club treasurer to discharge finds to students in need of financial assistance
and other humanitarian purposes had been approved by the Club adviser, Mr. Jesse Dagoon,
with the notation that approval was given in his capacity as adviser of the Club and
extension of the Superintendent's personality. Aside from misleading the officers and
members of the Club, Mr. Dagoon, had unsatisfactorily explained why he failed to give the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Club to the Superintendent for approval despite his
assurance to the Club president that he would do so. With this finding of negligence on the
part of the Club adviser, not to mention laxity in the performance of his duties as such, this
Office considers as too severe and unwarranted that portion of the questioned order stating
that Violeta Delmo "shall not be a candidate for any award or citation from this school or any
organization in this school." Violeta Delmo, it is noted, has been a consistent full scholar of
the school and she alone has maintained her scholarship. The decision in question would,
therefore, set at naught all her sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of graduating with honors
in this year's commencement exercises.
In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and so holds and hereby directs that
appellant Violeta. M. Delmo, and for that matter all other Club members or officers involved
in this case, be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if they are
otherwise entitled thereto. (Rollo, pp. 28-30)
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the Director and all the records of the
case. On the same day, petitioner received a telegram stating the following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner allegedly mistook the telegram as
ordering him to also send the decision back. On the same day, he returned by mail all the records plus the
decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director order him to furnish Delmo with a
copy of the decision. The petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to the Director informing the latter that he
had sent the decision back and that he had not retained a copy thereof..
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director
ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was impossible by this time to include
Delmo's name in the program as one of the honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a plain
student instead of being awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the Director for a reconsideration of the
latters" decision because he believed that Delmo should not be allowed to graduate with honors. The
Director denied the petitioner's request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the school to enter into the scholastic
records of Delmo the honor, "Magna Cum Laude."

On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in flag action for damages against the
petitioner. During the pendency of the action, however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended and
Supplemental Complaint was filed by her parents as her sole and only heirs.
The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner and in favor of the spouses Delmo.
The court said:
Let us go to specific badges of the defendants (now petitioners) bad faith. Per investigation
of Violeta Delmo's appeal to Director Vitaliano Bernardino of the Bureau of Public Schools
(Exhibit L it was the defendant who inducted the officers of the Student Leadership Club on
October 9, 1965. In fact the Club was allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration.
(Exh. "L"). If the defendant he not approve of the constitution and by-laws of the Club, why
did he induct the officers into office and allow the Club to sponsor the Education Week
Celebration"? It was through his own act that the students were misled to do as they did.
Coupled with the defendants tacit recognition of the Club was the assurance of Mr. Jemm
Dagoon, Club Adviser, who made the students believe that he was acting as an extension of
Mr. Ledesma's personality. (Exhibit "L").
Another badge of the defendan'ts want of good faith is the fact that, although, he kaew as
early as April 27,1966 that per on of r Bernardino, Exhibit "L," he was directed to give honors
to Miss Delmo, he kept Id information to . He told the Court that he knew that the letter of
Director Bernardino directed him not to deprive Miss Delmo the honors due her, but she (sic)
says that he has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exhibit "L," of Director Bernardino
0, him to give honors to Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb. 5, 1974, testimony of Mr. Ledesma, pp. .33-
35). It could not be true that he has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exh. "L,"
because said letter consisted of only three pages, and the portion which directed that Miss
Delmo "be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if otherwise entitled
thereto is found at the last paragraph of the same. How did he know the last paragraph if he
did not read the letter.
Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam had been one of bias and prejudice.
When his action would favor him, he was deliberate and aspect to the utter prejudice and
detriment of Miss Delmo. Thus, although, as early as April 27, 1966, he knew of the
exoneration of Miss Delino by Director Bernardino, he withheld the information from Miss
Delmo. This is eloquently dramatized by Exh. "11" and Exh. "13" On April 29,1966, Director
Bernardino cabled him to furnish Violeta Delmo copy of the Decision, Exh. "L," but instead of
informing Miss Delmo about the decision, since he said he mailed back the decision on April
28,1966, he sent a night letter on April 29,1966, to Director Bernardino, informing the latter
that he had returned the decision (Exh. "l3"), together with the record. Why a night letter
when the matter was of utmost urgency to the parties in the case, because graduation day
was only four days ahead? An examination of the telegrams sent by the defendant shows
that he had been sending ordinary telegram and not night letters. (Exh. "5", Exhibit "7"). At
least, if the defendant could not furnish a copy of the decision, (Exh. "L"), to Miss Delmo, he
should have told her about it or that Miss Delmo's honors and citation in the commencement
be announced or indicated. But Mr. Ledesma is one who cannot admit a mistake. Very
ungentlemanly this is home out by his own testimony despite his knowledge that his
decision to deprive Miss Delmo of honors due to her was overturned by Director Bernardino,
he on his wrong belief. To quote the defendant,1 believed that she did not deserve those
honors(Tsn Feb. 5, 1974, p. 43,Empasized supplied). Despite the telegram of Director
Bernardino which the defendant received hours before the commencement executory on
May 3-4,1966, he did not obey Director Bernardino because he said in his testimony that he
would be embarrassment . Tan Feb 5,1974, P. 46). Evidently, he knew only his
embarrassment and not that of r Bernardino whose order was being flagrantly and wantonly
disregarded by bim And certainly, not the least of Miss Delmo's embarrassment. His acts
speak eloquently of ho bad faith and unjust of mindwarped by his delicate sensitivity for
having been challenged by Miss Delmo, a mere student.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss s case smacks of contemptuous arrogance,
oppression and abuse of power. Come to think of it. He refused to obey the directive of Be o
and instead, chose to feign ignorance of it." (Reward on Appeal, p. 72-76).

The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to her parents for moral
damages; P5,000.00 for nominal damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary damages of P10,000.00 and
P2,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole question of whether or not the respondent
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that petitioner is liable for damages under
Article 27 of the New Civil Code.
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be reversed. It cannot be
disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's
neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in the case of
(Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):
There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongly act or omission." (People v.
Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 (1984).
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating
that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's decision. Granting this to be
true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have done so
considering that he received the decision on April 27, 1966 and even though he sent it back with the
records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it which consisted of only three pages. Moreover,
the petitioner should have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the latter,
at the very least of the decision. This, the petitioner likewise failed to do, and not without the attendant
bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its decision, to wit:
Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish Miss Delmo of a copy of the decision, he
could have used his discretion and plain common sense by informing her about it or he could
have directed the inclusion of Miss Delmo's honor in the printed commencement program or
announced it during the commencement exercises.
Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of Director Benardino hours before the
commencement exercises on May 3-4, 1966, disobeyed his superior by refusing to give the
honors due Miss Delmo with a lame excuse that he would be embarrassed if he did so, to the
prejudice of and in complete disregard of Miss Delmo's rights.
Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr. Pacifico Delmo, father of
Miss Delmo, who tried several times to see defendant in his office thus Mr. Delmo suffered
extreme disappointment and humiliation.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with circumspection and due regard to
the rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of his authority by defiantly
disobeying the lawful directive of his superior, Director Bernardino, defendant is liable for
damages in his personal capacity. . . . (Rollo, pp- 57-58)
Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in order. In the same case of Prudenciado v.
Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra., at p. 450, we ruled:
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an
example or correction for the public good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan American World Airways, 16
SCRA 431).
However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses Delmo damages in the
amount of P10,000.00 in their individual capacity, separately from and in addition to what
they are already entitled to as sole heirs of the deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the decision is
modified insofar as moral damages are awarded to the spouses in their own behalf.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with the slight modification as stated in the preceding paragraph. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971
Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and President, respectively, of a
school of arts and trades, known under the name and style of "Manila Technical Institute"
(M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.
Leovillo C. Agustin for plaintiffs-appellants. .
Honorato S. Reyes for appellee Brillantes, et al. .
Villareal, Almacen Navarra & Amores for appellee Daffon. .
TEEHANKEE, J.:
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. .
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a student in
automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on May 19,
1966, the action below for damages arising from the death on March 10, 1966 of their son at the hands of
a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said Institute. .
Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "(T)he defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the
incident which gave rise to his action occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the
institute; 1 the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof; the defendant Santiago M. Quibulue,
instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow
student of the deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship, but
lately on August 2, 1962, it was duly incorporated."
The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs' son were thus narrated by the trial court: "(T)he
deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and on the afternoon of
March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock, they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz
were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio
Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at
them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark
Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the
face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist
blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which
caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but
he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness; finally he
died. The foregoing is the substance of the testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the incident."
The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the incident, as testified to by the lone
eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a classmate of the protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness who "has no

motive or reason to testify one way or another in favor of any party" and rejected the self-exculpatory
version of defendant Daffon denying that he had inflicted any fist blows on the deceased. .
With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian of the Manila Police Department who performed the
autopsy re "Cause of death: shock due to traumatic fracture of theribs (6th and 7th, left, contusion of the
pancreas and stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage and slight subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain,"
and his testimony that these internal injuries of the deceased were caused "probably by strong fist blows,"
the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 3 It
held that "(T)he act, therefore, of the accused Daffon in giving the deceased strong fistblows in the
stomach which ruptured his internal organs and caused his death falls within the purview of this article of
the Code." 4
The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical
Institute, in this wise:
... Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code which
reads:
Art. 2180. ... .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable

for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
In the opinion of the Court, this article of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar, since
this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of
school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the
parents.
CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180. NEW CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED: The clause
"so long as they remain in their custody" contained in Article 2180 of the new
civil code contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of
the parents. In those circumstances the control or influence over the conduct
and actions of the pupil as well as the responsibilities for their sort would pass
from the father and mother to the teachers. (Ciriaco L. Mercado, Petitioner vs.
the Court of Appeals, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. L-
14862, May 30, 1960). 5
There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendant officials of the school. These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for
the tort of the defendant Daffon.
Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial court as follows:
1. Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased
Dominador Palisoc (a) P6,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual
and compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of
earning power, considering that the deceased was only between sixteen and seventeen
years, and in good health when he died, and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs
of this action. .
2. Absolving the other defendants. .
3. Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit.
Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal question that under the factual findings of the trial court, which
are now beyond review, the trial court erred in absolving the defendants-school officials instead of holding
them jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors, with defendant Daffon, for the damages awarded them as a
result of their son's death. The Court finds the appeal, in the main, to be meritorious. .

1. The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the ground that the provisions of Article 2180,
Civil Code, which expressly hold "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades ... liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody,"
are not applicable to to the case at bar, since "there is no evidence that the accused Daffon [who inflicted
the fatal fistblows] 6 lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants-officials of the school.
These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon."
The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. Court of
Appeals, 7 that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a
situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence
on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the
conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the
responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils
appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is
over." This dictum had been made in rejecting therein petitioner father's contention that his minor son's
school, Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon, Quezon City [which was not a party to the case] should be held
responsible, rather than him as father, for the moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged against him for the
physical injury inflicted by his son on a classmate. [A cut on the right cheek with a piece of razor which
costs only P50.00 by way of medical expenses to treat and cure, since the wound left no scar.] The moral
damages award was after all set aside by the Court on the ground that none of the specific cases provided
in Article 2219, Civil Code, for awarding moral damages had been established, petitioner's son being only
nine years old and not having been shown to have "acted with discernment" in inflicting the injuries on his
classmate. .
The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another dictum in the earlier case of Exconde vs.
Capuno, 8 where the only issue involved as expressly stated in the decision, was whether the therein
defendant-father could be civilly liable for damages resulting from a death caused in a motor vehicle
accident driven unauthorizedly and negligently by his minor son, (which issue was resolved adversely
against the father). Nevertheless, the dictum in such earlier case that "It is true that under the law
abovequoted, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and
trades and not to any academic educational institution" was expressly cited and quoted in Mercado. .
2. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and squarely raises the issue of
liability of teachers and heads of schools under Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by their
pupils and students against fellow students on the school premises. Here, the parents of the student at
fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic
incident. There is no question, either, that the school involved is a non-academic school, 9 the Manila
Technical Institute being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. .
The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical
Institute (defendants Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and severally for damages to
plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's
laboratory room. No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of
directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as
party defendant. While plaintiffs sought to so implead it, by impleading improperly defendant Brillantes, its
former single proprietor, the lower court found that it had been incorporated since August 2, 1962, and
therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated, should have been brought in as party defendant. Plaintiffs
failed to do so, notwithstanding that Brillantes and his co-defendants in their reply to plaintiffs' request for
admission had expressly manifested and made of record that "defendant Antonio C. Brillantes is not the
registered owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute" which is now a corporation and is not owned by
any individual person." 10
3. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and
students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils
and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of
the child." 11 This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code. 12 In the law of
torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of
the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they
are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to
protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated,

including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow
students. .
4. As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde, "the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers,
etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority" 13 and "where the parent places the
child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one
answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not
supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher
while the child is under instruction." The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of
its school head and teachers under the same cited article. 14
5. The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they
could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on
his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the
school." As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the students) remain in their
custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess
time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the
dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by
the present decision. .
6. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must therefore be
held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's having
caused the death of his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from
the fight between the protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied
with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises
to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate,
the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last
paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said
defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. .
7. Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award of P6,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their son
should be increased to P12,000.00 as set by the Court in People vs. Pantoja, 15 and observed in all death
indemnity cases thereafter is well taken. The Court, in Pantoja, after noting the decline in the purchasing
power of the Philippine peso, had expressed its "considered opinion that the amount of award of
compensatory damages for death caused by a crime orquasi-delict should now be P12,000.00." The Court
thereby adjusted the minimum amount of "compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-
delict" as per Article 2206, Civil Code, from the old stated minimum of P3,000.00 to P12,000.00, which
amount is to be awarded "even though there may have been mitigating circumstances" pursuant to the
express provisions of said codal article. .
8. Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal that the lower court should have awarded exemplary
damages and imposed legal interest on the total damages awarded, besides increasing the award of
attorney's fees all concern matters that are left by law to the discretion of the trial court and the Court has
not been shown any error or abuse in the exercise of such discretion on the part of the trial
court. 16 Decisive here is the touchstone provision of Article 2231, Civil Code, that "In quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence." No gross negligence
on the part of defendants was found by the trial court to warrant the imposition of exemplary damages, as
well as of interest and increased attorney's fees, and the Court has not been shown in this appeal any
compelling reason to disturb such finding. .
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows: .
1. Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L. Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton and Santiago M. Quibulue jointly and
severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of
Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral,
damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of
this action in both instances; 2. absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3.
dismissing defendants' counterclaims. .

Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. .
Dizon, J., took no part. .
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring: .
I concur with the opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee but would like to clarify that the argument of the
dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180
should be limited to pupils who are minors (below the age of majority) is not in accord with the plain text of
the law. Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect: .
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. .
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. .
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company. .
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions. .
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry. .
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.
Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts
during minority, the article expressly so provides, as in the case of the parents and of the guardians. It is
natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other
categories of persons enumerated in the article, it would have expressly so stated. The fact that it has not
done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age. Further, it
is not without significance that the teachers and heads of scholarly establishments are not grouped with
parents and guardians but ranged with owners and managers of enterprises, employers and the state, as
to whom no reason is discernible to imply that they should answer only for minors. .
Giorgi, in his well-known "Teoria de las Obligaciones en el Derecho Moderno", Volume 5, page 404, No. 272
(Sp. Ed.), after noting the split among commentators on the point it issue, observes with considerable
cogency that
272. Ante esta variedad de opiniones, ninguna de las cuales se funds en argumentos
merecedores de seria ponderacion, no es facil tomar un partido. Esto no obstante, debiendo
manisfestar nuestra opinion, nos acercamos a la de los que no estiman necesaria la menor
edad del discipulo o del aprendiz; porque si el aforismo ubi voluit dixit, ubi noluit tacuit, no
es siempre argumento seguro para interpreter la ley, es infalible cuanto se refiere a una
misma disposicion relative a varios casos. Y tal es el art. 1.153. Lo que haya establecido
important poco si, elevandones a los principios de razon, puede dudarse de la oportunidad
de semajante diferencia; porque la voluntad cierta del legislador prevalece in iure condito a
cualquier otra consideracion. Por otra parte, si bien se considera, no puede parecer extrano
o absurdo el suponer que un discipulo y un aprendiz, aunque mayores de edad, acepten
voluntariamente la entera vigilancia de su preceptor mientras dura la educacion. Ni parece
dudoso desde el momento que los artesanos y los preceptores deben, al par de los padres,
responder civilmente de los daos comitidos por sus discipulos, aun cuando estos esten
faltos de discernimiento.
Similarly, Planiol-Ripert, in their "Droit Civil Pratique," Volume VI, No. 635 (Spanish version), say that
635. Personas de quien responde. Si bien la responsibilidad del maestro es originalmente

una estension de la de los padres (1), el art. 1384 no especifica que los alumnos y
aprendices han de ser menores de edad, por lo que la presuncion de culpa funcionara aun
cuando sean mayores (2); pero, la vigilancia no tendra que ser ejercida en iguales terminos.
Aun respecto a los menores variara segun la edad, extremo que tendra que ternese en
ceunta a los fines de apreciar si el maestro ha podido impedir el acto nocivo o no. .
I submit, finally, that while in the case of parents and guardians, their authority and supervision over the
children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age, the authority and custodial
supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter. A student over twenty-one, by enrolling
and attending a school, places himself under the custodial supervision and disciplinary authority of the
school authorities, which is the basis of the latter's correlative responsibility for his torts, committed while
under such authority. Of course, the teachers' control is not as plenary as when the student is a minor; but
that circumstance can only affect the decree of the responsibility but cannot negate the existence thereof.
It is only a factor to be appreciated in determining whether or not the defendant has exercised due
diligence in endeavoring to prevent the injury, as prescribed in the last paragraph of Article 2180. .
Barredo, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
I vote to affirm the decision appealed from. I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this
Court inMercado v. Court of Appeals, 108 Phil. 414, where the clause "so long as they remain in their
custody" used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code was construed as referring to a "situation where the pupil
lives and boards with the teacher, such that the (latter's) control, direction and influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents." I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results, considering
the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions, academic and non-academic, as well as
the temper, attitudes and often destructive activism of the students, to hold their teachers and/or the
administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them. When even the school
authorities find themselves besieged, beleaguered and attacked, and unable to impose the traditional
disciplinary measures formerly recognized as available to them, such as suspension or outright expulsion
of the offending students, it flies in the face of logic and reality to consider such students, merely from the
fact of enrollment and class attendance, as "in the custody" of the teachers or school heads within the
meaning of the statute, and to hold the latter liable unless they can prove that they have exercised "all the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage." Article 2180, if applied as appellants construe
it, would be bad law. It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority, rendering teachers
and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control. Present conditions being
what they are, I believe the restrictive interpretation of the aforesaid provision enunciated
in Mercado should be maintained. .
With particular reference to the case at bar, one other factor constrains me to dissent. The opinion of the
majority states: "Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon
was already of age at the time of the tragic incident." This statement is of course in accordance with
Article 2180, which says that "the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." Note that for
parental responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their company. If, as stated also in
the opinion of the majority, "the rationale of (the) liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious
acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain
extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the child," then it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long as they
remain in their custody" as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the
phrase "who live in their company" as used in reference to parents; and (2) that just as parents are not
responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors, so should teachers and school
heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category. I find no
justification, either in the law itself or in justice and equity, to make a substitute parent liable where the
real parent would be free from liability. .
Zaldivar, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
I vote to affirm the decision appealed from. I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this
Court inMercado v. Court of Appeals, 108 Phil. 414, where the clause "so long as they remain in their
custody" used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code was construed as referring to a "situation where the pupil
lives and boards with the teacher, such that the (latter's) control, direction and influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents." I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results, considering
the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions, academic and non-academic, as well as
the temper, attitudes and often destructive activism of the students, to hold their teachers and/or the
administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them. When even the school
authorities find themselves besieged, beleaguered and attacked, and unable to impose the traditional
disciplinary measures formerly recognized as available to them, such as suspension or outright expulsion
of the offending students, it flies in the face of logic and reality to consider such students, merely from the
fact of enrollment and class attendance, as "in the custody" of the teachers or school heads within the
meaning of the statute, and to hold the latter liable unless they can prove that they have exercised "all the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage." Article 2180, if applied as appellants construe
it, would be bad law. It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority, rendering teachers
and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control. Present conditions being
what they are, I believe the restrictive interpretation of the aforesaid provision enunciated
in Mercado should be maintained. .
With particular reference to the case at bar, one other factor constrains me to dissent. The opinion of the
majority states: "Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon
was already of age at the time of the tragic incident." This statement is of course in accordance with
Article 2180, which says that "the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." Note that for
parental responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their company. If, as stated also in
the opinion of the majority, "the rationale of (the) liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious
acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain
extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the child," then it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long as they
remain in their custody" as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the
phrase "who live in their company" as used in reference to parents; and (2) that just as parents are not
responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors, so should teachers and school
heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category. I find no
justification, either in the law itself or in justice and equity, to make a substitute parent liable where the
real parent would be free from liability. .
Zaldivar, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-50459 August 25, 1989
LEONARDO D. SUARIO, petitioner,

vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Davao Branch or The Manager/Cashier and NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
Leonardo D. Suario for and in his own behalf.
Canete Tolentino, Buyo, Caballero and Fuentes for respondent BPI.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioner, with himself as his own counsel, filed this petition for review of the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which denied his claim for damages arising from an alleged illegal
dismissal. In addition to the separation pay already awarded to him, the petitioner asks for P9,995.00
actual damages, P300,000.00 moral damages, P200,000.00 exemplary damages, and attorney's fees to be
determined by the Court.
On August 4,1977, petitioner Leonardo D. Suario filed a complaint for separation pay, damages and
attorney's fees against the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Davao Branch/ or the Manager and Assistant
Manager/Cashier alleging:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That complainant has been a loyal employee of the respondent bank since March, 1969,
first assigned as a saving clerk, then rose to become the head of the loan section in 1976
with an official designation as Credit Investigator Appraiser-Credit Analyst;
3. That during the time of the complainant's employment with the respondent bank, he
pursued his studies of law without criticism or adverse comments from the respondent bank
but instead praises were showered and incentives and considerations were bestowed in view
of the complainant's determination for intellectual advancement;
4. That sometime in March, 1976, the complainant verbally requested the then Asst. Vice-
President and Branch Manager, Mr. Armando N. Guilatco, for a 6-month leave of absence
without pay purposely to take the 1976 pre-bar review in Manila and that the said Mr.
Guilatco informed the complainant that there would be no problem as regards the requested
leave of absence;
5. That sometime in May, 1976, the complainant received a verbal notice from the new
Branch Manager, Mr. Vicente Casino, that the respondent's Head Office approved only a 30-
day leave of absence without pay but that Mr. Guilatco, then assigned in Head Office as Vice
President, advised him (Casino) to inform the complainant to just avail of the 30-day leave of
absence first and then proceed to Manila for the review since the request would be
ultimately granted;
6. That complainant never suspected that his application would be disapproved, much less
any bad faith on the part of the respondent bank to discriminate union member (sic), since it
has been the policy of the respondent bank to grant request of this nature as shown in the
case of four (4) former employees who were all granted leave of absence without pay.
Copies of the affidavits of Judge Juan Montejo and Atty. Bienvenido Banez and xerox copies
of the payroll of Jose Ledesma and Antonio Tan are hereto attached as ANNEXES 'A', 'B', 'C',
and 'D' and made an integral part hereof;
7. That on May 10, 1976, the complainant wrote a formal letter to the President of the
respondent bank, Mr. Alberto Villa Abrille, asking for a formal reconsideration and caused the
same to be received by Mr. Vicente Casino but the latter advised instead the complainant to
address to him (Casino) a letter of mild tenor since any reconsideration should be coursed
through the proper channel; and that Mr. Casino advised the complainant to just file his 30-
day leave of absence without pay as approved and then proceed to Manila since the request
would ultimately be granted. A Xerox copy of the said letter is hereto attached as ANNEX 'E'
to be made an integral part hereof;
8. That acting on the said advice of Vicente Casino, the complainant, with utmost good faith,
wrote a letter addressed to Mr. Casino aid at the same time, filed a 30-day leave of absence.
Copies of the letter and Application for Leave of Absence are hereto attached as ANNEXES
'F' and 'G' to be made an integral part hereof,
9. That on May 17, 1976, the complainant proceeded to Manila for the pre-bar review and
even went to the extent of going to the respondent's Head Office to seek an audience with
the Personnel Manager with an alternative of working with any of the Metro Manila Branches
of the respondent bank if and when the request would not be granted and that the Personnel
Manager promised to take up the matter with Mr. Alberto Villa Abrille;
10. That during the first week of August, 1976, the complainant received a letter from the
Asst. Manager/Cashier, Mr. Douglas E. Aurelio, ordering the complainant to report back for
work since the complainant's request was allegedly disapproved and that failure to report
back for work would be a conclusive proof that the complainant is no longer interested to
continue working and therefore considered resigned. ...
11. That upon receipt of the letter, complainant's review was unduly interrupted since
sleepless nights were spent in order to arrive at the proper decision and that the
complainant has decided not to report back because of the considerable expenses already
incurred in Manila after he has been led to believe that the request would ultimately be
granted;
12. That during the last week of August, 1976, the complainant received another letter from
Douglas E. Aurelio, attaching a xerox copy of the application for a Clearance to terminate on
the ground of resignation/ or abandonment. ...
13. That the complainant failed to file his opposition since as above averred to, he was
already in Manila taking up the review and was then very busy since the bar examination
was only two months shy;
14. That sometime during the first week of December, 1976, the complainant went to the
respondent bank but was verbally informed that he was already dismissed;
15. That on December 13, 1976, the complainant formally wrote a letter to the respondent
bank requesting for a written and formal advise as to his real status and that on December
14, 1976, the respondent bank replied that the matter was still referred to the Personnel
Department at Head Office leading again the complainant to believe that his case was not
yet hopeless. ...
16. That on December 21, 1976, the complainant wrote another letter pressing for a
categorical answer and on December 23, 1976, the lawyers of the respondent bank replied
that as far as the bank is concerned the services of the complainant was considered
terminated effective July 19, 1976 contrary to the respondent bank's manifestation that his
case was still pending before the Personnel Department. ...
17. That the dismissal of the complainant was clearly illegal and without just cause, being
discriminatory in character he being an active union member and in fact the Vice President
of the ALU-BPI Chapter until his dismissal in view of the uneven application of the
respondent's policy; ... (Rollo, pp. 15-19)
The case was set for conciliation but since the parties could not agree on any settlement, the case was
certified to the Labor Arbiter. Thereafter, the Executive Labor Arbiter required the parties to submit their
position papers. Based on the position papers submitted, a decision was rendered on December 7, 1977.
The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby ordered to pay complainant's claim

for separation pay in the amount of P11,813.36. His claim for moral, actual, and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. (Rollo, p. 46)
The decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter was affirmed on appeal to the National Labor Relations
Commission on October 9, 1978. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.
The petitioner alleges that the public respondent committed the following:
THAT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION IN ITS DECISION DATED OCTOBER 9,
1978 (ANNEX F OF THE PETITION) ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE CLAIM OF DAMAGES
PRAYED FOR BY PETITIONER DESPITE FINDINGS THAT THE DISMISSAL WAS CLEARLY ILLEGAL;
and
II
THAT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONER'S

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BASED MAINLY ON PD NOS. 1367 AND 1391 IN ITS
DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 9, 1979. (Rollo, p. 139).
The main issue in this case is whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioner's claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees in addition to his
separation pay.
On the matter of NLRC jurisdiction over claims for damages, it clearly appears that the complaint was filed
on August 4, 1977 and decided by the Labor Arbiter on December 7, 1977; hence, the applicable law is
Article 217 of the Labor Code which took effect on October 1, 1974, and which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
(1) Unfair labor practice cases;
(2) Unresolved issues in collective bargaining including those which involve wages, hours of
work, and other terms and conditions of employment duly indorsed by the Bureau in
accordance with the provisions of this Code;
(3) All money claims of workers involving non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime
or premium compensation, maternity or service incentive leave, separation pay and other
money claims arising from employer-employee relation, except claims for employee's
compensation, social security and medicare benefits and as otherwise provided in Article
128 of this Code;
(4) Cases involving household services; and
(5) All other cases arising from employer-employee relationship unless expressly excluded
by this Code.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by
Labor Arbiters, compulsory arbitrators, and voluntary arbitrators in appropriate casino
provided in Article 263 of this Code. ...
The contention of private respondent that the NLRC is not clothed with authority to entertain claims for
moral and other forms of damages is based on PD 1367 which took effect on May 1, 1979 and which
amended Article 217 by specifically providing that "Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters
shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages."
This limitation on jurisdiction did not last long. This Court in the case of Ebon v. De Guzman, (113 SCRA 52
[1982]) explained:
Evidently, the lawmaking authority had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters
and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that set up would
mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting findings and
conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim.
So, on May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1691 (which substantially reenacted Article 217
in its original form) nullified Presidential Decree No. 1367 and restored to the Labor Arbiters
and the NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in cases arising from employer-
employee relations (Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines v. Martinez, G.R. No.
58877).
It is now well settled that money claims of workers provided by law over which the labor arbiter has
original and exclusive jurisdiction are comprehensive enough to include claims for moral damages of a
dismissed employee against his employer. (Vargas v. Akai Phil. Inc., 156 SCRA 531 [1987]).
On the issue whether or not the petitioner is entitled to his claim for moral damages, we are constrained to
decide in the negative. The case of Primero v. Intermediate Appellate Court, (156 SCRA 435 [1987])
expounded on this matter, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The legislative intent appears clear to allow recovery in proceedings before Labor Arbiters of
moral and other forms of damages, in all cases or matters arising from employer-employee
relations. This would no doubt include, particularly, instances where an employee has been
unlawfully dismissed. In such a case the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award to the
dismissed employee not only the reliefs specifically provided by labor laws, but also moral
and the forms of damages governed by the Civil Code. Moral damages would be
recoverable, for example, where the dismissal of the employee was not only effected
without authorized cause and/or due process for which relief is granted by the Labor Code
but was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy-for which the obtainable
relief is determined by 'the Civil Code (not the Labor Code).lwph1.t Stated otherwise, if
the evidence adduced by the employee before the Labor Arbiter should establish that the
employer did indeed terminate the employee's services without just cause or without
according him due process, the Labor Arbiter's judgment shall be for the employer to
reinstate the employee and pay him his back wages, or exceptionally, for the employee
simply to receive separation pay. These are reliefs explicitly prescribed by the Labor Code.
But any award of moral damages by the Labor Arbiter obviously cannot be based on the
Labor Code but should be grounded on the Civil Code. Such an award cannot be justified
solely upon the premise (otherwise sufficient for redress under the Labor Code) that the
employer fired his employee without just cause or due process. Additional facts must be
pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these
being, to repeat, that the act of dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was
oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy;
and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., resulted
therefrom. (pp. 443-444, emphasis supplied)
The case of Primero v. IAC states the distinction between the two seemingly disparate causes of action, to
wit:
It is clear that the question of the legality of the act of dismissal is intimately related to the
issue of the legality of the manner by which that act of dismissal was performed. But while
the Labor Code treats of the nature of, and the remedy available as regards the first the
employee's separation from employment it does not at all deal with the second the manner
of that separation which is governed exclusively by the Civil Code. In addressing the first
issue, the Labor Arbiter applies the Labor Code; in addressing the second, the Civil Code.

And this appears to be the plain and patent intendment of the law. For apart from the reliefs
expressly set out in the Labor Code flowing from illegal dismiss from employment, no other
damages may be awarded to an illegally dismiss employee other than those specified by the
Civil Code. Hence, the fact that the issue of whether or not moral or other damages were
suffered by an employee and in the affirmative, the amount that should properly be awarded
to him in the circumstances is determined under the provisions of the Civil Code and not the
Labor Code. ... (P. 445)
In the case of Guita v. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 576 [1985]), we stated that:
Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. It is however not
enough that such injuries have arisen; it is essential that they have sprung from
a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. (Civil Code, Article 2217).
omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded. . . (R & B Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. v. IAC, 129 SCRA 736, 743.) (p. 580)
We do not find any bad faith or fraud on the part of the bank officials who denied the petitioner's request
for a six months' leave of absence without pay. If the petitioner was made to believe that his request would
be granted, we can not fault the branch manager or his subsequent replacement for giving their
assurances. They were merely personal assurances which could be reconsidered on the basis of later
developments or upon consultation with higher authorities and which are not binding. Certainly, the bank
officials who gave their verbal assurances had only the petitioner's paramount welfare in their minds.
There is no evidence to show that they meant to deceive the petitioner. They themselves thought that
such a request would be granted. Unfortunately, company policy had to be followed. The fact that the
petitioner's request for six months' leave of absence was denied does not ipso facto entitle him to
damages.
As held in the case of Rubio v. Court of Appeals (141 SCRA 488 [1986]):
xxx xxx xxx
omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse
result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to have
payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate. ... (p. 516)
It is incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that there was malice or bad faith on the part of the private
respondents in terminating him On the contrary, the records of this petition show that the private
respondent acted in accordance with law before effecting the dismissal. The records also show that there
was a prior application with the Ministry of Labor to terminate the petitioner's employment. A copy of said
application was furnished to the petitioner. The petitioner, however, did not oppose such application nor
did he do anything to preserve his right.
More pertinent is the fact that the petitioner knew as early as May 6, 1976 that he was granted only a one
month study leave (rollo, p. 98). He may have asked for a reconsideration but notwithstanding its denial,
the petitioner proceeded with his review. Whether or not his request for six months' leave without pay
would be granted, the petitioner was set on continuing with his review.
Neither can we consider the private respondents' response to the petitioner's query regarding his status as
having given him false hopes. The referral to the personnel department was merely a part of the formal
procedure undertaken by the bank. Such referral does not show that the bank acted in a wanton or willful
manner.

In the light of the foregoing, we sustain the Labor Arbiter's finding that the petitioner's claim for damages
must be dismissed for lack of sufficient basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G. R. No. 175605
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,**
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.
Promulgated:
____________________
ARNOLD GARCHITORENA Y CAMBA

A.KA. JUNIOR; JOEY PAMPLONA A.K.A.
NATO AND JESSIE GARCIA Y ADORINO,
Accused-Appellants.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 00765
which affirmed an earlier Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binan City, Branch 25 in Criminal
Case No.9440-B, finding accused-appellants Arnold Garchitorena y Gamba, a.k.a. Junior, Joey Pamplona,
a.k.a. Nato, and Jessie Garcia y Adorino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim in the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P16,700.00 as actual damages,P408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity and to pay the costs of
the suit.
The conviction of accused-appellants stemmed from an Information [3] dated January 22, 1996, filed
with the RTC for the crime of Murder, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about September 22, 1995, in the Municipality of Binan, Province of

Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Arnold
Garchitorena y Gamba, alias Junior, Joey Pamplona alias Nato and Jessie Garcia y Adorino,
conspiring, confederating together and mutualy helping each other, with intent to kill, while
conveniently armed with a deadly bladed weapon, with abuse of superior strength, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Mauro Biay y
Almarinez with the said weapon, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different
parts of his body which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his
surviving heirs.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, accused-appellants, duly assisted by their counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses; namely, Dulce Borero, elder sister of the victim
Mauro Biay and eyewitness to the killing of her brother; Dr. Rolando Poblete, who conducted an autopsy on
the body of the victim and prepared the post-mortem report; and Amelia Biay, the victims widow. The
evidence for the prosecution, as culled from the CA Decision under review, is as follows:
In the proceedings before the trial court, witness for the prosecution Dulce Borero
testified that on September 22, 1995, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening, she was selling
balut at Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision, Brgy. Dela Paz, Binan, Laguna. Her brother, Mauro
Biay, also a balut vendor, was also at the area, about seven (7) arms length away from her
when she was called by accused Jessie Garcia.Borero testified that when her brother Mauro
approached Jessie, the latter twisted the hand of her brother behind his back and Jessies
companions- accused Arnold Garchitorena and Joey Pamplona began stabbing her brother
Mauro repeatedly with a shiny bladed instrument. Joey was at the right side of the victim
and was strangling Mauro from behind. Witness saw her brother Mauro struggling to free
himself while being stabbed by the three (3) accused., until her brother slumped facedown
on the ground. Arnold then instructed his two co-accused to run away. During cross-
examination, Borero claims that she wanted to shout for help but nothing came out from her
mouth. When the accused had left after the stabbing incident, witness claimed that she
went home to call her elder brother Teodoro Biay, but when they returned to the scene, the
victim was no longer there as he had already been brought to the Perpetual Help
Hospital. They learned from the tricycle driver who brought Mauro top the hospital that their
brother was pronounced dead on arrival.
Dr. Rolando Poblete, the physician who conducted an autopsy on victim Mauro Biay
and prepared the post-mortem report, testified that the victims death was caused by
hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds. Witness specified the eight (8) stab
wounds suffered by the victim one in the neck, two in the chest, one below the armpit, two
on the upper abdomen, one at the back and one at the left thigh and also a laceration at the
left forearm of Mauro. According to the expert witness, the nature of stab wounds indicate
that it may have been caused by more than one bladed instrument.
The victims widow, Amelia Biay, testified that she incurred burial expenses
amounting to P16,700.00 due to the death of her husband. Also, her husband allegedly
earned a minimum of P300.00 a day as a balut vendor and P100.00 occasionally as a part-
time carpenter.

The accused-appellants denied the charge against them. Specifically, accused-appellant Joey
Pamplona denied that he participated in the stabbing of Mauro Bay, accused-appellant Jessie Garcia
interposed the defense of alibi, while accused-appellant Arnold Garchitorena interposed the defense of
insanity. Succinctly, the CA Decision summed up their respective defenses:
On the other hand, accused Joey Pamplona denied that he participated in the
stabbing of Mauro Biay. Joey Pamplona claims that he was seated on a bench when co-
accused Arnold came along. Then the balut vendor arrived and Joey saw Arnold stand up,
pull something from the right side of his pocket and stab the balut vendor once before
running away. Joey Pamplona testified that after the stabbing incident, due to fear
that Arnold might also stab him, he also ran away to the store of a certain Mang Tony, a
barangay official and related the incident to Aling Bel, the wife of Mang Tony. Joey Pamplona
said that he stayed at Mang Tonys store until his father arrived and told him to go home.
Danilo Garados testified that on Septemebr 22, 1995, he was at the store of Mang
Tony to buy cigarettes and saw Arnold and Joey seated on the bench near the artesian
well. Arnold and Joey allegedly called Mauro Biay and he saw Arnold stabbing Mauro. Jessie
Garcia was not there and Joey allegedly ran away when Arnold stabbed Mauro.
Clavel Estropegan testified that on September 22, 1995, around 9:00 p.m. Joey
Pamplona entered her store and told her that Junior or Arnold Garchitorena was stabbing
somebody. She did not hear any commotion outside her house which is just four houses
away from the artesian well. However, she closed her store for fear thatArnold will enter her
house.
Barangay Captain Alfredo Arcega testified that he investigated the stabbing incident
and, although he had no personal knowledge, he found out that it was Arnold Garchitorena
who stabbed Mauro Biay. Upon questioning Arnold, the latter admitted that he did stab
Mauro.
Defense witness Miguelito Gonzalgo testified that on September 22, 1995, he was in
his shoe factory at his house located at 186 Sta. Teresita Street, Almeda Subdivision, Binan
when he heard Mauro Biay shouting, and so he went out of his house. He allegedly saw two
persons embracing each other near the artesian well. He recognized these two persons as
Mauro and Arnold. He saw Arnold pulling out a knife from the body of Mauro and the latter
slowly fell down on his side. After Arnold washed his hands at the artesian well and walked
away towards the house of his aunt, this witness approached Mauro and seeing that the
victim was still breathing, went to get a tricycle to bring Mauro to the hospital. When he got
back to the area, there were many people who helped board Mauro in the tricycle and they
brought him to the Perpetual Help Hospital in Binan.
The other co-accused Jessie Garcia took the stand and claimed that on September
22, 1995, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening, he was still riding a bus from his work in
Blumentritt. He arrived at his home in Binan only at 11:00 p.m. On September 24, 1995, he
was fetched by two (2) policemen and two (2) Barangay Tanods from his house and brought
to the Binan Police Station for questioning.Thereafter, he was put in jail and incarcerated for
six (6) months without knowing the charges against him. He was only informed that he was
one of the suspects in the killing of Mauro Biay by his mother.
With respect to Arnold Garchitorena, Dr. Evelyn Belen, Medical Officer III and resident
physician of the National Center for Mental Health, testified that she examined the accused
Arnold and based on the history of the patient, it was found that he had been using
prohibited drugs like shabu and marijuana for two (2) years prior to the stabbing incident in
1995. The patient is allegedly suffering from schizophrenia, wherein he was hearing auditory
voices, seeing strange things and is delusional. However, Dr. Belen also testified that the
accused Garchitorena had remissions or exaservation and understands what he was doing
and was aware of his murder case in court. [4]

On May 9, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision, [5] as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court

finds accused Arnold Garchitorena y Gamboa alias Junior, Joey Pamplona alias Nato and
Jessie Garcia y Adorino GUILTY beyond reasonable of the crime of MURDER as defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by Republic Act 7659,
(Heinous Crimes).Accordingly, all of them are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
DEATH.
Furthermore, all of the accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally
Amelia Biay, widow of the victim Mauro Biay, the following sums:
a) 50,000.00 as and for civil indemnity
b) 50,000.00 as and for moral damages
c) 50,000.00 as and for exemplary damages
d) 16,700.00 as and for actual damages
e) 408,000.00 as and for loss of the earning capacity of Mauro Biay; and
f) To pay the costs of suit.
Likewise, the Provincial Warden of the Provincial Jail, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, is hereby
ordered to transfer/commit the three (3) accused to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City,
immediately upon receipt hereof.
Considering that death penalty was meted against all of the accused, let the entire
records of the above-entitled case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review
and judgment pursuant to Rule 122, Sec.10 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Accused-appellants appealed to the CA. Pamplona and Garcia reiterated their denial of the charge
against them. Garchitorena who never denied his participation in the killing, insisted, however, insisted
that he is exempt from criminal liability because he was suffering from a mental disorder before, during
and after the commission of the crime.
On May 31, 2006, the CA rendered the Decision [7] now under review, affirming RTCs Decision in toto,
thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is

DISMISSED. Accordingly, the appealed March 9, 2001 Decuision of the Regional Trial Court of
Binan, Laguna, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 9440-B finding herein accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
In arriving at the assailed Decision, the CA ratiocinated as follows:

After studying the records of this case, we do not find any reason to overturn the
ruling of the trial court.
Despite the testimony of defense witnesses that it was only accused-appellant Arnold
Garchitorena who stabbed the victim Mauro Biay, we find reason to uphold the trial courts
giving credence to prosecution witness Dulce Borero who testified as an eyewitness on the
circumstances surrounding the incident and the manner by which the crime committed.
Defense witness Garados testified that he was at the store and saw both Arnold and
Joey at the vicinity where the stabbing incident happened, seated on a bench near the
artesian well, when they called the victim Mauro. Defense witness Gonzalgo was in his house
when he heard the commotion and went outside to see Arnold and Mauro embracing near
the artesian well and the former pulling a knife from the body of the latter. On the other
hand, prosecution witness Borero was merely seven arms length away from the incident and
could easily see the victim Mauro overpowered and attacked by his assailants, Arnold
Garchitorena, Joey Pamplona and Jessie Garcia. She witnessed the stabbing incident in its
entirely and positively identified the accused and their criminal acts. It is a well-settled rule
that the evaluation of testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with
the highest respect because such court has the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses
on the stand and determine if they are telling the truth or not. (People vs. Cardel, 336 SCRA
144)
Evidence presented by the prosecution shows that the accused conspired to assault
the victim Mauro Biay. Accused Jessie Garcia was the one who called the victim and
prompted the latter to approach their group near the artesian well. When the victim was
near enough, accused Jessie Garcia and co-accused Joey Pamplona restrained Mauro Biay
and overpowered him. Witness Borero then saw the two accused, Jessie Garcia and Joey
Pamplona, together with their co-accused Arnold Garchitorena instructed his two co-accused
to run. Conspiracy is apparent in the concerted action of the three accused. There is
conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it (People vs. Pendatun, 434 SCRA 148). Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from
the acts of the accused which show a joint or common purpose and design, a concerted
action and community of interest among the accused (People vs. Sicad, et al., 391 SCRA 19).
Likewise, we affirm the trial courts appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of

abuse of superior strength to qualify the crime into murder. While it is true that superiority in
number does not per se mean superiority in strength, the appellants in this case did not only
enjoy superiority in number, but were armed with a weapon, while the victim had no means
with which to defend himself. Thus, there was obvious physical disparity between the
protagonists and abuse of superior strength attended the killing when the offenders took
advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense. (People of the
Phils. vs. Parreno, 433 SCRA 591). In the case at bar, the victim was rendered helpless when
he was assaulted by the three accused. He was restrained and overpowered by the
combined strength and the weapons used by his assailants.
We do not find improbable Boreros failure to act or shout for help upon witnessing the
stabbing of her brother Mauro Biay. It is an accepted maxim that different people react
differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling experience. xxx
There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident. The
workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. (People
of the Philippines vs. Aspuria, 391 SCRA 404)
Accused-appellant Jessie Garcias denial of any involvement cannot prevail over

Boreros positive identification. As ruled by the trial court, allegations that accused Jessie
Garcia was somewhere else when the crime was committed is not enough. He must likewise
demonstrate that he could not have been present at the crime scene, or in its vicinity. He
also could have sought the help of his co-worker, employer or anyone in the area to support
his defense of alibi. Indeed, we affirm that accused Jessie Garcias allegation that he was
elsewhere when the crime was committed is not substantiated by evidence. Alibi can easily

be fabricated. Well-settled is the rule that alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the victim. (People of the Phils. vs.
Cadampog, 428 SCRA 336)
Finally, the defense of insanity cannot be given merit when the expert witness
herself, Dr. Belen, attested that accused Arnold Garchitorena was experiencing remission
and was even aware of his murder case in court. The trial court had basis to conclude that
during the commission of the crime, Arnold was not totally deprived of reason and freedom
of will. In fact, after the stabbing incident, accused Arnold Garchitorena instructed his co-
accused to run away from the scene. We agree that such action demonstrates
that Arnold possessed the intelligence to be aware of his and his co-accuseds criminal
acts. A defendant in a criminal case who interpose the defense of mental incapacity has the
burden of establishing the fact that he was insane at the very moment when the crime was
committed. There must be complete deprivation of reason in the commission of the act, or
that the accused acted without discernment, which must be proven by clear and positive
evidence. The mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not preclude
imputability. Indeed, a man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove
that he is legally so.(People of the Philippines vs. Galigao, 395 SCRA 195)
Having found the court a quos decision to be supported by the evidence on record,
and for being in accord with prevailing jurisprudence, we find no reason to set it aside.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is

DISMISSED. Accordingly, the appealed March 9, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bian, Laguna, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 9440-B finding herein accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED in its entirely.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. The People and the accused-appellants
opted not to file any supplemental brief. The respective assignments of errors contained in the briefs that
they filed with the CA are set forth hereunder.
For accused-appellant Pamplona:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL AND TOTAL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS DULCE BORERO
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLANT
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT WHEN HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN DULY
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
For accused-appellant Garcia:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE ALLEGED
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT GIVEN BY DULCE BORERO, ELDER SISTER OF THE VICTIM AND
PROSECUTION WITNESS, IN RESPECT OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE HEREIN ACCUSED
DESPITE GLARING INCONSISTENCIES, INHERENT IMPROBABILITIES AND UNRELIABLE
DECLARATION ATTENDING THE SAME; AND, ON THE OTHERHAND, IN DISREGARDING THE
COHERENT, CONSISTENT AND CREDIBLE EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF DEFENSE WITNESSES
ALL IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES GOVERNING QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL
CASES AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENSE EXISTING IN FAVOR OF ACCUSED GARCIA;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI

INTERPOSED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT JESSIE GARCIA WHO WAS SOMEWHERE ELSE AT THE
TIME AS TO RENDER IT PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO HAVE BEEN AT THE SCENE OF
THE CRIME AND EVEN IF THE SAME IS SUBSTANTIATED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE, THAT IS, THE TESTIMONIES OF OITHER DEFENSE WITNESSES WHO WERE ONE IN
SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT PRESENT THEREAT;
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION FOR JESSIE GARCIA
INSTEAD OF ACQUITTAL WHEN NONE OF THE OTHER ACCUSED, AFTER HAVING ADMITTED
THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIME, IMPLICATED HIM;
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED, IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN THE
ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THEREFOR.
For accused-appellant Garchitorena:
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE OVER THE TESTIMONY OF AN
EXPERT WITNESS.
II
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED ARNOLD GARCHITORENA TO HAVE WILLFULLY

EXECUTED THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF.
Accused-appellant Pamplona capitalized on Dulce Boreros inaction at the time when she had
supposedly witnessed the slaying of her younger brother. He argued that if she really witnessed the crime,
she would have had readily helped her brother Mauro instead of fleeing. Accused-
appellant Garcia anchored his acquittal on his defense of alibi, while accused-
appellant Garchitorena used his alleged mental disorder, specifically, schizophrenia, as a ground to free
himself from criminal liability.
The core issues raised by the both accused-appellants Pamplona and Garcia are factual in nature
and delve on the credibility of the witnesses.
Since the accused-appellants raise factual issues, they must use cogent and convincing arguments
to show that the trial court erred in appreciating the evidence.They, however, have failed to do so.
Accused-appellant Pamplona contends that the trial courts decision was rendered by a judge other
than the one who conducted trial. Hence, the judge who decided the case failed to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses on the stand so as to gauge their credibility. This argument does not convince the Court
for the reason it has consistently maintained, to wit:

We have ruled in People v. Sadiangabay (G.R. No. 87214, March 30, 1993, 220 SCRA
551), that the circumstance alone that the judge who wrote the decision had not heard the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses would not taint his decision. After all, he had the
full record before him, including the transcript of stenographic notes which he could
study. The efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only
took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by him. [8]
A perusal of the trial courts decision readily shows that it was duly based on the evidence presented
during the trial. It is evident that he thoroughly examined the testimonial and documentary evidence
before him and carefully assessed the credibility of the witnesses. This Court finds no plausible ground to
set aside the factual findings of the trial court, which were sustained by the CA.
The eyewitness Dulce Boreros testimony clearly established Pamplona and Garcias participation
and, consequently, their culpability in the appalling murder of Mauro Biay:[9]
Fiscal Nofuente (To the witness)
Q: Madam witness, do you know Mauro Biay?
A: Yes sir.
xxx
Q: Do you know likewise the cause of his death?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What was the cause of his death?
A: He was repeatedly stabbed sir.
Q: You said that Mauro Biay was repeatedly stabbed, who stabbed Mauro Biay
repeatedly?
A: Arnold Gatchitorena, was stabbing repeatedly the victim sir.
Q: Was Arnold Gatchitorena alone when he stabbed Mauro Biay?
A: They were three (3) who were stabbing Mauro Biay, sir.
Q: You said that they were three who were stabbing Mauro Biay, who are the other two?
A: Jessie Garcia and Joey Pamplona sir.
Q: So that when you said three, you are referring to Arnold Gatchitorena, Joey Pamplona and
Jessie Garcia?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Now, when [did] this stabbing incident [happen]?
A: On September 22, 1995 sir.

Q: Do you know what was [the] time when this incident happened on September 22, 1995?
A: 9:00 oclock in the evening sir.
Q: Where [did] this stabbing [happen]?
A: At Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision, dela Paz, Bian, Laguna sir.
Q: Could you tell Madam Witness, where in particular place in Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision
this stabbing incident happened?
A: In the street near the artesian well sir.
Q: Do you know where is that street?
A: Sta Inez St., Almeda Subdivision, dela Paz, Bian, Laguna sir.
Q: You said a while ago that accused Arnold Gatchitorena, Jessie Garcia, Joey Pamplona
repeatedly [stabbed] Mauro Biay, do you know these three accused?
A: Yes sir.
xxx
Q: Will you kindly step down from your seat and tap the three accused that you have pointed
to us to be the persons who stabbed and killed your brother Mauro Biay?
Court: Police Officer Dionisio will you kindly accompany the witness.
P02 Dionisio: Yes sir.
Fiscal: I would like to manifest Your Honor, that the witness was crying when she
was pointing to the three accused, uttering that Sila ang pumatay sa aking
kapatid!.
xxx
Q: What is the name of that person wearing that blue t-shirts?
A: Arnold Gatchitorena sir.
Q: We would like to confirm if he is really Arnold Gatchitorena pointed to by the witness?
Interpreter: The person pointed to by the witness wearing blue t-shirts identified
himself as Arnold Gatchitorena.
Fiscal: Do you know the name of second person whom you tapped on his side wearing white
t-shirts?
A: Yes sir.

Q: What is his name?
A: Jessie Garcia sir.
Interpreter: The person pointed to by the witness identified himself as certain

Jessie Garcia.
Fiscal: Likewise Madam Witness, do you know the name of a person in longsleeves polo
shirts-checkered?
A: Yes sir, Joey Pamplona sir.
Interpreter: The person pointed by the witness identified himself as certain Joey
Pamplona.
xxx
Q: How far were you from Mauro Biay when he was being stabbed by the three accused Joey
Pamplona, Jessie Garcia, and Arnold Gatchitorena?
A: Seven (7) arms length sir.
Q: You said that your brother was stabbed successively by the three accused, how did it
[happen] Madam Witness?
A: They called him sir.
Q: Who was called?
A: Mauro Biay sir.
Q: Who called Mauro Biay?
A: It was Jessie who called sir.
Q: When you said Jessie, are you referring to Jessie Garcia, one of the accused in this case?
A: Yes sir.
Q: When Mauro Biay was called by Jessie Garcia, what was [M]auro Biay doing there?
A: Mauro Biay approached sir.
Q: By the way Madam Witness, do you know why Mauro Biay was in that place where the
incident happened?
A: Yes sir.
Atty. Pajares: Witness would be incompetent Your Honor.

Court: Witness may answer.
Fiscal: Why was he there?
A: He was selling balot sir.
xxx
Fiscal: When Mauro Biay approached Jessie Garcia, what [did] Mauro Biay do, if any?
A: Jessie Garcia twisted the hand of my brother and placed the hand at his back
sir.
Q: Who were the companions of Jessie Garcia when he called [M]auro Biay?
A: Joey Pamplona and Jr. Gatchitorena sir.
Q: When you said Jr. Gatchitorena are you referring to Arnold Gatchitorena?
A: Yes sir.
Q: So that when Jessie Garcia called Mauro Biay, he was together

with ArnoldGatchitorena and Joey Pamplona?
A: Yes sir.
Q: If you know Madam Witness, what did Joey Pamplona and ArnoldGatchitorena
do after Jessie Garcia twisted the arm of Mauro Biay on his back?
A: Arnold Gatchitorena repeatedly stabbed [M]auro Biay at his back and also
Jessie Garcia also stabbed my brother sir.
xxx
Q: Were you able to know the weapon used to stab Mauro Biay?
A: It was like a shiny bladed instrument sir.
Q: Now, what was the position of Mauro Biay when being stabbed by the three accused?
A: He was struggling to free himself sir.
Q: You said that he was struggling to free himself, why did you say that he was struggling to
free himself?
A: Because I could see sir.
Q: You see what?
A: Because that three were repeatedly stabbing Mauro Biay sir.

Q: Aside from stabbing Mauro Biay, what was Joey Pamplona doing to Mauro Biay,
if you can still remember?
A: He was also repeatedly stabbing my brother sir.
Q: Aside from that stabbing, what else if any Joey Pamplona was doing to Mauro
Biay?
A: Aside from stabbing Mauro Biay Joey Pamplona was also struggling [strangling]
the neck of Mauro Biay sir.
Q: You said that Mauro Biay was stabbed by the three accused successively, was
Mauro Biay hit by these stabbing?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Why do you know that he was hit by stabbing of the three?
A: Because I saw the blood oozing from the part of his body sir.
Q: Now, what happened to Mauro Biay, when he was stabbed and hit by the successive
stabbing of the three accused?
A: The victim Mauro Biay was suddenly slumped face down on the ground sir.
xxx
Q: What did you learn if any when you went to the hospital to see your brother [M]auro Biay?
A: He was already dead sir.
Even under cross-examination, Dulce Borero was unwavering, straightforward, categorical and
spontaneous in her narration of how the killing of her brother Mauro took place. [10] Notably, her testimony
as to the identification of Garchitorena as the one who stabbed Mauro Biay was even corroborated by
defense witness Miguelito Gonzalgo,[11] thus:
Q: From the time you saw these two persons near the artesian well, what happened after
that, mr. witness?
A: Mauro Biay slumped on the floor and I saw Junior stabbed once more the victim
but I am not sure if the victim was hit at the back, maam.
Q: How far were you from the two when you saw the incident, mr. witness?
A: More or less 7 to 8 meters, maam.
Q: Were there anything blocking your sight from the place where you were standing to the
place of incident, mr. witness?
A: None, maam.
Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of Borero, we sustain the lower court in giving her
testimony full faith and credence. Moreover, the prosecutions version is supported by the physical
evidence.[12] Boreros testimony that the victim was successively stabbed several times conforms with the
autopsy report that the latter suffered multiple stab wounds.[13]

Accused-appellant Pamplonas argument that there were inconsistencies in the testimony of
prosecution witnesses Borero is not convincing. He specifically points out that in the direct examination of
Borero, she stated that it was Jessie Garcia who twisted the hand of Mauro Biay backwards when the latter
approached the former.[14]In the cross-examination, she stated that it was Joey Pamplona who strangled the
victim when the latter approached Jessie Garcia.
The seeming inconsistencies between her direct testimony and her cross-examination testimonies
are not sufficient ground to disregard them. In People v. Alberto Restoles y Tuyo, Roldan Noel y Molet and
Jimmy Alayon y De la Cruz,[15] we ruled that:
minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to
strengthen rather than weaken their credibility. Inconsistencies in the testimony of
prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect
either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their
testimony. Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard
against memorized falsities.
Moreover, such inconsistencies did not contradict the credibility of Borero or her narration of the
incident. On the contrary, they showed that her account was theentire truth. In fact, her narration was in
harmony with the account of defense witness Gonzalgo. We note further that both the Sworn
Statement[16] of Borero and her testimony before the lower court[17] were in complete congruence.
Undoubtedly, accused-appellants identities as the perpetrators were established by the

prosecution. The prosecution witness was able to observe the entire incident, because she was
there. Thus, we find no reason to differ with the trial courts appreciation of her testimony. Positive
identification, where categorical and consistent, and not attended by any showing of ill motive on the part
of the eyewitnesses on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial. [18]
Accused-appellant Garcias alibi has no leg to stand on. In People v. Desalisa,[19] this Court ruled that:
for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some
other place when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity through clear and convincing
evidence.
Here, the crime was committed at Binan, Laguna. Although Garcia testified that he was still riding a
bus from his work in Blumentritt and arrived in Binan only at 11:00 P.M. or two hours after the killing
incident, still, he failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the place of the crime or
its immediate vicinity.His alibi must fail.
Accused-appellant Garchitorenas defense of insanity has also no merit. Unlike other jurisdictions,
Philippine courts have established a more stringent criterion for the acceptance of insanity as an
exempting circumstance.[20] As aptly argued by the Solicitor General, insanity is a defense in the nature of
confession and avoidance. As such, it must be adequately proved, and accused-appellant Garchitorena
utterly failed to do so. We agree with both the CA and the trial court that he was not totally deprived of
reason and freedom of will during and after the stabbing incident, as he even instructed his co-accused-
appellants to run away from the scene of the crime.
Accused-appellant Garcia also argues that there was no conspiracy, as there was no evidence
whatsoever that he aided the other two accused-appellants or that he participated in their criminal
designs.[21] We are not persuaded. In People v. Maldo,[22] we stated:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for conspiracy
may be inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the
incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose, concert of action or community of
interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by each of the conspirators for the act of
one of them is deemed the act of all. (citations omitted, emphasis ours)
In this case, conspiracy was shown because accused-appellants were together in performing the
concerted acts in pursuit of their common objective. Garcia grabbed the victims hands and twisted his
arms; in turn, Pamplona, together with Garchitorena, strangled him and straddled him on the ground, then
stabbed him. The victim was trying to free himself from them, but they were too strong. All means through
which the victim could escape were blocked by them until he fell to the ground and expired. The three
accused-appellants prior act of waiting for the victim outside affirms the existence of conspiracy, for it
speaks of a common design and purpose.
Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among the accused rendered the fatal blow
is not necessary. All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and the character of
their participation, because the act of one is the act of all. [23]
The aggravating circumstance of superior strength should be appreciated against the accused-
appellants. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim
and the aggressor, considering that a situation of superiority of strength is notoriously advantageous for
the aggressor and is selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. [24] This
circumstance was alleged in the Information and was proved during the trial. In the case at bar, the victim
certainly could not defend himself in any way. The accused-appellants, armed with a deadly weapon,
immobilized the victim and stabbed him successively using the same deadly weapon.
All told, the trial court correctly convicted the accused-appellants of murder, considering the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Since an aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength attended the commission of the crime, each of the accused-appellants should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death in accordance with Article 63 [25] of the Revised Penal
Code. Murder, under Article 248[26] of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Following Article 63 of the same code, the higher penalty of death shall be applied.
In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346,[27] otherwise known as the Anti-Death Penalty
Law, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
should instead be imposed.Accordingly, accused-appellants shall be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole in lieu of the penalty of death.
While the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for
a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. [28] Consequently, the civil indemnity for the
victim is still P75,000.00. In People v. Quiachon,[29] we explained that even if the penalty of death was not
to be imposed on appellant because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity
of P75,000.00 was still proper. Following the ratiocination in People v. Victor,[30] the said award is not
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty, but on the fact that qualifying circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the crime.
Hence, we modify the award of civil indemnity by the trial court fromP50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Civil
indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime. Likewise the award of P50,000.00 for moral damages is modified and increased
to P75,000.00, consistent with recent jurisprudence [31] on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is
death, it is reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. 9346. The award of moral damages does not
require allegation and proof of the emotional suffering of the heirs, since the emotional wounds from the
vicious killing of the victim cannot be denied. [32] The trial courts award of exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 shall, however, be reduced to P30,000.00, also pursuant to the latest jurisprudence
on the matter.[33]

As to the award of actual damages amounting to P16,700.00, we modify the same. In People v.
Villanueva,[34] this Court declared that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to
less than P25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of
actual damages of a lesser amount. In the light of such ruling, the victims heirs in the present case should,
therefore, be awarded temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
The award of P408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity is justified. As a rule, documentary evidence
should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of
exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary
evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws, in which case judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceaseds line of work no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor laws. [35] It cannot be disputed that the victim, at the time of
his death, was self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. The
computation arrived at by the trial court was in accordance with the formula for computing the award for
loss of earning capacity.[36] Thus,
Award for = 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income 50% (GAI)]
lost earnings
= 2/3 [80-29] x P24,000.00 P12,000.00
= (34) x (P12,000.00)
= P408,000.00
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00765, finding the three-accused
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is hereby AFFIRMED WITH the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellants is REDUCED to RECLUSION
PERPETUAwithout eligibility for parole pursuant to RA 9346; (2) the monetary awards to be paid jointly and
severally by the accused-appellants to the heirs of the victim are as follows: P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages; (3) P408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; and (4)
interest is imposed on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from this date until fully paid. [37]
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 185841

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.
- versus -
Promulgated:
August 4, 2009
ISMAEL DIAZ @ Maeng and RODOLFO

DIAZ @ Nanding,
Accused-Appellants.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01606 dated 5 June 2008
which affirmed in toto the Joint Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in
Criminal Cases No. 98-02261-D and No. 98-02262-D, finding appellants Ismael and Rodolfo Diaz guilty of
two counts of Murder.
For the deaths of Elmer Quinto and Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Richard Dalioan, appellants Ismael,
Rodolfo Diaz and one Domingo Doe were charged before the RTC of Dagupan with Murder and Assault
Upon An Agent in Authority with Murder. The informations, which were filed on 17 July 1998, read:
Criminal Case No. 98-02261-D
That on or about the 15th day of April, 1998, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ISMAEL DIAZ @
Maeng, RODOLFO DIAZ @ Nanding and DOMINGO DOE, being then armed with a gun and
Armalite rifle, with treachery, evident premeditation and with intent to kill one ELMER
QUINTO, confederating together, acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the latter
by shooting him, hitting him on the head, thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due to
Hypovolemic Shock, Gunshot Wound as per Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Benjamin Marcial
Bautista, of the City Health Office, this City, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of
said deceased, ELMER QUINTO, in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) Philippine currency, and other consequential damages. [3]
Criminal Case No. 98-02262-D

That on or about the 15th day of April, 1998, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ISMAEL DIAZ @
Maeng, RODOLFO DIAZ @ Nanding and DOMINGO DOE, being then armed with a gun and
Armalite rifle, with treachery, evident premeditation and with intent to kill one SPO1
RICHARD DALIOAN, a member of the Philippine National Police, qualified and appointed as
such, confederating together, acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the latter
by shooting and hitting him several times on vital parts of his body, while said SPO1
RICHARD DALIOAN was then engaged in the performance of his official duties or on occasion
thereof, thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due to Hypovolemic Shock, Multiple
Gunshot Wound as per Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Benjamin Marcial Bautista, of the City
Health Office, this City, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased,
SPO1 RICHARD DALIOAN, in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) Philippine currency, and other consequential damages. [4]
In view of the arrest of the appellants, the trial court, on 5 June 2000, ordered the revival of the
cases and the retrieval of the records of the cases from the archives. [5]
When arraigned on 9 June 2000, appellants, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged.[6]
The pre-trial conference was held on 14 June 2000 and the following admissions were made by the
parties:
1. That the two cases will be tried jointly since they happened during the same incident;
2. The identity of the two accused in the sense that they were the accused who were
charged and who were arraigned in these two cases;
3. Both accused knew personally the late Elmer Quinto, both as private citizen and as a city
councilor. As a matter of fact, he is addressed as a grandfather by the accused Ismael Diaz;
likewise, co-accused knew personally Richard Dalioan, both as a private citizen and as a
policeman of Dagupan City;
4. That on the night of April 14, 1998 there was an occasion in Lucao, Dagupan Citywhere
trophies were awarded to winners of a basketball game until dawn of the next day, April 15,
1998; the affair was a Victory Ball and both accused, Ismael Diaz and Rodolfo Diaz, were in
attendance.
5. That deceased Elmer Quinto is married to one Teresita Quinto, the private complainant in
CR-98-02261;
6. That one Rosa Dalioan is also the wife of SPO1 Richard Dalioan, the victim in CR-98-
02262.[7]
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) SPO1 Salvino Junio; [8] (2) Dr.
Benjamin Marcial O. Bautista;[9] (3) Ernesto Decano;[10] (4) Arnel Quinto;[11] (5) Consolacion Quinto;[12] (6)
Pedro Urbano;[13] (7) Rosa Dalioan;[14](8) Dr. Ronald Bandonill;[15] (9) SPO2 Ramon Valencerina;[16] (10) Police
Officer (PO) 3 Marlon Decano;[17] and (11) SPO4 Onofre Madrid.[18] Their collective testimonies established
the following:
On the evening of 14 April 1998, there was a victory ball in Sitio Nibaliw, Lucao
District, Dagupan City involving the recently concluded sports tournament conducted in
said barangay. Said event was part of the celebration of the barangay fiesta. The main event of the
program was the awarding of trophies to the winners of the various ball games held. Aside from the
awarding of prizes, there were political speeches and public dancing. Firecrackers were likewise exploded
during the program. Present therein were politicians who donated the trophies to be awarded and who
were invited to deliver campaign speeches for the upcoming May 1998 local elections. Among the
politicians present were City Councilors Elmer Quinto, Hermenio Casilang and Rico Melendrez.
Councilor Quinto was seated in front of the stage facing the audience. He was seated at the left potion of
the stage between Councilors Casilang and Melendez. Appellant Ismael Diaz was at the left side at the
back of the stage. SPO1 Richard Dalioan, the security escort of Councilor Quinto, was also at the left side
behind the stage, seated on a bench. Behind SPO1 Dalioan on the right was appellant Rodolfo
Diaz. Ernesto Decano, a cousin of Councilor Quinto, was sitting on the left side of a fence about three
meters from SPO1 Dalioan, while Arnel Quinto, the driver of Councilor Quinto, was about six meters away
from the latter.
The program lasted until dawn of the following day, 15 April 1998. At around 3:00 a.m., the people were
invited to dance. While the dancing was going on, firecrackers were exploded. Suddenly, appellant Ismael
Diaz shot Councilor Quinto from behind with a .45 caliber pistol. Upon seeing that Councilor Quinto was
shot, SPO2 Dalioan drew his gun and was about to fire. It was at this moment that appellant Rodolfo Diaz
fired his M16 armalite rifle, hitting SPO1 Dalioan on different parts of his body.Thereafter, Ismael Diaz and
Rodolfo Diaz fled towards Sitio Tococ.
Councilor Quinto died on the spot. Ernesto Decano and Arnel Quinto rushed SPO1 Dalioan to the
Trauma Center Hosptial, Lucao District, Dagupan City where he died an hour after. Ernesto Decano and
Arnel Quinto informed Councilor Quintos wife of what happened to her husband.
Dr. Benjamin Marcial O. Bautista, Rural Health Physician of the City Health Office, Dagupan City,
conducted autopsy on the bodies of Councilor Quinto and SPO1 Dalioan. Councilor Quinto suffered a fatal
gunshot wound above the left ear.The point of entry was 1 centimeter in diameter, left superior pinna, with
lacerated wound and gunpowder tattooing, less dense through and through the temporal bone, at the level
of the left superior pinna, gunpowder tattooing with abrasion collar, inverted edges, direction slightly
upward, antero-lateral. The cause of his death was Hypovolemic Shock. [19] On the other hand, SPO1
Dalioan sustained multiple injuries and gunshot wounds on different parts of his body. The cause of his
death was Hypovolemic Shock due to multiple gunshot wounds. [20]
Ernesto Decano testified that when the shooting happened, he saw Ismael Diaz at the back of the
stage holding a .45 cal. pistol. He then saw SPO1 Dalioan, who was about to pull out a revolver, get shot
many times by Rodolfo Diaz using an M16 armalite rifle.[21] Next, he saw the two flee towards Sitio Tococ.
Arnel Quinto disclosed that after seeing Ismael Diaz shoot Councilor Quinto, he then saw Rodolfo
Diaz gun down SPO1 Dalioan with an armalite rifle. The two then took off to Sitio Tococ.
SPO1 Salvino Junio was the Desk Officer of the night shift at the Dagupan City Police Station when
SPO2 Romeo Esquillo reported to him in the early morning of 15 April 1998 the shooting incident. He
recorded the report in the Police Blotter as Entry No. 2075 [22] under the date 15 April 1998. A team headed
by Senior Police Inspector Nelson Vidal was dispatched to investigate the incident. SPO1 Junio recorded the
result of the investigation in the Police Blotter under Entry No. 2076. [23]
SPO1 Pedro Urbano of the Dagupan City Police Station narrated, among others, how they surveyed
the place where the incident happened and how the empty shells of a .45 cal pistol and M16 armalite rifle
were recovered. He disclosed that he recovered five empty shells of a .45 caliber pistol, more or less, three
and one-half (3) meters away from the cadaver of Councilor Quinto. As to the empty shells of the armalite
rifle, he found 15 of them beside Renato Cuisons house, which was situated six meters away from the back
of the stage.

Rosa Dalioan, widow of SPO1 Dalioan, said her husband was 40 years old and was earning a
monthly salary of P5,600.00.[24] Her husbands death was very painful, for he was the sole breadwinner of
the family. Because of his death, their four children were farmed out to their relatives.
Consolacion Quinto, mother of Councilor Quinto, was at the crime scene when the incident
happened. She was 2 to 2 meters away from her son when the guns were fired. She tried to dive to the
ground, but was not able to do so. She bent low towards the ground where she saw her son lying on the
ground with plenty of blood on his head. She heard people shouting, It was Maeng and Nanding who did
it. She identified Maeng as Ismael Diaz and Nanding as Rodolfo Diaz, both of whom she personally knows.
Consolacion Quinto disclosed that his son, Elmer Quinto, was 47 years old when he died [25] and was
a member of the City Council of Dagupan City, by virtue of his being the President of the Liga ng mga
Barangay in Dagupan City, and was receiving a monthly salary of P18,749.00.[26] She added that Elmer had
six children with his wife, and that his children were traumatized by the incident. Losing her son caused
her sufferings. She said her husband was likewise affected. As a result, he became very weak and sickly
until he eventually died. Not only did she lose a son, she also lost her husband.
Dr. Ronald Bandonill, Medico Legal Officer, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), testified that
on 24 April 1998, he was directed by the officer-in-charge of the NBI, Dagupan City, to proceed to the NBI
Dagupan District and to conduct an autopsy on the cadaver of Elmer Quinto. The autopsy was requested
by Teresita Quinto, wife of Elmer Quinto. [27] He explained that Elmer Quinto suffered a fatal gunshot wound
on the head, the point of entry of which was at the left side of the back of the head above the left ear,
while the point of exit was at the right temple. He added that the trajectory of the bullet was from the back
going forward and going upward.From the gunshot wound entrance, he estimated that the firearm used
was either a .45 caliber or a 9 mm., and that the tip of the barrel of the gun was within six inches from the
head of the victim. His findings were reduced into writing.[28]
SPO2 Ramon Valencerina, Warrant Officer of the Dagupan City Police Station, testified that he tried
to serve warrants and alias warrants of arrest issued in the names of Ismael Diaz and Rodolfo Diaz, but the
same were returned unserved, because the subjects thereof could not be found in their respective
residences.[29]
PO3 Marlon Decano testified that his only participation in the arrest of Alfredo Diaz, the brother of
the appellant Rodolfo Diaz, was to point to him because his co-police officers did not know
him. Subsequently, Alfredo was invited for questioning.
SPO4 Onofre Madrid testified that on 2 June 2000, he was assigned as Chief Investigator at the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Lingayen,
Pangasinan. On said date, he was told by an informant that Ismael Diaz and Rodolfo Diaz were sighted at
Barangay Barangobong, Villasis, Pangasinan. He relayed the information to Major Franklin Mabanag, his
provincial officer. He then informed his companions via text messaging that they would conduct an
operation to arrest Ismael Diaz and Rodolfo Diaz on the strength of the warrants of arrest issued by the
trial court. Upon being informed that the group of Ismael Diaz was already leaving the barangay, he,
together with one agent and the owner of a borrowed car, proceeded to the highway in Barangay Bacag in
Villasis, Pangasinan where he met his other companions. Upon seeing the car bearing the accused, they
gave chase. Upon reaching the intersection at Urdaneta Proper, SPO4 Madrid got down from the car and
positioned himself at the back of the accuseds car.The accused tried to escape, but their vehicle was
stopped by the Urdaneta Police, which SPO4 Madrid had already alerted. Ismael Diaz and Rodolfo Diaz
surrendered peacefully and were brought to the Urdaneta Police Station where they were fingerprinted,
interviewed and photographed. Major Mabanag arrived and talked to the Police Chief of
Urdaneta. Thereafter, the accused were brought to the SacredHeart Hospital for medical check-up before
being brought to the CIDG office in Lingayen, Pangasinan. He added that the accused were never
manhandled and were not about to be salvaged. He had no knowledge of the accuseds allegation that they
(the police officers) had accused the Diazes of being carnappers. The medical certificates[30] issued by one
Dr. Norberto Felix, Medical Director of the SacredHeart Hospital, stated: Injuries sustained no physical
injuries noted.
For the defense, the following took the witness stand: (1) Imelda Quinto, [31](2) Josue de Vera,[32] (3)
Ricardo Avelino,[33] (4) Rhodora Jose,[34] (5) Lolita Velasco,[35] (6) Ismael Diaz,[36] (7) Rodolfo Diaz,[37] (8)

Santiago Marcella, Jr.,[38] and (9) Alfredo Diaz.[39] Their testimonies disclosed the defenses version of the
incident.
Appellants Ismael Diaz and Rodolfo Diaz denied shooting Councilor Elmer Quinto and SPO1
Dalioan. They, however, admitted that they were present in the dance hall where the shooting
happened. They were there as players of a softball team, which was to receive the runner-up trophy. They
said their table was 20 to 25 meters away from the table, where the guests who included Councilor Quinto
sat.They alleged that when the shooting occurred, they saw the people in the dance hall stoop. They
likewise crouched to prevent being hit. When the people began to run, they (appellants) stood up and
heard the people say that somebody was shot.Appellants Ismael Diaz and Rodolfo Diaz then ran together
with Imelda Quinto, Jayho Villanueva, Ricky Velasco and some others.
Ismael Diaz and Rodolfo Diaz did not return to the dance hall to know what really happened. They
remained in their respective houses until armed men began to look for them on 17 or 18 April 1998. Ismael
Diaz was brought to Project 6, Quezon City by his mother. On the other hand, Rodolfo Diaz, after being shot
at and chased by four armed men, went to Bongabong, Nueva Ecija, the place of Guillermo Lictaoa, his
brother-in-law, and stayed there for one month. They left because they were afraid that they might be
killed by the armed men who were looking for them.
Ismael Diaz said he returned to Sitio Nibaliw, Lucao District, Dagupan Cityafter a month to look after
his fishpond. When armed men looked for him anew for the death of one Leopoldo Calulut, and his house
was raided on 9 January 1999, he went to Baguio City to hide. After a few weeks, he returned again to take
care of his fishpond. He even became the manager of a basketball team, which took part in a school
sportsfest at Sitio Eskuelahan. This, he claimed, was known to Consolacion Quinto. Aside from these, he
even became a sponsor in a wedding and in a baptism.He wanted to surrender to the police, but was afraid
he might be killed because the policemen were the ones accusing him.
On the day he and Rodolfo Diaz were arrested at Urdaneta City, they were attending a baptismal
and birthday party of one of their relatives. They were badly beaten by the police officers who arrested
them, and they were even tagged as carnappers. They were forced to admit all the accusations being
imputed to them.
Rodolfo Diaz, despite knowing that he was being held responsible for the deaths of Councilor Quinto
and SPO1 Richard Dalioan, did not surrender to the authorities because he feared that he might be killed.
Imelda Quinto, a resident of Lucao District, Dagupan City testified that she was at the victory ball
and was seated behind the table of the appellants. She was watching the people dance to the tune of
Dayang- Dayang when she suddenly heard gunshots.She stooped because she did not want to be hit. She
saw the appellants, who were on their seats, bend down to hide. When the people started to run, the
appellants also ran and so did she. She said appellants could not have done the shooting because she did
not notice them carrying any firearm, and they were still seated when she heard the gunshots.
Josue de Vera was a resident of Lucao District, Dagupan City and relative of both the appellants and
Councilor Quinto. When the incident happened, he alleged that he was on the same table as that of the
appellants. When the tune of Dayang-Dayang was played, he heard a firecracker-like sound and saw the
people running and stooping. He and the appellants also stooped to avoid being hit. He denied the
accusation against the appellants, explaining that they were still seated with him when the shooting
happened.
Ricardo Avelino declared that he was at the victory ball when the killings took place. Upon his
arrival there, Ismael Diaz escorted him to the presidential table, he being a candidate for city councilor. He
revealed that he did not see the actual shooting of the victims, because he was sleeping on one of the
tables. When he heard the gunshots, he stood up and looked for his wife and son. He saw Ismael Diaz who
was 2 meters away from him. He said Ismael Diaz did not shoot Councilor Quinto because Diaz was not
holding a gun when he saw him, and that they were 15-20 meters from the place where Councilor Quinto
was shot.

Lolita Velasco disclosed that she was the aunt of Ismael Diaz and cousin of Rodolfo Diaz. She
testified that at around midnight of 17 April 1998, four armed men went to her house looking for the
appellants. The men searched her house and even poked a gun at her sleeping son. Not finding the
appellants, the armed men left. She immediately left and informed Ismael Diaz of what happened. She
advised her nephew to hide.
Rhodora Jose, a neighbor of Lolita Velasco, testified that at around midnight of17 April 1998, four
men armed with long firearms came to her house looking for appellants. One of the armed men searched
her house. Since the appellants were not there, these men left, saying that they would kill the appellants if
they saw them. She told her husband what happened and the latter told her to inform Florita Diaz, mother
of Ismael Diaz, about what happened, which she did.
Santiago Marcella, 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City, testified that he handled two cases
for attempted homicide filed by Salvador Alabasco and Lanecita Arenas against appellants. The said cases
were dismissed on account of the affidavits of desistance filed by said complainants.
Alfredo Diaz, a brother of Rodolfo Diaz, testified that he was at the victory ball when the shooting
happened. He was at the gate watching when he heard a loud sound which he thought was
a trianggulo exploding. When he saw people running and heard someone shouting that somebody got
shot, he also ran. Thereafter, he was arrested by the police officers, one of whom was Marlon
Decano. Several hours later, he was released.
On 18 April 2001, the trial court promulgated its Joint Decision finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of Murder committed in conspiracy with one another. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, both the accused ISMAEL DIAZ and RODOLFO DIAZ are
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for having committed in conspiracy with one
another two (2) counts of MURDER as defined by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
as penalized by RA 7659, and since neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance was
attendant to the commission of the offense, each accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA in each of the herein cases. Also in each of the two cases,
both should jointly and severally indemnify the death of ELMER QUINTO and RICHARD
DALIOAN each in the amount of P50,000.00. They should likewise pay jointly and severally
the heirs of Elmer Quinto the amount of P2,474,736.00 as lost earnings which would have
been received by his heirs as support had he been alive,P30,000.00 as moderate or
temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as moral damages, as well as to the heirs of SPO1
Richard Dalioan the amount of P874,380.00 as lost earnings which would have been
received by his heirs as support had the said victim been alive, P20,000.00 as moderate or
temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs. [40]
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of Ernesto Decano and Arnel Quinto, who pointed to the
appellants as the assailants. It ruled that Ismael Diaz had a strong motive to kill Councilor Quinto, because
the latter was the principal suspect in the killing of the formers father (Pablo Diaz) who was the political
opponent of Consolacion Quinto. It likewise found the shooting of SPO1 Richard Dalioan connected with the
shooting of Councilor Quinto. The almost simultaneous shooting of the two, the trial court said, was
enough proof that the appellants conspired with each other.
On the other hand, the trial court was not convinced by the denial offered by the appellants. Not only did
appellants admit they were present in the place where the incident took place, they were positively
identified by eyewitnesses. The trial court did not find credible the defense witnesses (Josue de Vera,
Imelda Quinto and Ricardo Avelino) who alleged that appellants were with them and were not holding any
firearm when the victims were gunned down. It found that appellants had a motive to kill Councilor Quinto
and considered their flight in arriving at its decision.

On 2 May 2001, appellants filed a Notice of Appeal informing the trial court that they were appealing the
Joint Decision to the Supreme Court.[41]
In its Order dated 3 May 2001, the trial court, finding the notice of appeal to have been filed in time,
directed the records of the cases to be forwarded to the Supreme Court. [42] However, pursuant to our ruling
in People v. Mateo,[43] the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition.[44]
On 5 June 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Joint Decision of the RTC.
On 19 June 2008, the appellants filed their notice of appeal. [45]
In a Resolution dated 19 June 2008, the Court of Appeals elevated the records of the case to the Supreme
Court.[46] Thereafter, in our resolution dated 18 February 2009, this Court noted the elevation of the records
of the case, accepted the appeal and required the parties to submit supplemental briefs, if they so desired,
within 30 days from notice.[47] The parties opted not to file supplemental briefs on the ground that they had
fully argued their positions in their respective briefs.[48]
Appellants make the following assignment of errors:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, WHEN THEIR
GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY
OF THE PROSECUTIONS EYEWITNESSES.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT CONSPIRACY AND TREACHERY
ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.[49]
It is appellants contention that there was no proof that the prosecution witnesses saw the actual
shooting. They argue that this is supported by the trial courts finding that Ernesto Decano could have seen
Ismael Diaz when the latter was retreating backward.They add that Decanos testimony that he heard the
gunshots and saw how Councilor Quinto was shot is doubtful considering that music was being played and
firecrackers were being exploded and that he took cover behind the fence to hide. As to Arnel Quinto,
appellants tried to discredit him by asking how he could have seen the actual shooting of the victims when
he admittedly hid or took cover. Moreover, they maintain that it was unnatural for Arnel Quinto not to have
warned Councilor Quinto when he saw appellants approaching and holding guns. With all these major
inconsistencies, appellants assert that the conviction of the appellants was not justified.
After meticulously going over the testimonies of both Ernesto Decano and Arnel Quinto, we are convinced
that appellant Ismael Diaz shot Councilor Elmer Quinto, while appellant Rodolfo Diaz shot SPO1 Richard
Dalioan.

The testimony of Arnel Quinto, the driver of Councilor Quinto, clearly points to the appellants as the
assailants. His testimony as to the actual shooting of the victims goes this way:
Q. Did anything unusual happen in the early morning of April 15, 1998 at Sitio Nibaliw,
Lucao, Dagupan City?
A. Yes sir, there was.
Q. What was that unusual event that happened?
A. There was a shooting incident that took place, sir.
Q. Who was shot on that incident?
A. Councilor Quinto and SPO1 Dalioan, sir.
Q. Did you personally see who shot Kgd. Elmer Quinto and SPO1 Richard Dalioan?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who shot Kgd. Elmer Quinto?
A. A certain Maeng Diaz, sir.
xxxx
Q. Who shot SPO1 Dalioan?
A. It was Nanding Diaz, sir.
xxxx
Q. Please narrate to the Court the sequence of events that occurred during this shooting
incident?
A. There was an announcement for the public for dance for all, sir.
Q. And after that announcement, what happened, Mr. Witness?

A. Firecrackers burst out, sir.
Q. And while the firecrackers were being burst, what happened, if any?
A. I heard gun burst shots, sir.
Q. What happened after you heard gun burst shots?
A. I saw Kgd. Elmer Quinto fell down, sir.
Q. Was Kgd. Elmer Quinto shot?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where was Councilor Quinto when he was shot?
A. He was in front of the stage a little left side, sir.
Q. Who shot Councilor Quinto?
A. It was Maeng Diaz, sir.
Q. Where was Maeng Diaz when he shot Councilor Elmer Quinto?
A. He was on the left side of the stage behind, sir.
xxxx
Q. After Councilor Elmer Quinto was shot, what happened, if any?
A. I saw SPO1 Dalioan who was also shot down, sir.
Q. Who shot SPO1 Dailioan?
A. It was Nanding Diaz, sir.
Q. What did Nanding Diaz use to shoot SPO1 Dalioan?
A. An armalite, sir.
Q. After Nanding Diaz shot SPO1 Dalioan, what happened next, if any?
A. Maeng and Nanding ran away towards Tocok, sir. [50]
Arnel Quintos account of the incident was substantially corroborated by Ernesto Decano in this wise:
Q. Was there anything unusual happen in the early morning of April 15, 1998 at
Sitio Nibaliw, Lucao, Dagupan City?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was this unusual event that happened?
A. Councilor Quinto and SPO1 Dalioan were shot and killed, sir.
xxxx
Q. Who shot Elmer Quinto?
A. Maeng Diaz, sir.
xxxx
Q. And who shot SPO1 Dalioan?
A. Nanding Diaz, sir.
xxxx
Q. Please relate to the Court the unusual event that occurred during the shooting incident?
A. Councilor Quinto was sitting in front of the makeshift stage, sir.
Q. And then what happened, Mr. Witness?
A. The public was told to dance and they play the song Dayang-Dayang, sir.

Q. While the song Dayang-Dayang was played what happened?
A. While the song Dayang-Dayang was played some firecrackers were being burst, sir.
Q. What happened when a firecracker was being burst, if any, Mr. Witness?
A. Then suddenly I heard some gunshots, sir.
Q. What happened after the firing of the gunshots?
A. I saw Maeng Diaz at the back of the stage holding a .45 caliber pistol, sir.
Q. What happened after that, if any?
A. SPO1 Dalioan was about to pull out the .22 revolver but he was shot many times by
Nanding Diaz with M16 Armalite Rifle, sir.[51]
From the foregoing declarations, it is clear that after the people in the dance hall were invited to dance,
the song Dayang-Dayang was played and some firecrackers were exploded. It was at this moment that
Ismael Diaz, using a .45 caliber pistol, shot Councilor Quinto from the back hitting him on the head. When
SPO1 Dalioan was about to draw his weapon, Rodolfo Diaz shot him with an armalite rifle inflicting on him
multiple gunshot wounds. As explained by the trial court, though the tables of appellants and Councilor
Quinto were situated 20-25 meters away, it was not impossible for the appellants to have gone to the
place where the victims were located by slipping under the bamboo strand of the fence surrounding the
dance hall, and going to the stage from behind, towards the place where Councilor Quintos table was
located.
The statement of the trial court that Ernesto Decano could not have seen him (Ismael Diaz) go near Elmer
Quinto since everybodys attention was focused on the audience and he (Ernesto Decano) could have only
seen him (Ismael Diaz) as the said accused was retreating backward from his target does not mean that
appellant Ismael Diaz was not the one who shot Councilor Quinto. The fact that Ernesto Decano saw Ismael
Diaz holding a .45 caliber pistol, whether retreating or not, bolsters the declaration of Arnel Quinto that it
was Ismael Diaz whom he saw shoot Councilor Quinto with a .45 caliber pistol.
Appellants argument that both Ernesto Decano and Arnel Quinto could not have witnessed the shooting
because they admitted that they hid or took cover during the shooting incident does not have a leg to
stand on. Both witnesses emphatically stated that the shooting happened so fast that they were able to
hide or take cover when the shooting had almost ended.
Arnel Quinto explained:
Q. Were you standing near the sound system during the shooting incident?
A. No, sir.
Q. What did you do?

A. I hid because I might be hit by the bullets, sir.
Q. Could you still see what happened from your position?
ATTY. CABRERA:
We would object to that, Your Honor, please, how could he see that? He has already hidden
himself.
ATTY. JAVELLANA:
That is why we were asking him, your Honor.
COURT:
Q. How did you hide yourself?
A. Because before I hid, the shooting incident has almost ended, because as what I have
said, the incident happened so fast, sir.
xxxx
COURT:
Q. You said that when the dance was going on you were looking from place to place
watching Kgd. Elmer Quinto, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why do you need to watch Kgd. Quinto?
A. Because I was then his driver, your Honor.
Q. But your duty as a driver was to drive him and not to watch him, is that correct?
A. I was watching over him, Your Honor, because of instances that he might be asking me to
do something for him so that he can easily tell me through signal.
Q. So the court understands that you are watching him because there was possible harm
that may occur to him, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, of course, when you go from one place to another within the premises of the
dancing hall, you noticed the presence of Rodolfo Diaz and Maeng Diaz behind the
stage?
A. Not yet, sir.
Q. What moment did you notice the presence of Ismael Diaz and Rodolfo Diaz in relation to
the gun report?
A. During the gun burst, Your Honor.
Q. But you did not tell that you went somewhere else to hide yourself?
A. Your Honor, it was when the gun burst was about to end when I hid myself. [52]
Ernesto Decano made it clear that he saw what happened, thus:
Q. Now, from your position when you took cover, Mr. Witness, could you still see what was
happening?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why?
A. The sight is almost finish[ed] when I was able to take cover because it is very fast, sir. [53]
Appellant further tries to discredit Arnel Quinto by claiming that it is highly unnatural for the latter
not to have warned either Councilor Quinto or SPO1 Dalioan when he saw Ismael Diaz and Rodolfo Diaz
holding firearms.
Arnel Quinto testified on how he acted under the situation in this manner:
Q. Will you tell us the reason why you did not call the attention of either Kgd. Elmer Quinto or SPO1
Dalioan despite the fact that you have seen these two accused already holding a firearm
before the firing took place?
A. Because I was not aware of their intention, Your Honor.
Q. Did you not know that SPO1 Dalioan was there to secure the safety of Kgd. Elmer Quinto because
of previous grudge with people?

A. I do not know, Your Honor.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY ATTY.JAVELLANA
Q. You said that you saw Maeng Diaz and Nanding Diaz before the shooting incident, could you tell
us how long before the shooting incident that you saw Maeng Diaz and Nanding Diaz?
A. About a minute, sir.
Q. Is that the reason why you were not able to inform SPO1 Dalioan and Councilor Quinto?
ATTY. CABRERA
Misleading, we object, Your Honor, please.
COURT
Q. Did you know that the family of Diazes and the family of Quintos were not exactly in good terms
because of previous incident that happened between them?
A. I know, your Honor.
Q. And yet, you know that very well but you did not call the attention of either Police Officer Dalioan
and your boss Elmer Quinto about the presence of Ismael Diaz and Rodolfo Diaz holding
their respective firearms?
A. I was far from them, your Honor.
Q. You claim to be 6 meters away from them, you consider that too far?
A. Of course, I did not tell them anymore or get near them because if I have done it, I might be even
one of those who were hit, Your Honor.[54]
We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said that the credibility of said witnesses was not
affected because it is well-settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of
situation, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a
strange or startling or frightful experience. Witnessing a crime is an unusual experience which
elicitsdifferent reactions from the witnesses and for which no clear-cut standard form of behavior can be
drawn.[55] As Arnel Quinto explained, he failed to call the attention of Councilor Quinto or SPO1 Dalioan
because he did not know the intention of the appellants, and the incident happened very quickly, giving
him no opportunity to give any warning to the councilor and to his security escort. Moreover, he was
scared that he might get hit if he called the victims attention.
Having been positively identified by prosecution witnesses as the assailants, all that appellants can
offer for their exoneration is the defense of denial. Appellants admitted that they were present in the
dance hall where the victims were gunned down, but claimed that they were not the assailants.
To be believed, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability.Otherwise, it is

purely self-serving and without merit. [56] Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the
accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission
of the crime.[57] In the instant case, appellants failed to adduce strong and credible evidence to overcome
the testimonies of the prosecutions eyewitnesses. The testimonies of the defense witnesses (Josue de
Vera, Imelda Quinto and Ricardo Avelino), who alleged that appellants were with them and were not
holding firearms when the victims were gunned down, were not given credence by both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals. These witnesses were not credible witnesses. Thus, denial, unsubstantiated by any
credible evidence, deserves no weight in law.
When it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses
deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to
evaluate testimonial evidence properly.[58]
It is to be noted that the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC. In this regard, the settled
rule is that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings
are generally conclusive and binding upon thisCourt.[59] We find no compelling reason to deviate from
their findings.
The Court has consistently adhered to the principle that proof of motive is not indispensable for a
conviction, particularly where the accused is positively identified by an eyewitness, and his participation is
adequately established. Motive assumes truesignificance only when there is no showing of who the
perpetrator of a crime might have been. [60] In this case, not only were the appellants positively identified as
the killers, it was shown that they had a motive to kill the victims. As shown by the evidence, appellants
Ismael Diaz and Rodolfo Diaz are the son and cousin, respectively, of the late Pablo Diaz, the political
opponent of Consolacion Quinto, who is the mother of Councilor Quinto. Councilor Quinto is suspected of
having masterminded the killing of Pablo Diaz.
Appellants flight is further evidence of their guilt. It is well-established that the flight of an accused
is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an
inference of guilt may be drawn.[61] In the case before us, appellants were apprehended only on 2 June
2000, or almost two years after the informations were filed in court on 17 July 1998. We find their claim,
that they did not resort to flight because they were not aware that warrants for their arrest were issued, to
be untenable. As testified to by SPO2 Ramon Valencerina, he went to the respective residences of the
appellants to serve the warrants [62] for their arrest, but they were not there. SPO1 Pepito Ventura, another
Warrant Officer of the Dagupan City Police Station, tried to serve the duplicate copy of the warrants to no
avail. We are likewise not persuaded by appellants claim that they had remained in their barangay or had
returned thereto for a considerable length of time. Such claim was belied by the declaration of Consolacion
Quinto, mother of Councilor Quinto, that her people had been looking for the appellants in
their barangay, and that it was impossible for her people not to find the appellants if they were indeed
staying there.
Appellants assert that neither conspiracy nor treachery attended the killings.
We disagree. Both conspiracy and treachery were present in the commission of the killings.
We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said:
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Although there is no direct proof of conspiracy, the same may still be deduced from the
mode, method and manner by which the offense was perpetrated or it can be inferred from
the acts of the appellants themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.
In the present case, appellant Ismael Diaz was behind Councilor Quinto while appellant
Rodolfo Diaz positioned himself behind SPO1 Dalioan, the security aide of Councilor
Quinto. When Ismael Diaz shot Councilor Quinto, SPO1 Dalioan tried to pull out his gun but
appellant Rodolfo Diaz shot him. Thereafter, the two escaped going to Sitio Tococ. Both
appellants were apprehended only on June 2, 2000 inside a car on the road going to
Dagupan in Urdaneta City.
The possession of arms by both appellants, their strategic positions before the incident and
their simultaneous firing of guns ineluctably show their concerted action to kill Councilor
Quinto, including the latters aide. Their actions were so closely connected showing that they
mutually aided one another in bringing about their criminal design. [63]
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found the appellants guilty of two counts of
murder in view of the presence of treachery. There is treachery when the means, methods, and forms of
execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and such
means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused
without danger to his person.[64]
In the case under consideration, the attack was unexpected and swift.Appellants attacked from
behind, catching both victims defenseless. Both victims had no opportunity to defend themselves, and the
appellants were not exposed to any danger in view of the unexpected attack. It is likewise apparent that
appellants consciously and deliberately adopted their mode of attack the use of high-powered weapons
like a .45 caliber pistol and an armalite rifle -- making sure that the victims would have no chance to
defend themselves by reason of the surprise attack.
We now go to the penalties to be imposed on appellants.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, [65] murder is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance
in the commission of the felony, appellants should, in each case, be sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
conformably to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
We now go to the award of damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages
may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages. [66]
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than
the commission of the crime.[67] The trial court properly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 to each of the
heirs of the victims as civil indemnity. The amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is awarded only if the
crime is qualified by circumstances that warrant the imposition of the death penalty. [68]

As to actual damages, the heirs of the victims are not entitled thereto, because said damages were
not duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. [69]However, the award of P25,000.00 in temperate
damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is
presented in the trial court.[70] Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered,
as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss, although the exact amount was
not proved.[71] Thus, the award of temperate damages to the heirs of Councilor Quinto is reduced
to P25,000.00, while that granted to the heirs of SPO1 Dalioan is retained.
Anent moral damages, the same is mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without need of
allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. [72] The trial court awarded P25,000.00 as moral
damages in each case. The same must be increased to P50,000.00 to conform with current
jurisprudence. [73]
Both lower courts did not award exemplary damages. The heirs of the victims are entitled to
exemplary damages since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly established. [74] Under Article
2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages as part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The term aggravating circumstances as used
therein is to be understood in its broad or generic sense, since the law does not specify otherwise.
[75]
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we award the amount ofP25,000.00 as exemplary damages to
each of the heirs of the victims.[76]
The trial court awarded the amounts of P2,474,736.00 and P874,380.00 as lost earnings to the heirs
of Councilor Quinto and SPO1 Dalioan, respectively.
The monthly income of Councilor Quinto was P18,749.00 or a gross annual income
of P224,988.00. He was 47 years old at the time of his death. On the other hand, SPO1 Dalioan was 40
years old when he was killed and was earning P5,600.00 a month or a total of P67,200.00 gross annual
income. The formula[77] for unearned income is as follows:
Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income (G.A.I.) less Living expenses (50% G.A.I.)]
where life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - age of the deceased )
The unearned income of Councilor Quinto is computed as follows:
Unearned Income = 2/3 (80-47)(P224,988.00-P112,494.00)
= 2/3 (33)(P112,494.00)
= P2,474,868.00
The unearned income of SPO1 Dalioan is computed as follows:
Unearned Income = 2/3 (80-40)(P67,200.00-P33,600.00)

= 2/3 (40)(P33,600.00)
= P896,000.00
The unearned income or lost income awarded to the heirs of Councilor Quinto and SPO1 Dalioan
must respectively be increased to P2,474,868.00 and P896,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01606 dated 5 June 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATION that the award of temperate
damages to the heirs of Councilor Quinto is reduced to P25,000.00; the award of moral damages to each of
the heirs of the victims is increased to P50,000.00; the award of unearned income to the heirs of Councilor
Quinto and SPO1 Dalioan is increased to P2,474,868.00 and P896,000.00, respectively. Exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 are awarded to the heirs of each of the victims. Cost against the
appellants.
SO ORDERED.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES.

DAMNUM ET INJURIA/ DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 83589 March 13, 1991

RAMON FAROLAN as ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, and GUILLERMO PARAYNO, as CHIEF

Dakila F. Castro & Associates for private respondent.

The relevant facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 1

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 2

After due proceeding, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 11

3. In our decision of July 27, 1987, We awarded to plaintiff-appellant Pl00,000 as temperate

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 3

We rule for the petitioners.

[G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996]

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 5

Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.[4]

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 6

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 7

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-8385 March 24, 1914

Southworth, Hargis & Springer for appellant.

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 9

Articles 1106 and 1107 of the Civil Code read as follows:

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 11

(1) Damages to the plaintiff.

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 13

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 14

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 15

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 16

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 17

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 18

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 77950 August 24, 1990

ISIDRO V. SABA, petitioner,

Antonio G. Saba for petitioner.

Jose F. Falcotelo for respondents.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

ACTUAL/COMPENSATORY DAMAGES (ART. 2199-2215)

[G.R. No. 114118. August 28, 2001]

HEIRS OF SIMEON BORLADO, namely, ADELAIDA BORLADO, LORETO BORLADO, REYNALDO

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 21

2. Declaring defendants as owner of the land and entitled to possession;

4. To pay the costs of the suit.

Roxas City, Philippines, March 18, 1988.

(Sgd.) JONAS A. ABELLAR

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Hence, this appeal.[7]

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 22

The Courts Ruling

El Fallo del Tribunal

[G.R. No. 134972. March 22, 2001]

The antecedents of this case are as follows:

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 23

Meanwhile, the lease agreement between BPI and Galang expired.

Respondent, on the other hand, filed a notice of appeal.

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 24

Torts and Damages. Damages. | 25

In order to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor, an immediate execution of a judgment is

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners

4. The costs of suit.