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Christoph Luth
To cite this article: Christoph Luth (1998) On Wilhelm von Humboldt's Theory of Bildung
Dedicated to Wolfgang Klafki for his 70th birthday, Journal of Curriculum Studies, 30:1, 43-60,
DOI: 10.1080/002202798183756
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j. curriculum studies , 1998, vol . 30, no. 1, 43 59
T his paper outlines the essential aspects of the educational theory (Bildungstheorie) of
Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767 1835). Humboldt s theory is a central reference point
for German theories of curriculum and educational policy and Humboldt s role in
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German educational theory can be compared to that of Dewey in the US. After a
biographical sketch the paper o ers an interpretation of Humboldt s famous fragment
`T heory of human Bildung (1793/1794). In the concluding sections of the paper the
fragment is placed in a wider theoretical and political context. Humboldt s writings
before and after `T heory of human Bildung are examined as well as the Prussian
educational reforms of the early nineteenth century. As a leader of this reform
Humboldt attempted to realize his educational theories and this political endeavour
of Humboldt also plays an important part in understanding the continuing in uence
of his theories for German curriculum theory and educational policy.
(c. 1793/94) . In the third and nal section I refer to Humboldt s earlier
writings, highlight a few strands of thought which were later developed in
his theory of education, and touch on his contribution to the Prussian
reform of education (1809 1810) .
Biograph y
Humboldt s life was a blend of the contemplative and the active. He was
born in Potsdam and educated by tutors; he then studied law, as well as
philosophy, history, classical philology and physics and made the usual
journeys for young men of his station: to the Rhine, to Paris (shortly after
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Th e ory of h u m an Bild u n g
of humankind (I, 234) . He does not pursue the question in any detail, but
makes suggestions for work of this kind. He sees the justi cation of his plan
in the fact that little heed is generally paid to such questions by scholars,
and even less by those who acquire and apply science eclectically in their
preparation for a career. Humboldt sees in the absence of inquiry into the
preconditions for the disciplines and their interrelationship an explanation
for much of the contemporary criticism of scholarly pursuits.
Humboldt suggested that although a great deal was being achieved by
the application of science, humanity was not being improved. T renchantly
he observes that the application of science was accomplishing a great deal
`around us , but improving little `within us (I, 234) . T he contrast of
`without and `within , a typical con guration in Humboldt s re ection, will
concern us later. It is this criticism, reminiscent of Rousseau s rst
Discourse (1750) on the question of moral improvement through the
development of the arts and sciences, which provides Humboldt with his
justi cation for addressing the sciences contribution to Bildung.
Humboldt emphasizes a principle of a theory of Bildung in support of
the criticism. People are at the centre of `all particular kinds of activity (I,
235). T hus it is imperative to inquire which `peculiar abilities are required
of a person engaging in a particular discipline and to explore the interaction
of the di erent elds of human understanding in Bildung. In a further
principle linking theory of Bildung and anthropology (more of this con-
nection later) Humboldt speaks of people s striving (`inner unrest [I, 235])
to train their powers through exercise and to secure value and continuance
for their being (I, 235) . In both cases, people need the world. Here, then,
attention is directed back towards the world, but this time from within the
person, who thus remains in the centre.
T he `striving of humankind reveals itself in thought and action. In pure,
ultimate terms, thought is always an attempt of the mind to be comprehen-
sible to itself, while action is an attempt of the will to become free and
independent in itself. People s entire external activity is nothing but an
endeavour against futility. (I, 235)
Identifying this form of endeavour, Humboldt looks beyond the
humanities and sciences and refers to action in general. Later he describes
a further activity, the cultivation of nature, as an expression of humankind s
endeavour (I, 236). Despite the importance of these extensions for his
46 c. l Uth
internal Bildung, but also of the `ultimate task of our existence (I, 235) to
create something permanent through knowledge and action, which is not to
be random, but should extend the content of `the concept of humanity in
our person (I, 235) . T his means that a new de ning property is to be added
to our concept of what is human. T he pyramids in Egypt, for example,
were built to demonstrate what absolute rule and self-dei cation (by the
pharaoh) mean. Or, to take an example from the present, if gene technology
can serve to intervene in the ontogenetic process, then this represents a new
scienti c attitude towards the nature of humankind and thus extends what
were previously reckoned to be the characteristics of a human. By the
formulation of the task such that a person is to extend `the concept of
humanity through activity it becomes clear that Humboldt s theory of
Bildung has a normative side. We shall return to this later.
After emphasizing the importance of results for continuance of achieve-
ment in the history of humankind, Humboldt returns to the `inner being of
man (I, 237) , i.e. to humankind s powers. He does this to avoid the danger
of men and women becoming alienated from themselves as they gain
knowledge of the world (`nature ) . It is, Humboldt admits, human nature
to look to the external objects (I, 237). But the important consideration in
this outward drive is that men and women do not lose themselves, but
rather re ect back into their innermost self the clarifying light and the
comforting warmth `of everything which they undertake outside them-
selves (I, 237) . T he point of this activity is to gain knowledge of nature. We
explore one and the same object in nature through various receptive
faculties like sense perception and such active faculties as reason and
imagination (`self-activity , in Kant `spontaneity ) . In correspondingly
varying guises the object appears as `intuition of the senses , as concept,
as image (I, 237). T hese di erent aspects serve above all to enhance the
faculties through application. As Humboldt presupposes that the di erent
faculties are simply di erent manifestations of one and the same power,
he maintains that it is a question of strengthening our `own innate power
(I, 237) . T his is further emphasized by the fact that the receptive and active
faculties i.e. receptivity and self-activity are in a state of `constant
3
interplay and thus form one unity (I, 237).
Humboldt interchanges the terms `nature and `world without making
his di erentiation clear (I, 235 237) . He appears to regard `world as
a concept covering more than `nature (cf. Menze 1965: 140) , i.e. society,
on wilhelm von humboldt s theory of BI L DUNG 47
history, other people, cultural products, etc. T his would explain why he not
only speaks of `laws of nature , but also of `decisions of fate meaning, for
example, history (I, 237) which are in opposition to the obstinacy of our
will (I, 237) . It is apparent that Humboldt is using the scienti c treatment
of nature as an example to elucidate what the development of the faculties
through scienti c knowledge means and how this is comprehended through
re ection. But that the activity of the naturalist is meant only as an example
can also be concluded from the fact that Humboldt cites the mathematician,
the artist and the philosopher as well as the naturalist in his plan for a study
of the faculties required for scienti c work (I, 234) .
T he enhancement of the faculties through the comprehension of nature
shows what Humboldt means when he postulates that humankind should
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not become alienated from itself but should let `the clarifying light and
the comforting warmth re ect back into our inner being. T hrough the
application of their various faculties men and women develop them. T he
metaphor of `clarifying light intimates that the rational operations become
clearer if they are applied in the analysis of an object. T hey are provoked by
having, for example, to use terms to describe the diversity of the objects,
then to categorize and explain them. T his diversity is only present in nature
(I, 237) and therefore it is nature which we must address. Although the risk
of alienation is present, this is humankind s only opportunity to develop its
faculties further (cf. Wagner 1995: 30 36) .
A degree of alienation remains by virtue of the fact that in forming a
conception of nature man distances himself a little from his previous state.
T his modi cation and advancement of mental activity through scienti c
knowledge is later expressly emphasized (I, 240). Men and women do not
lose themselves if they retain an awareness that their faculties are developed
through a conception of nature. Humboldt describes a process of mutual
adaptation, with nature adapting to the conceptual forms of men and
women (sensory perception, reason, imagination), and humankind s con-
ceptual forms having to adapt to nature in its diversity, whereby a greater
resemblance between the two is created (I, 237). 4
According to Humboldt, reference back to one s own faculties safe-
guards against the loss of self `in in nity (I, 238) , in a never-ending
progression of confrontation with the world (= nature) . In this way,
`scattered knowledge and action can be `uni ed . T he circle is completed
by the return to the individuals own faculties. T he decisive point for the
theory of Bildung is the understanding that only in this way can `mere
scholarship be transformed into `scholarly Bildung and the `ultimate goal
(i.e. Bildung through extension of the `concept of humanity in our person ,
I, 235) be ful lled (I, 238, cf. I, 234 235) . Scienti c activity does not,
therefore, automatically induce Bildung, only under this speci c condition.
In the second part of the 1793 fragment the work Humboldt envisaged
at the beginning is presented as a method of avoiding humankind s
alienation from itself. T he method is summarized, elucidated further and
thus highlighted. In the analysis of the various intellectual activities,
attention would once more be directed away from the objects of science
to the inner being of men and women, i.e. to their faculties. T he in nite
mass of objects would be exchanged for the narrower circle of humankind s
48 c. l Uth
arises out of the diversity in the minds of those acquiring the world through
science (I, 239) . T his brings individuality to the foreground, a point we
shall address in more detail later. T he fragment concludes with a sketch of
the in uence of individuality on the progress of the sciences, as well as `the
in uence of national character, of the period and of external circumstances
in general an early sociological perspective on the individuality of the
scientist (I, 239 240) .
We have already seen that the 1793 fragment contains some statements
which point beyond the narrower circle of scienti c activities. T here is
reference to the activity of the artist, counted among the `various elds of
human knowledge (I, 234) because the artist, for example, when creating a
sculpture of a deity, does not so much seek to create a concrete shape as to
express `the fullness of his plastic imagination (I, 239). T he main concern
is, therefore, the extension and the knowledge of this faculty of imagining
in plastic terms. But this activity is on the borderline of the various elds of
science. Humboldt goes beyond this demarcation line when he cites other
areas of human activity besides science: action and humankind s `whole
external activity . 5 Broadly, he regards any of life s business as a possible
factor in Bildung (I, 238) .
Let us now look to other works of Humboldt to yield further statements
on the nature of humankind and the process of Bildung. I use questions
arising from the study of the fragment as a framework on which to pin a
broad-brush representation of Humboldt s work before and after. T hus we
can shed more light on the fragment itself by relating it to the theory of
Bildung as developed by Humboldt up to that point, as well as pursuing the
subsequent route of the theory and exploring its role in educational policy
(Bildungspolitik).
T he title of the fragment promises more than the text actually provides. A
`theory of human Bildung is only developed in its most rudimentary
principles. 6 We can identify three questions:
Concept of power
restricting obstacles (1797, I, 351; cf. 1806, II, 29) . Before an implement-
able ideal can be set up, it must link up with empirical human observation.
I shall return later to the question of the ideal when I deal with the
objective of Bildung.
Second, Humboldt expects anthropological studies on the di erence
between individuals to have repercussions which contribute to the Bildung
of the observer. Cognitive treatment of individual variation di erentiates
the consciousness of the observer. And consciousness di erentiated in this
way a ects the observers themselves (1793, II, 21; 1797, I, 347 348) .
We have already touched on processes of Bildung. In the next section
we shall consider a few conditions of these processes and their structures.
We have not so far discussed the role which social relations play in
Bildung. In his letter to Korner of 1793 Humboldt emphasizes that a theory
of Bildung in which life and social contacts play a major role is the most
important part of a comprehensive theory of human development (1793, V,
173). Even earlier Humboldt had said that education alone does not su ce.
More important are the `circumstances which accompany a person
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We have already seen the central role of subject matter in every process of
Bildung:
T he assumption that a goal has been set and that humanity cannot but
move closer to it is later relinquished. It depends on the reason of
individuals, he says, whether they tread the path of `uninterrupted progress
towards perfection (1797/1798, I, 381) . Human reason has given humanity
the task of overcoming arbitrariness in its subsequent actions (1797/1798, I,
380). T hus the question of goal orientation is transferred to reason.
Humboldt advocates this orientation to humanity, to human reason, in
order to locate a standpoint within man himself following the break-up of
political order in the French Revolution. If everything outside is pre-
carious, then `the only safe refuge is within us (1797, I, 506) . T his is
reminiscent of the statement in the 1793 fragment that humanity is in the
centre of all activity (I, 235). Such an orientation to human reason is also
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ratio of receptivity and self-activity, the inner fusion of the sensual and
the intellectual, retention of equilibrium and symmetry in the sum of all
e orts (1808, II, 69 70). T hese examples su ce to show the central role
of Humboldt s goal of harmonious Bildung of all powers, which is also
re ected in his school plans (1809) and his university plan (1810, IV,
261).
But how can such equilibrium of the forces be achieved? Only in
exceptional cases would it be possible to exercise all powers to the same
extent (1792, I, 37; 1793, II, 7) . As a rule, the various powers can only be
exercised and thus trained in sequence.
Each person is only able to work with one power at a time, or rather his whole
being is at one time determined to one activity. T hus humanity appears
condemned to one-sidedness by weakening his energy as soon as he spreads
himself over several objects. (1792, I, 64)
emotion will infallibly prevail, in the slow character reason and re ection
(1797/1798, I, 445).
T his is, of course, a step away from the postulate of equilibrium of the
powers. T his correction is important, because it is in the very deviation
from the state of equilibrium that `the interesting characters, the most
particular and diverse manifestations (1797/1798, I, 441) originate.
Humboldt cites three historical gures to illustrate his point. In Alexander
the Great will and imagination dominate; in Caesar will and passion; in
Friedrich II will and reason.
T he diversity of individuals in the course of history serves to extend the
`concept of humanity , as it is termed in the 1793 fragment (1793, I, 235) ,
through the continued appearance of new manifestations of individuals.
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T his does not only include the great gures of history, but refers to the
albeit small contributions of the majority of humankind (1807, II, 113
114). Only in the course of history can the greatest possible di erentiation
of the concept of humanity to an `ideal of humanity be achieved. It is a
communal e ort of humankind. T his goal can only be achieved by
enhancing the powers of individuals and of humankind. T hus it is `highest
or `most exalted Bildung which is postulated. But as long as Bildung
proceeds through the active acquisition of the products of other individ-
uals, it cannot be complete in this sense. No individual can acquire the
products of such `totality of individuals , not even if the products are only
intended to serve in the training of the powers and not in the acquisition of
matter. T his was recognized by Simmel (1986: 216) , who refers to `a store
of objectivizing mind growing into the unforeseeable distance . He sees
Humboldt s conception of Bildung (the acquisition of such products) as
overburdened and doomed to failure. It could be countered, however, that
in the face of such incalculability of products Bildung is only possible as a
communal e ort, through `division of labour .
With the aim of `totality of individuals the future is open, as it cannot
be ascertained in advance which individualities will emerge. T o this extent,
any form of teleology is relinquished (cf. Benner 1990) . T his argument that
the diversity of individuals is enhanced by the `well-nigh boundless
interconnection of all nations and continents (1792, I, 88) anticipates the
thoughts of the French anthropologist Le vi-Strauss (1973, 27, 43) in his
essay written for UNESCO defending his anti-racist position that cultures
can only bring forth a `cumulative history by combinations of their
achievements and that the resulting highly di erentiated `world culture
must take the cultures of the so-called third world into account.
With respect to the assumption that Humboldt anticipated a form of
postmodernism in the arbitrariness of life-forms, individuals and plurality
it must be ascertained that Humboldt wished to restrict this maximum
diversity by principles of ethics, aesthetics and science (truth) (1797, I, 512;
1797/1798, I, 413, 416, 419) . He describes his `blueprint for a state as
follows:
I have tried to locate the most advantageous situation for humankind within
the state. T his, so it appeared to me, would have to encompass the most
58 c. l Uth
diverse individuality and the most original independence in parallel with the
most diverse and most intimate union of several persons a problem which
only liberty of the highest kind may resolve. (1792, I, 211)
Note s
1. Quotations from Humboldt s writing and letters are referenced by the volume and page
of Flitner and Giel s edition, i.e. Humboldt 1960 81.
2. From this point, as in the title, I shall use the word Bildung rather than the conventional
translation `education. Previous work in this eld (e.g. Hopmann and Riquarts 1995) has
shown that no single term in English captures the full meaning of Bildung as process and
product of personal development guided by reason. T he formation by external in uences
(parents, teachers, etc. ) is expressed by the noun Erziehung, also generally translated as
education. T he reader who can accept Weltanschauung, Schadenfreude and Zeitgeist as
entries in Webster s Dictionary will, I am sure, accept Bildung in preference to any
translation which is in constant risk of calling up false associations. T he noun Bildung is
derived from bilden, to form or, in some instances, to cultivate. In the few cases where the
adjective bildend would be used in German, I use formative.
3. T his epistemological standpoint can be traced back to Kant: the active faculties of reason
receive matter to be processed through sensory perception, while the matter assimilated
by sensory perception is ordered or structured by reasoning activity.
4. It therefore evidences prejudice on Horkheimer s part as on Litts (1947) before him
when he accuses Humboldt of furthering internalization through concentration on the
individual. Such concentration, maintains Horkheimer, puts an end to the `substantial
Bildung of the individual and thus to the individual himself (Horkheimer 1978: 26). I
suggest, however, that Horkheimer himself characterizes the process of Bildung in a
manner quite in keeping with Humboldt s approach while purporting to refer only to
Bildung as interpreted by the `realistic genius of Goethe and Hegel (Horkheimer 1978:
26). For Horkheimer, Goethe and Hegel had recognized that Bildung is a process of
externalization, or simply of experience, which takes place and achieves fruition solely in
devotion to the matter, in intellectual work and in practice aware of itself. Only in
objective work can the individual progress beyond the randomness of his very existence
(cf. Horkheimer 1978: 26). T his is precisely Humboldt s theory of Bildung through
alienation.
5. T hese other activities are in view when Humboldt speaks of state constitutions created by
humankind. Humboldt s earlier works also re ect his close study of constitutional issues:
his investigation of the `new French Constitution following the French Revolution
(Humboldt 1791, I, 33-42) and his treatise on the limitation of state activity to the
guarantee of internal and external security, which was to become well-known within the
tradition of political liberalism (Humboldt 1792, I, 56-233). In the 1793 fragment,
Humboldt also speaks of the processing of nature by humanity as a process of Bildung (I,
236).
on wilhelm von humboldt s theory of BI L DUNG 59
6. It therefore comes as no surprise to learn that the work was not given its title by
Humboldt, but by Albert Leitzmann, who rst published the fragment in 1903. He
derived the title from the letter to Korner cited above.
7. One wonders whether this represents an appreciation in worth for the statesmen or for
the teachers!
8. In the contacts sketched here it is not a question of imitation, but of self-assertion. It is,
however, quite a di erent matter if the mechanism of self-assertion is interrupted by
moral transgression or the abandonment of truth. Thus `anything which cannot exist in
parallel must be destroyed by social contacts (1792, I, 82).
9. In view of this signi cance of matter Klafki, in his famous essay `Kategoriale Bildung
(Klafki 1963: 33), quite rightly criticizes a particular reception of Humboldt s theory of
Bildung, encapsulated in the ideology of the German Gymnasium, as one-sided.
Summarizing this ideology Klafki points out: `T he essential aspect of Bildung is not
the assimilation and acquisition of contents, but the formation, development, maturation
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Re fe re n c e s