DR.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

LUCKNOW

SEMESTER VI
(2015-16)
PROJECT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

THE REASONABLENESS OF THE DOCTRINE OF LEGITIMATE

EXPECTATION IN RELATION TO CORPORATE ALLOCATIONS

(FOR THE PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE DEGREE OF B.A. LLB (HON))

SUBMITTED BY -

S UBMITTED TO

GARIMA PARAKH
SHEKHAR

M R. SHASHANK

ROLL NO. 57

ASST. PROF (LAW)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to

My teacher and my mentor Prof. Shashank Shekar for giving me this opportunity to work on this
project and for his able guidance and advice,
Vice Chancellor, Dr. Gurdeep Singh Sir and Dean (Academics), Prof. C.M. Jariwala for their
encouragement and Enthusiasm;
My seniors for sharing their valuable tips;
And my classmates for their constant support.

INTRODUCTION
The doctrine belongs to the domain of public law and provides relief in those cases where a civil
consequence has been suffered due to governmental action but the claim cannot be justified solely
on the basis of law. The concept of legitimate expectation is being used by the courts for judicial
review and it applies the ethics of fairness and reasonableness to the situation where a person has
an expectation or interest in a public body retaining a long-standing practice or keeping a promise.
The courts have emphasized that legitimate expectation as such is not an enforceable right.
However, non-consideration of legitimate expectation of a person adversely affected by a decision
may invalidate the decision on the ground of arbitrariness. The doctrine of legitimate expectation is
not applicable in relation to a dispute arising out of a contract qua contract. Furthermore, this
doctrine cannot be invoked to modify or vary the express terms of a contract, more so when they
are statutory in nature. An expectation can be said to be legitimate in case where the decision of
the administrative authority affects the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage
which either
(i)

he had in the past been permitted by the decision maker to enjoy and which he can
legitimately expect to be permitted to continue until some rational grounds for
withdrawing it are communicated to such an individual or party and the affected
person/party has been given an opportunity of hearing, or

(ii)

the affected person has received assurance from the concerned administrative authority
that it will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing
reason for contending that they should not be withdrawn by the administrative
authority.

A legitimate expectation is quite different from anticipation. The Supreme Court in Jitendra
Kumar v. State of Haryana1 reiterated that
Expectation is distinct and different from a desire and hope. It is based on a right. It is grounded in
the rule of law as requiring regularity, predictability and certainty in the Government's dealings
with the public and the doctrine of legitimate expectation operates both in procedural and
substantive matters.

1 (2008) 2 SCC 161.

A person, who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, has to
satisfy that he has relied on the said representation and the denial of that expectation has worked to
his detriment. The Court can interfere only if the decision taken by the authority was found to be
arbitrary, unreasonable or in gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice
and not taken in public interest. But a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything
more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. At the heart of the doctrine of
legitimate expectation lies a tension between the protection of administrative autonomy and the
pursuit of often conflicting policy goals. The principle means that expectations which are raised
as a result of administrative conduct of a public body may have legal consequences. Either the
administration must respect those expectations or provide reasons as to why the public interest
must take priority over legitimate expectation. Forsyth has stated that the judicial
motivation for seeking to protect legitimate expectations is, if the executive undertakes,
expressly or by past practice, to behave in a particular way the subject expects that undertaking to
be complied with. That is surely fundamental to good government and it would be monstrous if the
executive could freely renege on its undertakings public trust in the government should not be left
unprotected. The modern origins of the term phrase legitimate expectations stems from the use of
that phrase by lord Denning in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs2. A foreign student
sought to review the decision of the Home Secretary which refused the extension of his temporary
permit to stay in the U.K. In rejecting the students contention that he ought to have been afforded
a hearing, Lord Denning M.R. said in the obiter that the question of a hearing all depends on
whether he has some right or interest, or, I would add, some legitimate expectation, of which it
would not be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to say. Schmidt and the cases which
followed it referred to the legitimate expectation without analysing its scope or basis, and in
particular without distinguishing it from the right to a hearing arising from the existence of a
protectable interest.

2 (1969) 1 All ER 904 (CA)

ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE DOCTRINE

DEVELOPMENT UNDER ENGLISH LAW
One of the earliest cases where the expression `legitimate expectation` occurred was Schmidt v.
Secretary of State for Home Affairs 3. In that case, two scientology students were refused an
extension of their permission to remain in the United Kingdom when their right to be there had
expired. They complained that the extension of the right to stay had been denied to them without a
hearing being granted. Lord Denning expressed the view that the students had no right to remain in
the country; they could not, therefore, have any legitimate expectation of a hearing. Due to
extensive development in the doctrine of legitimate expectation, extensive reliance on the Schmidt
case would be unwise. It was in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg Union4 that the doctrine of
expectation found its right place. Here, the district committee of a trade union had refused to
endorse a members election as a shop steward. The court held that if a person claims a privilege
he can be turned away without a hearing, but here a person has more than a privilege a legitimate
expectation that his election would be approved unless there are relevant reasons for not doing so,
therefore, the natural justice principles are attracted to the case to ensure fairness. In McInnes v.
Onslow-Fane5, referring to situations where the right to be heard existed, the court through
Megarry VC made a distinction among application, forfeiture and legitimate expectation situations
in license cases. On one of the spectrum lie application cases where there does not exist any right
to the grant of his application, while on the other lie those of forfeiture where a right has been
violated.6 In between lies a third situation of legitimate expectation cases which covers renewal of
licenses. In this situation, a person can legitimately expect that his license will be renewed, he has
a right to know what makes him unsuitable now when he was suitable earlier principles of
natural justice. In this case the individual concerned had a legitimate expectation of being granted
a hearing before the renewal of license was denied. It should be noted however, that the
expectation created was an expectation of a hearing prior to the refusal of a renewal of the license
and is not an expectation of a particular outcome. Further, the Privy Council in Attorney Gen of
3 (1969) 1 All ER 904 (CA).
4 (1971) 1 All ER 1148 (CA).
5 (1978) 3 All ER 211.
6 ibid.

Hongkong v. Ng Yuen Shiu7 held that there is a violation of the legitimate expectation of the
immigrant based on announcement of the authority that while examining the cases of illegal
immigration, each case would be decided on its own merit and therefore, a removal order cannot
be passed without a fair hearing. In Council of Civil Services v. Minister of Civil Services 8 the
House of Lords held that legitimate expectations may arise from an expression or promise made by
the authority, or from an established past practice which cannot be violated without good reasons.

DIRECTION OF EXPANSION UNDER INDIAN LAW

1. NON-ARBITRARINESS

IN GOVERNMENT ACTION IS THE BASIC PRINCIPLE BEHIND

LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION

Article 14 of the Indian Constitution provides that

The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws
within the territory of India.
Legitimate expectation flows from the principle of non-arbitrariness under Article 14 and becomes
an enforceable right in cases where the State or its functionaries fail to give due weight to it. As
observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court the doctrine of legitimate expectation falls within the purview
of the rule of non-arbitrariness integrated in Article 14 of the Constitution. 9 In a constitutionally
governed society when reasonableness of an action of the State is called in question, the rule of
law is to be determined not according to the claimants perception but in the large public interests
and the public interest shall have to be more central consideration and may overshadow the
legitimate expectation of an individual/claimant and bona fide decision of the public authority
reached in this style would gratify the requirement of non-arbitrariness and shall stand the test of
7 (1983) 2 All ER 346 (PC).
8 (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL).
9 Food Corporation of India v. Kamadhenu Cattle Feed Industries Ltd AIR 1993 SC 1601.

judicial scrutiny. Legitimate expectation, by virtue of not being a concrete ground to claim a right
to a benefit/privilege, can be rejected by the considering authority on presenting evidence of
substantial overriding public interest.10 Undoubtedly the doctrine of legitimate expectation is a
source of procedural as well as substantive rights and the Government/state and its departments
responsible for administering the affairs of the country are expected to honour their promises or
undertaking through their statements of policy or intention and are bound to treat all the citizens by
affording full personal consideration without any iota of abuse of discretion. The policy statements
given by the representatives of the State cannot be disregarded unfairly or applied selectively
because unfairness in the form of unreasonableness is akin to violation of natural justice. Claims
based on legitimate expectation have been held to require reliance on representations and resultant
detriment to the claimant in the same way as claims based in promissory estoppels. In State of W.B
v. Niranjan Singha11 the Court observed that the doctrine of `legitimate expectation` is only an
aspect of Art.14 of the Constitution requiring to deal the citizen in non-arbitrary manner but by
itself does not give rise to an enforceable right. Whether an action of the government or the
authority or functionary of the state is arbitrary or not, the principle of legitimate expectation
would be relevant despite the fact that earlier in M.P.Oil mill case, the Court was of the opinion
that in appropriate cases legitimate expectation which operates in the domain of public law,
constitute a substantive and enforceable right.
TYPES OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION
The expectations that individuals may have are various. However, expectations may broadly be
divided in two types
1. Procedural Legitimate Expectation: It denotes the existence of some previous right the
applicant claims to possess as a result of actions by the public body that generates the
expectation. The Courts have accepted that procedural protection should be given where an
individual has a legitimate expectation of procedural protection such as a hearing or of a
consultation before a decision is made. Fairness means that the expectation of a hearing or
other procedural protection be fulfilled. It is also accepted that where an individual has a
legitimate expectation that a benefit of a substantive nature will be granted, or if already in
10 D D Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, vol 1 (8th edn, Wadhwa 2008) 1262.
11 (2001) 2 SCC 326.

receipt of the benefit, that it will be continued, then fairness too dictates that expectation of
the benefit should give the individual the entitlement to be permitted to argue for its
fulfillment. In this situation the decision maker merely has to hear what the individual has
to say but does not have to give substantive benefit. What has been the subject of some
controversy is whether or not a legitimate expectation can give rise to substantives
protection.12
2. Substantive Legitimate Expectation: It refers to the situation in which the applicant seeks
a picky benefit or product. The claim to such a benefit will be founded upon governmental
action which is said to validate the existence of the relevant expectation. Many legal
luminaries believe that the substantive legitimate expectations would not only generate
sprite in public administration but reliance and trust of the citizens in government in so far
as principle of equality is concerned and will also uphold rule of law. Procedural
expectations are protected simply by requiring that the promised procedure be followed. 13
Substantive expectations are often protected procedurally, i.e. by extending an opportunity
to make representation to the person affected before the expectation is dashed. Thus where
recommended the applications of the applicants for hospital posts were rejected in breach
of a long established practice because they had complained about bad conditions, they were
held entitled to a hearing before rejection. The person affected is not entitled to a favorable
decision but the trust which he has reposed in the decision makers undertaking should be
protected. But there are other cases in which procedural expectation cannot adequately be
protected from the unfairness occasioned by the decision-makers breach of his promise or
established practice. Thus in case of a boy seeking admission with a view to adoption, the
Court of Appeal found that refusing admission on an altogether different ground amounted
to grossly unfair administration and in the absence of an overriding public interest
justifying the change from the old criteria should apply. Although such substantive
protection has been recognized several times in decided cases, it sits awkwardly with the
need not to fetter the exercise of discretion, moreover, decision makers must not, by
substantive protection of expectations, be prevented from changing their policies. Two
Court of Appeal decisions hold that substantive protection of expectations will only be
12 C K Takwani, Lectures on Administrative Law (5th edn, EBC 2012) 228.
13 ibid.

possible where the change in policy is irrational. The Court of Appeal in rejecting
rationality as the appropriate standard of review held that it was for the court to judge
whether there was a sufficient overriding interest to justify a departure from what has
previously been promised or what has been previous practice. This approach is consistent
with the European law which balances the protection of the general public interest against
the individuals legitimate expectation.
TRACING THE REVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE

WEDNESBURY REASONABLENESS
Judicial review of administrative action is concerned with the lawfulness of administrative action
and not with the merits of the decision. Unreasonableness of decisions of administrative bodies has
been held to be a ground for judicial review since a considerable period of time as highlighted in
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation14. In this case, a Cinema
Company, Associated Provincial Picture Houses, was granted a license by the Wednesbury
Corporation, to operate a Cinema Theatre on condition that No children under the age of fifteen
years shall be admitted to any entertainment, whether accompanied by an adult or not. This
condition was imposed under Section 1, sub-Section 1 of the Sunday Entertainments Act of 1932.
The Picture Houses sought a declaration that such a condition was unacceptable and outside the
power of the Corporation. The Court held that it could not intervene and turn down the decision of
the Corporation simply because the Court disagreed with it. The Court observed that discretion
must be exercised reasonably. Where discretion is exercised in disregard of these guidelines one
is said to be acting unreasonably. Even judges are bound by these and other stringent rules in
exercising discretion. Lord Justice Warrington in Short v. Poole Corporation,6 gave the example of
the red-haired teacher who was dismissed because she had red hair. This is unreasonable in one
sense and in another sense it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable
that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith; and, in fact, all these things run into
one another. The following conditions were laid down in the case as to when interference is
warranted

14 [1948] 1 KB 223.

i)

Whether the Wednesbury Corporation, in making that decision, took into account

ii)

factors that ought not to have been taken into account, or

The Corporation failed to take into account factors that ought to have been taken into

iii)

account, or
The decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority would ever consider
imposing it.

The Court felt that that none of the conditions imposed by the Corporation fell into any of these
categories and rejected the claim of the appellants. These principles of Wednesbury
unreasonableness underwent some modification by the decision of Lord Diplock in the celebrated
case of Council of Civil Services Unions v. Minister for the Civil Services also known as GCHQ
case. Through his judgment, Lord Diplock widened the grounds of judicial review. He mainly
referred to three grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review.
The first ground being illegality, the second irrationality and the third procedural
impropriety. He also mentioned that by further development on a case to case basis, in due course,
there may be other grounds for challenge. He particularly emphasized the principles of
proportionality. Thus, In a way, Lord Diplock replaced the language of reasonableness with that
of rationality. The general rule is that judicially developed principles cannot be static since
opinions differ and alter overtime and are influenced by many factors in exercising discretion, and
the Wednesbury principle is no exception to this rule. Unreasonableness, an apparently straight
forward and simple test may fail in objectively assessing what would amount to unreasonable.
There is also an inherent complexity in a large amount of subjectivity playing a major role in
identifying unreasonableness. Hence, the Wednesbury principle was subjected to a critical juristic
scrutiny examining its suitability as a test for administrative exercises of power. The crux of the
judicial opinion was that the depth of judicial review varied with the subject matter. An individual
may find an administrative decision unreasonable, but that is not enough for the Court to strike
down that administrative action as unreasonable. It is only in those extreme and limited cases of
unreasonableness, where no reasonable person can find the decision reasonable, does the
Wednesbury principle permit the Court to interfere with the administrative decision. So much so,
there can be a large amount of subjectivity ruling the judicial mind in applying the Wednesbury
test. Hence, as mentioned above, jurists had to look for alternatives. A strong alternative approach
was the doctrine of proportionality.
DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY

The doctrine of proportionality is understood in the legal fraternity in two different perspectives.
First, under the municipal law, it refers to a doctrine which suggests that a punishment afforded to
a guilty should match the offence. The second one is under International Humanitarian Law, where
the doctrine refers to the use of legal force in armed conflict. However, we are concerned only with
the first one. Proportionality includes three conditions 15
(i)

The means which is applied by public authorities should be available to achieve the

(II)

aims and should be effective or in other words, suitable.

The means should be necessary to realise the aims and should not be more than what is

(iii)

necessary to fulfill the aim as showed in the laws.

The means which causes a burden for individuals should be proportionate to the aim.

The restriction by an administrative action and fundamental right of an individual should be

balanced and should include a clear proportionality between the parties. In short, the gain or loss to
the community which is necessary for public interest and the loss or gains to individuals should be
balanced.
VIEWS OF THE SUPREME COURT
It is worth mentioning that even before the decision in Ex-P. Daly (13 May 2001), the Supreme
Court had firmly acknowledged this tool of judicial interpretation in Om Kumar v. Union of India16
decided on 17 November 2000. In this case, inter alia, the Supreme Court noted that while dealing
with the validity of legislation infringing fundamental freedoms enumerated in Article 19 (1) of the
Constitution of India, the issue of whether restrictions imposed by the legislation were
disproportionate to the situation and not the least restrictive of choices has been repeatedly
examined by the superior courts in numerous judgements. Thus in the Om Kumar case
proportionality was held to mean whether while regulating the exercise of fundamental rights, the
appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures have been adopted by the legislature or the
administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or administrative order. And that it was
for the superior Courts to decide whether the choice made by the legislature or the administrative
15 Chief Justice of India,Efficacy of Wednesburys Principles and Contemporary Development of Law Judicial
Review of Facts, 28 July, 2007.

16 AIR 2000 SC 3689.

authorities infringed the rights excessively. This to my mind is the essence of the doctrine of
proportionality.
In State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava and Ors.17, the Supreme Court while holding that
the High Court erred in interfering with the quantum of punishment dwelt upon the question of
applicability of doctrine of proportionality. And while holding the view that the doctrine of
proportionality could be invoked only under certain situations, the Court however acknowledged
that the doctrine of unreasonableness was giving way to the doctrine of proportionality.
In Reliance Airport Developers v. Airports Authority of India18 The Court while adjudicating upon
a challenge to the exercise of discretion by Government in altering the terms of the original tender
documents inter alia held that though the test of proportionality was very much relevant in the light
of ex-parte Daly, the facts of the case in Reliance Airport Developers did not necessitate its
application.
In the case of Indian Airlines Ltd. v. Prabha D. Kannan 19, it was held that where no appeal is
provided for against an administrative order, judicial review of such an order would be
maintainable. Further, that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution while undertaking such review need not confine itself to the traditional tests of review
viz illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety. The Judges who adjudicated upon this
matter also held the view that in such cases of judicial review the Court has to necessarily delve
deeper into the matter and subject such orders to deeper scrutiny going beyond the above three
tests. Based on the facts and the issues in this case, the Supreme Court inter alia had to go into the
validity of certain regulations and the power of Judicial Review of administrative acts. While
going into this question, the Supreme Court acknowledged that keeping in view the situational
changes particularly, the outsourcing of sovereign activities by the State; the Supreme Court had
been expanding the scope of judicial review. In its judgment it has held that the doctrine of
unreasonableness has now given way to the doctrine of proportionality.

17 (2006) 3 SCC 276.

18 (2006) 10 SCC 1.
19 AIR 2007 SC 548.

CORPORATE ALLOCATIONS
In 2012 public interest litigations were filed against the central government for alleged illegal and
unconstitutional allocations of coal blocks between 1993 and 2010. The petitioners challenged the
government's power to allocate coal blocks, as well as the procedure for allocating the same. By a
judgment dated August 25 2014, the Supreme Court declared the allocation of coal blocks between
1993 and 2010 arbitrary and illegal. A further judgment on September 24 2014 cancelled the
allocation of such coal blocks. The judgments and their ramifications are discussed below.
The central government prepared a booklet of available coal blocks and invited applications for
mining leases. A screening committee processed the applications and the government then issued
letters of allocation based on the committee's recommendations. Mining licences were also granted
to state government utilities through government dispensation by virtue of Section 3(3)(a)(i) of the
Coal Mines Act. This process continued from 1993 to 2010, when the Mines and Minerals Act was
amended to insert Section 11A, which provided for allocation of coal blocks by competitive
bidding. Originally, coal mines could be allocated only to entities found eligible under Section 3(3)
(a) of the Coal Mines Act. Any mining lease that allowed commercial exploitation of coal was in
violation of Section 3.
Although the central government has a pre-eminent role under the Mines and Minerals Act, insofar
as it can grant a reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease, it cannot violate the
Mines and Minerals Act. Further, neither the Coal Mines Act nor any rules framed under the act
provide for allocation of coal blocks by the central government or consideration by the state
government of applications made by allottees to receive prospecting licences or mining leases. In
addition, except for defining the entities that can carry out coal mining operations, no procedure
for coal mining is provided in the Coal Mines Act or the 1960 Mineral Concession Rules.
Even with regard to matters falling under the Coal Mines Act (eg, the prescriptive direction that no
entity other than those provided in Section 3 can carry on mining operations in coal mines), the
legal regime under the Mines and Minerals Act (subject to the prescription under Section 3) applies
in full. Neither the Coal Mines Act nor the Mines and Minerals Act provides a procedure for the
allocation of coal blocks by the central government. In addition, the issuance of an allocation letter
is not merely an identification exercise it grants a valuable right to the allottee. Further, although
the Mines and Minerals Act imposes a statutory obligation on the state government to recommend

grant of prospecting licences or mining leases for coal mines to the central government, once the
central government issues a letter allocating the coal block, the statutory role of the state
government is reduced to completion of procedural formalities only. The central government's
method for selecting beneficiaries and allocating coal was not found within the Mines and
Minerals Act or the Coal Mines Act. Thus, the government's practice and procedure for allocating
coal blocks through an administrative route were clearly inconsistent with law. Finally, the central
government's allocation of coal blocks resulted in the selection of allottees, which in turn entitled
the allottees to receive prospecting licences and mining leases from the state government; this
amounted to grant of largesse, which required judicial review in light of the test of nonarbitrariness.
JUDGMENT OF AUGUST 2014
The Supreme Court held that the allocation of coal blocks based on the recommendations of the
screening committee were beyond the scope of the Mines and Minerals Act and violated the Coal
Mines Act because it did not adhere to the end use requirements. A court analysis of the 36
meetings held by the screening committee between 1993 and 2008 demonstrated that the allocation
process was arbitrary. The court held that no visible objective criteria were followed in
determining who was selected. The court found the process discriminatory and opaque, and held
that it did not evaluate or compare the merits of the applicants. According to the court, this made
the selection process invalid. The court also found that the end use condition under Section 3(3)(a)
(iii) of the Coal Mines Act was not adhered to on a large scale.
Additionally, the court held that the allocation of coal blocks under the government dispensation
route to public sector undertakings (which ultimately enabled them to mine coal commercially)
was in breach of the Coal Mines Act. The court concluded that the allocation of coal blocks
under both the screening committee and through government dispensation was arbitrary and
illegal. The court considered it necessary to hear the parties further before it issued any penalties.

JUDGMENT OF SEPTEMBER 2014

The court held that in light of its decision that the coal block allocations under both government
dispensation and selection by the screening committee were arbitrary and illegal, the licences had
to be cancelled. The court clarified that its judgment would take effect in six months (ie, from
March 31 2015), in order to allow all stakeholders including the central government and allottees
time to manage their affairs on the basis of the emerging situation. Additionally, giving credence
to the assessment made by the comptroller and auditor general of India, the court directed the
allottees to pay an additional levy of Rs295 per metric ton of coal extracted from the date of
extraction as compensation.
COMMENT ON THE ISSUE
The Mines and Minerals Act sets out the procedure for obtaining a mining lease, the Coal Mines
Act under Section 3(3)(a) specifies the entities that are eligible to carry out coal mining operations.
There can be no disagreement with the court's finding that there is no known procedure for
allocating coal blocks other than that found within the Mines and Minerals Act. However, the
cancellation of licences en masse creates concern. The state government's role is to recommend
entities for central government approval. This is necessary before a licence can be granted. The
central government's role is pre-eminent: without central government approval, a licence cannot be
granted. There is no doubt that the central government had given its approval in these cases.
Therefore, to cancel the allocation of licences on the principle that where a statute requires
something to be done in a certain manner, it must be done as specified in the statute or not at all is
discordant even more so when, through various decisions, the Supreme Court has held that
procedure is subservient to justice. The Supreme Court instead should have considered whether the
central government had done anything illegal by granting the licences, allowing each allocation to
be individually considered by a court-appointed committee. Barring six instances where the
Central Bureau of Investigation has initiated enquiries against the beneficiaries of the coal block
allocation, no infringement or violation of law has been alleged. Even the Supreme Court orders
are bereft of any such finding against the allottees. The cancellation of the licences of allottees
including those that were not party to any illegality is a severe step.
Given that the court found no elements of fraud on the part of the allottees, the interest of justice
would have been better served had the court, in exercising its powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution, protected the licences allotted to private citizens. This is even more relevant because

the licences had been allotted over 16-year period, from 1993 to 2008, by successive
governments.20 The allottees have a legitimate expectation that their licences will remain operative
if they have not committed a misdemeanour. The imposition of an additional levy is nothing short
of a penalty, one which presupposes a misdemeanour on the part of the allottees. As stated above,
the court found no fault with the allottees; thus, the additional levy by the comptroller and auditor
general the auditor of the government is harsh. The individual allottees were not allowed to go
before the Supreme Court and therefore did not have the opportunity to present their respective
positions. In these circumstances, a request for a court-appointed committee to consider individual
cases was legitimate and merited reflection.

CONCLUSION
The doctrine of legitimate expectation is therefore an ancillary ground for redressal and
making it the sole ground would an unfair exercise of judicial power. The said doctrine
originated from the Wednesbury principle and has now been adapted to the various exigencies
and now is applied with the principle of proportionality as has been seen by the various
English and Indian judgments. The application of the principle though usually observed in
cases of individual rights being injured, it now has application in cases of corporate right
infringement also, as has been observed from the recent coal block allocations case. The
implications of this judgment are huge as it has re-ignited the debate of undue judicial
interference in administrative matters. It remains to be seen how the jurisprudence will
develop.

20 Thacker N and Banerjee R M, Supreme Court Delivers Knockout Punch in Coal Mining Decision (11
Nov 2014).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Proportionality as a Ground for Judicial Review Indian Journal of Public Administration

(vol 60, Jan-Mar 2014)

Chief Justice of India,Efficacy of Wednesburys Principles and Contemporary

Development of Law Judicial Review of Facts, 28 July, 2007

Thacker N and Banerjee R M, Supreme Court Delivers Knockout Punch in Coal Mining

Decision (11 Nov 2014)

Massey I P, Administrative Law (8th edn, EBC 2012)
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