Symbiosis Law School - Prosecution Memo

Team Code: RECEPTIVITY
AURO UNIVERSITY 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

BEFORE THE COURT OF SESSIONS
AT NEW DELHI
S.C. NO. ____ OF 2016
FOR THE OFFENCES CHARGED UNDER:

SECTION 302,SECTION 364,SECTION 313,SECTION 201,SECTION 120B,SECTION 34 OF THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
STATE OF DELHI (NCT)

(PROSECUTION)
V/S
REKHA DAS, SUHAS KUMAR AND SHYAM SAHU

(DEFENCE)
BEFORE SUBMISSION TO HONBLE SESSIONS JUDGE
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................... i

List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................... vi
[A] INDIAN CASE LAWS ................................................................................................. vi
[B] LEGISLATIONS ....................................................................................................... viii
[C] LAW DICTIONARIES / LEXICONS ..................................................................... viii
[D] BOOKS ....................................................................................................................... viii
[E] DATABASES AND WEBSITES .............................................................................. viii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........................................................................................ x
SUMMARY OF FACTS .......................................................................................................... xi
ISSUES INVOLVED ............................................................................................................ xiii
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ............................................................................................. xv
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED................................................................................................... 1
ISSUE 1: WHETHER CONFESSION OF ACCUSED NO. 3, ADDUCED AS
EVIDENCE, IS
RELIABLEError!
Bookmark not defined.
[1.1] Evidentiary value of the confession on the basis of corroboration. .................Error!
Bookmark not defined.
[1.2] The confession is admissible against the maker as well as the other accused
persons3
[1.3] Narco analysis findings corroborated with A-3s confession3
[1.4] Evidence from Hostile witness must not be rejected in toto.4
i | Page
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE ACCUSED ACTED IN FURTHERANCE OF A

COMMON INTENTION TO COMMIT THE CRIME ................................................... 5
[2.1] A Common Intention was shared by all accused persons ......................................... 5
[2.2 There was participation by all the accused persons .................................................... 6
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE THREE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY OF
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY UNDER SECTION 120-B OF THE INDIAN PENAL
CODE, 1860 .......................................................................................................................... 6
ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE THREE ACCUSED PESONS ARE GUILTY OF THE
OFFENCE OF MURDER PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 302, INDIAN PENAL
CODE, 1860 .......................................................................................................................... 9
[4.1] The three accused persons had the intention to murder ........................................... 9
[4.1.1] Rekha Mukherjee ............................................................................................... 9
[4.1.2] Suhas Kumar ..................................................................................................... 9
[4.1.3] Shyam Sahu.10
[4.2.] Actus reus is established......................................................................................... 10
[4.3] The fact of the Last Seen Together Theory shifts the burden on the accused12
[4.4] Absence of Motive is irrelevant..12
ISSUE 5: WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY OF CAUSING
THE OFFENCE OF ABDUCTING IN ORDER TO COMMIT MURDER UNDER
SECTION 364 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 Error! Bookmark not defined.3
[5.1.] The accused persons committed the offense of Abduction under Section 362, I.P.C
........................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined.4
[5.2.] The three accused persons had the intention to commit the Murder ...............Error!
Bookmark not defined.4
ISSUE 6: WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY OF CAUSING
DISAPPEARNCE OF OFFENCE OR GIVING FALSE INFORMATION TO SCREEN
OFFENDER PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 201 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE,
1860....Err
or! Bookmark not defined.4
ii | Page
ISSUE 7: WHETHER A-1 IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE OF CAUSING

MISCARRIAGE UNDER SECTION 313 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE,
1860..16
PRAYER.18
8
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
A.I.R. All India Report
ALLMR All Maharashtra Law Reporter
ALT Andhra Law Times
Anr. Another
Art. Article
Bom. Bombay
Cal. Calcutta
Co. Company
Coch. Cochin
Corpn. Corporation
Cri. LJ Criminal Law Journal
iii | Page
CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure,1973
Del. Delhi
DRJ Delhi Reported Judgments
Ed. Edition
Id. Ibid
ILR Indian Law Reporter
IPC Indian Penal Code, 1860
Kart. Karnataka
Ker. Kerala
L.R. Law Reports
Ltd. Limited
Nag Nagpur
NCT National Capital Territory
Ors. Others
p. Page
iv | Page
Para. Paragraph
Pat. Patna
PLR Punjab Law Reporter
Raj. Rajasthan
Rang. Rangoon
Sec. Section
S.C. Supreme Court
S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases
S.L.P. Special Leave Petition
Supp. Supplementary
u/s. Under Section
v. Versus
Vol. Volume
W.L. West Law
v | Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[A] INDIAN CASE LAWS

1. A H Desai v. State of Mysore AIR 1956 Mys 46,47
2. Aizaz v. State of U.P., (2008) 12 SCC 198
3. Ammini & Ors v State of Kerala 1998 Cr LJ 481(SC)
4. Badri v. State of U.P., AIR 19953 All 189
5. Badshah v. State of U.P., (2008) 3 SCC 681: 2008 Cr LJ 1950: (2008) 3 All LJ 524
6. Bakshish Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 2016
7. Barenda A-2 Ghosh v King Emperor, AIR 1935 PC 1
8. Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 682,687
9. Bodh Raj v. State of J&K, AIR 2002 SC 3164
10. Dibia v. State of U.P., AIR 1953 All 373
11. Dinesh Bulakhi Harijan v. State, 209 CrLJ 4664
12. Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 3 SCC 106
13. Geejaganda Somaiah v. State of Karnataka, 2007 CrLJ 1792 : AIR 2007 SC 1355
14. Hari Om v. State of U.P, AIR 1993 SCW 666 : 1993 Cr LJ 1383
15. James v. State of Kerala, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 55 (Ker.);
16. Jyotish Das and Anr. Vs. State of Tripura, 2010 (1) ALT (Cri) 23
17. K. Hasheem v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 1 SCC 237
18. Kalawati v. State, 1953 SCR 546
19. Kehar Singh v. State AIR 1988 SC 1883
20. Krishnan v State of Kerala, AIR 1997 SC 383
21. Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 1803
22. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. V. Datar Switchgerar Ltd., (2010)
10 SCC 479
23. Mahommad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyaar v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1981
SC 1062
24. Malleshi Vs. State of Karnataka, 2004 (3) ACR 2688 (SC)
25. Maqsoodan v. State of U.P., 1983 CrLJ 218 : AIR 1983 SC 126
26. Md. Idrish v. State, 2004 Cr LJ 1724 (Raj)
27. Md. Sharif And Anr. v. Rex, AIR 1950 All 380
vi | Page
28. MO Shamshuddin v. State of Kerala, (1995) 3 SCC 351

29. Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1976 SC 483
30. Mulakh Raj v. Satish A-2, AIR 1992 SC 1175
31. Nitin Jairam Gadkari vs State Of Maharashtra, 2004 (4) Mh LJ 419
32. Nitya Sen v. State of West Bengal, 1978 Cr LJ 481
33. Omanakuttan Alias Biju and Binu T...vs. State of Kerala, 2000 CriLJ 4893
34. Paramjit Singh v State of Punjab, (2007) 13 SCC 530
35. Prabhu @ Kulandaivelu vs State Rep , CRLMP Nos. 10666/2015
36. Pradumansinh Kalubha v. State of Gujarat, (1992) Cr LJ 1111
37. Ram Prakash Vs. The State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 1
38. Ram Tahal v. State of U.P., 1972 Cr LJ 227
39. Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli and ors. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2011 SC (Cri.) 120
40. Ramchander, 1970 Cr LJ 653.
41. Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54
42. Ramkrushna v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 CrLJ 3431 (3433) : 2007 AIR SCW 3134
43. Razak Khizar v. State, 1967 CriLJ 484
44. Sathya Narayanan v. State Tr. Insp. Of Police , 2013 (1) ALD (Cri) 458
45. Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263
46. Sharda Bux Singh Vs. State of U.P., 1995(19)ACR25
47. Sharif Ahmad Alias Acchan, (1956) 2 All 188
48. SR Jain v State of Uttar Pradesh (1984) 1 Crimes 233(All)
49. State & etc v. Siddhartha Vashishta alias Manu Sharma 2001 Cr LJ 2404(Del)
50. State of Kerala v. Thomas, (1986) 2 SCC 411
51. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Digvijay Singh, 1981 Cri. LJ 1278 (SC)
52. State of Maharashtra v Meyer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722
53. State of Maharashtra v. Bhairu Sattu Berad, AIR 1956 Bom 609
54. State of Punjab v Sucha Singh, AIR 2003 SC 1471
55. State of U.P. v Ramesh Prasad Misra, AIR 1996 SC 2766
56. State of UP v Ashok A-2 Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 840
57. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sukhbansi AIR 1985 SC 1224
58. State v. Abdul Rashid, 2002 Cr LJ 3118 J&K
59. Sukhram v. State of Rajasthan (1995) 1 Cr LJ 257 (Raj)
60. Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681
61. Velayuda Pulava Vs. State by Sub-Inspector of Police, (2009)14SCC436
vii | Page
62. Vinod vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2008 SC 1142
[B] LEGISLATIONS
1. Constitution Of India
2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
3. Indian Penal Code, 1860
4. Indian Evidence Act , 1872
[C] LAW DICTIONARIES / LEXICONS

1. Blacks Law Dictionary
2. JOWITTS Dictionary of English Law
[D] BOOKS
1. Jain, MahabirPrashad, Samaraditya Pal, and Ruma Pal, Indian Constitutional Law:
Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, 2010.
2. Gaur, K.D., Commentary On The Indian Penal Code. New Delhi: Universal Law Pub.
Co., 2013
3. Stephens, Commentaries on the Laws of England ,21st Edition, volume IV,
4. R A Nelson, Indian Penal Code, (9th ed., 2003), volume I
5. Ratanlal Ranchhoddas., et al. Ratanlal And Dhirajlal's The Indian Penal Code.
Nagpur: Wadhwa and Co. Law Publishers, 1992.
6. S. C. Sarkar, Law of Evidence, Volume II, 18th Edition, 2013, Page 2764-75
[E] DATABASES AND WEBSITES

1. LexisNexis [www.lexisnexis.com]
2. Westlaw [www.westlaw.com]
viii | Page
3. Jstor [www.jstor.com]
4. Manupatra[www.manupatra.com]
5. SCC Online [www.scconline.co.in]
6. Hein Online [www.home.heinonline.org]
7. Westlaw [www.westlaw.com]
ix | Page
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Honble Court has jurisdiction to try the instant matter under Section 177
read with Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Section 177:
177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trialEvery offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose
local jurisdiction it was committed.
Read with section 209:

209. Commitment of case to court of session when offence is triable exclusively
by itWhen in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or
is brought before the magistrate and it appears to the magistrate that the offence
is triable exclusively by the court of session, he shall(a) commit the case to the court of session;
(b) subject to the provisions of this code relating to bail, remand the accused to
custody during, and until the conclusion of, the trial;
(c) send to that court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if
any, which are to be produced in evidence;
(d) notify the public prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the court of
session.
x | Page
SUMMARY OF FACTS
1. Trisha Das was the daughter of Rekha Das who was an Indian HR consultant and
media executive
2. After splitting with Siddhart Das, Rekha left Trisha under the care of her parents
in Mumbai and moved to Delhi
3. Later, Rekha settled with Jacob Mukherjee and Trisha came to Delhi to live with
them.
4. In June, 2011, Trisha, assistant manager in Delhi Metro One cohabited with
Shobhit Mukherjee from 2009 to 2012 which was the result of their mutual
romantic relationship
5. In 2011, Trisha got pregnant with Shobhits child and she was allegedly forced by
Rekha to abort the child
6. On 24th April 2012, Trisha took leave of absence and while on leave, she sent in
her written resignation and a break up SMS to Shobhit. Her mother claimed that
Trisha had gone to U.S for higher studies and hence no missing FIR was lodged
7. On 30th April 2012, Shobhit went through two failed attempts to file a missing
complaint in Lajpat Nagar and Cannaught Place police station and also confronted
Rekha about the passport used to send Trisha to U.S since he had the original one
8. On 23rd May, 2012, police found a decomposed body at Kausani forest and the
skeletal remains were sent to JJ Hospital. However, Trishas disappearance and
the identification of skeletal remains were unreported and unlinked for 40 months
9. Rekha was kept under surveillance but arrests were made after Shyam Sahu,
Rekhas driver was arrested on August 21, 2015, in a case related to illegal arms
10. As per the FIR lodged by Delhi Police, Sahu gave a statement to the Police that
the murder was planned by Rekha who had discussed the same with Suhas Kumar,
her ex-boyfriend
11. Rekha had allegedly done a recce of the dumping ground the evening before the
murder
12. On 24th April 2012, Suhas Kumar had flown to Delhi and checked into Hotel
Hilltop
13. Rekha had earlier asked Trisha to her on 24th evening and consequently, rented an
Opel Corsa for abducting her. Later, on 24th at 6 pm, she picked up Suhas from the
xi | Page
hotel and went to Cannaught place to pick Trisha who was dropped there by
Shobhit at 7pm
14. Further, Sahu drove the car to the by-lanes of Dwarka where Kumar allegedly
strangled her and after the murder, her body was taken to Rekhas residence in
Lajpat Nagar where it was put in a bag and stuffed in the cars boot
15. The same night, the three accused drove to the village of Kotputli, Kausani forest
area. On the way, they propped the body between Rekha and Kumar to avoid
police detection
16. Further, on 25th April, at 4 am, the accused dragged the body out of the car in an
isolated spot in the forest, stuffed it in the bag, poured petrol over the bag (the
driver brought petrol from Shri Ram Petrol pump situated on the highway) and set
it ablaze
17. After the body was burnt, all the three accused returned to Delhi and Kumar later,
left Delhi.
xii | Page
ISSUES INVOLVED
ISSUE I
WHETHER THE CONFESSION OF ACCUSED NO. 3, ADDUCED AS EVIDENCE, IS

RELIABLE
[I.1.] Evidentiary value of the confession on the basis of corroboration.

[I.2.] The confession is admissible against the maker as well as the other accused persons
[I.3.] Narco analysis findings corroborated with A-3s confession
[I.4.] Evidence from Hostile witness must not be rejected in toto
ISSUE II
WHETHER THE ACCUSED ACTED IN FURTHERANCE OF A COMMON

INTENTION TO COMMIT THE CRIME
[II.1.] A Common Intention was shared by all accused persons

[II.2.] There was participation by all the accused persons
ISSUE III
WHETHER THE THREE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY OF CRIMINAL

CONSPIRACY UNDER SECTION 120-B OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
ISSUE IV
WHETHER THE THREE ACCUSED PESONS ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE OF

MURDER PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 302, INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
[IV.1.] The three accused persons had the intention to murder

xiii | Page
[IV.1.1] Rekha Mukherjee

[IV.1.2] Suhas Kumar
[IV.1.3] Shyam Sahu
[IV.2] Actus reus is established
[IV.3.] The fact of the Last Seen TogetherTheory shifts the burden on the accused
[IV.4.] Absence of motive is irrelevant
ISSUE V
WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY OF CAUSING THE OFFENCE
OF ABDUCTING IN ORDER TO COMMIT MURDER UNDER SECTION 364 OF THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
[V.1.] The accused persons committed the offense of Abduction under Section 362, I.P.C
[V.2.] The three accused persons had the intention to commit the Murder
ISSUE VI
WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY OF CAUSING DISAPPEARNCE

OF OFFENCE OR GIVING FALSE INFORMATION TO SCREEN OFFENDER
PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 201 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
ISSUE VII
WHETHER A-1 IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE OF CAUSING MISCARRIAGE

UNDER SECTION 313 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
xiv | Page
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I WHETHER THE CONFESSION OF ACCUSED NO. 3, ADDUCED AS

EVIDENCE, IS RELIABLE
It is humbly submitted that the confession given the co-accused, adduced as evidence, is
reliable as it is well grounded and sufficiently corroborated by circumstantial evidence
making it admissible in the Court and further, with the complete chain of circumstances, it is
admissible against the other accused persons as well. Moreover, the corroboration with the
Narco-analysis tests add weight to the confession followed by the accepted evidence given by
the hostile witness. Hence, it is proven beyond doubt that the confession is reliable
ISSUE II WHETHER THE ACCUSED ACTED IN FURTHERANCE OF A COMMON

INTENTION TO COMMIT THE CRIME
It is humbly submitted that all the three accused had committed the act in furtherance of
common intention. The requisite intention was derived from the discussion of the plan by A-1
and A-2 as well as the additional acts assisted by A-3. Moreover, all of them participated in
the act constituting the offence. Hence, it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that all of
them acted in furtherance of a common intention to commit the crime.
ISSUE III WHETHER THE THREE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY OF

CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY UNDER SECTION 120-B OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE,
1860
It is humbly submitted that in matters similar to the present case, the accused persons
conspired together to do an illegal act. The apex court in various other cases has held that
corroborated circumstantial evidence is enough to find an accused guilty under this section.
The actions and the circumstantial evidence present on record establishes the link which
proves that the three accused persons acted in furtherance of a common intention and of a
criminal conspiracy.
xv | Page
ISSUE IV WHETHER THE THREE ACCUSED PESONS ARE GUILTY OF THE

OFFENCE OF MURDER PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 302, INDIAN PENAL
CODE, 1860
It is humbly submitted that the three accused persons had committed an act of murder at the
Kausani Forest with a complete chain of evidence linking to the crime, the actus reus. The
accused
persons
also
had
the
requisite
mens
rea
to
commit
said
crime.
Hence, it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of Murder was indeed
committed by the three accused in the case at hand.
ISSUE V WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY OF CAUSING THE

OFFENCE OF ABDUCTING IN ORDER TO COMMIT MURDER UNDER SECTION
364 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
It is humbly submitted that the accused persons had caused the offence of abduction as they,
in furtherance of common intention, induced the victim to move from Cannaught Place to
Dwarka, thus abducting her. Further, they also had the requisite intention to murder her.
Hence, since all the evidences form a chain of events pointing towards the commission of the
crime, it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of Abduction in order to Murder
was indeed committed by the three accused in the case at hand.
ISSUE VI WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY OF CAUSING

OFFENDER PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 201 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE,
1860
It is humbly submitted that the three accused persons had caused the disappearance of
evidence after committing the offence of murder as all of them, in furtherance of common
intention, gave false information to the police as well as PW6 and propped the victims body
between A-1 and A-2 with the intention of screening the offender to avoid detection. Hence, it
xvi | Page
is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the all the accused persons had caused the
disappearance of evidences and gave false information to screen the offender.
ISSUE VII WHETHER A-1 IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE OF CAUSING

MISCARRIAGE UNDER SECTION 313 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
It is humbly submitted that A-1 is guilty of causing miscarriage without the victims consent
punishable under Section 313, I.P.C as she forced the victim to abort the child and had the
primary motive to do so. Hence, it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of
Miscarriage without the womans consent was indeed committed by A-1 in the case at hand.
xvii | Page
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
[1]. WHETHER THE CONFESSION OF ACCUSED NO. 3, ADDUCED AS

EVIDENCE, IS RELIABLE
It is humbly contended before the Honble Court that the confession given by Accused No. 3,
Shyam Sahu (hereinafter referred to as A-3) is reliable as it is well grounded and sufficiently
corroborated by circumstantial evidence thereby making it admissible in the Court [1.1]
against the co-accused as well as the other accused persons [1.2]. Moreover, the Narcoanalysis tests add weight to the confession [1.3] followed by the accepted evidence given by
the hostile witness [1.4]
1.1 Evidentiary value of the confession on the basis of corroboration

Being an accomplice i.e. a guilty partner or associate in crime1, the evidence given by A-3 is
subject to the combined reading of Sec 114 and Sec 133, Indian Evidence Act ,1872 and
requires some independent corroboration in material particulars for acceptance. 2 The
corroboration need not be direct evidence, it is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial
evidence.3
Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 that talks about the proof of information received from
the accused shall further assist the Court in determining the admissibility of the confession.
Section 27 reads as follows:
How much of information received from accused may be proved.
Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information
received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of
such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact
thereby discovered, may be proved.4
It is contended that a statement even by way of confession made in the police custody which
distinctly relates to the fact discovered is admissible in evidence against the accused. 5 If a fact
1
MO Shamshuddin v. State of Kerala, (1995) 3 SCC 351

State of Kerala v. Thomas, (1986) 2 SCC 411
3
Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54
4
Section 27, Evidence Act, 1872
5
Bodh Raj v. State of J&K, AIR 2002 SC 3164; Dinesh Bulakhi Harijan v. State, 209 CrLJ 4664
2
1|Page
is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded

thereby that the information was true and accordingly it can be safely allowed to be given in
evidence.6 Here, the discovery must be of such a fact which the police had not previously
learnt from other sources7 and this discovery includes, within its ambit, not only the physical
object produced but also the place from which it was produced as per the knowledge of the
accused.8
Further, each and every piece of information mentioned in the extra-judicial confession need
not be corroborated by independent evidence. It was held that conviction can be recorded
solely on the basis of the extra judicial confession if it is found to be credible and worthy of
acceptance.9 In the present matter, as per the evidences produced before the Court, the DNA
of the body recovered from the Kausani forest matched the DNA of the main accused, Rekha
Mukherjee10 affirming the victims death. This was the discovery of a new fact not falling
within the knowledge of the police, thus, falling within the ambit of this Section. In addition
to that, this body found in the forest also confirmed with the location of the crime as stated in
the statement, the discovery of which was an immediate consequence of the confession.
Similarly, the evidence also stated that A-2s and the victims phone location was traced to be
located at the Kausani forest on 25th April11 i.e., on the day of the murder. This particular
information regarding the location matched the contentions of the statement given by A-3.
It is further contended that even if the accused retracts from his statement which had led to a
discovery of a new material fact such as the crime weapon, the statement still remains valid
for use as evidence.12
Hence, it is humbly submitted that that since the substantial portion of A-3s confession
distinctly relates to the facts discovered, the entire confession is reliable as legal evidence,
even though he denied his confession before the Court because the confession along with the
evidences produced before the court form a continuous chain of events.
Geejaganda Somaiah v. State of Karnataka, 2007 CrLJ 1792 : AIR 2007 SC 1355
Pradumansinh Kalubha v. State of Gujarat, (1992) Cr LJ 1111
8
Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1976 SC 483
9
Velayuda Pulava Vs. State by Sub-Inspector of Police, (2009)14SCC436
10
Moot Problem, page 2, Evidence 1.
11
Moot problem, page 2, Evidence 7
12
State v. Abdul Rashid, 2002 Cr LJ 3118 J&K
7
2|Page
1.2 The confession is admissible against the maker as well as the other accused persons
Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 when read in consonance with Section 114
Illustration (b) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, asserts that the statement of an accomplice
is worthy and competent when corroborated by material particulars.13 Conviction based on
such accomplice evidence sustains under Indian Law.14
It is further contended that the confession given by A-3 can be used against other accused
persons too, by the virtue of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, 1872 which states that where
more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, a confession made by any
one of them affecting himself and any one of his co-accused can be taken can be taken into
consideration by the court not only against the maker of the confession but also against his
co-accused.15 The amount of credibility to be attached to a retracted confession, however,
would depend upon the circumstances of each particulars case and although a retracted
confession of the co-accused is ordinarily not acted upon to convict the other accused
persons, it is taken into consideration if the confession corroborates with the evidence
produced before the court.16 This principle of corroboration of material particulars was
reiterated by the Allahabad High Court17. Further, in the case of Sukhram v. State of
Rajasthan18, the High Court held that when the circumstantial chain is complete, the coaccuseds confession is usable against the other accused persons.
In the present case, A-3s confession corroborated with the evidences produced before the
Court making it admissible against him as well as other accused persons.
1.3 Narco analysis findings corroborated with A-3s confession
It is humbly submitted that the evidentiary value of narco tests was laid down in the
landmark case of Selvi v. State of Karnataka19. The apex court held that that information
subsequently discovered from the result of a voluntary test can be admitted as evidence.
13
S. C. Sarkar, Law of Evidence, Volume II, 18th Edition, 2013, Page 2764-75
K. Hasheem v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 1 SCC 237
15
Section 30, Evidence Act, 1872
16
Ram Prakash Vs. The State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 1
17
Sharda Bux Singh Vs. State of U.P., 1995(19)ACR25
18
(1995) 1 Cr LJ 257 (Raj)
19
(2010) 7 SCC 263
14
3|Page
In the present case, narco tests of the accused persons corroborated with the contentions of
the FIR.20Hence, the discovery of new facts-DNA result of the body and phone location of
the victim and A-2 on the night of 24th April, not only confirmed information derived from
the narco analysis tests but also gave affirmation to the statement given by A-3.
Therefore, it is humbly submitted that these tests add more weight to A-3s confession.
1.4 Evidence from Hostile witness must not be rejected in toto
It is contended before this Court that with regard to appreciation of evidence of hostile
witnesses, it was held that the evidence of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if
spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused but it can be subjected to closed scrutiny
and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or
defence may be accepted.21 Thus, the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be rejected in
toto.22
In background of the facts of the current case, the petrol pump attendant, Rambahadur
(hereinafter referred to as PW2) had identified A-3 before the police but later turned hostile
before the court.23 With regard to the above stated principles, the evidence of hostile witness
can be relied upon up to the extent to which it supported the case of the prosecution.
It is clear that even in the absence of any eyewitness, if various circumstances relied on by
the prosecution relating to the guilt (of the accused) are fully established beyond doubt, the
court is free to award conviction.24 It is humbly submitted that the evidence provided by the
PW2 must be relied upon as it corroborates with the confession of A-3 and proves that A-3
bought petrol from Shri Ram petrol pump from the highway connecting to Kotputli forest.
This proves that the accused were in the circumscribing area of the crime scene. As per A-3s
confession, this petrol was later used by A-1 to set fire to the victims body.
Hence, it is humbly submitted that the confession given by A-3 before the police is
completely admissibly in the Court.
20
Moot problem, Page no. 2, Point no. 2

State of U.P. v Ramesh Prasad Misra, AIR 1996 SC 2766
22
Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli and ors. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2011 SC (Cri.) 120
23
Moot problem, page 2, Evidence 6
24
Sathya Narayanan v. State Tr. Insp. Of Police, 2013 (1) ALD (Cri) 458
21
4|Page
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED ACTED IN FURTHERANCE OF A COMMON INTENTION TO

COMMIT THE CRIME
It is humbly contended that all the three accused acted conjointly in furtherance of a common
intention to commit the offences for which they are charged.
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, that criminalizes the acts done in furtherance of a
common intention, is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. 25 The
essence of this issue is to prove that since all the three accused intentionally acted jointly, it is
just the same as if each of them had done it individually.26
To invoke an aid under this Section successfully, two ingredients must be fulfilled:
i.
Common intention to commit the crime
ii.
Participation by all accused in the act or acts in furtherance of the common

intention.27
The pre-requisite of common intention will be proved in the first sub-issue [2.1] while the
participation by all the accused in the act of crime will be discussed in the second subissue [2.2]
2.1 A Common Intention was shared by all accused persons
Before convicting a person for any offence read with Section 34, common intention
should be established by proving that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the
pre-arranged plan.28 However, this common intention can also be formed in the course of
occurrence without prior conspiracy.29 In fact, in most cases, the intention is inferred from
the act(s) or the conduct of the accused or any other relevant circumstances of the case.30
In the current case, as per A-3s confession, A-1 had planned the victims murder and had
further discussed it with A-2. This definitely concludes that A-1 had a prior concert with
A-2, for committing the offence. As far as A-3 is concerned, his common intention with
the other two accused persons can be inferred from the manner in which he arrived on the
25
Section 34, Indian Penal Code, 1860

Ratanlal, Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, p. 502 (34th Ed. 2014)
27
Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. V. Datar Switchgerar Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 479
28
Sharif Ahmad Alias Acchan, (1956) 2 All 188, Ramchander, 1970 Cr LJ 653.
29
Hari Om v. State of U.P, AIR 1993 SCW 666 : 1993 Cr LJ 1383
30
Maqsoodan v. State of U.P., 1983 CrLJ 218 : AIR 1983 SC 126 ; Aizaz v. State of U.P., (2008) 12 SCC 198
26
5|Page
scene, the acts done by him to assist the co-accused persons and the concerted conduct
subsequent to the commission of the offence.31
2.2 There was participation by all the accused persons
For bringing a conviction r/w this section, it is not necessary that all the co-accused
persons committed an overt act for the achievement of the object.32 It is not necessary that
each and every companion should have caused fatal injury by his overt act. All that is
necessary is that the act was done in furtherance of common intention though done by any
one of them.33
As per A-3s confession, the rented car that was used to abduct Trisha was driven by A-3.
He further drove to Dwarka where A-2 strangled her. After the murder, all of them left
the scene of incident together in the same car. A-3 drove the co-accused persons and the
dead body to A-1s residence where the body was put in the bag and stuffed in the boot.
A-3s intention was further affirmed by his act of sleeping in the car with the body in the
boot. The same night, the three accused drove to the village of Kotputli, Kausani forest
area. To avoid the police and checks on the highway, they propped the body between A-1
and A-2, to make it appear that Trisha was sleeping. After reaching the isolated spot in
Kausani forest, at 4 am in the morning, A-1 dragged the body out of the car, stuffed it into
the bag, poured petrol over the bag and set it ablaze.
Hence, the totality of circumstances should be taken into consideration in arriving at the
conclusion that all the accused acted in furtherance of the common intention to commit
the offence.
3. WHETHER THE THREE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY OF CRIMINAL

CONSPIRACY UNDER SECTION 120-B OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
It is humbly contended that the three accused persons are guilty of criminal conspiracy as
they conspired conjointly to commit the crime.
Section 120 B of the I.P.C states as follows
31
Ram Tahal v. State of U.P., 1972 Cr LJ 227, Nitya Sen v. State of West Bengal, 1978 Cr LJ 481
Krishnan v State of Kerala, AIR 1997 SC 383
33
Paramjit Singh v State of Punjab, (2007) 13 SCC 530
32
6|Page
Punishment of criminal conspiracy.

(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death,
[imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall,
where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be
punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.
(2)Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit
an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.
Hence,
to
substantiate
charge
of
conspiracy
the
prosecution
must
prove:
(i) the accused conspired with another or others;

(ii) that he did so to do, or cause to be done, an illegal act or an act which is not illegal, by
illegal means.34
The aforesaid can be established by either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence 35, or by
necessary implications.36 For the conviction under this Section, the prosecution has to place
on record some connecting link or connecting evidence of the meeting of minds of the
conspirators for achieving a particular object.37
However, direct evidence in proof of
conspiracy that is generally treated in the stealth of darkness is seldom available, and even
when available it is tainted, being that of an accomplice, requires corroboration.38
Hence, this, along with the fact that conspiracies are hatched in secrecy; they are usually
proved by circumstantial evidence alone.39
In the present matter, the prime evidence is A3s confession which has been corroborated
with the subsequent findings of the police. As stated above, though it is not possible to prove
the actual meeting of minds, it must be inferred from their acts. According to A3s
confession, the rented car that was used to abduct Trisha was driven by A-3. He further drove
to Dwarka where A-2 strangled her. After the murder, all of them left the scene of incident
together in the same car. A-3 drove the co-accused persons and the dead body to A-1s
residence where the body was put in the bag and stuffed in the boot. A-3s intention was
further affirmed by his act of sleeping in the car with the body in the boot. The same night,
the three accused drove to the village of Kotputli, Kausani forest area. To avoid the police
and checks on the highway, they propped the body between A-1 and A-2, to make it appear
34
R A Nelson, Indian Penal Code, (9th ed., 2003)

Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 682,687;SR Jain v State of Uttar
Pradesh (1984) 1 Crimes 233(All)
36
Mahommad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyaar v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1981 SC 1062
37
State & etc v. Siddhartha Vashishta alias Manu Sharma 2001 Cr LJ 2404(Del)
38
A H Desai v. State of Mysore AIR 1956 Mys 46,47; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sukhbansi AIR 1985 SC 1224
39
State & etc v. Siddhartha Vashishta alias Manu Sharma 2001 Cr LJ 2404
35
7|Page
that Trisha was sleeping. After reaching the isolated spot in Kausani forest, at 4 am in the
morning, A-1 dragged the body out of the car, stuffed it into the bag, poured petrol over the
bag and set it ablaze.
When deciding the question of sufficiency of circumstantial evidence for the purpose of
conviction, what the court has to consider is the total cumulative effect of all the facts. In the
case of Ammini & Ors v State of Kerala40, the accused persons entered the house and
administered poison to cause the death of the woman, there was sufficient evidence regarding
their movements, relevant time near the house, one of the accused confessed. On these facts
the apex court held that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.41 In cases where the accused act in furtherance of a common intention and
of a criminal conspiracy there acts must be judged on the basis of circumstantial evidence.42
It is humbly submitted that in the present matter, the actions and the circumstantial evidence
present on record establishes the link which proves that the three accused persons acted in
furtherance of a common intention and of a criminal conspiracy.
4. WHETHER THE THREE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE

OF MURDER PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 302, I.P.C
It is humbly contended that all the three accused persons are guilty of committing the offence
under Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In order to bring a successful conviction
under Section 302, IPC, it is pertinent to refer to Sec 300, IPC which elucidates the essentials
of murder.
A person is guilty of murder if he intentionally causes the death of a person or causes such
bodily injury as he knows, is likely to cause death of that person or causes such bodily injury,
which in the ordinary course of nature results into death or commits an act so dangerous that
it must, in all probability cause death of that person.43
The Prosecution humbly contends both mens rea [1.1] and the actus reus [1.2] can be
established
40
1998 Cr LJ 481(SC)
Ammini & Ors v State of Kerala 1998 Cr LJ 481(SC)
42
Kehar Singh v. State AIR 1988 SC 1883
43
Ratanlal, Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, p. 502 (34th Ed. 2014)
41
8|Page
4.1 The three accused persons had the intention to murder

It is humbly contended that the intention to cause death may be revealed by the
circumstances of the story which form a complete chain of events.44 The common
intention of all the accused persons has been established in Issue no. 2. However, to add
to that, the chain of events revealing the intention has been illustrated for all the accused
persons individually in the subsequent sub-issues.
4.1.1 Rekha Mukherjee
As per A-3s confession, Rekha Mukherjee (hereinafter referred to as A-1) had rented
an Opel Corsa for the abduction and murder of the victim. Despite being from an affluent
background, the very fact that she rented a car to pick up Trisha raises a reasonable
suspicion on her intention, which was inclined towards abducting and murdering Trisha.
Further, an evening prior to the murder, A-1 had conducted a recce of the dumping
ground at Kausani forest. This clearly adds to her guilty intention.
Another aspect in the matter that cannot be ignored is the victims sudden written
resignation to the company after having taken the leave of absence on 24th April, 2012.
Additionally, Shobhit Mukherjee also received a shocking breakup SMS from Trishas
phone on the day her written resignation was tendered to the company. Both of these
incidents were rather sudden and unannounced as she had shown no inclination to take
such actions in her past. In this case, there is nothing to prove that the victim was
unhappy with her relationship with Shobhit Mukherjee or with her job and hence, this,
without any deliberation, indicates that A-1 intended to remove Trisha from her social
and professional circle without raising any doubt in the minds of other people.
4.1.2 Suhas Kumar

It is humbly contended that the intention to kill can also be inferred from the nature of the
injuries caused to the victim.45. Causing a serious injury on a vital part of the body of the
deceased with a dangerous weapon must necessarily lead to the inference that the accused
intended to cause death or bodily injury sufficient to cause death of the victim, and it
44
45
James v. State of Kerala, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 55 (Ker.);

Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 1803
9|Page
answers to section 300, I.P.C.46

It is humbly submitted that according to A-3s admission to the police, the victim was
taken to one of the by-lanes in Dwarka where A-2 strangled her. This was clearly a
serious injury to the neck of the victim which is a vital part of the body of the victim.
4.1.3 Shyam Sahu
It is contended that the guilty intention of the accused is proved or inferred from the acts
of the accused.47 As per the above admission, on 24th April 2012, the car that was used to
abduct the victim was driven by Shyam A-3 who further drove the car to Dwarka where
the victim was ultimately strangled. Afterwards, the victims body was taken to A-1s
residence where it was put in a bag and stuffed in the boot of the car. A-3s intention is
affirmed by his act of sleeping in the car with the body in the boot.
It is humbly submitted that all the three accused persons had the intention to commit the
murder.
4.2 Actus reus is established
It is contended that Actus reus is any wrongful act.48 Thus, in a case of murder, actus reus
would be the physical conduct of the accused that causes death of the victim. In the instant
case, the actus reus is established by way of witness statements and circumstantial evidence
present on record. It is to be borne in mind that it is not for the prosecution to meet any and
every hypothesis suggested by the accused, howsoever extravagant and fanciful it might be.49
The circumstantial evidence in the instant matter shows that within all human probability, the
act must have been done by the accused persons.50 Since the acts were done in furtherance of
common intention, all the three accused persons are liable for the results of all the acts of
others.51
According to A-3s confession, all the three accused persons had picked up the victim from
Cannaught Place on the evening of 24th April 2012 .On the same evening she was strangled to
46
Md. Idrish v. State, 2004 Cr LJ 1724 (Raj); Md. Sharif And Anr. v. Rex, AIR 1950 All 380; Badri v. State of
U.P., AIR 1995 3 All 189; Dibia v. State of U.P., AIR 1953 All 373, State of Maharashtra v. Bhairu Sattu
Berad, AIR 1956 Bom 609
47
State of Maharashtra v Meyer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722
48
Aiyar, P Ramanatha, The Law Lexicon, p. 49
49
State of UP v Ashok A-2 Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 840
50
Bakshish Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 2016
51
Barenda A-2 Ghosh v. King Emperor, AIR 1935 PC 1
10 | P a g e
death by A-2. The same night (the early morning of 25 April 2012), the three accused drove
to the village of Kotpuli, Kausani forest area. They allegedly wanted to avoid police checks
on the highway and hence, to make it appear Trisha was sleeping, propped the body between
A-1 and A-2 on the rear seat rather than putting it in the boot. At 0400 hours on 25 April
2012, the accused dragged the body out of the car in an isolated spot in the forest, stuffed it in
the bag, poured petrol over the bag and set it ablaze.52 This confession has been verified by
two other circumstantial evidence materials on record. Firstly, on 24th April 2012, A-2 and
the victims phone location was found to be in the same location of the forest. This confirms
that A-2 and the victim were definitely present in that location on that night. Secondly, the
DNA of the skeletal remains of the victims body matched the DNA of A-1. This, without
any deliberation, verifies the statement of the third accused and completes the chain of events
as proposed by the prosecution.
Furthermore, one of the evidences produced before the Court on examination of Trishas best
friend, Ruhi (hereinafter referred to as PW7) stated that Trisha was continuously in touch
with Trisha through WhatsApp till the date A-1 was arrested. This, along with the fact that
Trisha never agreed to talk on the phone or have a video conference even on repeated
insistence, proves that A-1 was using the victims phone throughout to text her friends to
cover up for the murder since the messages stopped from the day of her arrest. Another
similar compliant was received from Shobhit Mukherjee when he was examined as PW6
where he stated that he never got a reply of his Facebook message sent to Trisha and he also
informed there was no activity on her account since 24th April 2012 which was very
uncharacteristic of Trisha who was fond of uploading pictures on Facebook. Also, there is no
explanation for the omission on A-1s part to file a missing report of her daughter since she
had been missing from 24th April 2012.
Thus, these evidences confirm that not only A-1 murdered the victim but also acted further to
cover up for her crime.
Hence, it is humbly submitted that all the three accused persons had committed the act of
Murder.
52
Moot problem, Page 2, Para 1
11 | P a g e
4.3 The fact of the Last Seen Together Theory shifts the burden on the accused
It is humbly contended that in cases where the accused was last seen with the deceased victim
just before the incident, it becomes the duty of the accused to explain the circumstances under
which the death of the victim occurred.53
The theory of the Last Seen Together theory is based on the principal of probability and
cause and connection. Where a fact has occurred with a series of acts accompanying it, it can
be safely presumed that the fact was possible as a direct cause of the accompanying acts. 54
As per A-3s confession the victim was picked up the accused persons at Cannaught Place on
24th April 2012. Furthermore, according to the evidence before the court victims phone
location was along with A-2s phone location. Therefore, the fact of the Last Seen Theory has
been squarely established in the present case.
Victims body was found on 23rd May 2015 from Kausani forest after the villagers had
complained a foul odour.55 The victim was last seen on 24th April 2012 and as mentioned
above her phone location on that night was in Kausani forest. Therefore, the time period,
between the time when the deceased was last seen by the accused and her death is too short to
raise the probability that anyone else except the accused could have committed the act. 56
4.3 Absence of motive is irrelevant
Assuming for the sake of argument that the accused persons had no motive, it is contended
that absence of motive is no ground for acquitting the accused.
Motive is immaterial so far as the offence is concerned, and need not be established57 as the
mere existence of motive is by itself, not an incriminating circumstance and cannot take the
place of a proof58. Therefore, absence of proof of motive, does not break the link in the chain
of circumstances connecting the accused with the crime, nor militates against the prosecution
case and is not fatal as a matter of law.59 When the circumstantial evidence on record is
sufficient to prove beyond any doubt to prove that it was the accused and no one else, who
53
Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 3 SCC 106

Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, 32nd Enlarged Edition, 2013, Page 1566-67
55
Moot Problem, Pg 1, Para 9
56
Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681
57
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, 33rd Ed. (2011)
58
State of Punjab v Sucha Singh, AIR 2003 SC 1471
59
Mulakh Raj v. Satish A-2, AIR 1992 SC 1175
54
12 | P a g e
intentionally caused the death of the accused then, motive of the crime need not be proved,60
as in the current case.
Moreover, when the presence of the accused with the deceased at the scene of occurrence is
found established, motive takes a back seat.61 In the present case, as evident from above, the
presence of A-1, A-2 and A-3 at the scene of occurrence (Kausani forest) was established by
the statement given by A-3 and the evidence produced before the Court.
Hence, it is humbly submitted that Motive is not a sine qua non for the success of prosecution
case since other evidences remain convincing and prove the offence beyond reasonable
doubt.
5. WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY OF CAUSING THE
OFFENCE OF ABDUCTING IN ORDER TO COMMIT MURDER UNDER
SECTION 364 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
It is humbly contended that to establish an offence under Section 364, I.P.C, it must be
proved that the person charged with the offence had the intention at the time of abduction that
the person abducted will be murdered or so disposed of as to put in danger of being
murdered.62
It is to be noted that the essential elements of Sec. 364 are as follows:
The accused kidnapped or abducted some person
The accused had the intention at the time of kidnapping or abducting that the person
kidnapped/abducted will be murdered or so disposed of being murdered63
The Prosecution contends both abduction [5.1] as well as the intention to commit
murder [5.2]
60
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Digvijay Singh, 1981 Cri. LJ 1278 (SC)

Ramkrushna v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 CrLJ 3431 (3433) : 2007 AIR SCW 3134
62
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, 33rd Ed. (2011)
63
Badshah v. State of U.P., (2008) 3 SCC 681: 2008 Cr LJ 1950: (2008) 3 All LJ 524
61
13 | P a g e
5.1 The accused persons committed the offense of Abduction under Section 362, I.P.C
It is contended that all the three accused had committed the offence under Section 364
I.P.C.
The ingredients of Abduction are:
Forcible compulsion or inducement by deceitful means;
The objects of such compulsion or inducement must be the going of a person from
any place.64
It is submitted that provision envisages two types of abduction i.e. (1) by force or by
compulsion; and/or (2) inducement by deceitful means.. The case at hand falls in the second
category. To "Induce" means "to lead into". Deceit according to its plain dictionary meaning
signifies anything intended to mislead another. It is a matter of intention and even if A1 did
not expressly use any misleading statements, the question was whether she was acting in a
bonafide manner or not.65 The accused persons guilty intention has already been established
in the previous issue and hence, it is submitted that the three accused deceitfully induced the
victim to move from Cannaught place to Dwarka.
5.2 The three accused persons had the intention to commit the Murder
This intention has already been proved in Issue No. 2, sub-issue 1[2.1].
6. WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY OF CAUSING

OFFENDER PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 201, INDIAN PENAL CODE
It is contended that all the three accused persons have committed the offence under Sec. 201
of the Indian Penal Code, 1861.
It can be seen that the basic necessities of this Section are
1. an offence has been committed,
64
65
Jyotish Das and Anr. Vs. State of Tripura, 2010 (1) ALT (Cri) 23
Malleshi Vs. State of Karnataka, 2004 (3) ACR 2688 (SC); Vinod vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2008 SC 1142
14 | P a g e
2. the accused must or has reason to believe that the offence has been committed,
3. the accused must either cause any evidence of the commission of that offence to
disappear, or give any information respecting the offence which he knows or believes
to be false, and
4. the accused must have acted with an intention to screen the offender from the legal
punishment.66
Firstly, it is important to determine whether this section can be charged against the person
who is screening the evidence to save oneself from legal punishment. This was answered by
the Supreme Court in the case of Kalawati v. State67 where it was held that the Section will
be held applicable not only against a person who causes disappearance of evidence with the
intention of screening an offender from legal punishment, but also against one who does so
intending to screen himself from legal punishment after having committed the offence
himself.68 The same principle was reiterated by Jammu and Kashmir High Court.69
On scrutinising the actions of A-1, A-2 and A-3, it can be observed that their actions fall well
within the ambit of the Section to satisfy their conviction.
Firstly and most importantly the offence of murder under Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 has been committed by the three accused in question. This in itself satisfies the first
ingredient of the crime of destruction of evidence. Secondly, all of them acted in furtherance
of the common intention as proved in the first issue and hence, the three accused had full
knowledge of the fact that the victim was dead.
Further, as per A-3s confession, after the commission of the murder, the three accused
persons propped the body between A-1 and A-2 to avoid police detection. This was the first
attempt to screen the offender from legal punishment. This strongly reflects her intention to
screen the offender which requires to be the primary object of the accused for conviction
under this Section.70Additionally, A-1 avoided the filing of the FIR of her missing daughter
by telling the Police Officers that the vicitm was outside India and informed the same to
Shobhit on his repeated confrontations about Trishas whereabouts. She also informed
66
Nitin Jairam Gadkari vs State Of Maharashtra, 2004 (4) Mh LJ 419

1953 SCR 546
68
ibid
69
Razak Khizar v. State, 1967 Cri LJ 484
70
Omanakuttan Alias Biju and Binu T vs. State of Kerala, 2000 CriLJ 4893
67
15 | P a g e
Shobhit about another passport that was made to send Trisha to U.S since Shobhit was in
the possession of the original one. All these false information was generated by A-1 to justify
the sudden disappearance of Trisha. This clearly satisfies the core element of this Section
which criminalises giving of false information with respect to the offence. Finally, all the
three accused in furtherance of common intention, caused the disappearance of the chief
evidence in this particular case i.e Trishas body, by it setting ablaze.
Hence, it is humbly submitted before the Court that all the three accused were guilty under
Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code.
7. WHETHER A-1 IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE OF CAUSING MISCARRIAGE
UNDER SECTION 313 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
It is contended that A-1 Mukherjee is guilty of causing miscarriage under Section 313, I.P.C
The essential ingredients of an offence under Section 313 are:
(i) That the accused caused miscarriage to a woman with child;
(ii) That he did so voluntarily;
(iii) That he cause miscarriage without the consent of that woman.71
To establish an offence under this Section, the miscarriage must be made without the consent
of the victim. Thus, if the consent is obtained by force, circumvention or undue influence, it
is to be treated as a delusion and not free act of the mind.72
In the present case, the victim had to abort the chid due to A-1s pressure. Apart from the
alleged force, A-1 was also in a dominating position to influence the decision of the victim.
Moreover, there was no apparent reason for Trisha to have gone in for medical termination of
pregnancy. Hence, in all circumstances, the miscarriage was not consented to by the victim.
Additionally, A-1 did not approve of Trishas relationship with Shobhit Mukherjee and
wanted to keep this as a secret as it is considered to be a social and religious taboo in India.73
Hence, considering this as the primary motive, it was in the interest of A-1 to have the
pregnancy terminated as that would lighten her burden on her to defend the controversial
71
Prabhu @ Kulandaivelu v. State Rep , CRLMP Nos. 10666/2015

JOWITTS Dictionary of English Law
73
Moot Problem, page 1, para 4
72
16 | P a g e
relationship between Trisha and Shobhit. This proves that the miscarriage was voluntarily
caused by A-1.
Therefore, it is humbly submitted that in the context of the facts of this case, A-1 Mukherjee
is guilty of committing an offence under Section 313 of the Indian Penal Code.
17 | P a g e
PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of the Issues Raised, Authorities Cited and Arguments Advanced, it is
most humbly and respectfully requested that the Honble High Court of State be pleased to:
1. Convict the Accused No. 1, Rekha Mukherjee, for offences punishable under Section
364, 302, 120B, 34, 201 and 313 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 .
2. Convict the Accused No. 2, Suhas Kumar , for offences punishable under Section
364, 302, 120B,34 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 .
3. Convict the Accused No. 3, Shyam Sahu, for offences punishable under Section 364,
302, 120B, 34 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
AND/OR
Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.
Date:_________, 2016
COUNSEL ON BEHALF
OF THE PROSECUTION
18 | P a g e

Symbiosis Law School - Prosecution Memo

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Symbiosis Law School - Prosecution Memo

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Team Code: RECEPTIVITY

AURO UNIVERSITY 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

S.C. NO. ____ OF 2016

FOR THE OFFENCES CHARGED UNDER:

STATE OF DELHI (NCT)

REKHA DAS, SUHAS KUMAR AND SHYAM SAHU

BEFORE SUBMISSION TO HONBLE SESSIONS JUDGE

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

AURO UNIVERSITY 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................... i

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

AURO UNIVERSITY 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE ACCUSED ACTED IN FURTHERANCE OF A

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

AURO UNIVERSITY 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

ISSUE 7: WHETHER A-1 IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE OF CAUSING

A.I.R. All India Report

ALLMR All Maharashtra Law Reporter

ALT Andhra Law Times

Cri. LJ Criminal Law Journal

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

AURO UNIVERSITY 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure,1973

DRJ Delhi Reported Judgments

ILR Indian Law Reporter

IPC Indian Penal Code, 1860

L.R. Law Reports

NCT National Capital Territory

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

AURO UNIVERSITY 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

PLR Punjab Law Reporter

S.C. Supreme Court

S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases

S.L.P. Special Leave Petition

u/s. Under Section

W.L. West Law

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

AURO UNIVERSITY 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

[A] INDIAN CASE LAWS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

AURO UNIVERSITY 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

28. MO Shamshuddin v. State of Kerala, (1995) 3 SCC 351

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

AURO UNIVERSITY 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

62. Vinod vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2008 SC 1142

[C] LAW DICTIONARIES / LEXICONS

[E] DATABASES AND WEBSITES

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

AURO UNIVERSITY 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

AURO UNIVERSITY 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

Read with section 209:

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

AURO UNIVERSITY 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

AURO UNIVERSITY 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

AURO UNIVERSITY 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

WHETHER THE CONFESSION OF ACCUSED NO. 3, ADDUCED AS EVIDENCE, IS

[I.1.] Evidentiary value of the confession on the basis of corroboration.

WHETHER THE ACCUSED ACTED IN FURTHERANCE OF A COMMON

[II.1.] A Common Intention was shared by all accused persons

WHETHER THE THREE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY OF CRIMINAL

WHETHER THE THREE ACCUSED PESONS ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE OF