The Role of Battlefield Tactics and Armaments in the Battle of Poitiers 732 AD

Out of the death of the Western Roman Empire came the reshaping of many non-Roman
peoples. The age of tribal warbands and nomadic pillagers warring across Ancient Europe
eventually gave way. They were replaced by the powerful, organized, and professional armies of
Middle Ages. Faced with deadly new weapons and new enemies, European soldiers of the
seventh and eighth centuries required even greater skill and courage. The superior training,
discipline,and tactics of the eighth-century Franks overcame superior Muslim arms in the Battle
of Poitiers.
The Dark Ages of Medieval Europe grew out of Roman Antiquity. It was a period marked
by decreased literacy and devotion to scholarly works. It is a historical tragedy that so few
reliable accounts of the period have survived to our day. The Battle of Poitiers (also known as the
Battle of Tours) is a prime example of the scarcity of historical accounts during the eighth
century. While the battle itself is mentioned in several Christian and Muslim histories, the details
of the actual battle are only found in two sources; the Chronicle of 754 and the Chronicle of
Fredegar. The 754 account is the most detailed of the two. Written about twenty years after the
battle, most likely in Muslim-occupied Spain, it is still one of the most cited sources on the
subject. The chronicle details the Muslim invasion of southern France and the battle itself in little
more than two paragraphs. The Fourth Chronicle of Fredegar is a continuation of the history
Liber Historiae Francorum, a history of the Franks up to 751. Its account is even shorter than
the 754 Chronicle.
Background to and the Battle of Poitiers
If any lessons are to be learned from Poitiers, it is important to have an overview of the
events that preceded the battle. The gradual collapse of the Roman Empire over the fourth and

fifth centuries gave new sapling nations a chance to grow. Germanic tribes spilled over the Rhine
River and migrated into Roman Gaul. These nomadic, tribal Germanic-Franks stopped north of
Iberia and Italy, and adopted a sedentary way of life. As the Franks embraced Catholicism and
solidified their kingdom, the Islamic Empire burst onto the world stage. Muslim armies brought
the Koran and the sword to the powerful Byzantine and Persian empires. In the short seventy
years after Islams conception, Muslim soldiers conquered all of North Africa and in 711 AD,
they invaded the Visigothic Kingdom of Iberia. With the fall of Christian Spain, the Muslim
conquerors stood at the doorstep of the Franks; the most powerful player in Christian Europe.
In 732 AD, the Arab commander of the Muslim forces in Spain, Abdul Rahman Al
Ghafiqi, marched his Muslim army north into the Pyrenees Mountains of northeast Spain.1
Rahman marched to quell an insurrection led by one of his Berber commanders in northern
Spain. After order was restored, Rahman continued north into the Frankish province of
Aquitaine. It is possible this was simply to loot and gain booty since his army was already up at
the Aquitaine border, or Rahman might have been looking to punish the Duke of Aquitaine, who
collaborated in the Muslim uprising. Whichever the reason, Rahmans army pillaged and looted
deep into central France.
This Muslim raid was halted by the Frankish Mayor of the Palace, Charles Martel. While
not the king, Martel was the most powerful person, politically and militarily, throughout the
Frankish provinces. When word of the invasion reach him, Martel rushed his army away from a
conflict with Saxony near the Rhine River, and blocked the road that lead from the city of
Poitiers to that of Tours.2 Martel deployed his infantry in a defensive position and waited for an
1 Edward Creasy, Decisive Battles of the World (New York: The Colonial Press, 1851), 87.
2 Creasy, Decisive Battles of the World, 88.

attack. Over the course of an entire day, Rahmans forces charged the Franks, again and again,
trying to break their line.
The Chronicle of 754 tells us that the Franks remained as immobile as a wall, holding
together like a glacier.3 The Muslims were unable to break through or go around Martels
position. Once Rahman himself was killed on the battlefield, the Muslims forces grew nervous
about the safety of their booty and baggage train, and retreated in the night. Martel secured what
loot was left in their camps the next day, but did not pursue his enemy further.
The historiography on the Battle of Poitiers is a wide scope of options that generally fall
into one of two camps. Most historians prior to the 1950s (Edward Gibbon, Edward Creasy,
Leopold von Ranke),4 but also some modern historians (Immaculatas William Watson, Prof.
Emeritus Antonio Santosuosso),5 see Poitiers as macrohistorical and pivotal in the history of
Western Civilization. More contemporary scholars (Manchester's Prof. Paul Fouracre, Harvard
Professor Philip Khuri Hitti, Sociologist Toma Mastnak) have been opposed to applying great
significance to Poitiers, calling it more of a halted Muslim-raid rather than a decisive battle.
In either case, with the limited primary accounts of the battle, historians like Bernard
Bachrach and Hugh Kennedy have relied on archeological evidence, concurrent battle accounts,
and even artistic depictions to fuel their historical imaginations as they envisioned the Battle of
Poitiers. All of the the factors that contributed to Martels victory and Rahmans defeat are far
too numerous to be discussed here, but even in the limited scope of armaments and tactics, we
can see how the battle was won.
3 The Chronicle of 754, 80.
4 Williams Watson. The Battle of Tours-Poitiers Revisited. Studies in Western Civilization v.2 (1993). Republished by De Re Militari
(September 2013) http://deremilitari.org/2013/09/the-battle-of-tours-Poitiers-revisited/ (accessed September 30, 2013).

David Nicolle. Poitiers AD 732 (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 2.

Muslim Armaments & Tactics at Poitiers

In his book, The Armies of the Caliphs, St. Andrews Dr. Hugh Kennedy lays out the
weapons and equipment most likely carried by Rahmans Muslim warriors at Poitiers. Muslims
soldiers of the eighth century protected themselves with a type of mail called zard.6 It was made
of overlapping metal plates sewn into a garment, protecting the wearer from arrows and glancing
blows. Kennedy reasons, Mail was certainly known in the Roman army from the third century
and by the time of the Muslim conquest it was probably the main form of body armor for both
Byzantine and Sasanian soldiers.7 As Muslim Armies developed, they adapted the strengths of
their enemies, including both Byzantine and Sassanid.
In contrast to many western medieval societies, where archery was often regarded as
socially inferior to fighting with sword or lance, archery was highly esteemed among the
Muslims.8 The high regard and esteem Muslims placed on archery bordered on religious
reverence. The Prophet Muhammad is recorded as saying, it is these sharp arrows and bows that
will enable you to liberate countries from the hands of Non-Muslims" and "there were no other
better weapons than these arrows.9 This high esteem for archery translated into something
Frankish armies never practiced; training dedicated solely to archery.
Because Frankish troops only received archery training as an addition to standard infantry
training, Frankish archers lacked the skills of their Muslim counterparts. Muslim archers could
fire arrows between 180-240 meters. These distances were possible only through superior bow
6 Hugh Kennedy. The Armies of the Caliph: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State (New York: Routledge, 2001), 168.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 172.
9 Ibn Qayyim, Kitab al-Furrisiyyah, 15-16.

design.10 Depending on the situation, foot archers used either light Arab bows made of wood or
heavy Persian bows made composite horn and wood. The compound design, the double-S shape,
and the composite materials were decades ahead of the simple European wooden bows.11
Eventually Muslim archers would gain historical renown as mounted archers, able to attack and
retreat quickly. However, this development cannot be confirmed until the Late Abbasid period of
the ninth century. Muslim archers at the Battle of Poitiers would have dismounted and fired on
foot.
Rahmans men most likely carried a straight, double bladed sword called a sayf.12 At
almost a meter long, it easily out reached the Frankish gladius. Used for slashing and thrusting
they were highly praised and essential for Muslim cavalrymen. The history and quality of the
blade was also very important and was recorded by their owners. Sri Lankan steel and Yemeni
forgers were highly renowned in sword production and were highly sought after.13 The quality of
Muslim swords was far superior to that of the Franks.
The expense of quality crafted swords often put them beyond the reach of many infantrymen.
Most infantry settled for an iron pointed, two-handed spear called a rumh.14 Kennedy points out,
Despite some illustrations of mounted figures holding spears, the spear almost always appears
as an infantry weapon in the literary sources; cavalry duels were typically fought with swords.15
10 Ibid., 176.
11 Ibid.
12 Kennedy, Armies of the Caliph, 173. Sayf is the Arabic word for sword.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 176.
15 Ibid.

This is important to note since almost all of Rahmans forces at Poitiers would have been
cavalry, wielding swords, and not spears.
The great Roman philosopher Cicero famously said, War is not so much a matter of weapons, as
of money. This has been a truism throughout the ages and it is especially true at the Battle of
Poitiers. In his book, Bachrach argues that because Rahmans men were wealthier than the
Franks, they had superior armaments.16 Islamic expansion over the previous hundred years had
absorbed much of the Roman, Byzantine and Sassanid empires, these being the richest lands
since Roman Antiquity. Along with material wealth, these lands came with existing cities and
infrastructures far superior to anything in the Latin west. As resourceful as Charles Martel was,
his Frankish kingdom could not match the arms production of the Islamic Empire.
Rahmans army would have been very wealthy, even by the standards of other Muslim forces.
The complete conquest of Iberia had taken place only twenty years beforehand. The Visigoths of
Spain surrendered plenty of loot and material wealth to Muslim forces over that period. In
addition, the sacking and looting of French cities leading up to Poitiers literally made Rahmans
baggage train heavy with riches. This loot, however, made movement slower. It is fair to say that
the wealth of the Muslim troops at Poitiers afforded them armaments of superior quality than that
of the Franks.

Muslim armies of the eighth century were highly efficient and experienced forces.
Rahmans forces at Poitiers were composed of professional, wealthy, Arab soldiers (muqatila)
and poorer, recruited, Berber soldiers (mawali) from North Africa.17 Both Arab and Berber
16 Bernard Bachrach. Early Carolingian Warfare (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 175.
17 Nicolle. Poitiers AD 732, 31.
6

traditions grew out of nomadic/pastoralist, tribal units. Inter-tribal raiding and mounted warfare
were standard practices for nomadic peoples, and were easily adapted into light cavalry for
Muslim armies.18 Muslim light cavalry was an essential part of the Islamic conquests of the
seventh and eighth centuries.
Muslim cavalrymen were lightly armored to facilitate quick and complex maneuvers. Dr.
al-Mubarak of the University of Glasgow wrote that Muslim armies used, lightning strikes
against opposite armies, using a well-organized cavalry capable of swift but effective attacks. In
an attempt to impress upon his soldiers and their leaders the importance of a well-disciplined
cavalry, the Prophet [Muhammad], declared: Steeds of war have good bound in their forelocks
until the day of resurrection; and discipline your horses for they can be made tractable.'19 The
Battle of Walaja in 633 AD20 and the Battle of Yarmouk in 636 AD21 are both examples of
Muslim light cavalry using great mobility to flank, harass, and route much larger enemy forces.
This harassment was exactly what Martel would have faced at Poitiers.
An often used tactic of Muslim light cavalry was the feigned retreat.22 With swords and
javelins, cavalry would charge the enemy line, hoping to break it up. After the initial charge, the
cavalry would disengage with the appearance of retreating. The emboldened enemy line would
then pursue the retreating cavalry, drawing themselves out of formation. At a signal, the light

18 Nicholle, Poitiers AD 732, 32. The tribal raiding of Arabs was historically camel based, while the tribal raiding of Berbers in North Africa
was primarily horse based. It is fair to assume that Rahmans forces utilized both camels and horses.

19 Malik Abdulazeez al-Mubarak, Warfare in Early Islam (PhD diss, University of Glasgow, 1997), 27.
20 Agha Ibrahim Akram, The Sword of Allah: Khalid bin al-Waleed - His Life and Campaigns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 87.
21 Agha Ibrahim Akram, The Muslim Conquest of Persia (Birmingham, UK: Maktabah Publications, 2009), 44.
22 Spurgeon Baldwin, Deception and Ambush: The Cid's Tactics at Castejn and Alcocer, MLN Vol. 99, No. 2, Hispanic Issue (March 1984):
383.

cavalry would quickly turn heel and charge once more upon a now broken, spread out, enemy
line. Because of the mobile nature of light cavalry, these charges and retreats could be repeated
over and over again. The courage of infantrymen to endure these attacks, and the discipline to
not chase after the retreats, suggests that Martels men must have had exceptional training and
good leadership.
Frankish Tactics & Armaments at Poitiers
While the Chronicle of 754 does mention the sword, it is by looking outside of the
Chronicle that we discover a very specific sword was wielded by Martels men. The gladius was
a single-bladed, pointed sword, not much longer than a mans forearm. Citing the a fifth-century
Roman, Bachrach explains, Rhabanus emphasizes that a jab with the sword has penetrating
power, whereas the slash, which often is difficult to aim and control, may strike a bone or the
enemys shield and thus will do comparatively little damage.23 In in their tight shield-wall
formation, the Franks would have been limited to thrusting weapon. Bachrach argues that the
gladius would have been the most effective tool for Martels men at Poitiers.
Another plausible sword of the Franks would have been the spatha. This was a sword
often discovered in the graves of wealthier Franks. It was longer than the gladius and bladed on
both sides, but had a rounded, blunt point. Bachrach explains that where the gladius was meant
to stab and pierce, the spatha was meant to slash.24 The double blade enabled the soldier to
cause damage both with a backhand and a forehand cut.25 This was a weapon more suited to
cavalry and not a tight, infantry phalanx with limited room to swing weapons. Therefore, I find it
23 Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, 89.
24 Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, 89.
25 Ibid., 90.

unlikely that the spatha saw much action at Poitiers.

Facing volleys of incoming arrows, it is unlikely that Martels men had many long-ranged
weapons to answer with from behind their shield wall. A Frankish military training manual,
detailed by Rhabanus, does not show any regimented training for either slingers or archers. Any
troops that did train in the bow or sling were normal infantry with exceptional skill.26
Marksmanship training was optional and received very little, if any, focus. In addition, the bows
of Medieval Europe were simple and wooden.27 Most experts in historical weaponry would agree
that the Persian bows of Rahmans forces would have had much greater range than any of
Martels archers.
It is very possible, however, that Martels men hurled javelins as the Muslims charged
their line. Speaking generally about armies of the early Middle Ages, Bachrach states, Not all
spear throwers were expert marksmen, and a hail of spears against a mass of enemy troops was
often used.28 This tactic didnt require much training and its use is recorded often in both
Roman and Frankish accounts. The spears thrown by Martels men were lighter and thinner than
the typical spear. Archaeological finds have uncovered larger, heavier spears that werent suited
for throwing.29 It is believed that these spears were used by cavalrymen for charging, and not by
infantry. Since no Frankish cavalry was deployed at Poitiers, I find it reasonable to assume that a
number of Rahmans charging cavalry met their end from thrown javelins instead of from heavy,
two-handed spears.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 99.
29 Ibid., 94.

The tangible savior of the Frankish infantrymen at Poitiers was the wooden shield. A
round, wooden shield with a diameter of about eighty centimeters, called a scutum rotundum,
was worn on the left arm of every soldier.30 Discussed below in greater detail, it is clear that
Martels men would have needed these shields to block incoming arrows or javelins. The weight
of holding these heavy wooden shields at their sides, or above their heads for extended periods of
time, must have been very taxing. To hold these shields for an entire day or for wave after wave
of Muslim assaults would have required considerable training. Rhabanus records that outside of
battle the Franks trained their soldiers with shields twice the weight of scutum rotundum to
strengthen the soldier and to give him greater endurance for actual battle.
The 1960s saw growing disagreements between historians over Frankish cavalry and the
adoption of the stirrup. Historians Lynn White Jr. claimed that the Battle of Poitiers introduced
the Franks to the stirrup, which in turn gave birth to Frankish Heavy knights31, but the argument
has since been repudiated. Reliable documentation of Muslim stirrups is not known prior the
ninth century32 and the stirrup remains unmentioned in France until well past Charlemagne's
rule.33 What is clear is that the Franks did used cavalry and trained those cavalrymen to be
versatile. Frankish cavalry was trained less as the shock-charge troops seen in the Late Middle
Ages, but more as general-purpose, quick-deployment troops. The historian Rhabanus, in
observing the Franks, states that they, gave considerable attention to the training of horsemen to
mount and dismount in battle.34 Such training allowed cavalrymen to move quickly about the
30 Ibid., 91.
31 See Lynn White, Jr., Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964).
32 Hugh Kennedy, The Armies of the Caliph, 168. Descriptions by Al-Jahiz and the Kamil of al-Mubarrad.
33 Paul Fouracre, The Age of Charles Martel (Essex, England: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), 63.
34 Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, 123.
10

battlefield and effectively engage the enemy as needed. Most scholars, such as Bernard Bachrach
and William Watson, theorize that a large portion of Martels men were these very same
dismounted cavalry.

Bernard Bachrachs extensive study of medieval warfare provides a great illustration of

probable tactics employed by the Carolingians, and specifically those at the Battle of Poitiers. To
do this, Bachrach relies heavily on the works of Rabanus Maurus and Vegetius Renatus. Rabanus
was a German monk, living 780-856 AD, and wrote extensively on Franco-Germanic military
matters.35 Vegetius was a Roman historian who wrote about military matters until around 383
AD. While Vegetius lived well before the time of Poitiers, Bachrach maintains that Carolingian
warfare was an extension of Late-Antiquity, Roman warfare.36
The most central battle tactic at Poitiers, mentioned specifically in primary accounts, is the
formation of the Frankish shield wall. This wall is more accurately described as an infantry
phalanx. The phalanx is a battle formation that dates back well beyond the Roman Empire. In
the most basic sense, the phalanx is simply a line of infantry with shields held to cover the bearer
and to partially cover the man to his left.37 In a Byzantine military history called the Strategikon,
the Emperor Maurice notes that the Franks normally draw up in a dense phalanx with an even
front.38 This is the most probable manner in which Charles Martel would have deployed his
35 Michel Aaij, Rabanus Maurus, the Preaceptor Germaniae, on the 1150th Anniversary of his Death, The Heroic Age. no 12 (May 2009):
25, http://www.heroicage.org/issues/12/cb.php (accessed November 20, 2013,).

36 Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, 12.

37 Ibid., 173.
38 Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, 170.
11

men.
In reality, the phalanx had numerous complexities that required great strength, skill, and
training. The power and force of an offensive phalanx is seen in a 612 AD battle between
Franks. The opposing phalanxes attacked head on and it is recorded that formations were so
tight, that there was no room for the dead to fall.39 The difference between a pressing mob and
phalanx was in training ones soldiers to act as a single unit. Martels soldiers would have trained
together in phalanx formations. Each man in a phalanx inevitably tended to crowd to the right,
unconsciously trying to gain more protection from his neighbors shield. This tendency had to be
compensated for with additional training. If terrain was just slightly uneven, phalanxes would
develop gaps as they marched forward. Again, even more training was required to compensate
for this eventuality.40
As was discussed earlier, Muslim forces of the seventh and eighth centuries had
exceptional bowmen; more so than any in the Latin West. It is very fair to assume that Rahmans
troops rained volleys of arrows down upon Martels exposed, motionless phalanx. Since Martels
troops neither retreated nor suffered extreme casualties, the Franks must have formed a tusudeo.
Deployable from a phalanx, the men behind the front ranks simply raise their shields above their
head, creating a dome or a bubble of protection. This formation again required great training
tactically, but also psychologically. Bachrach explains the fear those in a tusudeo would face just
from the sound of hundreds of arrows raining down on their shields. Additionally, the tusudeo
was in no ways an impenetrable protection from missile attacks. An eyewitness to the battle of
Qadisiyya in 637 reports that Muslim archers penetrated the armor of the Persian soldiers, whom
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 175.

12

they defeated. We have no reason to believe that the armor used by Charles soldiers was
superior to that used by the Persians.41
In addition to the psychological training of enduring attack, the Franks at Poitiers must
have been trained in not attacking. Evidence suggest that it is difficult for a unit to retain its
static position in the wake of a disorderly, or even an apparently disorderly, retreat by a
putatively defeated enemy force....For any corps of troops to sustain a major military action in an
ostensibly immobile phalanx on foot,...they needed long periods of exceptionally effective
training and drills.42 With each attacking wave and retreating tide of Muslim at Poitiers, the
Franks held their line. Throughout history it has often been the challenge of commanders to stifle
the blood lust or battle frenzy that would cause their men to break ranks and chase after
retreating enemies. I imagine that this training was particularly important given the rather
common Muslim tactic of the feigned retreat.
Conclusion
The tragedy, but reality, of history is that so much has been lost without much hope of
recovery. So to, does the Battle of Poitiers suffers from a lack of primary accounts. Instead,
military historians have turned to other contemporary sources and used historical imagination to
recreate a clear picture of 732 AD Poitiers. From that conceptualization, we find that Muslim
forces, despite superior weapons and equipment, could not break the Frankish infantry phalanx
with repeated cavalry charges. Because of the superior training and a superior battle strategy,
Charles Martels men wore down the Muslim invaders, forcing them to retreat. While many
factors played a part in the Battle of Poitiers, in the eyes of the bloodied and brave soldiers who
41 Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, 172.
42 Ibid., 171.

13

fought, battle tactics, training and effective use of armaments made all the difference in their
victory.

14

Bibliography
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15

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