Modern Middle East Final Paper: Black September

It is human nature to try and forget painful experiences. Even large and significant
historical events can be downplayed and ignored if they are regrettable or unfortunate. The
Jordanian Black September is one such period that much of the Arab world like to put behind
them. However, in the study of this chaotic and confusing time, one can see notable patterns and
behaviors in major players of the Arab world. Looking back at Black September and events
surrounding it, one can see a repeated cycle of Palestinian defiance which placed King Hussein
in a precarious position, and continued rebelliousness ultimately brought heavy reprisals.
In September 1970, Arab and Palestinian interests came to head in a violent and deadly
conflict. Black September is remembered as a tragedy by nearly the entire Arab world. In this
conflict, we see a young nation that would no longer appease the demands of non-natives, and a
victimized people that quickly grew in military might. The events that built up to Jordans Black
September and the responses of King Hussein were complex layers built on top of each other
until everything collapsed.
As with almost all Middle Eastern conflicts, one must understand the regions history to
understand its contemporary disputes. In line with the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the British
Mandate established the land west of the Jordan River as Palestine and the lands east as
Transjordan. This territory was given to Abdullah I bin al-Hussein for services in World War I
and his subsequent his non-interference in the unseating of his brother Faisal by the French at
Damascus (Cleavland150). Abdullah helped earn the region's independence, becoming King of
Transjordan in 1946. Only two years later Israel also declared independence.
After Jordan's defeat as part of an Arab coalition in the 1948 Palestine War, the
population of Jordan began to change. Palestinian refugees, through either force or fear, poured
across the Jordan River and massive camps were established inside Jordan. Somewhere around
400,000 Palestinians fled to Jordan (Hampton 12). In 1950 Jordan formally annexed the
Palestinian West Bank, which was not yet under Israeli control. This was a diplomatic move by
King Hussein who tried to include the new Palestinians in Jordanian life and government.
However, with his actions the Jordan's population became 2/3 Palestinian and only 1/3 native
Jordanian (Robins 84). Jordanians became a minority in their own country, ruling over a
Palestinian majority.
In March 1968, Israeli forces crossed into Jordanian territory and converged on the small
town of Karameh, and by doing so, laid the groundwork leading to Black September. The
objective of the Israeli operation was the PLO camp within Karameh, from which the PLO had
been launching cross-border attacks against Israel. The camp was destroyed and some 150
Palestinians were killed, but the IDF suffered higher than average casualties at 28 killed and 80
wounded (Ensalaco 13). Many Palestinians even saw the inordinately high IDF losses as a
victory. While military operations of this kind werent unusual, this operation did have more
significant results.
One of the PLO leaders that benefited from the attack on Karameh was a young Yasser
Arafat. Arafat, along with Fatah and the PLO, gained a significant boost in popularity from their
defiance to Israel. Both the PLO and the Jordan Arab Army were engaged at Karameh and both
claimed the battle as a victory, portraying it a stand against an Israeli invasion of Jordan (Pollock

717). Arafat was seen throughout the Arab world as a hero and champion against Israel. Arafat
was even on the cover of Time Magazine, elevating him to a world stage (Time Magazine). The
message that Arafat spread using his new exposure was empowering to Palestinians. "What we
have done is to make the world... realize that the Palestinian is no longer refugee number so and
so, but the member of a people who hold the reins of their own destiny and are in a position to
determine their own future" (Neff 87). Palestinians began to believe in Palestinian statehood
again. Within days of the battle, new recruits joined the PLO and other militant groups by the
thousands. Donations from all over the world swelled Fatahs treasury. The Palestinian arsenals
and weapons grew more sophisticated and deadly (Dobson 30).
It is at this point that one can mark the beginning of the cycle of Black September. After
Karameh a self-confident, emboldened attitude grew within the PLO. No longer seeing
themselves as refugees, but as empowered people looking to reclaim their homeland, the
Palestinians became bolder in both their attacks on Israel and in their position within Jordan
(Dobson 32). Palestinians began establishing their own authority within the refugee camps. They
flagrantly imported weapons from neighboring Arab nations. They established armed and
uniformed Palestinian guards, set up check points, and even went as far as collecting their own
taxes (Cobban 48). King Hussein was surely uneasy about the separatist and defiant attitudes
growing in the PLO.
King Hussein initial response to the growing defiance was rather trepid. He could not
allow the PLO to continue usurping Jordanian authority, but he did not wish to antagonize the
majority Palestinian population inside his boarders. The king wanted to avoid violence and
especially wanted to avoid the scorn of Egypts Gamal Abdel Nasser, the champion of the Arab
world and great supporter of the Palestinian people. In November 1968 King Hussein and
Palestinian representatives held a conference and produced the Seven Point Agreement (Dobson
31). The points all aimed at limiting Palestinian authority and reaffirming Jordanian authority
within the refugee camps.
The Seven Point Agreement however, was not honored. The PLO and other Palestinian
groups continued to grow in numbers and strength. As these groups operated with greater
impunity within Jordan, they also grew more daring in assaults on Israel. Extensive coordination
and resource pooling by PLO leaders inside Jordan made incursions into Israel possible. These
attacks were most often done without the permission of or notification to the Jordanian
government (Pollock 335). At times these Palestinian operations brought cross-border reprisals
from Israeli forces, often destroying homes of native Jordanians.
In the escalation of these PLO attacks on Israel, a deliberate effort can be seen on Arafats
part to stall the peace process and draw Jordan into greater conflict with Israel (Gowers 32).
Hussein clearly wished to prevent another costly war and to reign in the PLO, but he was forced
to tread lightly. In order to act, Hussein first needed the blessing of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser
was seen as a hero in the Middle East and as a strong supporter of the Palestinian cause. If
Hussein were to take action against the PLO, Nasser was likely to intervene with his superior
military. Luckily for Hussein, an agreement was reached in February of 1970 in secret meetings
in Cairo (Cobban 236). Nasser gave Hussein permission to exercise greater force on the
Palestinians, but not to start an all-out war with them.

In an effort to appear diplomatic, but more likely to force the PLOs hand, on February
10, 1970, the king published a 10 Point Agreement that forbade Palestinians groups from military
actions, from political service, and from assembling without permission. The 10 Point Agreement
was completely ignored by the Palestinians, who established a military command base the very
next day (Dobson 42). Fighting broke out in Jordans capital, Amman, the night of February 11
between Jordanians and Palestinians, resulting in some 300 deaths. Still fearful of the
consequences that all-out war would bring, King Hussein ordered his military to stand down. To
appease the Palestinians he fired an interior minister who had been very vocal in his opposition
to the Palestinian threat (Cobban 148). As a result, the immediate crisis was averted.
Hussein's approach to the Palestinian issue moved from trepid to heavy handed when in
July 1970 Egypt accepted the US cease-fire plan for the Egyptian-Israeli war of attrition. Jordan
quickly accepted the plan as well, following Egypts lead (Cobban 235). While up to this point
Palestinian organizations had been focused on Israel, they now officially turned their attention to
the Hashemite Kingdom. Overthrowing the king would give the majority Palestinian population
control of Jordan and undermine the U.S.-backed cease-fire plan with Israel. King Hussein had
gained the resentment of both the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and the
DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine), as well as the majority of the PLO.
Yasser Arafat did not stop his Fatah members from preparing for war, but he did not openly
condone overthrowing the King (Gowers 59). Arafat was skeptical about the PLOs assurance of
victory against a Jordanian Army five times the size of the PLOs forces. Arafat didnt wish to be
on the losing side of history.
Black September in 1970 began with the actions of the PFLP. On September 1 there was
an assassination attempt on King Hussein by Palestine extremists. Just 5 days later, the PFLP
carried out the hijacking of three commercial airliners and diverted them to Jordanian territory.
The passengers were taken hostage and the TWA, Swissair, and BOAC airliners were destroyed
as a symbolic defiance to the Western nations (Hampton 1). The hijackings created international
outrage from both outside and inside the Arab world. Leftist PLO groups, which Arafat refused
to muzzle, stood in open defiance to King Hussein, acting as if Jordanian territory was now
Palestinian. The continued defiance by the PLO forced King Hussein to act. With Nasser
dismayed about the precarious state of Egypt's cease-fire plan, and with the international
community outraged at the PLO's hijackings, the king decided the timing was right.
The PLO's continued defiance resulted in a full-force military response. A grave concern
of King Hussein was a prolonged military engagement. He feared that the longer the fighting
went on, the sooner international condemnation and pressure would force a diplomatic
resolution. With hopes of a quick victory, Jordanian tanks surrounded Amman, Sweileh, Irbid,
Zarqa, and Salt, and on September 17 a simultaneous attack was ordered (Dobson 34). However,
the quick victory desired, was soon transformed into a full-blown war. PLO groups had months
of preparation and were dug in by the time the Jordan Arab Army arrived. Even in the capital of
Amman, fighting was street-to-street, and house-to-house.
To further complicate the situation, on September 18th the Syrian Army invaded
Northern Jordan. Under the influence of Palestinian guerrillas in Syria, the Syrian government
invaded under the notion of preventing Palestinian genocide. Syrian tanks pushed Jordanian
forces as far as Ramtha, but on September 22 the Jordanian Air force battered the unprotected
Syrian convoys (Pollock 476). Whether Syrian forces were outmatched or Damascus truly felt

threatened and under defended from Israel, the Syrian troops were recalled back across the
border.
The Syrian withdrawal dampened the hopes of a Palestinian military victory and Yasser
Arafat agreed to negotiations. In Cairo on September 27th, Arafat, Hussein and other Arab
leaders met and forced Hussein to sign an unfavorable cease-fire agreement (Cobban 208). The
agreement required Jordan to support the Palestinian liberation against Israel, to release all war
prisoners, and to withdraw its troops from the cities. Hussein was strong-armed into these
conditions by Nasser and Syria and gained nothing in return.
Black September was a very violent and deadly month, but with its end the previous
cycle began again. The PLO was still firmly rooted in many cities and towns across Jordan, was
still very popular in the Muslim world, and had the cease-fire as time to regroup and strengthen
itself for the next fight. As before, King Hussein's options were limited and his power hamstrung
by the terms of the Cairo agreement. But unfortunately for the PLO, two outside events seriously
shrank their chances of victory. Right after the cease-fire agreement, on September 28th Gamal
Abdel Nasser died of a massive heart attack. Two months later in Syrias strongman, Salah Jadid,
was toppled in a coup by Hafez al-Assad (Hampton 64). By November of 1970, the PLO had lost
the support and protection of both Egypt and Syria (Cobban 278).
Yasser Arafat, ever trying to preserve his power, realized the danger the PLO was in
without Egyptian support. He even agreed to a new Five Point Agreement with King Hussein,
but Arafat could not control the PFLP and DFLP which, once again, escalated their defiance to
Jordanian authority. Not only did these groups ignore the new agreement, but some even
declared Jordan to now be part of Palestine (Dobson 41). Beginning in November, clashes started
up once more between PLO and Jordanian soldiers. In response the Jordanian government once
more demanded that the Palestinians cease carrying weapons openly. The demand was ignored
and Jordanian forces were ordered to confiscate all PLO weapons (Cobban 197).
Free from the threat of Egyptian or Syrian interference, King Hussein once again turned
from trepidation to aggression. By January 1971 the Jordan Arab Army instituted martial law in
most major cities, but Palestinian extremists continued a guerrilla resistance. The Jordanians
eventually attacked the PLO bases linking Palestinian cities together, effectively cutting off
communication and resupply between PLO groups (Pollock 341). In June 1971, in a major shift
of strategy, King Hussein ordered a large portion of the army out of the Palestinian cities and into
the mountains of near Jerash in north-central Jordan (Dobson 37). Palestinians of various militant
organizations had sought to regroup in the safety of the mountains, unwilling to surrender or give
in. Jordans four-day campaign into the mountains left thousands of Palestinians dead and the last
of the PLO threat extinguished. The PLO leadership, including Yasser Arafat, quickly left the
country. Jordans fight for survival was won.
Black September had significant effects in both the short and long terms. At least, but
possibly much more than, 3,000 Palestinians died in the fighting, as well as numerous Palestinian
civilians who died in the indiscriminate shelling of Palestinian cities (Gowers 15). The PLO
stood up to the full might of the Jordanian military and came away crippled. The liberation
movement quickly migrated to southern Lebanon, where its leaders could regroup (Cleaveland
344). As in Jordan, the PLO agenda helped destabilize the national government there by
influencing the Lebanese Nationalist movement, which brought about Lebanon's extremely

bloody civil war (Cobban 64). After 1970, the PLO incorporated the famous militant group
Black September, known for numerous assassinations in Jordan as well as the infamous 1972
Munich Olympic assassinations (Hampton 41).
The reputation of Jordan and King Hussein suffered greatly because of Black September.
Arab nations saw Hussein as the obvious aggressor against their Arab brothers, the suffering and
oppressed Palestinians. While it was the aggressiveness of King Hussein's approach that
preserved his kingdom, that aggressiveness was seen as excessive and ruthless (Cobban 207).
The Hashemite Kingdom was seen as just another minority group ruling tyrannically over a
majority population. But even worse than that, it now seemed that Jordan had stepped into the
anti-Palestinian camp occupied by the great enemies: Israel and America.
While King Hussein's reputation outside Jordan diminished, his support among native
Jordanians soared. He was beloved and honored as a hero who prevented national disaster. Black
September provided a much needed unification of the Jordanian people. Jordan had only been a
defined region for fifty years, and a legal, independent nation for less than twenty-five years. The
state lacked a defined national identity. By overcoming an outside threat, native Jordanians
could establish a unique Jordanian character distinct from that of Palestinians. Whether defining
a national identity was worth the thousands of lives lost in Black September, is hard to say.
Black September is remembered as tragic period where Arab brothers went to war.
However, by studying this conflict we see some of the character of key players in the modern
Arab world. We see the PLOs flagrant defiance and disrespect for Jordanian national authority
in the September hijackings to Jordanian soil, the uncontrollable attacks of the PFLP and DFLP,
and asserting their own authority over Palestinian populations. We see in King Hussein an
initially captious response, his actions checked by the pro-Palestinian supporters of Egypt and
Syria. However, because of events like the Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire, the death of Nasser, and
the Syrian coup, Hussein gains the freedom to bring the full force of his superior military down
upon the PLO. Black September is an indisputable part of what has defined the Modern Middle
East we know today, but as its name connotes, it was a tragedy none the less.
Bibliography
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Hampton, Wilborn. War in the Middle East: A Reporter's Story. Massachusetts: Candlewick
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Neff, Donald. "Battle of Karameh Establishes Claim of Palestinian Statehood". Washington
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