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probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to
the existence of probable cause. But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence is not mandatory. The courts first option under the above is for it to immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. That is
the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against
the respondents.
In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple
murder, they should be insulated from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
the
warrantless
arrest
valid?
Ruling: Yes. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit, an offense. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court refers to
arrest
in flagrante
delicto.
Furthermore, the Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest
or the procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived. We have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of
his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his
arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured
when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court. We have also held in a
number of cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; such
arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
Herein, Alunday (D) went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he
actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of irregularity of his arrest only
during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged defect
by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea during his
arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by not raising the objection before
his arraignment.
The RTC found Roselle guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, and sentenced
her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. The RTC also sentenced her to
undergo rehabilitation for not less than six months at a government drug rehabilitation
center subject to the provisions of R.A. 9165 for her violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A.
9165.
FACTS:
An appeal was made by Roselle to the CA but the latter affimed the decision of the RTC.
PO1 Esguerra testified that they received information that Roselle was selling illegal drugs
at her house in Makati City. Esguerra then conducted a test buy and received from her one
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet that presumably contained shabu. When he returned
to his office, Esguerra marked the sachet with "@ Tisay" then sent it to the laboratory for
testing. Before receiving the results of the test buy, an asset told the police that Roselle was
going to leave her house, prompting Esguerras team to conduct a buy-bust operation.
ISSUES:
After returning to the station, he turned over Roselle and the seized sachet to the
investigator. When the contents of the first and second sachets (with "@ Tisay" and "RPS"
2) Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding that the prosecution evidence
established her guilt of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: Roselle claims that the police did not make a valid arrest in her case since
they arrested her without proper warrant and did not apprise her of the rights of a person
taken into custody as the Constitution and R.A. 7438 provide. 7 But Roselle raised this issue
only during appeal, not before she was arraigned. For this reason, she should be deemed to
have waived any question as to the legality of her arrest.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was right in averring that the evidence was inadmissible, it being
the fruit of the poisonous tree.
HELD:
The court held that the petitioners failure to raise the issue on the validity of his arrest
before arraignment and his active participation in the proceedings in the lower court
estopped him from assailing the same on appeal. He was deemed to have waived his right.
The admissibility of the articles as evidence relied on whether the search made was lawful.
Although the prosecution established through Esguerra the acts constituting the
crime9 charged in the drug-pushing case (Section 5), it failed to provide proper identity of
the allegedly prohibited substance that the police seized from Roselle.
What is more, the prosecution failed to account for the whereabouts of the seized specimen
after the crime laboratory conducted its tests. This omission is fatal since the chain of
custody should be established from the time the seized drugs were confiscated and
eventually marked until the same is presented during trial.
Taking into account the above reasons, the SC finds it difficult to sustain the conviction of
Roselle for violation of Section 5. The presumption of her innocence of the charge must
prevail.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions
permitting a warrantless arrest: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The following occasions also permits a warrantless search: 1. Warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The Court held that sufficient evidence supported the warrantless arrest of petitioner
effected under Section 5 (a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto.
The police officers witnessed petitioner flicking a transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance in plain view. Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu,
the arresting officers immediately approached petitioner, introduced themselves as police
officers and effected the arrest. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline
substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
The arrest having been lawful, the item seized was likewise lawful. Not to mention, the
items veracity was well established.
The Court affirmed the lower courts decision and found accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
?
Two civilian informants informed the PNP Narcom that one Jun was engaged in
illegal drug activities and the Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrenst Jun in a buybust operation.
?
On the day of entrapment, PO3 Manlangit handed Jun the marked bills and Jun
instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him while he got the marijuana from his associate.
?
When they met up, Jun gave PO3 something wrapped in plastic upon which PO3
arrested Jun. They frisked Jun but did not find the marked bills on him. Jun revealed that
he left the money at the house of his associate named neneth
Held:
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify
a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some
overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine. Appellant herein
was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit
an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle.
Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police
officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the
information given by the informant , appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have
been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. Neither was the
arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite
warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the
"tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellants physical
description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19),
there was an assurance that he would be there the following day(May 20). Clearly, the police had ample
opportunity to apply for a warrant.
?
They wen to Neneths house. PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dinin
table and noticed something wrapped in plastic inside the box.
?
Suspicious, PO3 entered the house and took hold of the box and found that it ha 10
bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
?
Simultaneously, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from Neneth. The
policemen arrested Neneth and took both her and Jun, together with the coz, its contents
and the marked bill and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters,
Jun was then learned to be Florencio Doria while Neneth is Violata Gaddao.
?
They were both convicted feloniously selling, administering and giving away to
another 11 plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops, in violation of R.A 6425, as
amended by RA 7659
?
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense that can be raised by an accused &
partakes the nature of a confession & avoidance.
?
American federal courts and state courts usually use the subjective or origin of
intent test laid down in Sorrells v. U.S. to determine whether entrapment actually occurred.
The focus of the inquiry is on the accuseds predisposition to commit the offense is charged,
his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents.
?
Another test is the objective test where the test of entrapment is whether the conduct
of the law enforcement agenst was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other
than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense.
?
The objective test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported
transaction must be clearly & adequately shown. Courts should look at all factors to
determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are
relevant to determine the validty of the defense of inducement.
?
In the case at bar, Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust
operation to give ground for her arrest uner Sec. 5a of Rule 113. She was not committing
any crime. Contrary to the finding of the TC, there was no occasion at all for Gaddao to flee
from the policement to justify her arrest in hot pursuit
?
Neither could her arrest ne justified under second instance of personal knowledge
in Rule 113 as this must be based upon probable cause which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds for suspicion. Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged
indentification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangt, however, declared in his direct
examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his query as to
where the marked money was. Doria did not point to Gaddao as his associate in the drug
business, but as the person with whom he lfet the marked bills. This identification does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs, If
there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own
right, knowledge of the acts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal
offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
?
Furthermore, the fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in
Gaddaos house does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.
?
The prosecution thus had failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with Doria in the
sale of the said drug. Thus, Gaddao is acquitted
take photo and video coverage of the supposed pay-off. He identified Macias together with
appellant and the latter as the one who took the ransom.
Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already gone. Appellant then
apprised him that his sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along
South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place and found his sons and helper
seated at the corner of the gas station. P/Supt. Cruz and his group was assigned at Fort
Bonifacio then heard on their radio that the suspects vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was
heading in their direction. A few minutes later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it
reached Dasmarias Village in Makati. When said car slowed down, they blocked it and
immediately approached the vehicle.
They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect, who turned out to
be appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38caliber revolver and a scuffle took place. They
managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was requested to open the
compartment and a gray bag was found inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun
inside the bag.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid arrest and search without warrant?
DOCTRINE: The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule
113 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: x x x; (b) When
an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) x x x.
A search incident to a lawful arrest is also valid under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court which states:
A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant.
RATIONALE: The instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited
above necessitates two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected:
(1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Records show
that both requirements are present in the instant case. The police officers present in
Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which effectively
consummates the crime of kidnapping. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other
police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. Section 5, Rule 113 does not require the arresting
officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. It is
sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours
long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper.
This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause. Likewise, the search
conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented to such. Even
assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to search the car, they can
still validly do so by virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126.
In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to
conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latter's reach. Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for
the police to search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested.