‘or Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 The Western Sahara Conflict: Morocco’s Millstone ‘An Intelligence Assessment Secres Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 Warning Notice Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved : (WNINTEL) National Security Unauthorized Disclosure Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions \ | ' | Diseminaion Gon ——-NOFORNGNF)______ Not Reena a Forcgn Nationals | Abbreviations NOCONTRACT (Ni ie : PROPIN (FP) ~Caution—Propeictary information Involved NFIBONLY (NO) ‘NFIB Departments On ORCON (06) Discnntion and Extraction of lafomation _ onto by Originator Ra “This lfomaton Has Bsn Authorized fo Rie. : ar —~Forign Goverment infomation i This pubcion avaiable Derivative csistion by 490999 comer Review 30 years fam Gate ‘Togsta microfiche copy of his Derived from multiple publication call 177 (OCR DSB): for future issuances in dation oor in ea of ard copies, all $203 (PPG7RD). All maeral on this paws i fsunclasied Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-225X18 25X14 NOFORN-NOCONTRACT- Assessment ‘oRcon Center (aaperdietersr Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A0008001390R1-2 rs ‘reign The Western Sahara Conflict: Morocco’s Millstone (s) An Intelligence Assessment Research for this report was completed (on 23 March 1979. This assessment was prepared at the request of and coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia Te hr Iie Pia Analysis, Commuting fees are the Office of Strategie Research andthe Office of Economie Research. Comments and queries are weleome and should be directed to| Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP8OT00942A000800}8H0H1 4°Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 EAs conveyer ba Bu ce at Teen Westen “atuanesnatmene “Samara 4 Bike jen ee _-” MAURITANIA _NOUAKCHOTT Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A00080013 8H Ic2.nocowrracr. ‘The Western Sahara Conflict: Morocco’s Millstone (s) Key Judgments Morocco has lost the initiative in its effort to maintain its hold on the former Spanish Sahara in the face of unrelenting harassment by the guerrillas of the POLISARIO Front. The tide of war is running in favor of the POLISARIO, and we do not believe that Morocco will bbe able to reverse this trend as long as the flow of military supplies from Algeria continues and the Algerian safehaven for PoLisarro guerrillas is main- tained. The Moroccan problems have been com- pounded by Mauritania’s withdrawal from the fight- ing, allowing the guerrillas to concentrate their offensive against the Moroccan-administered sector of the Western Sahara. (s) POLISARIO’S 3,000 to 5,000 combatants are exploiting the tactical advantages of the sparsely populated desert terrain, and while they probably cannot drive the Moroccan Army out of the Western Sahara, they can probably make the price of staying there unacceptable 10 Morocco. (8) King Hassan won popular support by his 1976 annexation of Moroceo's portion of the Western Sahara, but since then the cost in men and resources hhas become a political liability. A political settlement is badly needed, but he would lose considerable prestige—and possibly his throne—if he were to back down on his claims. (S) ‘Algeria's new leadership has not slackened from the late President Boumediene’s commitment to the cause ‘of Western Saharan nationalism. Algeria continues to refuse to recognize the Moroccan-Mauritanian annex- ations and provides the PoLIsARto guerrillas sanctuary and material support . There appears to be little immediate prospect of a negotiated settlement to this conflict without the prodding of outside mediation. (s) NOTE—This study addresses the principe! developments leader. shi changes in Algeria and Mauritania and Mauritani’s with Srawal from the war that have occurred in the to year since Publication of the Interagency Intligence Memeorandum, The Conflict im the Western Sahara ‘ORCON Several developments in the dispute seem plausible over the next few years: + Growing domestic opposition to the war in Morocco may within a year or so seriously weaken Hassan’s negotiating position. In the absence of negotiations, political, economic, and military constraints will prob- ably keep the confit from escalating into a conven- tional war. (8) + The vouisario will continue to move at will through the countryside, scoring occasional military successes, and inflicting heavy casualties on Morocean forces. ‘Some guerrilla attacks—notably those in southern Morocco proper—will have considerable propaganda value. For their part, Mauritanian forces will continue to honor their cease-fire with the guerrillas and may pull out of their sector altogether, + Buoyed by the guerrillas’ battlefield successes, Algeria and the POLISARIO may become less and less disposed to compromise. A political settlement would most likely have to take the form of Moroccan ‘acknowledgment of Saharan self-determination and Lerritorial concessions to the new Saharan state + If'a Saharan ministate were created in the Mauritanian sector, such an arrangement would be tunstable, POLISARIO leaders would view their ministate asa liberated zone from which they would continue their insurgency in the Moroccan Sahara. They would turn to Algeria for military support when threatened by Morocco, + Most countries have not acknowledged the partition vf the Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania, and the PoLtsaRto’s government-in-exile will slowly gain broader recognition, Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/10 TORORN-NOCONTRACTE ORCON + i factions representing diverse political leanings. (s Nt seo) lhe dominant ideological orientation within the viotssanto leadership reportedly is Arab nationalism, Secretary General Mohamed Abdelaziz and most siluential POLISARIO leaders stress non-Marxist Arab ism and unity. the fight for independence, and vasionalism as Ue main features of the POLISARIO ‘uggle. POLISARIO leaders advocate a hardline mili Approved For Release 2001/08/1 Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 Confidential © tary approach 6s the oly effective means of achieving independence. (s NF Si OC) Other PoLIsARIO nota! les are identified with one or ‘more of the following : teological lines: pro-Algerian/ snon-Marxist, pro-Algerian/ Marxist, and pro-Libyan, ‘There appear to be fe» confirmed Marxists among POLISARIO'S top leader. Some POLISARIO leaders were born in Mauritania an’ have close ties with a militant faction in the Meurita ian leadership aligned with Algeria, (SNF NC OC) The PoLIsaRio Front ! 1s been concentrating on strengthening its shak: political credentials while conducting guerilla ererations against Morocco and, antil last July, Maurit.sia. In February 1976 the POLISARIO Frort announced the creation of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic, in effect. a :* The SDAR consists ofa skeleton cabinet of little-known figures and a legislative coun- cil. The Front, noweve is the dominant authority. A See figure | government-in- 1A-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130004!2 ‘Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR) President Mohamed Abdelaziz ‘Council of Ministers (Gctober 78) Prime Ministor Mohamed al-Amin Ould Ahmed (amine Amin) Minister of Defense "brahim Ghai Ould Moustapha ‘Minister of interior Mahjoub Larouss! (Manfoud All Beiba) Minister of Foreign Attairs brahim Hakim (Hakim Ad) Minister of Information ‘Mohamed Salem Ould Saleck Minister Without Portiotio Mohamed Ould Sidat Secrotary General of Ministry of Commarce ‘Secretary General of Socretary Gonoral of Ministry of Eaueation ‘A Ould Mahmoud ‘Secretary General of Ministry or He ‘Salock Ould Bouboh ‘Moulay Ahmed Ould Baba Ministry of Communications and Eneray Hamoudl ahmed Ould Baba I ‘Saharan National Council President 41 members, Sidi Ahmed Ould Mohamed Including a21-member Pottburo Vice Presisont Bashir Mustapha Siyec al-Ouak Countries Thet Recognize the SDAR Date Algeria 36-76 Angola 11-76 Benin 39-76 ‘Burund 2:20.76 ‘Congo _6278 Equatorial 113-78 Guinea Ethiopia 224-79 Guinea-Bissau Madagascar Mozambiqu North Korea Panama wanda ‘Sao Tome & Principe Seychelos 0-7 South Yoron 244-78 Tanzenia 11-078 nine-member Executive Committee is the formal executive body, but we suspect the shadowy Revolu tionary Command Council —perhaps an amalgam of the party's political and military wings —is the real power center.’ There may be other influential bodies ‘representing specific interest groups, for example, the commanders of fighting units based at Tindouf. (s) Ninetecn governments recognize the Saharan Demo- cratic Arab Republic. Eight, including Vietnam and Ethiopia, have granted recognition in the past 13 ‘months, suggesting that the Front’s diplomatic effort is gaining momentum. Morocco’s decision in March to refuse to discuss further the Sahara issue in inter: national forums inevitably will strengthen the POLISARIO'S position, Rabat’s decision in March 1976 to break relations with Algiers served as a deterrent to reeognition of the Saharan goverament-in-cxile by See figure 2 states that value relations with Morocco, Among the ‘Arab states, only South Yemen has followed Algeria’s lead in recognizing the SDAR. (s) The POLISARIO leadership is closely allied politically to Algeria, with which it shares the common objective of weakening Morocco. That tie, however, should not dobscure the fact that Saharan nationalists have their ‘own interests and objectives and are not mere ap- pendages of Algiers. (8) An independent Saharan state would form close ties with Algeria and Libya, the latter probably the POLISARIO'S second most important backer, and would be heavily dependent on them for financial assistance. ‘A now Saharan regime would probably emulate these states in establishing an Arab socialist political and Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : ClA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2POLISARIO Front (October 78) | commitee or exeral Aare sot A | Armed Bane Miske val aka amd All ‘Secretary General Mohamed Abdelaziz Deputy Secretary General ir Mustapha Sived al-Oval = Executive Committee {nine members Mohamed Abdelaziz Secretary General, POUSARO ‘Bashir Mustapha Siyed Doputy Secretary General, POLISARIO Monamed al-Amin Ould Ahmed Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 ii Revolutionary Command Councit ohamed Andelacz ‘vohamed ab-Amin Ould Ahmed ‘rahim Ghall Oulé Moustepha "anjoub Laroussi | rain Ayoub st-Habib ‘Sidi Ahmed al nomic system, It would seek close political ties with srogressive” Third World states and adopt a mnaligned posture. POLISARIO leaders would probably ciain interest in @ relationship with the United States: ney appear to appreciate the US policy of denying sas to Morogco for use in the Sahara. (S) he leaders of an independent Western Sahara — iwugh presumably socialists—are probably not Mos: sw oriented, They might, however, be susceptible to {forts by the Soviet Union and Cuba to wield situence locally. The USSR, Cuba, and other Com- ‘ounist states currently give limited political and vonmilitary support to the PoLisaKtO cause, This could orovide an opening wedge for Communist penetration to a newly created Saharan state. The Soviets and ‘Cubans, however, might proceed cautiously for fear of using strains in their relationship with Algeria and Morocco. (8 NF NC OC) | Prime Ministr, SOAR ula Moustepna { Dotense Minister, SDAR. Manjoub Larouss! Intorior Minister, SOAR Mohamed al-Amin Bounali ata ‘Omar Hadrant (Mohamed al-Ova Mauritania Drops Out Coup and Disengagement ‘The military coup in Mauritania on 10 July 1978, ended 18 years of rule ay Moktar Ould Daddah and brought to powst a go" ernment committed to ending Mauritania’s irvolver: ont in the dispute over Western Sahara, (8) The decision to cast its ot with Morocco in partitioning the territory of the foriner Spanish colony proved fatal to the Ould Daddah g: vernment. Algerian President Boumediene warned Laddah in November 1975 that siding with Merocco »-ould be his undoing. As the conflict unfolded! in 176, the PoLisaRro Front shifted the focus of its attack- (o Mauritania, the weaker ofits 4 Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : ClA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-225X16 Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 two antagonists. The relentless pressure of the guerril- las on the poorly trained and equipped Mauritanian forces ultimately broke the Mauritanians’ will to fight. 6s) ‘The new military government, led by President Mohamed Saleck, has, in effect, already withdrawn from the war, and it appears determined to extricate Mauritania from the dispute altogether. Mauritania has worked to preserve a cease-fire that the guerrillas declared unilaterally last July shortly after the coup. Nouakchott’s leaders have made a permanent peace in the Western Sahara their overriding objective, but many key factors are beyond their control. (8) Moving cautiously in deference to Rabat, the Mauritanians have made extensive contacts with Algeria, the PoLisaRto Front, and a number of potential mediators, including France, Libya, and Mali. Since the beginning of the year, the Mauritanian leadership, faced with growing porisario impatience, has inched closer to a unilateral withdrawal from the ‘Sahara. Public and private Mauritanian statements have indicated that Nouakchott now: *+ Accepts the principle of Saharan self-determination ‘+ Would agree to a referendum under OAU or UN, ‘+ Admits tacit potisaRto control of the Mauritanian tor of Western Sahara. (5) The guerrillas, buoyed by recent battlefield successes, are demanding more, They argue that agreement to a settlement covering the Mauritanian portion would undermine their claim to an independent state com- prising all of the Western Sahara. They reportedly have ‘hater T° renew attacks against Mauritai fouakchott refuses to accede to an ultimatum that calls for: *+ A public statement by Mauritania that it has relinquished control ofits sector of the Western Sahara {0 the POLISARIO Front + Withdrawal of Mauritanian forces from the Western Sahara, + Mauritanian diplomatic recognition of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic. By carly March, Mauritania’s talks with Algeria and the guerrillas appeared to have reached an impasse. (sNexc oc) Troubled Relations With Morocco Mauritania’s courting of Algeria and the POLISARIO Front has created strains in is relations with Rabat Such is the intention of the Algerians and the guerrillas, who exploit each opportunity to drive a wedge between Rabat and Nouakchott, (s) The obvious inability of Mauritania to continue its role in the costly conflict has encouraged Morocco 10 reassess its position and look for a political rather than military solution. Both Morocco and Mauritania now agree on the need for a negotiated settlement, but they diverge on tactics and Morocco is much tougher on terms. King Hassan recognizes that a harsh Moroccan reaction against Mauritanian peace feelers might backfire and drive Nouakchott to renounce its claims to its portion of the Western Sahara, leaving Rabat even more isolated internationally, For the near term, Mauritania will probably continue to press the Moroceans to take a more flexible approach toward negotiations in return for a pledge from Nouakchott not to conclude a separate peace with the guerrillas. (8) The principal constraint on Mauritanian freedom to seck a unilateral settlement is the presence in Mauritania of a 6,000- to 8,000-man Morocean military force sent there in 1975-76 at the request of the Ould Daddah government. After the coup the new government requested their withdrawal. King Hassan grudgingly acceded, apparently in the belief that the political costs internationally of using Moroccan forces in Mauritania to block a separate peace would be prohibitive, 25X6 Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 Economic Imperatives mn Nowakchott's perspective, renewal of hostilities ‘sold be economically disastrous. Mauritania’s deci- sw to withdraw from the Saharan conilict was based sely on its worsening economic situation. The war sted severe strains on the budget in the past two ves even though Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other countries provided $400 million in financial soort, During this period an estimated 60 percent of « fudget was spent on delens sswling was reduced by at least 20 percent. (5) ‘cut deeply into Mauritania’s foreign exchange Last year repeated guerrilla attacks against sal iron ore ratl fine [rom the Zouerat mines to the F Nouadhibou sharply reduced iron ore exports. + seybined with falling. iron ore priees, this cut into «gn exchange earnings. Iron ore export exrmings lor / were $127 million below the average for the jou four yeurs. (U) ough a settlement in the Western Sahara would prove Mauritania’s long-term economie prospects. rl factors preclude a quick recovery. The price of nore which constitutes 86 percent of Mauritania's ports—is depressed on world markets and is not pected to recover soon. Mauritania therefore will cca (o diversify its exports and encourage more ‘vate participation. --both foreign and domesti clopment schemes, Saudi Arabia and other affluent ‘rab states will remain necessary important sources of| vvestment capital and Finaneial assistance. (9) ‘iow from Algiers New Regime’s Position Toward Conflict here is no slackening of support for the PoLISARIO J cont in the new Algerian Government under Chadli icndjedid, who was elected President on 7 February. It 's become clear that Algerian support for the muusanto Front before President Houari Bou- yucdiene’s death was government poficy as well & ppcrsonal commitment by Boumediene. (s) ‘new leadership has emphasized continuity with joumediene’s Sabacan policy. implying support for ‘asimum POLISARIO objectives. The inflexibility of Iueria regarding a face-saving compromise with, Moraceo on their dispu: power polities, P-esider Boumediene’s urchaile: the support of the: Arm, sorted out, Bend edid 2 probably hold fast to Bs deny powertul rizals an Algeria has no terciton although it has sieadfa interested party with pe protect. In keepi gt wit! ‘anticolonial imaste, Ale referendum on sell-dete Sahara. (9) The realities of Algerie Western Sahara is but problems of Algeria's r Maghreb stabili'y. Alg von of the northatn Sa deposits, because this ¢ eminence 1m northwest tence between sovialist monarchy of Mcroeco, gompetition. Mcreover Morocco, which has la memories of the 1963 & Views Toward a Peacess Algeria's role will be er negotiated settlement « ‘Only Algeria fas the le is to eome to the conte provide the POLISARIO | lunee—-sametuary. arms the guerrillas’ Fighting impaired. (3) The chances are very s support of the guerrills accept a settlement thi determination. There » Jor Algiers to abandon weakening its regional Algiers is likely to be ir only if Rabat is willing for the Saharans. Alge in part derives rom internal Bendjedid does not eniny sed authority and depeds on Until power relationstips are J his military backers will mediene’s Suitaran poliey to exploitable openings. (3) clarms on the Sahara, ly maintained that it isan tucal and security interests to ts carefully cultivated 1 has publicly supported a ‘mination for the people of position are more complex: ‘ac aspect of the larger ations with Moroceo and rs opposes Morocean absorp- tra, with its etch phosphate uld reduce Algerian pre ‘rica. The ideological diverg- tgeria and the traditional 1s intensilied their geopolitical he specter of an irredentist claim to part of Algeria, and reder war have not faded. (5) 1 Settlement cial if there is to be a the Western Sahara conflict erage to persuade the guernil> nee table. The Algerians ront with vital military assist- ‘and training without which upability would be seriously ‘that Algiers will decrease its in an eflort to force them to falls short of Saharan sel vuld seem to be litte incentive policy that is succeeding in vval at relatively little cost, (8) cerested in an accommodation o discuss self-etermination aan leaders reportedly will not Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : C1A-RDP80T00942A000800130001:2 urge the guerrillas to agree toa cease-fire and negotiations until they have secured a strong military position. ($ NF NC 0c) The Algerians have little interest in extricating Hassan from a war that is becoming an increasingly serious political lability for him. They would probably prefer keeping the Moroccan Army bogged down in a long ‘and costly insurgency in the hope that Morocean military coup plotters, war-weary and disgruntled with ‘Morocco’s mounting economic prablems, will topple Hassan. Algerian leaders would see the end of the Alaouite dynasty as forestalling indefinitely Moroccan aspirations for hegemony in North Africa and clearing the way for Algerian preeminence in the region. (5) Small Cost of the War Algiers can sustain its commitment to the PoLIsaRto at 1 relatively small cost. It presently provides financing, arms aid, logistical support, and a haven for both POLISARIO fighters and some 20,000 to 40,000 refugees near Tindouf. Financing the insurgency has not been a significant drain on Algerian resources and has not interfered with economic development, Algeria’s num- bber-one priority. (8) ‘The proportion of Algeria's budget spent on national defense fell from 14 percent in 1976 to 10 percent in 1978, the latter amounting to $469 million. [ts not clear that these figures include support for the potisanto Front. Such financial outlays, in any event, are probably small because the guerrillas have been supplied only with small arms, ammunition, and light equipment. (s) Moroceo’s Limited Options Political Repercussions ‘The stability of King Hassan’s regime is closely tied to the outcome of his Saharan venture. Hassan com mitted his personal prestige to this policy. His success in forcing Spain in [975 to relinquish its Saharan province to Morocco and Mauritania greatly boosted his popular image initially, but enthusiasm has waned in the face of military stalemate and rising costs. (S) Moracco's leadership, despite setbacks in the war, ‘continues to view annexation of Moroceo’s portion of | the Sahara as vital in domestic political as well as national strategic terms. Hassan links the successful absorption of the Sahara to his ability to compete with his primary geopolitical rival, Algeria. Having com- mitted his personal prestige, moreover, Hassan would lose considerable domestic support—and possibly his ‘throne—if he were to back away from Morocco's claims. (s) ‘The King’s objective of absorbing the northern sector of the Western Sahara as an integral part of Morocco is popular, but his failure to achieve results is not, The unending conflict over mineral-rich Western Sahara is Hassan’s principal preoccupation. Complaints from Moroccan citizens about the costs of the war and from students about the sacrifices involved in holding on to the Sahara have increased markedly. The King’s moderate response to a highly embarrassing POLISARIO raid in late January on the southern Morocean town of Tantan—even though intended to keep the door open for negotiations—evoked widespread criticism of the government and the King and probably contributed to ‘popular image that the King is weak and indecisive, (s) The principal constraint on Hassan in preserving his hold on power is the loyalty of the armed forces. That loyalty cannot be taken for granted; the leaders of the ‘wo coup attempts in 1971 and 1972 came from the senior officer corps. Military officers, like their civilian ‘counterparts, support Morocco’s annexation of West~ cern Sahara, but they are increasingly frustrated with the unending guerrilla war there. The inevitable strains on troops engaged in a no-win situation in the desolate Sahara have compounded other morale prob- lems—poor discipline, lackluster leadership, and a poor logistics system. (8) Hassan’s options in reaching a resolution of the thre« year-long. conflict that will leave his power intact are ‘extremely limited, The Moroccan Army has demon: strated its inability to bring the insurgency under control and is steadily losing ground to the guerrillas. Hassan recognizes that a political settlement offers the only hope of extricating himself from this predicament. Iis difficult, however, to visualize fruitful negotia~ tions, given the inflexible positions of his opponents and the lack of incentive to push them to compromise. Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 cn soldiers and equipment captured ving raid an Fanian, Moroeco {4assan’s abulity 10 obtain a political settlement de- ‘onus on a shared perception by all parties that a rnuitary solution is impossible and Morocco’s willing vess o make previously unpalatable territorial conces- cons. Algeria and the guerrillas may increasingly seve that @ military solution in their favor is indeed sossible. The eool response of Algeria's new leadership ss the Moroccan Forcign Minister's peace ipen letter on | February does not augur well for an Lr negotiated settlement. (s) ‘he dectining fortunes of the Moroccan Army are verging with increasingly pressing domestic prob: is; together they encourage domestic opposition and ‘caken the King’s position. In the absence of a oliival solution, the King’s political skills will be Severely tested in the year ahead. (S) AL some point Hassan may conclude that the risk o ontinuing the present policy outweighs that of chang: Approved For Release 2001/08/1 1on of or coercion Irom the ing it. With the -ooper Army, hte may eventua’ try some bold initiative, including major conces ons, to break out of his increasingly constrietis- predicament. (s) Economic Conscraints The Saharan venture i opinion much longer fr of unemployment, inl which are causing soci conflict has contr bute Moroccan econemie gr Tive years of expansion the economic slowdow unlikely to divert popular m chronic economic problems on, and depressed wa unrest. The Western Sahara toa marked downturn in wth since late 1977 foliowing Dther Factors contributing to are depressed prices for phosphates roeco leading export —and Furo: pean Community impo « restrictions on other Moroc ‘can exports sucks as te» Les. (8) 1A-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A00080013008%-2 Morocco's overall economic situation in 1979 appears considerably less favorable than it was two years ago. Forcign exchange holdings have declined steeply since mid-1977. Rabat has been forced to resort to large- scale foreign borrowing to finance a reduced version of an ambitious development progeam begun in 1975 Moroceo’s foreign indebtedness rose by about 50 percent to $4 billion during 1977 and by September 1978 was nearly $5 billion. (s) Sizable expenditures on military operations in the Western Sahara have aggravated budgetary problems, Although a foreign-financed defense budget—$800 million from Saudi Arabia alone— paid for many of the outlays through 1977, there have been large indirect costs that have Fallen on the Moroccans. An estimated 40 percent of Morocco’s 1978 budget of $4.3 billion went for military expenditures, and the outlay is likely to be as high this year. (s) Moroceo’s financial problems reached crisis propor- tions after Saudi aid flows were cut in carly 1978 Since then, the burden of the Saharan war and the military modernization program has weighed heavily ‘on Morocco. This setback, if not overcome, will force King Hassan to reconsider how much longer Morocco Finance the war. (s) Involvement of Outside Powers Soviet Role Soviet sympathy for the Algerian position on the Sahara issue is clear. The Soviets have supported Algeria's calls in the United Nations for self-determi- nation for the Sahara, and they have collaborated with Libya in support of Algeria and the PoLisasto. Moscow has sanctioned, for example, the transfer of weapons from Libyan stocks to Algeria for usc in the Sahara and the border region. This method allows Moscow to remain one step removed from direct involvement. (s) Indirect support of the PorisaRio offers several advantages to the Soviets. They have been able to avoid being pulled into deeper involvement in the criss, particularly when direct clashes have occurred tween Algerian /PoLisaRio forces and Moroccan forces in the Sahara. The Soviets have also been able 10 9 avoid unnecessarily alienating the Moroceans, with whom they have negotiated a major deal involving phosphates. In addition, neither the Arab nor African nations were backing the Algerian position, and the Soviets did not want to be openly identified with a less- than-popular cause. (s) The Soviets have longstanding and expanding military assistance programs, a substantial economic aid pro- gram, and significant trade ties with Algeria. The integration of Soviet military equipment into the Algerian armed forces and its reliance on Soviet technical expertise have led to an expanded Soviet presence there. An estimated 1,000 Soviet military personnel and 2,500 civilians are currently in Algeria, () Even so, Algiers has been an inconsistent friend. It has publicly attacked Soviet aspirations in the Middle East and has rejected a special Soviet role among the rnonaligned. The late President Boumediene petiod- ically called for the removal of the Soviet as well as the US Navies from the Mediterrancan. The Soviets were disappointed with the selection of Colonel Bendiedid as Algeria's new President, favoring party coordinator Yahiaoui, who they thought might push for closer military ties with the USSR, ($ NF Nc oc) The Soviets have apparently decided that they have little to gain by more forthright support for Algiers, although they remain a reliable source of military supplies. Although sympathetic to Algeria’s interest in denying the Western Sahara to Morocco, Moscow has been publicly neutral on the issue in recent years and hhas withheld recognition of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic. The Soviets do not want to risk their rowing economic stake in Morocco, and they will probably keep Algeria uncertain about Soviet backing in the event of hostilities. (5) The rotisaRio guerrillas currently count for little in Moscow's calculations. The Soviets are undoubtedly aware of the movement's potential value, but they recognize that Algeria wants to remain POLISARtO’S principal foreign backer. Moscow probably would not want to jeopardize its ties with Algeria by seeking to influence Algeria's HOLISARIO clients, Moscow has not Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2Secret provided the POLISARIO any direct military support, ‘out it has made no attempt to block Algeria's transfer 11 Soviet weaponry to the guerrillas. (8) Pontical differences between Morocco and the USSR over Soviet and Cuban activity in Africa have not curbed the growth of commercial dealings that could suiake Rabat the Soviet Union’s most important ‘ading partner in Affica. The short-term prospects for Soviet political gains in Morocco are not good, but the ‘Saviets may see in their commercial relations the basis Jor influence over the longer term. (S) ‘of enduring importance to both countries is the $2 bitlion economic aid agreement signed in March 1978, for the development of the Meskala phosphate de- nits. This 30-year arrangement—which could rise to ‘39 billion with trade and credit transactions—is the largest single accord Moscow has ever negotiated with 1 Third World country. It underscores the importance » the Soviet agricultural program of developing a stable source for this critical fertilizer component. A ishing agreement was signed the following month ster Moscow assured Algeria that the ageeement did .t contain an implicit recognition of Moroccan claims Western Sahara territorial waters. Moscow has also supplied to Meroceo minor amounts of military -suipment. (3) che current level of fighting in the Sahara continues, he Soviets are likely to try to pursue their balancing tt. In order to reaffirm their credentials with the new cxime in Algiers, they may expedite deliveries of arms Algeria, but they would probably couple this with vtensified efforts to assuage Rabat. (s) “hould large-scale fighting break out, the Soviets would offer political backing to Algeria and probably ake at least a limited effort to resupply Algerian «senals. This might consist of some resupply flights rnd an increased flow of seaborne arms deliveries. Nevertheless, Moscow is not likely to underwrite an out Algerian military effort against Morocco. (S) ‘he attitude of the United States toward a Morocean- \lyerian conflict would have an important bearing on jet policy. The Soviets do not currently view the Sahara issue as a superpower contest. But i the United Soeret Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 States moved eramati ally to increase military shi ‘ments to Rabai, the S wiets would be under much greater pressure to re: ond with substantial resupply of Algeria. (8) French Interests President Giseard, lik his predecessors, sees North Africa as France’s na’ ural sphere of influence and believes France has a .pecial responsibility to ensure stability and preserve French and to a lesser extent ‘Western interes's the'e. A durable solution would extricate France from 3 conflict that threatens ‘extemely important it not vital French interests. Many thousands of French ! ve and work im the former North African colonizs in pe sitions ranging from senior advisers and corapan; directors to mechanics and shop clerks, (9) Paris is primarily con-erned that the moderate govern: ment of King Hassan which faces manifold domestic and foreign policy pr: Slems including the Western Sahara, will be replaced by a “progressive” regime as difficult wo deci with «5 Algeria. Although officially neutral in the Wester t Sahara dispute, France is pro- Moroccan because o! its economic interests in and military relationship sith Morocco and the congruence of French and Moro san security interests elsewhere in Africa. (8) The French do aot wnt a widening of the fighting in the Sahara nova gres‘er French military role, but they hhave been frustrated ay the impotence of the Mauritanian Acmy- which they have been helping 10 train-—to control the "OLISARIO or protect French, interests in Mauritar a. (8) With the changes of sovernment in Algeria and Mauritania, France tas tried to adopt a more balanced position. It has been cting as broker, but with little success. Paris wants» continue to improve its relation- ship with Algeria, wi*h which it has more important trade ties than it has with Morocco. (8) [France has demonstr ted in the past, however, that itis willing to risk Alger: sn hostility as well as domestic tand international er’ scism by taking military action ‘against the POLISAR! | when it believes its interests are threatened. [n the w: ster of 1977-78 and again in May Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001:2 1978 France carried out effective air strikes in retaliation against the POLISARIO in Mauritania for the taking of French hostages from the mining complex Zouerat. (S) France wanted to display its determination to protect, French citizens und demonstrate to pro-French gov= cernments in Africa that Paris would use force when necessary to safeguard its interests. The raids were well received by the French public, which grected with ‘enthusiasm the subsequent release of the French hostages. The government recognizes, however, that military intervention usually pays few dividends do- mestically, especially should there be French casual- ties. Thus, France has been careful to emphasize the selective and defensive character of its strikes in Mauritania. (s) Should military hostilities break out between Algeria and Morocco, France would support Morocco militarily—discreetly, if possible, The French have continually stressed the need for a political solution and initially would probably offer to mediate. IF unsuccessful, they probably would expedite delivery of previously ordered equipment to the Moroccans and might send some advisers, They might also provide pilots for restricted use in Morocco and the Western ‘Sahara, Paris continues to promote the idea of an African mutual security organization, and the French might try to aid Morocco under the guise of an ad hoe Alrican defense force. (s) Spain's Residual Ties Madrid’s policy toward the Western Sahara is also based on a need to maintain a rough balance in its, relations with Morocco and Algeria. Spain continues to pay lipservice to the Madrid Tripartite Agreements of November 1975, in which Madrid surrendered administrative power over the Spanish Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. This position is calculated to please Moroceo, Madrid has sought to hedge its bets and placate Algiers by insisting that sovereignty over the region resides with the people of the Sahara, whose aspirations toward independence must be determined ina UN-sponsored referendum. (s) ‘Strong Spanish security interests in North Africa are closely tied to the struggle between Moroceo and Algeria, The Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on n the Mediterranean coast of Morocco are coveted by Moroccans, and Madrid worries that friction with Rabat could provoke a “green march™ against the cenclaves. Spain is even more determined, however, 10 keep its Canary Islands—where Algiers has demon- strated an ability to stir up trouble among a small separatist group in order to apply pressure on Madrid to renounce the Sahara settlement. Spanish fishermen, moreover, are vulnerable to Morocean-, Algerian-, and POLISARIO-sponsored attacks as they ply the fishing grounds off the Saharan coast. (3) ‘The transition to democracy in Spain has also brought pressure on the government from the socialists —the principal opposition party—who threw their support to the Algerian-backed poLisario Front in 1977. Partly in order to protect his government from charges of favoring the Moroccan monarchy, Prime Minister ‘Suarez has encouraged informal public contacts be: tween leaders of his party and the PoLISARIO; he also ‘seemed to be moving toward a rapprochement with Algeria last fall when Boumediene’s declining health interrupted negotiations. (s) Torn by conflicting pressures, Madrid is likely to stay aloof from direct involvement in any negotiations, The Spanish Government believes that Spain pulled out of the Sahara just in time to avoid a colonial war, and itis determined not to be drawn back into the fray. In the event of hostilities between Morocco and Algeria Spain would keep its distance, while possibly offering. wo mediate. (s) Should a settlement create an independent Saharan state, Madrid would probably offer what limited financial and technical aid it could to bolster the new regime. The Spanish Government would hope that such support would be favorably received internation- slly. Spain’s support to an independent Western Sahara would also assuage guilt feelings over the precipitate withdrawal of Spanish forces in early 1976 ind perhaps facilitate Spanish access to the phosphate eposits in the Sahara. (s) * See Chronology entries for 16 October and 6 November 1975, Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2ial Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 25X6 Prospects, Sw Settlement in Sight there seems to be little immediate prospect of a peaceful solution to the Saharan dispute, and the war is ely to drag on through its fourth year. Desultory seitiement efforts between Morocco and Algeria had The outlines of a polit al settlement are hard to “hailed at the time of Algerian President Boumediene’s visualize, given the present positions of the parties, and th last December. Neither Morocco nor Algeria the likelihood is nigh « vat the insurgency will continue is yet shown a willingness to back away fram its basic to threaten reg:onal st bility for some time. (8) wsition. Although changes of governments in Algeria 1d Mauritania might have been expected to break the Restraints Against a Mforoccan-Algerian War stalemate, the dispute now seems even less tractable Costly and embarrass. ag attacks on Morocean terti= ian when the war began more than three years ago. tory from Algevian-ba ed POLISARIO guerrillas no 3 doubt will continue, ard King Hassan may be pres: sured i ge" essive military policy toward hie continuing negotiating deadlock is attributable to Algeria. There is wide support in Morocco for direct several factors, POLISARIO military capabilities in the strikes against POLIsa «10 sanctuaries near Tindouf in Western Sahara are growing relative to those of the Algeria, even at the rk of war with Algeria. Ocea- acreasingly frustrated, dispirited, and ineffectual _sional reports indicate that some members of the Moroccan Army, The guerrillas’ battlefield successes Morocean military sh. re this sentiment, even though re reinforcing the Algerians in their rigid Saharan Algeria's superiority military equipment is unques- wolicy. The Algerians show no sign of considering the tioned. (s) ‘drawal of their support to the guerrillas, the one seessure tactic that might compel the guerrillas to Hassan’s military alte natives for mounting a punitive scitie for something less then independence in all of the operation against Alga appear as bleak as his irmer Spanish Sahara, The POLISARIO Front seems options to reaci a poli weal settlement of the conflict sre concerned with consolidating its military gains with the Pottsakio. W bile the King may permit sainst an inereasingly isolated Morocco than with commando raids agair st POLISARIO outposts near the Algerian border to as- age public opinion, he is ‘unlikely to mount oper sions that would draw Algerian Gormulating a negotiating position. (S) 1 his part, King Hassan is presently unwilling to regular forces into the lighting. Given Algerian snsider compromises—self-determination and terri- military strength in the Tindouf area, the chances of a trial concessions-—that might encourage Algiers to successful Morozean . onventional attack are slight, ress the guerrillas to adopt a more flexible posture. and the costs are like’ to be high. (S» Hassan is likely to continue to temporize, perhaps oping that outside powers—France or the United Hassan no doubi rece .nizes that a humiliating defeat Siiates, for example will encourage Algeria to change or an inconclusive sta: off with Algeria eould cost him ts policies. He may also believe that he needs Arab his throne, Moreover. xe is aware that an overt military rnediation to provide a suitable framework to thrust into Algeria weld scuttle efforts toward a 25X6 Luonalize territorial concessions in the interests of negotiated setttement ind undercut the diplomatic Arab unity support for his Weste-a Sahara position that Morocco hay worked hard to ac sieve in international forums and particularly in the Arb world. (3) A Morocean decision carry the war to the Algerian sanctuaries would be fluenced by a number of considerations, These include the military balance between Morosco ane! Algeria, which is greatly to Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-225X6 Seeret Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 Table 1 Comparison of Military Forces Moroeco Personne Army 85,000 Naw 4,200 Air Fore (pilots/jet qualified) 7,000 (160/50) ‘Selected Armaments “Tanks-medim us Light 70 APCS 20 Reconnaissance vehicles 450 Artillery & mortars (over {00-mm) 530 ‘ATOM launchers us Air defense artillery 245 SAMS 2.Chapparat launchers Jet fighters a Light bombers ° Transports 20 Missile patrol boats ° Autack helicopters 0 Foreign Miltary Advisers France 200 USSR 0 eerie PousaRio Mauritania 80,000 3000-5000 4.000 ° 7,500 (275/168) ° sas ° ° o 65 0 ° 220 0 m7 500 ° 16 Unknown ° o 520, ° ° 18 SA-2 iaunchers Unknown (32 miele) No.of 20SA-6 launchers SAS (200 mises) 20 ° ° 2 ° ° 8 o 2 0 o 0 23 ° ° 0 ° 100 500-600 o ~o This able Scere, Morocco’s disadvantage in the air, the number and capabilities of units available,’ troop morale and physical condition—most Moroccan troops have been engaged in operations for well over a year—logistics, and Mauritania’s withdrawal from the fighting. (S NF) ‘See table 1 fora comparison of Algerian and Moroccan military forces There are two other options open to the Moroccans. both highly provacative—which involve the use of regular forces in conjunction with the irregulars. The first is to exercise the right of “hot pursuit” that Hassan proclaimed in September 1977 and has reiter- ited on several occasions. To our knowledge, the Moroceans have never chased a PoLIsARto force into Algeria, The PoLIsaRio forces obviously have not been cowed by this threat, and itis unlikely to deter them in the Future. (8) Iis almost inconceivable that Hassan would authorize a full-scale military offensive against the POLISARIO havens in Algeria knowing that this would lead to Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-225X16 25X16 25X6 25X6 Secret cashes with Algerian regulars. This course has been urged upon Hassan almost from the outset of the war hoy some of his military leaders. Their reasoning has hoeen that without the havens in Algeria, the POLISARIO| would not be able to conduct operations in the Sahara, he way to end the POLISARIO insurgeney, in their 1ew, is to destroy its means of sanctuary and support oo) |: s unlikely that the Moroccans would be successful in Jesteoying the guerrilla bases because of the superior Firepower and mobility of the Algerian forces at Tindouf. Algeria’s advantage in numbers of combat treraft should ensure its air supremacy and provide ipportunities for effective close air support Groping for a Solution T’he limited chances for a peaceful solution hinge on ‘he mediation efforts of outside powers, especially \rab, The mediation efforts of Saudi Arabi 1776, hold some promise of prog niaion eMoris By Mternaionat organizations ‘OAL have had little success, and the UN General Assembly has not taken a stand, In December 1978 the IN again adopted contradictory resolutions on the Western Sahara. (8) tie best chance, but only a slim one, might be vecsuading Morocco and the POLISARIO to accept an ‘creement providing for an independent ministate seated primarily in the Mauritanian portion of the Swestern Sahara, Algeria's role in persuading the sucrrillas to accept such a solution would be crucial. In iow of the guerrillas’ diplomatic and military momen- tu it is doubtful Algiers and the vouisakio would veitle for a formula that would give the Saharans. onal autonomy in an entity tid either to Morocco vr Mauritania, We believe that any solution would ‘ave to contain the following additional elements. ‘rritorial concessions by Rabat in which a portion | the Morocean sector north of the partition line ld be ceded to the ministate, Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 + Recognition by Alge’ i of Moroccan sovereignty lover a truncated portic of the Western Sahars + Economic inducemer 1s for the protagonists, includ~ ing financial aid ‘rom. utside parties-for example, Saudi Arabia — provid: 1g for resettlement of Saharan refugees at Tindouf ar ! joint exploitation of the Sahara’s mineral weal. + A guarantee to Alge ia of an access route to the Atlantic + Ratification by Mor: veo of the 1972 border agree- ment with Algeria. (S Moroceo's acceplance -fany such formula would incur grave domestic politic: ! risks for King Hassan, and we judge that chances for his agreement are poor. [tis conceivable that he €0"Id sell the Moroccans, particu- larly the military, a eo npromise that would tunder Moroccan contr ol the large reserves of high grade phosphate depo: ts around Bu Craa. Lven if a Saharan ministate we: = created in sprie of manifest obstacles, such an arr. agement would be unstable. POLISARTO leaders wot ld ‘+ Resist confinement 4 truncated state in the southern Western Sab ir + Ignore any axteeme sn the settlement negotiations to respect the t2eritor: | integrity of the Moroccan ‘Sahara and Mauritan 1 + View their ministats as a liberated zone, which they would use as a stagine area for continuing their insurgency in the Mor ean Sahara. + Turn to Algeria for oilitary support when threat ‘ened by Morocco. + Seok to build an alli_ nce with the letist faction in the Mauritanian leadersh p in covert efforts to ereate an Islamic socialist state -omprising Mauritania and the Western Sahara and_ligned with Algeria. (S) W Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2Secret, Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 Any foreseeable settlement package would be intrinsi- cally unstable and unlikely to bring a durable peace to northwest Africa because the guerrillas may now believe they can force the Moroceans to cut their losses and pull out of the Western Sahara altogether. The POLISARIO movement has demonstrated its ability to divert significant Morocean manpower and economic resources. A protracted and increasingly effective guerrilla war seems inevitable in the absence of a Moroccan capitulation or major intervention by outside powers. (5) Relations between Moroceo and Algeria will remain strained, and the risk wil persist that cross-border ‘operations could lead to an unintended escalation of | tensions. Prevailing political, economic, and military factors, however, will dissuade both parties from embarking on the course of a full-scale conventional war in the near term. ($ NF NC Is Secret 1A-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/1Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A00080013600%(2 Chronology 1963 Large deposits of phosphate rock discovered in Spanish ahara, 1970-73 Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania hold a series of summits professing agreement on the decolonization of Spanish Sahara. 1973, May Potisanio Front is formally established 1974 April-May Coup in Portugal and Franco’s failing health prompt King Hassan to increase pressure on Madrid to honor Morocean irredemtism, July King Hassan announces that he will not permit the establishment of a puppet state in the Sahara. October Morocco and Mauritania propose that the UN Gen: cral Assembly seck an advisory opinion on Spanish, Sahara from the International Court of Justice. December UN General Assembly adopts resolution requesting advisory opinion on Western Sahara from the Interna- tional Court of Justice " 1975, 16 October ICJ opinion fails to support Morocean and Mauri- :anian claims of sovereignty 16 October King Hassan announces plans for a mass march by 350,000 unarmed Moroccans into Western Sahara. 6 November “Green march” of Moroccans begins and lasts for three days without serious incident, 14 Nosember Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania sign the Madrid Agreements providing for a phased turnover of the territory to Rabat and Nouakchott, December UN General Assembly adopts two contradictory resolutions, one taking note of the Madrid Agreements, First contingent of Moroccan troops assigned to Mauritania, a 250-man force, arrives at Bir Mogrein 1976 26 February Spain withdraws from tripartite administration of Western Sahara, and Morocco and Mauritania ar- range a rump session of the territorial assembly to approve the territory's integration into Morocco and Mauritania, 27 February PorisaRto Front proclaims Saharan Democratic Arab Republic. Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : ClA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2March storoeco and Mauritania break relations with Algeria Iter the latter recognizes the POLISAKIO government exile. # April ‘emai partition of Western Sahara by Moroceo and Mauritania Mid-Aprit ‘ost guerrilla attack against the rail Hine in evatitania. Fest guerrilla attack on Novakehott, Janaary Fest substantial contingent of Moroccan troops st ioned in Mauritania arrives at Bir Mogrein, bringing oop strength to | 300. st Moroccans Mauritanian joint sweep operations ‘ovinst guerrillas in Mauritania. i May Jk on Mauritanian town of Zouerat results in six rench hostages: 13 May Morocco and Mauritania sign & mutual defense ‘cement, providing the framework for military ‘operation against the guerrillas. futy Second attack on Nowakchott. Hetober ‘wo more Erench hostages taken during attack on Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 December French air attacks agi Mauritania begin. ost POLISARIO guerrills in 1978 25X6 May fast French aie attac) son guerrilla formations in Mauritania. Waly Military coup ir Maw: stanta brings new regime to power that wants an tly peace settlement, 1-4 August Algerian and Moroe. n emissacies meet under French auspices. Seprember King Hassan plannex. «o meet President Boumediene in Belgium lor direct ts 4s on the Sahara dispure, but iliness of Bournedier aborted meeting. 18 November Algeriun President -sumediene lapyes into s coma four days after his re uen from x seven-week stay in the Soviet Union for me: cal treatment December UN General Assem 1975, adopting two cern Sithara. The prc determination for $. narans yy repealy action of December intradietory resolutions on West Algerian eesolution cals for self= 27 December Death of Algerian F -esident Boumediene. Constitur tional succession pr 2ess begins. Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : ClA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2Approved For Release 2001/08/11 1A-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 Secret 1979 28 January POLISARIO guerrillas overrun the Moroccan town of ‘Tantan and subsequently withdraw. Action marked the first time guerrillas had overrun a sizable Moroccan population center. 9 February Chadii Bendjedid inaugurated as President of Algeria Algeria officially enters post-Boumediene era. This chronology is Secret 19 Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2 Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2