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Laurel vs Garcia

GR 92013 July 25, 1990.


Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the
Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the
properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for
damage done by the latter to the former during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is
property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of
men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall
apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit
that the principle of lex situs applies.
Issues and Held:
1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.
The answer is in the affirmative.
Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public
dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has
become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As
property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no


conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only
when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an
immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables,
the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the
transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same
matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There
is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue
is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of
property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures
adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule
of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light
on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does
not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through
reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell
them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the
Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should
determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional
limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino
citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.
Mirasol Vs Ca
351 SCRA 44 G.R. No. 128448
February 1, 2001

Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB)
financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan
financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on
Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage
empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the
payment of their obligations to it.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange
Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance
PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was
to be remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to
pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it
ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded
withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due
and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by
way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said
proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained
adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under
said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National
Government.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and
damages against PNB.
Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without
notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the
resolution of the Trial Court.
Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.
Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.
Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution
vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not
only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor
General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a
law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount
to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand,

the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and
similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and
not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words
used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the validity of
a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor
General is mandatory.
Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for
violating the due process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private property
without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial
review.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First,
there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review.
Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question
of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

ZANDUETA VS DE LA COSTA

Case Digest: LCP VS. COMELEC


G.R. No. 176951 : February 15, 2011
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented
by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; CITY OF
CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento;
and JERRY P. TREAS, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners,
v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY,
PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF
CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF
WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF
SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE
OF EASTERN SAMAR; AND MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS,
PROVINCE OF QUEZON,Respondents.
FACTS:
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for
prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City
of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the
constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the
municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood
Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject
laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a
6-5 vote, granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws
as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the
equal protection clause.
In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc,
by a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a
vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section


10 of the Constitution
Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6
and the equal protection clause of the Constitution
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Cityhood Laws
First issue:
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of
its legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The
Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their
original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in
the Congress of the Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers.
Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it
enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was
again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When
Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable
indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government
unitsincome, population, and land area.
However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent
municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income
requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and
blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside
development and autonomy, especially accounting for these
municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective
provinces.
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the Cityhood Laws amended
R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since
the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities
from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are,
therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself.
Second Issue:
Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of
respondent municipalities to become component cities of their
respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws,
recognized this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to
become the States partners in accelerating economic growth and
development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of

the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during


the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the
present.
The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Cityhood Laws are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.