REPORT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 27th INFANTRY DIVISION

SAIPAN OPERATION

- RAY M. STROUPE rMi= Capi, Inf

0 NOV 194-4

HEADQT1 A.P.O. 27

: DIVISION
Y

15 September 1944.

SUBJECT* Report of G-2 activities, FORAGER Operation, with Recommendations.

TO i Commanding General, 27th Infantry Division.
1, Submitted herewith is the report of Intelligence Activities with
Recommendations for the FORAGER Operation. Period covered is from 1 April
1944 to 6 August 1944 inclusive.

W. M. VAN ANTWERP
Lt Colonel^ GSC
AC of S, G-2.

Section

I#

planning phase - 1 April to 31 May, 1944. A B Preparation of Combat Intelligence, Training Preparation.

Section Section Section Section Annex A Annex B Annex C -

I I Movement phase 1 June t o 16 June 1944, I I I Operation Phase 16 June to 9 July 1944, IY V
XJJEUN

and Mop*up Phase 10 July t o 7 August 1944,

Recommendations, Public Relations Report, 1ITLF Pew Interrogation Form. Proposed 27th Division Interrogation Form,

PLANNING PHASE - 1 APRIL TO 31 MAY, 1944

A.

PREPARATION OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE*

1. GENERAL*

a. As the 27th Infantry Division was designated as the floating

reserve for the Expeditionary Force (TF 51), it was necessary that all
elements be prepared to land on any one of the three objectives, SAIPAN,
TINIAN, or GUAM* In addition, there was little possibility of elements
being jNWtssembled once the transport divisions departed from PEARL HARBOR*
Therefore, it was necessary that each transport division and ship therein,
be self sufficient in maps and intelligence information. Dissemination of
maps and intelligence information was based on this situation.

2t

INFORMATION AGENCIES*

a Three (3) principle agencies were available for combat intel ligence information
JICPOA, including PRISIC
Hq. 5th Amphibious Force
Hq* V Amphibious Corps
The first named, JICPOA, was by far the most valuable of these
agencies. The facilities at the call of this headquarters plus the person nel available, made them the primary source of intelligence information*
In one phase,that of aeijial photo interpretation, all three headquarters
participated but without coordination. The result was that the Division
was flooded with "G-2 situation maps" to an extent that intelligence person nel were swamped with interpretations which often varied to a great degree.
b. G-2 Section, CPA, was available for assistance on call and aided
materially in supplying maps for the training cruises to MAUI as the G-2
section, V Phib Corps, did not participate* in training but devoted itself en tirely to combat intelligence efforts.
c. Organisation of XXIV Army Corps was accomplished at too late
a date to be of material assistance,
3. COUNTER INT3LLIGSNC3 ACTIVITIES*

a. Headquarters, 27th Infantry Division, was situated in quadrangle

I, Schofield Barracks, when the Division Headquarters moved into this loca tion, AC of S, G-2 emphasized the need of security rooms to be available on
assignment of the Division to an operation. This plan had been approved and

two rooms were available whenfcjjsForager Operation was ordered. One

room was reserved as a planning room for officers and particularly for the
use of G-3; the other room, for maps and other intelligence data and as a
work room for preparation of overlays, relief models, and such.
b. From previous experience it was reoognized that officer courier
service between headquarters is necessary if complete security is to be ac complished during the planning phase of an operation. Higher headquarters
aohieve a degree of security due to the number of plans being worked upon by
them but direction of information on a particular area to a particular unit,
quickly identifies that unit's mission. In addition to this, it has been
felt that some higher headquarters, particularly those of naval association,
are not as security conscious as army personnel. Officer courier service was
therefore established between all headquarters involved and in addition,
AC of S, G-2, made almost daily calls at JICPOA and on the intelligence
officers of Force and Corps. The oalls made by G-2 were responsible for
hastening dissemination of information and data from the higher links in the
chain of command, on occasions by as much as a
o* Complete security within the Division is known to have existed
until the training cruises were commenced. At that time, frequent mention,
of ultimate destination, as well as other possible objectives, became notice able among Division personnel with emphasis on the MART ANAS. Investigat tion disclosed that the subject was freely discussed among the navy enlisted
men and that our men received their information from this source during the
cruises. Because of this, increased attention was given to possible leaks of
information. It is a credit to the personnel of the Division and to their
security training that not one case of "blabbing" was reported.
d. Division shoulder patches were ordered removed as of May 10th.
Comment: In future operations, if removal of patches is necessary, it would
appear more advisable to do so by organization and at varying times or im mediately before embarkation.
e. The fact that POW interrogations and captured documents show
no knowledge of our proposed landing on SAIPAN until our fleet began its
bombardment, appears proof that the security nt surrounding the operation
was not broken by the enemy.
4. MAPS and LITHOMOSAICS*
a. Types of maps provided for the operation consisted of:
(1) 1/20000 topographic with 1000 yard numbered target squares
superimposed thereon. In turn, the 1000 yard squares were
broken into 25 - 200 yard squares numbered from A thru Y.
Comment: This map, while not favorably accepted at first,
was generally agreed to as very satisfactory by the close of
the operation. The method of target designation proved
a rapid means of reporting locations. Most common sug - 4
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gestion made is that if the system is to be continued, all

personnel should be trained to break the 200 yard lettered
square mentally into quarters numbered 1 thru 4, thereby
making point targets more exact in location* Example;
D A E Point X now reported as in H TA 123 A, would be given as K 0 TA 123 A 2 ,

The chief criticism of the target square system is the possibility of location of point targets by coordinate system being disregarded for the easier method. The target square system is excellent when using the shackle code. (2) (3) 1/62500 topographic without target squares was found of value for orientation purposes primarily, General, (a) Maps were very accurate considering the sources from
which they were produced (captured enemy maps and aerial
photographs). However, they did not bring out the
particularly rugged nature of the terrain and there
were instances when terrain features were out of line.
This latter was particularly apparent when our map was
compared with an enemy terrain map taken during the
operation. Amazement was expressed, by an officer
POW on seeing our map and it was thought by him to
have been made after our capture of the island,
(b) A desire for a l/lOOOO map for staff use only and for
distribution down to and including battalions staffs
has been expressed,
b, Litho-mosaics- of SAIPAN were not satisfactory. Reasons for this
were twofold: many clouid covered areas and the fuct that they were produced
from photographs taken some months prior to D Day. Paper on which mosaics
were lithographed gave poor results. Mosaics of TIN IAN received but not
used* were much better. Good mosaics are definitely needed,
c. Distribution, (1) 1/20000 - SAIPAN, TIUIAiy, AOTA, GUAM: To squad leaders, 1/62500 - SAIPAN, TITJlaN, GUAM: To platoon l e a d e r s . Litho-mosaics - S/iIPAN: To company commanders with in creased d i s t r i b u t i o n to Division A r t i l l e r y , To accomplish the above d i s t r i b u t i o n to division and a t tached u n i t s , the following quantities of maps were r o quested and received:
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(2)

1/20000 - 3500 1/62500 - 1250 Litho-mosaics - 850 " h n consideration is given to the fact that the SAIPAN We l/20000 imps and mosaics consisted of 5 sheets each; TINIANf 4; R T , 4; and G A , 11, an idea will be gained of the OA UM undertaking necessary-to distribute the maps in accordance with the details listed in par. d, below. In addition to this vast quantity of paper, there were many "G-2 Situation Maps" received from higher headquarters in quantities of 75, 150, or 300, which received special distribution accord ing to quantity* (3) General: Survey conducted following the operation showed that distribution was satisfactory throughout the Division except that engineer units report they require twice the allotted issue.

d.

Method of distribution. (1) As previously noted, i t was necessary that each ship be self sufficient in maps for each objective prior to depart ure from P A L H R O . This necessitated allotment of maps E R AB R based on the sailing l i s t for each ship. 6-2 section per sonnel counted out the maps to meet the requirements of eb.ch transport division (105, 106, and 165th Inf and Division Artillery) and placed them in the hands of the regimental S-2s and D/A S-2 commencing approximately two weeks prior to departure and us the sheets were received. In turn S-2fs brfck tho maps down in their secrut operation rooms to f i t the needs of each ship. All maps were double wrapped in sealed packages which were not opened until two (8) hours after sailing, . (NOTE: This practice was observed with a l l intelligence data), Maps required by the Division Head quarters were similarly handled but by representatives of t the G-2 section. . Comment: The system was satisfactory except as follows: (a) Distribution of 1/20000 maps to squad leaders on board ship was made too early and maps v/ere, in many cases, in poor condition on arrival at destination, thereby requiring issue of reserve maps. It is be lieved that u limited issue for study during the voyage is better with a final issue made shortly prior to the day of landing. were cases where detachments which of necessity we|e scattered thru the trans-divs did not receive
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their full allotment of maps.

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AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS.

a. General. Aerial photographs were slow in arrival at first.

First pictures received of SAIPAN and TINIAN were of 23 February 1944.
Pictures of the same island taken during April were the next received*
GUAM pictures arrived in April and May.
b. Distribution. Photographs were usually received in sets of four
(4) of 4-5 sorties* varying in scale and with obliques and verticals in cluded. As distribution was necessary between five headquarters (Div, 3
Inf Regts, and D / A ) , the quantity received was not satisfactory.
Comment: l/lOOOO vertical (focal length 24", altititude 20000) proved most
satisfactory. Obliques, except for YORK 9-C, Feb 23, 1944, were found of
little value as they were taken from such great distances. Only one com plete coverage of SAIPA1I and TINIA1J was received. The value of either type
of picture naturally increases as the altititude from which taken becomes less.
c. Requests for vertical and oblique pictures of selected areas on
SAIPAN and TINIAN were submitted on several occasions as their need became
necessary in planning.
6. RELIEF MODELS.

a. Previous experience had proved the value of relief models ftf

objectives. This was recognized by Naval Headquarters and all ships re quiring the models were so provided. A similar situation was not recog nized in regard to Army forces involxred. Request for eighteen (18) models
of the objective (one for each transport) was made by the Division Command er shortly after the information was received that the Division would par ticipate in the operation. Reply was to the effect that one model would
be available to the Division and that not until just prior to sailing. This
obstacle was met by construction of a model of Shi PAN and another of TINIAN
by personnel of the G-2 section. When security measures permitted, personnel
of infantry regiments and of the D/A were advised asto methods of construct ion and similar models were made, in some cases, during the movement to the
objective. For preliminary planning and orientation of troops, relief
models are invaluable. Large scale models of landing beaches would have
boen of great value but since there was no certainty as to where the Division
would land and time did not permit, these were not constructed.
7. INTELLIGENCE A M B Z AND Q-2 STUDILS.

a. As operation plans rather than field orders were all that could
be prepared, an Intelligence Annex was published which could become part of a
field order without change. Capabilities and Reconnaissance Missions were
added as addendas as additional plans were developed. Enemy capabilities*
although not part of the prescribed form, were included in the Intelligence
A nnex and Addendas because past experience in doing so had proved of justifi f
able .value. -":* |
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Vt :) t

mm' i J 3 ^ Studies of S A | F M 4 ^ 1 p # an d G A were mad appendices UM t o the I n t e l l i g e n c e Annex and"pub1ishod in s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t i e s t o r e ceive ample d i s t r i b u t i o n for o r i e n t a t i o n of troops on each s h i p . 750 copies of the s t u d i e s were p r e p a r e d . 8, LANGUAGE ISAM.

a. Although the number of language personnel (one officer and ten

(10) enlisted men) was recognized as insufficient for the requirements of an
Infantry Division, the following distribution of the men was made and proved
the best solution possible*
Div Hq 105th Inf 106th Inf 165th Inf 1 officer 4 enlisted men
2 "
2 " "
n
2

The Division group moved in two sections during the sea voyage
and reassembled on le*nding# Shortly thereafter it was necessary to send two
of the men to assist the Division Civil Affairs Officer until Garrison Force
language personnel became available, a period of approximately three weeks,
9, CIVIL AFFAIRS.

a. Although Northern Task and Landing Force Headquarters included

a Civil Affairs Section, divisions were considered responsible for the hand*
ling of civilians until they were turned ovjr to NTLF The Marine Division
staffs included Civil Affairs officers. The Judge Advocate General of the
27th Inf Division was assigned this work in addition to his otlur duties,
G-2 assisted the Division Civil Affairs officer in drawing up plans for the
removal of civilians tak&n into custody as the Division advanced and for the
questioning of key civilians on intelligence matters.

10,

INTELLIGENCE RADIO^JET.

a* Based on previous axperienco, authority was requested and grant ed for the formation of an intelligence radio n e t . Unavailability of radio s e t s necessitated two nets including: (1) (2) Div G-2, Regimental S-2s, Div Rcn-'tr, and Div OP. (SCR 509 s e t s ) . Regt and Bn S-2s (SCR 300 s o t s ) .

Cammunt: This net provod its worth in full, particularly during the first
days of the operation, and in aiany instances was of use to the Division G-3
as well. Radio communication between the Div OP and Div CP was absolutely
necessary as in more than one case, wire communications would not have been
available in time and the dalay entailed by messenger service would have
decreased the value of information materially.

11. CENSORSHIP.
a. Approximately SO" days prior to departure, the following censor ship restrictions were imposed.
(1) Use of APO 27 only by personnel of the Division. Attached
units were required to collect mail of their personnel and
forward it to Theater Censor, CPA, specially marked.
(2) Trans-Pacific and inter-island telephone calls were limit ed to emergency calls only.
(3) SCM cables were limited to emergencies but EPM priviliges
were more liberal. However, all EFM1s were examined to
insure that messages made sense and that code by use of
EPM numbers was not possible.
b. Arrangements were made with Theater Censor, CPA, that the same
theater censorship personnel revievr Division and attached unit mail during
the entire period in order that special restrictions would not be overlooked.
12. PUBLIC RELATIONS.

a. Approximately one month prior to departure, an additional

officer was attached to the G-2 section to handle the public relations pro blems of the Division. He was assisted by one man taken from the Special
Service section who had had limited press experience. This action was
authorized after the Division had been canvassed for experienced newspaper
men without success. Both men v/ere attached to the Public Relations Sect ion, CPA, for instruction, contacts, information as to naval censorship
restrictions (all press releases of the operation necessitated final naval
approval), and plans of transmission of press releases for publication.
b. Several correspondents, designated to accompany the Division,
were invited to visit the Division in order to meet key officers and to be come acquainted with the Division history and its units. These men spent
several days making their visits and becoming familiar with the units, of ficers, and background of the Division prior to departure. Pictures were
taken in many cases, for distribution after the Division1s participation in
the action was announced.
c. The public relations question is discussed in detail in Annex
"A" attached to this report.
13. QWI.

a. I t is realized that O i a c t i v i t i e s may not be considered as pre V / T parations for an operation but in this case, they hr.d an indirect ohVot. b. During April, several conferences were held which included re presentatives from the G-2 office CPA, 27th Inf Div, the O T office in W Honolulu, and Mr.Owen Latimore, Washington (Ml representative. Subjects

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ssed were primarily the ji.se. -and contents of propaganda leaflets and
broadcasts*
c. Propaganda broadcasts were prepared by the Division language
section in order that well thoughout and carefully constructed messages
would be available at any time during combat when broadcasting was possible
by a public address system. These broadcasts were carried by each of the
Division language personnel. Comment: During conferences it was emphasized
that propaganda should be prepared or at least reviewed by personnel of
Japanese birth in order that the proper psychology be used. That this is
necessary appears confirmed by prisoners of war who criticized propaganda
leaflets prepared by NTLF language Personnel (Caucasian) and approved the
broadcast wording prepared by the 27th Division Language Team (Nisei).

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B.

TRAINING PREPARATION.

1. GENERAL. Intelligence training was reorganized following the

GILBERT ISLANDS Operation with particular emphasis on subjects considered
essential as a result of this operation and later, the experiences of the
7th Division and elements of the 27th Division in the MARSHALLS.

2#

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

a. In addition to the intelligence personnel provided in tables

of organizations it was required that a minimum of two (2) men from each
combat infantry company be designated as combat intelligence men and train ed for one week out of each five with a battalion intelligence section or
the regimental I & R platoon. Purpose was to provide understudies for T/0
intelligence personnel in case of casualties and to increase the flow of
intelligence information from front line units.
Comment: The theory was good but was not a success from the replacement
angle. One of the two men selected was usually the company communication
sergeant and the other in almost every case, an excellent man whom the
company commander eventually used as a combat leader replacement. Reports
of information due to the scheme showed little improvement and will be
discussed under the Operation Phase of this report.
3. TRAINING OF T/O INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL.

a. Map reading: included memorizing maps, photo interpretation

symbols, Japanese maps, and Japanese map symbols. Personnel of the G-2
section prepared a booklet on Japanese signs and symbols to assist in
Japanese map reading. 500 of these booklets were distributed.
b. Instruction in aerial photograph interpretation.

c. Observation.
d. Scouting and patrolling

e. Sketching.
f. Message writing.
g. Interrogation of prisoners.
h. i. 4. Familiarization with c m ; . n Japanese documents.
orio CP Exercises.

TRAINING OF ALL DIVISION PERSONNEL.

a. Security training by lectures.
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b. Intelligence orientation lectur

c. Identification of aircraft by attendance at navy schools.
Renshaw system was used*
d. Instruction in Japanese phrases. 10,000 cards containing simple
phrases were distributed through the Division and pronunciation was taught
by personnel of the G-2 language section. . Troops report several occasions
when the cards and instruction proved their value during the operation.
e. Familiarization with common Japanese weapons by scheduling the
Division weapons collection to units with sufficient time for units to allow
personnel to make a study of those weapons.
f. Processing and questioning of POl/Vs. This instruction was g ' r n
ite in a three (3) act play produced by personnel of the G-2 section and language
team and illustrating the right and wrong methods.
5. SPECIAL TRAINING.

a. Intelligence school. All S-2's and senior intelligence enlisted

personnel were required to attend a Division intelligence school which to talled 20 hours. Instruction was in the nature of a Refresher course and
was accomplished by lecture and practical work. Navy personnel from the
intelligence officers of 5th Phib Force and ? Phib Corps were invited to
attend this school. Invitation was accepted by the former Headquarters
which sent ten (10) officers to take the course.
b. Division language school. Realizing that the Division language
team was insufficient to fill the demands of an infantry division in combat,
a canvass of the Division was made to find personnel who were familiar
enough with the Japanese language to receive instruction in Japanese combat
phrases. Two instruction groups, each of approximately ten (10) students,
were selected:
(1) The Caucasion group who were given instruction in speaking.
(2) A group of Chinese ancestry who were instructed in reading
as well as speaking the language. Each group met for four
(4) hours, throe (3) days a week for six (6) weeks.
Comment: The results of this school were most satisfactory during
the operation. Students were used at POW collecting points and in the front
lines, to make limited interrogations and translations of documents. There
were also instances when they mr.de successful appeals to enemy individuals
and groups to surrender. It is believed that an additional six weeks of
training for this personnel would have provided the Division with a lang uage group capable of performing simple language section duties. However,
the group can never be a substitute for a trained language team. (NOTE?
It must be recogni^c^UMfralheselanguage students did not start from scratch

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but had had previous instruction at the University of Hawaii or elsewhere,

or could read and speak Chinese. All students were required to meet a
definite level of knowledge in the Japanese language before being accepted
for the Division school-.
c. Division Reconnaissance Troop.
(1) The Reconnaissance Troop was definitely recognized as an
intelligence agency. As such its training was directed by
G-3 after conferences with G-2. All of the subjects list ed in par B 3 and 4 above ("Training of T/O Intelligence
Personnel" and "Training of all Division Personnel") were
included in the training of the troop. One officer and a
key noncommissioned officer attended the Division intell gence school and one enlisted man was enrolled in each of
the two language school classes.
(2) With knowledge that lack of shipping would prevent trans portation of the majority of the troop's moShanized vehicles,
particular emphasis was placed on foot patrolling.
(3) Early in the planning stages, it toecame apparent that re connaissance of beaches might be necessary. While not
equipped or trained for such work, special instruction in
this phase was prescribed for the troop and included
familiarization with hydrographic terms and conditions,
use of rubber boats, and two days of training in landing
by rubber boats from a destroyer both in daylight and dark ness*

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SECTION

II

MOVEMENT PHASE - 1-16 JUNE, 1944

! Maps and intelligence data were broken out and distribution com menced two (2) hours after ships departed from PEARL HARBOR.
2 Orientation was commenced on the second day out and continued un til arrival at destination. The general method of orientation was as
follows:
a. Lectures by intelligence officers to assembled officers on each
ship covering conditions of possible landing beaches, terrain, enemy strength,
native population, sanitary and health conditions, and such. In turn, com pany officers presented similar lectures to their troops.
b. Intensive study of maps and relief models where available with
the objective that all personnel would be thoroughly acquainted with the gen eral terrain situation.
c. On some ships, Command Post Exercises were held covering each
probable plan of landing. These exercises also afforded an opportunity to
familiarize all with the communication nets to be used..

SECTION III

OPERATIONS PHASE - 16 JUNE TO 9 JULY 1944

1, GENERAL,
a. For the movement to SAIPAN, the G-2 section was divided into two
teams* One team with the AC of S, G-2, accompanied the Division Commanding
General on the FREMONT and one team was with the Assistant Division Command er on the CAVALIER. Late in the afternoon of 16 June, the Assistant Division
Commander as directed to land on SAIPAN to coordinate the commitment of the
Division. Ho took with him a small staff in which was included the Ass't G-2
and two enlisted men from the G-2 section.
b* Contact was made with the Headquarters of the 4th Marine Division to
which the first units of the 27th Division to be landed were to be attached*
The Ass1t G-2 conferred with the D-2 of the Marine Division to obtain all
the information of the enemy known at that time. A copy of their periodic
report was obtained and estimates of the situation received. Early in the
morning of 17 June., the G-2 came ashore and remained the rest of the day
with the D-2 of the 4th Marine Division. At -this time, the 165th Infantry
with a few elements of the 105th Infaiitry were the only units which had land ed and they had been attached to the Marine Division. Therefore, the primary
job of the Division Headquarters was to prepare itself for the future employ ment of the Division on thy right of the Marines.
c. The Marine Division had very little information of the enemy on its
immediate front at this early stage. The Division had received large con centrations of artillery fire while landing and had progressed about 400
yards inland. As a result, little definite information of the enemy strength
or dispositions could be obtained*
2. G-2 SECTION - OPERATION AND PROCEDURE.
a* As noted above, for the movement to SAIPAN, the G-2 section had
bfeen divided into two groups. These groups were both self-sufficient as
each contained an intelligence sergeant, stenographer, draftsman, photo
interpreter, and an intelligence enlisted ma.n. For a forward displacement
of the Division Command Post, this breakdcTAffh continued with either one team
or the other accompanying the Ass't G-2 to the new CP. This forward group
set up the Command Post tent and made all the initial preparations. Vfhen
communications were established, G-2 closed the old CP and there was nc
break in the functioning of the section. 5wo l/4 ton vehicles and one trail er were available to the section for all moves as a general rule. The men
were transported in a 2 l/2-ton truck or a DUKW.
b. Early in the operation, the second Ass't G-2 was wounded and there after the section functioned with only two officers. The enlisted personnel
of the section were divided into groups of four, and schedules observed to
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provide*eaiiplelcp<ffinity for rest. The four men. on duty included a steno grapher, who k^|| tii journal and typed messages, a draftsman, who kept the
map posted*,A <&m%?f*a.nd a senior sergeant, who supervised activities and
kept the work sheet. This system functioned extremely well and provided for
24 hour continual operation of the section.
c. With regard to the actions of the G-2 and Assft., it was customary
for one to remain at the CP during the day keeping in touch with the entire
situation. In addition, this officer prepared the periodic report at the
conclusion of the day's activity and was prepared to give estimates of the
situation during the day. The other officer paid daily visits to the regi mental and battalion CPfs and to the front line mnits. As a result of this
plan, the G-2 was always personnally informed of the situation on the front
of the Division. This contact with the S-2*s of regiments and battalions is
considered invaluable for obtaining personal vie?; points and additional in formation.
3. INTERPRETERS - USE AMD DISTRIBUTION.
a. Distribution of the Division Language Team has been outlined in the
planning ".phase of the operation. Each regiment used its language personnel
differently. In one, both interpreters were assigned to the assault batta lions and worked with the battalion S-2's. In another, both were kept at thi
regimental CP, and in the third, one was at the Regimental CP and one assign ed to the battalion where it was felt he was most needed.
b. The practice at Division Headquarters at first was to keep two inter preters at the civilian internment camp which the Division was required to
operate. This had not been anticipated and initially, only one man was
assigned but this proved insufficient. This left available to the G-2, a
language officer and two interpreters. Two of this trio were generally em ployed at the Division POW Collecting point. The third man was available
to work on call with the Reconnaissance Troop in searching enemy dead or
with members of the G-2 section who, in some cases, were used for the same
purpose. He was also used to sort out and translate captured documents*
c ^he vast number of documents which were received presented a special
problem. It would take many interpreters to translate all these and at
least one man working full time to sort out and translate the most import ant. In view of the impossibility of complete translation, documents were
given a hasty check and only those of the utmost importance (primarily
captured field orders and entries in diaries and captured supply books)
were translated. The remainder were sent to NTLF. Regiments and battalions
found it almost impossible to make any written translations and merely check ed documents for information of immediate value.
4. PRISONERS OP riARHANDLING, COLLECTION, AMD INTERROGATION
A* Although it is appreciated that the evacuation of TOVfs is a G-l
function, during this operation, it was handled entirely by G-2 with some
assistance from G-4. The method employed, which is outlined below, worked
very satisfactorilv.

; When plans were made for-*cifflForward displacement of the Division

Comflnaf iPost, a tentative location for the Division POW Collecting Point
was selected by map study on the main supply road and near the proposed
Division CP. The Language officer of the Division, together with a non commissioned officer from the MP detachment detailed to guard the POW
Collecting Point, went forward with the advance echelon of the command post
and made a personal reconnaissance.
c. Prisoners were evacuated from the forward elements to Regimental
Collecting Points and thence to the Division Collecting Point by any trans portation returning to the rear. Military prisoners presented no difficulty
as they were never received in any large quantities. Civilian prisoners at
times presented problems which were solved by G-2 obtaining trucks from O 4
and in some cases, evacuating them directly from the regiments.
d. Evacuation from the Division Collecting Point to the Division Stock ade and later to the Northern Landing Force Stockade was accomplished by
taking advantage of transportation going to the rear. Again, there was
little difficulty in evacuation of military prisoners and the civilian
problem was solved in the same manner as abo^e. Military Police utilized
Eeturning nontactical vehicles whenever possible and only two instances
were reported of interference with tactical vehicles.
e # Once during the operation the number of civilians reached such pro portions as to necessitate the retention at the division enclosure of any
large number over night. In this instance, there were approximately 150
civilians interned and transportation was not available until the next morning.
f. Interrogation of prisoners was made by the language team attached
to the Division. All of the Nisei had been through at least one campaign
and had been attached to the Division for approximately ten months. They
were well trained and had the advantage of knowing the personnel of the
Division and knowing what information was particularly desired from prisoners*
Before landing, they had been briefed on board ship in the enemy order of
battle and given specific instruction as to the type of information which
was desired. In addition, they had been instructed in the plans of operation
and were familiar with the proposed employment of the troops. Therefore,
language personnel were able to conduct interrogations without outside
guidance. It is felt that it is essential that interrogators be familiar
with the operations of our own troops and that every effort be made to see
that this is done.
g. During the operation, NTLF issued interrogation forms for the in terrogation of prisoners. This method had the disadvantage of producing a
limiting effect on the interrogation, (^opy of the form attached as Annex
B). For many cases, the form was incomplete and did not cover the infor mation necessary for a front line division. In addition, it is very diffi cult to get interrogators to go beyond a form and ask additional questions*
- 17

As a result, a plan^jwa* fSftfpied whereby the POW was held at tho Division
J3p 3 1 0 ati rig feint until %"t2h* j-Isults of the interrogation were made known to
^. 'one <Df the officers of "t]|&iJfc section. Then, if additional information was
desired, it couUifce^obtained immediately. For this purpose, tho Signal
Qitfi-cirof**"ran"a telephone line to the collecting point and the evacuation of
prisoners was delayed only slightly. This resulted in much more effective
interrogation for two reasons: first,particular questions could be asked
of tho prisoner; and secondly, the interpreter could be kept abreast of
additional information desired and would ask other prisoners those questions
without further instructions*
h. Attention is called to the f*ot that personnel of tho Divj_sion who
had been trained in tho division Language School proved of groat value
during this operation. Instances arc reported of iinmediato front line in terrogation which permitted our forces to locate enemy positions directly on
their front a*d destroy them. Thcro is no question of the value of such
men and as much instruction as possible should be given thorn.
5. IDENTIFICATION OF JAPANESE UNITS
jtt In the initial stages of tho operation, it was very difficult to
obtain definite identifications of Japanese units, .among tho reasons for this are:

(1) Most Japanese soldiers know only the code number of their unit,
or tho name of their immediate com-landing officer.
(2) Unfamiliarity of US forces with tho complex organization of
Japanese forces.
(3) Japs wero removing and burying their dead.
b. Approximately ten d^ys after the initial landings, NTLP published
a Japanese Order cf Battle of SAIPAft which listed seme cede numbers and
commanders namas. This proved invaluable and copies of this wore placed in
tho hands of every interrogation team.
c. Identifications were obtained from the following sources:
(1) POVifs who, in many cases, know only the cede iiunbor of their
organization. With the assistance ,cf tho Order of Battle and
additions thoretc prepared cy the Division G-2 section, the
code numbers of the larger organizations were soon broken down.
(2) Documents-: Captured documents vfcrc of course a valuable sourco.
Diaries, naps,orders, notebooks* tc,, wore taken raid usually
definitely located the unit an oar front and in acme cases,
gave additional coco number a and inf urmatiei. of other units.
(3) "Dog tags11!' It is interoGting * note that very few "dog tags"

were found on JapanJb soldiers or sailors. In some cases*

these "dog tags" caused confusion because they contained the
code number of former unit of the Japanese soldier. Many of
the troops had only recently arrived from MANCHURIA and still
wore the "dog tag" of their MANCHQRIAN units. (Note: Japanese
army"dog tags" supposedly bear the code number of the organ ization to which the soldier presently belongs but necessary
changes are often delayed.

'

SEARCHING ENEMY DEAD.

a. Definite measures were taken by G-2 and S-2's to search enemy dead.
G-2 instructed the Reconnaissance Uroop to send out small groups to search
the dead immediately behind front line units and S-2!s used personnel of I
& R platoons for the same purpose. It is appreciated that this is not a
usual mission for a reconnaissance troop but with knowledge that mechanized
reconnaissance would not be possible, training in this work had been under taken and trained personnel were available.
Comments Although it may seem strange, training and experience are necessary
if men are to know how, where, and what to search for on a dead body*
b In several instances, an interpreter was sent with a group searching
the enemy dead. This method is of positive value when an interpreter can
be spared, because identifications can be obtained immediately and sent back
by the fastest means of communication.
Comment: If utmost value is to be obtained from search of enemy dead, bodies
must be searched as soon as possible for, in addition to obvious reasons*
decomposition sets in so quickly that search becomes difficult and odious.
c A CIC detachment specially trained for this purpose would prove in valuable to a division during combat in the Pacific. Personnel of such a unit
should have some knowledge of Japanese and be trained in the recognition of
important documents and intelligence material.
7. OBSERVATION POSTS.
a. During the early stages of the operation, the Division did not main tain an OP because no ground was available which commanded a sufficient part
of the Division front. Regimental and battalion OPs were operated and furn ished sufficient information. Immediately after MI. TAPOTCBAU was captured
a Division OP was set up on its summit. This was manned by four men from
the Reconnaissance Troop with a noncommissioned officer in charge. They were
furnished with a radio which offered direct communication to the Division CP.
As the Division advanced north of MT. IAPQTCBAU, other high ground became
available which permitted observation of the enemy front. As this ground was
captured, the OP was moved forward and the observers were rotated by the
Reconnaissance SJroop*
- 19

b. An unusfeglfc^^^&ng^frfitijjnf ofalfrJlMf was received in the shortest

possible time from the OPs. Instances can be cited of Japanese ammunition
dumps being fired upon within a few minutes after being observed by the OP,
of groups of enemy troops looated and subjected to artillery and mortar fire
within a similar period of time, as well as enemy troop movements in rear
areas. However, it should be pointed out that a large part of the terrain
of SAIPAN was peculiarly well suited for a Division OP. Certain dominant
terrain features gave excellent observation of most of the island area. This
will probably not be as true in other operations, and it is unlikely that
a division OP which permits observation of the major portion of a division
front can be set up.

8. GUARDING IMPORTANT CAPTURED INSTALLATIONS.

a. A small group of men from the Reconnaissance Troop were attached to

the G-2 section to operate the radios in the intelligence net and for the
additional purpose of taking over and guarding important installations as
soon as they were captured. This plan worked particularly well in the
capture of ASLITO Airfield. All S-2s had been advised that these men were
available, and in this instance, the S<-2 of the 165th Infantry reported the
capture of a number of buildings containing valuable intelligence material
and Japanese equipment. Some of this group were immediately dispatched to
the airfield and took over the protection and guarding of these installations.
As a result, there was ho known looting of this material and in addition,
front line troops were spared the neoessity of detaching men for this pur pose. Much valuable material was undoubtedly saved in this instance and in
other instances during the operation when these men were used similarly.
9. ESTIMATION OF ENEMY STRENGTH.

a. It is very difficult to make accurate estimates of enemy strength

prior to a landing operation on an island such as SAIPAN and in the days
which follow. There are several reasons for this among which are included:
(1) The number and diversity of organizations necessary for the
defense and administration of an island base.
(2) The impossibility of accurately estimating the casualties
which have been inflicted by the preliminary air and naval
preparation.
(3) Difficulty in estimating losses to the units occupying the
island but suffered from submarine action while enroute.
(4) The complex and diverse nature of the organization of the
Japanese Army and Navy.
(5) Lack of information by the U.S. of definite information on
the organization and equipment of Jap forces.
- 20

Practice of making Tables of Organization to fit

.tuations.
" * b. The above reasons and others made it difficult ot give any accunate
" estimate during the early stage of the operation. Another factor -was that
the Japs apparently removed or buried their dead as long as they could do
so* Initially few dead Japanese were encountered by the Division. POWs
were very vague in giving any estimate of the casualties that their units
had suffered, and as pointed out above, identifications were very difficult
to obtain.
c. During the period the Division was engaged in fighting on the EAST
slopes of MT. TAPOTCHAB, it became possible to prepare an order of battle
with an estimate of the enemy strength on the Division front. This was
issued with a periodic report. FOW interrogations and translation of docu ments at later dates prove that this estimate was quite accuratet from this
point on* it was possible to laaku continued and' 'aound' estimates "of the enemy
strength on the front of -tho Division. Strength in front of.particular units
o f the Division was very difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy.
. 10. ENEMY FRONT LINES.

a. A perusal of periodic reports and overlays which accompany them

reveal that the enemy front lines were rarely definitely defined. This is
because in only a few instances during the operation did it appear that
the Division was up against a definite front line or main defensive position
of the Japanese. The enemy chose to defend certain key terrain features
and strong points, usually hills and cliffs which were studded with caves*
As a result, the lines were very fluid, many gaps appear on the periodic
report overlays and in some cases, enemy lines are found in the rear of our
most advance elements. Often strong points were by-passed and left for
mopping-up by designated units.
b* A second reason is that our forces were continually attacking during
the entire active phase of the operation. As a result of this and the dis ruption of his communications and the impossibility of moving reserves, the
enemy was continually forced back and apparently found it difficult to set
up any main line of resistance*
11. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION.
a. Within the Division.
(l) The question of dissemination of enemy information is one
which no matter how stressed, will never be considered com pletely satisfactory. Within the Division, dissemination,
both up and down the channel, was poor during the early
stages of the operation. It is believed that this can be
- 21

\ ***'

attrifli% to the fact that units were very scattered due

to ojbiBfliffent to other organizations, and to inexperience.
Iks the operation progressed, improvement was noticeable.

(2) Limited production facilities made distribution of G-2

Periodic Reports impossible below regiments. This distribu tion was increased when the hectograph equipment became
available. Report was required by higher headquarters as of
1600 each day which :aeant that copies did not get to message
center until at least one hour after this time. Blackout
driving, terrain conditions, and distance of routes due to
road nets, caused further delay. In order to counteract
these delays, every effort was made to give a verbal synop sis of the report to NTLF, regiments, and D/A by telephone.,
Even so, the dissemination cannot be considered satisfactory.
Flash reports (i.e. tank activity, etc.) were required and
dissemination of these was entirely satisfactory. Periodic
verbal reports were required and as these came in, enemy sit uation on the right and/ or left of the reporting unit was
given.
b Higher headquarters.
(1) Little information of combat value was received from NTLF
during the operation. Requests wore made that our head quarters be furnished with periodic reports during tho day
of enemy activity on the fronts of the other divisions.
This request, however, was very rarely honored and very little
information was received. Only once or twice did any member
of tho G-2 section of higher headquarters, other than language
officers, pay a personal visit to the division CP. Requests
v/ere also made for estimates of the strength of tho enemy
remaining on the island in order that the division might pre pare an estimate on its immediate front, but only vague
answers were given, and then, after delay.
(2) The reason given for failure to disseminate the information
on the fronts of adjacent divisions is one that might bear
further study. It was stated that liaison officers of
divisions were for that'purpose. It is true that some in telligence information was received from these officers.,
but they are accustomed to work under the G-3 section and
in practice most of their information is of more value to
G-3 than to G-2. Coinrnunicr.tiens also handicapped this source.
(3) The most valuable information provided tho division was tho
Order of Battle prepared by NTLF Language Section. Its value
has been pointed out
12. PERIODIC REPORTS.
ligence Annex of NTLF, G-2 periodic

reports were submitted *a,yof 1600 each day. , Thfiapcessity for setting a
definite time for the submission oft those is rocognized.. However,... $he
results of doing so should be noted. On many ocoasions, our attack was
still progressing at this time of the day and therefore, the report did not
present a true picture of activities at the day's close and in addition, the
capabilities changed as the troops advanced. Secondly, the difficulty of
reproducing and distributing reportsmeant that in many cases the reports were
not received by lower echelons until daybreak of the following day.
Comment: It is highly desirable that periodic reports be submitted as of
a oertain phase in the day*s operations. So far as possible, this time
should be selected so as to include the conclusion of the day 1 s attack and
at a time that front line units are usually establishing their perimeters
for the night.
13. AIRPLANE OBSERVATION AND PHOTO MISSIONS.

a. There were comparatively few times during the operation V&en. the
Division requested observation missions flown. There are everal reasons
for this, among which are:
(1) Initially planes were not available for this purpose.
(2) Battalions and regiments had available to them JASCO Units
which were in direct communications with observation planes
and information could be requested directly. Most of the
Division requests related to activity in enemy areas,particu larly movement of reserves and location of enemy artillery.
The majority of air mission reports were negative because of
the concealment afforded the enemy by the SAIPAN terrain.
b. Aerial photos proved of little value during the operation. They
were requested on numerous-occasions but either were received too late or
were not clear enough to be of value. In addition, it took at least 36 hours
to get the photographs from NTLF and when they were received they had not
been catalogued. Because of this, it was extremely difficult to locate the
areas covered by the photos. Several times photos were received which were
supposed to be of a certain area And turned out to be of an entirely differ ent place. Some effort should be made by higher headquarters, where facili ties are available, to sort pictures to insure that only those usable are
distributed to the troops and that they are accurately located on the maj>.
So few copies were received that front line battalions and companies which
are primarily interested in them, did not receive copies.

14. USE OF RECONNAISSANCE TROOP

a. I n planning for t h i s operation, tho Commanding General issued i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t the troop would be employed i n missions which would be selected generally by G-2 or a f t e r coordination with him. I t i s f e l t t h a t t h i s method should be followed h a b i t u s U ^ * J ^ k - n ^ shipping space provented the loading of any armored oar&sof tfc i&do^ jaij&"-iii a d d i t i o n , i t was f e l t ^ , t*mfW* P% - 23

their use would be extremely limited by terrain. Therefore, the only

mechanized equipment brought by the troop was four half-tracks in addit ion to five l/4 tons.
b. Missions given the Reconnaissance Troop consisted of the following!
(1) Operating Division OP as outlined above*
(2) Searching of and estimation of number of enemy dead.
(3) The troop was used for a period of several days in main taining contact with the adjacent divisions; this became
necessary when gaps occurred between divisions and when the
extremely rugged nature of the terrain prohibited personal
contact between them.
(4) Night patrolling activities were conducted \>f the troop on
the Division front for several nights.
(5) The half-tracks were used for supply and fort he evacuation
of wounded in several instances when this was the only type
of vehicle which could reach the front. It is obvious that
this is not a reconnaissance mission but these were the only
half tracks available within the Division and their use was
essential at the time.
(6.) Patroling and protecting the south shore of SAIPAN during
the Divisions advance across the southern part of SAIPAN.
15. REPORTS FROM FRONT LINE UNITS.

a. In spite of the stress given in training to making accurate re ports, (how, when, what, where, etc.) there were many cases of reports
from companies and battalions which were general in nature such as, "Received
heavy enemy fire from our left flank," "Strong opposition on our front,"
etc. One cause for this may be that Bn. S-2's were lost by becoming casual ties and also were used to replace other officer casualties. Of the nine
battalions in the Division, only two of the original S-2's were function ing in that sole capacity at the conclusion of the operation. This meant
that staff sergeants were required to assume the S-2 duties. All did ex tremely well.
16. ENEMY CHEMICAL WARFARE EQUIPMENT,
a. There were no instances verified of the Japanese using gas during
this operation nor was any gas laying equipment or shells found. However,
almost all Japs carried gas masks and a considerable amount of protective
clothing, of excellent manufacture, was taken.

LOCATION OF ENEMY ARTILLERY POS

a. During the operation, it was extremely difficult to locate ono:.iy
artillery when it opened fire on our troops. In some instances, it may
have been that mortar fire was reported as artillery but this could not
have been universally true. On one occasion, when the Division CP was re ceiving artillery fire, communication by telephone was established with
the Div Arty S-2 who was in direct contact by radio with three observation
planes in the air. Despite the fact that those planes were observing over
the area from which the enemy artillery was believed to be firing, they
were unable to locate the pieces. One cause for this is that the* enemy
artillery in many cases was concealed in caves and dug-outs. It is felt
that a Corps Arty Sound and Flash Range Bn might have been of value* Of
interest, however, is a statement of pOWs who say that when their artillery
opened up, a concentration of our fires was placed upon them and their gun ners frequently deserted there guns.
18. DETECTION AND LOCATION OF MINE FIELDS.
a. The Japanese showed little skill or originality in laying mine
fields on SAIPAN* However, large quantities of mines of various types,
many of which were of excellent construction, were captured. Some mine
fields we&e encountered and in addition, artillery shells and airplane
bombs were emplaced as mines. One of our tanks was severely damaged and
three of the crew killed when it ran over a bomb buried as a mine. Beabhes
were mined with the customary Japanese anti boat mine and a lafge nu&bor of
sea mines were captured* Most of the mines were not discovered until a
tank or vehicle had run over one.
Comment: Additional training of engineer personnel in the detection, re moval of, and marking of lanes through mine fields, is necessary as it is
probable that mine fields in larger numbers will be encountered in future
operations against the Japs.
19. TANKS,
a. Best estimates place the number of Japanese tanks on SAIPAN at
101, the majority of which were medium tanks. Included among these were
a number of amphibious tanks. Although the principal Japanese tank unit
(9th tank Regt (-)) contained a number of veterans of tank fighting in
MANCHURIA, they showed no improvement in tank tactics. Tanks employed
against the Division were used piece msal, in night attacks and from camou flaged positions from which they emerged and commenced firing just before
our troops came upon them; or fired from the rear if our troops passed
them by* The 27th Division claims credit for knocking out 41-47 enemy tanks.
20. PATROL ACTIVITY.

a* After a* certain period, orders from higher headquarters directed

that patrols be sent out each night. For several nights, the Reconnaissance
Troop was used for this purpose. Patrols of the troop varied in sisje
- 26

from eight men to a platoon*

b* During the later phases of the operation, infantry battalions
conducted limited night patrolling to their immediate front and flanks.
The majority of the resulting reports were negative and in very few
instances were there any reports of enemy activity. It fs believed the
troops need more training in this subject. Daylight patrolling was
limited because of the fact that the Division was constantly advancing
thereby affording little opportunity to sen4 out patrols to probe and
feel out enemy positions. In addition, preparatory artillery fires were
being laid down and bombing and strafing missions being executed by the
air force. That patrol activity must be carefully coordinated with the
artillery and air, is obvious. One instance is reported of a large body
(200) of enemy troops being observed in the open but artillery fire could
not be placed upon tham because friendly patrols from a Marine Division
were operating too close to the area.
21. FLASH REPORTS.

a* Activity of enemy aviation was pasctically nil except at night

and then caused little damage. Reports of enemy planes approaching at
sight came from higher headquarters where radar was available. In some
cases, delay was encountered in the transmission of these reports*
b. With regard to tanks, reports of enemy action were received almost
as soon as the tanks were observed. The flash report system worked very
well in warning of tank action and there are no instances of tanks break ing through bur lines*
22. JAPANESE TACTICS COMMENTS.

a* Once again the Jap ended his defense in a large scale "counter
attack" (Japanese "Gyoku-Sai" "Die in honor") with the apparent objective
of killing as many of our troops as possible before he himself was wiped out*
b. In the period following the end of organized resistance by the
enemy, a questionaire was distributed to certain Division General and
Special Staff officers and all Regimental and Battalion Comr:.anders, S-2s
and S-3*s requesting comments on enemy tactics which they had observed*
The following is a list of these observations. Those marked (*) were
mentioned by several officers.
(l) *Use by the enemy of caves, rock covered terrain, and
tree covered areas as strong points.
(2) *Use by the enemy of smokeless powder with the practice
of firing only 3-4 shots at a time thereby making it
difficult to locate his position.
of appreciation of defensive organization.
- 26

(4) *Several oocasions were reported of the enemy firing his

artillery ancl/ormcrfcara on our troops at the same timo
that our artillery was in action in the sane general area
in an apparent attempt to give our troops the impression
that our artillery was falling short.
(5) *PraotioQ of night infiltration, often in groups of con sideraole size*
(6) *Use of land mines was crude and hasty*
(7) *Use of roverse slopes for defense on several occasions*
(8) Enemy appeared to use our long bursts of M# fire as a means
of locating targets This was confirmed in POW interrogations
who stated that long bursts revealed the location of autoin&tio
weapons.
(9) Lack of organization in retrograde movements and along linos
of resistance. MGs reported placed without plans for traver sing fire.
(10) practice of enomy to collect and make use of our equipment
whioh had been dropped by our casualties*
(11) Many nomy artillery pieces knocked out by our fice were found
Xooated at road junctions or curves and laid for direct fire
to cover long stretohes of road, flnemy did not j|prbably
could not) use his artillery for mass fire and confined his
fire to one or two -pieces at a time, firing; comparatively
fow rounds.
(12) Near the conclusion cf the operation, the enemy frequently
used his tanks in concealed locations end they did not open
fire until our troops were almost on them, '^his action was
frequently reported as "immobile tanks being used as pill boxes".
(13) Enemy oountsr attaoks wore poorly timed and laoked coordinat ion, but invariably were puahed to th limitt
(14) While not tactics, the individual enemy soldier's spirit cf
"Die for the Emperor" is confusing by its frequent non-tacticalv
element of surprise.
23. E N M Y SUJ.-1LY BST^LISHiSENTS.
A* During the operation, large numbers of enony supply dumps of all
classes as well as much valuable equipment were captured. Pood caches
- 2 7

; and ammunition dumps were scattered over the island in gcoves, caves and
"valleys. Enoggh food alone was taken on SAIPAN to feed the interned civi lian population for a period estimated as 7 months.
b. Although G-2fs problem ends with the capture of these and after
he has obtained any information therefrom, several points that arose should
be noted. In the first place, enemy ammunition dumps were frequently cap tured near the close of the day and therefore, could not be moved or thorough ly examined. Such precautions are necessary as booby traps and electric
wires permitting detonation by the Japanese were found in some cases* One
ammunition dump blew up early in the evening, apparently set off by remote
dontrol or by infiltrating parties, and caused casualties to our own troops
who were in the immediate vicinity. Secondly, the enemy, knowing the
location of his dumps, in many cases directed artillery and mortar fire on
them in an apparent effort to detonate them.
24* MEMY KNOWLEDGE OF OUR SITUATION.

a* Early in the operation, superior observation undoubtedly gave the

enemy c E j p e e knowledge of our situation. MT* TAPOTCHAU and the hills
xBalt south of it completely dominate the southern section of SAIPAN* As we
advanced north and seized MT TAPOTCHAU, enemy observation became poorer
and undoubtedly from that point on, he had limited information of our
activities*
6* POWs report that our landings were a complete surprise* Even when
our ships appeared off shore, there is evidence that the enemy was not certain
we were going to land. It is not known that the enemy captured any soldiers
of this Division or ceoeived any information from this source. Several
instances were reported where Division units lost classified doeuments, but
there are no known cases of the enemy taking advantage of, or actually obtain ing these documents. During the final counter-attack of 7 July, the enemy
overran positions containing SQIs and orders, but it is believed that he was
so completely disorganized at that time, that these were not used or even
recogni zed by him.
25. PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS AND PUBLIC ADDRESS BROADCASTS.

a. Higher headquarters had prepared leaflets calling upon the Japs to

surrender, which were dropped froxn planes both before landings were made
and during the operation. The value of these and their proper phraseology
will be discussed under reccramendations. Several times during the operation,
the Division requested that leB.flets be dropped. In the majority of these
cases, the leaflets fell either on our own troops or in the ocean and proved
of little valiae.
b The public address systems which were set up in the tanks of tank
commanders, proved of little value for the reason that every time these were
desired, the tanks were actively engaged in combat. It should be noted how ever, that the Division had attached to it only a Provisional Tank Bn and

that if a full battalion had been attached, tanks from the headquarters
unit might have been more available. In the few instances that tanks were
used for broadcasting purposes, some success was achieved*
c Due to the very limited use of tank loud speakers, it was necessary
to obtain public address systems from any source available. Initially
JASCO units furnished these from their shore parties. When its equipment
was landed, Division Signal Co. provided one. However, these systems were
too bulky to be transported into the jungle or cave areas, and could only
be operated from places where a vehicle could go. During the active oper ation, the prisoners obtained from the use of the system were few in number,
but during the mop-up phasd, the PA system proved of great value.
26. ENEMY CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS OF WAR.
a. During period 16 June thru 16 July 1944, the 27th Infantry Division
records give the following tallies of enemy killed, enemy service personnel
taken prisoner, and civilians taken into custody by troops of the Division*
^Killed 10537
FOiY 62
^Civilians in Custody 1129
Includes enemy killed by elements of the 27th Division while attached
to the 2nd or 4th Marine Divisions.
*Does not include POWs or civilians taken into custody by elements
of the 27th Division while attached to 2nd or 4th Marine Divisions*

SECTION

WHi.

T1SUN AND MOP - DP PHASE - 10 July - 7 Aug, 1944

1. TINIAN,

a. From 10 July to 30 July, the Division loss one regiment was held
in alert for use on;TIHIAN. During this period, all intelligence activities
wore directed toward preparation for this possible mission. This included*
(1) T w 0 meetings attended by Division General and 8pecial Staff
officers and"Regimental and Battalion commanders and staffs
during which orientation on terrain and enemy strength on
TINIAN was given by AC of 8, G-2.
(2) Translation and distribution of copies of a captured Jap map
. showing terrain descriptions. (Maps were obtained from G-2,
AGP).
(3) Preparation of the proposed intelligence annex to accompany
the Division field order if and v/hen required.
(4) Preparation and distribution of an Order of Battle for TINIAN
showing distribution of enemy units as disclosed by a map cap tured on SLIPAN.
(5) Meeting with all intelligence officers for discussion of intel ligence system as a result of &UIPAA experiences witih resulting
changes and additions*
(6) Preparation of an increased questionnaire form for use in inter rogation of POW's.
(7) Visit by AC jf S, G-2, to Hdqrs NTLF, and 2nS- and 4th MarDivs
on TINIAN for reconnaissance of terrain and comoat information*
b On 30 July, the division was released from the TINIAN alert and
assigned the mop-up mission of the northeastern portion of Sal PAN In telligenoe activities of this period included 1
(1) Tabulation of daily figures of enemy killed or captured and
civilians killed or taken into custody.
(2) Preliminary interrogation of POW s and civilians taken into
custody to ascertain location of otner groups.
(3) Frequent use of broadcasts to groups of enemy found in caves
or surrounded in-gulokes.
- 30

. ... wi

o* As matter of record and interest, the following figures are i n

oluded in this report for the mop-up period and the period following
thereafter* Figures attributable to elements of the 27th Infantry Div ision only are included. It should be born in mind that these figures
are compiled from combat results after the announcement that SAIPAN had
been "secured".

KILLED

POW Civilian 38 107 9 Military 117 75 66 Civilian 674 452 342

Date July 16-30 incl (105 INF) July 31 Aug 7 (incl) Aug 8 - 3 1 (incl)

Military 773 796 331 1900

755"

I35ff

Comment: The above figures should serve as warning to all intelligence

officers that the fight is not over at the moment the word "secured" is
given. They must be alert to the fact that in following days there will
be plenty of grief from enemy groups hiding in caves, gulches, and rough
terrain and their ingenuity will be taxed to suggest methods of assisting
the troops to root out such groups. It is during this period that inter preters and broadcasts are in particular demand.

SECTION

RECOMMENDATIONS

A The following recommendations are submitted as a result of experience

gained in preparation for and during the SAIPAN operation*
1 MAPSi a* It is recommended that:

Scale l/20,000 be continued as the official scale*

b Target square system be continued but a more prominent color

be used for the numbers designating the squares. Consideration must be
given to choice of a color which will not make terrain features unread able. Training to include a further mental division of 200 yard sub-squares
as explained in Section I par 4.
c. Distribution be made to include squad leaders. Maps of scale
l/62,500 be provided for orientation purposes to include plato&n leaders.
d. Maps of scale l/l0,000 be provided for use of staffs.
e. Litho mosaic maps of scale l/20,000 be provided to include platoon
leaders, but printed on more legible paper and from the most recent photographs
possible, even if distribution must be delayed until a few days prior to em barkation.

2#

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS:

a. Under the present T/0 of an Infantry Division which limits facilities

for P.I. study, vertical photographs of 24" focal length taken at 10,000
feet and oblique photographs taken at 1000 to 1500 feet are recommended.
b. During planning phase, a minimum of fiTje (5) sets of each is
recommended for an Infantry Division.
c. During operation phase distribution of complete sets is recommended
to include Division Headquarters* each Infantry Regimental Headquarters, J)/A
Headquarters, and each Artillery Battalion Headquarters* It would be ideal if
selected photographs could be available to each Infantry Battalion Headquarters
covering the Battalion area with further selection to each Company Commander
covering his immediate front.
d. Oblique coverage of the terrain 2000 to 5000 yards ahead of a
division front at time intervals depending on the progress of the advance
and with distribution similar to that described in c above.

- 32

& Vectograph photographs are considered invaluable for plan ning purposes before and during an operation.
f. Comment: Value of photographs during combat depends greatly
on the length of the delay between time of taking and receipt by users.
This is problem to be solved by headquarters above division and requires
serious consideration and planning.
3. RELIEF MODELS: It is recommended that:
a. Production of a minimum of five (6.) relief models for planning
purposes be made available as quickly as possible after assignment of a
mission*
b Production of enough relief models be accomplished in order
that one model will be available for study and orientation on each ship
carrying combat personnel. Models are not considered essential on AKAs
c Production of models of definitely chosen landing beaches to
include terrain as far as the initial beachhead line be made.

4. PUNNING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

a. As previously described, many headquarters are involved in

planning an operation. Working independently Intelligence Sections of these
Headquarters are frequently working on the same angle and in turn will pro duce this angle as intelligence information. This was particularly true
in preparation of Photo Interpretation Reports for the Forager Operation.
The result of this particular case was a deluge of material (sometimes
contradictory) on the lowest element, in this oase the division.
b It is recommended that higher Headquarters prescribe weekly or
more fsequent conferences be held between Intelligence Officers of all
headquarters involved in order that each may be familiar with the other*s
plans and duplication of effort prevented. A centralized group of P. I.
specialists would materially simplify this angle. Such coordination can not but reduce time, labor, expense, and headaches.
5. PROPAGANDA;
a. It is recommended that all propaganda prepared for distribution
prior to or during an operation be reviewed by persons of Japanese ancestry
who are thoroughly familiar with Japanese psychology. This also applies to
preparation of broadcasts urging the enemy to surrender. A check must be
included on the printing of Japanese chaactors as mistakes amuse the Japanese
soldier and greatly reduce the vnlue of propaganda leaflets. A study of
P 1 Y interrogation reports will frequently suggest propaganda angles which
O/ prisoners have volunteered as suggestions along this line.

6. AERIAL PHOTO IiJTal

a. It is recommended that aerial photographs provided during combat
be accompanied by keys which will show the area involved and if time permits,
interpretations. It should be possible for higher headquarters to accomplish
this with personnel and facilitiesfityailable.Limited delay necessitated
would fully compensate for the great delay necessary in making such identifi cations and interpretations at a division or lower unit command post where
personnel f n facilities are very limited.
id b. For training purposes it is recommended that photographs provided
as aids bo accompanied by "approved solutions". The solutions should be the
result of a trained interpreter's analysis or from actual inspection of the
ground after an operation. They will provide a student with a definite answer
to his interpretation and not leave him hanging in the air which has been
frequently the case in the p . s
t\t

7. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION.

a* The present l/o strength of the Intelligence Section of an In fantry Division is not considered suitable and it is recommended that the
following reorganization be considered*
Lt. Col, AC of S, G-2
Mc.jor, Asst, AC of S, G-2
Capt., Asst, AC of S, G-2
HEADQUARTERS (CP) SECTION
Section Chief Stenographer Draftsman Clerk Asst Section Chief Stenographer Draftsman Clerk

Comment: With this organization, the section can work satisfactorily

over an extended period, and in movement of command posts*
OBSERVATION (Qp) SSCTION
Chief 2 Observers

ORDER OF BATTLE SECTION

One (l) enlisted m:m
Comment; It is believed that c, trained order of battle man is most
necessary for a division in the Pacific Thoato-r, The structure of tho Jap anese Army and Navy requires the entire time of a trained men, both in garri son or combat operations.^ Ajiian who can translate Japanese would be an asset*

PHOTO INTERPRETATION SECTION

One (1) officer
2 Interpreters
Comment: The value of aerial photographs, if received in reasonable
time, is extremely high. Their value is lessened unless trained photo inter preters are available to study the pictures and disseminate the results rapidly
to those who need them. It is further reoommended that one (l) trained photo
interpreter be included in the l/0 of each infantry regiment and a minimum of
one (l) in the T/0 of a division artillery headquarters*
HJBLIC RELATIONS SECTION
One (1) officer
6 enlisted men
Comment: The personnel should be trained in all phases of Public
Relation activities. It is recommended that personnel be distributed: One
(1) officer assigned to division headquarters for general supervision* Two
(2) men to be assigned with this officer. This group should cover all units
of & division except the division artillery and the three (3) infantry regi*
ments, to each of which one (l) nan should be assigned. During a combat oper ation, transportation is required by the PR Section for use of correspondents.
LANGUAGE SECTION
(See separate recommendations)
CENSORHHIF DETACHMENTS
a. It is recommended that the AC of $, G-2 of a division, and the
senior'officer representing a Theater Censor, be authorized to make censor ship decisions as problems arise during combat operations and the period
immediately following. <
b. It is further recommended that the censorship team attached to a
division from the Office of a Theater Censor, bo of sufficient strength to
censor all of a division's mail. If this is the case, such a team will be
familiar with all restrictions imposed on a division prior to and during an
operation and will aid in reducing the delay in out-going mail which occurred
during the SAIPAN Operation.
Comment: For some months, two (2) officers and one (1) enlisted man
were attached to the Division from the Office of the Theater Censor, CPA.
This personnel accompanied the Division to SAIPAN. They were instructed by
Theater Censor, CPA, prior to departure from OAHD, but not given authority to
make censorship decisions on the ground as problems arose. Similar authority
was not given to the Division. This resulted in some confusion and lack of

/ * -** p fm
"* 8. PERMANENT LANGUAGE TEAMS.
a. It is recommended that Nisei language teams become permanent
parts of Infantry divisions operating in the Pacific Theater. If this is
not possible, it is recommended that nucleus of a team be a permanent part
of a division. The necessity for such action is considered paramount for
the following reasons*
(1) Familiarization of personnel of a division with the Nisei
personnel who will work with them is essential.
(2) Familiarization of Nisei personnel with a division1s plan
of use of them. The extreme contrast between the operations
of the 27th ^ivision Language team in the Gilberts (6 weeks
after it joined the Division) and at SAIPAN is an example.
(3) Need of Nisei personnel in rehabilitation periods for in struction of division personnel in Japanese phrases, common
documents, and interrogation procedure; instruction of
selected personnel in the Japanese language; processing of
trophies; and translation.
b. It is recommended that a language team be increased to consist
of four (4) officers and sixteen (16) enlisted men to be used in an operation
as follows:
One (l) officer and two (2) men at division headquarters - inter pogation and translation.
One (1) officer and two (2) men for use of the civil affairs offi cer and on release, to augment the division headquarters team.
One (l) officer and four (4) men with each infantry regiment.
(Two at regimental headquarters and one with each battalion)
NOTE: Division Artillery with its many radios reported many
Japanese intercepts during the SAIPAN Operation and it is possible that mater ial of value could have been picked up from these had a man who understood
Japanese been available at the moment.
9. ORDER OF BATTLE.
a. It is recommended that until such time as tables of organization
of an infantry division authorize Order of Battle personnel, one man be desig nated in a division intelligence section to act in that capacity as his prin*
ciple duty. This man should receive all possible data covering the subject.
He must become thoroughly familiar with Japanese army terms and its constant ly varying organization. In the field, his time should be reserved for tho
performance^of ^ s , pn&o^l duties. Selection of the man to fill this job will
-36

*&$' LM

'**& .,ii'

-'

. *4

_. .

._.

require serious consideration as the duty requires an analytical mind.

EADIO SETS FOR OP PERSONNEL.
a. It is recommended that an infantry division G-2 section be
equipped with two (2) SCR 300 sets for communication to and from division
advance OPs.

11. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING FOR UNITS.

10.

During the training period prior to the SAIPAN operation, emphasis

was placed on the obtaining and accurate reporting of intelligence information
by all personnel and in particular by officers, noncommissioned officers, and
patrols, there were frequent cases when negative results of this training
occurred. It is reconanended that added emphasis be given to night and day
patrolling and submission of accurate, brief, and correct reports. Sketching
should also be included. It is suggested that in all battalion and oompany
tactical problems, this subject be emphasized to the point that the commander's
solution be considered unsatisfactory if the intelligence angle is not satis factorily met.
12. PROCESSING OF POfts AND CIVILIANS.

a. It is recommended that future training exercises include actual

G-l, G-2, G-4 situations involving processing of POWs and civilians in order
that procedure can be coordinated. POWs and civilians should be represented
and not simulated, thrown into the problem in varying numbers and at various
times, and routes of evacuation should be realistic so that all possible sit uations are presented. Transportation facilities should be limited..MB train ing should include searching of enemy personnel, utilization of proper vehicles,
and instruction in similar subjects met in an operation.
13. TRAINING OF RECONNAISSANCE TROOP;

a. It is recognized that the primary mission of a division recon naissance troop is distant mechanized reconnaissance to the front and flanks
of a division. Operations in the Central Pacific against atolls and rela tively sruall islands with rugged mountainous terrain have severely limited this
use. In addition, shipping space has not been available for the mechanized
equipment of a troop. As a result, troops have been trained and used either
as combat units similar to rifle companies or as amphibious reconnaissance
units. In the SAIPAN Operation, the 27th Division Reconnaissance Troop was
assigned a number of varied missions. The majority of these were of value
for intelligence purposes but were not primarily reconnaissance.
b. It will be recognized that as a result of combat experience to
date in this theatre, the primary purpose of Reconnaissance Troops has of
necessity been placed in the background. It is to be anticipated that future
operations in the Pacific will demand the use of the troop along the lines
for which it was CESS*1^^!* However, undoubtedly, there will be other in

stances where the specialized training troops have been given will prove of
value, particularly amphibious reconnaissance, rubber boat training, and dis mounted patrolling. Therefore, it is recommended that the training of a
troop emphasize mechanized reconnaissance but that training also continue
in the specialized subjects.
14. PUBLIC RELATIONS:
a. For recommendations see Annex - A -

- 38

ANKEX (A) * REPORT OF J&B&LC RELATIONS

1. GENERAL.
a Public Relations activities of the 27th Infantry Division during
the SAIPAN Operation were covered by two types of correspondents*
(1) Combat correspondents and photographers attached to the Div ision by Hq CPA. These correspondents were all either officers
or enlisted men of the Army. Included in this group w &s a
photographic team from the GpA Signal ihoto Lab. whoso mission
covered intelligence studies as well as r'R servicest
(2) Civilian correspondents a:id photogr-.\phcrs representing news papers, magazines, ,>ross service3, and news reclsp These
representatives were assigned by Naval Headquarters to move
on designated ships and to cover specific units.
2. PLANNING.
a. During the weeks preceding departure for the Operation, the Division
PR Officer devoted most of his time to close association with the Public
Relations Section, CJTA. It was recognized that atoll combat, lasting only
a few days, would be supplanted by land mass fighting which can last over
an extended period. With this in mind it was necessary that well coordin ated but flexible plans be made. Included in the planning were:
(1) A complete knowledge of the policies of CPA headquarters.
(2) Complete familiarity with Naval censorship regulations as
Navy completely controlled this feature of press releases.
(3) Elastic plans for accumulation, preparation, and transmission
of copy and pictures
(4) Familiarity with tactical plans by tho Division PR officer.
(5) Cultivation of acquaintanceship with all newspaper correspondents
and in particular those assigned to cover the Division*
3. ASSIGNMENT OF CORRuSi QI
a. As previously noted, civilian pr^ns correspondents wore assigned by
Navy for movement to SAIPAN. In ardor tu o,,vor all phases of the operation,
the Navy planned that these correspondents v/uulc! prepare pooled copy* This
copy received radio release to Penrl Harbor. In addition, correspondents
were permitted to mail copy after censoring had been done by the Navy. This
plan functioned to a decree for approximately the first week but broke down

when the command ship, which controlled the copy, was required to leave the
vicinity of SAIPAN. At this tine, civilian correspondents were changed from
Division coverage to general coverage and thereafter acted in a free lance
capacity.
b. The combat correspondent and photographic personnel supplied by CPA
consisted of one (l) officer and fourteen (l4)men. These men were distributed
as follows:
DIVISION HEADQUARTERS
Public Relations Officer, CPA
Combat Correspondent
News Photographer
EACH INFANTRY REGIMENT
Combat Correspondent
2 Still photographers
Movie Photographer
Combat correspondent group assigned to Division Headquarters Covered
the D/A and special units and movie men from the Infantry Teams were avail able for such pictures of these same organizations.
c. Photographic Team attached to the Division from the CPA Photographic
Laboratory consisted of one (l) officer and five (5) men; three (3) were
still and three (3) were movie cameramen. It was understood by AC of S,
G-2 that their missions were to be threefold:
(1) Photographs of subjects which the officer in charge considered
of interest to the " t .
fD (2) Photographing subjects for intelligence purposes as directed
by AC of S, G-2, CPA.
(3) Photo coverage of the Division for news and intelligence pur poses.
Originally this team was broken into three sub-teams, each consisting
of one movie and one still photographer, and each sub-team was attached to
an Infantry Regiment. The officer in charge was advised of feature subjects
by the division PR Officer whenever possible.
Comments The functioning 6f the Photographic Team was not satisfactory.
It is not believed that further comment is necessary as the reason was one
of leadership. The officer in charge did not fulfill his intelligence M s sions, was constantly unavailable as ho was on personally selected missions^
and returned to OAHU before the end of the operation. One enlisted man
voluntarily remained behind to film movies covering actions of the Division.

4. PROCEDURE.
a. Press coverage of the operation covered three (3) distinct phases:
(1) Approximately the first two weeks when the news agencies wore
interested in the overall picture.
(2) Period thereafter when the regional stories were demanded, the
operation having lost front page priority,
(3) The entire period, but particularly toward the close of the oper ation when "hero" stories were in demand.
b. In newspaper terms a story is cold after twenty-four hours. There fore, speed and accuracy were necessary. To provide this, the following
plan was made. In order to provide shelter, maintenance, and working
facilities to civilian correspondents NTLF established a "Press Club" in
CHAR&N KANOA at which the following daily routine was observed by the Divis ion PR officer.
(1) A situation map was ke|rt.
(2) Combat correspondents1 copy was picked up daily,
(3) Copy of the combat correspondents was passed to civilian
correspondents,
(4) Civilian correspondents were briefed by the Division PR officer
on the previous day's activities and the tactical plans for the
present day, which information he obtained at headquarters NTLF,
(5) Civilian correspondents prepared their copy,
(6) Division xR Officer delivered press copy to the command ship
for censorship and transmission,
(7) Division PR Officer informed the civilian correspondents of
particular occurrences which might be desired as human interest
or special features,
5. COMMENTS:
a. The civilian newspaper man is a human being. It is natural that he
will turn his attention to where his own best personal interests lie. '^hose
civilian correspondents assigned to the 27th Infantry Division were human
and after several days of hitch hiking and caring for themselves, it was
natural for them to incline toward coverage of units which provided them with
transportation and conveniences. To combat this it is apparent that in future
operations, particularly those which include other branches of the service,
maintenance must be considered by the Army for represent

atives of the press if the Army is to get complete coverage.

b. The Combat Correspondent is a part of the service. As such he is
primarily a soldier. However to cover his job completely he must be con stantly on the move with little time for rest and is in contact continually
with officers and men who do not know him and who handicap his work because
of this lack of knowledge. A combat correspondent should be allowed to wear
a distinguishing patch, personnel should be educated as to their duties, and
sufficient combat correspondents should be provided so that shifts can be
arranged.
6P ACCOMPLISHMENTS*

a. During the SAIPAN Operation 10,000 feet of black and white and
2,00 feet of Kodachrome movie film were taken of Division activities.
Approximately 1500. still pictures were shot, ver 700 stories were written
and released to the press or to the rublic Relations Section, G-2 CPA.
7. RECOMMENDATIONS.
(NOTEj The word "Correspondent" is used to cover both newsman and
photographers)
a. It is recommended that study be made and equipment provided to meet
the needs of civilian press representatives attached to an Army Division to
cover an operation. This should inolude transportation, meintanance, and
working facilities.
b It is recommended that the number of combat (enlisted) correspondents
working with a division during an operation be increased to twenty (20) so
that these men can be relieved at intervals to prepare their copy and accom plish the "reporting" end of their duties. Combat correspondents should wear
an identifying patch and be afforded means of transportation. (30 combat
correspondents and 70 combat photographers were present with Marine units
during the SAIrAN Operation)
c. It is r_commended that all Army personnel be thoroughly familiarized
with the functions and duties of civilian and combat correspondents in order
that they may have a clear conception of how this personnel should be received
and assisted.

- 42

NTLF Pflfr IMT&RHOGiiTION FORM Date: Name:

When did POW oome to area:
UNIT complete identification: name, number, organization Time and place of capture:
Circumstances of capture/surrender:
Food:
Water:
Propaganda leaflets:
Morale of POW - expand on this:
What is morale of his unit:
Casualties in his unit:
Disposal of enemy dead:
Yi'here has unit gone:
What units oppose us:
Site:
Disposition:
Weapons:
Enemy communication and organization telephones, radio centers:

(Note t o Language O f f i c e r s : P r e s s t h e s e q u e s t i o n s - GET THE INFO SOMEHOW GET AROUND THEM - GET THE D&eE THAT I S URGENTLY NEEDED N 1 J I f POW d o e s n ' t OY know, say s o , but g e t e v e r y t h i n g he does know!

ANNEX

PROPOSED 27TH INFANTRY DIVISION INTERROGATION FORM

The following points of enemy information.mil be covered by those
interpreters assigned to the Division FOW Collection Point,
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Name, age, rank, serial number, branch.
JOT's date of arrival zt '. . \
Date of departure from JAJ?AN or previous station.
Organization - including code number and COs of Co., En* and Regt,
Initial strength of organization and detailed history of its
action since time of our landing/attack.

6 Casualties of his unit - other units*

7. Strength of forces on . ,
8. Identification of any other units opposing us, or in
code numbers, strength, disposition, weapons. Check this against
the Order of Battle.
9. Location of artillery or dual purpose guns - mortars, MGs.
10. Location attdaatroagth of reserves (i.e., any force or assembly
of troops, no matter how small, in rear areas.)
11. Location of headquarters of his unit, other headquarters.
12. Location, number, and size of any tanks - both mobile and immobile.
13. Location and size of any mine fields - including bombs and shells
buried as mines - STRESS.
14. Location and type of enemy dumps - food, water, ammunition.
15. Any information as to the enemy's plan of defense (ie. delaying
action, fixed line, oounter-attack, etc.)
16. Location and type of any prepared defensive positions.
17. Does i?OW know of any plans for a counter-attack, including assembly
area, strength, time, plan, etc? Stress this as enemy situation
becomes increasingly difficult.
18. Disposition of enemy dead.
19. Are they searching our dead, and if so, are they receiving any
, information?
20. j?OWfs morale.
21. Morale of enemy troops on . .
22. Food and water conditions.
23. What are enemy communications?
24. What is our most effective weapon?
25. What was the effect of preliminary bombing and shelling?
2$ Location of any civilian assembly areas.
27. Location of any difficult and critical terrain features.
28. How much did the enemy know of the operation on " : - how
'; long were communications open and how effective were they?
29. Effect of propaganda leaflets - previous days and future,
- 44

30#

Reaction to interrogation by Nisei.

2 Completion of answers tc the questions on this list does not end your
job- Go after any other information concerning the operation which you can
obtain.
3. Written reports will be provided to G-2 as soon as possible, giving in
detail the informntioa received from the j W . If possible, the P V f will be re Oi tained at the collecting point until an officer of the G-2 Section has had the
opportunity to review the written report. Each report will be signed by the
interrogator in charge before being submitted to G*2

f l

MAP ' SAIPAN

SCALE" 1.40,000

HEADQUARTERS 27 INFANTRY DIVISION OPERATIONS of 2 7 T H 17 JUNE - 9 JULY

PREPARED

INF 1944

DIV

BY A C o f S , G - 3

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT "

9
Framj To : 161700 June 1944 171700 June 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div TA 126Y 17 June 1944 No. 1 Maps: 1. SAIPAN, l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 , Sheet No, 5

ENMT SITUATION AT END OP PERIOD, a, Omitted,

2,

ENEMY OPERATION DURING PERIOD, a. General Sumraary (1) None.

3#

MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy c a s u a l t i e s and POWfs*

(1) No r e p o r t . b# l e a t h e r and v i s i b i l i t y - H^^vy showers d u r i n g n i g h t and morning; v i s i b i l i t y f a i r , except during r a i n . c. Miscellaneous (1) 4. None,

E E Y CAPABILITIES, NM a. No report.

V N ANmBRP A Lt Colonel G-2

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

Fran: 1600 17 Juno 1944
To : 1600 18 June 1944
Hq 27th inf Div
TA 118R
18 June 1944
No. 2
Maps; SAIPAN l/20,000, Shoot 5
1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
a. Enemy front lino - Overlay attached,

b. Defensive organization - During day, only organized enemy positions

wore those circling ASLITO AIRPORT which consisted of reinforced concrete
blockhouses and undergound dugouts of largo dimensions. High ground extend ing SE from the airport also contained strong enemy positions. 4th MarDiv
air observer reportsenemy activity in TA 108 whore trenches and AA install ations appeared in process.
c. Units in contact - No identifications have been obtained by troops
of this division. Captured annex to enemy field order of May giving dispo sitions of units forwarded to Hq NLF at 0830. Typo of resistance follows
an organized plan giving the impression that the enemy is not disorganized
and that thoir morale remains unchanged,
d. Artillory - Artillery fire reported from positions in TA 108.
o. f. Reserve and other forces - No information.
Supply and evacuation establishments - No informatrion,

Z. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Sumuary of last night, enemy had been drivon to lino approxi mately 300 yards Ti f tho airport and on high ground running SE from the
airport. During t.. night, enemy counterattacked from the latrtor high
i-. ground driving our right back approximately 1200 yds. Commencing at day broak, our forces rocomnoncod the attack and by noon, had regained tho high
ground. At 1015, tho onomy had boon drivon from ASLITO AIRFIELD# From
those times on, enemy resistance was organized but light. During afternoon,
thoywithdrew slowly before our advances.
b. AA artillory - Rcportod in TA 108.

c. Miscellaneous - Six (6) enemy mines discovered along SE coast from

TA 117Q to TA 109D. Evidence that other mines had boon blown or romovc?d
May be minos on reef.

- 1

3. MISCELLANEOUS.
a* (1) Enemy casualties estimated light. Bodies found by our troops
infrequently.
Prisoners - Approximately twolvo (12) civilian prisoners taken
by 105th Inf. One (1) wounded Japanoso soldiers taken by 165th Inf.
b. Morale - Continues unchanged.

c. Supply and equipment - Largo quantities of technical supplios wore

abandoned at the airfield as well as quantities of ammunition. Caves along
the SE coast from TA 117Q to TA 109D reported to contain stocks of ammuni tion.
d. Terrain not under our control - See overlay.

e. Enemy knowledge of our situation - High ground to the N occupied by

the enomy gives him complete observation of our activities,
f. Weather and visibility - Have remained excellent during day except
for dust clouds following movement of vehicles,
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Tho enemy is capable of continuing his withdrawal to the E# occupy ing the high ground in TA 102, 108, 115, 124 from which ho con launch
counterattacks against us. The enemy is capable of attempting to remove
his forces to the I into the high ground known to be already held b^hiin.
T The enemy is capable of attempting landings along the S and SE shore? from
TITIAN thereby coming in our rear in order to relieve the pressure Op, his
troops being forced back to the E. ^

Ml. M. VAN ANTWERP

Lt Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-2

- 2

10
16

/
/^H

08

13

G-2 SiTJftTlON OVERL iY

TC ACCOMPANV AS 0*^ 36GO 18 JUNE f9'+4

1:20,000

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1600 18 June 1944
To : 1600 19 June 1944
Hq 27th Inf Div
TA 118Y
19 June 1944
No. 3
Maps: SAIPAN, l/20,000, Sheet No. 5.
1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
a. Enemy front line - From TA 140W to TA 124Ef the enemy has boen iso lated in groups of mangrove and coral caves at intervals along the coast.
Balance of enemy occupies the SE point within an area bounded roughly by
TA 124A to 123S114R113S106D.
b. Defensive organization - During period, no organized installations
v/ore met except pill boxes in TA 106BCDE107A and along the crest of the
ridge extending N from NAFUTAN POINT.
c. Units in contact - No new identifications were made during the per iod. From all appearances, enemy on the NAFUTAN POINT ridge are making a
do or die stand.
d. Artillery - See overlay.
o. Reserves - No reserves possible as a l l enemy is pocketed on the high ground N of NAFUTAN POINT. f Supply establishments. - Additional caves containing ammunition wer located along the S shore from T 104B-10&D. Ammunition dump was reported A in general area 123FG. Dunps of gas, 8" s h e l l s , and grenades found in oavos at 117ST. 2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
a. Summary - Enemy action continued similar to previous twenty-four (24) hours v/ith gradual withdrawal to high ground n of NAFUTAN POINT. Air
observation indicates strong l a s t stand resistance in this area.
b. Operations

(1) Artillery - Dual purpose gun in action at 12371. 70mm or 75mm

artillery fire and heavy mortar fire received from high groujad N of NAFUTAN
POINT.
(2) Aviation - One air attack received at approximately 1830,
18 June 1944. One plane crash landed at ASLITO Airfield and pilot* captured;
processed and forwarded to Hq NLF.
c. Miscellaneous - Land mines reported along the line 123X114X
Additional mines found along IVhito Beach #1.
- 1

cL Pill boxes encountered in TA 1O6A-E are so constructed that personnel

can retire into inner compartments thereby escaping explosion of grenades
thrown into pill box openings.
e# A few mines and booby traps reported found on ASLITO Airfield,

3* MISCELLANEOUS.
a. (1) Prisoners - Approximately 400 prisoners have been taken during
the period of which two (2) were army and one (1) air force. Among the
civilian prisoners wore several of Japanese descent clad in light tan uni forms and caps. Generally speaking, they were elderly and stated that they
had been "ostracized" from Japan, They were employed as laborers and were
allowed no access to military knowledge< They expressed hatred of the Japan ese soldier because of treatment received*
(2) Casualties - Same situation as in previous report. Very few
enemy dead have been encountered*
b. Morale - Enemy gives impression of a last stand attitude. In one
incident, one soldier could be seen loading and firing what appeared to be
a 70mm gun by himself.
c. Supply c i equipment - Except for ammunition and gas as previously
ud noted, little enemy materiel taken.
d. Enemy controlled terrain - See overlay.

e. leather and visibility - Excellent throughout period except for dust.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
a. Tho enemy is capable of making a death stand on the high ground N
of NAFUTAN POINT.
b. The enemy is capable of making a counter attack in an attempt to
escape from his bottled up position N of NAFUTAN POINT.
c. The enemy is capable of attempting landings along the S and SW shores
of tho island in an attempt to come in our rear.
d. The enemy is capable of assisting any of the aforesaid capabilities
by fire from peninsula N of MAGICIENNE BAY.

M. VAN
Lt Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-2

' - 2

10

G-2 SlTUATIOM

TO ACCOMPANY
O-2 PCRIOOIC REPORT # 3 AS OP te60C TO 19*600 JV)Ht '44 SAIPAN- 1^20,000

\ 470mm
-

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1600 19 June 1944
To : 1600 20 Juno 1944
Hq 27th Inf Div
TA 129K
20 June 1944
No. 4
Maps: SAIPAN, l/20,000, Sheet No. 5
1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF P3RI0D.
a. Enemy front line - See attached overlay.

b. Defensive organization - The enemy defensive organization consisted

of a number of strong points and there was no definite front line at any
period. The system of defense of the enemy seems to be to defend certain
local strong points with artillery and moratr fire from NAFUTAN PLATEAU.
Along the south shore of the island were a number of pill boxes and
strong points which delayed the advance of the 3rd Bn 105th Inf as each had
to bo cleaned out individually. In addition in the entire zone of advance
of the Division, there are numerous caves and holes in the hills where enemy
civilians and military personnel were concealed,
c. Units in contact - Only positive identification - 55th Guard Unit.
There io*o also elements of the TOHA Unit which consists mainly of air force
personnel connected with ASLITO Airfield, Identifications from documents of
forces on SAIPAN were forwarded earlier.
d. Artillery - 70mm HOW artillery has been falling on our troops from
positions on the ridge which have been difficult to locate. In the after noon of the 20th, artillery pieces wore wheeled out of a cavo in TA 165M
and opened fire on our troops. For further positions, see overlay.
e. Reserves - It is believed that there are no reserves available to
tho onomy in the SE part of SAIPAN as all forces are probably committed in
this restricted or on..
f. Supply and evacuation establishments - A dump of 20mm and small arms
ammunition was captured EAST of tho airfield. There are approximately ton
20mm AA guns on airfield with plenty of onraunition. In addition, there are
approximately 400 rounds of 4,7 ammunition. There are probably additional
supply dumps in the caves in the vicinity of MT. NiiFUTAN and along tho S
shore.
2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
a. Summary - At about 2000 19 June, about 75 of the enemy made a dis organized counterattack against the right flank of the 165th Inf. This was
turned back by artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire, the area having been
lighted by flares. During the remainder of the night, some infiltration was
attempted,
- 1

Our attack jumped off at 1200 20 June and advance d rapidly as the
enemy fought a continued defensive action from various strong points,
b. Operations

(1) A r t i l l e r y * - Several f i e l d guns from positions noted on overlay

fired on our troops. Thoy apparently had previously r e g i s t e r e d on ridge
lines and c r i t i c a l p o i n t s . During afternoon of the 20th, a r t i l l e r y in caves
in PURPLE BEACH area opened f i r e from the rear on our forces.
c. Miscellaneous

(1) Additional land mines -were reported around the a i r p o r t and in

TA 119L Booby traps also v/ero found in v i c i n i t y of these mines.
(2) Additional horned mines were found on MITE BEACH # 1 as well as booby traps consisting of hand grenades with s t r i n g s attached. (3) In areas 123TYE p i l l boxes were reported which had charged wire
ar und them and some casualties wore caused by t h e s e .
3. MISCELLANEOUS. a. prisoners

(1) One (1) military prisoner connected with the Naval Air Corps
was captured. Also, three (3) prisoners were captured along the coast gen erally in TA 1320. One of these was possibly a military prisoner although
they all stated they were Koreans. An attempt was made by using the loud speaker system to capturenoro POY/S.S in the general area. It is possible more
prisoners can be taken in the caves underneath the cliffs along the shore
by using this system. About seventy (70) additional civilians were also
token.
(2) Casualties - No accurate estimate can. be given of the enemy dead
because of the extremely rugged nature of the terrain and the apparent attempt
of the enemy tor en: ve his dead.
~ b. Morale - Morale apparently continues high. Several of the enemy
were observed committing suicide when capture appeared imminent. T&e enemy
seems determined to make i. do or die stand on the S E point. Prisoner NAKSHIMA
Toshio, is willing to broadcast to any prisoners who are trapped, calling up on them to surrender.
c. Supply and equipment - See 1 (f) above.
d. Terrain not under our control. This terrain is extremely rugged
country and is cohered by coral rock and dense woods. In the cliffs over looking the sea and in the mountain areas, are numerous caves and holes.
Those will continue to make progress slow as each must be carefully examined.
e. Enemys probable knowledge of our situation - E^omy observation con tinues good from the high ground and he is probably fami? iar with our situa tion. - 2

f Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - Have continued good and observation has not been r e s t r i c t e d . g. Miscellaneous - During the night of 19-20 June, enemy troops were reported milling around on PURPLE BEACHES #1 and #2, A counterattack or enveloping movement in boats was a n t i c i p a t e d , but t h i s did not develop. 4. E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM

a. The enemy is capable of defending on the high ground in the v i c i n i t y with a l l his forces making a l a s t ditch stand a t t h i s point. b . The enemy is capable of counter attacking a t any time and a t any place on our front with a l l forces pinned on NAFUTAN POINT. c. The enemy is capable of landing along the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST shores of the island moving troops from TINIAN or from the NORTHERN p a r t of SAIPAN.

VAN ANTWE Lt Colonel G-2

- 3

G--2
to ACCOMPANY

ARtV PC tN TA I65*|

hoi

L E & I *4D
OilT

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 16OOK 20 June 1944
To : 1600K 21 June 1944
Hq 27th inf Div
TA 129K
21 June 1944
No. 5
Maps: SAIPAN, l/20,000, Sheet No. 5.
1* E P M Y SITUATION AT END OF PSRIOD.

a* Enemy front line - Seo Overlay.

b Defensive organization - Enemy fighting from caves and holes housing
machine guns and mortars. Some heavier guns present. Blockhouses*
o. Units in contact - Enemy personnel appears to be mainly the remnants
of the Naval air units from ASLITO FIELD. Estimated 300 to 500 service per sonnel with a larger number of civilians in addition.
d. Artillery - Artillery fire was received from a gun concealed in a
cave with steel doors at TA 108G.
Field piece observed at TA 108L.
Either artillery or DP guns observed on shore of
MAGICIENNE BAY, in TA 165B.CD, and TA 176V.WJC. No
observable activity around them.
e. Reserves - None possible in NAFUTAN POINT area.

f. SUPPLY and evacuation dumps - None reported during period,

ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
a. General Sunmary - :iinor counter attacks at 2000 and 2200 20 June
1944, were repulsed. During day, 21 June 1944, action of purely defensive
nature similar to 20 June.
b. Operations of component elements 2.

(1) Artillery - The field piece located at TA 108G operated from a

cave with entrance covered by steel doors. Doors opened, gun was run out
and fired, returned to cuve, and doors closed,
(2) Chemical warfare - Enemy in front of 165th Infantry all carried
gas masks, pow stated they expected to have gas employed against them.
(3) Infantry increased use of knee mortars and 90mm mortars
observed.
c. Misce1lane ous

- 1

(1) The three (3) captured 4,7 Jap guns previously reported were
used to fire on PURPLE BEACHES during night 20-21 June. Ammunition plenti ful.
(2) Land mines were reported at IA 115C. Mines and booby traps
were found in pillboxes along shore in TA 106#
(3) previously reported booby traps on WHITE BEACH # 1 , made of
grenades with strings attached, were examined by an Engineer officer who
reports they appear to be a type of grenade carrier consisting of two boards
with 5 grenades between them and the boards strapped together with tape.
3. HISCELLANEOUS.
a. area.
(2) caves,
(3) Many individuals refused to come out of caves, Caves were blown in making i t impossible to oven estimate number of dead sealed therein. (4) In areas T 128A-E and 129A-D inspection of A positions dis A A closed estimated 400-500 dead.
(5) PO'lf's - 22 civilians including one (1) woman who identified her self as a nurse on the plantation. Her husband is in TINIAN whore she spent six years. T o (2) naval personnel. w b. Morale (1) water. Do or die attitude s t i l l present. Indications are that dead have been ha-uled away and hidden in
Enemy casualties. (1) Approximately 25 dead Japs ware counted in the N F T N POINT
AU A

(2) Ono r val P W gave up duo to propaganda leaflets and lack of O He roporte food available.

(3) One (1) civilian committed suicide before our troops could roach him and shouted there is nothing to livo for now. (4) success, c. Supply and equipment It is beliovod further use of propaganda leaflets can have

(1) T o 8" mortars reported in T 1241 can now be definitely identi w A fied as such. Division ordnance officer reports barrel 8* longj estimated weight 12-14000 lbs; breech loaded; semi-fixed ammunition; 30-40 lb projec t i l e . Sighting equipment destroyed. Guns in fixed positions. 123G. (2) Large quantity of good 3" A annunition found in .dump at T A A Puses removed and stored at airfield by ordnance officer.

- 2

(3) Thirteen foot height finder found in T 123G has been removed A to airfield, d* Terrain not under our control - See overlay. rugged with more and deeper caves and holes. e. Continues increasingly

Enemy's knowledge of our situation - No change. Visibility

f. Weather - T o s h e a r s during night; fair during day. w good except for dust.

g. Use of interpreters to urge enemy to give up was continued at 1600. no results reported. h. One P W states that prior to O were brought to SAIPAN from TIN IAN. IENNE B Y area one week prior to our A G R . A and CHARAN-KANQA were closed A AP N week. 4. E E Y CAPABILITIES, NM a. No change. our landing bcth soldiers and civilians Seven hundred were brought to the MA.GIC* landing* One week prior to our attack, to a l l c i v i l i a n s for approximately one

Lt Colonel

- 3

To ACCOMPANY

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

W
From: 16OOK 21 June 1944
To : 1600K 22 Juno 1944
Hq 27th Inf Div
TA 129K
22 June 1944

No. 6
Maps:

3AIPAN, l/20,000, Sheet No, 5.

1. ENEiCY" SITUATION,AT END OF PERIOD.

a# Enemy front line - See overlay.

b. Defensive organization - Unchanged, Continued defense in caves and

holes, using 75mm artillery, mortars and machine guns. Enemy had entrenched
in TA 115 M-U during night 21-22 June.
c. Units in contact - No change.
d. Artillery - No change in positions since 21 Juno report
o. Reserves - No change*

f. Supply and evacuation establishments - No change.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
a. b. Enemy continued "cave" resistance in extremely rugged terrain*
Operations of component elements.

(1) Aviation, combat: At approximately 220200 June enemy staged

air attack, dropping bombs. None reported as falling in the Division sector.
c, Misccllano u s :

(1) Eight ines previously reported a t RJ 196 (TA 122-0) i d e n t i f i e d as 3" s h e l l s sunk in ground. Investigation of fuz.es proved t h a t lugs con t r o l l i n g detonation pins had not been removed so s h e l l s would have T^een i3fc2To,ct i v e . Sample fuzes forwarded t o G-2 NLF 3 . MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy c a s u a l t i e s : 2 enemy army k i l l e d in v i c i n i t y Division CP

b . POW: Sent to NLF.

One enemy army p r i v a t e capturod in v i c i n i t y of Division CP Total a t Civilian Stockade: 112 Jap c i v i l i a n s 325 Koreans.

c.

Morale - No chango. - 1

d. Supply and equipment: Enemy DP of non-usable items including bombs, torpedo heads, e t c . , wore blown by Division demolition group in T 130 a t A 221520 June. e. Terrain not under our control: overlay, f. Rugged cave pocked area as shown on

Enemy knowledge of our situation:

Unchanged. Bal

g Weather and v i s i b i l i t y : Brief shower during night 21-22 June. ance of period, fair. Visibility clear except for dust. h Mis cellane ous:

(1) During day 22 June interpreters urged occupants of caves t o sur render with no success. During F loud speaker system installed in tank was M employed. (2) Majority of leaflets dropped during afternoon 21 June fell in

sea or on our troops. 4. ENEIIY CAPABILITIES. a. Enemy bottled in NAFUTAN PT area are capable of
(1) Fighting to death.
(2) Staging final all out counterattack to escape frun area.
(3) Infiltrating thru our lines in attempt to escape.

(4) Attempting to escape by sea to MAGICI3NNE BAY area.

b. Enemy is capable of landing forces on south of island to disrupt our
supply establishments*
c. Enemy is cupublo of landing troops in SOUTH MAGICIENNE BAY area for
some purpose as b.

VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel

G-2

- 2

mmmm?
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G-2 SITUATION 0V&KI.AY

, TO ACCOMPAHV' 0-2 Pf RIOD^C REPORT # 8 .AS or 22t600.Jt;Nfe'44'

' A n -

i-ao,,ooo

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

< From: 221600 June 1944
To : 231600 June 1944
Hq 27th Inf Div
TA 129K
23 June 1944
No. 7
Maps: SAIPAN, 1/20,000, Sheets 3 and 5,
1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
a. Enemy front line - See overlay (atchd),

b. Defensive organization - Enemy is defending in caves and on cliffs

in very rugged mountain terrain.
c. Units in contact - Only identification is of 1st Bn 118th Inf from
a docuraont on dead soldier found in rear of 106th Inf front line. Rapid Fire
Gun platoon, 3rd Bn 89th Inf identified by document found in TA 104W.
d. A r t i l l e r y - M report* o

e . Reserves and other forces capable of i n t e r v e n t i o n - Are s t i l l r e p o r t ed in v i c i n i t y of CHATCHA V i l l a g e , f. Supply and evacuation establishments - Captured Jap map showing what are believed to be food DP's forwarded t o G-2 NTLF, Supply dump located in T 212TY - T 213PU p a r t i a l l y destroyed by a r t y f i r e . Many supplies of un A A known class remain, 2. E E Y OPERATION DURING PERIOD. NM

a. Enemy continued a stubborn defense with machine gun, mortar, and r i f l e f i r e , ID assigned to Division was found t o b e in enemy hands when t h i s Division r e l i e v e d t h e 4th i.-TarDiv in i t s zone of advance, A strong point a t TA 184W held up the advance of the 106th Inf. 2nd Bn 105th Inf, in M T NAFUTAN area was r e l e a s e d from Division control and put under Corps command. b. AA Arty - Fired on Arty observation piano.

c. Arty - Ab mt 12 rounds including many duds cf what is believed t o bo 75mm or 3" f e l l a t 0500 in immediate v i c i n i t y of D i v i s i o n CP (129K) Frag ments sent to G-2 NLF. . d. Aviation, combat - One Blue a l e r t a t 2400, 22 June, in Division Ar^a, o . Tanks - Enemy medium tank found in T 162-0* A used as pillbox* Armament estimated as 57mm gun, f. No bombs dropped

.Appeared to have boon TA 162-0.

Miscellaneous - Magnetic mines found in case a t

- 1

3#

MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Estimated enemy c a s u a l t i e s , including p r i s o n e r s : No estimate of enemy c a s u a l t i e s : 3 m i l i t a r y POWfs (evacuated t o Corps P W cage). O Rev is e d f igur e P W ca gs :
O 149 Jap c i v i l i a n
291 Korean
Hospital cases, 5 unidentified
All m i l i t a r y POWs evacuated.
b. c Morale - Nothing upon which a change can bo reported. Supply and equipment - None.

d# Terrain not under our control - Extremely rugged with sheer c l i f f s and many caves. Will probably continue t o get more d i f f i c u l t in the advance NORTH to the 0-5 l i n e . o. Enemy's probable knowledge of our s i t u a t i o n : Enemy observation con tinues good. Part of SOI l o s t by A Co. 105th Inf on man who is missing in action in v i c i n i t y ASLITO A i r f i e l d . f. Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - Continues good during day except for dust*

g. Additional report of use of loudspeaker system in oaves on SOUTH coast not available as yot but i t is possible t h a t t h e enemy has movod from the caves where the attempt was made. 4. E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM

a. The enemy is capable of continuing his defense in the LIT TAPOTCHMJ area using a l l forces remaining on island. b . The oncay is capable of fulling back t o previously prepared positions in the mountain aroa a t any tin taking advantage of the extremely d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n and fighting a delaying a ction on successive l i n e s . c. The enemy is capable of reinforcing his forces on S/i.IPAN by barge from TINIAN under cover of darkness. d. Tho enemy is capable of counter attacking from the high ground on our front at any t i n e with forces of unknown s t r e n g t h .

VAN MTWERP Lt. Colonel G-2

- 2

G-2 SITUATION 0
TO ACCOMPAMY

SAIPAN- U
AS Of 2JI&0O JUN6'44

H-27-D

6-2 PERIODIC REPORT

W From:. 231600 June 1944 To : 241600 June 1944 Hq 27th Inf Div T 144X A 24 June 1944

No. 8 Maps: 1.

SAIPAN, 1/fe0,000, Sheet 5 .

E E Y SITUATION AT E D OF PERIOD. NM N

a. Enemy front l i n e : enemy occupies positions along high ground thru area I95PU, 186AB, 186DE* 187AFK. b . Defensive organization: enemy occupies sides of high ground under cover and takes our troops under enfildde f i r e as opportunity presents* All volleys leading into high ground seem defended and available for enemy tank attacks * c. d. e. f.. 2. Units in contact: Artillery: Reserves: no further report. identifications.

no further

no report as of t h i s period. no r e p o r t .

Supply and evacuation establishments.:

E Ei Y OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD. N lC

a. General Summary: The enemy appeared dug i n t o sides of h i l l s . Their plan appears t o bo to allow our troops to enter g u l l i e s and tako them under enfilade f i r e . Tanks wore employed during the evening of 23 Juno and again a t noon on 24 June. Troops r e p o r t t h a t enemy posts during night ware u s u a l l y G a M or mortar with two r i f l o n o n . Would allow our p a t r o l s t o p a s s , b Ope r a t i ons of c omponent e1oments;

(1) A - A r t i l l e r y observation piano f i r e d on by enemy during a f t e r A noon of 23 Juno while searching areas 204 and 205. A gun taken under A artillery fire. (2) Tanks - During evening 23 June, 106th Inf reported 5 enemy tanks in their area with four knocked out by self-propelled mounts. 165th Inf r e ported six enemy tanks knocked out. AS tanks attacked along boundary be tween these two Regts, there is some question as to duplication of reports. Tanks reported us lights or. tankottes. During morning 24 June, 106th Inf reported four onoiny medium tanks knocked out and 165th, three* At approximately 1200 24 June, another tank attack occurred. (Reported by air as 60-70 heavy tanks) Infantry report 8 medium tanks knock ed out.

- 1

(3) Engineers: 3. MISCELLANEOUS.

Report White Beach #1 clear of all mines.

a, ftio r e p o r t of enemy dead by 106 or 165 inf. 105 Inf r e p o r t s k i l l i n g two enemy s o l d i e r s and t h r e e c i v i l i a n s during n i g h t . 51 c i v i l i a n POYiT's t a k en in t h e NAFUTAN PT a r e a , Sevon c i v i l i a n POWfs taken in e a r l y evening 23 Juno v i c i n i t y 105 Inf CP. b. Moral remains the f i g h t t o the death a t t i t u d e .

c An enemy ammunition DP burned up between 2030 and 2100, Explosions made i t appear a DP of mixed types of ammunition. The explosion occurred a l most a t our front l i n o s and i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t i t was s e t off by the enemy* d. e. f. Terrain n:>t under our c o n t r o l is rugged with s t e e p c l i f f s and gulches, Enemy holds high ground and d o u b l t l e s s can watch our a c t i o n s . Weather has been c l e a r except for heavy thunderstorm during n i g h t .

g. (1) F i r s t booby t r a p r e p o r t e d was found in T 15lC a t 105 Inf CP A Was a hand grenade inside a Jap helmet. (2) Heavy r i f l e , badly charred, with e l e c t r i c a l wiring found in Forwarded t o G-2, NLF.

T 165* A

(3) Many l / 2 inch s t e e l p l a t e s approximately 12" x 14" with s l o t for r i f l e found in T 144X. p l a t e has hinged arm to hold i t u p r i g h t , p l a t e A being -sent to G--2 NLF 4. E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM

&. The enemy is capable of continuing his f i g h t as a t p r e s e n t in the high ground along t h e East-West l i n e thru MT. TAPOTCHAU. b . Enemy is cup-able of withdrawing during the n i g h t t o p o s i t i o n s n o r t h of MT. TAPOTCHiiU. c. Enemy is capable of c o u n t e r - a t t a c k i n g down v a l l e y s toward our f r o n t .

d. Enemy is capable of i n f i l t r a t i n g in order to d i s r u p t our r e a r e s tablishments.

VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel G-2

j "' '

- 2

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 241600K June 1944
To t 251600K June 1944
Hq 27th inf Div
TA 162-0
25 June 1944
No, 9
Maps: SAIPAN, l/20,000, Sheets 3 & 4.
1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
a. Enemy front lines: overlay.

b. Defensive organizations* Enemy continues to operate from what appears

to be connecting tunnels in steep hillsides and from high ground. He waits
our attack and appears at opportune times to take our troops under fire of
rifles, MG f s, and mortars. On return of fire by our troops he ducks back into
cover. Some artillery fire has been reported.
c. Units in contact: No definite proof. Identifications as follows:

Two (2) identifications of 62nd Unit of NAKANO Unit,

One (1) identification of 4th Co, 15th Bn Independent Guard,
Clothing on one (1) body marked "Engr Hq" (TA 175A)
Gas mask found marked "MANCHURIA 533 UNIT" (TA 175L).
in TA 175L roads "Assembly Area KYO BUTAI".

d. e. f.

Artillery: Reserves:

No report, No information,

Supply and evacuation Establishments: Arty AH T3p: T 162Q (also contained some radio equipment) A Gasolino ;nd s n a i l arms am: TA 163Q. GronuCos nd small arms an: T 144X. A Approx, f i f t y 2000-lb bombs-. TA 144X, Small arc .is can, grenades, mortar, and 75mm: TA 138R, Magnetic mine Dp: TA 15IT. 47mn A Dp: T 175L. m A

2,

EitfEI-IY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

General Summary: During night enemy was quiet with l i t t l e fire de livered, , During day enemy hold his positions defending with r i f l e , Ws, and mortar f i r e . Positions consisted of separated strong points covering c o r r i * dors and had to bo rooted out in order to allow our troops t o advance, (See overlay for such strong p o i n t s ) , b. Operations by Component Elements: Both 106th and 165th Inf reported 75mm f i r e falling

(1) A r t i l l e r y : on their l i n e s .

- 1

(2) (3) area* 3.

Tanks:

None r e p o r t e d d u r i n g p e r i o d . A t t a c k a t 1930, No bombs r e c e i v e d i n 27th Div

Combat a v i a t i o n :

MISCELLANEOUS.

a Enemy cas ua Ities

165th Inf 79 dead (approximately 40 found piled in cave at
TA 175GH).
106th inf - 25 dead
105th inf - 0 dead
Div CP area (TA 144X) - 100 dead
Total: 204 dead
b, POYPs: 1 army wounded bad*
1 Korean wounded
6 Korean laborers
1 Jap family of 7

c, Morala: No facts upon which to base change. Wounded Army POW had no
water or food. Some dead reported as having crackers,- crab neat, some water.
d, Supply and equipment: Ammunition appears plentiful* Has been found
in small dumps and doubtless there are many small dumps in enemy occupied
territory.
o. Terrain not in our control: Strong points in our front are rugged and
afford excellent fields of fire and observation to the enemy. Ahead of 0-5
line terrain appears to be more open on right. Left appears continuing
mountainous.
f. Enemy knowledge of our situation: Due to holding high ground enemy
can doubtless watch all of our movements,
g. Weather and visibility: 4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

No change from capabilities listed in Periodic Report #8, 241600 June

Good. Shower during night 24-25 June.

a. 1944.

AN ANTSERP Lt Colonel G-2

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 ' * " '

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SOME QUESTION AS
TO'WHETHER DCTTfO
EXISTS

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STRONO POINTS OCCUPIED BY EST ISO-ZOO HEAVY

20

10

G-2 SITUATION OVERLAY

TO A? Or fc<600 j y t y ,944

M-87-D

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT From: To : 251600 June 1944 261600 June 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div TA 162-0 26 June 1944 No. 10 Haps: 1. SAIPAN, l/20,000, sheets 3 & 4 .

E E Y SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD. NM

a . Enemy front line - See overlay. b . Defensive organization - one (1) concrete blockhouse reported in TA 197G. Observers also report t h a t caves in the side of the- c l i f f running generally from 185W - 195U had been reinforced with concrete. This c l i f f con* tinues t o be a very strong point and permits enfilading f i r e on our troops p,- .coo ding NORTH on road in front of c l i f f . Trenches are reported in TA 234 Y 215in/ vy a i r observer. The balance of the defensive organization consists of small groups of riflemen and machine gunners. c*. Units in contact - Ordnance manual marked 165th Infantry area identifio s the following: CGf 31st Army - OBATA, Eio
31 255 Unit
BI 533 Unit
50NAB Unit
5th Construction Unit - BI 792
d. A r t i l l e r y - No change,
M

very s e c r e t " captured in

e. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention - See overlay. These forces can probably be employed a t any place on our front. I t is im possible to estimate the coiubat efficiency or strength as thoy are reported by a i r . f. Supply and evacuation in T 175A containing fron 3" A ammunition dump, in T 163S, A fuses. In TA 205*0 and 20SF storage buildings 2, establishments - One (1) large ammunition dump to small arms ammunition. In TA 162-0# 47mm eighty (80) cases of dynamite with caps and unknown suppljr dumps and in T 206G, possible A

E E Y OPERATIONS DURING P3RI0D. NM

a. General Summary - During night enemy staged l i g h t counterattack in area 195QR. During day 26 Juno, enemy maintained his defensive positions c.lon.; the high ground extending from TA 195A SOUTH t o TA 185W. Machine gun firo was received from points along t h i s l i n e . Liaison officer from 106th Infantry advised t h a t observers saw what appears to be concrete reinforce ments in some cavos along c l i f f l i n o . Enemy maintained strong points with machine gun and in oratr f i r e in tho general area 187HJM0. - 1

Additional enemy resistance occurred along the general line T 195VU A with machine gun f i r e received from high ground along t h i s l i n e . Reports of vjnemy a c t i v i t y were given in the following a r e a s : ABFG, T 205J0, T 2O5FK, T 2Q5GD, TA 22OFH?RP # A A A TA 196

Air reported troops digging in, in T 215PQUV and a truck park, and A enemy concentration in T 2O5J 2O6FGHI. A A defense line extending along the general lino T 212K# 205J, 207M A was reported as having "been mentioned in the t r a n s l a t i o n of a Japanese document. b. tank. (2) Tanks One (1) l i g h t tank was destroyed by 3rd Bn, 165th Infantry
in T 198K a t 0637,
A 3. MISCELLANEOUS. a. Estimated enemy c a s u a l t i e s , including prisoners - (incomplete r e p o r t ) . Military: Civilian: k i l l e d - 28
PCM - 0
killed POtff 0
3 Japs
2 Koreans
Operations of cemponent elements: (1) Antitank units - One (1) gun was reported in T 185N damaging our A

b.

Morale - No change,

c. Supply and equipment - Captured Japanese a r t i l l e r y Range Deflection Fan forwarded as reported as highly important by our a r t i l l e r y . d# Terrain n: v ;nder our control - Continues particularly rough in part of sector; 3 . 3 1 section of sector - cultivated fields and sugar cane Av 1 with sane gulches or sending to the shore. o. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation - Loss of highest terrain probably decrcasos enemy fields of observation. f. g. leather and v i s i b i l i t y - Clear and fair. Miscellaneous (1) 106th Inf and 165th Inf reported Japanese wearing American helmets.
(2) Air reports Japanese in TA 204JO wearing bright green camouflaged
uniforms
(3) Further cluo as to disposition of enemy dead received in report
from 165th Infantry that a pile of eight (8) dead covered with a blanket had
been discovered in front of cave entrance.

- 2

4.

ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a; The enemy can continue to defend from his present positions holding
to the last man in strong points on the dominate terrain features.
b, The enemy can fall back on previously prepared defensive positions
S-hown on attached overlay.
c. The enemy can counterattack at any point on our front with his forces
at present on the line reinforced by reserves from areas shown on attached
overlay. It is impossible to estimate the strength of these reserves.

VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel

G-2

- 3

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H^llKl 111 M<Wi tjOtlP

10

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I i I
I

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I I
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10 90 m* Pwlodie NUB*

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

~ From: To 261600 June 1944 271600 Juno 1944

Hq 27th inf Div TA 162-0 27 June 1944 No. 11 Maps: SAIPAN, l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD. a. Enemy front l i n e : Overlay.

b . Defensive o r g a n i z a t i o n : Enemy continues h i s defense of the c o r r i d o r TA 186 - TA 195 in same manner, using up t o and including 3" c a l i b e r -weapons from w e l l p r o t e c t e d , hidoen p o s i t i o n s and a l l high ground, c> Units i n c o n t a c t : (1) (2) Identifications obtained,

INTENDANCE UNIT SAIKI CO of H M R UNIT. O AE

d. A r t i l l e r y : Two (2) f i e l d p i e c e s , c a l i b e r unknown were knocked out by our mortar and 37mm f i r e in TA 185 S and 0 On (1) 47mm i n TA 196R. e Reserves: None located in s e c t o r , Possible dump in v i c i n i t y of RJ 482, TA 205Q.

f. Supply and evacuation: (See par 2 c (1) ) . 2.

ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD. a. General summary.

(1) During n i g h t , a c t i v i t y on front of Division Sector was q u i e t . Reported t h a t approximately 500 troops broke3from NAFUIaN PT a r e a and spread t h r u r e a r a r e a s . An DP of 105th Inf was attacked a t 260300 but a t t a c k b e a t e n off leaving 117 enemy dead. Balance of enemy group was being chased West t h r u cane f i e l d s . Between 0700 - 0800 27 June, 27th Div Arty r e p o r t e d an i n f i l t r a t i o n p a r t y operating in v i c i n i t y TA 144$. Eight t o ten enemy were k i l l e d and remainder being run down in neighboring s n a i l caves. (2) F i g h t in c o r r i d o r T 186 - TA 195 continued as in p a s t s e v e r a l A days with slow p r o g r e s s . Enemy continues t o hide u n t i l our troops are en f i l a d e d by him or on t o p of him and then opens up, b Operations of component elements.

(1) A r t i l l e r y : 3 a i r b u r s t s , believed from 105mm guns in our r e a r f e l l on TA 138R a t approximately 270700 June. 47mm r e p o r t e d a t TA 196R. - 1

(2) Combat a v i a t i o n : Enemy bombed ASLITO FIELD a t approximetely 262100 June. Reported personnel bombs were dropped with some duds, (3) 2nd MarDiv reports 2000-lb bombs prepared a s demolitions along G R P N beaches. A AA c. Miscellaneous*,

(1) one platoon of Div Ren Tr moved a p a t r o l t o v i c i n i t y of RJ 482 (TA 205Q) around midnight 26-27 Juno. Heard heavily loaded trucks being moved Y/est. Report Jap security poor* Much chattering* A few English words such as "Move i t back", "Over here", e t c . also heard. (2) Request made to G-2. NLF for photo coverage of T 185TJYE. 186-7, A 195-6 and 204-5. (3) Enemy diary found on N F T 1 PT navy corpse giving d e t a i l s of A U AJ fight thru 26 .June, (forwarded to G-2, N (4) 106th Xnf reports discovery of a Jap woman who appears to have boon k i l l e d fighting. (5) ment* 3. MISCELLANEOUS. o.* (1) Enemy c a s u a l t i e s : *At At At At 105th inf A Dp m 117 service RJ 293 108 service Div Arty area (TA 144ft) 26 service 27th Div CP 11 service Total ~HM May be reported by Marines a l s o . dead dead dead dead Continued reports of some enemy wearing US clothing and equip

(2)

POW'S: Korean c i v i l i a n Jap c i v i l i a n Jap service

70 6 2 (One (1) WIA sent d i r e c t to rear)

b* Morale: P T reports older men (35-40) are fed up with war but younger OT S t i l l e n t h u s i a s t i c , pood and water p l e n t i f u l . All are low over f a i l u r e of f l e e t to arrive on June 19th as rumored i t would. S t i l l are expecting a i r . c. Supply and equipment:

(1) Parts of ono model 92 Inf Bn Howitzer found in Div Arty area including carriage, s i t e , tube. Also 16 H shells Mark 89 and 2 rounds 70mm* E d. Terrain not under our control: JTo change from l a s t r e p o r t . Probably only f a i r due to loss of

e . Enemy knowledge of our s i t u a t i o n : highest ground. f* Weather and v i s i b i l i t y : night and early morning.

Generally clear with occasional showers during

- 2

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
a. Enemy can continue his defense of the corridor thru TA 136 - 195 in
same manner as in past few days.
b. Enemy can desert his positions leaving small covering detachments and
move back to prepared defensive positions in rear,
c. Enemy can counterattack down corridor to South or Southeast toward
CHACHA VILLAGE in effort to disrupt our rear.

VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel

G-2

- 3

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G-2 PERIODIC REPORT From: To : 271600 June 1944 281600 Juno 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div T 162-0 A 28 Juno 1944 No. 12 Maps: 1. SAIPAN, l/20,000.

E E Y SITUATION AT E D OP PERIOD. NM N

a. Enemy front line - Overlay. b . Defensive organization. - Continues of samo nature with Japs dug in in s c a t t e r e d positions with machine gun end mortur f i r e in support. Some 37 or 47ima guns reported i.s well as f i e l d p i e c e s . One possible command post reported in T 196U. A c . Units in contact - No exact information p o s s i b l e y e t . taken in immediate v i c i n i t y of action a r e : 6th Co., 118th inf (Vicinity 187Q) : . 3rd Rifle Co, 118th inf (North of C A H VILLAGE) HCA Identifications

page from diary taken on 106th Inf front confirms previous i d e n t i f i cations and code numbers of units on island. Preliminary r e p o r t given to representatives of G-2, NLF a t 1600. Complete r e p o r t to be forwarded. d. e. f T 196U. A (2) Air Observer reports A dump a t T 212-0 was s e t on fire when m A our a r t i l l e r y placed W f i r e on apparent truck park in T 212S. P A 2. E E Y OPERATIONS DURING P3RI0D. NM A r t i l l e r y - Overlay. Reserves None located. Supply and evacuation establishments. (1) Water hole and communication center is reported in v i c i n i t y

a. Summary - At 1800 27 June, 3rd Bn 106th Inf received mobile 77mm fir and mortar f i r e on i t s p o s i t i o n . Forward movement was continued and report received t h a t "the Bn with tanks attached met approximately one canpany of japs and p r a c t i c a l l y wiped i t out. At 200Q, enemy threw up a f l a r e and im* mediately t h e r e a f t e r a plane dropped one bomb which landed South and West of the Battalion with no e f f e c t . At 280020, one bmb was observed t o f a l l on ASLITO A i r f i e l d and 0050 Div Arty reported 4-5 bombs dropped in t h e i r areas v/ith no damage. During n i g h t , Div Arty reported s c a t t e r e d sniping as did front l i n e Bns. - 1

 During day, 1st Bn 106th inf contirSred action against "hor w n e t s nest in T 185 RS with small a dvances, 2nd and 3rd Bns 106th Inf ad A vanced North approximately 600 yards against r i f l e and M fire* Fir from G enemy field pieces which are hidden on reverse slopes of commanding t e r r a i n as well f;S mortar f i r e from h i l l s i d e on West of sector continued to deny the use of roads leading North from RJ 520 making supply and evacuation a major problem. The 2nd Bn 165th Inf continued mopping up action in Area 187ACUW with H i l l in TA 187A continuing as the enemy strong point. One tank attacked 2nd Bn 106th Inf a t 1336. Division CP was shelled a t 0720 and 0730, each time by 16 rounds of what is believed t o be 70mm s h e l l s . Shelled again a t 1155 with few er rounds. All rounds over and no damage r e s u l t e d . Shelling occurred again a t approximately 1500, apparently from two guns* Div Arty reported having thrown WP into a truck at TA 212S* Fire spread and ignited an A dump (caliber unknown) in TA 212 0. m b. Operations of component elements :

(1) A r t i l l e r y - Enemy placed 16 rounds (estimate 77mm) of a r t i l l e r y f i r e in v i c i n i t y of Div CP a t 0720 and. again a t 0730 28 June, CP was shelled again a t 1055 though with fewer rounds. From 1440 to 15 30, similar intermit t e n t fire was received in same area. Typo of fire makes i t appear that two (2) guns are employed by the enemy. (2) Aviation combat - One (1) bomb reported in T 186K a t 272000 June A having been dropped following flare shot off behind the enemy lines* One (1) bomb reported dropped near a i r f i e l d a t 280020 June and 4-5 bombs in Div Arty area (144N) a t 0050. (3) Air observation RED a l e r t at approximately 1930

(4) Tanks - One (1) jap tank was reported at 195J a t 1400 end a line of tanks along road extending SE from CR 619 (TA 195C) to bend in road at TA 1951. In neither case v*as there further report of t h e i r a c t i o n s . c Miscellaneous An enemy mine put one (1) Sherman tank out of action in- T 195V. A 3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a (1) Casualties - 77# At approximately 271700 June, report was r e ceived from 3rd Bn 106th Inf t h a t i t had come upon a group of enemy approxi mating one (1) company and with assistance of BLUE tanks, had k i l l e d the majority of t h i s group. Further investigation t h i s date failed to enlarge on the subject. This b a t t a l i o n being engaged in area where access t o i t is almost impossible except by radio* (2) prisoners of Enemy m i l i t a r y Korean laborers Jap c i v i l i a n
- 2

1 4 1

b. c.

Morale - N facts on which to base any change. o Supply and equipment - No information on which to b ase comment*

d# Terrain not under our control - Continues of same type as outlined in last two (2) reports, e. f. g. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation No change. Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - Continued f a i r . Miscellaneous

(1) Three now unfired 6M naval guns reported a t t i p of N F T N PT AU A by 2nd Bn 105th Inf. Guns were in process of i n s t a l l a t i o n . (2) Map of SAIPAN vdth installations (particularly those in North of island) found in vicinity of T 15IN &nd forwarded to G-2, A (3) results. (4) One (1) mass grave of 12 enemy dead lightly covered over, dis* covered by 165th Inf. (5) 4. 27th Div O in process of establishment of M T P T H U P T AOC A . Broadcast attempted from tank from v i c i n i t y T 162T produced no A

E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM

a. The enemy can continue his same type of defensive action gradually withdrawing to the North. b . The enemy is capable of counterattacking in force down the corridor T 212 - 205 - 195. A c. Enemy is capable of counterattacking from present positions S across W the Division boundary in an attempt to drive S into our r e a r . W

V N ANTWERP A Lt Colonel G-2

/ *

- 3

' r ; j

' -

'

&*S-SITUATION OVERLAY

10

AUQ C^-2 PERIODIC AS OF 2&I60O JUHC - V. ZO:OOO

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT From: To : 281600 June 1944 291600 June 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div TA 162-0 29 June 1944 No. 13 Maps: 1. SAIPAN, l/20,000,

E E Y SITUATION AT 3ND OP PERIOD* NM

a. Enemy front line - See attached overlay. b . Defensive organization The enemy continues his defense in the caves along the c l i f f s on the Western sector of the division zone of advance. He continued to defend the h i l l s in T 187 but about 1100 the h i l l a t 187K was A reduced. A preliminary examination discloses ubout forty (40) deadj two heavy machine guns, three l i g h t machine guns, and s i x knee mortars. The h i l l a t 187A remains as a strong point probably defended with at l e a s t the strength found upon 187K. The 2nd Bn 165th Inf, a t the time of -writing t h i s report'j i s attempting an enveloping movement. On the front of the 106th Inf, the enemy defense consisted of r i f l e and machine gun f i r e . I t has also been reported t h a t there are several enemy tanks which appear to remain immobile in camouflaged p o s i t i o n s . Some reports are that they are in emplacements. As soon as the troops commenced advancing they received heavy machine gun fire from these t a n k s . c. Units in contact - The following i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s were obtained today. In 187K the 3rd Company of the 136th Inf was identified by a diary taken from a dead Japanese s o l d i e r . This is the H M R 11935 Unit and this company O AE was under the command of 1st L t . ISHIZAKI. The u n i t landed on SAIPAtt a t 201900 May. An excerpt from the diary is attached to this report* Also identified in the v i c i n i t y of RJ 278 was an "Intendance Commander" d. A r t i l l e r y - See overlay.

At 0715, six (6) rounds f e l l 200 yds SE of the Command post of the 106th Inf. At various intervals during the day, two or three rounds f e l l in the v i c i n i t y of the 27th Div CP. One fuse from a s h e l l fragment which f e l l in the Div Cp was w r i t t e n MMtn f i e l d f l a t t r a j e c t o r y typo 8 8 . " The b a t t e r y reported c-.t 2I2B was f i r e d upon by Div Arty a t 0930. An a i r observer reported t h a t i t "was knocked out and t h a t the f i r e !lGot them running 11 . e Reserves and other forces capable of intervention - No report..

f. Supply and evacuation establishments - The following establishments have been reported: - 1

(1)

Dump at 205A which is camouflaged observed by the Division 0P

(2) A Chamorro native roports a r i f l e A dump and gasoline dump in m the v i c i n i t y of CHICO radio and telephone center, 2500 meters North of DONNAY. (3) At 1230 the 106th Inf reported a large food cache at T 175Q A containing a considerable quantity of r i c e . (4) Large engineer dump is located at T 1870. A generators, r i n g s , b e l t s , Diesel fuel, e t c , (5) TA 230Q.
(6) A platoon of 762nd Tk Bn reported that between 0830 and 0900, they observed approximately 200 Japanese evacuating supplies from TA 212 t o the North. These supplies were being hand c a r r i e d . They were taken under f i r e by a r t i l l e r y and by the tanks, (7) Captured map of Jap food dumps is forwarded to NLF with the orig i n a l of this r e p o r t . 2, E E Y OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD. NM I t contains new

Div Arty reports t h a t at 1437 i t destroyed a Japanese . m dump in

A

a. Summary - At 282050, RED a l e r t was announced. Approximately 15 min utes l a t e r , a n t i - a i r c r a f t fire was seen over MA.GICIENNE BAY* and at 2110 an enemy plane crashed on I 1 1 A POINT after exploding in the a i r , OG5 N A ated abruptly in an large parachute was bright enough to b f i r e developed in the v i c i n i t y of the a i r f i e l d and termin explosion Yfhich cppi^ontly extinguished the f i r e . One observed carrying a burning object -vvhich appeared not a flare.

Ground a c t i v i t y during the night was confined to s c a t t e r e d sniper f i r e . Enemy continued to occupy tho h i l l s i d e extending from 185N North thru 195K. On the Div right flank, enemy continued t o make his strong point in tho area 187MK, but was dislodged from h i l l in 187K. At 1530, he was s t i l l holding his position on h i l l at 187A. During day, our main effort forced the enemy to withdraw from the general line 195K - 196K North to the general line 204U 205U. His defense consisted of mortars, machine guns and r i f l e f i r e , a s s i s t e d by f i r e from what appeared t o bo immobile tanks painted green and hidden by camouflage. His p r i n c i p a l strong points wore positions on high ground on our r i g h t flank. Preliminary reports received on search of h i l l at 187K d i s closed 30-40 enemy dead, 6 knee mortars, 2 heavy machine guns and 3 l i g h t machine guns. Areas southeast of Div CP was shelled three times, 2 or 3 s h e l l s on each occasion, Regtl CPfs of 105th and 106th Infs wore shelled at approxi mately 0930 and again a t approximately 1500, 105th inf reported 3 b u r s t s ; were a i r bursts at an a l t i t u d e estimated a t 200 f e e t . b. Operations of component elements,

(1) A n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y - A . f i r e was received from 227M* Divi A sion a r t i l l e r y reported knocking t h i s piece out.
- 2

(2) Antitank u n i t s - A h a l f - t r a c k of t h e Ren Tr evacuating c a s u a l t i e s from tho 106th Inf front was disabled by what was reported as a 47mm AT gun from the c l i f f s . (3) A r t i l l e r y - SGG paragraph 1 d above

(4) Aviation, combat - Enemy planes f lev/ over the Div CP aroa a t 282050 June. Our A f i r e was observed t o bring down one (1) p l a n e . F i r e s A were observed on t h e ASLITO A i r f i e l d followed by a large explosion. One large parachute was observed a t about 2100 f l o a t i n g down South of the Div CP. (5) infantry - The OP of the 4 t h jfarDiv reported a t 281830 June t h a t A many Japs were in IA 195ABC and many moving South in T 195AK* At 0900, a column of approximately 100 were observed on t h e road at T ZZOGIU The A infantry opposition during the day consisted of r i f l e , machine gun and mortar fire, (6) Tajiks - T o Jap tanks were reported knocked out a t 281920 June w in T 204W by Div Arty while registering. Division O reported that two A P additional tanks were knocked out at 196GH 1450. There was no enemy tank attack but a number of tanks were observed immobile and camouflaged with green paint, which opened fire on our troops as they advanced. These tanks were used in the nature of pillboxes. 3. MISCELLANEOUS, a . Estimated enemy c a s u a l t i e s - 105th Inf r e p o r t s approximately 40 enemy dead were found on h i l l 187K. One sniper was k i l l e d near RJ 278. He had a surrender l e a f l e t on him, which is forwarded with t h e o r i g i n a l of t h i s r e p o r t , but when asked t o surrender in Japanese, turned and r a n and i t was necessary to shoot him. At 1530, a member of tho language s e c t i o n of the Division s u c ceeded i n g e t t i n g ct l e a s t 30 POW's out of caves in T 152, Incomplete r e A p o r t s received a t the time of the p r e p a r a t i o n of t h i s r e p o r t fixed the number a t a t l e a s t 30 including2Koreans from a construction b a t t a l i o n . The r e s t were e i t h e r Japanese c i v i i a n s or Korean c i v i l i a n s . Complete r e p o r t w i l l b e given l a t e r . Chamorros captured near D N A were i n t e r r o g a t e d and report has been ONY forwarded t o NLF. b . Morale - Charaorro r e p o r t s t h a t enemy morale is very low and they have heard t a l k of surrender by s o l d i e r s . Many j a p s o l d i e r s appear to be hiding in caves and tire unarmed. I t would seem t h a t the surrender l e a f l e t s w i l l be increasingly effective. c. Supply and equipment - No change,

d. Terrain not undor our control - The advance of tho 106th Inf carries the Div past the most difficult terrain. Terrain becomes more open North of our present line for a short distance. However, enemy strong points s t i l l r e main in areas behind the front line in extremely difficult t e r r a i n . e. f. 4. Enemy's probable* knowledge oi our situation - No change. Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - Continues good.

E E Y (LABILITIES. NM

No c h a n e

s
- 3 -

(/fa
VN A Lt Colonel
G-2

HEADQJARTERS 27TH INFANTRY DIVISION A. P. 0. 27 29 Juno 1944 Translation of d i a r y taken from dead body of SATS'JBA, Hirarai i n TA 187K# morning of 29 June 1944. SATSUBI was a member of t h e 3rd Company, 136th Infantry Regiment, code number of which is HOMaRE 11935 1 May 1944; Command platoon 1st Platoon 2nd platoon 3rd p3a toon M Platoon 6 TOTAL 11 Juno 1944: 12 June 1944: 13 June 1944: 27 men 55 men 47 men 45 men 40 men 214 men 2 1 1 1 1 officers officer officer officer officer

6 officers

Enemy plane a r r i v e s . Enemy planes a r r i v e . Prom about noon the enemy ships increase to over 30 ships. The amphibious unit commences firing against SAIPAN. Ve f immediately commenced r e t a l i a t i n g ; however our planes do not arrive or return. The enemy planes fly over our skies and naval barrage is continuously being laid doum at auxiliary airfield and C A A - A O . Because of H R NK N A landings, the disposition troops and the 2nd Company of H M R Unit takes up positions. However, the enemy is O &E superior in strength and from day before we arrived, the decision was mado for night assault on the 16th by the battalion. However, because of furious gun fire we wore defeated and withdrew on the 17th. Friendly planea arrived on the evening and morning of the 16th but went homo right away.

17 June 1944: Enemy warship s t a r t s to burn. 18 June 1944: Friendly pianos arrive in the morning, 19 June 1944: Same.

6-2
As OF Z?lfeOO

O'LAY
JUNE

SAIPAN

I'. 20,0 00

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G-2 PERIODIC REPORT From: To ; 291600 June 1944 301600 June 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div TA 162-0 30 June 1944 No. 14 Maps: 1* SAIPM, l/20,000.

E E Y SITUATION AT E D OP PERIOD. NM N

a. Enemy front line Overlay. b . Defensive organization Enemy appears to be defending low ridges which extend in an East-YJest direction across the Division s e c t o r . His f i r e s continue to consist of r i f l e , machine gun and mortars. Entrenchments are possible along the general lino 212GS <-s s everal reports of digging operations in this area have been received. c. Units in contact

(1) Identifications of the 3rd Co. 118th Infantry and 3rd Co. 136th Infantry -were found on H i l l 187A. Civilian PCM taken a t 195F s t a t e s t h a t the 1st and 3rd Cos* 118th Infantry were in that area. Several Mdog t a g s " found on new corpses on S i l l 187A identified the 370th Manchurian Unit* (2) Following l i s t of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s wore found in documents c o l l e c t ed on Hill 187K. (Confirmation of report submitted to G-2, NLF during morning 30 June). On H i l l 187A, preliminary report of search for documents discloses a disposition l i s t of the 25th Brigade or Group which confirms identifications given in NLF Order of B a t t l e . Document being forwarded to G-2, NLF* An old corpse found in T 176F i d e n t i f i e s the 6th Co., 118th Infantry. A d. A r t i l l e r y - Information on enemy a r t i l l e r y was limited during the (Say. One (1) piece was reported a t T 203IJ. A e. Reserves - Div OP and a i r observers report a c t i v i t y in the area 212 DEIJ with appearances of entrenching. f. Supply and evacuation establishments,- TA 174V, 15 55-gallon drums of Diesel o i l and ten cases of hand grenades. TA 187K - large number of 55 gallon drums. TA 205AB large number of gasoline drums. T 174S A dump, A m caliber underterained. T 186p a t RJ 520, machine gun A dump. A m 2, E E Y OPERATIONS DUHIIG P3RI0D. NM

a* General Summary Activity throughout the Division sector was quiet during the night 29-30 June, with occasional sniper f i r e . Patrols maintained contact with the .enemy, but with one exception, found no aggressive p a t r o l ling on his p a r t . At 291935 June, 106th Xnf reported that t h e enemy displayed a green s t a r c l u s t e r , a nd at the some tiae appeared to be moving a machine gun into the general area T 204 G. During daylight 30 June, enemy continued A - 1

to defend but withdrew before our troops. The fire continued to consist of
rifle, machine gun and mortar fire with particular strength on our right
flank.
The enemy was driven from Hill 187A at 0940. Final resistance on his
part appears confined to the area TA 187GH The cliff area extending from
185S thru 194U appeared reduced to individual sniper fire.
Reports from the Division OP and Air described the enemy as being
active in the general area TA 212DEIJ with appearance of trenches in IJ*
This area was taken under artillery fire and one explosion occurred. Reports
from the 3rd Bn 165th Inf and 1st Bn 105th Inf on the 4th MarDiv boundary
stated they were able to pick off individual enemy soldiers who appeared from
caves along the high ground 212GL*
b. Operations of component elements

(1) Tanks - At approximately 291630 June, three tanks were reported

in the area TA 196AB These tanks were found in defilade and had waited until
our troops passed before firing upon them. One tank was knocked out and the
other two escaped. At approximately the same hour, a single tank was report ed in the vicinity TA 187H but no further report has been r eceived. Total
tanks knocked out by 106th Inf during late afternoon and as of 291900 Juno
consists of three medium and one light.

c.

Miscellaneous.

(1) Booby traps - patrols clearing out in T 186PQ found a disabled A Japanese tank containing a booby trap of dynamite. Trap was exploded without injury to our -troops. (2) Land mines - Land mines were discovered in double rows on both sides of the road running SE frora RJ 520 (TA 186p to T 185Y) One mine ex A ploded k i l l i n g one and wounding six of our men. Qno report infers t h a t dig ging in TA 212IJ reported above could be additional nines being planted by the enemy. I t would not be surprising to find land mines emplaced by the eneiay as we move forward. fire. ices, (3) General report is t h a t most enemy dead shoxv marks of our a r t i l l e r y Further report received of enemy disposing of t h e i r dead in deep crev

(4) I t appears thr.t the enemy is removing -weapons frcm his dead as few bodies show arms. Our am dead recovered from beyond our front usually have been robbed of r i f l e s and grenades. This l ^ s t observation bears out reports t h a t the Japanese are using our weapons. (5) Report from G-2 NLF s t a t e s thut i t is believed t h a t enemy in TA 217-218-227-228 w i l l give s t i f f opposition and that i t is probable we w i l l meet special Naval Landing Force Troops and the 5th Guard Force in this a r e a . 3. MISCELLANEOUS. a. Estimated enemy c a s u a l t i e s .

(1) Two hundred (200).. This figure includes approximately 30 dead found in the general area TA 186FHUR a l l of whom were a t l e a s t three days old.
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I t also includes 70 bodies found on H i l l 187K of which 3 were decomposed, included is the preliminary report of bodios on H i l l 187A which e r e , a t t h i s tiiae, reported as between 35 and 40, (2) PORT'S Military 3
Civilian
Japanese 3 Korean 26 b* Morale - Interrogation of POY*r|s in a l l 3 cases gave evidence of lower ing of enemy morale. All 3 prisoners emphasised the enemy's lack of weapons, as well as shortage of food, one c i v i l i a n stated t h a t ha had seen Jap sol* diers without weapons and armed only with grenades. c. Supply and equipment - See paragraph 1 f#

d. Terrain not under our control - Terrain within t h e Division sector and forward of the general line T 204KJ appears to be of a r o l l i n g typo A crossed by low ridges running in an E d i r e c t i o n . High t r e e covered areas W border the Division West boundary with some c l i f f s . The East boundary touches on t r e e covered steep ground descending Eastward, Between these wood-covered borders are the low ridges and bowl-like a r e a s . These ureas and the low ridges are cultivated and cane covered. The road running North through the sector crosses two ridges between our present front and the 0-6 l i n e . I t can be expected that the enemy w i l l defond on the f i r s t of these ridges and in strength along the ridge on the 0-6 l i n e . As a l l ridges show h i l l s near our East boundary, action similar to thct on Hills 187A and I{ can be expected. The 0-6 ridge contains four definite h i l l s - one West of the road and three t o the East. At the 0-6 l i n e , the road turns uw toward PLOIfcSS PT and crosses one more ridge before i t commences i t s descent through a yulch to the POINT. The high ground on our l e f t boundary affords the cneny observation of our action. f, 4. Weather and v i s i b i i l i t y - Yi/bather c l e a r ; v i s i b i l i t y good.

E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM

a. The enemy can continue his withdrawal on FLORES PT defending on t h e E ridge lines described in p a r . 3 d , W b. The enemy can counterattack a t any point on our front,

c. The enemy is capable of making i n f i l t r a t i o n attempts Into our rear establishments altho the more open country in the Division sector makes this less probable than on previous days.

VAN MTWERP Lt Colonel G-2

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G-2 PERIODIC REPORT Frcm: To : 301600 June 1944 011600 July 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div TA 175-M 1 July 1944 No. 15 Maps: SAIPAN, l/20,000. 1, E E Y SITUATION AT E D OF PERIOD NM N a* Enemy front lino - Overlay

b . Defensive organization - Enemy on the front of the Division sector defended with automatic weapons located in the rugged wooded ground on the Right and Loft boundaries of the s e c t o r . Light f i r e was encountered in the center of the zone. Defenses on the boundaries were found in caves, in front of which, built-up b a r r i e r s had been erected. c# Units in contact - Identifications made during the period consisted of additional identifications from the 118th and 136th Inf. One prisoner taken in the late evening of 30 June was identified as a member of the 55th Security Unit, (KEIBITAI) U1139. His unit had been stationed in the GARAPAN area when he was wounded on 28 June. After being t r e a t e d a t the dressing s t a t i o n , he found his unit had moved North with destination - KARABERA PASS. The prisoner s t a t e s that he became disgusted and due to the pain of his wound* decided t h a t the best way to end i t a l l would be to walk toward our l i n e s , believing he would be k i l l e d by u s . He s t a t e s that in moving South, he met many soldiers moving North, a l l of whom told him he was going the wrong way. This movement North is substantiated by the statement made by a c i v i l i a n woman taken in the v i c i n i t y T 205K* who said that the Japanese in t h a t area had A withdrawn in the early evening, 30 June, taking with them 20-30 wounded. I t is further substantiated by reports from the 4th MarDiv OP t o the effect that groups of 3 or 4 enemy soldiers had been moving North since 0630 t h i s morning. d. A r t i l l e r y - Report of an enemy battery f i r i n g at high v e l o c i t y and f l a t t r a j e c t o r y weapon from the v i c i n i t y T 229V was received but a i r spotters A failed to find any signs of the p i e c e . e. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention - Concentration of troops was reported in the area T 22OMNSX. This area was brought under a r t i l A lery f i r e at 1200 and enemy reported running in a l l directions as a r e s u l t of the f i r i n g . f. Supply and evacuation establishments - Fuel dump in the FLORES PT area burning 301839 June, Div Arty reported. Machine gun f i r e blew up what appear ed to be a small arms dump a t T 212}JJ. Vi/hat appeared to be another small A arms dump was taken under a r t i l l e r y f i r e in T 205A. A supply dump is be A lieved to have been in the area shelled by the Div Arty (TA 220MNSX)*

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2.

E E Y OPERATIONSDURING PERIOD. NM " a. General summary

(1) Three (3) BED a l e r t s occurred during the night 30 June-1 J u l y , with no damage reported in Division area.. (2) During day, enemy appeared to be opposing our forces with secur i t y detachments covering his withdrawal to the North. Main s t r e n g t h was on the Right and Left boundaries of the Division as described in p a r . 1 b . b. Operations of component elements

(1) Aviation, combat - Three RED a l e r t s occurred a t 2000, 2045 and 0105. During the f i r s t a l e r t , 5 to 6 bombs were dropped North and East of the A i r p o r t . I t appeared t h a t one plane crashed well out to sea off MAGICIENNE BAY. c. Miscellaneous

(1) Preliminary r e p o r t of p a t r o l s cleaning up in area TA 185SD 186RC r e p o r t location of three small ammunition caches, p a t r o l s disassembled one (1) Antitank gun, one (1) f i e l d gun, c a l i b e r unknown, 30-40 r i f l e s , and some USA BAR'S which had been used by the Japanese, P a t r o l also reported bodies found in caves were many days old. (2) A p a r t i a l l y burned s e a r c h l i g h t with whet appeared t o be p l o t t i n g equipment is reported in T 204-N. A (3) bout mines. Mines previously reported a t T 185Y were hemispherical, a n t i A

(4) Blue-print plans of "Blue D4Y2R Plane" were taken a t T 195X A and are being forwarded t o G-2, NLF (5) A u n i t j o u r n a l of the 533rd Unit, I/t MURAKAMI, Cmdg, was taken in area 196L- Last entry in journal was June 19. Original s t r e n g t h of the u n i t was noted a t 218 with strength on June 19 a t 3 1 . 3.. MISCELLANEOUS. a. Estimated enemy c a s u a l t i e s - one ( 1 ) . New dead in r e a r of 106th Inf area - twenty nine ( 2 9 ) . Estimated old dead in rear of Division area - 150. POY/fs - M i l i t a r y Civilian 4 21

b. Morale - The r e p o r t s of a l l service personnel and POW's, agree on a lowering of the enemy morale, with b e l i e f t h a t the older men would be willing t o c a l l i t q u i t s , vjhile the officers and y mirror men desire t o continue, Qfte prisoner reported t h a t ho had boon shot hy his officer when he attempted t o give himself up with a. number of c i v i l i a n who desired t o surrender.

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c, Supply and equipment - Reports continue that enemy troops are lacking
in arms but carry grenades, use of our weapons and ammunition continues to
be reported.
d, Terrain not under our control - No change from description given in
Periodic Report No. 14, 30 June, except that tree growth is becoming apparent
toward the center of the corridor.
e, Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation - The high ground to the
North continues to afford the enemy means of observing our operations,
f, Weather and visibility - Fair and clear except for scattered showers,
g, Div Arty reports increased movement of civilians in our rear areas
after dark. One (1) young girl was shot during the night.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy can continue his withdrawal to the North delaying our forces
with security detachments*
b. The enemy can attempt to deny us the ridge running across the 0-6
line in an endeavor to prevent our movement into the FLORES PT area*
c. The enemy is capable of counterattacking with the forces he has moved
into the high ground in the North, but such action would be more probable
down the East or West coasts of the island.
d. The enemy can attempt infiltration into our rear, endeavoring to
disrupt our installations

VAN ANTVJERP L t . Colonol G-2

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HEADQUARTERS 27TH INFANTRY DIVISION A. P. 0. 27 1 July 1944 TO: G-2 NTLF, 2d MarDiv, 4th MarDiv, Div Arty, 105th, 106th, 165th Inf.

Attached l i s t of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s found on H i l l , TA 187A# from dead bodies or houses on afternoon of 29 June and omitted from P e r i o d i c Report 301600 June,

1. 2*

Service record of soldier in 136th inf - ISHISAKI UNIT 11935. Notebook on tanks - may contain l i s t of equipment and personnel of 9th Tank Regt,

3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Pocket patches identifying SONAE 533 UNIT. D r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e 533 Unit. Sheet i d e n t i f y i n g Supply p l a t . 35072, 29921, 35087, Service record - 136th Inf H M R 11935, SUXIMOTO UNIT. O AS Tank t r a i n i n g notes Requisitions to 5th Const Unit identifying:
261 Naval Air Unit. (
T-6 Destroyer and Sub Flotilla (for Ord Material) ( All on
17th Destroyer and Sub Flotilla ( SAIPAN
(
516 Guard Unit (May 24) 226 Const Unit
412 Guard Unit (KUSAIE)
411 Guard Unit (ENTABI)
VAN ANT7JERP* Lt Colonel G-2 /

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G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: To : 011600 July 1944 021600 July 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div T 175 M' A 2 July 1944 No. 16 Maps: SAIPAN, l/20,000. 1. E E Y SITUATION AT E D OF P3RI0D. NM N a. Enemy front line - See attached overlay.

*> Defensive organization - The 106th and 165th inf Regts advanced against f l i g h t opposition* There appeared t o be no organized defenses. The 106th mf encountered five (5) enemy medium tanks which were immobile and used as p i l l b o x e s . These tanks were overcome early in the day. The 105th mf Regt, in the center, received machine gun f i r e from caves and positions in t h e ridge lino on i t s f l a n k s . c. Units in contact - The following units have been identified in front of the Division during the day: 16th Shipping Engr Regt, on the front of the 1st Bn, 165th Inf. . Identification established by a POW, who s t a t e d that the strength of his unit was now approximately 200, and t h a t on D-Day, i t had been around 600. The 264th Independent Vehiclo Company, and the 16th Shipping Engr Regt both identified by documents found in v i c i n i t y HJ 482 on the front of the 105th inf. Tho 136th Inf was identified on the front of the 106th by a J>OW. He s t a t e d tiiat tho throe Bns of t h i s regiment had bo an combined into one. Tho original strength of his b a t t a l i o n was stated t o be about 500, and was now 1500-1600. The reason for t h i s reduced strength is t h u t only the trained men were shipped from Japan, and tho remainder of the regiment was l o f t behind for additional t r a i n i n g . d. A r t i l l e r y - At 011805 July, a b a t t a l i o n of f i e l d a r t i l l e r y of the Division a t T 150-Qf reported thut there were flashes and fragments of the A s h e l l s f a l l i n g on i t s front. Examination of these fragments proved them t o be from Jap explosive shells of about 20mm. Enemy f i e l d pieco was reported by the 4th MarDiv OP on the front of the 106th inf in T 226Q f i r i n g on our A lines t h i s morning. e . Reserves - See Order of Buttle attached h e r e t o . Chamorro POW's r e ported that the Japs are withdrawing to TARQ30H0 (TA 23 9X) where there is water a v a i l a b l e . f. Supply and eva cuation establishments - The following i n s t a l l a t i o n s are reported! (1) Extensive supply dump containing Chenical Warfare, and Ordnance equipment, burned out tanks and trucks, e t c , a t T 187CGH* A (2) Mortar and machine gun ammunition a t T 212ST A - 1

(3) TA 25 2S.

Food dump in v i c i n i t y RJ 482.

Air reported possible dump in

(4) Chamorro PCM's reported t h a t the enemy had established a h o s p i t a l in the T R H H a r e a , AOOO (5) 2. Small arms ammunition dump is reported in -the v i c i n i t y of TA 212IJ.

E E Y OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD. NM

a. General summary * The 165th Inf Rogt on the r i g h t , advanced rapidly during the day against l i g h t opposition. I t reported that i t k i l l e d about twenty (20) Japs during i t s advance. The 105th Infantry, in t h e center, was held up by machine gun positions in the ridge lines on i t s flanks These positions appeared to be omplaced in caves and rocks. The 106th Infantry ad vanced against l i g h t opposition. Early in the day, the 106th Infantry over came five (5) camouflaged medium tanks. These tanks remained immobile and did not open f i r e u n t i l they were fired upon by our troops. Units of the 118th Inf Rogt, 136th Inf Regt, 264th Independent Vehicle Company, and the 16th Shipping Engr Rogt, Ware encountered on our front during the day. During the early morning and about 1530, mortar f i r e of heavy c a l i ber was received by our front line troops, TWO (2) m i l i t a r y prisoners of war were captured during the day. Approximately 86 Chamorros were taken on the front of the 105th infantry. b. Operations of component elements. (1) AA. A r t i l l e r y Soo 1 d above.
TIS RG

(2) Aviation, cambci,t A RED Alert t i o n a l information. (3)

declared a t 0110.

No addi

Chemical Yfarfaro A Chemical Ytfurfare dump reported at T 187CGH. A

(4) Engineer - A road block, consisting of a t r e e f e l l e d across the road and a large mine, was reported a t 0815 in the Southern p a r t of 187C. Air observer reports t h a t mines are possibly being emplaced at T 250S-240V-251W* A 24IS. This i s based upon the fact t h a t areas near the road are dug up as if mines were being emplaced. One (1) magnetic mine wus found in ifche v i c i n i t y of the Division CP. (5) Infantry - At 1300, Division OP reported t h a t thero was one (1) company of infantry with tonics moving North along road a t T 23OD. Air obser A vation revealed nothing more. (6) An unknown number of tanks yjoro reported by a i r observer a t 0830 fc* A 220MN0. A r t i l l e r y f i r e was put on these and i t is reported t h a t one was <|0$i>royed. During the morning, the 106th Infantry captured five (5) medium "^afijcs. These wore camouflaged and immobile but not emplaced. This action of enemy tanks has beon observed sovor&l times beforo. In some cases, the enemy jkas kept the tanks camouflaged und has not opened f i r e u n t i l our troops had advanced past them.
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3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties and POW's - During the night of 1-2 July, the Infantry regiments killed 14 Japs on their perimeters. It is interesting to note that none of these had any identifications on them. The five (5) k i l l ed by the 165th Inf were killed by improvised booby traps. The 165th Inf re ports that i t killed twenty (20) Japs during the day. Those were flushed out by artillery and killed by the infantry. Few were reported to have weapons. O 1 July, the 165th Inf buried 247 Japs in T 213S. It is possible that these n A have been reported on previous reports of the 4th MarDiv. - Two (2) m i l i t a r y P0Ws, one (1) from the 136th Inf and one (1) from the 16th Shipping Engr Regt were captured during the day up to the time of t h i s r e p o r t . All units capturing prisoners must be certain t h a t P W tags O are attached t o them showing time and place of capture and name of prisoner if possible, b . Morale - All prisoners report that the morale of their u n i t is low. I t should be borne in mind t h a t these are statements of a POW's but even those caught by surprise make the same r e p o r t . Apparently the enemy feels t h a t , since i t s f l e e t is so long overdue, there is no longer any hope. Many report that there would be more surrenders but that the officers threaten t o k i l l them. Six (6) Japs were found a t T 204X a t 1235 who had committed suicide by taking A thoir shoes off and pulling tho t r i g g e r with their toes, c . Supply and equipment - Most of the equipment on doad Japs appears t o be excellent, especially shoos and leather equipment. However, front line u n i t s report many troops are armed only with grenades. Two (2) of the five (5) k i l l e d on the 105th inf front during the night, had only grenades. d. Terrain not under our control - Because of the reported advance of the 165th Inf, we now have good observation of tho t e r r a i n on our front. As the 165th Inf advances, i t should be advancing down the West side of t h e mountain ridge and should havo the advantage of superior observation. e . Enemy*s probable knowledge of our s i t u a t i o n - Loss of the high ground probably has reduced the enemys observation of our p o s i t i o n s . f. Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - Continues f a i r except for b r i e f showers dur ifjg the morning, g. (1) Late in t h e afternoon of 1 July, two (2) Jap pillboxes when fired upon by self-propelled mounts of the 105th Inf, sent up a green s t a r c l u s t e r , meaning " l i f t a r t i l l e r y f i r e " according to our SOI. (2) Chamorro internees s t a t e t h a t there is a Catholic nun and several Catholic c l e r i c a l people noar TAROHOHO. (3) A number of Chamorros wore taken by the 105th They had been previously reported by our OP as waving a white flag as a r t i l l e r y and machine gun fired on them. Front line troops report that they could not see them. 4. E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM See Order of Ba,ttle attached for probable location of reserve f o r c e s .
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a . The enemy can c o n t i n u e t o cover M s w i t h d r a w a l u s i n g the some h a r r a s s ing t a c t i c s of s m a l l groups w i t h a u t o m a t i c wsapons emplaced i n -well concealed

and protected positions. b. The enemy is capable of using a l l or part of the reserves possibly located in areas IA 219, T 229, and T 238 to counterattack, particularly be A A tween the 106th and 165th Infantry .Regiments. These reserves can be moved during the night by the road running through the mountain range which remains in enemy hands, i t is probable that any counter attack would be launched during the night as such movement of troops would be extremely difficult dur ing the day because of our domination of the a i r . c. The enemy is capable of defending in strength with an infantry force of five (5) battalions, the strength of which has probably been depleted. P W reports would indicate that this defensive position would be generally O on an East-Wost line through TARQHOHO. d. The enemy is capable of continuing his attempts at infiltration during the night to harrass rear installations and to destroy dumps and supplies.

VAN ANTWEHP Lt Colonel G-2

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QUARTERS 27TH INFANTRY DIVIS!

2 July 1944
ORDER OF BATTLE, 2 JULY 1944, 27TR INF DIV
The following units have been identified on the front of th 27th In fantry Division today and the past few days:
118th Infantry Regiment - 1st & 3rd Companies; and somo Supply Units.
On D Day, this Regiment numbered about 2000 men, as half of it was
sunk by our submarines enroute to SAIPAN* The survivors arrived
SAIPAN on 7 Juno 1944 previously, 2 Battalions cf this Regiment
were reported on the 4th Marine Division front.
136th Infantry Regiment - 1st & 3rd Companies; and stne Supply Units.
This Regiment suffered major losses on D and D plus 1 days* Its total
strength believed around 1000 less casualties inflicted by this Division
the past few days. The unit originally defended the South part of the
island*
9th Tank Regiment (HOMARE 533),
Light and medium tanks of this unit have been encountered on our front,
with maintenance personnel fighting as infantry, A large number of
these have been killed. Apparently we have driven thru the assembly
and maintenance area of this unit,
16th Shipping Snginoor Regiment (AKATSUKI 16700),
Original strength of this unit reported by POW this morning, 2 July,
to be 600; reports present strength approximately 200. Unit identified
on the front of the 165th Inf and on the right front of the 105th Inf.
264th Independent Vehicle Company.
Strength, 200; hasboen identified on front of 105th Inf. The 105th Inf
apparently passed thru tho vehicle park of this unit as 8 vehicles were
found destroyed in vicinity RJ 482.
Reserves; It appears that tho following units are not committGd on any front
at present:
1st Bn - 135th Infantry
3rd Bn - 89th Infantry
3rd Bn - 14th Infantry
3rd Bn - 10th Infantry
3rd Bn - 40th Infantry
Theso latter f ~ u (4) battalions probably have had heavy losses
;r as they originally defended tho South }f tho Island, Strength on
. D Day of each oatto.tod * t 800-1000, Present reports locate them
on West side of ridge overlooking FL0R3S PT. The 27th Division
may encounter then as wo cross the mountain range,

KOTEJ

* //A fn t,y 2>

VAN ANTWERP / Lt Colonel G-2

QUARTERS 27TH INFANTRY DIVIS! NTLF PCM INTERROGATION FORM 2 J u l y 1944 NAME: OKAMOTO, Masao Private, Does not remember serial number*
Age: 31 years.
Called to service 28 December 1943,

WHEN DID POW COME TO AREA: Arrived SAIPAN on 7 June 1944.

UNIT - COMPLETE IDENTIFICATION: Name, Number, Organization:
SAKAGUCHI Unit belonging to the 43rd Division Intendance Unit (HOMA.KE
11944), commanded by 2nd Lt SAKAGUCHI. Intendance Unit commanded by Lt
Colonel OHKAWA. SAKAGUCHI Unit consisted of about 600 men; Intendance Unit
of approximately 2400 men.
TIME AND PLACE OF CAPTURs/sUR2EM)ER:Captured by 105th inf at TA 205Uu

CIRCUITTANCES OF CAPTURE: Captured in house while asleep.

FOOD: Very little; had been chewing on cane and sweet potatoes.
WATER: Very scarce
PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS: Read leaflets about 10 days ago; thought did not occur
to him to surrender; had no opportunity.
MORALE OF POW - EXPAND ON THIS: Absolutely a lost cause; feels that there
is no hope. States that spirit in Japan
is still high and that they do not get
any bad news.
Y f A IS MORALE OP HIS UNIT: Very low; believes others will surrender.
tHT CASUALTIES IN HIS UNIT: Very heavy; easily over half.
DISPOSAL OF ENEMY" DEAD: Left them where they fell; had soon about 50 dead
in the mountains
WHERE HAS UNIT G0N3: Still in area where he was captured.
WHAT UNITS OPPOSE US: Does not know.
SIZE: Does not know.
DISPOSITION: D O G S not know.
WEAPONS: His unit carried a few rifles and bayonets.
ENEMY" COMMUNICATIONS AM) ORGANIZATION - Telephones, Radio Centers: Runners
and a few telephones*
PCM states his whole battalion debarked in TANAPAG HARBOR and assembled in the
GARAPAI? area. When naval barrage started on the 11th, his unit went to the
mountains and played hide and seek.

VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel G-2

^ K A D QUARTERS 27TH INFANTRY

NTLF POW INTERROGATION FORM

2 July 1944

NAME: HAYASHIDA, KAZOMI Superior private #168 Age: 38 y e a r s . From: SHIGA KEN Prefecture.

MIEN DID PCM C M T AREA: Arrived SAIPAN on 7 June 1944. O E O UNIT:- COMPLETE IDENTIFICATION: Name, Number, Organization: companies). POWs Unit was Lt NEGORO. strength of

H M R 14949 - KEIRI KINMU (intendance Unit consisting of 5 O AE Strength of Rogt about 2800. Regt Comdr - Lt Col OKAWA. 3rd Company - strength of 550. P0Wf s Company Comdr - 2nd P W l e f t Y K H M with a En of the 118th Inf Regt; Bn had O OOA A approximately 1000 Says this Bn is in the front l i n e .

TIME A D PLACE OF CAPTURE: Captured in front of MAM Co. 106th Inf a t 1430 N (212FG). CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE/SURRENDER: P W came out of own accord and alone. O FOOD: P W had not eaten for 3 days; food is very low. O WATER: Had l i t t l e water. PROPAGANDA L&iFLSTS: Had seen l e a f l e t in Korean language and could not understand i t . M R L OF POW:-EXPA1 O THIS: OAE N P W s t a t e s he did not have a weapon and O thought i t was useless t o r e s i s t any longer and gave himself up.

MORALS OF HIS UNIT:

Low

in his own u n i t - 200 dead and wounded. States he saw 350 casualties of various units in this area day before yostorday (30 Juno); had seen endless stream of wount/.od going to r e a r . DISPOSAL OF E E Y DEAD: Buried them. NM WERE H D HIS UNIT GONE: Across the ridge to the r e a r . A W A UNITS OPPOSE US: HT SIZE: DISPOSITION: Thinks i t is the 118th Inf. Regt.

CASUALTIES IN HIS UNIT:

SONAL Regt Comdr - Major NISHIYAMA. Scattered. Knows nothing. While in valley E of TAPOTCHAU,
VAN ANTOERP Lt Colonel G-2

WEAPONS: Rifles and grenades. E E Y COMMUNICATION A D ORGANIZATION - Telephones, radio centers? NM N TANKS; Heard that there were about 100 tanks. saw about 10 tanks.

BDQUARTERS

27TH INFANTRY D I V I S 3 W

NTLF POW INTERROGATION FORM 2 J u l y 1944 : SAKAKBARA, SHIGEO * p r i v a t e . Does n o t know s e r i a l number.
Age: 34 y e a r s .
C e l l e d t o s e r v i c e 28 December 1 9 4 3 .

MEN DID POW COME TO AREA: A r r i v e d h e r e 7 June 1944. UNIT - COMPLETE IDENTIFICATION: Name, Number, O r g a n i z a t i o n 4 3 r d D i v i s i o n i n t e n d a n c e U n i t (H0UAK3 1 1 9 4 9 ) . SAKAGUCHI U n i t , 2nd L t . SAKAGUCHI commanding, POW's company ( t h o 4 t h Co) c o n s i s t e d of a b o u t 600 men. Complete i n t e n d a n c e U n i t c o n s i s t e d of about 2400 men i n 4 Cos. TIME AND PLACB OF CAPTUiiE: Ho r e p o r t on t i m e . Token by 105th Inf a t TA 205LM. CIRCUITSTANCES OF CAPmtE/sUIffiSNDER: Captured i n house w h i l e s l e e p i n g .

FOOD: Very l i t t l e * Ato hard t a c k and a l i t t l e canned food; also sugar cane and sweet potatoes. VJATERs Very l i t t l e , and t h a t muddy rain water. PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS: Did not see them, M R L OF P W - EXPAND O THIS: Absolutely a l o s t cause; feels there is no OAE O N hope. WHiiT IS M R L OF HIS UNIT: All in his unit are over 30 years of age and OAE married. All believe i t is a l o s t cause and vfould come out and would like to surrender but probably not of own accord. CASUALTIES IN HIS UNIT: Over half; c a n ' t be sure as unit is s c a t t e r e d . DISPOSAL OF E E Y DEAD: Until few days ago, buried them; are now l e f t NM where they f a l l , WHERE HAS UNIT GONE: S t i l l in area where P W was taken, too scared t o run O away. UNITS OPPOSE US: Doos not know. SIZE: Does not know, n DISPOSITION: " " WEAPONS: Few carried r i f l e s and bayonets; majority unarmed, E^ch man given a grenade with which t o commit s u i c i d e . E E Y COMMUNICATION A D ORGANIZATION - Telephones, ifaclio Centers: Runners and NM N a few telephones; believes most of phones were knocked out. P W had heard only of the SASAKI Unit O here, Statss i t was about 300 men in Majority of Intendance Unit came here army, P Y is a r e s e r v i s t called into O\ T which was on the same boat on the way strength. Knows nothing of other u n i t s . to farm, but he had been t r a i n e d by the the s e r v i c e .
VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel G-2

ACTIVITY
I

Or

TO

ousoo Tc

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 021600 July 1944 To : 031600 July 1944 Hq 27th Inf Div T 196 L A 3 July 1944 No. 17 Maps: SAIPAN, l/20,000. 1. ENELIY SITUATION AT E D OF PERIOD. N

a f Enemy front lino Enemy front lino consists of small groups along the general line T 229p to T 238V. A A b Defensive organization - Enemy strength has been from caves and high ground with two (2) concrete cisterns being u t i l i z e d as p i l l b o x e s , reported in v i c i n i t y T 230A. A c. Units in contact - identifications found during the period a r e : 43rd intendance Unit in front of 106th and 105th Inf3.
278th independent Vehicle Co,
1st Co., 136th inft
Transport Co., 43rd Div,
31st Army Hq.
YOSHINO UNIT (irJas disembarked here although originally dispatched
to 41st Guard Force at TRUK.) d. e. f A r t i l l e r y - See par* 2 b ( 2 ) , Reserves - Hone located in immediate Division area, Supply and evacuation

(1) A very large Dp (reported identified as jap Dp #2) was located in T 213p. Contained food and ammunition. Nearby i n T 213H is an underground A A tank with many ground valves. Appears to be a water p o i n t , (2) An oxtensive Dp of food, clothing and ammunition under t r e e s and cover in 220 MO is reported. Most of ammunition has been destroyed by our artillery. (3) (4) (5) (6) Two (2) 3" guns at 205B. Two (2) searchlights at 204-0; one burned. Truck filled with machinists tools at 212-0. Truck filled with signal equipment at 205K,

- 1

2.

ENEMY OPERATIONSPURING PERIOD.

a. General summary - During ni^ht 2-3 July, oneny a c t i v i t y along e n t i r e front lino was "quiet. 106th in? roportod a ^ b a t t l e of fluroo" from approximate ly 3100 -to 24QO, but-.no .etto::^ a c t i o n r e s u l t e d . During ni-ht,,-'27 oueivsy were k i l l e d by the 105th inf* 18 in an enemy carrying party by the 165th Inf, and 10 by the 106th Inf.,' 2 of which wore snipers a t tho ^ogimental 0P " ' 106th and 105th.Infs moved forward a t 0730 with l i t t l e opposition,
except on t h e l e f t flank of the 106th Inf. Opposition a t the c l i f f base was
present throughout the day. 165th Inf, t i e d i n with the 4th MarDiv l i n o , hold
t h e i r move u n t i l 1100 when tho Marines attacked.
Resistance was reported on the l e f t of the 105th Inf a t 1000, but i t was overcome. At approximately 1130, 105th Inf reported M f i r e being received G by t h e i r right flank and by the l e f t flank of the 165th inf. This f i r e was l a t e r reported as coming from five (5) enemy MGfs and two (2) concrete c i s t e r n s being used as p i l l b o x e s . Reports from P0Wfsf OPfs and G-2 NLF continued t o show the enemy mov ing North.
b. Operations of component elements

(1) A A r t i l l e r y - Air observer flying over IA 238, 239, 247 and 248
A reported no A or M f i r e .
A G (2) A r t i l l e r y - None reported. saving i t for the end.
pOTf s t u t c s he thinks the enemy is

(3) Aviation combat - Report by G-2, NLF of possible enemy a i r attack from PALAU and YAP from 3 July on. (4) Infantry - 3nemy weapons continued a s r i f l e , knoe mortars,
machine guns and heavy mortars.
(5) c. Tanks - Reported at 260RQ,

Miscellaneous. (1) P W report - Jap Army Hq four (4) miles North of DONHAY. O Have received few casual
NAFUTA-N

ties.

(2) P W report - SNLF in mountains r e s t i n g . O Were formally in GARAPAN. (3) Reported 108 persons taken from caves in

PT on 1 July.

(4) NLF reported t h a t during the aftornnon there was interference on

NGF #300 radio n e t , channel 34.
3. MISCEUANEOUS. a. Enemy casualties and POW's. (1) (2) Casualties - 151 POW'S: Military - 9.
2

Jap Civilian 12
Korean Civilian - 7
Chamorro - 104
b. Moral - All reports show lowering of enemy morale, influx of Cham orros infers that Japs are releasing them to come into our lins. NOTE: In
previous engagements it has not been unusual for the Jap to launch counter attacks at the time when his morale appears broken,
c. Supply and equipment - Reported by POW that only front line troops
have weapons,
d. Terrain not under our control - Our Division troops are now on ridge
overlooking TANAPAG Harbor. Terrain to Northeast is mountainous with three
(3) cross island roads cutting the range. The coastal plain and foothills
present the easiest access to MAKPI PT.
o. Enemy knowledge of our situation - His observation to the Northeast is
limited but he is probably not completely blind to our movements.
f. Weather and visibility - Heavy rain about 0230 morning of 3 July* Day
was clear and visibility fair.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES,

a. Enemy can make a last stand fight with his forces in the GARAPAN*
PLOHES PT, TANAPAG area.
b. Enemy can continue his withdrawal on MARPI PT making stands along the
high ground forming tho saddles used for cross island roads.
c. Enemy can make a general withdrawal to MARPI PT leaving delaying posi tions to retard our advance and to give him opportunity to prepare his final
positions,
d. The enemy can counterattack along the E^st coast road in an attempt
to break into our rear,
e. Enemy can attempt infiltration at any point along our lines.

VAN ANTWERP
Lt Colonel
G-2

- 3

G-2 PERI0B2C REPORT

From: To i 031600 July 1944 041600 July 1944

Hq 27th inf Div TA 196 L 4 July 1944 No. 18 Maps: SAIPAN, l/20,000. 1. ENEMY SITUATION AT E D OF PERIOD, N

a. Enemy front l i n e - At 1600 enemy had been driven from beach as far NE as FLORES PT. From TA 236D t o TA 247M enemy was making a l a s t stand a t the beach, with emplaced MG's. 1 s t Bn 165th Inf was receiving M and mortar f i r e G and had driven the enemy to a l i n e approximately 600 yards from the beach on their front. b . Defensive organiza tion - Until 1230 enemy confined his defense to r i f l e fire primarily. As beach was approached MG's and mortars came into action from positions in remains of buildings. Hasty entrenchments were found by our troops c. Units in contact.

(1) Dead body at 212N was identified by 106th Inf as a Sgt in 136th Inf at 040630 July. (2) Result of action at 165th Inf CP at 0130 identified: Col OGAm (killed) 136th Inf Regt. 25 th Ail Unit AKATSFKI 16700 and 1671Q., 2131 (3) Listed on t h e margin of a map taken a t tho sexae plac wero: Unit ARIMA Unit YOSHINO Unit MA.TSUNAGA Unit KATADA Unit NAKAMJPJL Unit SOKARA Arty TiiDOKA Tk Arty AA Unit (Comd by 1st Lt ANZO). (4) (5) P0W taken by 106th Inf a t
229K

was from 135th Inf.

TERASU 7757 Unit by dogtags and documents by 106th Inf.

(6) Document dated 6 June 1944 found c i t i n g 9th Expeditionary Force commanded by Major GOTO - 1

d. Artillery.

(1) 75mm or 105mm emplacements were observed in TA 24 7D "by the 4th

Div. These laere reported as new emplacements not previously reported and sited
to fire on GARAPAN.
(2) DP guns were reported as observed by 106th Inf in TA 226XY at
031845 July.
(3) At 031800 July, Division Artillery reported receiving fire from 20mm
guns or artillery on one of thoir abandoned positions then being used as an am
point* 2-3 of the shells were reported as air bursts.
(4) Enemy AA fire was reported from TANAPAG Harbor at 1710 and at
031735 July.
e. Reserves - At 041400 July concentration of enemy troops, artillery, and
vehicles was reported in gulch TA 260MQKV. Those troops can b e used as reserve,
for counterattack twoard TANAPAG, or to defend from the high ground.
f. Supply and evacuation establishments:
At TA 212L- Medical, Signal, and Am.
At TA 213PQ - Largo Dp of food and iua.
At TA 229E - Radio equipment.
2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING P3RI0D.
a. General Summary - Night of 3-4 July was generally inactive along the
front line, but active in the roar. 106th Inf reported scattered enemy around
their CP, their reserve Bn area, and between the Reserve Bn aroa and the front
line. 105th Inf was generally quiet. At 040130 July, pcrinoter of the 165th Inf
CP observed party of 5 cnoniy moving fron South followed by a larger group. In
firing which followed, onomy was dispersed. At daylight, 26 dead were found
including body of Col. OGAWA, CO 135 Inf Regt; also documents and maps of value.
Enemy action during day consisted generally of riflo firo until 1230 when
enemy machine guns opened from area 237CD against 1st Bn 105th Inf. Approximate ly 200 enemy were pushed from this area and ran NW into plain whore they wore
taken under fire. Artillery OP reported that approximately one (1) company ran
North from woods along shoro at T& 236D - TA 246X when taken under artillery
fire. At 1600, 165th Inf reported MG and mortar fire holding up final advance
to the beach.
b. Operations of component elements.
(1) AA Artillery: See 1 d (4).
(2) Artillery: Soe 1 d.
(3) Engineers: (a) (b) 15-20 mines of floating (sea) typo reported a t Tk 229J. G-2 NLF reports anti-vehicle typo "93" mines have been found in the MT. TAPOTCHAU aroa setf as booby t r a p s .
- 2

(4) Tanks; 3rd Bn 105th Inf destroyed 4 Jap tanks (reported light
tanks) at TA 212H at 031840,
c. Miscellaneous.

(1) At 032045 July, Division OP reported a patterned series of flashes

observed on high ground in area 270K*
3. MISCELLANEOUS.
a. Established enemy casualties and POWs.
(1) Casualties: 169.
(2) POW's; 4.
b . Morale - Information from POWfs points to s t e a d i l y declining morale of enemy. Chamorros are vehiemont over the Japanese imprisonment of their Catholic p r i e s t . The subject comes up repeatedly. They have been deprived of t h e i r churches for some time. ct d. Supply and equipment No r e p o r t . Terrain not under our control

The area Northeast of the line IANAPAG (TA 24 7D) t o TA 224A consists of r i s i n g plain areas on both coasts. These areas r i s e t o a NE-SW ridge which t e r minates a t the Northeast in steep c l i f f s overlooking a 1200 yard p l a i n on which the MARPI Airfield is located. "Whilo the Tfcst coast plain extends thru MARPI PT. tho East coast plain is broken by the steep c l i f f s of a nose extending to and dropping abruptly t o the soa in area 270. 11T MAKPI, which overlooks the p l a i n a t the end of the island, is 833 f e e t high anc! generally of plateau formation a t i t s c r e s t . A coastal road follows the T/est shore l i n e to MARPI PT. The ridge is traversed by what appear to be throe main roads. Moving NE from IANAP&G, tho f i r s t road runs East and South frorn a point about 400 yards from the town (258u) climbing fron an a l t i t u d e of 60 feet (600 yards East of tho shoro) to a 550 f t . a l t i t u d e about half way to the East coast. This road is in our hands. The next road commences at M K N H and runs South about 400 yards across AUSA the r i s i n g p l a i n where i t moots the steep ascent t o 1 T ATCHUGAU ( a l t 767 f t ) . S From hero i t runs almost duo East climbing the ridgo for 1400 yards where i t enters KARABB32A. PASS ( a l t 500 f t ) . The 3rd road loaves tho coast road a t a point approximately 600 yards NE of MAKUNSHA. I t runs w-E across the range to M PETOSUKARA (500 yds from the T east coast) where i t swings North to descend into MARPI PT botwoon M MABPI and T a peak overlooking INAGSA PT. An unimproved roiid leaves t h i s main road a t MATOISA and runs NE t o r e j o i n tho main road as i t enters MARPI PT p l a i n . From TANAPAG t o MABPI PT, tho t e r r a i n r i s e s f a i r l y uniformly t o the c r e s t of the r i d g e , varying in width from 500 yds to 1500 yds. A bowl like area appears between TAIIAPAG and M K N H and a similar but much larger area East and AUSA North of MAKUNSRA. The st6ep slopes of M ATCHUGAU control the e n t i r e coastal T
- 3 *

area H and S of M K J S A 2000 yards NE of M K N H and about 400 yds in from E W A TN H . AUSA the coast is a sharp c l i f f -which extends NE to MARPI M The coastal plain West T of the c l i f f s , narrows Tfest of M MARPI and is dominated thru i t s entire length T by the c l i f f s . The plain narrows to less 200 yds with the sea and sheer c l i f f s of M MuRPI making i t a corridor easily defended by the enemy. T M MARPI is the controlling t e r r a i n feature (of MARPI PT). T i t s e l f is f l a t and generally 1500 yds in width (NE-SW).
!flie point

The Western coastal area appears generally cultivated and cane covered. Cam fields are present in the bowls and on tho slopes mentioned and some are found in tho ridge area proper. Much of tho ridge area is tree covered. Terrain similar to that passed -tiiru by the Division in the past few
days can be expected with caves prevalent on a l l high ground.
e. Weather and v i s i b i l i t y . G e n e r a l l y over

Light shower during n i g h t , t h u n d e r s t o r m i n m o r n i n g . cast during day. (2) 4. Visibility - fair.

E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM " a. Enemy can continue his withdrawal toward MARPI POINT.

b . Enemy can defend the West Coast along tiie high ground in area M TAP0T T CHAU; area MARPI - MATOISA - HATANSAj high ground ( T MARPI) overlooking MARPI M Airfield. c. Enemy can counterattack with his forces assembling in T 260MNQRV. A

d. Enemy can harrass our roar i n s t a l l a t i o n s with groups passed by in our advance or by i n f i l t r a t i o n p a r t i e s .

VAN ANTKERP Lt Colonel G-2

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT From: To : 041600 July 1944 051600 July 1944

Hq 27th inf Div TA 228-0 5 July 1944 No. 19 Maps: SAIPANt l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 1. ENEIvIY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a . Enemy front lino - The enemy front l i n o , i f i t can bo so c l a s s i f i e d , ex tends generally from TANAPAG East t o 248D; thence SE t o 249F; thence HE follow* ing t h e c r e s t 249D26OU, and across the gulley head 260T b Defensive organization - Defensive organization during the day, has con s i s t e d of l i g h t opposition from r i f l e s and machine guns a c r o s s t h e major p o r t i o n of the f r o n t , pillboxes of various types were encountered along the TANAPAG beach. Eneiay strong p o i n t s , from -which mortar as well as machine gun f i r e has been r e c e i v e d , i s s t i l l present in the general area TA 249ABFG No a c t i v i t y has boon observed in the gulley T 26QfcflJ3V. The r i g h t flank of the.165th Inf i s r e A ported a t TA 26QXY encountering l i t t l e r e s i s t a n c e . c. Units i n contact

(1) Captured sketch of General SAITO's plan of defense as of morning 3 J u l y , i d e n t i f i e d tho 5 t h Base Force on the Division l e f t front and the 135th Inf on the Division r i g h t f r o n t . Sinco jumping off time (1300) i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s of n e i t h e r of theso organizations has be^n received. (2) No new i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s obtained during tho p e r i o d .

(3) A lance c o r p o r a l , by nano AOKI, Shohachi, s t a t e d he was a member of TERTJ BUTAI, code 7757 and t h a t he was p r e s e n t as an observer. d. A r t i l l e r y - 105th Inf reported c o a s t a l defense gun observed a t TA 248Q with no a c t i v i t y in the neighborhood. e . Heserves - No f u r t h e r r e p o r t of exact locations of u n i t s l i s t e d on sketch attached t o General SAITO's order. f. Supply and evacuation - The following dumps have been r e p o r t e d :

(1) Largo quantity of ordnance, including bomb s i g h t s , in v i c i n i t y of FLORES PT Seaplane Base. Dump of motor p a r t s and new t i r o s a t TA 229A A dump of a i r p l a n e p a r t s a t T/i 228j Approximately twenty (20) ply-wood folding boats with motors in cave a t T 205p Boat capacity approximately 20-25 men. Vilater A hole a t TA 249F. Ammunition dump, apparently of large c a l i b e r ammunition, burn ed a t T/i 247DE. Underground c i s t e r n , with e x t e r n a l v a l v e s , previously reported i n area T 213H has boon i d e n t i f i e d by t h e engineers as the main r e s e r v o i r for A GAftAPAN. - 1

TOT
2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DUKING PERIOD.

a . General summary - During the n i g h t , 3rd Bn, 165th inf, reported s c a t t e r ed fir from enemy machine guns* r i f l e s , and m o r t a r s . The 165th Inf was t a k i n g over the l i n e from the 4 t h MarDiv and except for above, r e p o r t e d q u i e t n i g h t . In the 105th Inf a r e a , a l l u n i t s reported only casual s n i p e r f i r e a f t e r they had fought t h e i r way i n t o t h e i r f i n a l p o s i t i o n s Axi enemy pocket was r e p o r t e d i n TA 2 3 7 U . Also a Japanese loaded truck drove South in the area and was destroyed. 106th Inf i n reserve r e p o r t e d everything generally q u i e t . During morning of 5 J u l y , the 165th Inf remained on t h e i r p o s i t i o n awaiting the 1300 timo of a t t a c k . 105th Inf s t r u c k enemy opposition of r i f l e and machine gun f i r e and some mortar f i r e while making t h e i r forward move t o the l i n e of Departure. Jap p i l l b o x e s of various typos, including c o n c r e t e , were reported along the shore l i n e T 246T A 247p, These p i l l b o x e s appear t o be p r e s e n t along t h e shore l i n e t o and i n c l u d A ing TANAPAG. Enomy strong p o i n t T 249ABFG was r e t a r d i n g the progress of the r i g h t of th 105th and l o f t of the 165th I n f s , a t time of t h i s r e p o r t . b. Operation of component elements, (1) A r t i l l e r y - See paragraph 1 d,

(2) Tanks - Five (5) enomy tanks were r e p o r t e d moving South along beach
A in area T 26OB a t 050550 J u l y ,
(3) Engineers - Naval mines r e p o r t e d in P e r i o d i c Report No, 18 have been d e f i n i t e l y i d e n t i f i e d in small batches along road T 2291 t o TA 230C. There A are approximately 100 of those riinos l e s s f u s e s , 105th inf r e p o r t finding a Jap grenade buried in u No. 10 can f i l l e d with black powder a t T 248X. A (4) Infantry - Estimated t o be one (1) company of i n f a n t r y was r e p o r t e d e a r l y on the evening of 4 July in t h e gulch i n T 237IJ. A c . Miscellaneous. - At 041750 J u l y , AGL i n t e r c e p t reported Japs observed p u l l i n g rubber bot.ts with torpedoes attached t o thorn on the North a r e a of TINMF 3. MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy c a s u a l t i e s and PQVY's. (1) Enemy c a s u a l t i e s : 105th inf 106th Inf 165th Inf Total 297
600
105
TO?

The 600 figure, reported by 106th Inf consists of estimated 100 old and new bodies found in what appeared to be a CP area in T 212L* and 500 dead A knocked out on the afternoon of 4 July as the regiment took the T H P G - FLOHES A AA PT shore. (2) P0Ws: Military 16 Korean Laborers - 2
Civilian:
Chaiaorros - 67
Japanese (child) - 1
- 2

One (1) of the prisoners taken was Caramon dor Jiro SAITO, who s t a t e s ho servos as a staff officer on tho staff of Roar Admiral TSUJIMURA, commanding 5th Base Force. P I stated that, originally, 5th Base Force was made up of OT separate units but t h a t they now have been combined into ono (1) unit, 4000-5000 strength. b. c. d. Morale - N change, o Supply and equipment - Ho change. Terrain not under our control - No change.

e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation - Enemy occupation of M * T M R I provides him with observation of our Division front, AP f. Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - Heavy rain during early evening 4 July, 5 July clear and hot except for slight shower in early morning* Visibility f a i r . g. Miscellaneous.

(1) Captured document notes ono (1) Naval Air Fleet Reconnaissance Unit on SAIPAM, 31 March 1944. (2) Battalion and regimental S-2's in general, report that identifica* tions on dead enemy bodies are becoming harder to find giving evidence that the enemy is on his guard on this subject, 4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy can continue his withdrawal to the M defending on lines as E noted in Periodic Report No. 18. b. The enemy can make a conplete withdrawal to M R I PT# delaying our ad AP vance by strong points in order to have time to prepare positions for his last stand, c. the enemy is capable of attacking to the S down the corridor formed by W the shore and rising ground to the central ridge. Such an attack would bo more likely against our left than against our right.

VAN MTvvERP Lt Colonel G-2.

- 3

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: To :

051600 July 1944 061600 July 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div TA 228-0 6 July 1944 No. 20 Maps: SAIPAN, l/20,000. 1. E E Y SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD. NM a. Enemy front lino - See attached overlay,

b . Defensive organization - Enemy is reported to be using barges beached on the shore and ships inTANAPAG harbor as strong points similar to his p r a c t i c e in previous operations. Fire has been received from ships in the harbor and from beached barges. Concrete emplacements, dugouts, and trench systems have been encountered on the Division front during the day. The enemy has continued t o fight a delaying action from these strong p o i n t s , in addition, P W s t a t e s t h a t O there aro approximately 2000 japs in the area shown on the overlay. YvTiile t h i s statement comes from a P017, a i r observation raid reports from the Division OP dis closes considerable a c t i v i t y in this area as well as along the coast to TA 27211, Some of the heaviest mortar fire received by the Division curing the operation was layed down by tho enemy during the afternoon. c. Units in contact - Identifications from prisoners and documents identify the following u n i t s on tho Division front: Independent Mortar Unit 12589 The original strength of t h i s u n i t was approximately 300, but only half of t h a t number reached the island the remainder hav ing been sunk enroute. 6th Co, 135th Inf.
55th Guard Force,
4th plat YQSHIKAKAWA Unit (Navy).
17th Independent Mortar Bn
POW states only four (4) mortars left.
118th inf Rogtl Gun Unit.
3rd Bn 136th Inf,
MANSHU 257 Unit.
SONAE Unit 2100.
(An ordnance unit which originally had 105 men)
d. Artillery - A POW stated that there were originally three artillery com panies in the 136th Inf but that these had been grouped together into one com pany after many casualties. This company has a strength of about 60 men, and he
believes only one (1) mountain field piece remaining.
o Reserves - The Division OP and Air have observed large numbers of troops
all along the shoreline from TA 2591 to 272M. All of this force could be employ ed on the Division front within a short period of time.

A P W s t a t e s t h a t he thinks t h a t there can be no organized reserves in O the rear areas since the units are so s c a t t e r e d . He also f e l t t h a t for t h i s reason, i t would be impossible for the enemy to s e t up an organized defensive position. f. Supply and evacuation establishments.

(1) Cave a t T 237E was closed by a demolition squad in order to entomb A some Japs in i t . I t is believed t h a t this might have been a CP and t h a t i t con tained some valuable documents. (2) P W reports that the h o s p i t a l is located a t MATANSA. O

(3) The enemy has l o s t a large number of vehicles including what must be the majority of his truck t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . I t hc.s been reported by a F W O t h a t the enemy has only twenty (20) trucks l e f t and t h a t a large p a r t of the gasoline has been destroyed* For t h i s reason, the enemy probably has consider able d i f f i c u l t y in supplying his front line u n i t s altho his lines are much shorter in view of his withdrawal. 2. EMM OPERATION DUIIING PERIOD.

a. General summary - During the n i g h t , 5-6 July, our p a t r o l s observed the equivalent of two (2) companies of the enemy Northwest of H i l l 767, These troops were placed under a r t i l l e r y f i r e with good r e s u l t s . In addition, consid erable a c t i v i t y was observed around I.lAKUl\fSHA and to the NE of this town. The enemy resistance encountered today was considerably stronger than during the l a s t few days. I t consisted of machine gun, r i f l e , and some of the heaviest mortar fire received to d a t e . Large numbers of enemy have been observed along the shore in the zone of advance of the Division by Air observers and the Division OP, In addition, a P W s t a t e s that there ca%o approximately 2000 troops O in our zone of advance who are arnod mostly with r i f l e s , grenades, and a few machine guns. Two (2) enony medium tanks have been reported encountered by the 105th jnf a t the time of this r e p o r t . More tank action is anticipated from observa t i o n and POltf r e p o r t s . The f i r s t mine f i e l d s of any considerable extent were encountered l a t e yesterday afternoon and during the morning. Five (5) of our l i g h t tanks were knocked out and three (3) medium. An aroa in the v i c i n i t y of EJ 2 (258V) was found rainod with 125-lb general purpose bombs, one of these destroyed one of our l i g h t tanks l a t e yesterday afternoon. This field extended for approximately 250 yds SB from the coast. Another mine f i e l d , made up of smaller type mines which broke off the tracks of the tanks, was encountered in TA 249ABFG* In addition, on antitank gun knocked out one (1) of our s e l f - p r o pelled mounts. Two (2) enemy tanks were reported destroyed by our a r t i l l e r y during the morning. b. Operation of component elements.

(1) Antitank units - One (1) antitank gun opened f i r e a t 1230, in the zone of advance of the 2nd Bn 105th Inf. I t put a hole thru the 2" armor plate of a self-propelled gun a&d the caliber of the antitank gun is estimated a t a t l e a s t 37mm.
- 2

(2)

Artillery Seo paragraph 1 d, above,

(3) Aviation combat - Two (2) iiED alerts were sounded during the night () uly, of 5-6 July , (4) Engineers

() T O(2) mine f i e l d s were reported since 051630 July, One of W these in the general area of RJ 2 (TA 258V) see overlay, was found t o consist of Japanese 63kg general purpose bombs. This f i e l d consisted of about 150 bombs set in the ground with the nose up. Only about 100 of these had been fused. The field was roughly 250 yds in width and 250 yds long and was made up of four rows of bombs. The bombs were set %n the ground about 20-40 yds apart, and the rows were staggered, A l i g h t tank, which ran over one of the bombs at 051430 July, was almost t o t a l l y destroyed, A249ABFG* (b) A second mine f i e l d was reported in the general area T This field apparently consisted of customary AT mines us i t blew off the tracks of both light and medium tanks. Four of our light tanks and three medium were damaged in t h i s area, (5) infantry - The enemy infantry continues to fight a delaying action by employing large numbers of machine gun, r i f l e , and considerable mortar f i r e against our troops. I t appears, however, t h a t the enemy infantry units are d i s organized, (6) T^nks

(a) Two (2) enemy tanks are reported camouflaged and dug in as pillboxes in T 249AB A c i v i l i a n P0 reported that there might be as many as A eleven (11) tanks in t h a t general area, A (b) Division OP observed u ccjiouflaged tank in T 266U and in the same area, our a r t i l l e r y , a t 060845 July reported knocking out two (2) tanks, 3, MISCELLANEOUS.

&, Estimated enemy casualties and POYI'S: - Incomplete reports received from the infantry regiments, show 406 Japs k i l l e d during tho l a s t 24 hour period! Seven (7) military POWfs wore captured during this period. Twelve (12) Japanese c i v i l i a n s , 20 koroan laborers, and 106 Choraorros were also takon# b . Morale - All prisoners are unanimous in s t a t i n g that the oncmy is grow ing tired of the fighting. Many s t a t e , however, that the Japanese w i l l fight to the end altho the increasing numbers of prisoners indicates t h a t their morale is considerably shaken and i t is believed t h a t propaganda l e a f l e t s might well be used again as the oneiny is compressed in tho area to the NE. c Supply 'unC. equipment* - A P W stated t h a t the 118th Inf had no more O field guns remaining. All PORT'S s t a t e that the communication system, has been disrupted and t h a t for this reason, there is considerable disorganization of units, d. Terrain not under our control - See periodic Report - 3

e,

Enemys probable knowledge of our s i t u a t i o n - No change

f. Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - Continued good except for s c a t t e r e d showers during the n i g h t and morning. g Miscellaneous

(1) A document e n t i t l e d "Miscellaneous References 11 containing the monthly r e p o r t by supply u n i t as of 1 June 1944 showed the following: Service personnel on SAIPAN - 9943 Army u n i t s - 23295 Attached -civilian and specialized workers brought the t o t a l t o - 40,374 On TIN JAN m s l i s t e d :
Service personnel - 8495
Amy u n i t s - 3290
This document has boon forwarded t o NLF for further

study.

(2) Japs wore reported throwing mines a t our tanks in v i c i n i t y TA 249p and in one case, t h a t a Jap threw hiriself a t the tank with the nine and was blown up. (3) (4) Several "potato nashors" type grenades were found. A Jap c a r r i e r pigeon was caught by one of our a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s ,

(5) A page from a log of an unidentified a i r c r a f t u n i t , revealed t h a t on 2 June four (4) Americans were taken prisoner by the Japs -when they floated in on a s n a i l boat* Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t is the f a c t t h a t the log s t a t e s t h a t they gave no information of value and they gave only t h e i r NAME, IvANK, and SERIAL NUMBER. Their s p i r i t (BUSKIDO) was reported very high by the Japs, (6) Blinker l i g h t s vicro observed flashing from a d e r e l i c t in the TANA* PAG Harbor and i t is Believed that there are s t i l l japs on those d e r e l i c t s , and other boats in t h e harbor and along the beach. (7) Some flat-nosed "dun duin" b u l l e t s were found in the v i c i n i t y of the Division CP, T 237-0. A (8) A ?0W r e p o r t s t h a t there were 10,500 r e s e r v i s t s on the island en gaged in farm work, IThen our attack was imminent, they were spread throughout the following units : 118th, 135th, 136th, A A I A v and MANCHURIAN 370 Unit. S HG V A 4. E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM No change.

V N ANTWEIiP A Lt Colonel G-2

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promf" 061600 July 1944 To : | 0 71600 July 1944

- *
w

Hq 27th Inf Div T 228-0 A 7 July 1944

No. 21 Maps: SAIPAN, 1/20,000. 1. E E Y SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD. NM

a. Enemy front line - as of 1600, enemy had been driven North of the line TA 247D - 249C - 259T - 260PBN. He was s t i l l occupying the gulch TA 260MKV with email groups, b . Defensive organization - No organized defensive system is probable a s , a t the time of t h i s r e p o r t , our troops were moving forward and i t is probable t h a t the enemy occupies h a s t i l y constructed trenches, remains of buildings, caves and such natural p o s i t i o n s , c Units in contact - Preliminary search of enemy dead by the 105th Inf in the v i c i n i t y of t h e i r C? at TA 247L produced i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s of: 135th Infantry 136th Infantry 3rd independent Mountain A r t i l l e r y 10628 Unit 53711 Unit 7105 Unit A P V taken in the approximate area T 249A l a s t night* was i d e n t i f i e d Oi T A as a leading seaman from the 55th Guard u n i t , in an enemy OP located on the ridge in roar of the 106th Inf Cp, (TA 229A) the bodies of a ppc of the 4656th Unit and a Lieutenant of the 50th unit (HINOSHISHI TAI) were i d e n t i f i e d . d. e. f 8. A r t i l l e r y - None located, Reserves - No information. Supply and evacuation establishment - NO information,

E E Y OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD. NM

a. General suranary - Early evening reports of a l l u n i t s along the Division front were negative. At 1930, the Division OP reported small groups of enemy withdrawing to the NE iloport received from NLF of c i v i l i a n s surrendering in front of the 4th MarDiv, in large numbers, was not true in t h i s sector. At ap proximately 2030, tho 105th Inf reported what appearod to be a counterattack be ing launched in front of the 3rd Bn of t h a t regiment (approximate area TA 249B). At the same time, an enemy demonstration was reported by the 165th Inf in the gulch a t TA. 260MRV, Both of these attacks included r i f l e , machine gun, and mor t a r f i r e and both had terminated by approximately 2200.

Prior to the Tfttack on the 3rd Bn 105th Inf, Steading seaman from the 55th Guard Force was taken by our troops while asleep at his post* interroga tion of this prisoner by the 105th Inf and at the Division CP disclosed the following information. The prisoner stated, after approximately two hours of questioning, that he had been ordered to report to his unit commander at the junction of three roads (POW unable to locate on map) and at that time had re ceived his orders which in turn had come from MABPI PT Field* These orders were to the e f f e c t that an a l l - o u t attack by the enemy was to be made at 062000 July. Furthermore, prisoner stated that he understood that the enemy would be ordered to dispose of themselves at 071500 July as a finale to their all-out attack* This information was transmitted to a l l major units of the Division and G-2 NlFt As noted, demonstration terminated at approximately 2200 and from that time on, the night was quiet along the entire front. During the night, four R D alerts E were called. At 070510 July, word was received from the Regimental CP of the 105th Inf that a "sake" attack appeared under way, coning down the corridor in the direction NE to S along the railroad and S thereof (general line T 259M-258w). W A At the same time, word was received that the 3rd Bn 105th Inf was receiving a heavy attack in i t s front (TA 249ABC). Reports from various OP'S disclosed enemy moving down the road and railroad paralleling the shore between T 258T A IA 258U* During the morning* reports from the 3rd Bn, estimated enemy on their front 500-1000 with particular offort on their l e f t . Other enemy of strength were reported moving into the general area T 247DRTE and occupying old trenches A in the area T 248KN At approximately 1000, the estimate of enemy along the A Division front was figured at 1500. Until 1200, enemy pressure had continued along the same area as noted abov and estimate of enemy strength was raised to 3000. A P W taken in front of the 3rd Bn 105th Inf stated that this attack O was an all-out attack on the port of the enemy. He disclosed that 3-4 nights ago, an enemy plane had dropped a message at the MASPI PT Airfield to the effect that the Japs could expect no further help from the homeland. Based on this message, the commanding officer at MARPI PT had ordered the all-out attack. P W O stated that approximately 20,000 men had been assembled at MAHPI PT and moved down the railroad track t o the S in groups of 3,000. The mission of the attack W was to penetrate our linos to the limit, fighting to the l a s t and k i l l i n g a l l Americans possible. At approximately 1400, enemy pressure began to die off and our troops moving forward on the l o f t of the Division sector were met with r i f l e fire primarily and 2-3 machine guns. The balance of the afternoon continued un der the same conditions. Late in the afternoon, a Lt. (jg) C.J. BLaNC, Naval Gunnery Liaison Offi cer, with the 1st Bn 105th Inf, arrived at the Division CP and gave the follow ing account of this battalion and the 2nd Bn 105th Inf. Tho two battalions and established perimeters in tho area T . 259KMPR. At 070450 July, ho hoard firing A on the perimeter. Ho stated that a Japanese force, so groat that i t was imposs ible for him to give any estimate of the number, was seen rushing down the corri dor from the direction of MAJOJNSIki on both sides of the railroad. The enemy was armed with clubs and knives, as wsll as service weapons. They wore running and shouting in a frenzied manner, packed so closely that i t was hardly necessary for our troops to take aim. The enemy on the c l i f f side of tho corridor contin ued to stream on to tho S as others engaged tho two battalions in great numbers. W At 1030, the two battalions had boon dossimated by heavy mortar firo and fight ing had become practically an individual, overy-nan-for-himself, hand to hand affair. Lt. BLANC stated ho had worked his way S with seven (7) men following W a route between^the railroad and the coast and eventually had moved due S across

country u n t i l he was^Cole to enter our l i n e s . He b e l l i e s t h a t other small p a r t i e s from the 1st Bn may have been able to accomplish the same escape but cannot speak for the 2nd Bn* At approximately 1030, word had been received a t the Division CP t h a t a group t o t a l l i n g approximately 150 men, from the 1st and 2nd Bns of the 105th Inf were in the v i c i n i t y RJ 2 (TA 2S8TJ)* b* Operations of component elements*

(1) Antitank units - Two (2) 37mm guns were reported by tho Division OP in the area 258W* (2) infantry - 14 mortars were reported in the same place a t the same time as the 37inm guns. c. Miscellaneous.

A (1) in combing the area along the ridge T 229DL# the 106th inf d i s covered what appeared to be on enemy OP hidden in a building* One (1) enemy officer and four (4) e n l i s t e d men were k i l l e d in the building by the p a r t o l (See par* 1 c ) . A telephone appeared to have been in use and food and water supplies gave the impression t h a t the OP had been in use since our occupation of the area* (2) Humorous enemy wore observed with bayonets attached t o s t i c k s . The majority of enemy dead carried grenades and there was evidence of grenade s u i cides* (3) AS the enemy was driven back during the afternoon, 50-70 were r e ported as having attempted t o escape to sea and were k i l l e d along the reef off MAPAG* (4) leaves* 3. MISCELLANEOUS. a. Eneiny casualties and POVf's. (1) The following is a preliminary report on estimate of enemy dead: A By 165th inf during night 6 July in gulch T 260MHV (includes twenty (20) officers) - 100 7 July 165th infantry * 3rd Bn 105th Inf . Area v i c i n i t y 105th Inf and along shorc fron T 257L to T 257D A A . . . . Perimeter area of 2nd Bn 105th Inf (TA 259KLFQ) 106th inf 425 700 550 500 400 P ! reports many of the enemy as wearing groen hoadnets strung with OV

On roof off TANAPAG pt Total

- 50
775F

b. Morale - Enemy was koyod to a frenzied pitch during their attack. If P v statements can bo believed, he is in a suicidal state of mind at the moment. OT
- 3

c.

POVPSs-

jfRitary personnel
Navy - 1
Army - 1
Civilian
Japanese - 2
Chamorros- 29

d. Supply and equipment - Covered in paragraph 2 a, general summary. Motor parks of the 1st and 2nd Bns of 105th Inf was overrun by enemy who probably have some undestroyed motor equipment in his hands a t t h i s time. During morning of 7 July, party from "H" Btry, 10th Marines, entered 105th inf C? s t a t i n g t h a t I!H" Btry had been overrun and a l l guns l o s t . During afternoon, i t was reported t h a t these guns, as well as the guns of two (2) other Marine Batteries had been recaptured by our t r o o p s . At no time did the enemy use these guns against u s . e. f. Terrain not under our control - No change, Enemy*s probable knowlodgo of our s i t u a t i o n .

(1) If the OP discovered by 106th inf was in operation, i t is probable enemy has detailed information of our operation in the immediate area through 0800 t h i s morning. (2) I t is probable that the enemy captured radios of the 1st and 2nd Bns 105th inf. g. l e a t h e r and v i s i b i l i t y - A heavy r a i n f e l l a t approximately 070430 Juty Balance of day was c l e a r . V i s i b i l i t y was f a i r . h. Miscellaneous - i t is possible t h a t necessary e x t r a c t s from SOI such as authentications and shackle codes may have been taken when the enemy overran the 1st and 2nd Bns 105th inf, 4. E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM

a. The enemy is s t i l l capable of attempting another a l l - o u t attack on our forces with those of his troops driven back during the afternoon, 7 July, aug mented by other troops and c i v i l i a n s which he may not have been able to gather for his attack of t h i s morning. b . Enemy is capable of attempting further i n f i l t r a t i o n t a c t i c s and can harrass with these and similar p a r t i e s who may have worked thoir way into our rear during t h i s morning's a t t a c k . c. Other c a p a b i l i t i e s unchanged from those l i s t e d in Feriodic Report #19.

VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel G-2

- 4

G-2 rlUlODIC itEFORT From:

To :

071600 July 1944 081600 July 1944

Hq 27th inf Div T 196-L A 8 July 1944 No. 22 Maps: SAIPAN, l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 1, E E Y SITUATION *T ES OP P3RIC3D* NM JD a. Eneray front l i n e - HQ r e p o r t . Division withdrawn from f r o n t .

b . Defensive organization - Forces of enemy r o m i n i n g a f t e r eneray a l l - o u t a t t a c k occupied old trenches, holus, and drainage ditches in the front of the Division s e c t o r . c. Units in contact - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s from enemy dead and PORT'S as follows: 5th Comaunication Unit
118th infantry
136th Infentry
43rd Division
Field Hospital Unit OZAKI Unit, 136th Infantry 83TSUSI TAI (From construction worker KAGAKU KEN) YOKOSHISUI 48910 (KANS3T7 BUTal) I t is evident t h a t personnel fron every a v a i l a b l e u n i t "were used in the onouy a t t a c k of 8 J u l y . d. e. A r t i l l e r y - Ho r e p o r t . Reserves - Ho r e p o r t .

f. Supply and evacuation - Air reported trucks and a steam r o l l e r in T 281 A DEIJ and several trucks in T 288170. One (1) truck in T 287c. A A 2. E E Y OP&UTIONS DURING PSIiIOD. NM a. General surraary.

(1) The 165th Inf and 3rd 3n 105th Inf occupied high ground on the r i g h t of the Division s e c t o r , ^urin^; the n i j h t , thoy reported l i t t l e oneoy a c t i v i t y . (2) 3nony in front of tho 1st and 2nd Bns of the 106th Inf which occu pied the l e f t and corridor section of the Division s e c t o r , coanonooc. spasmodic y e l l i n g and f i r e froia disorganized groups a t 0100 and continued t h i s u n t i l 0430 with some atteiipts a t i n f i l t r a t i o n . At 0430, t h i s a c t i v i t y had increased t o i n elude most of the front with p a r t i c u l a r enphasis on tho l o f t . At 0500, enoiay moved toward our l i n o s but without the f a n a t i c a l actions of the previous day

anct were mowed down E^our f i r e . By 0800 this type oURctivity had died down except for isolated strong points in front of the line. b. Operation of component elements.

(1) Artillery - 106th inf reported what appeared to be two (2) rounds from enemy a r t i l l e r y on the ridge forward of the 165th inf at 072240 July. Con sidering no other report of artillery during period, i t is possible that those were from heavy nor tar s. (2) Engineer - Mines were reported along the shore in IA 247D. B m o b disposal officer reports that he had defused approximately 50 of these mines by 081700 July but that thero is good possibility that there are many more N E of the point t i t which he had finished his work. H states that the mine e appears a small edition of the standard Japanese anti-boat mine. H estimates G i t as 14" high, 9" base diameter, roughly connical in shape, and with one fuse at the top. fho fuse contains a lead horn with a vial of acid and would r e quire a heavy step to cause ignition. It appears primarily an anti-vehicle or anti-boat mine* 3. MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy c a s u a l t i e s and PCM's: (1) POWfs M i l i t a r y - 2

Civilian - 1
(2) Casualties - The following casualty r e p o r t i s presented in order t h a t a summary can be seen of enemy c a s u a l t i e s r e s u l t i n g from t h e enemy counter attack which commenced a t 0705Q0 July. Figures in parenthesis are those r e p o r t ed i n Periodic Report # 2 1 . Tanapag lieef (50 ) 50* 165th jnf (425) 440* Area v i c i n i t y 105 Inf CP (550) 550* 3rd Bn 105th Inf (700) 1000* 1st & 2nd Bns 105th inf (500) 1000 106th inf (400) 1150* Total 4190 * Actual count made. b . Morale - Enemy in front of 1st and 2nd Bns 106th Inf gave definite e v i dence of desiring to hasten their death by open exposure of themselves and s u i c i d a l a c t i o n . Two (2) cases of attempts a t Hari K i r i were observed on the p a r t of enemy personnel when t h e i r capture appeared c e r t a i n t o them. c. Supply and equipment - Inspection of enemy dead showod many cases of our weapons being carried by them, p a r t i c u l a r l y carbines, and i,f 1s I t i s f e l t t h a t previous reference t o the enemy carrying poles vrith knives attached, has been overemphasized by higher headquarters. YJhile such weapons were present, they have not been seen in great numbers. d. weather and v i s i b i l i t y - Normal with previous days. 4. E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM

None to report. Division in reserve.

w<>"//

//, ,t

VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel 0-2

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT To 081600 July 1944 : 091600 July 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div TA 196-L 9 July 1944 No. 23 j SAIPaN, l/20,000.

1. E E Y SITUATION AT END OP PERIOD. NM " Quitted. 2. D i v i s i o n in r e s e r v e s t a t u s .

ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD. Omitted,

3.

MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Enemy casualties end POl'T's.

(1) Casualties: 1st Bn 106th Infantry reports 1000 enemy killed in
their front during morning attack on 8 July. They believe the figure low.
(Figure not included in periodic Report #22, this Headquarters, it not having
been received).
(2) POlT's: Military 1. Taken by p Co, 106th Inf, North of GARAPAN.
Identification: YUSOHEI, HOMARE Unit.
Light rain in early morning, fair thereafter.

b. Weather and visibility: Visibility, good.

4. CAPABILITIES.

a. in the immediate area of this Division i t is possible that the enemy can c o l l e c t small, isolated p a r t i e s into one group and attack any of our bivouacs. b . The enemy can make nuisance raids with p a r t i e s l e f t behind in his with* drawal, c. The enemy can counterattack the west or center of the Marine line con taining t h e MA3PI ?T a r e a .

VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel G-2

G-2 PERIODIC

ORT

From: To :

091600 July 1944 101600 July 1944

Hq 27th inf Biv T 196-L A 10 July 1944 No. 24 Maps: 1. SAIPAN, l/20,000.

E E Y SITUATION AT E D OF PSixIOD. NM N a. General Summary* (1) 165th Infantry s t i l l attached to 2nd MarDiv. (2) 105th and 106th infantry report no a c t i v i t y during period.

(3) 105th FA reported sniper a c t i v i t y in area 221u with 4 enemy a t tempting t o take one of their MG's* Two enemy were k i l l e d a t approximately 0115 and inspection of dead bodies t h i s morning found one wearing the insignia of a Major General. The l i t t l o data on his person identified the officer as Major General KAJIMA. A message addressed t o the C PAGAN Garrison Force may provide O a clue that the general was here on an inspection. The general's name does not appear on t h i s message* The name of such a Gfeneral does not appear in the order of B a t t l e . At time of writing this r e p o r t , 105th FA reports action on h i l l a t 221W appearing to involve a few enemy with possibly one (1) L G M (4) 249th FA reported two enemy approached t h e i r perimeter (TA 220S) a t approximately 0130 and were k i l l e d . No i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s found* 3* MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy c a s u a l t i e s : 4. 0. Visi

b Weather: Ovorcast during period with shower in early eveninr> bility fair except for fog in early morning.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES,

a. The enemy continues capable of harassing our bivouacs with small groups or a combined larger group composed of enemy in hiding and passed over during our advance.

VAN ANTWEHP Lt Colonel G-2

G-2 PERIODIC iiEFOltT From: ^***iTo . 101600 July 1944 1H600 July 1944

27th inf Div TA 196-L 11 July 1944 No. 25 Maps: SiilFAH, l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 1. E E Y SITUATION AT E D OF PSitlOD. NM N a. 2. 27th Inf Div, l e s s 165th Inf, i n r e s e r v e and n o t i n contact with enemy.

E E Y OtfEiiATIONS DU&BKJ PERIOD. NM a. General Summary.

(1) Tho 165th Inf Rogt remains attached t o the 2nd MarDiv and r e p o r t of a c t i o n of t h i s organization forwarded through Marine D i v i s i o n . (2) 105th and 106th Inf maintained anti-sniper patrols during the day and report no enemy activity* (3) Field Artillery Battalions of this Division killed three (3) Jap soldiers during the ni;-;ht. i t is believed that small groups of tho enemy are s t i l l concealed in caves in tho vicinity of those battalions* The 106th Inf has boon assigned to clean these out. 3. MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy c a s u a l t i e s and POWs. (1) (2) Enemy c a s u a l t i e s - 3 . PORT'S - passing through Division c o l l e c t i n g p o i n t : 1 2 1 2 j a p s o l d i e r from 118th Inf r e ~ t . japs from c o n s t r u c t i o n b n s . Korean from c o n s t r u c t i o n b n . Jap civilians.

b. Weather and visibility - Remains clear throughout day and night except for occasional* showors. c. Miscellaneous.

(1) Reports that verbarro in periodic xteport #22, this Headquarters, for period ending 031600 July 1944 has been misinterpreted, make i t advisable to include a resume of activity in front of the 1st and 2nd Bns, 106th infantry for that period.

At approximately 0100 the enemy commenced spasmodic yelling and firing from groups in front of the 1st and 2nd Bns, 106th Inf. Attempts a t in f i l t r a t i o n were included, and increased until 0430 when this activity had creased a l l along the line with particular emphasis on our J.eft. At a | i f mately 0500, the enemy moved on our lines with^k I^rtfcdtry comparable to thV( displayed by him on the morning of the previoufMilay.. Coordinated fires rom a l l weapons broke the enemy attack by 0800. O&ltt *is c^lfte^ ^strong points remain ed in front of the l i n e . *** Credited casualties for the 1st and 2nd Bns as reported by S-2
106th inf are:
24 hours ending 071600 July (count) - 400
24 hours ending 081600 July (count by 1st Bn) - 750
24 hours ending 081600 July (estimated low by
1st Bn. This report
not received until
1400, 9 July) - 1000
Total 2150

d. (1) Preliminary report of reconnaissance of MITE and Y L O i beaches EL Y f on TINIAN by the 5th Corps .Reconnaissance Bn states that the mission was suc cessful. This f i r s t report shoves that the Bn got ashore without discovery or casualties. (2) The Division Signal Officer furnished a public a ddress system to the 165th Inf, 2nd Bn. Report received by this Divison is to the effect that the public address system was effective. A number of civilians and military prisoners were taken and i t is believed that the system was largely influential in effecting the surrender. 4. E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM

a. The enemy is capable of harrassing our bivouacs and installations with small groups emerging from hiding places in the mountains. There are apparent ly many caches of food and ammunition available to these isolated groups.

VAN ANTWERP Lt C o l o n e l G-2"

, r

- 2

G-2 PERIODIC REPOHT : 111600 July 1944 121600 July 1944

27th inf Div 'A 165-K 12 July 1944 No. 26 Maps: SAIPAU, l/20,000. 1. This Bivision remained in reserve during the period covered by t h i s re p o r t . The 165th Inf Regt reverted t o Division control a t 0630* During the night 11-12 July, only a c t i v i t y reported was on the perimeters of the 105th FA and 249th FA Bns one (1) enemy soldier was k i l l e d during the evening by these b a t t a l i o n s and they took into custody, several Japanese c i v i l i a n s and children. 2. During the day, the infantry maintained a n t i - s n i p e r patrols reporting meeting no enemy soldiers up to the time of this r e p o r t . Four (4) c i v i l i a n s were taken into custody by the 105th Inf Regt. 3. 106th Inf reports that i t s guards on the FLOEES PT seapl&ne base have k i l l e d 26 Jap soldiers during the past several days. All of these Japs were shot coming down the beach and were apparently remnants of the counterattacking forces who have bean in hiding. 4 . C O Burns, in charge of burying Jap dead in the area of the counter W attack of 6 and 7 July, reported t h a t 3,816 Jap s o l d i e r s and s a i l o r s had been buried up u n t i l 111730 J u l y . Ho also stated t h a t there are a t l e a s t 1500 r e maining enemy bodies which are being buried by marine u n i t s . 5 . The enemy continues capable of harrassing our i n s t a l l a t i o n s and rear areas in small groups.

TAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel G-2

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT From: To : 121600 July 1944 131600 July 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div T 164-J A 13 July 1944 No. 27 Maps: SAIPAF, 1/20,000, 1* All units* r e p o r t s of enemy a c t i v i t y for period covered by this report or negative except for Division A r t i l l e r y . The 249th FA Bn reports that dur ing the n i g h t , i t k i l l e d four (4) jap s o l d i e r s . This b a t t a l i o n had placed some booby t r a p s around i t s perimeter' and r e p o r t e d t h a t in the v i c i n i t y of one which had gone off, they found a Jap officers saber and f i e l d g l a s s e s , but nothing o l s e . In t h e v i c i n i t y of Division A r t i l l e r y Headquarters, approximately f i f t e e n (15) Japs are reported holed up in caves. These are being exterminated by the 106th Infantry a t the time of t h i s r e p o r t . 2. Map of TBFIAN showing possible landing places and some ground forms and vegetation was t r a n s l a t e d by the Language Section and d i s t r i b u t e d t o u n i t s .

V N ANTWERP A Lt Colonel G-2

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT ffrom; To : 131600 J u l y 1944 141600 J u l y 1944

Hq 27th I n f Div TA 1 6 4 - J 14 J u l y 1944 No. 28 Maps: SAIPAN, l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 1* Division Artillery The 104th PA Bn reports capturing the following prisoners during

(a) the night:

In T 213TJ A

3 men in soldiors uniform 4 women 15 children

(B) H Div Arty reports finding five (5) charred bodies in cave q T 212T (see 2 below). A 2. 106th inf reports negative with exception of five (5) Japs in cave T 212T.referred to in last report. They vero unable to get the Japs to come A out after firing small arms and bazookas into cave. They then wired up en trance of cave for the night to await arrival of flame throwers. At 140730 July, cave was secured. 3. 102nd Engrs report water point (TA 236u) was fired during lost two evenings by small oarms f i r e . 4. All other units of this command report negative for period covered by this report.

VAN ANTWERP Lt C o l o n e l G-2

/ '

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT Prom: To : 14X600 July 1944 151600 July 1944 7th Inf Div 64-J 15 July 1944 No. 2S Maps: SAIPAN, l/20,000, 1* Division A r t i l l e r y a. The 249th FA Bn reports t h a t during the night they k i l l e d throe (3) Japanese s o l d i e r s , and wounded two (2) children. b . The 104th FA Bn reports onemy M a c t i v i t y in T 213U. They return G A ed the f i r e and upon investigation patrols found a bloody helmet and shoes, but no bodies. 2, The 106th Inf reports k i l l i n g tfacee (3) Japanes in TA 2130N during the afternoon 14 July, one of the three was a woman, dressed in army uniform. 3, The 165th Inf reports .an a n t i - b o a t mine dump, consisting of s i x t y (60) mines not fused, in T 166A A 4 , The 727th ordnance Co reported a mine f i e l d 100 yds xvide and 150 yds long in T 113T. The Bomb Disposal Section cleared t h i r t y five (35) mines from A t h i s f i e l d . Mines consisted of 77mm s h e l l s , placed nose up with safety pins removed* 5 A fuse for a horned mine was removed from the reef a t Purple Beach 1 by Bomb Disposal Section. 6, All other units of t h i s command report negative for period covered by t h i s report.

VAN ANTWERP IX C o l o n e l G-2

/ ^

G-2 PERIODIC RSPOHT From: 151600 J u l y 1944 161600 J u l y 1944

16 J u l y 1944 - - 30 Maps: S A I P A N , 1 / 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD, a. 2. Omitted.

ENEMY OP&UTIONS DURING PERIOD. a. General Summary

(1) 105th Inf remains attached to the Garrison Force, and report of this organization w i l l be forwarded through Garrison Force G"2 (2) 106th and 165th Infantry maintained anti-sniper patrols during the day and report no enemy activity other than two (2) shells, possibly 7 m which 5 m did not burst, in T 166F at 1000. A (3) Field Artillery Bns of this Division remain attached to X I Corps XV and report of these organizations forwarded through the Corps Artillery. 3. MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy c a s u a l t i e s and POW's (1) (2) Inf. b Weather and v i s i b i l i t y Clear throughout n i g h t and day except for occa s i o n a l showers. c. Miscellaneous (1) 4* The 165th Inf r e p o r t s large food storage i n T 175. A Enemy c a s u a l t i e s none. POW's one (1) Jap c i v i l i a n and four (4) c h i l d r e n taken by 106th

ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a.

no change.

VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel G-2

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT From: To ; 161600 J u l y 1944 171600 J u l y 1944

Hq 2 7 t h I n f B i v TA 1 6 4 - J 17 J u l y 1944 No. 31 Maps: SAIPAN, l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 1. ENEMY SITUATION i*T END OF PERIOD. A. 2. Omitted.

ENEMY OPEXTIONS AT END OF PERIOD. a. G e n e r a l Summary*

(1) 105th Inf remains attached t o the Garrison Force, a nd r e p o r t of t h i s organization w i l l be forwarded through Garrison Force G-2. (2) 106th and 165th Inf maintained a n t i - s n i p e r p a t r o l s during the day. The 165th Inf reported n e g a t i v e . At 0730 t h i s morning the 106th Inf r e p o r t s k i l l ing s i x t e e n Japs in T 185j a l s o sent out a strong p a t r o l vrilth demolition team A of engineers attached to clean out Japs reported holed up in caves in area bound ed by TA 194J0 and TA 195FK. (3) F i e l d a r t i l l e r y Bns of t h i s Division remain attached t o XXIV Corps, and r e p o r t of these organizations forwarded through the Corps A r t i l l e r y . 3. MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy c a s u a l t i e s and P0W*s (1) (2) b. day. c. rations. Miscellaneous. (1) The 165th Inf r e p o r t s a cave in T 165D containing 10 cases of Jap A Cave is 40 f t . deep and moans of entrance i s a rope l a d d e r . Enemy c a s u a l t i e s - 16. POWfs - 1 Jap c i v i l i a n g i r l (2 y r s old) taken by 106th Inf.

Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - V i s i b i l i t y good, c l o a r throughout t h e ' n i g h t and

(2) 727th Ord Co. r e p o r t s Jap am. dump in v i c i n i t y TA 282R. p a r t of am. t h e r e i n is two largo boxes each containing 1000 c a r t r i d g e s of c a l i b e r . 3 0 3 , Winchester, stamped 7 B Jan 1942. 4. E E Y CAPABILITI NM E S No change.

VAN ANTWERP L t Colonel G-2

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: To : 171600 J u l y 1944 181600 J u l y 1944

;q 27th Inf Div 'A 164-J 18 July 1944 No. 32 Maps: 1. iiN, l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 .

ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD, a. Omitted,

2.

E E Y OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD. NM a.

General summary. (1) 105th Inf remains attached t o the Garrison F o r c e , and r e p o r t of t h i s organization w i l l bo forwarded through Garrison Force G-2, (2$ 106th and 165th Infs maintained a n t i - s n i p e r p a t r o l s during the day* 106th Inf r e p o r t s the following k i l l e d : 2 Japs in TA 204L 3 Japs i n TA 20317 2 Japs i n T 194J, 1 woman in cave a t TA 195SY* The 165th inf k i l l e d 2 Japs in A TA X47S. (3) The 102nd Engr Bn r e p o r t s t h a t 3 Japs attempted t o i n f i l t r a t e t h e i r Bn area ( l a 189H) a t 0230 # One ( I ) jap was k i l l e d and 2 escaped, (4) 3. F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Bns. - No change. into

MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy c a s u a l t i e s and POTHs, (1) Casualties - 1 1 ,

(2) POW's - one (1) Jap c i v i l i a n (male) and 3 Jap c h i l d r e n were persuad ed t o come out of a cave in T 186}J by 762nd Tk Bn with a i d of Division i n t e r p r e A t e r s . One (1) Jap c h i l d was picked up by 106th Inf i n cave a t 195SY* b Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - V i s i b i l i t y c l e a r throughout n i g h t and slay -with occasional showers during morning, c Mis ce1lane ous

(1) Captured Jap documents: Transportation and Supply, Order of B a t t l e of the 43rd Jap Div, These documents forwarded to G-2 NLF* (2) Cave in TA 164-J containing approximately 100 60-lb saeks of r i c e , 50 cases of 47mm and 50 cases 57mm am (3) drums) (4) Booby trapped cave in TA 195K, 106th inf r e p o r t s l a r g e Deisel o i l dump i n TA 187H (150-200 55-gal

ENEMY CAPABILITIES, a . .No change. VAN AlIT^SRP Lt Colonel G-2

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: H **>"^ *>***< m ^
m
m

181600 July 1944 . xgieoo July 1944

Inf Div

19 July 1944 No 33 Maps: 1. SAIPAN, l / 2 0 f 0 0 0 .

ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD, a. Omitted.

2.

ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PBRIDD. a. General Summary, (1) 105th Inf - no change.

(2) 106th and 165th Infs maintained a n t i - s n i p e r p a t r o l s throughout t h e day. The 106th Inf r e p o r t s one (1) Jap k i l l e d i n TA 194S. The 165th Inf r e p o r t s negative on i t s p a t r o l s , (3) 3. FA Bns - no change,

MISCELLziNSOUS.

a. Enemy casualties and POTf's.

(1) Enemy casualties one (1) dead.
(2) POW's - One (1) Jap civilian male, member of the Home Guard; one (1)
Jap civilian, female; and three (3) Jap children were taken by the 88th Chemical
Mortar Bn attached to the 106th Inf.
b. Weather and visibility - Clear throughout the night and day.
c. Miscellaneous,
(1) Two (2) boxes of Winchester .303 cal ball -cartridges, each contain ing twenty (20) rounds forwarded to NTLF with detailed report (reference: G-2
Report No. 32, 18 July),
(2) One (1) inner icon M-5 ant i~ tank mine found just off shore in TA 164J,
(3) Distribution of maps, air photos, G-2 data for TATTERSALL operation.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES,
a. No change.

VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel

'

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT rcm j o : 191600 J u l y 1944 201600 July 1944

!q 27th Inf Div TA 164-J 20 J u l y 1944 No. 34 Maps: SAIPAN. l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 1. E E Y SITUATION AT END OP PERIOD. NM a. 2. Omitted.

ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD, a. General Summary. (1) 105th inf - no change.

(2) 106th and 165th Infs maintained a n t i - s n i p e r p a t r o l s throughout the day. During the night 19-20 J u l y , the 20th Marines r e p o r t e d Japs had i n f i l t r a t e d and wounded five (5) Marines a t TA 206G. Following t h i s r e p o r t , f l a r e s were r e ported i n t h i s a r e a . The 106th Inf i n tho area immediately South of t h i s area r e p o r t e d no a c t i v i t y . During the day, guards from the 106th Inf p r o t e c t i n g a. dump in T 220D k i l l e d four (4) J a p s , i.t l e a s t two (2) a d d i t i o n a l Japs were A k i l l e d by the 106th Inf i n TA 185-OS whore flame thrower teams and s e l f - p r o p e l l e d mounts are destroying Japs holed up i n caves. The 165th Inf r e p o r t s negative during the day and n i g h t . (3) 3. FA Bns - no change.

MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy c a s u a l t i e s and POWfs. (1) Enemy c a s u a l t i e s , p r e l i m i n a r y r e p o r t - Six (6) Jap s o l d i e r s k i l l e d .

b . Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - Heavy thunder and l i g h t n i n g storm during n i g h t . Heavy swells r e p o r t e d approaching Wost c o a s t . Weather c l e a r throughout day. c. Miscellaneous* (1) (2) (3) (4) 4. Two (2) naval mines found in T 196M. A Cane f i e l d on f i r e in T 190PU exploding ammunition in -this a r e a , A D i s t r i b u t i o n of a d d i t i o n a l maps and mosaics for TATTERSALL o p e r a t i o n . Language s e c t i o n continues t r a n s l a t i o n of Jap documents.

ENEMY CiiPiiBILlTISS.

a. No change.
VAN ANTWERP
Lt Colonel
G-2

f,

i ? SP

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT 201600 July 1944 211600 July 1944 ;q 27th Inf Div TA 164-J 21 July 1944 No. 35 Maps: SAIPAN, l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 1. E E Y SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD, NM a. 2. Oniittod.

ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD, a. General Summary* (1) 105th Inf - no change.

(2) 106th and 165th Infs maintained tintx-sniper p a t r o l s during the day. 106th Inf r e p o r t k i l l i n g two (2) Jap s o l d i e r s in T 194-0 y e s t e r d a y afternoon. A This i s in a d d i t i o n t o Periodic Report No. 34. 108th and 165th Infs r e p o r t no word from t h e i r p a t r o l s a t time of t h i s r e p o r t . (3) 3. FA Bns - no change.

MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy c a s u a l t i e s and POl'T's. (1) b* Enemy c a s u a l t i e s 2 Jap s o l d i e r s k i l l e d .

ing; c.

Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - S c a t t e r e d showers during night and e ^ r l y morn Weather c l e a r throughout day. V i s i b i l i t y 8-10 miles* Miscellaneous.

(1) 165th Inf r e p o r t e d the following; Jap a r t i l l e r y dump i n T 174E; A 3 Jap c o a s t a l guns, dismantled and covered with grass and leaves i n TA 180P. (2) Th following f i g u r e s on the SAIPAN operation up t o and including 20 July 44, are quoted for the information of a l l t r o o p s . 20,212 Japs buried t o d a t e ; 846 Jap pQW1s; 828 Korean p r i s o n e r s ; and 14,600 c i v i l i a n s . A t o t a l of 101 Jap tanks were destroyed during the o p e r a t i o n . (3) As of e a r l y t h i s morning, the 3rd Div of the U M landed onGUAM a t S C RED Beach, and a t 1400, had secured l i n e s , as r e p o r t e d by a i r , 580NSX - 559EJ 560FGHIJ - 582DEf map of Island of GUAM, l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 . Up u n t i l t h i s time no r e p o r t r e c e i v e d of the 1st Prov B r i g . 4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES, a. No change.

VAN ANTWERP Lt C o l o n e l

G-2

$i

$ ****

G-2 (PERIODIC REPORT

From: To :

211600 J u l y 1944 221600 July 1944

Hqi27th Inf Div 22'July 1944

No. 36
Maps: SAIPAN, l/20,000; G U M , 1/20,000.
1* ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD,
a. Omitted,
2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD,
a. General Summary.
(1) 105th Infantry - no change.
(2) 106th and 165th Infs maintained anti-sniper patrols throughout the
day. The 106th Inf reported killing one (1) Jap soldier in TA 22OD, and one (1)
Jap soldier in the vicinity #of FL03ES PT. (this soldier was killed attempting
to throw a hand grenade while driver was changing tire on main road,) The 165th
inf reported negative on its patrols,
(3) FA 3ns - no change.
(4) 102nd Engr Bn killed one Jup soldier (sergeant) in TA 189H
3. MISCELLANEOUS.
a. Enemy casualties and POw's. (1) Enemy casualties: Three (3) Jap soldiers, (2) P0i.7fs: Military One (1) Civilian Twelve (12) b. Weather and visibility: Scattered showers during day; visibility 8-10 miles. c. Miscellaneous. (1) 106th Inf reports taking into custody one (I) woman and two (2) chil dren, and finding one (1) dead child in TA 196; also taking into custody nine (9)
civilians ( a l one family) in TA 196 at 1330, This organization captured one (1)
.l POW in TA 229UV at 0930.
(2) The 165th Inf reports a small amount of Jap food in TA 176H.
(3) At 1330, based, on air observer reports, the front linesson GUAM were
approximately TA 558DINX - 531E - 532iiGHDE - 533A - 560VST in the northern land ings, 'At 1000 it was indicated that new landings had taken place on GUAM in
TA 379AB, 380K, 364H. At 1433, troops were observed landing from 22 landing craft
on CABRAS ISLAND and troops were reported in TA 557FA.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES,
a. No change.

VAN ANTWERP
Lt Colonel
G-2

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: To :

221600 July 1944 231600 July 1944

0
ro
1. ENEMY SITUATION A T END OF PERIOD.
a. Omitted.

Hq 27th inf Div TA 164-J uly 1944

2.. ENEMY OPERATIONS-DURING P3&I0D.

a. General Summary
(1) 105th Inf - no change.
(2) 106th Inf and 165th Inf continued to maintain anti-sniper patrols i
thir respective zones. The 106th inf reports killing four (4) Jap soldiers and
two (2) civilians in TA 194 165th Inf reports negative.
(3) FA Bns - no change*
i3. MISCELLANEOUS.
a. Enemy casualties and POW f s.
(1) Enemy casualties: Four (4) Jap soldiers
Two (2) Civilians
(2) POWs: Military - 0
Civilian - 10
b Weather and visibility: Brief heavy shower during night; visibility fair
to good except during rain.
c Miscellaneous.
(1) 165th Inf reports capturing throe (3) Jap civilian men, throe (3)
Jap civilian women and four (4) children in TA 164B.
(2) Information regarding GUAM operation remains, for the most part
unchanged ovyr yesterday, with occasional air observer reports indicating that
the landings and subsequent operations are progressing satisfactorily.
(3) Distribution of air photos in preparation for TINIA.N Operation.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES,

a.

Uo change.
/
VAN ANTPvERP
Lt C o l o n e l
G-2

''0

km m

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT From: To : 231600 J u l y 1944 241600 J u l y 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div TA 164-J 24 J u l y 1944 Ho.. 38 " Maps: SAIPAN, l/20,000 TINIAN, l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 . U ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD. a. Omitted,

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

&. General Summary*
(1) 105th Inf - no change.
(2) 106th and 165th Infs continued to maintain anti-sniper patrols
throughout the day in their respective areas, 196th Inf reports killing two (2)
Jap soldiers in 196V* and that approximately ten (10) escaped and headed into
the hills* . Illuminating flares were used during the night to locate those that
had escaped. Two (2) Jap soldiers managed to elude a patrol of the 106th Inf
at 1430 in TA 196. The 165th Inf reports negative on its patrol activity.
(3) FA Bns - no change.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

Enemy casualties and POW's,

(1) Enemy casualties: Two (2) Jap soldiers.
(2) PCHPs: Military - 0
Civilian - 2

b . Weather and v i s i b i l i t y : V i s i b i l i t y limited, c. Miscellaneous*

Intermittent showers during night and day.

(1) 165th Inf reports finding eleven (11) cases of Jap grenades on road in T 163X. Ihe 106th Inf reports taking into custody one (1) >roman, "85 y e a r s , A and-.one (1) c h i l d , 3 years of ago. (2) No further information regarding G A operation has b eon received UM by t h i s Headquarters. (3) At 0742 elements of the 4th MarDiv 3a nded on TINIAN on beaches 7&ITE 1 and 2. By 1440, the entire 4th MarDiv, with the exception of the 3d Bn

at" the beach, 23d Marines, had completed landing. Light resistance ri s a t i s f a c t o r y tfwitn" some mortar f i r e f a l l i n g on beach WHITE 2 Progres fp^ldwe*: ^TA 64lGl the front lines as of 1414 (intercepted from 10th M i lendly tanks r e p o r t G3-L1-L3-Q1-Q3-V1-V3- 634A2-A3 - 633J2-J3-I3-L4-M2-M The only mention of ed a t 1400 moving towards the a i r f i e l d from TA 646J0 tanks (enemy) thus far was a t 1138 when the 419th FA Group reported destroying one (1) tank and dispersing three (3) others in T 610FG# The only report of A mines up to 1400 has been t h a t two (2) LVTfs were damaged by mines on beach TiiiHITB 2 during land in g 4, E E Y CAPABILITIES, NM a. No change.

VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel G-2

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT From: To : 241600 July 1944 251600 July 1944

j q 27th Inf
j TA 164-J
25 July 1944
No. 39,
Maps: SAIPAN, l/20,000; TINIAN, l/20,000.
1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD,
a.
2. ENEMY" OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
a. General Summary*
105th inf no change.
(2) 106th and 165th Infs continued to maintain a n t i - s n i p e r p a t r o l s throughout t h e day, 165th Inf reported negative, Px-eliminary r e p o r t frt>m 106th Inf s t a t e s t h a t p a t r o l k i l l e d five (5) Japs, male, in uniform, in T 196, A (3) 3. FA Bns - no change*

MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy c a s u a l t i e s and POW's. (1) (2) Enemy c a s u a l t i e s - 5 . POW's - 0 .

b. Weather and visibility - intermittent showers during day. Visibility

8-10 miles.
c. Miscellaneous - The TIHIAN Operation is proceeding according to plan.
During the early hours of the morning, 0315 to 0500, three counterattacks or at tempts at infiltration were launched by the Japs. The first one occurred at
0315 in TA 633HI v/horw approximately 100 Japs filtered into the swamp and were
evicted by our counterattack at daybreak. Three tanks were used in support of t
the Japs, two of which wore destroyed. At 0500, counterattacks were launched
simultaneously in TA 647, TA 641 and in TA 652G. In each of these counterattacks
three tanks were used but no penetrations of our linos were made* In TA 647 TA 641 counterattacks, tho participants were reported primarily Air and Navy per sonnel. Our troops have beon under some 70mm and 75mm fire. Up until this tim#
a total of 13 tanks have beon reported. Five of these have been knocked out.
Ihe maximum number of tanks at the beginning of the operation is considered by
G-2 NLF to bo twenty tanks* Coastal Defense guns reported in T * 510G scored two
i hits on the COLORADO killing 18 and wounding 36, and three hits on the destroyer
NORMAN SCOTT. Subsequently, three coastal defense guns were knocked out in this

a r e a . All reports t e n a t o corroborate previous reports of strong nomy positions in t h i s area. Known dnemy dead, including l a s t n i g h t ' s counterattack t o t a l l e d 1,079. !Hie following units havo been identified although no POWs have been t a k en: Elements of tho 50th Inf Rogt., 58th K e i b i t a i , 1st Bn 135th Inf. Our troops had encountered numerous booby traps attached t o items t h a t are normally of souvenier i n t e r e s t , including beer cases, watches, swords, e t c . Some of these have been of types not previously reported. The front l i n e s , as reported by NLP as of 1527 are as follows: TA 652RX - 647EJ0TY - 641EJ0KSX - 634EJIHCFKPU 633YXWKVU - 626A - 625BJNHMLGFA - 624E - 631YXSRM. There has been no further report of the a c t i v i t y on G i M U> 4. E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM a. No change.

ANTIM-SEP

Lt Colonol G-2

- 2

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

Pram; 251600 July 1944
o : 261600 July 1944

26 July 1944 No. 39 Maps: SAIPAN, TIN IAN, GUAM, 1/20,000. 1. E E Y SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD, NM a. 2. Omitted.

E E Y OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD. NM a. General Summary. (1) 105th Infantry - No change.

(2) 106th Inf and 165th Inf continued to maintain a n t i - s n i p e r p a t r o l s throughout the day. 165th Inf r e p o r t s having received r i f l e f i r e a t approxi mately 1700 in TA 196U. The 106th Inf reported k i l l i n g five (5) Jap s o l d i e r s armed with r i f l e s and grenades, in T 196E on t h e afternoon of 25 July ( t h i s i s A confirmation of preliminary r e p o r t i n G-2 Report No. 3 8 ) . She 106th a l s o r e p o r t s k i l l i n g one woman, dressed in army uniform, in la 187AB on afternoon of 26 J u l y . (3) 3 . PA Bns - no change.

MISCELLANEOUS. ftt Enemy c a s u a l t i e s and POW*s. (1) (2) Enemy c a s u a l t i e s ; POW'S: None. one (1) woman (dressed in army uniform).

b. Weather and visibility: Scattered showers during night. Visibility,

fair to good.
c. Miscellaneous.

(1) 1165th Engr Gr r e p o r t s l o c a t i n g nineteen (19) mines i n TA 196U* 102nd Engr Bn-reported finding one (1) a n t i - b o a t mine in TA 187N> and s i x (6) mines in T 176MN. A (2) Front l i n e s on G A as of 251800 are as f o l l o w s : 602R, 583BGRQV# UM 5O2BF. 561 OTSRU, 534A, 533J0TYXP, 532TQ, 506A, 505E, 480EDCB, 479CGK, 478 OSV i n North gone. In the Southern p o r t i o n , the l i n o s are as f o l l o w s : 411XT# 412 PQMDG, 413PHD, 432XST, 433-0, 414BMXY, 398ABCI0, 399KQRX, ,3841, 383-0, 366V, 350K, 3491V, 333LU, 317AGK, 316*0K, 315TS. - 1

(3) On TINIAN, our forces continue t o make steady p r o g r e s s , 2nd MarDiv completed t h e i r landing today and assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e E&st s i d e of t h e l i n e , preliminary r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e t h a t the 50th Inf Regt i s a v e t e r a n o r g a n i s a t i o n of campaigns i n KOREA and MANCHURI/u No new i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s have been r e ported t o t h i s Headquarters. There were no r e p o r t s of c o u n t e r - a t t a c k s l a s t n i g h t . . At 1830 an estimated Bn of the enemy moving SOUTH t h r u 619FG towing t h r e e (3) f i e l d pieces was dispersed by our a r t i l l e r y . Enemy attempted t o i n f i l t r a t e in small groups i n ; I A 6 2 7 B and 619A but without s u c c e s s . Enemy c a s u a l t i e s a r e e s t i mated a t 1,648 as of 250600 J u l y . No further r e p o r t s of enemy c a s u a l t i e s have boon received; however, a i r observer r e p o r t e d 25$J c a s u a l t i e s i n f l i c t e d on Bn men tioned above, 70mm a r t i l l e r y f i r e f e l l on YilHITE beach 2 on 25 July for a s h o r t period of time. All r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e t h a t the enemy is using camouflage t o every advantage. Propaganda l e a f l e t s have been dropped by our p l a n e s . Front l i n e s on TINIAN-as of 1445 ( r e p o r t e d by NT&LF and a i r observer) arc as follows,: 616R, 617Q, 618PQRST, 619KLMJ, 62OA, 627VRN0, 628KLGCDE, 629ABHIJ, 630FGH. (4) AGUIJAN Island - The following information i s presumably from a captured map or document: On the i s l a n d a r e 75 t o 100 s o l d i e r s , 1 r a d a r , 3 l i g h t AA guns, and 5 MG's, 4. E E Y CAPABILITIES* NM a. No change.

1
V N ANTWERP A Lt Colonel G-2 jf

- 2

}~2 PERIODIC REPORT

?f *,***

^ " *

~ ~'~ f**^ promj 261600 July 1944

;.,jLf!| To : 271600 July 1944
- ^.r v / < A 164-J
J,
27 July 1944

No. 41 Maps: SAIPAN, TINIAN, l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 1. E E Y SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD, NM a. 2. Omitted.

E E Y OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD. NM a. General Summary. (1) 105th infantry - No change.

(2) 106th inf and 165th inf continued t o maintain anti-sniper patrols throughout the day i n t h e i r a r e a s . Both organizations r e p o r t n e g a t i v e . (3) FA Bns - No change.

3. MISCELLANEOUS*
a* Enemy casualtios and POW'S: None.

b. Weather and visibility: Brief showers during night and day; visibility
poor to fair.
c. Miscellaneous.
(1) On TINIAN* the 2d and 4th MarDiv encountered light resistance and
for the good part of the day, advanced standing up. At 1344 the 0-4 line had
been secured. Units were to remain there for consolidation, and no further
advance was to be made for the remainder of the day.
(2) No further information is available as to the situation on GUAM.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES,
a. No change.

ANTWERP Lt C o l o n e l G-2 (NOTE: G-2 R e p o r t , 2 5 - 2 6 J u l y , numbered

#39, should be #40.)

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

271600 July 1944 281600 July 1944

Hq 27th inf Div TA 164-J 28 July 1944

No. 42 Maps: 1.
SAIPAN,

TINIAN, GUAM,

l/20,000.

E E Y SITUATION' AT END OF PERIOD. NM a. Omittod.

2.

ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD, a. General Summary.

(1) 105th Infantry - No change. (2) 106th and 165th Inf maintained a n t i - s n i p e r p a t r o l s in t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e areas throughout the day. One (1) Jap s o l d i e r committed s u i c i d e a t B O N RW beach 2 when accosted by a p a t r o l from, the 106th Inf. 165th Inf r e p o r t s nega time. (3) 3. FA Bns - No change.

MISCELLANEOUS.

a. .Enemy casualties and POW f s.

(1) Enemy casualties: One (1)
(2) P0Ws: Military - 0
Civilian - 9
b. Weather and visibility: Brief showers daring night, overcast during
day; visibility limited.
c. Miscellaneous.

(1) 165th Inf reports finding bomb fuses in a cave entrance in T 145F# A apparently s e t as booby t r a p s . (2) 106th Inf reports taking into custody nine (9) c i v i l i a n s (4 women, 5 children) in T 195. A (3) TINIAN - During the night ther^ was very l i t t l e a c t i v i t y on port of enemy. The 2d MarDiv received some a r t i l l e r y f i r e believed to be from p o s i tions on the plateau SOUTHEAST of TINIAN Town. The enemy dead as of 0945 amounts to 2,246. P0Ws are eight ( 8 ) . Tentative new identifications accord ing to m&lF are the 233d Construction Bn, the 82d AA Unit and the 83d A Unit. A

.Marine engineers report magnetic and electrically coircrolled mines -were sown
along the road in TA 619UVWXYZ* A booby trap consisting of a cylindrical can
about the length of a 60mm mortar was reported, as was a special type of bang alore torpedo with a triangular shaped tape mine at each end. It is interest ing to note that the Marine troops on TINIAN report that the enemy troops on
the island appear to be much better marksmen, and are well equipped with hand
grenades and new rifles. POl'Y's report that the only source of water is rain
water. The 4th MarDiv reports capturing two (2) medium tanks which appear to
be in operating condition* Latest front lines are: as of 1550, NORTHERN part
of TA's 553ABCDE; as of 1554, NORTHERN part of TA*s 554D1T0, 555K; latest
report on balance of line was as of 1251, generally along the 0-5 line.
(4) GUAM - As of 261800 the front lines were 602M 583M* 56lM 534K#
533V, 532W, 506AU, 480G, 479C, 478RV, 455V, 414IK, 398A, 384L, 366W, 349S,
316H# 314T* Enemy known dead at that tano amounted to 2,783.
(5) At 1522 a radio intercept reports the capture of two (2) military
pilots on TINIAN who identify two (2) air units as the TAKA (Hawk) Unit and
tho TOBI (Buzzard) Unit. Both arc believed to be naval aviation units.
4. ENEMY" CAPABILITIES.
a. No change.

VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel

G-2

- 2

-**

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT From: To : 281600 July 1944 231600 July 1944

Hq 27th Inf T 164-J A 29 July 1944

No. 43 _
m _ ^ Maps: S A I P B ^ ^ ^ T O T TINIAN, 1. l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 .

ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

2,

ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD. a. General Summary* (1) 105th Inf - No change.

(2) 106th and 165th Infs maintained a n t i - s n i p e r p a t r o l s during day. 106th Inf r e p o r t s one (1) Jap s o l d i e r shot on B O V Beach 2 and seven (7) HSN Jap s o l d i e r s k i l l e d in TA 212RW by MP detachment, and two (2) Jap s o l d i e r s armed with hand grenades k i l l e d in TA 186p a t 1130. (3) 3. FA Bns - No change

MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy casualties and P0Ws.

(1) Enemy casualties - 11
(2) POET'S - 0

b. c

Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - Cloudy with v i s i b i l i t y from 4-6 m i l e s . Mis ce1lane ous

(1) 165th Inf reports two (2) caves, approximately 100 feet deep, in tft 152M in which were 60-70 jap sea minos. They also reported findirg one (1) jap body and small Jap stove in ci.ve a t T 180W. A (2) TINIAN - All reports received by t h i s Headquarters indicate t h a t the 2nd and 4th MarDivs continued to meet l i g h t sporadic r e s i s t a n c e . By 281600 July, RCT 23 had secured the GAAGUAN PT A i r f i e l d s main s t r i p . An enemy strong point was noted from report of l i a i s o n officers as being in TA 596PQV. The only enemy observed in number was in the area bounded by T A 584N, 585M# 572H and 573H The 2nd MarDiv reported encountering overhead booby traps with t r i p wire attached to p u l l type i g n i t e r fuzes in T 622QV A and a l s o reported t h a t the Shinto Temple in TA 628V was booby trapped with - 1

'

<

blocks of p i c r i c a c i d . Also disco.xsr.e4 in 3^L 1L were over 10Qi^ei3betjtrical mines with wires leading toward cation of the AKIYAMZI BUTAI# a smdd.1 nava], tmit wxi^ji l3^i{rack| jrte.rJTA 627. Two (&) Japs were k i l l e d during nj%i"a|fewbEaddScfc%&iij$taingw^fitelisgported as q u i e t . 4th MarDiv reports extensive enemy defensive p o s i t i o n s , .consisting of well camouflaged trenches and dugouts, wore found by their troops as they advanced, and by p a t r o l s in front of their l i n e s . An enemy CP was located a t T 602D in which a l l documents had been burned and equipment destroyed. A POW's s t a t e t h a t the enemy is well armed and a l s o t h a t the heavy bombardment greatly affected morale. Dropped propaganda l e a f l e t s appear to be very sue* ceesful with c i v i l i a n s . Reports from both divisions indicate that the enemy is conducting a well executed and orderly withdrawal. Units report that the enemy is disposing of their dead making accurate estimate of casualties d i f f i c u l t , if not impossible. Front lines of TINIAN as of C91427 J u l y , 2nd MarDiv linos a r e : 571N0T, 572U, 561BHMEW, 549CH23SX, 539DJ. As of 1545, 4th MarDiv lines a r e ; 534AB, 544VW* northerly p a r t of XYT, 545PQRSN0. southerly, p a r t of 546FGHIJ. 547FGH. As of 290815 July, 494 c i v i l i a n POW's were taken and 2,537 m i l i t a r y Japanese were k i l l e d . () G A - No further reports have been received by t h i s Headquarters. UM

(4) At 291020 July, Corps A r t i l l e r y reported one (1) man had died and one (1) man was very i l l from drinking Japanese beer. All Units of t h i s command were notified t o diss eminate the above information to a l l tro ops., 4. E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM " a. No change.

VAN ANTWERP Lt C o l o n e l G-2

- 2

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: To : 291800 July 1944 301800 July 1944

Hq 2SthoInf TA 164-J 30 July 1944 No. 44 Maps: SAIPiiK, l/20,000j TINIAN, l/20,Q00. 1. E E Y SITUATION AT E D OF PERIOD. NM N a. 2* Omitted.

E E Y OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD. . NM a. General Summary*

(1) 106th and 165th inf maintained a n t i - s n i p e r p a t r o l s during day. 165th Inf reported n e g a t i v e . The 106th Inf s t a t e d in a preliminary report A t h a t they had taken s^ven (7) P0Ws in T 220D, which included 2 men, 2 boys and 3 g i r l s - a l l c i v i l i a n s . 105th inf r e p o r t s the folio-wing: eight (8) s o l d i e r s k i l l e d in T 260W, 1 s o l d i e r k i l l e d in T 262U, 3 s o l d i e r s k i l l e d A A in T 262Y 2 s o l d i e r s k i l l e d in T 263T. 8 soldiers k i l l e d in T 269W, 2 A A A c i v i l i a n s k i l l e d in T 238G, 3 c i v i l i a n s captured in T 270S, 2 c i v i l i a n s A A captured in T 275U 3 c i v i l i a n s captured in T 212G# and 2 s o l d i e r s captured A A in T 269W. A (2) FA Bns - No change.

(3) 1165th Engr Gr r e p o r t s that p a t r o l s encountered enemy in IA 201E and T 2O2A. Fifteen (15) enemy k i l l e d and 12-15 were seen r e t r e a t i n g to the A hills. 3. MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy c a s u a l t i e s and POY^s. (1) (2) Enemy c a s u a l t i e s i P0WS: Civilian - 2
Military * 22

C i v i l i a n - 25
Military - 2

b . Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - Continuous r a i n during night followed by clear to cloudy day. V i s i b i l i t y 8-10 m i l e s . c Mis cellaneous

(1) Report of the 105th Inf from 16 July t o 29 July i n c l u s i v e , of enemy c a s u a l t i e s is as follows:

SERVICE Killed 739

Captured 115

Captured 663

(2) G A - No further reports of this operation have been received UM by this headquarters. > (3) TINIAN - Front lines as of 1550, 4th MarDiv 520B* 527VRSTt 528 PVMXYT, 529PKLGD, 537y; as of 1520, 2nd MarDiv along 0-7 l i n e . Enemy a r t i l lery was reported in T 523N* 509W, 506GHM. Machine guns were located in A c l i f f s in T 507GC. Considerable enemy a c t i v i t y was reported in TA 517XY A and 512DE* Ihere were again numerous reports of mines and booby traps being used by the enemy* A Korean P W captured by RCT 25 reports Colonel O A A had O GT his CP in T 51lGHLM A great deal of intelligence material and technical A gear were found in the v i c i n i t y of G H U N PT A i r f i e l d , I t was a l s o reported AGA that there was an undamaged plane s t i l l crated in T 577N A
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a No change.

VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel

G-2

- 2

(g-2 PERIODIC REPORT

vii
No. 45 Maps: SAIPAN, l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 1. E E Y SITUATION AT E D OF PERIOD. NM N

From: To :

301800 July 1944 311800 July 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div Til " 213*11 31 July 1944

a. Small groups of enemy continue to occupy hideouts in t h e a r e a NE of the l i n e T 236N - T 223K Groups contacted consisted of army, navy, armed A A

civilians (male) as woll as small groups of c i v i l i a n s . 2. E E Y OP&UTIONS DIKING PERIOD. NM

a General Summary - Following pockets of resistance -wore met during day:
TA 219N A group of five (5) enemy were killed in this area after
offering resistance and appeared to have occupied their
hideout for some time.
TA 2371X Enemy group occupying this gulch fired on our troops with
a light machine gun.
TA 224K * Our troops were firod on by enemy machine gun from the
shore cliffs in this area.
3. MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy c a s u a l t i e s and POWfs. (1) Enemy c a s u a l t i e s : M i l i t a r y - 53

.Civilian - 5
(2) P0Ws: Military - 3
Civilian - 25

b # An enemy ammunition dump was located in T 213QRS and contained the A following ammunition scattered in small dumps: 149 cases 8cm A am; 608 cases A TyipQ 89 Grenades; 184 cases Type 41 mountain gun s h e l l s ; 166 cases 70mm shells; 88 cases 10cm H W s h e l l s ; 325 cases Type 94 mountain gun s h e l l s ; 15 cases O !iype 93 fuzes; 166 cases lype 97 hand grenades; 10 cases $ype 99 hand grenades; 37 cases Type 99 7.7 r i f l e am; 94 cases siaoke s h e l l s ; 23 cases 37imn am; 5 cases 47mm; 72 cases Type 97 mortar am; 7 cases lype 98 mortar am; 12 cases !iype 38 f i e l d gun am; 2 cases 20:TETI A am; 30 cases p l a t e land mines; 6 cases A 25ma am; 2 cases 13mu. am. In addition to t h i s am, was considerable quantity of foodstuffs.
1

c . Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - Weather good, v i s i b i l i t y clear with excep t i o n of heavy storm at approximately 1000. d. Two (2) c i v i l i a n s taken by the 106th Inf s t a t e d that t h e y were p a r t of a group of five ( 5 ) , the other three (3) being s o l d i e r s . They r e p o r t other similar groups s c a t t e r e d in the h i l l s SOUTH 6f M/LRPI and t h a t these groups continue t o move about. 33iey s t a t e t h a t t h e r e are a number of s o l d i e r s 3s f t in t h i s area and t h a t these men are armed primarily with grenades, though some have r i f l e s and machine guns. Ammunition is lacking, Iho two (2) c i v i l i a n s s t a t e t h a t the t h r e e (3) s o l d i e r s with thorn committed suicide when they were surrounded. Ihey a l s o s t a t e d t h a t t h e i r group was headed for M IAPO!ICHAU T considering i t to be a safer a r e a , and t h a t they are of the opinion t h a t other groups may attempt the same p l a n . e . TINIAN - Best a v a i l a b l e information gives front linos as follows: 4th MarDiv as of 1645: T 5Q9UTOY, S10UVQL. gap 510MHC, 51572CSNI; 2nd MarDiv A as of 1600: T 515IJ, 516A# 523XIJNID, 530XST, 531PQ3ST* 532U 525A. A 4. E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM

a.. The enemy is capable of continuing the same "small group" hold-out a c t i v i t y which has been present since 10 July 1944, b, The enemy is capable of attempting i n f i l t r a t i o n through our l i n e s in order t o return to areas with which they are b e t t e r acquainted or t o harrass our i n s t a l l a t i o n s wherever they may find them. c. The enemy is capable of gathering together the small s c a t t e r e d groups SOUTH of MAHPI PT and attempting another suicide drive with the objective of accomplishing as much destruction as possible before they are k i l l e d . V/hile t h i s is a c a p a b i l i t y , i t would require leadership and, as y e t , there have been no signs t h a t such leadership is a v a i l a b l e .

VN A Lt Colonel G-2

- 2

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT From: To : 021800 August 1944 031800 August 1944

Hq 2 7 t h Inf Div TA 238-Y 3 August 1944 No. 48 Maps: SAIPAN, l / 2 0 , 0 0 0 * 1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD, a. No change i n t y p e of a c t i v i t y .

B. . ( 1 ) ..LCI being used by 106th Inf r e p o r t e d o b s e r v i n g 6-8 enemy i n a r e a s TA 292KLM* The LCI f i r e d approximately 100 rounds of 40mm s h e l l a t t h i s enemy and observed no movement i n t h e a r e a during the next hour. I t i s p o s s i b l e , however, t h a t enemy s t i l l e x i s t i n t h i s a r e a . (2) A Division A r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n plane r e p o r t e d , as of 1700, t h a t approximately twenty (20) enemy in groups of 2-3 had been observed in caves A A along t h e coast i n areas T 291, 292 and 286, with the majority i n areas T 291 and 286. Some of those observed remained s t a t i o n a r y i n the open while others attempted t o hide as tho piano approached. 2. E E Y OPERATIONS DURIIG PERIOD. NM

a. During night 2-3 August, both regiments reported t h a t enemy a c t i v i t y was less than encountered in previous n i g h t s . 105th Inf reported very few enemy encountered u n t i l 031200 August when they were relieved by the 165th Inf. Enony encountered by the 106th Inf were few u n t i l approximately 1100 when numbers increased. 3. MISCELLANEOUS* a . Enemy c a s u a l t i e s and POW's
MILITARY Killed 105th i n f 106th I n f 165th Inf Hq Co 27th Div
2
65 0 2

CIVILIAN
Killed 8 4 0
12 POV 1
55
0
0
56

POW 0
9 0
0

TOTAL 6 9

Ninety (90) enemy killed reported by 1st Bn, 106th Inf on 31 July has
been increased to 100. Figure is divided, 99 .military and one (1) civilian.
This figure is included for the first time in recapitulation figures shown in
par. 3c, this report.

b. Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - 6.atherr W S faiir during the entire period ex A cept for two light showers occurring during night 2-3 August; v i s i b i l i t y good, c. Following is recapitulation of figures since mop-up operations were commenced bn 16 July and thru 031800 August: MILITARY CIVILIAN
lied POW Killed POW 16 thru 30 July (105 Inf) 311july (Div) 31 July (1/106 not previ ously reported)* 1 August (Div) 2 August (Div) 3 August (Div) Total

773 53
99

117
3 0
9 6 9
144

58 5
r-l

674

11
0
45 50 56
836

147
143 69
1284

20 40 12

136

Delayed report of 90 killed (no breakdown as to status) now given as

100, broken down as shown.
d# Information from G U M received from AGF may be summarized as follows:
The 3rd MarDiv on the left and the 77th Div on the right are moving NORTH along
the whole width of the island. General line as of 011800 August is: TA 6O7B 569v - 544H - 494D The marine brigade is outposted across the island along
the general line originally occupied by the 77th Inf Div in their furthest
movement SOUTH.
o TINIAN - It is reported that enemy is'still occupying caves in the SE
of the island, employed mortars against our troops during the night 2-3 August*
f ROTA - Information received by radio broadcast during the evening 2
August, that our forces had landed on ROTA is believed to be of Japanese origin^
There is no knowledge that any of our troops have landed on this island.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
a# No change

VAN MTWERP
Lt Colonel
G-2

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HEADQUARTERS 27TH INFANTRY DIVISION A. P . 0 . 27

3 A u g u s t 1944

THE FOLLOWING DISPATCH FROM CTF 56 IS FORWARDED FOR INFORMATION AND COMPLIANCE :

"CINCPQA HAS ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF RECOGNIZING INDICATIONS OF JAPANESE PLANS TO CARRY ON BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE X STRANGE BEHAVIOR OF ENEMY PLANES KAY GIVE EVIDENCE SUCH AS SPRAYING OF ANY SORT OR DROPPING CONTAMINATED ARTICLES FROM LOW FLYING PLANES NEAR TROOPS X DEATHS OR ILLNESS OF MANY TROOPS FROM NO APPARENT CAUSE SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED AND REPORTED PROMPTLY X REPORT DEATHS OF RODENTS OR DOMESTIC ANIMALS BT URGE NUMBERS X ODD TYPES OF CONTAINERS OR BOMBS MADE OF PLASTIC OR GLASS FROM MICH POWDER OR LIQUID CM BE SPRAYED ARE TO BE REPORTED X CINCPOA DESIRES M3DICAL SUPPLIES AND DOCUMENTS WITH SAMPLES X SAMPLE VACCINES ARE DESIRED AS SOOU AS POSSIBLE X IN THE INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS FIND OUT ABOUT RECENT VACCINATIONS, TYPE, NUMBER AND OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION OF 3I0L0GISTS: BIOLOGICAL LABORA TORIES iiND RELATED RESEARCH X REPORT N3fi CONSTRUCTION OF GAS MASKS ESPECIALLY THICKNESS OR TYPE OF FILTER OR NEW EXHJOST VALVE ACTION X SLIGHTEST EVIDENCE OF USE OF BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE SHOULD BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY BY DISPATCH TO CBJCPOA X I F NEW GAS MASKS ARE FOUND SEND SAMPLES BY A I R TO CINCPOA X AT NO TIME WILL THESE INSTRUCTIONS BID CARRIED IN AIRPLANES".

VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel G-2

f *

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 031800 August 1944
To : 041800 August 1944
Hq 27th Inf Div
TA 238-Y
4 August 1944
No* 49
Maps: SAIPAN, l/20,000.
1. ENEMY" SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD,
a* No change in type of activity.

b. From information received, it is probable that enemy pockets will be

found in TA 286QMNR, along the NORTHEASTERN base of the cliff overlooking
M&RP'I Airfield* and in caves along the shoreline bounding MARPI PT#
2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING P3RI0D.
a. General summary - Some activity occurred on both regimental fronts dur ing night 3-4 August. ^ W ^ g the day, a ctivity continued as in previous days
although in several instances, enemy groups wer- larger than previously en countered.
b. Miscellaneous.
(1) Interrogation of prisoners by both regiments continues to empha size the fact that Japanese soldiers have indoctrinated civilians with the
firm belief that they vail be tortured and killed if they surrender themselves
to us. one occasion is reported of a young boy throwing himself off a cliff
rather than be taken by our troops. This morning, a woman and her family wore
taken into custody and in spite of being given every kindness, the woman begged
that she be killed at once rather than have her eventual death postponed.
(2) Report is given of a Jap officer who formed a group of twelve (12)
soldiers in double ranks and commenced to drill them, apparently as a gesture
of defiance. The group scattered on being fired upon by our troops on the
cliffs above them.
(3) Two (2) school teachers, male, ages 31 and 32, were taken by 106th
Inf. Both men state that at the time of our landing, they fled to the NORTH
end of the island and have been in hiding ever since. It is interesting that
their story disagrees with the stories of so many P0Ws in the fact that they
stated they have not seen any Japanese soldiers for some time. All other re ports speak of many small groups of soldiers and civilians being present in the
area.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.
.* X "'
*

a.

Enemy casualties and POW's. MILITARY O Killed P W 106th inf 105 th inf Hq Co 27 mf Div Total 23 40 17 80 6 4 _0 10 CIVILIAN Killed P W O
6 2 _3

38 44 1
83

11

TOTAIS T 041800 AUGUST

O
Thru 031800 Aug 1284 80 031800-041800 Aug Total 1364 144 10 154 136 11 147 836 83 919

b . Morale - Every report emphasizes the fact that the Japanese soldier plans death rather than surrender. c. Yfeather and v i s i b i l i t y - Night of 3 August was fairly cloar with no rain. Morning of August 4 was bright but showers developed a t approximately 1100 and balance of day was overcast. V i s i b i l i t y good in morning; poor from noon time on. d. 4* No further report from G A or TINIAN. UM

E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM a. Capabilities as l a s t reported are s t i l l in effect.

b . I t seems probable that with the enemy moving back before our advance and approaching the NORTHEASTERN limits of tho island, his capabilities are one or any combination of three actions; (1) Continuing his small group resistance as in previous days.

(2) Assembling into larger groups and surrendering as a mass or committing mass suicide* (3) our l i n e s . Gathering into large groups and attempting final break through of

VAN ANTWERP Lt Colonel G-2

m.

?i OTSI

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT prom: To : 041800 August 1944 051800 August 1944 Hq 27th Inf Div TA 238-Y 5 August 1944 No. 50 Maps; SAIPAM, l/20,000 # 1. E E Y SITUATION AT E D OF PERIOD. NM " N

a # Type of enemy a c t i v i t y remained r e l a t i v e l y the same except that p a r t i c u l a r l y strong points of resistance were met in T 276QR, 286D, 286M, and 286R, A 2* E E Y OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD. NM

a. General Summary - Activity during night on both regimental fronts was q u i e t . During the day, heavier resistance was met in pockets as noted in par, 1 a, pockets contained caves and heavy jungle, and in T 286E* a cave A 39-40 feet deep was reported as containing 100-150 s o l d i e r s , pocket in T 286D A contains caves and dense jungle and p a r t i c u l a r l y heavy resistance -was met here with casualties to our troops,

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

Estimated enemy c a s u a l t i e s and MILITARY CIVILIAN

106th Inf 165th inf Div Hq Co Total

Killed 68
74
9

151

POW 4 7 0
11

Killed 9
16
1
26

POW

36
3
0
39

TOTAIS TO 051800 AUGUST Thru 041800 Aug PERIOD 1364 151

MlHNIiHa

154 11
MMNW

147 26 173

919 39 958

Total b. c. Morale - No change. Supply and equipment. (1)

1515

165

A number of a e r i a l bombs were reported in TA 286c.

(2) Japanese ammunition dump (caliber of ammunition not s t a t e d ) r e p o r t ed in TA 289P.

m

d. Weather and visibility - Night cloudy with no rain. A heavy thunder storm at approximately 0620 this morning. Morning fair but heavy storms dur ing the afternoon. Visibility for entire period poor.
e Miscellaneous,

(1) A POW reported this morning that eight (8) soldiers left SAIPAN
last night on two (2) rafts, their destination being TINIM, A second POW told
the same story later in the day,
(2) 165th inf reported finding fifteen (15) dead bodies in TA 292S*
From all appearances, the location had been that of a former aid station as
medical supplies were found in the immediately adjoining area, in this same
area were found lumber, sealed cans, and rope, and it is possible that construc tion of rafts was planned at this point,
(3) 165th Inf reported that they also discovered in TA 2 92S, approxi mately 100 enemy bodies, The bodies were piled up and those at the bottom of
the pile had disintergrated into skeletons. Those at the top may have been 3-4
days old. It appeared that this location had been used by the enemy as a bur ial dump.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES,

a. The enemy is capable of infiltrating through our lines in an endeavor

to gain safety in the mountains SOUTHWEST of MA&PI PT.
b. The enemy is capable of infiltrating through our lines and attempting
harrassing action in guerilla groups on our installations and personnel.
c. The enemy is capable of hiding out and either existing as best he can
or doing away with himself.

VAN ANTWERP
Lt Colonel
G-2

- 1

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT Fromj To : 051800 August 1944 061800 August 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div TA 164-J 6 August 1944 No. 51 Maps-. SAIPAN, l/20,000 1. E E Y SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD. NM a# 2. 27th Inf Div mop-up mission completed.

E E Y OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD. NM a. General summary.

(1) In e a r l y evening 5 August, the 106th i n f a n t r y took i n t o dustody a group of 91 c i v i l i a n s (23 men, 22 women, and 46 c h i l d r e n ) , 2 s o l d i e r s and 2 s a i l o r s in TA'S 277GEQM* (2) During the afternoon of 5 August, 27th Div Ren Tr encountered a pocket i n TA 286D in which i t THIS found t h a t approximately ten (10) enemy were occupying caves p a r t way up the side of a c l i f f which rose in p l a c e s to 40 feet, These caves were f i n a l l y knocked out by flame t h r o w e r s , grenades, and machine guns. Enemy was well p r o t e c t e d by b u i l t up entrances to the caves and before he was e l i m i n a t e d , he had k i l l e d 5 of our men and wounded 12. (3) As of l a s t night# only enemy r e s i s t a n c e remaining was contained &long t h e c l i f f s i n TA 286MIDE - TA 290y. (4) 3. Night was q u i e t .

MISCELLANEOUS. a. Enemy casualties and POWfs:

UNIT KILLED Military 105th Inf 106th Inf 165th inf Total Previously Reported Grand Total 1 8 17 26 1515 1541 Divilian 0 0 3 3 173 176

POW
Military Civilian 0 4 1 5 165 170 0 98 1 99 958 1057

Following is report of our casualties for1 period 6 July to 5 August

indlusive as received from G*I:

KIA
Officer 105th inf 106th inf 165th inf 27 Cav Ren Tr Total

WIA

EM 11
6 0 4
21 Officer

EM

54
45
3
12

114

1 0 0 1
2

2 3

1
0
6

b . Weather and v i s i b i l i t y - Heavy r a i n continued during t h e night of 5-6 August, During day 6 August, sky was o v e r c a s t . During t h e n i g h t , v i s i b i l i t y was very bad and during t h e day, poor, c. Miscellaneous.

(1) This morning, t h e 106th Infantry reported taking i n t o custody a Japanese judge and h i s male s e c r e t a r y . (2) 106th infantry a l s o reported taking a Jap m i l i t a r y i n t e r p r e t e r who had occupied hideouts on the IJS coast a f t e r our landing. He expressed s u r p r i s e t h a t our troops f a i l e d t o i n v e s t i g a t e caves i n t h e i r movement toward MARPI PT prior to 9 July, 4. E E Y CAPABILITIES. NM

a . The enemy i s s t i l l capable of conducting h a r r a s s i n g actions in small " ' groups against our i n s t a l l a t i o n s and personnel. b* The enemy i s always capable of conducting a i r r a i d s upon t h i s island, and care must be taken t h a t personnel does n o t become careless regarding capability.

V N AM'IERP A Lt Colonel G-2

^e*v "fsif

- 2