Sheker vs.

Sheker
G.R. No. 157912
December 13, 2007
FACTS: The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice Sheker and
thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against
the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on a contingent claim for
agents commission due him in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be
incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice Sheker (MEDINA) moved for the dismissal of
said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee,
as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2)
petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3)
petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed
and served personally.
The RTC-Iligan City issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the
money claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioners MR was
denied.Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a
probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a
written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon
filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the ROC
provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special
proceedings only in a suppletory manner.
[The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly
filed with this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the ROC]-

Hilado vs. CA

G.R. No. 164108

May 8, 2009

Facts:
Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife,
private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter,
Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At the time of his death, two (2) civil case were pending against
Benedicto involving the petitioners.
Administratrix Benedicto, then submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real
Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband, which included as among the
liabilities, the liability corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 959137 andP35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178. Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private
respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the
estate.
On September 24, 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC: (1) Manifestation/Motion Ex
Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings; (2) Omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a
deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedents
estate; and (3) pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private
respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been
submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court
to intervene in the intestate proceedings.
A petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals by the petitioners. But on 27
February 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and decated that the Manila RTC did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings.
Issue:
WON the petitioners has the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the deceased
Benedicto.
Held:
The disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct.

Petitioners be furnished with copies of all

processes and orders issued in connection with

the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings

filed by the administrator of the estate.
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records tomonitor
prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper
disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of
the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual
accountingappears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for
sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over
the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested
persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x.

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do

require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested
parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be
given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference
to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor
or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize
the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the
hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue.

A deadline be set for the submission

by
administratrix
Benedicto
to
submit a verified and complete
inventory of the estate, and upon
submission thereof

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a

true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the
deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule
85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration
within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of
administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an
administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the
estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the
administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of

dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and
available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent
claims against the estate.

On complaints against the general

competence of the administrator

The proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance

with Section 2, Rule 82.

FACTS: Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, is married to Maxine Tate Grimm
(second wife) and had two children, Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm. He also had
two children with his first wife, Juanita Kegley Grimm (divorced), named Juanita Grimm Morris and
Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden).
On January 23, 1959, he executed two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed
of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The
second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. The two children of the first
marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this
country.

He died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. On March 7, 1978,
the two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm in the Third Judicial
District Court of Utah. However, on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as
the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the
second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into
a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate.

43 days after Edwards death, Ethel, the daughter of the first marriage, filed a petition for intestate
proceeding. Maxine, the second wife, opposed on the ground of the pendency of the probate proceedings
in Utah. Later, September 8, 1980, Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a
petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979

partition approved by the intestate court be set aside. They alleged that they were defrauded due to
the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that
the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to
the decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by Judge Leonidas. Ethel then
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be
dismissed, or alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch

20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard
prior to the petition for probate.
ISSUE: Whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an
intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by
its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district court).
HELD: YES. The respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss. A testate proceeding is proper in this case
because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it
is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249;
Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person
who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case
should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate
proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition
and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient
for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies
of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.

19. AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA

JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 189121

July 31, 2013

FACTS

Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law

wife Ma. Lourdes Belen. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her
mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC
of Las Pias City in order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the
dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two
children, filed an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper
venue asserting that Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las
Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners
averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratix of Eliseos estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. In
validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was
able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by
establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992.
For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the
Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the
decedent was a resident of Las Pias City.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.
Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.
HELD:

1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at
the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the
terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In
the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence,"
in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot

be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the
settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is
evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the
venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
2. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming
evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is
founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to
her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.Having a vested
right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise
can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the
law.