Chapter

8: The Legislative Department

A. Organization and Membership;
Composition/Apportionment

MARIANO vs. COMELEC (242 SCRA 211)

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not an apportionment law that is disproportion in

representation is unconstitutional.

1.Two petitions assailing certain provisions of RA No. 7854 (An Act

Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City) as
unconstitutional.2.GR No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and
declaratory relief, and assailing the statute as unconstitutional on the
following grounds: a.Section 2 did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in
relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code .b.Section 51
attempts to alter or restart the three-consecutive term limit for local
elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and
Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.c. Section 52:i.Increased the
legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter) violates the
constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within three years following the return of every census ii.
The increase in legislative district was not expressed in the bill title iii.The
addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accordance with
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution the population of Makati is
450,0003.GR No. 118627 involves a petition which assails Section 52 as
unconstitutional on the same grounds as a fore stated.

HELD:

ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned provisions are constitutional.

Yes, a law giving provinces with less number of inhabitants more

representative districts than those with bigger population is invalid because
it violates the principle of proportional representation prescribed by the
Constitution. Such law is arbitrary and capricious and against the vital
principle of equality.

HELD: Yes. Petitions dismissed.

MACIAS VS COMELEC
GR. L-18684 (Sept. 14, 1961) (Constitutional Law Apportionment,
Proportional Representation)

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of a law (Republic Act
3040) that apportions representative districts in this country on the ground
that it is unconstitutional and void because it apportioned districts without
regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces. Respondents
aver they were merely complying with their duties under the statute, which
they presume and allege to be constitutional.

RATIO:
a.D: The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local government unit cannot be overemphasized. The
boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners
have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the
proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries.

D: The existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an

insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with
reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit.
Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati.
b. D: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality
of a law are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events (i.e.
Mayor Binay will run again, etc.)Petitioners merely posed a hypothetical
issues. Petitioners (residents of Taguig) are not also the proper parties to
raise this abstract issue.
c. D: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special
law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides
that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a
general reapportionment law.
This is exactly what the Congress did in enacting RA No. 7854 and providing
for an increase in Makatis legislative district.
D: The policy of the Court favors a liberal construction of the one title one
subject rule so as not to impede legislation. The Constitution does not
command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or
completely catalogue all its details. Hence, it should be sufficient
compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions
are germane to such general subject.
D: Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least
250,000 shall have at least one representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has

increased to more than 250,000 shall be entitled to at least one

congressional representative.
Although Makati has a population of 450,000, its legislative district may still
be increased since It has met the minimum population requirement of
250,000.

Tobias vs. Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783, Dec. 8, 1994
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit
on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading
of the applicable provision, Art. VI, Sec. 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the
present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly
provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The inescapable
import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may
be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.
Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by RA
7675 is not unconstitutional.
As to the contention that Sec. 49 of RA 7675 in effect preempts the
right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument
borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was
Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed
law, including Sec. 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a
right which pertains to itself.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been
made to participate in the plebiscite on RA 7675 as the same involved a
change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the
principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan
were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do
with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

Similarly, petitioners additional argument that the subject law has

resulted in gerrymandering, which is the practice of creating legislative
districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep.
Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent
representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having
consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep.
Zamoras constituency has in fact been diminished, which development
could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

Party-list System: Inviolable parameters to determine the winners;

Computation

B. Election, term and contests-qualifications; residence

residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that
she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to

be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

248 SCRA 300

HELD:

FACTS:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election

purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners
claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her
own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following
reasons:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her

domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in
the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college
degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In
1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When
Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan,
Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won
presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and
Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy
Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and
also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner,
in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency,
which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and
that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became

Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father
brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond
with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile
because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same
thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos
in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage
and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres.
Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated
that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in
1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She

even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,

celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby
SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.

AQUINO VS. COMELEC
(248 SCRA 400)
FACTS:

ISSUE: WON Aquino is legible to run for the said position WON Declaring the
winner from the remaining legible candidates is constitutional
HELD:
NO to both issues.
RATIO :
Sec 6 Art VI of the Constitution provides that a candidate must be a
resident of the district he is representing for at least one year before the
elections. Aquino has always been a resident of Conception, Tarlac prior to
the elections. Although he leased a condominium unit within the district he
will be representing, mere leasing instead of buying the unit is not evident
of a strong intention to establish a domicile. Declaring the person who
garnered the second highest number of votes as the winner because the
choice of the majority is disqualified is against the sovereign will of the
people

Agapito A. Aquino files his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of

Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati. (Note: he
stated his residency period as 0 years and 10months)

Move Makati and Mateo Bedon (LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) files petition to

disqualify Aquino for lacking residence qualification.

COMELEC dismissed petition to disqualify

Move Makati and Mateo files a motion for reconsideration.

On the election Aquino wins with 38,547 votes over his opponent, Agusto
Syjuco, with 35,910votes.

COMELEC grants motion for reconsideration declaring Aquino as ineligible

and thus disqualified as a candidate and determine the winner from the
remaining legible candidates.

C. Compensation and privileges-freedom from arrest;

privilege of speech and debate

PHILCONSA v. Gimenez
G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
Regala, J.

Facts:

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the
validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and
commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives,
and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on
retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on
increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office,
contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The
same provision constitutes selfish class legislation because it allows
members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service
and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years
of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of
the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can
retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity
which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which,
in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick
leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of
Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further
increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of
retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers
objected to by the petitioner does not constitute forbidden compensation
within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution.
The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of
commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely
in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring
member and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.

Issue:

whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the
Constitution which reads as follows:

The senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an
annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each,
including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and
exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective
districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and
to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when
attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided
by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of
sixteen thousand pesos.

Held:

Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the
compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was
only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as
follows: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly
elected subsequent to approval of such increase. In other words, under the
original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National
Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the
Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14,
Article VI, includes in the term compensation other emoluments. This is
the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement
benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the
term other emoluments.

Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or

employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is
annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.

It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of
emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one
possessing any office.

Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon
the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits
were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of
the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs
counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA
3836 is therefore unconstitutional.

OSMENA V. PENDATUN (109 PHIL. 863)
FACTS:
In a privilege speech entitled: A message to Garcia, Osmena made
allegations of bribery against the Garcia administration. House Resolution
no. 59 followed the creation of a special committee to investigate the
allegedly groundless charges made by Osmena against the Garcia
administration. House Resolution no. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious
disorderly behavior and thereby suspending him for 15months.
ISSUES: WON his suspension was constitutional
HELD: Court has no Jurisdiction. Dismissed

RATIO:
Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him complete
parliamentary immunity in his privilege speech. Although the purpose of

parliamentary immunity is to guarantee the legislator complete freedom of

expression without being made responsible in criminal or civil actions, it
does NOT protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
whenever his words or conducts are disorderly or unbecoming of a member
thereof. The question of whether Osmenas speech constitutes disorderly
conduct is for the House to judge. The matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the house knows best. On the question of
jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed for being moot or academic.
Because n opreliminary injunction was issued, the special committee
performed its task, reported to the house and the latter approved the
suspension order.

JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG (17 SCRA 87)
The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action- that is
actions that are done in relation with the duties of a Member of the
Congress.
FACTS:
Respondent was a member of the House who wrote an open letter
to the President of the Philippines, and caused this to be published in
several newspapers of general circulation. The contents of the letter were
mainly to inform the president of the so-called three operational plans
under serious study of some officers of the AFP and aided by some civilians.
It also describes these plans as an insidious plan or a massive political build-
up of then Secretary of Defense Vargas. It also details the various means
that has already been mopped out to ensure the success of these
operational plans. The letter also suggested that the planners already have
in their control several officers of the AFP, included are the petitioners. It
was mentioned however in the letter that those mentioned above as
already in control of the planners may be unwillingly be only tools of the
plan which they may have absolutely no knowledge. An ordinary civil action
for damages was instituted by petitioners against respondent for the
publication of an allegedly libelous letter. The trial court dismissed this
complaint.

ISSUES:

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to attend sessions in

Congress?

1.) Whether or not the letter was privileged communication?

HELD:
2.)Whether or not the letter could be considered libelous?
HELD:
No. It is not privileged communication. Although the Constitution
provides for any member of Congress not to be questioned for any speech
or debate therein, in the halls of Congress or elsewhere, this publication
doesnt fall into this category. The said expression refers to utterances made
by legislators in the performance of their functions, while Congress is in
session. In the case a quo, the letter was made while Congress was
presumably not in session. Furthermore, he caused the letter to be
published in newspapers of general circulation, thus ipso facto he wasnt
performing his official duty either as a member of Congress or any officer of
any committee. No. The fact that the letter suggested that the plaintiffs may
be unwilling tools of the plan without having knowledge thereof already in a
way exculpate the responsibility of the plaintiffs in the said plans if ever they
have any part in the same. This is not derogatory to the petitioners to
entitle them to damages, especially that the planners of the operational
plans were already clearly suggested.

No. Election to high government offices doesnt free the accused

from the common restraints of general law. The constitution provides that a
member of the House of Representative is privileged from arrest only if the
offense is punishable by not more than 6 years of imprisonment. The
accused has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of this provision. Section 11, Article 6 of the Constitution states
that a the members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions especially if the reason if a legitimate one. Confinement of a
congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years of
imprisonment has constitutional foundations. Allowing the accused to
attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make
him a free man. When the voters of his district reelected him, they had full
awareness of the limitation of his freedom of action. The accused is only
one of the members of the House of Representatives. Congress continues to
function despite the absence of one or a few of its members. The issue in
this case boils down to the question of equal protection. Election to the
position isnt reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.
Instant motion is denied.

PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS (324 SCRA 689)

FACTS:

The accused was a member of the lower House when he was

convicted of rape. He was confined in the

National Penitentiary while his appeal was pending. He was re-

elected. He argued that he should be allowed to attend legislative sessions
and committee hearings; because his confinement was depriving the
electorate of his district of their voice in Congress and that he has a duty to
attend the sessions in Congress.

D. Disqualifications and Disabilities- Incompatible vs

Forbidden Offices; duty to disclose in conflicts of
interests; sec 12 and 13 Art VI, sec 14 Art VI

ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, may intervene in

the SEC Case without violating the Constitution.
HELD: The Order granting Fernandez to intervene in SEC Case is
reversed and set aside.

RATIO:

PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN (113 SCRA 31)

Fernandez acquired a mere 10 shares out of 262, 843 shares.

He acquired said shares after the institution of the contested
election, after the suit has been filed and a day before he filed a
motion to intervene. Realizing that the objection of petitioner Puyat
as valid, Fernadez decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of
legal interest in the matter under litigation. Under those facts and
circumstances, the Court found that there has been an indirect
appearance as counsel before and administrative body and it is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The intervention
was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings in some other capacity. A ruling upholding the
intervention would make the Constitutional provision ineffective. All
an Assemblyman need to do, if he wants to influence an
administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the
interest of the client and then intervene in the proceedings. That
which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done in
indirection which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically
or impliedly prohibited. In brief, the Court held that the intervention
of Assemblyman in SEC case falls within the ambit of the prohibition
contained in Section 11.Art. VIII of the Constitution.

FACTS:
On May 14, 1979, an election for the Directors of the
International Pipe Industries Corporation was held. Petitioner Puyat
was among those elected. On May 25, 1979, the other group of
directors, led by Acero, instituted a proceeding questioning the said
election on the ground that the votes were not properly counted.
Thereafter, Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of Interim
Batasang Pambansa,entered his appearance as counsel for Acero to
which Puyat objected due to Constitutional Gorunds which provides
that:
SEC 11. ART VIII No Member of the Batasang Pambansa
shall appear as counsel . or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly, or indirectly be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not accept
employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be
called on account of his office.
Assemblyman Esatnislao Fernandez did not continue his
appearance as counsel but instead filed a Motion for Intervention.
SEC granted the motion on account that Fernandez had 10 shares
on the corporation. Thereafter, the Court en banc issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining SEC from allowing the
participation as intervener of Assemblyman Fernandez. Solicitor
General supported the allowing of the intervention. Hence this
petition.


Villegas vs Legaspi
Political Law Appearance in Court by a Congressman
FACTS:

Singularity of Office/Position
FACTS:
Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in

On 27 Sept 1979, Villegas filed a complaint for annulment of bank

checks and damages against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the Court of
First Instance Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the
complaint and they were represented by Valentino Legaspi, an
assemblyman and a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then
challenged the representation made by Legaspi as counsel for the spouses
on the ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas no
member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court
without appellate jurisdiction. The presiding Judge however overruled
Villegas challenged and proceeded with the trial. Judge said that Courts of
First Instance have appellate jurisdiction. Villegas appealed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not CFIs are appellate courts resolving this is essential
in determining if Legaspi indeed violated a constitutional provision?
HELD:
CFIs have dual personalities. They can be courts of general original
jurisdiction (courts of origin) or appellate courts depending on the case that
they took cognizance of. In the case at bar, CFI Cebu acted as a court of
general original jurisdiction since the case filed by Villegas was not elevated
from any lower court. It is then clearly resolved that this CFI in the case at
bar is a court without appellate jurisdiction. Legaspi then has violated a
constitutional provision and is hereby barred to appear as counsel before
the said court of first instance.

Adaza vs Pacana

the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started
discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana was
elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the
law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On
March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14,
1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the
ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates,
while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa
on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said
office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of
Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the
duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of
the governors office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana
therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six
years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term
expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of
the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a
local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and
simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a
governor of the province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor
who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such
can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.

HELD:

Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:

Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan

Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the

government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,

including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his

tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .

The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza

cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot complain of any

restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one

office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the
Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana,

as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left

vacant by petitioners election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul

against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on

May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that governors,
mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall,

upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of

absence from office. Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of

this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of

candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.

E. Internal Government- officers; quorum; sessions;

discipline of members; journal

ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA (277 SCRA 268)
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually
specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes,
originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was
approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on
September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain
amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions
of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral conference
committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21,
1996. At11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship
speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmien to was first
to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for
lack of quorum. Rep.Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a
head count. After a roll call, the Chair (DeputySpeaker Raul Daza) declared
the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. In the
course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to
raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation
he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript
of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as
published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6,
1996:MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the
conference committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion? MR.
ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There
being none, approved.(Gavel)MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr.
Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair
asked the distinguished sponsor. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There
was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the
Chair called for the motion.MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted
to object. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for
one minute.(It was 3:01 p.m.)(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)THE
DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.MR. ALBANO. Mr.
Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week. THE
DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock,
Wednesday, next week. On that same day, the bill was signed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as
having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the
Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. Petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari and/or challenging the validity of RA 8240.
ISSUES:
Whether or not RA 8240 was passed in violation of rules of the House which
will therefore be a violation of the Constitution. Whether or not the
Supreme Court has the power to look into the internal proceeding of the
House.
HELD:
It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been
violated in the enactment of R.A. No.8240 are merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law. Petitioners claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a
query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albanos motion approved.
But what happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor
of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair
called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There
being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, however,
Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep.

Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo

subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then already been declared by the
Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel. Verily, the fact that nobody
objects means a unanimous action of the House making the passage of the
bill to a law in accordance with the law. The Constitution does not require
that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to
vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings
of the bill. Therefore, no violation of the Constitution was shown. In this
case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute
to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has no more power to look into
the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House as long as
no violation of the Constitutional violation is shown.

AVELINO VS. CUENCO (83. PHIL. 17)
FACTS:
Petition of quo warran to. Petitioner, Jose Avelino, asks the court to
declare him the rightful senate president and oust the respondent, Mariano
Jesus Cuenco.
Feb 18, 1949; the request of senator Lorenzo Tanada to speak on
the floor on Feb 21, 1949 was granted to formulate charges against the then
senate president Avelino. On the day that Tanada was supposed to speak on
the floor, Avelino delayed his appearance, did not immediately openthe
session, and read slowly the resolution of senator Sanidad and Tanada.
When the session finally started, Sanidad moved that the roll call be
dispensed with but senator Tirona, Avelinos follower, opposed the motion
because of the plan of Avelinos group to delay the session to prevent
Tanada from delivering his privilege speech. Suddenly, a disorderly conduct
broke out in the senate gallery. Senator Pablo David, Avelinos follower,
moved for adjournment of session perhaps consistent with their ploy to
prevent Tanadas privilege speech. Sanidad opposed the motion and moved
that it be submitted to a vote. Suddenly, Avelino banged the gavel,
abandonedthe chair, and walked out of the session hall followed by senator
Francisco, Torres, Magalona,Clarin, David, and Tirona. Cuenco was

designated to chair the session. Tanada was finally able to deliver his
privilege speech. Sanidads resolution no. 68 was read and approved.
Tanada yielded the chair to senate president pro-tempore Arranz. Then,
Sanidad introduced resolution no. 67 entitled Resolution declaring vacant
the position of the president of the senate and designating the honorable
Mariano Jesus Cuenco acting president of the senate. Resolution no. 67
was approved.
ISSUES: Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? If it has,
were resolutions nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
DECISION: Petition dismissed. Court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
RATIO:
The court does not have any jurisdiction in view of the separation of
powers and the constitutional grant to the senate of the power to elect its
own president. The selection of the presiding officer affects only the
senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers,
change, or reinstate them. The petition to put back the petitioner to preside
is only acceptable if the majority of the senators want to, such remedy lies
in the senate session hall and not in the supreme court.
Assuming that the court has jurisdiction, the session left by Avelino and
presided by Arranz was a continuation of the session. Thus, the departure of
the minority senators does not prevent the remaining majority senators
from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.

OSMENA V. PENDATUN (109 PHIL. 863)

FACTS:

Mabanag vs Lopez Vito
Political Law Amendment to the Constitution

In a privilege speech entitled: A message to Garcia, Osmena made

allegations of bribery against the Garcia administration. House Resolution
no. 59 followed the creation of a special committee to investigate the
allegedly groundless charges made by Osmena against the Garcia
administration. House Resolution no. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious
disorderly behavior and thereby suspending him for 15months.

FACTS:

ISSUES: WON his suspension was constitutional

senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required

HELD: Court has no Jurisdiction. Dismissed

RATIO: Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him complete
parliamentary immunity in his privilege speech. Although the purpose of
parliamentary immunity is to guarantee the legislator complete freedom of
expression without being made responsible in criminal or civil actions, it
does NOT protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
whenever his words or conducts are disorderly or unbecoming of a member
thereof. The question of whether Osmenas speech constitutes disorderly
conduct is for the House to judge. The matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the house knows best. On the question of
jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed for being moot or academic.
Because n opreliminary injunction was issued, the special committee
performed its task, reported to the house and the latter approved the
suspension order.

Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three

senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8
representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House
except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some
vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing
amendments to the Constitution)* which has been considered as an
**enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered
into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was
passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote.
Petitioners pray that the said resolution be prevented. Respondents argue
that the same can no longer be prevented as entered in the Journals. The
Journal of each house is conclusive to the courts.
*this is in contrast to Art 15 of the Constitution as well
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar.
HELD:
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal
which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps
complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective.
It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of
Article XV of the Philippine Constitution consists of (only) two distinct
parts: proposal and ratification. There is no logic in attaching political

character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to

amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the

Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by
the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of
any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency
scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest,
there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then
into that of ratification. On the other hand, as far as looking into the
Journals is concerned, even if both the journals and an authenticated copy
of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the
basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for,
as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of
the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court
found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and
did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if
one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of
conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled
copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy
out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each
other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two
documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that
if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals,
disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment
thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both
houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and
filed by the secretary of state.

Philippine Judges Association Versus Prado

Direct Filing

Facts:
Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the
Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation
through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court,
COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn
from them.

In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the
methods adopted prior it becoming a law.

Issues; WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional.

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof."

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall
become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to
its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.

- Violative of the Equal protection clause

Ruling:
The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1)
ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying
that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act,
or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.

However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection

clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary
and the grantees of the franking privilege.

Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

F. Electoral tribunals and the Commision on

Appintments

act is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case
we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the
particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine
whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or
attented by either an executive official or the legislative."

[G.R. No. L-10520 | February 28, 1957]
TAADA vs. CUENCO

FACTS:
Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and
Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal.
Respondents allege that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of
jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the
members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause
of action, because "petitioner Taada has exhausted his right to nominate
after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more
Senators."

RULING:
We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from
the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs.
Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the
respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to
compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to
perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution
provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the
Senate.

Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive
power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the
authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on
judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:

"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain
powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether
the powers possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the
latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate
branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an

Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested
exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from
the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress. And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the
legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by
the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of
said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be
determined in the proper actions.

In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation
cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of
Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to
pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded
without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual
destruction.

As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the
question whether the issue before us is political or not.

In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what
it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words,
in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present
case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman
of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of
its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said

members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon

nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the
Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The
Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon
is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in
nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to
pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

Whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law
is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by
statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may
determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such
statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to
deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439;
emphasis supplied.).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also,
the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties
herein.

Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as
members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?

Section 11 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, reads:

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest
number of votes and three of the party having the second largest
number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman."

Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of

the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made
without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party,
and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as
members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members
thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second
largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the
Citizens Party, to which Senator Taada belongs and which he represents.

Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the
effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members,"
six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the
nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by
the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Taada
nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived
his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated
Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the
Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias
and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the
fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are
de jure members of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents,
Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid
and lawful.

What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and
concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the
majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the
structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and
the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who
are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The
procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the
Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it
constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said
procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null
and void.

It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the
membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7),

instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present

composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our
Constitution.

Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the
solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan
considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the
majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the
party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.

Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents'
contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party has only one
member in the Upper House, Senator Taada felt he should nominate, for
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The
same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said
Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Taada did not nominate other two Senators,
because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position,
therein, of the Citizens Party.

Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party
would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one
(1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court.
With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said
Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The
equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed. What
is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court
would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide
open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination
of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what
the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not
been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that
the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate
not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the
party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the
exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as

members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor
any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one
having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its
representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no
standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said
respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void
ab initio.

As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold, however, that their
appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the
consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant
to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant
(supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the
jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe
that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4)
respondents abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the
Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents
Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not been
duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not
entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined
from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal
and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case
No. 4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed,
as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio
and Placido Reyes.

Cunanan vs Tan
CARLOS CUNANAN vs. JORGE TAN, JR.
Facts:
Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan
Jr as acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration.
Cunanan was formerly appointed in the same position but was later on
rejected by the Commision of Appointment prompting the President to
replace him with Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent.

Filing the quo warranto proceeding to the Supreme Court, Cunanan
questions the validity of the convened Commission of Appointments citing
irregularities as to the numbers of members comprising the same.
Issue: WON the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr is valid.
Ruling:
With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was
ruled that such is a power vested in the Congress as they deem it proper
taking into consideration the proportionate numbers of the members of the
Commission of Appointment members as to their political affiliations.
However, with their reorganization, this affected a third party's right which
they rejected as its result. To correct this, the Supreme Court declared the
reinstatement of the petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate and turn
over the office in contention.

ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (166 SCRA 651)
FACTS:
Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution states that the Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be

Justices of the Supreme Court...and the remaining six shall be Members of

the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be. On October 9, 1987, Petitioners
filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET
Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were
proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. The
respondent tribunals was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the
Supreme Court and six (6)senators. On November 17, the petitioner filed
with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of
the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of the
above case on the ground that all of them are interested parties, and
respondents. This mass disqualification, in effect, would leave only the three
Justices to serve as Members of the Electoral Tribunal. The Motion was
denied and hence, this petition for certiorari.
ARGUMENTS: Petitioners argue that considerations of public policy and
norms of fair play and due process require the mass disqualification. Further,
necessity dictates that an amendment of the Tribunals Rules of procedure
permitting the contest to be decided by only three Members is a practicable
and unconstitutionally unobjectable solution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Senate Electoral Tribunal composed of only three
(3) Justices of the SC is a valid Electoral Tribunal under the Constitution
HELD: NO. The suggested device is unfeasible and repugnant to the
Constitution.

REASONS:
Looking into the wording and intent of Section 17 of Article VI of the
Constitution, it is clear that in creating a Tribunal composed by Justices of
the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, both judicial and
legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed
membership of the SET is 2 to 1 an unmistakable indication that the
legislative component cannot be totally excluded from participation in the
resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the

spirit and intent of the Constitution. The proposed mass disqualification, if

sanctioned and ordered, would leave the tribunal no alternative but to
abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it
cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of senators. The framers of the Constitution could not have
been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all
24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment
thereon. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such
unusual situations. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust
and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members
of the Tribunal. Refrain from participation must be distinguished from
complete absence. Indeed, an individual Member of the Tribunal may
recues himself from participating in the resolution of a case where he
sincerely feels that his biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. But a Tribunal cannot legally function as such absent its
entire membership of Senators or Justices.

ARGUMENTS: In moving to dismiss private respondents protest on the

ground that it was filed late, petitioner cited Sec.250 of the Omnibus
Election Code: A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of
the Batasang Pambansa...shall be filed...within ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the results of the election
.

LAZATIN VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (168 SCRA 391)

Using the above rule, Petitioner argued that respondent had only until
February 6 to file a protest. Since the protest was filed on February 8, the
HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it. However, the HRET argued that
petitioner was able to file the protest on time, citing Sec. 9 of the HRET
rules: Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall
be filed... within fifteen (15)days from the effectivity of these rules on
November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the
effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen
(15)days from the date of proclamation. Using the above rule, the HRET
argued that respondent has up February 11 to file a protest. Since it was
filed on February 8, the HRET ruled it was within the prescribed period and
thus, had jurisdiction over the matter.

FACTS:

ISSUES:

Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for

Representative of the first district of Pampanga in the May 11, 1987
elections. During the canvassing of the votes, respondent objected to the
inclusion of certain election returns and brought the case to the COMELEC.
On May 19, The COMELEC ordered the suspension of the proclamation of
the winning candidate, yet on May 27, petitioner was proclaimed the
winner. Respondent filed two petitions: a) to nullify the proclamation and b)
prevent petitioner from taking office. However, the COMELEC did not act on
the petitions. On June 30, petitioner assumed office. On September 15, the
COMELEC nullified the proclamation. The Supreme Court set aside the
revocation on January 25, 1988.On January 28, Respondent received a copy
of the Courts decision and consequently filed an election protest with the
HRET on February 8.

1. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the protest

2. Whether or not the Supreme Court may conduct a Judicial Review of

decisions/final resolutions of the HRET
HELD:
1. YES. The HRET has jurisdiction over the protest, as it was filed within the
period prescribed by Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules.
2. NO, except for cases requiring the exercise of the Courts extraordinary
jurisdiction.

REASONS: Inapplicability of Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code to the

case at bar:
Under the 1973Constitution, Section 250 of the Omnibus Election
Code applies to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election
of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city
official. Under the 1987 Constitution, it has ceased to be effective. First, the
Batasang Pambansa ha salready been abolished and legislative power is now
vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the HOR and the Senate in their respective
Electoral Tribunals.
Exclusive character of the Electoral Tribunals Power:

Scope of the Supreme Court over decisions made by the HRET:

So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole
judge of all contests related to the election, returns and qualifications of its
Members, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall as a rule, not be reviewed by the Court. Its corrective
power extends only to decisions and resolutions constituting a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the Electoral
Tribunals.

Daza versus Singson
Tribunal and its Composition

The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters
within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before
it, is beyond dispute. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive
character of the jurisdiction conferred. It is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Its rule-making
power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the
Constitution. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power
is conferred is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary
for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred.
Following this principle, the HRET, in order to fully exercise its constitutional
function may implement its own rules concerning the filing of electoral
protests. A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except
under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch
has been exclusively granted to the legislative body itself. In the 1935
Constitution, this power was lodged to an independent, impartial and non-
partisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for that
singular purpose. Under the 1973 Constitution, this delineation between the
power of the Executive and the Legislature was blurred when jurisdiction
over electoral contests was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general
jurisdiction over the conduct of election for all elective national and local
officials. The 1987 constitution vested this jurisdiction back to the respective
Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives.

FACTS:
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized
resulting to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its
representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the
seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member.
Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA
which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by
Singson. Daza questioned such replacement.
ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment
validly changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD:
As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the
House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily
connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the
requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also
subsequently thereto NOT the court.

Coseteng Versus Mitra

parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Holding/

Facts:
Held:
Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives
from diverse political parties Petitioner Anna Dominique Coseteng was the
only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA.
A year later, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino or LDP was
organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of
Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees,
including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments,
had to be reorganized. Petitioner Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker
Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed
as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral
Tribunal.
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised the
House majority membership in the Commission on Appointments to
conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP,
with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was
retained as the 12th member representing the House minority.
On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs praying that the Supreme Court declare as null
and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco,
Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and
Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them
from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from
recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the
theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional
mandate of proportional representation
Issue:
1. WON the question raised is political.
2. WON the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments
were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political

1. No, it is not. The political question issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson,
where this Court ruled that the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner
of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution
is justiciable, and, even if the question were political in nature, it would still
come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which
includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio
Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of
the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall
act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a majority
vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.) The composition of the
House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are
160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House
membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of
12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members,
which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The
remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-
Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL
(respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House.
There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the
Commission on Appointments was done on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties therein. There is no merit in the
petitioners contention that the House members in the Commission on
Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective

political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their
respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not
by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The
validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments-eleven (11)
from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable.
Section 21&22

Teofisto Guingona vs Neptali Gonzales

HELD:
It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled
to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional
representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of
application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to
which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate

HRETs Composition Rounding Off

converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one

FACTS:

senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15

doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly

LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN

reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on

senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12

Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.

representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional

This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance

formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of

with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the

Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members

proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator

for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5

Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the

member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader,

representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the

nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and

NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-

that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the

members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party

CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino

which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In

who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight

order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to

LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a

come up with proportional representation especially since one party may

member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that

have affiliations with the other party.

the compromise is against proportional representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys

representation in the CoA.

BONDOC VS. PINEDA (201 SCRA 792)

FACTS:
Marciano Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and
Dr. Ermigidio Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party were rivals in the
congressional elections held on May 11, 1987. Pineda was the proclaimed
winner, but Bondoc filed a protest before the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal(HRET). The said tribunal is composed of nine (9) members,
3 of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court, and the remaining six (6) are
members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from political parties and party list. A decision
has been reached by the HRET where Bondoc won over by Pineda; thus the
LDP members in the tribunal insisted on a reappreciation of votes and
recount of ballots delaying the finalization of the decision at least four
months. Thereexamination resulted in increase of Bondocs lead over
Pineda from 23 to 107 votes. It shall be noted that Congressman Camasura,
a member LDP, voted with the Supreme Court Justices to proclaim Bondoc
the winner of the contest; hence, HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation No.
25 declaring Bondoc as the winner. Subsequently, Congressman Cojuanco
informed Camasura and Bautista that the LDP expelled them from the party
on the ground of betrayal to the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP.
Thereafter, Cojuanco informed the House Speaker Mitra of the ouster of the
said Congressmen and their decision to withdraw the nomination and
rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET. The Tribunal issued a
Resolution canceling the previous decision on the ground that without the
vote of Congressman Camasura, who was relieved from the Tribunal, the
decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Sec. 24 of the
Rules of Tribunal, and therefore, cannot be validly promulgated. A Petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Bondoc seeking the
following reliefs:1.) to annul the decision of HRET to withdraw the
nomination of Camasura to the HRET.;2.) issue a writ of prohibition
restraining whoever may be designated in place of Camasura from assuming,
ossupying, and discharging functions as a member of the HRET,;3.)writ of
mandamus ordering Camasura to return and discharge his functions as a
member of the HRET; In his answer, Pineda asserts that the Congress being
the sole authority that nominates and elects the members of the HRET;
hence, it has the power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in
representation of the political parties materially changed.

ISSUE: Whether of not the House of Representatives, at the request of the

dominant party, change the partys representation in the House
Representatives Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision
freely reached by the said tribunal in an election contest pending therein.
DECISION: SC ruled in favor of Bondoc.
RATIO: (Read Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution)
The tribunal was created to function as a non partisan court
although two-thirds of its members are politicians. The purpose of the
constitutional convention creating the Electoral Tribunal was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration and to transfer to that
tribunal all powers in matter pertaining to contested election of its
members. The Tribunal is a body separate from and independent from the
legislature.
Resolution of House of Representatives violates the independence of HRET.
The Resolution of House of Representatives removing Congressman
Camasura from the HRET for disloyalty to LDP, because he cast a vote in
favor of Nacionalista party, is a clear impairment of the constitutional
prerogative of the HRET to be the sole judge of the election contest
between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such interference would reduce
the HRET as a mere tool for the advancement of a party in power.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the
HRET
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They
must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and
independenceeven independence from political party to which they
belong. In expelling Camasura from HRET for that ground, the HRET
committed grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the
Constitution. Such resolution is therefore null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.

Members of the HRET, as judges, are entitled to security of tenure,

just as members of judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution
(Sec 2.,Art VIII, 1987 Constitution). Membership in the HRET may not be
terminated except for just cause, such as, expiration of the members
congressional term of office, death, permanent disability, resignation from
political party which he represents, formal affiliation with another political
party, and removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by
the House of Representatives for party disloyalty short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another political group. The records shows that
Camasura has not formally affiliated with another political group; thus, his
termination from HRET was not for valid cause, hence, it violated his right to
security of tenure.

ISSUES:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of

government. It obtains not through a single provision but by actual division
in our Constitution that each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
restrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the government.

Angara versus Electoral Commission

FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the
respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were
candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly for
the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly
and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8,
which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935,
Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against
Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared
elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said
position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a
resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9.
Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court
therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing
related facts, and in the affirmative,
(2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against
the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly
RULING: On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional

organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral and
constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of
course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the
power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate and function as a
harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances and subject to
the specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument.
The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other

departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the

legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the
rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very
lis mota presented. Courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must respect the wisdom
and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of government.
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy
involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the
National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the
other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when
and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people
and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral
Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it
were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining
the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission
The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy
certain errors of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. The

purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by
the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members,
to an independent and impartial tribunal.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with
the necessary authority in the performance and exercise of the limited and
specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a
power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent
organ.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power
by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the
legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within
which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed. Therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise
of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed
by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for
the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for
the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly
passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet
met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the
time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature,
confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the
Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power

to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said
election protests.

appoint the Chairman of the CHR, without the confirmation of the CA, pursuant to
the abovementioned constitutional provision.

HELD:

Calderon vs. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992

The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of

its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest
filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against he election of the herein
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly
on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of
the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

Fast facts

Provides that the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC shall be appointed by
the President upon the confirmation of CA.

Concepcion-Bautista vs. Salonga, 172 SCRA 160 (1989)

Doctrines from jurisprudence (Mison, Quintos-Deles, and Concepcion-Bautista)

President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC

representing the public workers and employers sectors. It was stated that the
appointees may qualify and assume the duties and responsibilities of their
appointed seats.
RA 6715 Section 13

FACTS:

1. Confirmation from CA is only required when the appointee involved in the first
group, including those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Bautista was appointed by President Aquino, from an ad interim appointment, as
constitution itself in the President (i.e. sectoral reps to Congress and members of
the Chairperson of the CHR. She took her oath and assumed the duties and
the CSC, etc.)
responsibilities of the position. Her appointment was questioned by the CA because
she was appointed without having the CA confirm her nomination.
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government
Contention c/o Bautista
CA does not have the jurisdiction to question her appointment.
Held & Ratio

officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint

3. Confirmation is not required in the appointment of those from inferior offices,

The position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among because it shall be construed as those officers whose appointments are not
the positions mentioned in the first group of presidential appointees, as otherwise provided for by law
enumerated in Article 7, Section 16, appointments to which are to be made with the

confirmation of the CA. The appointment of the Chairman of the CHR is not
specifically provided in the constitution itself, unlike the Chairpersons and members
of the COMELEC, CSC, and COA, whose appointments are expressly vested by the
constitution in the President, with the consent of the CA. The President shall validly

Issue:

WON Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CA of appointments

extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly
mentioned in Article 7, Section 16 fo the Constitution whose appointments require
confirmation from the CA

Contention c/o pet

Section 13 of RA 6715 must mandatorily be complied with.

Held & Ratio:

As to the constitutionality of the appointments. The President is within her

authority to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC without the prior
confirmation of the CA. The aforementioned officials are not included in the first
group of appointees, as clearly explained in Mison. As to the constitutionality of RA
6715. Unconstitutional. It amends legislation by adding to the first group provided in
Article 7, Section 16, additional officers which it requires to be appointed by the
President upon the confirmation of the CA. It appears that the legislature is not
happy with the lessened role of the CA in the appointment process, as compared to
the 1935 Constitution.

G. Powers and Functions:

3.Constituent powers: Legislatice inquiries(sec. 21);
appropriation

Bengzon Versus Blue Ribbon Committee
Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee. Granted.
FACTS:
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG), filed a complaint
with Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case. PCGG allege, among
others, that: defendants (petitioners therein) Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez
and Juliette. Gomez Romualdez, alleged cronies of former President
Marcos and First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos, engaged in schemes and
stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino
people. Among these stratagems are (1) obtained control of some big
business enterprises such as MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (2)
manipulated the formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable and
borrow more capital, reaching a total of more that P2 billion, (3)
collaborated with lawyers (petitioners therein) of the Bengzon Law Offices
in concealing funds and properties, in maneuvering the purported sale of
interests in certain corporations, in misusing the Meralco Pension Fund
worth P25 million, and in cleverly hiding behind the veil of corporate entity.
On 13 September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech before
the Senate on the alleged take-over of SolOil Incorporated by Ricardo Lopa
(who died during the pendency of this case) and called upon the senate to
look into possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA
3019. The Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or Blue
Ribbon Committee (SBRC) started its investigation through a hearing on 23
May 1989, but Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify. The SBRC rejected
petitioner Bengzons plea and voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner

claims that the SBRC, in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the court has jurisdiction over this case.
2. WON the SBRCs inquiry has a valid legislative purpose.
3. WON the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a purely
private transaction which is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.
HELD:
1. YES. As the court held in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the
Constitution provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the departments of the government,
and it is the judiciary that was vested of the powers to determine the scope,
nature and extent of such powers.
2. NO. The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible
violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted
by respondent SBRC was to find out WON the relatives of President Aquino,
particularly Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the
alleged sale of the 36/39 corporations of Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa
Group. There appears, therefore, no intended legislation involved. The
inquiry also is not conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 2123 (SR
2123), as the committee alleges. The inquiry under SR 2123 is to look into
the charges against PCGG filed by stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in
connection with the implementation of Section 26 Article XVIII of the
Constitution.
3. YES. Mr. Lopa and the petitioners are not connected with the government
and did their acts as private citizens, hence such a case of alleged graft and
corruption is within the jurisdiction, not of the SBRC, but of the courts.
Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of this issue before the SBRC did.
The inquiry of the respondent committee into the same justiciable
controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment
of into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction.

4. NO. The Constitution provides the right of an accused of a crime to

remain silent; this extends also to respondents in administrative
investigation but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding.
This is not so in this case. BUT since the court already held that the inquiry is
not in aid of legislation, the petitioners therein cannot be compelled to
testify.

Whether or not the Judiciary may encroach with the exercise of

functions of the legislative and executive departments.
HELD:
(1)The first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is in
violation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Section 16[5],
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:

DEMETRIA VS. ALBA (148 SCRA 208)

No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,

however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may bylaw be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their respective appropriations.

FACTS:
Petitioners, who filed petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction questioning the constitutionality of the first
paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 as concerned
citizens of the Philippines, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan
Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with
general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as
taxpayers whose vital interest may be affected. Said paragraph 1 of Section
44 provides:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
general agencies of the Executive Department, which are included
in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Petitioners claim that it is in violation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1177 is in violation of Section16[5], Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution.

Section 16 authorizes the President to augment any item in the

general appropriations law for their respective offices; however, first
paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 unduly over-
extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the
President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one departments, bureaus,
offices and general agencies of the Executive Department to any program,
project or activity of any department, bureau, office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. Indeed, such provision
in question is null and void.
(2)The law provides the doctrine of Separation of Powers as well as Checks
and Balances to ensure that no abuse of power shall take place. Therefore,
where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its
authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former.
But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what
the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void

GUINGONA v. CARAGUE, G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991

FACTS:

This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the
constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990
budget.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No.
81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by
P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D.
No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment
Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities
Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.

The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81,
Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to
restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant
to said decrees.

Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the
aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio when he
was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the one-man
legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power was
restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was
ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress
providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has
not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic
appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no
law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.
Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81,
P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President
Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees are
inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII which provides
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked."

(Emphasis supplied.)
They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Section
24, Article VI of the Constitution, i.e.,
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments. (Emphasis supplied.) Whereby bills have to be
approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress to
authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said
decrees violate Section 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides
as follows
Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an
appropriation; otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to
the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the
debt service. 12

RULING: The Court is not persuaded.

Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed or revoked."
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by
its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then
President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and
effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise
amended, repealed or revoked.

The Court, therefore, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81,
Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations
or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by
Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to
implement the same.

ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO (87 SCRA 29)

October 29, 1949: 2 checks payable to Burt aggregating Php 1,500,000 were
delivered to Arnault.

FACTS:
Buenavista Estate Original owner: San Juan de Dios Hospital Jan 1,
1939 to Jan 1, 1964Philippine Govt has the option to purchase this property
for Php3,000,000 within this period if the Philippine Govt will not purchase
this property, it will be disposed in court on June 21,1944But if Philippine
Govt will opt to purchase the said property, they'll pay the owner the sum
of Php3,000,000June 29, 1946San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the property to
Ernest Burt for Php 5,000,000 who made adown payment of Php 10,000 and
agreed to pay Php 500,000 within one year and the remainder in annual
installments of Php 500,000 each Failure to make any of said payments
would cause the forfeiture of his down payment of Php10,000 and would
entitle the Hospital to rescind the sale to him. Latter part of October,
1949Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration
bought Buenavista Estate for Php 4,500,000. Php 1,000,000 was paid to Burt
through his attorney- in- fact in the Philippines, the Assoc. Estates Inc.
represented by Jean L. Arnault for BUENAVISTAESTATE
Tambobong Estate Original owner:
Philippine Trust Company May 14, 1946Philippine Trust Company
sold this to Burt for Php 1,200,000, who paid Php 10,000 and promised to
pay Php 90,000 within 9 months and the balance of Php 1,100,000 in
10successive annual installments of Php 110,000 each Feb. 14, 19479 month
period expired without Burt's having paid the said or any other amount then
or afterwards Sept. 4, 1947Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and
delivered the estate to RURAL PROGRESSADMINISTRATION by an absolute
dead of sale in consideration of the sum of Php 750,000February 5,
1948Rural Progress Administration made a notarial demand upon Bert for
the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with the
Philippine Trust Company due to his failure to pay the installment of Php
90,000 within the period of 9 months CFI of Rizal ordered the cancellation of
Burts certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the
Rural Progress Administration. Latter part of October, 1949the Philippine
Government, through the Rural Progress Administration bought Tambobong
Estate for the sum of Php 500,000, which was all paid to Burt through his
other attorney- in-fact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also
represented by Jean L. Arnault for the TAMBOBONG ESTATE.

That same day, Arnault opened a new account in Burts name with
the Philippine National Bank where he deposited the two checks
aggregating Php 1,500,000
On the same occasion, he drew on the same account 2 checks One
check for Php 500,000, which he transferred to the account of the
Associated Agencies, Inc.
Another check for Php440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
It was the desire of the Senate to determine the ultimate recipient of the
sum of Php440,000
Feb 27, 1950, Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8 to investigate the
Buenavista and the Tambobong Estate Deals.
A special committee was created by the said resolution to work on the
investigation
Arnault refused/ dont want to mention who was the ultimate recipient of
the sum of Php440,000 because
His answer might be used against him. Also, he said that it is his
constitutional right torefuse to incriminate himself. According to him, such
question violates his right as a citizen to have privacy in his dealings with
other people.
I dont remember the name; he was a representative of Burt I am not
sure; I dont remember the name
Without securing a receipt, he turned over the Php440, 000 to a
certain person, are presentative of Burt, in compliance with Burts verbal
instruction made in 1946;that, as far as he know, that certain person had
nothing to do with the negations for the settlement of the Buenavista and
Tambobong cases; that he had seen that person several times before he
gave him the money on Oct. 29, 1949, and that since then he had seen him

again 2 or 3 items. The last time being in Dec,1949, in Manila; that the
person was a male, 39-40 years old, bet. 52- 56.Senate deliberated and
hereby committed the petitioner to the custody of the Sergeant- at-
Armsand imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing
to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee the name of the person
to whom he gave the Php 440,000.
ISSUES:

investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material

or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry
The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to
the subject of the inquiry
The ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the information sought from
the witness is presumed to be correct.

1.The Senate has no power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to
reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php 440,000, because
such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or
purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not
embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process.2.Senate lacks
authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session, which ended on May 18, 19503.Petitioner invokes the
privilege against self- incrimination.

The investigation had not been completed, because due to the

contumacy of the witness, his committee had not yet determined the
parties responsible for the anomalous transaction as required by Resolution
no. 8

HELD: The petition must be denied.

Those bills were not necessarily all the measures that Congress
might deem it necessary to pass after the investigation is finished

RATIO:[for issue #1]

Subject of the inquiry was the questionable expenditure of the
Government of Php 5,000,000 of public funds. Thus, its been decided that
its within the jurisdiction of the Senate.
Power of the Court is limited to determining whether the legislative
body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry/ investigation
Once an inquiry is established to be within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, we think the investigating committee has the
power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry,
subject to his constitutional right against self- incrimination.
Also, once the jurisdiction is conceded, the SC cannot control the
exercise of that jurisdiction or the use of Congressional discretion
Inquiry should be within the jurisdiction, material/ necessary for the
exercise of a power vested by the Congress and every question which the

The bills recommended by this committee had not been approved

by the House and might not be approved pending the completion of the
investigation.

This atmosphere of suspicion must be dissipated, and it can only be

done if appropriate steps are taken by the Senate to compel Arnault to stop
pretending that he cannot remember the name of the person to whom he
gave the Php440,000 and answer the questions which will definitely
establish the identity of that person
[for issue #2]
Court finds no sound reason to limit the power of a legislative body
to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the
last session terminating the existence of that body. Exercising the power to
punish for contempt is enables the legislative body to perform its
constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.
Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during
recess by duly constituted committee charged with the duty of performing
investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To
deny such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would

be to defeat the very purpose for which that power is recognized in the
legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to its legislative
function.

Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a

refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt assuming that a refusal to
testify would be so punishable.

There is no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for

contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in
the present case.

By refusing to answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the

performance by the Senateof its legislative function, and the Senate has the
power to remove the obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the
questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall have answered them.
This power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing
body, persists in performing the particular legislative function involved.
Also, its an absurd, unnecessary and vexatious procedure if we are
to hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the
adjournment of the session, the Senate would have to resume the
investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt
proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed.
[for issue # 3]
The ground upon which the witness claim is based is too shaky, infirm, and
slippery to afford him safety.
His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should
reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he
knew the name. Its also unbelievable that he gave Php440,000 to a person
unknown to him
Since according to the witness himself, the transaction was legal,
and that he gave the Php440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance
with the latters verbal instruction, court cant find a basis upon which to
sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might in criminate
him.

It is the witnesss clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere and

truthful testimony before acompetent authority.
The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizens obligation;
consistent of course with isright under the Constitution

Abra Valley College Versus Aquino
Facts:
Petitioner Abra Valley College is an educational corporation and
institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the SEC in 1948. On 6
July 1972, the Municipal and Provincial treasurers (Gaspar Bosque and
Armin Cariaga, respectively) and issued a Notice of Seizure upon the
petitioner for the college lot and building (OCT Q-83) for the satisfaction of
said taxes thereon. The treasurers served upon the petitioner a Notice of
Sale on 8 July 1972, the sale being held on the same day. Dr. Paterno Millare,
then municipal mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid of P 6,000
on public auction involving the sale of the college lot and building. The
certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him.
The petitioner filed a complaint on 10 July 1972 in the court a quo
to annul and declare void the Notice of Seizure and the Notice of Sale of
its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate
taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. On 12 April 1973, the parties
entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court
in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding
that the second floor of the building is being used by the director for
residential purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern
Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property
is not being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of

perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on

certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court,
by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.

the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch

of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I)
subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the
petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the ground floor is
being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being
used as incidental to education (residence of the director).
Issue: Should there be tax exemption?
Interpretation of the phrase used exclusively for educational
purposes

Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine

Constitution, expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for Cemeteries,
churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or
educational purposes. This constitution is relative to Section 54, paragraph
c, Commonwealth Act 470 as amended by RA 409 (Assessment Law). An
institution used exclusively for religious, charitable and educational
purposes, and as such, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation;
notwithstanding that it keeps a lodging and a boarding house and maintains
a restaurant for its members (YMCA case). A lot which is not used for
commercial purposes but serves solely as a sort of lodging place, also
qualifies for exemption because this constitutes incidental use in religious
functions (Bishop of Nueva Segovia case).

Exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or

educational purposes is not limited to property actually indispensable
there for but extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes (Herrera v. Quezon City
Board of Assessment Appeals). While the Court allows a more liberal and
non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase exclusively used for
educational purposes, reasonable emphasis has always been made that
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the
school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by
law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of

H. The legislative process- title of the bill; origination;

procedure for enactment; approval of bills; constitution
rules on general appropriations sec 25, ART VI

Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.:
Facts:
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang,
Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the
constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions
implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790,
12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred
to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the
boundaries of the two provinces.
2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon
in the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are
parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in
the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to
Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by
correcting legislation."
4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented
unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which

includes barrios located in another province Cotabato is unconstitutional

for embracing more than one subject in the title
HELD:
YES. RA 4790 is null and void
1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative
power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute,
of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is
the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the
title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of
command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution
does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations
the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which
became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final
approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated.
2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should
serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,
the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to
lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon
the legislators.
3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and,
which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated
in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title
which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one

subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in

omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act,
is bad.
4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of
Lanao del Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao
del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation
is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of
Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title
misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-
pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of
Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and
Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers
two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of
the law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to
the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as
to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.

TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-
75697; 18 Jun 1987]

Facts:
Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the
following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts
payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to
the subject matter thereof;

2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful

restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;

3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the
vast powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6;

4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;
5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and

6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance,
which it is not.

We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim.
1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" 1 is sufficiently
complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general
purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title
express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The
requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are
germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are
not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. 2 An act
having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general object." 3 The rule also is that the
constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. 4 It should be
given practical rather than technical construction. 5
Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax
provision of the DECREE is a rider is without merit. That section reads, inter
alia:
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall
collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as
the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram
containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the
province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrued to the municipality
where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax

shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan

Manila Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE,
which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram
Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not
inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for
regulation 6 it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms
scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to
include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize
the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from
Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the
lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the
creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to
include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its
provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or
that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE.

2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh
and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. However, it is beyond
serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it
regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. 8 The
power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in
extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any
restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority
which exercises it. 9 In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its
constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and
oppressive taxation.

The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue
measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram
establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected
to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of
revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they
make available for public viewing. It is similar to the 30% amusement tax
imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners pay to
the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the admission
ticket, thus shifting the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is
a tax that is imposed uniformly on all videogram operators.

The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to
answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of
the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights,
and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an
objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a
valid imposition.

The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which
impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over
another. 11
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of
taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from
a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation". 12 Taxation has been made the implement of the
state's police power. 13
At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing
legislature.

3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the
promulgation of the DECREE by the former President under Amendment No.
6 of the 1973 Constitution providing that "whenever in the judgment of the
President ... , there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence
thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular
National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any
reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to
meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of
instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land."

In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office aver that the
8th "whereas" clause sufficiently summarizes the justification in that grave
emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the
national economic recovery program necessitated bold emergency
measures to be adopted with dispatch. Whatever the reasons "in the
judgment" of the then President, considering that the issue of the validity of
the exercise of legislative power under the said Amendment still pends
resolution in several other cases, we reserve resolution of the question
raised at the proper time.

4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue
delegation of legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of

authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies

and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period,
the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement
functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but
merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution,
enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." 14 Besides,
in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit
such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized
agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the
BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and
corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the
eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate
remedy in law.

5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle. An ex post facto
law is, among other categories, one which "alters the legal rules of evidence,
and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense." It is petitioner's
position that Section 15 of the DECREE in providing that:

All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a period of
forty-five (45) days after the effectivity of this Decree within which to
register with and secure a permit from the BOARD to engage in the
videogram business and to register with the BOARD all their inventories of
videograms, including videotapes, discs, cassettes or other technical
improvements or variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased, or
otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any videogram found in the possession of
any person engaged in the videogram business without the required proof
of registration by the BOARD, shall be prima facie evidence of violation of
the Decree, whether the possession of such videogram be for private
showing and/or public exhibition.

raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the DECREE when
the required proof of registration of any videogram cannot be presented
and thus partakes of the nature of an ex post facto law.
The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the recent case of Vallarta

vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the
passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be
overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of
human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome
such presumption of innocence" (People vs. Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at
858-59, citing 1 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature may enact that when certain
facts have been proved that they shall be prima facie evidence of the
existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided
there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate
facts presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is
not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the
two in common experience".

Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that there is a
rational connection between the fact proved, which is non-registration, and
the ultimate fact presumed which is violation of the DECREE, besides the
fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches
only after a forty-five-day period counted from its effectivity and is,
therefore, neither retrospective in character.
6. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being over-
regulated and being eased out of existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a
relatively new industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. While the
underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie
industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its
enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film
piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by
the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing
pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in
government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to
mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually
untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees
are required to engage in business.

The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought about the
"demise" of the video industry. On the contrary, video establishments are
seen to have proliferated in many places notwithstanding the 30% tax
imposed.


In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity,
wisdom and expediency of the DECREE. These considerations, however, are
primarily and exclusively a matter of legislative concern.
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action
taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to
be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated
the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to
such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the
Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the
judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law,
as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which
rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired
the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of
the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if
valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained. 18
In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which
attaches to a challenged statute. We find no clear violation of the
Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No.
1987 as unconstitutional and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.

3.
4.

5.

6.

Chiongbian v Orbos (Executive Secretary)
1995, J. Mendoza
This suit challenges the validity of:
- Sec. 13, Art. 29 of RA No. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao)
- Executive Order No. 429 (Providing for the Reorganization of
Administrative Regions in Mindanao

Facts:
1. Pursuant to Sec. 18, Art X of the Constitution, Congress passed RA
No. 6734
2. RA No. 6734 called for a plebiscite to be held in the following
provinces: Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao
del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat,
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur; and

7.
8.

the following cities: Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos,

Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Prinsesa, and Zamboanga
Four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region:
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-tawi
The cities and provinces not voting in favor of the Autonomous
Region were under Art XIX, Sec. 13 of the RA 6734:
That only provinces and cities voting favorably in plebiscites
shall be included in the ARMM. The provinces and cities
which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions. Provided, however, that the
President may, by administrative determination, merge the
existing regions.
With this provision, President Aquino issued Executive Order No.
429, Providing for theReorganization of the Administrative Regions
in Mindanao.
Petitioners, members of the Congress, wrote to Corazon Aquino,
contending that theres:
o No law authorizing the President to pick certain provinces
and cities to be restructured to new administrative regions
o Some of the provinces and cities in the regions did not even
take part in the plebiscite
o The transfer of provinces is an alteration of existing
governmental units or reorganization. The authority to
merge doesnt include the authority to reorganize.
The inauguration of the New Administrative Region IX went ahead.
Congress brought the suit for prohibition and certiorari; petitioner
Jaldon brough a suit as resident of Zamboanga City, taxpayer and
citizen of the Republic.

Petitioners:
1. Section 29 of RA 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly
delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to
merge existing region and provides no standard for the exercise of
the power delegated; and,

2. The power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.

Respondent Solicitor General:
1. The exercise of power is traditionally lodged in the President (Abbas
v Comelec) and as a mere incident of his power of general
supervision over local governments and control of executive
departments, bureaus, and offices (Art X, Sec. 16 and Art VII, Sec. 17
of Constitution)
2. There is no undue delegation of power but only a grant of power to
fill up or provide the details of the legislation, bec Congress did not
have the facility to provide for them.
3. The grant to the President to merge existing regions is fairly
embraced in the title of the RA No. 6734, because it is germane to it.
Power extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the
establishment of the autonomous region.
4. PD 1416, as amended by PD 1772, provides that the President shall
have the continuing authority to reorganize the National
Government, guided by the framework of more effective planning
implementation, greater decentralization, etc. The President may
create abolish, consolidate units of the National Government.

Issues:
1. WON the power to merge administrative regions is legislative or
executive in character (and whether Sec. 23 of Art. 29 is invalid
because it contains no standard to guide the Presidents discretion)
2. WON the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute
3. WON the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of
regions and provinces that did not take part in the plebiscite
4. WON the power granted includes the power to transfer the regional
center of Region XI from Zamboanga to Pagadian

Held:

1. Nature of administrative regions and the purpose of their creations:

RA 5435 authorizing the President, with the help of a

Commission on Reorganization to reorganize the different
executive departments, bureaus, etc.
o Reorganization Commission submitted an Integrated
Reorganization Plan which divided the country into 11
regions (1969)
o PD No. 1 the Reorganization Plan was approved and made
part of the law of the land (1972)
o PD No. 773 divided Region IX into two grpups
o PD No. 1555 transfer of regional center of Region IX from
Jolo to Zamboanga
The Creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative
regions have been by the President pursuant to the authority
granted to him b the law. The choice of President is logical
because the division intended to facilitate the administration of
executive departments and local governments. It has been
traditionally lodged in the President.
By conferring the President the power to merge exising regions,
Congress merely followed a pattern set in previous legislation.
There is no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in
conferring on the President the power to merge administrative
regions.
Sufficient standard by which President is to be guided in the
exercise of power
o Standard can be gathered or implied
o Standard can be found in the same policy underlying grant
of power to the President in RA No. 5435 of the power to
reorganize the Executive Department: to promote
simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the government to enable
it to pursue its programs consisted with the national goals
for accelerated social and economic development.

2. The constitutional requirement that every bill shall be passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof has always been given a practical
o

rather than a technical construction. The title is not required to be

an index of the content of the bill. It is sufficient if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to
the subject, such as the reorganization of the remaining
administrative regions.

3. There is a qualification in Sec 13, Art XIX, which states that the
President may by administrative determination merge the existing
regions. While non-assenting provinces are to remain in their
regions, they may nevertheless be regrouped into contiguous
provinces forming other regions as the exigency of the
administration may require.

The regrouping is done only on paper and is no more than a
redefinition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative
regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision
of LGUs and insuring efficient delivery of services. There is no
transfer of local governments. It is not even analogous to
redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments.

4. The reorganization of administrative regions is based on relevant
criteria (EO 429):
o Contiguity of graphical features
o Transportation and communication facilities
o Cultural and language groupings
o Land area and population
o Existing regional centers
o Socio-economic development programs
o Number of provinces and cities

The change of regional center from Pampanga to Pagadian is based
on the power of the President (by virtue of the Executive Order) .
The transfer is addressed to the wisdom, not the legality of the
President. The Court cannot interfere.

Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

Political Law Origination of Revenue Bills EVAT Amendment by
Substitution
FACTS:
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716
otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino
averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution.
Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3
readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for
after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee
thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630.
Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by
striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way
the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text
(only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even
signed the said Senate Bill.

ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.

HELD:
By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or
concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the
Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative
must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances
before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR
version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of

amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of

Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it
would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what
has been done.

Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials
to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on
the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition.
Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific
interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a
sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

ISSUE:

papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,

or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may
be provided by law (Sec. 6 Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid and
enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively
promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not
preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative
acts. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of
general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person may
be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents.

Important Point:
It illustrates how decrees and issuances issued by one man
Marcosare in fact laws of general application and provide for penalties.
The constitution afforded Marcos both executive and legislative powers.
The generality of law (Civil Code, Art. 14) will never work without
constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides the publication
constitutes the necessary constructive notice and is thus the cure for
ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable

requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc.
where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates.

RULING:

Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public

concern and corollarily access to official records, and to documents and

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE
PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take
effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .;"
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication
thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a
point recognized by the Supreme Court in Taada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al.
(G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much
to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official
Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership";
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of
general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the
laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a
wider readership, and come out regularly"; and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code
should accordingly be amended so the laws to be effective must be
published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code
of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its
publication in the Official Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.