Hilario VS Salvador

Facts: petitioners, all surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Romblon, against private respondent Allan T. Salvador, Alleging That,
the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a
parcel of land , which property was [adjudged] as the hereditary share of their
father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single, and which
adjudication was known by the plaintiffs, That, sometime in 1989, defendant
constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the property of the plaintiffs
father without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-ininterest, That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises
but the latter manifested that he have (sic) asked the prior consent of their
grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador. The private respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the
action on the ground that the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or
describe the parcel of land referred to as the subject-matter of this action. The
petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an
accion reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus,
regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive
jurisdiction falls within the said court.
Issue: WON the case involves accion reinvindicatoria.
Held: No, We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of
the CA that the action of the petitioners in the RTC was an accion reinvindicatoria.
We find and so rule that the action of the petitioners was an accion
publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the real property
subject matter thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for
its object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It
involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said
ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery
of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit
filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or
from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. The action of the
petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of ownership over
the property. They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to
its possession, and that the private respondent, who was the defendant,
constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their knowledge and refused to
vacate the property despite demands for him to do so. They prayed that the private
respondent vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them.

Sampayang v CA; G.R. No. 156360; January 14, 2005.

Facts: the siblings Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano filed complaint
for forcible entry against Cesar Sampayan for allegedly having entered and
occupied a parcel of land, and built a house thereon without their knowledge,
consent or authority, the entry having been supposedly effected through strategy

and stealth. In their complaint, the plaintiffs (now private respondents),

substantially alleged that their mother Cristita Quita was the owner and actual
possessor of the land in dispute , that after their mothers death, they became coowners pro-indiviso and lawful possessors of the same lot; that on June 1, 1992,
while they were temporarily absent from the lot in question, defendant Cesar
Sampayan, through strategy and stealth, entered the lot and built a house thereon,
to their exclusion; and that, despite their repeated demands for Sampayan to
vacate the lot and surrender the possession thereof to them, the latter failed and
refused to do so. In his answer, defendant Sampayan denied the material
allegations of the complaint and averred that neither the plaintiffs nor their mother
have ever been in possession of Lot. He claimed that he did not enter the subject lot
by stealth or strategy because he asked and was given permission therefor by Maria
Ybaez, the overseer of the lots true owners, Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado who
were then temporarily residing in Cebu City for business purposes. In the view of the
forgoing, Improvements made thereon was presented by the defendant Clearly,
from the appearance of the improvements introduced by the predecessors-ininterest of the defendant, it is showed that they have been in possession of the land
for more than one (1) year. Hence, the action of the plaintiffs, if any, is accion
publiciana or plenaria de possession
Issue: WON the proper action is forcible entry and not accion publiciana therefore
granting the MCTC the proper jurisdiction to try the case.
Held: Yes. "[t]o give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or
deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort
to parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. x x x"
Clear it is from the above that for the MCTC to acquire jurisdiction over a forcible
entry case, it is enough that the complaint avers the jurisdictional facts, i.e. that the
plaintiff had prior physical possession and that he was deprived thereof by the
defendant through force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth.8 The complaint
in this case makes such an averment. Hence, the irrelevant circumstance that the
evidence adduced during the hearing rendered improper an action for forcible entry
is of no moment and cannot deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the case. The
MCTC continues to have that jurisdiction.

Santos v Ayon; G.R. No. 137013; May 6, 2005.

Facts: Ruben Santos, petitioner, filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities a
complaint for illegal detainer against spouses Tony and Mercy Ayon, respondents,
petitioner averred that he is the registered owner of three lots situated at Lanzona
Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title ,
Respondent spouses are the registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land. The
previous occupant of this property built a building which straddled both the lots of

the herein parties. Respondents have been using the building as a warehouse.
Petitioner further alleged in his complaint that in 1985, when he bought the three
lots, he informed respondents that the building occupies a portion of his land.
However, he allowed them to continue using the building. But in 1996, he needed
the entire portion of his lot, hence, he demanded that respondents demolish and
remove the part of the building encroaching his property and turn over to him their
possession. But they refused. Instead, they continued occupying the contested
portion and even made improvements on the building. In their answer, respondents
sought a dismissal of this case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over
it since there is no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Respondents
denied they were occupying petitioner's property by mere tolerance, claiming they
own the contested portion and have been occupying the same long before
petitioner acquired his lots in 1985. The RTC upheld the finding of the MTCC that
respondents' occupation of the contested portion was by mere tolerance. Hence,
when petitioner needed the same, he has the right to eject them through court
action.
Respondents then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for
review. In its Decision dated October 5, 1988 now being challenged by petitioner,
the Court of Appeals held that petitioner's proper remedy should have been an
accion publiciana before the RTC, not an action for unlawful detainer.
Issue: WON the right action is accion publiciana.
Held: no. petitioner's allegations in his complaint clearly make a case for an
unlawful detainer. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the
withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Here, there is an allegation in
petitioner's complaint that respondents occupancy on the portion of his property is
by virtue of his tolerance. Petitioner's cause of action for unlawful detainer springs
from respondents' failure to vacate the questioned premises upon his demand
sometime in 1996. Within one (1) year therefrom, or on November 6, 1996,
petitioner filed the instant complaint.
Ganila v CA; G.R. No. 150755; June 28, 2005.
Facts: priivate respondent Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment Complaints before the
16th MCTC, Jordan-Buenavista-Nueva Valencia, Jordan, Guimaras. Private respondent
alleged that she owns and that she inherited the lot from her parents; and that she
only tolerated petitioners to construct residential houses or other improvements on
certain portions of the lot without rental. Sometime in September or October 1996,
private respondent demanded that the petitioners vacate the lot and remove their
houses and other improvements thereon. Petitioners refused, despite offer of money
by way of assistance to them. After the barangay conciliation failed, private
respondent filed the complaints.
Issue: WON the action for unlawful detainer is proper.

Held:yes. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a

possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion
reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An
unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two
forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property.
Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary
action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to
recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds
of actions to judicially recover possession.
Ross Rica Sales Center v Sps Ong G.R. No. 132197; August 16, 2005.
Facts: The case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners
against respondents, before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch I. In the complaint,
petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels of land.
Petitioners likewise acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ongs ownership of the lots
previous to theirs. Joseph M. Baduel, representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty,
wrote respondents informing them of its intent to use the lots and asking them to
vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. But respondents refused to
vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots, so petitioners
alleged. Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc. (petitioners)
had acquired the lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale made on
23 March 1995. In turn, it appears that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired
the properties from the respondents through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 July
1994. However, this latter deed of sale and the transfers of title consequential
thereto were subsequently sought to be annulled by respondents in a complaint
filed on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate
Realty.[2] Per record, this case is still pending resolution. The MTC considered itself as
having jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and disposed of the same in favor
of petitioners. Said ruling was affirmed by the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed
the lower courts and found the complaint to be one not for unlawful detainer based
on two (2) grounds, namely: that the allegations fail to show that petitioners were
deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and that
there is no contract, express or implied, between the parties as would qualify the
case as one of unlawful detainer. Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the MTC,
had jurisdiction over the action, it being an accion reivindicatoria according to them,
on the ground that petitioners were constantly claiming ownership over the lands in
the guise of filing an action for ejectment. In their Comment respondents maintain
that they occupy the subject lots as the legal owners. Petitioners, on the other hand,
are seeking recovery of possession under a claim of ownership which is tantamount
to recovery of possession based on alleged title to the lands, and therefore is within
the original jurisdiction of the RTC, so respondents conclude.
Issue: WON the case involves an accion reivindicatoria hence jurisdiction over the
subject matter lies within the RTC.
Held: no.
This contention is not tenable.
The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real
property. This differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of

possession or possession de jure, and accion interdictal where the issue is material
possession or possession de facto. In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of
possession is primordial while the issue of ownership is generally unessential.
Neither the allegation in petitioners complaint for ejectment nor the defenses
thereto raised by respondents sufficiently convert this case into an accion
reivindicatoria which is beyond the province of the MTC to decide. Petitioners did
not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of claiming or obtaining
ownership of the properties. The acknowledgment in their pleadings of the fact of
prior ownership by respondents does not constitute a recognition of respondents
present ownership. This is meant only to establish one of the necessary elements
for a case of unlawful detainer, specifically the unlawful withholding of possession.
Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought to recover physical possession of the
subject property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels of land
as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case.
Peralta-Labrador v Bugarin; G.R. No. 165177; August 25, 2005.
Facts: petitioner Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador filed a case for "Recovery of Possession
and Ownership," with the MTC of San Felipe, Zambales. She alleged that she is the
owner of Cadastral Lot. located at Sitio Caarosipan, Barangay Manglicmot, San
Felipe, Zambales, having purchased the same in 1976 from spouses Artemio and
Angela Pronto. In 1977, she was issued Tax Declaration No. 10462 and paid the
taxes due thereon. Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly took
possession of the 108 sq. m. lot and refused to vacate the same despite the pleas of
petitioner. Hence, on January 18, 1996, she instituted a complaint for recovery of
possession and ownership against respondent. respondent contended that the area
claimed by petitioner is included in the 4,473 square meter lot, covered by the
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13011; and that he has been in continuous
possession and occupation thereof since 1955. however, respondent failed to allege
that the questioned lot is covered by the OCT No. P-13011, and instead asserted
that he planted fruit bearing trees in the property. Respondent further pleaded the
defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription.
Issue: WON the action has already prescribed and WON the petitioner has any
ground or action against the latter.
Held: the cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed and the MTC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the case. Petitioners complaint therefore should have been
filed with the proper RTC. It is clear that petitioners averment make out a case for
forcible entry because she alleged prior physical possession of the subject lot way
back in 1976, and the forcible entry thereon by respondent. is settled that
jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by
their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. 18 Hence, the failure of
respondent to insist on the defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription
stated in his Amended Answer with Counterclaim will not vest the MTC with
jurisdiction over the case. It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting
process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary
nature of such process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action
for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land.
However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted

from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period,
the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana,
which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession; or an accion
reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of action for forcible
entry filed by respondents had already prescribed when they filed the Complaint for
ejectment on July 10, 1992. Hence, even if Severo Malvar may be the owner of the
land, possession thereof cannot be wrested through a summary action for ejectment
of petitioner, who had been occupying it for more than one (1) year. Respondents
should have presented their suit before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their
cause of action for forcible entry had prescribed already, and the MTCC had no more
jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

Serina v Caballero; G.R. No. 127382; August 17, 2004

Facts: Dr. Jesus Seria and his wife, Enriqueta Seria filed a Complaint for quieting
of title, recovery of possession, and damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against respondents Victor Caballero and his tenants, Teodoro
Donela and Oliver Donela. When Dr. Seria died on August 6, 1983, he was
substituted by his children, petitioners Jesus, Jr., Antonio, Violeta, Reynaldo and
Emmanuel. The petitioners averred that sometime in March 1982, they discovered
that respondent Caballero was claiming ownership over the said land and offering it
for sale or mortgage to third parties. They also discovered that the respondents
Donelas were occupying the land as tenants and caretakers of the land. The
petitioners claimed that their father, Dr. Seria, bought the land from Lucia Vda. de
Marbella who inherited it from her father, Ramon Neri. They presented a Deed of
Sale6 dated August 23, 1947 showing that Dr. Seria bought 5 hectares of ricefield,
bounded on the North by Raymundo Seria, on the East by Teofilo Saburnido, on the
South by Obdelio Caballero, on the West by Obdullo Caballero, from Lucia Vda. de
Marbella. Dr. Seria was issued Tax Declaration No. 4029 allegedly for the said
property. As indicated in the tax declaration and subsequent tax declarations issued
in the name of Dr. Seria, they were issued for Cadastral Lot No. 3533 and covered
a 2.5-hectare ricefield with the same boundary owners as those in the complaint. 7
The petitioners also averred that they regularly paid taxes thereon since 1947 up to
the present. respondent Caballero alleged that he was the lawful owner, and had
been in actual physical possession of the disputed land since time immemorial. He
averred that the disputed land is part of Cadastral Lot No. 3533, C-7 of the Cagayan
Cadastre and originally owned by his grandfather, Eustaquio Caballero. The
respondents averred that Eustaquio Caballero declared the entire parcel of land for
tax purposes even before the war. Tax Declaration No. 2442 was issued in lieu of the
records that were destroyed during the war.

Issue: WON the property in question can be acquired thru acquisitive prescription
and such declaration of tax is sufficient to justify ownership.
Held: No. We agree with the respondents. Since the property has not been clearly
identified by the petitioners, their claim of acquisitive prescription cannot be
considered. Insufficient identification of the portion of land claimed in absolute
ownership cannot ripen into ownership. Possession as a means of acquiring
ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction. The petitioners argue
that they would not have regularly paid taxes on the land since 1947 had they not
believed that they owned the same.35 The respondents, for their part, aver that the
petitioners were only able to prove seven (7) years of actual possession of the land
through cultivation by their tenants. They argue that such seven-year period of
cultivation cannot be considered in the petitioners favor, since the witness who
testified on this fact did not personally know the boundaries of the land cultivated,
or whether it was the same land bought by Dr. Seria. The respondents contend
that acquisitive prescription applies only when there is no dispute as to the identity
of the property. The petitioners argument that the payment of taxes on the
property since May 31, 1948 constitutes proof of their possession of the
subject land for thirty-five years is untenable. Tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they
constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership of the property for which
taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual, public and adverse
possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership.

Perez v Mendoza; G.R. No. L-22006; July 28, 1975. MALABONG CASE
Facts: the Court of First Instance of Batangas was an action to quiet title over a
piece of land filed on March 20, 1959, by spouses Basilio Perez and Petra Montalbo
with spouses Nicolas Mendoza and Margarita Macalalad as defendants. The litigated
parcel of land was originally part of a bigger tract owned by Estanislao Montalbo.
When Estanislao died in 1918, his properties passed on to his children Petra, Felisa,
and Pedro all surnamed Montalbo, and because Pedro died single the two women
remained as the only heirs. By mutual agreement Petra and Felisa divided between
themselves the lands of their father and the parcel of which the litigated land was a
part was assigned to Felisa. The reason for the exchange was that Andrea wanted to
donate a piece of land to the municipality for use as a school site and the land of
Felisa was what the municipality preferred as it was adjacent to other properties of
the municipality. Upon her acquisition of Felisa's aforementioned land, Andrea
donated to the municipality the northern portion thereof which constituted almost
one-half of the entire parcel, and since then that portion was declared for taxation
purposes by the municipality together with its adjoining propertiesNicolas Mendoza
sought to transfer the tax declaration of the property to his name and of his wife
and for that purpose he submitted a deed of exchange of property dated January
14, 1922, allegedly executed by Felisa Montalbo and Andrea Montalbo in the

presence of the municipal secretary Rafael Manahan. When Basilio Perez came to
know about the supposed deed of exchange, he had it investigated and upon
discovering that the signature of Rafael Manahan appearing on the document was
forged, he filed a criminal complaint before the Fiscal's office which led to an
accusation for falsification of private document against Andrea Montalbo and
Nicolas Mendoza. the decision in favor of the spouses Mendoza. respondent court found
for itself that the agreement of partition dated May 27, 1934, Exhibit D, is not
incontrovertible proof that in 1934 the litigated property belonged in common to
Petra and the heirs of Felisa Montalbo both of whom may have been guided by the
fact that the property was still declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Estanislao Montalbo, and that the document of partition "did not overcome the
evidence on record that Andrea Montalbo became the owner of the land, and that
since 1927 the defendants have been in continuous possession of the land, openly,
adversely and in the concept of owners thereby acquiring ownership of the land
through acquisitive prescription."
Issue: WON the respondent owns the land in question
Held: yes, Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the
possessor goes the presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of ownership.
Article 433 of the Civil Code provides that "(A)ctual possession under claim of ownership
raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process
for the recovery of the property." In Chan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-27488, June 30,
1970, 33 SCRA 737, this Court upheld the finding of the Court of Appeals that the litigated
property belonged to the private respondents therein based on their possession of the
property, not only because such findings of fact of the appellate court are conclusive and
binding on this Court but because the conclusion is in accordance with Articles 433 and 531
of the Civil Code. The pretension of petitioners that the possession of the Mendozas is
8

that of a mere lessee was not believed by the trial judge and the appellate court not
only because of the absence of any written or oral evidence on the matter other
than the bare testimony of petitioner Basilio Perez, but also due to the
circumstances present in the case which We indicated and enumerated at pages 7
to 9 of this decision. In fine, it is a fact that the Mendozas are presently in
possession of the property and the presumption of ownership in their favor has not
been successfully rebutted by evidence that they are mere lessees of the land in
their possession as claimed by petitioners. As we have here conflicting claims of
possession by the parties over the land in controversy and because the fact of
possession cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities
except in cases of co-possession, the present possessor is to be preferred pursuant
to Article 538 of the Civil Code which We quote:

Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different

personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise
regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there
are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are
the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the

thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or

ownership through proper proceedings."

Dizon v CA; G.R. No. 101929; January 6, 1993. BOBONG CASE

Facts: It appears that on 21 August 1984, Aureo Reyes, et al. (hereafter
"respondents") filed an amended complaint before the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case No. 6752, for the annulment of a deed
of extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate of Dionisio Galang, claiming
to have been deprived thereby of their shares, as co-owners, issued in the name of
Dionisio Galang, covering said lots, are fraudulent and should therefore be annulled
and cancelled. The spouses Hilario Galang and Martina Laxamana owned two (2)
lots located in San Agustin, Potrero, Municipality of Bacolor, Province of Pampanga.
They had six (6) children, namely, Dionisio, Marciana, Potenciana, Flaviana, Leonora
and Gertrudes. The spouses mortgaged the aforesaid lots to Camilo Angeles. It is
alleged by the respondents that Dionisio Galang redeemed these lots in his own
name, despite the fact that part of the funds used for the redemption came from his
sisters. A cadastral survey involving the two (2) lots was conducted, and on 19 May 1919,
the Court of First Instance ordered the issuance in the name solely of Dionisio
GalangRespondents, who are heirs of Galang's sisters, claim that Galang and his five

(5) sisters had partitioned the subject lots on 27 June 1920, as embodied in an
unnotarized affidavit executed by Galang .As a consequence thereof, Galang's
sisters constructed their houses on Lot 3548. The structures passed on from
generation to generation, with each of Galang's sisters and their descendants
enjoying the benefits therefrom. No one questioned or disturbed them until the
petitioners (heirs of Galang), informed them that the lots in question were titled in
Galang's name and had been partitioned, on the basis of a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition ,into three (3) equal parts corresponding to his (Galang's) three (3)
children; that petitioners had succeeded in subdividing the lots and in obtaining
titles thereto in their name despite their (respondents') earlier demands for an
extrajudicial settlement of their dispute. The trial court 3 upheld Galang's titles over the
lots which, as aforestated, had been issued as early as 1922 in his name. The trial court
further held that respondents' action had long prescribed, having been filed only on 24
March 1983, or after a lapse of sixty-one (61) long years from the issuance of said titles. The
court also noted respondents' failure to establish their relationship to Galang's five (5)
sisters, premising their claim solely on an unsubstantiated assertion that they are
descendants of the deceased Galang sisters. 4 The presence or construction of the houses on
Lot No. 3548 was also not considered as evidence in respondents' favor, since no proof was
submitted establishing respondents' right to occupy the place. The documentary evidence
(Exh. "C" and "C-1") allegedly showing co-ownership among Dionisio and his co-heirs, was
likewise ignored by the trial court as this did not specifically refer to the disputed Lots.

Held: It is a fact that Dionisio Galang's ownership over the disputed lots (3548 and

3562) had been judicially confirmed on 19 May 1919 in Cadastral Case No. 14,
G.L.R.O. No. 51, which is a proceeding in rem and hence binding "on the whole
world." OCT No. 1056 (9010) and OCT No. 1057 (9102) were, as a consequence,
issued on 9 January 1922. None of Galang's co-heirs objected to or protested their
issuance. These titles became indefeasible and incontrovertible. Then it was only
after sixty-one (61) years or on 24 March 1983 that the descendants of Galang's coheirs asserted co-ownership claims over the subject lots. However, as can be
gleaned from the foregoing, there is no reference to Lot Nos. 3548 and 3562. Said
affidavit is not therefore a sufficient basis or support for what is alleged by
respondents as a partition among Dionisio and his now deceased sisters. It does
not, as correctly stated by the trial court, amount to anything insofar as the two (2)
lots involved in this case are concerned:

Even their presentation of the document purportedly executed by Dionisio Galang

on June 27, 1910 (Exh. "C" and "C-1") where the latter acknowledges that he and his
co-heirs named therein as co-owners of a certain property which they had
mortgaged to a certain family surnamed Angeles does not amount to anything for
nothing in this document shows that it pertains to the two lots involved herein. It
merely referred to a certain "land" which Dionisio Galang and his co-heirs "coinherited" and partitioned without any indication as to which property is being
referred

Alim v CA; G.R. No. 93213; August 9, 1991.

Facts: The case arose out of a Lease Contract with Option To Buy, dated January 5,
1977, which was entered into by and between respondent PACIFIC COAST TIMBER
PRODUCTS, INC., as lessor, and petitioner LUCIO TAN ALIM, as lessee, for a term of
fifteen months over a unit of tractor at a monthly rental of P10,000.00 subject to the
stipulation, among others, that after payment of five months, the lessee is given an
option to purchase the equipment at the price of P150,000.00, in which event the
rental paid shall be considered as part payment of the consideration and that the
subject equipment has to remain at the lessee's jobsite at PARCEL III-R between
Dianawan Creek and Bazal, San Joaquin, Baler. However, upon its delivery on
January 15, 1977, the tractor was discovered to be defective. Consequently,
petitioner Alim informed the private respondent's manager,and a repair was sent by
the respondent, the parties amended the lease contract with petitioner's obligation
to execute a Deed of Chattel Mortgage for his three motor vehicles in favor of the
respondent to guarantee his undertaking in the amended lease contract, the latter
failed to pay rentals for seven months, from September, 1977 to February, 1978 in
the amount of P70,000.00, for which reason the contract of lease as well as the
option to buy, are automatically terminated. The same counsel likewise sent a

notice of default in obligation secured by the Chattel Mortgage . However, the

petition for extrajudicial foreclosure thereon was returned by the sheriff unsatisfied,
Thereafter, a complaint for recovery of possession with replevin of a unit
of tractor was filed by private respondent before the then Court of First
Instance of Quezon City due to petitioner's refusal to pay the arrears and
to deliver the subject equipment. the petitioner denied having defaulted in the
payment of rentals and claimed to have sustained damages for unrealized income
in his logging business as a result of the wrongful seizure of the tractor.

Issue: WON the seizure of tractor is valid.

Held: yes, There is therefore no merit in the petitioner's allegation that the seizure
was wrongful for which he must be compensated. The ownership or right of
possession over the subject equipment belonged to the Pacific Coast Timber
Products, Inc. at the time it was seized. The seizure of the equipment was ordered
by the trial court for its restoration by means established in the laws of procedure.
Thus, the requisites for the issuance of the writ of replevin (Sec. 2, Rule 60) have
been satisfied. The writ is a provisional remedy in replevin suits. It is in the "nature
of a possessory action and the applicant who seeks the immediate possession of the
property need not be the holder of the legal title to the property." It is sufficient that
at the time he applied for a writ of replevin he is found to be "entitled to a
possession thereof as stated in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.

Taxicab Operators v Board of Transportation; G.R. No. L-59234;

September 30, 1982.

Facts: Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, who are grantees of Certificates
of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other
place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation
Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being
an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience. respondent Board
of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and
comfortable units are used as public conveyances;

WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again,
complained against, and condemned, the continued operation of old and dilapidated
taxis;

WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort,

convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis
should be adopted;

WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the
latter believes that in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered
the cost of his taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his investments; pursuant to
this policy, the Board hereby declares that no car beyond six years shall be
operated as taxi, and in implementation of the same hereby promulgates the
following rules and regulations:

1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered
withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and
operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972 and
later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation;

2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from
public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In
the registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be
accepted for registration and allowed for operation; and every year thereafter, there
shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi.
petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop
its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent
years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were
phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit
for operation.

Issue: WON the memorandum is constitutional and a valid limitation to the right of
ownership.
Held:yes, As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular,
the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police
power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,
safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate property rights. 6 In the language of
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the
exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded".

Republic v Castellvi; G.R. No. L-20620; August 15, 1974.

Facts:
Petitioner, as a lessee, occupied the property of Castellvi in 1947 on a year to year
basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year.) Before the
expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic sought to renew
the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased premises
after the termination of the contract, on July 11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of
Staff, AFP, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had decided not to
continue leasing the property. Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff,
answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate
the premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost
P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property, and that,
there being no other recourse, the acquisition of the property by means of
expropriation proceedings would be recommended to the President.

Petitioner Republic stated that the taking of Castellvis property should be

deemed as of the year 1947 by virtue of the lease agreement.

Respondent argued that the two essential elements in the taking of property
under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation
by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in
devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and
deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and
occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.

Issue: Whether petitioners contention that the taking occurred in 1947 (and not in
1959, is correct

Held: No.The following must be present in the taking of property for purposes of
eminent domain: 1) The expropriator must enter a private property. 2) The entrance
into private property must be for more than a momentary period. 3) The entry into
the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. 4) The property
must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected. 5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

The taking of Catellvis property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be

considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy
the property as lessee thereof. The Court finds merit in the contention of Castellvi
that two essential elements in the taking of property under the power of eminent
domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be
for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public
use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were
not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.

Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the just compensation is to be

determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that
when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the
filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine
National Bank, L-14158, April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 957, 961-962). In the instant case, it
is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property,
by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castellvi property
for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore,
be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

City Govt of Quezon City v Ericta; G.R. No. L-34915; June 24, 1983.
Facts:
This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64,
of the Quezon City Council null and void. ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF . For several years, the
aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven
years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the
following resolution:

RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby

request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have
failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Respondent
Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch
XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with

preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The

respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City
Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners
argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise
of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the
burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is
authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such
further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such
as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of
the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. The
respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source
of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of
promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property
outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for
public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general
welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a
house to prevent the spread of a conflagration.

The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of

the police power?

Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6)
percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are
charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The
expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not
covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center
of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to
the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the
Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and
in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to
provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations
requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,

playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very
clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual
lots are sold to home-owners.

Republic VS PLDT.

FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of
the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government
Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use
of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to
enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them.
ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System
can be a valid object for expropriation.
HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require
the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may
require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow interservice connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to
an easement of right of way.
U.S. v Causby DI KO GETS
Lunod v Meneses; G.R. No. 4223; August 19, 1908.
Facts: Nicolas Lunod, Juan de la Vega, Evaristo Rodriguez, Fernando Marcelo,
Esteban Villena, Benito Litao, Ventura Hernandez, and Casimiro Pantanilla, residents
of the town of Bulacan, province of the same name, filed a written complaint
against Higino Meneses, alleging that they each owned and possessed farm lands,
situated in the places known as Maytunas and Balot, near a small lake named
Calalaran; that the defendant is the owner of a fish-pond and a strip of land situated
in Paraanan, adjoining the said lake on one side, and the River Taliptip on the other;
that from time immemorial, and consequently for more than twenty years before
1901, there existed and still exists in favor of the rice fields of the plaintiffs a
statutory easement permitting the flow of water over the said land in Paraanan,
which easement the said plaintiffs enjoyed until the year 1901 and consisted in that
the water collected upon their lands and in the Calalaran Lake flow through
Paraanan into the Taliptip River. From that year however, the defendant, without any
right or reason, converted the land in Paraanan into a fishpond, hence, prevented
the free passage of the water through said place into the Taliptip River, that in
consequence the lands of the plaintiff became flooded and damaged by the
stagnant waters, there being no outlet except through the land in Paraanan; that

their plantation were destroyed, causing the loss and damages.the damage will
continue if the obstructions to the flow of the water are allowed to remain,
preventing its passage through said land and injuring the rice plantations of the
plaintiffs. They therefore asked that judgment be entered against the defendant,
declaring that the said tract of land in Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement.
to the answer of the defendant, the latter, on the 29th of August, 1904, filed an
amended answer, denying each and everyone of the allegations of the complaint,
and alleged that no statutory easement existed nor could exist in favor of the lands
described in the complaint, permitting the waters to flow over the fish pond that he,
together with his brothers, owned in the sitio of Bambang, the area and boundaries
of which were stated by him, and which he and his brothers had inherited from their
deceased mother.
Issue: WON the land in dispute can be subjected to statutory easement.
Held: yes, According to the provisions of law above referred to, the defendant,
Meneses, had no right to construct the works, nor the dam which blocks the
passage, through his lands and the outlet to the Taliptip River, of the waters which
flood the higher lands of the plaintiffs; and having done so, to the detriment of the
easement charged on his estate, he has violated the law which protects and
guarantees the respective rights and regulates the duties of the owners of the fields
in Calalaran and Paraanan. According to the provisions of law above referred to, the
defendant, Meneses, had no right to construct the works, nor the dam which blocks
the passage, through his lands and the outlet to the Taliptip River, of the waters
which flood the higher lands of the plaintiffs; and having done so, to the detriment
of the easement charged on his estate, he has violated the law which protects and
guarantees the respective rights and regulates the duties of the owners of the fields
in Calalaran and Paraanan. It is true that article 388 of said code authorizes every
owner to enclose his estate by means of walls, ditches fences or any other device,
but his right is limited by the easement imposed upon his estate.
The defendant Meneses might have constructed the works necessary to make and
maintain a fish pond within his own land, but he was always under the strict and
necessary obligation to respect the statutory easement of waters charged upon his
property, and had no right to close the passage and outlet of the waters flowing
from the lands of the plaintiffs and the lake of Calalaran into the Taliptip River. He
could not lawfully injure the owners of the dominant estates by obstructing the
outlet to the Taliptip River of the waters flooding the upper lands belonging to the
plaintiffs.
It is perhaps useful and advantageous to the plaintiffs and other owners of high
lands in Calalaran, in addition to the old dike between the lake of said place and the
low lands in Paraanan, to have another made by the defendant at the border of
Paraanan adjoining the said river, for the purpose of preventing the salt waters of
the Taliptip River flooding, at high tide, not only the lowlands in Paraanan but also
the higher ones of Calalaran and its lake, since the plaintiffs can not prevent the
defendant from protecting his lands against the influx of salt water; but the
defendant could never be permitted to obstruct the flow of the waters through his
lands to the Taliptip River during the heavy rains, when the high lands in Calalaran

and the lake in said place are flooded, thereby impairing the right of the owners of
the dominant estates.