(14~~

CONGRESS

1st Session

REPORT

SEZ\ThTE

>

so.

91465

ALLEGEDASSASSINATION
PLOTS
INVOLVING FOREIGNLEADERS

AN

INTERIM
OF

TO

REPORT
THE

SELECT
COMMITIEE
GOVERNMENTAL

STUDY

WITH

RESPECT

INTELLIGENCE

UNITED

STATES

20

U..k.
0

SENATE

WITH

SUPPLEMENTAL,
VIEWS

NOVEMBER

61-986

TO

ACTIVITIES

TOGETHER

ADDITIONAL,

OPERATIONS

(legislative

GOVERNMENT
WASHINGTON

day,

AND

NOVEMBER

PRINTING
: 1975

OFFICE

SEPARATE

X3),

1975

SENATE

SELECT
WITH

CO&IMITTEE
RESPECT

TO
TO

STUDY

GOVERNMENTAL

ISTELLIGESCE

OPERATIONS

ACTIVITIES

FRANK
CHURCH,
Idaho,
Chairman
JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Chairman
PHILIP
A. HART, hllchlgan
HOWARD
H. BAKER,
JR., Tmnessee
WALTER
F. ?+IONDALE,
hfinnesota
BARRY GOLDWATER,
Arizona
CHARLES
JlcC. Jl.\THIAS,
JR., Xwyland
WALTER
D. HUDDLESTON,
Kentucky
RICHARD
S.
SCHWEIKER,
Pennnsylvania
ROBERT
JIORGAN,
North Carolina
GARY HART,
Colorado
WILLIAM G. MILLER, Star Director
FREDERICK A. 0. SCIIWARZ,
Jr., Chiej
Counsel
CURTIS R. SYOTHERS, Counsel to the Minority
AUDREY HATRY, Clerk
of the
Committee

CONTENTS
Page
Prologue----________------___-_----~-------------------~-----------I. Introduction
and Summary--_ _ - _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _-_ _ _ __
A. Committees
Mandate_ _ ___- __ _____________ _ _____________ __
B. Committee
Decision To Make Report Public- _ ________ __- _____
C. Scope of Committees
Investigation
_______ - _ __- _________ -__ ___
D. Summary
of Findings and Conclusions- ______ _______ ____ _____.
1. The Questions Presented ____ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
2. Summary
of Findings and Conclusions on the Plots _________ _
3. Summary
of Findings and Conclusions on The Issues of Authority and Control--_ _____ - _______________________
_ _______
II. Covert Action as a Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation_ __ __
A. Policy Development
and Approval
Mechanism--- - _ __ ___ _ ___ __
B. The Concept of Plausible
Denial _____ _ _-_ _________________
_
III.
Assassination
Planning
and Plots--- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _
A. Congo__--_____-_____-___________________-----~---~------1. Introduction____________________________~~-----~--~----~
Dulles Cable to Leopoldville:
August 26, 1960 _______________
Z: CIA
Encouragement
of Congolese
Efforts
to Eliminate
Lumumba-___-_____-_________-_______-_________-_____
4. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba _____________ - ___________
Meetings
on Feasibility
of Assassinating
(4 Bissell/Tweedy
Lumumba_l__-____-~______-___-__I__-__-___-_-___I
Bissell/Scheider
Meetings
on
Preparations
for
Assassinating
(b)
An African Leader------_____ - _____ -__-___-___-_
(4 Scheider Mission to the Congo on an Assassination
Operation-____--________________________~--------(4 Congo Station Officer Told to Expect Scheider: Dulles
Cables About Elimination
of Lumumba ___________ -_
Issued to Station
Officer and
(4 Assassination Instructions
Lethal Substances Delivered:
September
26, 1960- _ _ ___
(0 Hedgmans Impression That President Eisenhower Ordered
Lumumbas
Assassination_________ _________________
(9) Steps in Furtherance of the Assassination Operation- _ ___ _
(i) Hedgmans
Testimony
About
Confirmation
from
Headquarters
of the Assassination
Plan ______c__ -_
(ii) Exploratory
Steps- - - _ __ _- - __ _ __ -_ _ __ _ _ _ ___ __ _ _
(iii) The Assassination
Operation
Moves Forward
After
Scheiders
Return
to Headquarters:
October 5-7,
1960-_-___--____________________________-----(iv) Headquarters
Continues
to Place Highest
Priority
on the Assassination
Operation_ _ ___- ___________
Testimony:
Extent
of Implementation;
(h) Tweedy/B&e11
Extent of Authorization
_________________
- ___________
(i) Tweedys
Testimony
About the Scope of the Assaasination Operation ________ - ______ -- ____ -- ____ -_-_
(ii) Bissells Testimony
About Moving
the Assassination
Operation
From Planning
to Implementation___ __

XIII

1
1
f
t
4
6
9
:;
::
14
:9
19

20
21
22
24
2
it
29
30
33
33
36

rv
III.

Assassination
Planning
and Plots-Continued
A. Congo-Continued
5. The Question of a Connection
Between the Assassination
Plot
and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Their Agents in the
Congo_----------------------------------------------(a) Mulroneys
Assignment
in the Congo ___________ __- _____
(i) Mulroneys
Testimony
That He Went to the Congo
After Refusing
an Assassination
Assignment
From
Bissell__------------------------------------~~
(ii)
Testimony
About
the
Assignment
. , Bissells
Mulroney---..-----.--------------------------(iii) Mulroney
Informed
of Virus in Station Safe Upon Arriving in Congo: November
3, 1960------_______
(iv) Mulroneys
Plan to Neutralize
Lumumba__- _ __ __
(b) QJ/WINs
Mission
in the Congo:
November-December
1960___-----------------------------------------(~1
Asks &J/WIN
to Join Execution
Squad:
\-, WI/ROGUE
December
1960__~_-___-_-_-----------------------6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved
in Bringing
About Lumumbas
Death in Katanga Province- ___________
(a) Lumumbas
Imprisonment
After Leaving U.N.
Custody:
November
27-December
3, 1960-- _- ________ -___-___
(b) Lumumbas
Death _____________ _ _- _____ ---:--:
_______
7. The Question of the Level at Which the Assassmatlon
Plot
Was Authorized_-------------------------------------,;
(a) High-Level
Meetings at Which I Getting Rid of Lumumba
Was Discussed----____ -___-___-_-___-_______ - ____
(0 Dillons Testimony
About Pentagon Meeting:
Summer
1960___--------------------------------------(ii) Robert
Johnsons
Testimony
That He Understood
the President
to Order Lumumbas
Assassination
at an NSC Meeting ____ - _____ -_- ______-_____--(iii) Special Group Agrees to Consider
Anything
That
Might Get Rid of Lumumba:
August 25, 1960-,--,,
(iv) Dulles Reminded
by Gray of Top-Level
Feeling
That Vigorous Action was Necessary in the Congo:
September7-8,1960____----------------------(v) Dulles Tells NSC That Lumumba
Remains
a Grave
Danger Until Disposed Of: Se~~?~r~__9~11
(b) Testimony
of Eisenhower White House
(c) Bissells Assumptions
About Authorization
by President
Eisenhower and Allen Dulles-- _ _ _ _ -___ __ __-_____---(d) The Impression
of Scheider
and Hedgman
That
the
Assassination
Operation Had Presidential
AuthorizationB. Cuba----------------------------------------------------1. The Assassination
Plots-- _ _ _ __ ___ _ _ _ __ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _-_ _ __
(a) Plots: Early 1960---____ - _____ - _____ -___- ___________
(i) Plots to Destroy Castros Public Image- _____________
(ii) Accident Plot- - _ _ _ __- _____ - _____________________
(iii) Poison Cigars- - _ _ ___- _____________ -_ ___- ________
(b) Use of Underworld
Figures-Phase
I (Pre-Bay of Pigs) _ _ _ _
(i) The Initial
Plan- _ _ _ _ __ --_ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _-(ii) Contact with the Syndicate- _ ___ ___-___-_______ _(iii) Las Vegas Wiretap__--___~__----________-__--__(1) CIA Involvement
in the Wiretap-..
&------_____
(2) Consequences of the Wiretap--___________-___(iv) Poison is Prepared and Deljvered
to Cuba- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (c) Use of Underworld
Figures: Phase II (Post-Bay
of Pigs)-(i) Change in Leadership_ _ _A _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ -- (ii) The Operation
is Reactivated_ /_ _________________
(d) Plansin
Early 1963 _____ - ______ - ____ --__- ___--______(e) AM/LASH
_______ - __________ +- _____ -- ______--__-___(i) Originof
theProject-----,--------___--_____---(ii) The Poison Pen Device_- -: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ - __ _ _ _ _
(iii) Providing
AM/LASH
with Arms ____ - ________ -___ __

Page

37
37
37
40
41
42
43
45
48
48
49
51
53
53
55
60
62
tt
65
67
8:
72

88
89

*
:

V
III.

Assassination
Planning
and Plots-Continued
B. Cuba--Continued
2. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Authorized Within
the Central Intelligence
Agency? ______________
(a) TheQuestion
Presented___-_---_-_--_________________
(i) Dunes_-_---_------~------~------~------~-~----(ii) McCone__-_______________________________-----(b) Did Allen Dulles Know of or Authorize
the Initial
Plots
Against Castro?-----------~---~___________________
(i) Dulles Approval of J.C. Kings December 1959 Memorandum_-___-______________----------------------(ii) Dulles January 1960 Statement
to the Special Group(iii) Meetings in March 1960 __________________________
(iv) Recision of Accident Plot in July 1960 ____.________
(v) Briefing of Dulles on Use of Underworld
Figures in
September1960__-----------~-------~---------(1) Evidence Concerning What Dulles Was Told- _ _ _ _
(2) Evidence Concerning When the Briefing Occurred(vi) Edwards Communications
to the Justice Department
in 1961 and 1962 ________ ----_-_-_-_-_--________
(vii) General Cabells
Remarks
to the Snecial Groun in
November
1960- _____ -_- ________ -~---_.---_~--(c) Did John McCone
Know of or Authorize
Assassination
Plots During His Tenure as DCI? _____ - ____ --_------_
(i) McCones Testimony _______ - _____ -__ __ _______ __ _ _
(ii) Testimony
of Helms, Bissell and Other Subordinate
AgencyEmployees__________________-___.._----(iii) Helms and Harvey Did Not Brief McCone About the
Assassination
Plots--- __-_-_-_-______ ___ __ ___ __
(iv) The Question of Whether
General Carter, McCones
Deputy
Director,
Learned About the Underworld
Plot and Informed
McCone _________ --_-_----_-_
(v) The August 1963 Briefing of McCone-----_---_____
3. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Authorized Outside of the Central Intelligence
Agency?. -- _ - _
(a) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization
Outside the
Central Intelligence
Agency in the Eisenhower
Admin(i) Summary__----~-------------------~-----------(ii) Richard Bissells Testimony-__ __ _________ _____ ___
(1) Lack of Personal Knowledge----_-------------(2) Assumptions
Concerning
Dulles-- __ ___ __ __ _____
(iii) Testimony
of White House Officials- __ _ - _ _ _ _ __ __ __ _
(1) Gordon Gray- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
(2) Andrew Goodpaster-_ _____________ __________
(3) Thomas Parrott-__ _ __ __ __ _-_ __ _ _ _ __ _ __ __ _ __ _
(4) John Eisenhower- ____________________________
(iv) Documentary
Evidence--__ _-_-_ __ _ __ _ __ __ _ __ __ _ _
(1) Inspector
Generals Report ____________________
(2) Contemporaneous
Documents--__ __ _-_ _ _ _ __ __ _
(b) The Question
of Knowledge
and Authorization
Outside
the Central
Intelligence
Agency During
the Kennedy
Administration- - - _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ __ _-_ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ __
(i) Pre-Bay of Pigs Assassination
Plot- _ _ - __ _-_ _ _ __ __ _ _
(1) Bissells Testimony
Concerning
His Assumption
That Dulles Told the President- _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _
(2) Bissells Testimony
Regarding
His Own Actions-(3) Kennedy Administration
Officials Testimony-,
__
(4) The Question
of Whether
Assassination
Efforts
Were Disclosed in Various Briefings of Administration Officials- _ _ _________________________
a. Briefing of the President-Elect
______________ _
b. Discussion with Bundy on Executive
Action
Capability-_ __ __ __ _ __ __ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _____ _
c. Taylor/Kennedy
Bay of Pigs Inquiry ________
(5) Conversation
Between
President
Kennedy
and
Senator George Smathers ______ __ _ __ _-_ _-_ __ _

92

94
t7

97
98
99
99
100
102
106
107
108
109
109
110
110
111
111
111
112
113
113
114
114
114
116
117
117
118
119
120
120
121
121
123

VI
III.

Assassination
Planning
and Plots-Continued
B. Cuba-Continued
3. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Authorized Outside of the Central Intelligence
Agency?-Con.
(b) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization
Outside of
the Central
Intelligence
Agency During
the Kennedy
Administration-Continued
(i) Pre-Bay of pigs Assassination
Plot-Continued
(6) The Question
of Whether
the President
or the
Attorney
General Might
Have Learned of the
Assassination
Effort from the Cuban Participants_-_-__-_--__--_--~----------~---~---Opera(7) The Question of Whether the Assassination
tion Involving
Underworld
Figures Was Known
About
by Attorney
General
Kennedy
or
President
Kennedv
as Revealed
bv Investinations of Giancana and Rosselli- -_ - I_ - - _ _ - - I- _
a. 1960_-____--_______---------------------b. 1961_--_------__--__~~------~-----~---~-c. 1962_-_____-_______---------------------(1) Did President
Kennedy
Learn Anything
About Assassination
Plots as a Result of
the FBI Investieation
of Giancana
and
Rosselli? ____ i-Z-__________________
(2) The Formal Decision to Forego Prosecution(a) Events Leading Up to a Formal Briefing of the Attorney
General ________
(b) Briefing
of the Attorney
General on
May 7, 1962__--__-________-_____
(aa) The Attornev
General Was Told
That
the
Operation
Had
Involved
an
Assassination
Attempt---________________
(bb) Evidence
Concerning
Whether
The
Attorney
General
Was
Told That the Operation
Had
Been Terminated
____ -__ _ _____
(ii) Post-Bay
of Pigs Underworld
Plot-MONGOOSE
Period-__----__-----____________________~----~
(1) Events
Preceding
the Establishment
of MONGOOSE_________-_-__-____________________
a. The Taylor/Kennedy
Board of Inquiry_ ___ __
b. National
Security Action Memorandum
100 of
October Fj, 1961, and the CIA Intelligence
Estimate-_____ -- ____ -- _________________
c. President
Kennedys
November
9, 1961 Conversation with Tad Szulc- _ _- _____________
d. President
Kennedys
Speech of November
16,
1961---_-_________--___________________
_ _ - - _- ____ - __________
(2) Operation MONGOOSEa. The Creation of Operation
MONGOOSE--__
(1) The Special Group (Augmented)
@GA)--(8) General
Lansdale
Named
Chief-of-Operations of MONGOOSE-______________
(3) CIA Organization
for MONGOOSE_
- ____
b. Lansdales
Theory
and Objective
for MONGOOSE__-_-__________-~--------------c. Bissells
Testimony
Concerning
Presidential
Instructions
to Act More Vigorously__ __ _
d. The January 19, 1962 Special Group Meetinge. General
Lansdales
MONGOOSE
Planning
Tasks _____ -- __________ -_--__---_._____
f. Lansdales Rejection
of a Suggestion that a Propaganda Campaign,
Including
Rewards
for
Assassination,
Be Explored _.____ __________
g. The control System MONGOOSE
Operationsh. The Pattern of MONGOOSE
Action _________
~

Page

124

125
125
126
129

129
131
131
131

132

132
134
135
135
136
138
139
139
139
140
140
140
140
141
141
142
144
144
146

VII
III.

Assassination
Planning
and Plots-Continued
B. Cuba- Continued
3. At FVhat Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Authorized Outside of the Central Intelligence
Agency?-Con.
(b) The Question of Knowledge
and Authorization
Outside of
the Central
Intelligence
Agency During
the Kennedy
Administration-Continued
Underworld
Plot-MONGOOSE
(ii)
of Pigs
\--, Post-Bay
~~
Period-kontinued(3) Evidence
Bearing on Knowledge
of and Authorization for the Assassination
Plot, Phase II- __ _
a. Helms Testimony
Concerning
Authority_ ___
(1) Helms Perception
of Authority
__________
(2) Helms Testimony
Concerning
the Absence
of a Direct Order and Why He Did Not
Inform Administration
Officials-------..
($1 Helms
Perceution
of Robert
Kennedys
- ~~ Position on *Assassination ____ _ _ _ ___ _ :- (4) Helms Testimony
as to Why He Did Not
Obtain a Direct Order- _ - _ ___-- _______
(6) Helms
Perception
of the Relation
of
Special Group Controls to Assassination
Activity __________ -__-___- __________b. Harveys Testimony
Concernin
Authority--_
(1) Harveys Perception
of Aut 6.ority-------(2) Harvey
and the Special
Group
(Augmented)----------------------------c. Testimony
of Kennedy
Administration
Officials_-_-_-----------------------------(4) The August 10, 1962 Special Group (Augmented)
Meeting_---------------------------------a. The Contemporaneous
Documents_ _________
(1) Lansdales August 13, 1962 Memorandum-(%) Harveys August 14,1962 Memorandum---(3) The Minutes of the August lo,1962 Meeting(4) The August 10 Meeting-- _ __ _ _- _ _ ___ __ __
b. The Testimony_ __ _ _-_ _ __ ___ _ -_ ____ __-_- __
(I) Testimony
About the August 10 Meeting- _ _
(a) McCone- _____ -_- ______ - _________
(b) Harvey ____________ - _______ - _____
(c) Goodwin---- ______________________
(d) McNamara
________ -_-__-- _______
(8) Testimony
About Events After the August
10, 1962 Meeting ______ _ ________ ____
(a) McCone ______ - ______ - ___________
(5) Harvey_------------------------(c) Elder- _ __ _ __ ______ _-_ ____ __ _ -1-L __
(d) Lansdale __________________
--___-(3) Testimony
of Reporters
About Lansdales
Comments on the August 10 Meeting--(a) The Martin
Report ________ -_ _ _ _ -_
(5) The OLeary Re art-- _ _ - _ ________
(iii) The Question of Whether the A 8 /LASH
Plot (1963196.5) Was Known About or Authorized
by Administration
Officials Outside the CIA- _ - _ ___________
(1) Kennedy
Administrations
Policy Toward Cuba
in 1963_______-_____----------~-----------a. Organizational
Changes _______________ - _____
b. Discussion
of the Contingency
of Castros
Death____-________-_------------------c. The Standing
Groups
Discussion
of United
States Policy Toward Cuba-- _____________
d. The Special Groups Authorization
of a Sabotage Program
A ainst Cuba----__________
e. The Diplomatic
8 ffort to Explore an Accommodation
with Castro- ________ - ______ ____

Page

148
it:
150
150
151
152
153
153
153
154
161
161
161
162
162
163
:tt
:Gt
164
165
165
165
165
165
165
167
168
169
170
170
170
170
172
173
173

VIII
III.

Assassination
Planning
and Plots-Continued
B. Cuba-Continued
3. At What
Level Were the Castro
Plots Known
About or Authorized
Outside
of the Central
Intelligence
Agency?-Con.
(b) The Question
of Knowledge
and Authorization
Outside of
the Central
Intelligence
Agency
During
the Kennedy
Administration-Continued
(iii) , The Question
of Whether
the AM/LASH
Plot (19631965) -Was Known
About
or Authorized
by Administration
Officials
Outside the CIA-Continued
(2) Testimony
on the Question
of Authorization
for
the AM/LASH
Poison Pen Device _______._-__
a. The October
Meeting
with AM/LASH
and the
Use of Robert
Kennedys
Name
Without
Obtaining
His Approval_ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _
b. The Delivery
of the Poison Pen on November
22, 1963-_-_-----_-_-___---------------(3) The Question
of Authorization
in the Johnson
Administration_-_----------_______________
a. Summary
of the Assassination
Activity-__ ___
b. The Issue of Authorization
_______________.__
c. The Covert
Action
Program
Against
Cuba in
1964-1965_-_----_-__~----~----.-------d. The Special Group
Investigation
of Reported
Castro Assassination
Plots by Cuban Exilese. Helms
Report
to Rusk---------___________
f. Helms
Briefing
of President
Johnson
on the
1967 Inspector
Generals
Report _____ __ _ ___
Testimony
on Authorization
in the
(4) Helms
Johnson
Administration
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
C. Institutionalizing
Assassination:
The Executive
Action
Capability--_-------~--------~-------~---~---------------..--1. Introduction__-_____-----------------------------------2. The Question
of White
House
Initiation,
Authorization,
or
Knowledge
of the Executive
Action Project _______________
3. The Question
of Authorization
or Knowledge
of the Executive
Action Project by the DCI__- _________________________
4. The Question
of Whether
Project
ZR/RIFLE
Was Connected
to Any Actual Assassination
Plots- _ ____ _____ __ _______ __ _
(a) Conversation
Between
Bissell and Bundy-_ _____ .______
(b) Bissells Instruction
to Harvey
to Take Over Responsibility
for Underworld
Contact:
November
1961- __ __________
(c) Use of QJ/WIN
in Africa ______________________________
D. Trujillo_---_---_-----_---_-_-_---_-_-_-_-_-____________-_1. Summary_-----_---_-_____________________
2. Background___---------~-~----------~---------------~--3. Initial Contact
With Dissidents
and Request
for Arms- _ _ __ _ _
(a) Dissident
Contacts----~-----------------~----------~(b) The Request
for Sniper Rifles- _ _ __ -_-_- _- _-___ ________
4. Summer and Fall of 1960 _________________________________
(a) Diplomatic
Development-Withdrawal
of United
States
Personnel__--------------------------------------(b) Dearborn
Reports
Assassination
May Be Only Way To
Overthrow
Trujillo
Regime--__-_
__- _- __ ___ _. _ __ __ __ _
(c) Efforts
to Convince
Trujillo
to Abdicate_ ______________
(d) CIA Plans of October
1960---------------------~-~---(e) December
1960 Special Group Plan of Covert Actions- __
5. January
12, 1961 Special Group Approval
of Limited
Supplies
of Small Arms and Other Material--_ __ __ __ ___________
(a) Memorandum
Underlying
the Special Group Action-__ __
6. January
20, 1961-April
17, 1961 (the Kennedy
Administration
throughthe
Bayof
Pigs)___--_---_-___-------_________
(a) Specific Events
Indirectly
Linking
United
States to Dissidents Assassination
Plans- _ _ - _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _
(i) Assassination
Discussions
and Requests
for
Explosives ________ -------_----_________________

Page

174
174
175
176
176
176
177
177
178
179
179
181
181
182
187
187
188
188
189
191
191
191
192
192
193
194
194
195
196
196
196
196
197
197
198
198

IX
III.

Assassination
Planning
and Plots-Continued
D. Trujille-Continued
6. January
20, 1961-April
17, 1961 (the Kennedy Administration
through the Bay of Pigs-Continued
(a) Specific Events Indirectly
Linking
United
States to Dissidents Assassination
Plans-Continued
(ii) The Passage of Pistols_- _ _ _ _ _-_ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
(1) Pouching to the Dominican
Republic-_ __ _ _ _ __ _ _
(2) Reason for the CIA Instruction
Not To Tell Dearborn-------------------------------------(3) Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?-----(iii) Passing of the Carbines- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- _
(1) Request by the Station and by Dearborn and Approvalby
CIA______--__------------------(2) Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?---(3) Failure to Disclose to State Department
Officials
in Washington_ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _-_ _ _ _ _ _ _-_ _ __ _ _
(iv) Requests for and Pouching of the Machine Guns- - - _ _ _
(1) Requests for Machine
Guns- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
(2) Pouching of Machine
Guns Approved by Bissell- (b) Knowledge of Senior American Officials (Pre-Bay of Pi@) _ 7. April 17! 1961-May
31, 1961 (Bay of Pigs Through
Trupllo
Assassmation)--__------------------------------------(a) Decision Not to Pass the Machine
Guns and Unsuccessful
United States Attempt
to Stop Assassination
Effort.. __ (b) Further Consideration
of Passing, Machine
Guns- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
: (c) Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 18, 1961_ - _ _ (d) Final Requests by Dissidents for Machine
Guns-------(e) Dearborn
in Washington
for Consultation-Drafting
of
Contingency
Plans - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (f) Cable of May 29, 1961____ - ___________________-_______
8. May 30,..1961 and Immediately
Thereafter ____ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ -_ _ - (a) Trupllo
Assassinated--_____ --___- _____ - _____ - _______
(b) Cables to Washington- _ ___-__ ____ - _________________
(c) Immediate
Post-Assassination
Period- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _
E. Diem----------------------------------------------------1. Sumrnary__--------------------.------------------------2. The Abortive
Coup of August 1963- _ ______-_____ _____----3. The November
1963 Coup-- - ___ -__ ____ - -__ --________--___
F. Schneider_-----------------------------------------------1. Summa~__--------------------------------------------2. The Presidents
Initial
Instruction
and Background
__ _ _ ___ __
(a) September
15 White House Meeting---_ _ __ -_-_ ________
(b) Background:
Tracks I and II ___________________L______
(c) CIA Views of Difficulty
of Project _________________-__3. CIAs Implementation
of Track II _________________________
(a) Evolution
of CIA Strategy- ___________________________
(i) The Constitutional
Coup Approach- __- __________
(ii) Military
Solution- _ _____ __ __ _ _ __ ___-_ -_ __ __ __ __ __
(b) The Chile Task Force- _ _ _ _ __ __ __ _-___-___-_
_ _ _ __ -.- ___
(c) Use of the U.S. Military
Attache aml Interagency
Relatlons(d) Agents Who Posed as Third Country Nationals-________
(e Chief of Station ________________________
-_-_- _________
4. C 2 A Efforts to Promote
a Coup _________ -_-___-__-_______
(a) The Chilean Conspirators_ _ __ __-_ __ ___ __-___ __ __ __ __(b) Contacts Prior to October 15-------------------------(c) October 15 Decision ___________ - ________ - ______ - ______
(d) Coup Planning
and Attempts
After October15 _ _ _ _-___-_
(e) The Shooting of General Schneider.. -__ __ _ __ _ __ ___ ___ __ _
(f) Post October 22Events -_____ --- ______ -___-___- _______
5. CIA/White
House Communication
During TrackII---------(a) September ____ - _________________
- ______ -_--_-______
(b) October--------------------------------------------(c) December_-----------------------------------------(d) Did Track II End?--- _-_ ________ ___ _ - _ __ _-_ _ __ _____ __

Psge
199
199
199
z
200

200

201
2::
202
202
205
2;
208
208
209
212
213
213
213
214
217
217
217
220
225
225
f;;
22g
232
233
iiz
234
2
238
239
239
.22:
itg
245
!$
E3
253
253

X
PIWe

IV.

Findingsand
Conclusions--__-----------_____ - _____ -_-- _______
A. Findings Concerning
the Plots Themselves_ _ _ _______ -__ _ ____ 1. Officials of the United
States Government
Initiated
Plots to
Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba- - _ __ _ _ - _ _
2. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed as a Result of Assassination
Plots Initiated
by Officials of the United States----__ - _ - - _
3. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots Which
Resulted in the Deaths of Trujillo,
Diem, and Schneider---..
4. The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere
Perceived to be
of Crisis Proportions---------------____ -- ____. - ____.__
5. American
Officials
Had Exaggerated
Notions
About
Their
Ability
to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders ____________
6. CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld
Figures in
Assassination
Efforts_--____ -- ____ --_-___- _____ --- _____
B. Conclusions
Concerning
the Plots Themselves _____--__________1. The United States Should Not Engage in Assassination--__--(a) Distinction
Between Targeted Assassinations
Instigated
by
the United States and Support for Dissidents Seeking to
Overthrow
Local Governments
________-_____-________
(b) The Setting
In Which the Assassination
Plots Occurred
Explains,
But Does Not Justify Them- __ --___ _- ____ __
2. The United
States Should
Not Make
Use of Underworld
Figures for Their Criminal
Talents ____ ---___- _____ -_--___
C. Findings and Conclusions
Relating
to Authorization
and ControlThe Apparent
Lack of Accountability
in the Command
and
Control System Was Such That the Assassination
Plots Could
Have Been Undertaken
Without
Express Authorization__ _
Findings
Relating
to the Level at Which
the Plots Were
Authorized_------------------------------------------(4 D iern__--------------------------------------------(b) Schneider------------------------------------------(c) Trujillo____-_--------------------------------------(d) Lumumba-_-_--------------------------------------(e) Castro---_____ -- ____ -- _____________________________
CIA Officials Involved
in the Assassination
Operations
Perceived Assassination
to Have Been a Permissible
Course of
Action_----------------------------------------------The Failure in Communication
Between Agency Officials in
Charge of the Assassination Operations and their Superiors in
the Agency and in the Administration
was Due to: (a) The
Failure of Subordinates
to Disclose Their Plans and Operations to Their Superiors; and (b) The Failure of Superiors in
the Climate of Violence and Aggressive Covert Actions Sanctioned by the Administrations
to Rule Out Assassination as a
Tool of Foreign Policy; To Make Clear to Their Subordinates
That Assassination
Was Impermissible;
Or To Inquire Further After Receiving
Indications
That It Was Being Considered__--------------------------------------------(a) Agency Officials Failed on Several Occasions to Reveal the
Plots to Their Superiors,
Or To Do So With Sufficient
Detail and Clarity _____ _ - __ __ __ _- __ _ _ - _ __ __ _- __ __ _ _ _
(i) Castro _____ -- _________ - ____ -- ___________ - _______
(ii) Trujillo ____ -- _________________
- _________________
(iii) Schneider---______________ -- ________________
:-(b) Administration
Officials Failed to Rule Out Assassinatron
As a Tool of Foreign Policy, To Make Clear to Then
Subordinates
That Assassination
Was Impermissibleor
To Inquire
Further
After Receiving
Indications
That
Assassination
Was Being Considered ____ _ _- ___________
(i) Trujillo--_______ -- ______ -- ____ - ______________ _(ii) Schneider--_-_______---------------------------(iii) Lumumba ____________________
- _____ --_-__- ______
(iv) Castro _______________________
- _______ -- ____ -__-_

255
255
255
256
256
256
256
;z:
257
257
258
259
260
261
2:
262
262
263
263
264

267
267
267
270
272

273
273
273
273
274

XI
IT. Findings
and Conclusions-Continued
and
C. Findings
and
Conclusions
Relating
to
Authorization
Control-Continued
5. Practices
Current
at the Time in Which
the Assassination
Plots Occmred
Were Revealed
by the Record To Create the
Risk
of Confusion,
Rashness
and Irresponsibility
in the
Very Areas Where Clarity
and Sober Judgment
Were Most
Necessary___~-_____-_-~----..~~~~-~------~~~~--------(a) The Danger
Inherent
in Overextending
the Doctrine
of
Plausible
Denial ______ -_-- _.__.___ -_-- _____ -------(b) The Danger of Using Circumlocution
and Euphemism.
(c) The Danger of Generalized
Instructions__-------------.
(d) The Danger of Floating
Authorization-__------------.
(e) The Problems
Connected
With
Creating
New
Covert
Capabilities
________ -----__._ -.-_----__-_--______
V. Recommendations
___._________.___
-- _._______ ----__-.-------__
A. General Agreement
That the United States Must Not Engage in
Assassination
_____________
-_- _______ -_-_---_-_---__._._.
B. CIA Directives
Banning Assassination_____-..----------------C. The NeedforaStatute-------------.----------------------Epilogue___--____~._..~-~--.~~~..~----~-~-------------------------Statement
of Joinder . ..______.____________________
--- _.___ ---_--__
AppendixA---______._-----__-~------~--~-------~-~.---~---------AppendixB-_______________-___-_-----~---~---~--------------------Separate Views of Senator Philip A. Hart_--___-_-_------------------Additional
Views of Senat.or Robert
Morgan- - _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ - _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ Additional
Views of Senator Howard
H. Baker, Jr ________ -- ___________
Additional
Views of Senator Barry Goldwater
___.__________.__________
Supplemental
Views of Senator Charles McC. Mathias,
Jr ________ ______
Abbreviations
of Citations-__ __ - _____ ____ - _________ _ ___ ________ ----

Page

277
277
278
278
278
279
281
281
282
282
285
286
289
291
297
299
303
341
345
347

PROLOGUE
The events discussed in this Interim
Report must be viewed in the
context of United St,ates policy and actions designed to counter the
threat of spreading Communism.
Following
the end of World War II,
many nations in Eastern Europe and elsewhere fell under Communist
influence or control. The defeat of the Axis powers was accompanied
by rapid disintegration
of the Western colonial empires. The Second
World War had no sooner ended than a new struggle began. The
Communist threat., emanating from what came to be called the SinoSoviet bloc, led to a policy of containment
intended to prevent further encroachment
into the Free World.
United
States strategy
for conducting
the Cold War called for
the establishment
of interlocking
treaty arrangements
and military
bases throughout
the world. Concern over the expansion of an aggressive Communist
monolith
led the United States to fight two major
wars in Asia. In addition, it was considered necessary to wage a relentless cold war against Communist
expansion wherever
it appeared in
the back alleys of the world. This called for a full range of covert
activit.ies in response to the operations
of Communist
clandestine
services.
The fear of Communist
expansion was particularly
acute in the
United
States when Fidel Castro emerged as Cubas leader in the
late 1950s. His takeover was seen as the first significant. penetration
by the Communists
into the Western Hemisphere.
United
States
leaders, including
most Members of Congress, called for vigorous
action to stem the Communist
infection
in this hemisphere.
These
policies rested on widespread
popular
support and encouragement.
Throughout
this period, the United States felt impelled to respond
to threats which were? or seemed to be, skirmishes in a global Cold
War against Communism.
Castros Cuba raised the spectre of a Soviet
outpost at Americas
doorstep. Events in the Dominican
Republic
appeared to offer an additional
opportunity
for the Russians and
their a.llies. The Congo, freed from Belgian rule, occupied the strategic center of the african
continent, and the prospect of Communist
penetration
there was viewed as a threat to american
interests in
emerging African
nations. There was great concern that a Communist
takeover in Indochina
would have a domino effect throughout
Asia.
Even the election in 1970 of a Marxist president in Chile was seen
by some as a threat similar to that of Castros takeover in Cuba.
The Committee
regards the unfortunate
events dealt with in this
Interim
Report as an aberration? explainable
at least in part, but not
justified, by the pressures of the time. The Committee believes that it
is still in the national interest of the United States to help nations
achieve self-determination
and resist Communist
domination.
However, it is clear that this interest camlot justify resorting to the kind
of abuses covered in this report. Indeed, the Committee
has resolved
that steps must be taken to prevent those abuses from happening
again.
(XIII)