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FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES

MS No. P-148

MOUNTAIN WARFARE

iJ

LIBRARY -
1954 D Q - MrR

rE 2 8 1990
INST R.__

PO REGIS-

~ ~L~ 31 LI~l~e~ I I- I rl -- I

HISTORICAL DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY, EUROPE
 S # P-14

MOUNTAIN WARFARE

A Brjef Treatise Based on Operations of slt Mountain Division

in Caucasus, August - September 1942

By

Lieutenant Colonel a.D Hans Roschmann

WITH A FOREWORD BY GENERALMAJOR a.D. HEUMUTH REINHARDT

Topic Leaders Hellmuth Reinhardt,

Generalmajor, aD.
Translator P. Klamerth
Editor Captain E. K. Stewart
Reviewer Col W, S, Nye

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
Historical Division
 F011ORP

The following study by Lieutenant Colonel Hans Roschmann is a summary

of information contained in the reports of the 1st Mountain Division on
combat in the Caucasus Mountains during the period from 8 August - 11 Sep-
tember 194g2 These reports were compiled under the pressure of time and
during action, and have not been reviewed or revised by higher headquarters;
thus the source material is limited and incomplete. Roschmann has, however,
derived excellent lessons therefrom and has furnished a brief but valuable
handbook on combat in high mountainous terrain.

The author was directed to base his study only on that information
contained in the original reports. He has added a few footnotes giving
supplementary data.based on his own knowledge or experience as a'member of
the mountain forces. He has also supplemented the report with a descrip-
tion of the area, a narrative of the action, several illustrations and an
appendix showing the divisional organization used by the Germans in the
Caucasus.

The study is restricted to experiences in the truly high mountain

country, the west central Caucasus region. It omits the activities in the
Kolehian forest region near Tuapse on the coast of the Black Sea, where
parts of the ist Mountain Division also fought.

Hellmuth Reinhardt
Genera? aj or, a.D.

- ii -
 C ON TENTS

Pan

.OEIIORD. . *a a a 0 . * $ e " m 8 0 0 a 1 0i S 4oe 0 6

CHPTEal. TAEARE OF OPERAIONS . . . . a s 400 00

S O ..

Section, I._ ,Llmterri

II. Ci ae.' ea 0o4 a 0 a. o
In. Vegetation o a * . a *o 0$0 80 0

e 0 0a.0
0 &
V. Economy 0 .r o . . e. . * o 0 44
a o

CHAPTER 2. THE M4ILITARY ACTION SUIHfY a 440. o0.0 1 o0

3. PRINCIPLBE OF MOUNIN CO$T .' 44444444400, e

Section 1. Bibligraphy0.... . *56 0 6.~..

II. Principles for the ployrnt of ! oinr fros 6

Combat. ! 4 *
1b .:6: .a '. . a s6 .' 6
0 0 d 4r

CHAPTER 4:. MAiPS, COI4 NI TIO(S, A1MD SP EIAL EQ~TS 44 6 ..

Section I. Maps and Cmpasese o.aasa a 11

11
12
ICoIIAPTER5".,
SUPYi .a. *.. so 46 0' a i4 s" d6..

U4

Section I.. Supe rnilsa. .da. 000 14

IIo Evaluation of the, Variou Means o t fMpzt. 15
IIIK Supplies and Transportation R ese for a
Reinforced Regiaental Combat, Tez ,., m 16
IV0 Regulationt of Taffix' long Suppl Roue . 04 16

GRAPTER 6, PESNN L PROMES.o , o

Q *j d ai * . * 6 17

Section I. Selectio .nd Tdi ig. ,. 4, a' 5 *a .6.a 17

17
III'~ Clothing' and Personal Equimit> . aw a~. 18.
IV. Food, 0 s 0 * 0 0 * 4 a 'd O
5e 0 * 19'
V0 Health 6 0 a 6 0' * 0 O .- 0 . 4'
. *r *9 0
 C 0 N T E N T S--continued

CHAPTER 7o CONSTRUCTION WORK, . • 0 " a " ." "9" " " a a " * . 20

Section I. Roads and Bridges. 20

II. Emplacements . a . . . . * S 0 9 21
III. Shelters , , . * 9. 0000 . 21

CHAPTER 8. TRANSPORTATION . . . 0 . 0 . 4 0 0. . 0 • O 23

Section I, Motor Vehicles . .. .* . . .. . . 23

II Pack Animals . . . .. . . . . 24

CHAPTER 9. THE EEMN. o .a a . * 0 •0 0 0 0 0 0 0

• •0

PPENDIX As AVALANCHES. . . . . * 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Illustrations

Map 1o 1st Mountain Division in the Caucasus, 1942 . preceding

Plate 1. Mountain Infantrymen on the Elbrus Glacier with

Mt.Uschba in the Background .* . ** *

Chart 1, The 1st Mountain Division .*. .

0 *. . .)
2. The 98th and 99th Mountain Infantry
Regiments . . . oo . o . o. . . . .)
3. The 79th Mountain Artillery Regiment, . 0 0)
4. The Semi-motorized Engineer Battalion,
)
54th Mountain Antitank Battalion, and the
)
54th Semi=motorized Reconnaissance
Battalion o . . . . *.* * * * * * . .)
5. Service Units . .* o . . . .. . .
6&o The 2d High Mountain Infantry Battalion . . . .)
6B, The 54th Semi-motorized Mountain Signal
Battalion and the 54th Field Replacement
Battalion . .* * . * 0. . * * .)preceding

- iv -
 REFERENCE MAP lst MOUNTAIN DIVISION IN THE CAUCASUS, 1942

Cherkess

Temnolesskaya

LEGEND:
~Railroad
Hard surface rood
- -- - Dry weather or dirt rood
--- Track or trail
/%..Most forward positions
-Rutes of advance

SCALE
0 10 20 30 40 50
KILOMETERS
 CHAPTER i

THE AREA 0 OPERATIONS

I. TERRAIN

The Caucasus mountains, the natural bulwark between Europe and the
Near East,. are higher and more rugged than the European Alps, but, like
the European mountain chains, they have sharply defined granite ridgese
The main peaks include the Elbrus* (5633 meters) and the Kazbek (168
meters), whose extensive ramifications inclose deep, steep-walled
valleys and canyons, The secondary ranges, which parallel the line of
the main divide, usually do not form continuous chains, but rather
short ridges and groups of peaks, which are connected to the main ridge
by diverging spurs and which are often separated from one another by
valleys and canyons leading from the main ridge , The foothills of the
Caucasus extend north to the upper courses of the Kuban and Terek Rivers;
to the south the spurs descend more steeply to the plains of Georgia.

II o CLIMATE

There are two contrasting climatic zones, that of the warm Riviera-
like coast of the Black Sea and that of the much dryer south Russian
plaen, both of which have their own great extremesa Despite the basic
differences in the two types of climate, they have one thing in commons
there is more rain in the spring than during the summer, whose dry
months are normally followed by heavy precipitation in the fall, In
general, precipitation increases from west to east; the yearly average
of 2000 millimeters of rain on the Black Sea coast contrasts with the
190 millimeters at Baku on the Caspian Sea. Rainfall in the high
mountains is estimated at 4000 millimeters annually.

*Plate 1, Mountain Infantrymen on the Elbrus Glacier with Mt. Uschba

in the background, gives an approximate idea of the height and appearance
of this mountain mass.
3,1_
 As a rule, one can count on dry, pleasant weather in the central
Caucasus during the summer months. Long periods of bad weather are rare,
but completely clear skies are also not the rule, Changes in weather occur
rapidly, although the sudden storms rarely bring lasting periods of rain.
Thick, wet fogs, frequently descend in the large, glacier-filled valleys
during the afternoon and seem a genuine omen of bad weather, However they
usually are entirely dispelled, sometimes within an hour, though often not
until evening or during the night. Like the fog, tremendous eloud masses
appear out of the south at midday and cover the ridges and crests of the
mountains. (See Plate 1.) Even during the summer one can seldom count
on continuously beautiful weather.

Summer precipitation on the north side of the central Caucasus often

takes the form of snow, which then remains for long periods in the deeply
out valleys and ravines, Thus the high passes which are often negotiable
on foot in February cannot be traveled without skis in May and June. The
permanent snow line is approximately 3300 to 4000 meters above sea level.
The huge glaciers which extend far down into the valleys are an especially
striking physical feature,

In summer at midday the temperature at the high passes does not

exceed ten degrees centigrade; at night it may fall to minus fifteen
degrees, In winter a temperature of minus twenty-five degrees centigrade
can normally be expected, and during the heavy storms, minus fifty degrees
centigrade.

At altitudes above 3000 meters snow drifts four meters deep and a wind
velocity as high as twelve meters per second is frequent. There is drift-
ing snow on the crests and a great danger of avalanches on the steep
slopes0 On the warm south side a regular and abundant rainfall occurs
during the summer. During the rainstorms even the smallest mountain stream
may swell into a rushing torrent in a surprisingly short time.

III. TVEGETATION

Because of the heavier precipitation the tree and vegetation line

extends much higher than in the European Alps: the deciduous tree line is
near the 1600 meter contour, and the evergreen limit is at about 2200
meters altitude. The heavily wooded northern foothills present a marked
contrast to the Pontian and Caspian steppea, which are treeless and with
little vegetation., The woods and graszing lands often extend into the
glacier zone; one rarely finds a middle zone of barren, stony ground as
is usually the case in the Alps. There is a great deal of mixed forest.-
land of magnificent conifers and giant birches, alternating with the most
varied types of underbrush, especially boxwood and rhododendron, Wild
fruit trees thrive as high as 1500 meters and in the woods there are
many types of edible berries,
 Plate 1

Itt t t t ttl RUla_ tt Yt1 TII i't'R

Elbrusgletscher nit Uschba (4696 m) Xufn. [)r. Hiaanitrr

GE(; I R (SJAGER I KA I' KAS 'S

Mountain Infantrymen on the Elbrus Glacier with Mt. Uschba

in the background
IV, POPULATION

The manner of living as well as the external appearance of the

mountain peoples is as rough as the climate and as wild as the country-
side. During the period from 1919 through 1924, as in centuries past,
they fought with the greatest tenacity against the domination of Soviet
Russia, and were subjugated in the end only by the superiority of the
Red Army artillery.

The most important tribes are the Cherkessians and the Karachaians,
who like the Georgians and other south Caucasian tribes under the influ-
ence of Islam became bitter feoes of the Russians. The survivors of these
once proud mountain peoples, those left alive after the bloody battles
against the Bolsheviks and the subsequent mass deportations, are often
excellent marksmen and good mountain climbers. They earn a modest living
by agriculture and stock raising. Their domestic animals are horses,
donkeys, sheep, goats, and cattle. Their zone of habitation in the
Caucasus extends as high as 1000 meters, and the pasture lands continue
to the eternal line of snow, approximately 2000 meters. The available
grazing land is sufficient.
V. ECONCmY

In addition to the abundant forests of the foothills, the petroleum

deposits near Maykop, the coal mines near Kutaisi, and the silver and
lead mines near Alagir are especially worthy of mention, In the northern
foothills of the Caucasus are several spas which are famous for their hot
springs and their climate Among them are the ancient Pyatigorsk and
Teberda, recently well known. Opportunities for local billeting are very
rare, and the shelters are usually unsuited for troops because of their
filthiness With the exception of meat it is impossible to obtain food
supplies from local sources,

VI. ROADS

In the western part of the Caucasus, exclusive of the forest lands

around Tuapse* and the passes east of Mount Elbrus, certain roads and
passes over the mountains are worthy of mention. The military road to
Sukhumi over the Klukhor pass (2816 meters) can be negotiated by two-
wheeled vehicles after suitable repairs. The main passes, over which the
roads were unusually well laid out originally, include: Pseashkha (2010
meters), Adzapsch (2500 meters), Chmakharo (2592 meters), Marukhskiy

*The spelling of all place names and physiographie locations follow

Eastern Europe Series, 1:250,000, A ..N501. (Ed

-3-
(2769 meters), Nakhar (2867 meters, Chiper (3200 meters), and the
neighboring Azau pass (3450 meters )*

'Two famous military roads lying east of Mount Elbrus are not
included since they were outside the area of operations of the 1st Mountain
Division and in the area of a German armored unit, These are the Georgian
or Grussnian road leading from Ordzhonikidze to Tiflis over the Daryal
pass and the Ossetian road from Ordzhonikidze to Kutaisi over the Mamisson
pass,
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CHART 5
 CHART 6 A

HIGH MOUNTAIN INFANTRY BATTALION

2dHIGH MOUNTAIN INF BN

(CO: MAJOR D. R. BAUER)

CHART 6 B

54th SEMI-MOTORIZED MOUNTAIN SIGNAL BATTALION

54th FIELD REPLACEMENT BATTALION

IMOTORIZED LIGHT
RANSPORT COLUMN

I
 CHAPTER 2

THE MILITARY ACTION SUMMARY

The German Seventeenth Army had forced its way across the Don River
in July 1942. Its XLIX Mountain Corps, consisting of the ist and 4th
Mountain Divisions (Charts 1 - 6), in a move which was completely unexpected
by its officers and men, was ordered to the western part of the Caucasus
mountains by way of Maykop with instructions to break through to Sukhumi
on the Black Sea, On the west the XLIV Corps was to proceed by way of
Tuapse over the coast road along the Black Sea; on the left elements of
the First Panzer Army were to move forward by way of Ordzhonididze into
the Georgian plain.- The mission of the three columns was to capture by
a rapid., combined attack the oil fields of Baku and Batumi.

The original force for the mountain operation had included an

Italian mountain corps of three alpine divisions, whose pack animals and
mountain equipment could have at least partly compensated for the lack of
supply trains in the XLIX Mountain Corps. These troops, however, were
diverted to Stalingrad before they reached the Caucasus,

Because the operation was ordered unexpectedly, the preparatory

measures, such as reconnaissance and the securing of mountain equipment
and pack animals, could be carried out by the command elements in Germany
only to a limited extent. Valuable time was lost through postponements
because of differences of opinion as to the command of the operation and
the method of committing the troops.

The XLIX Mountain Corps made rapid progress across the northern
ridges, On 25 August, together with elements of the 4th Mountain Division,
it crossed the Adzapsch and $ancharo passes. On 28 August the troops
captured Achavchar pass (1600 meters), which lay twenty kilometers south
of the main divide and only one day's march from the coast.
 In the meantime, on 16 and 17 August, units of the Ist Mountain
Division captured the important Klukhor pass on the Sukhumi military
road and secured the Elbrus passes on the left flank. In doing so, a
combined patrol from the Ist and 4th Mountain Divisions surprised a
Russian strong point located at the 4200 meter level on Mount Elbrus.

The mountain troops performed excellently. However, the early,

difficulties at Stalingrad, the failure of the attack by the XLIV
Corps in the forests south of Maykop, and the lack of mountain supply
trains forced higher headquarters to halt the offensive in the western
Caucasus, especially after it was realized that supplying the troops
by air across the main ridge was not practicable. 'Following the
decision to withdraw, the XLIV Mountain Corps was transferred to the
wooded area of the Caucasus in order to revive the abandoned attack on
Tuapse.

-6-
 CHAPTER 3

PRINCIPLES OF MOUNTAIN COMBAT

I. BIBLIOGRAPHY

The manuals and pamphlets which were available to the German forces
prior to the attack in the Caucasus proved valuable.* The following
publications are mentioned particularly:

o1 "Leadership and Combat," Army Field Manual 300, 599-620o

2. "Required Training for Mountain Troops," inrain
Regulations for Mountain Troops. *
3, "Instructions for Infantry Mountain Warfare." Pamphlet.
4. "Introductory Principles in Training and -ombat Utilization
of Ski Troops." Pamphlets
5. Handbook of Winter Combat,
6. "Engineer Operations During Winter0 " Pamphlet.
7. "The Pack Animal: Pack Horses, Mountain Saddle Horses, and
Oz Teamsa" Army Manual 375.
8. "Care of Weapons, Equipment and Ammunition in Winter,"
Manual 158.

*These manuals did not entirely anticipate, however, the possibility

of such an extensive mountain operation. Too little significance was
given to the importance of supply operations in the mountains,,
*"The Handbook of Military Mountain Climbing" was not published
until 6 November 1943, and although prepared especially for alpine train-
ing and very well illustrated, it was not available to the troops0 It
was compiled, at the army mountain school at Fulpmes in the Tyrol and
based in part on the action in the Caucasus.
IIo PRINCIPLES FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF MOUNTAIN TROOPS

The basic principles for the employment of mountain troops as out-

lined in the publications indicated above proved to be correct ones. The
following principles are particularly applicable:

1. The premises on which the training of mountain troops were predi-

cated in peacetime are valid for combat. The equipment was adequateo

2. All movements proceed slowly in the mountains and require much

time.

3. Officers and especially combat arms officers entrusted with

independent missions must be able to make long range decisions and assume
responsibility; they must have extensive mountain experience and outstand-
ing physical ability.

4. The commitment of available troops, which because of the network

of roads usually extends over a much broader area in mountains than on
level terrain, requires that independently assigned combat groups be given
full control over all medium artillery and all special units such as the
engineers and supply trains which may be needed for independent, lengthy
combat missions

5. The correct disposition of troops must be accomplished at the

outset. Any later displacement to the right or left is .difficult because
of the mountain crests usually lying between the flanks0 Subsequent
changes in the supply system to correspond with any new deployment are
extremely time-consuming.

60 The attack on a specific objective can sometimes be carried out

with fewer forces than are needed for the defense of a single sector 0

7, The early utilization of motorized forces and air support can

save a great deal of blood and time and can assist in winning decisive
objectives ,

III. ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT LEARNED IN COMBAT

1. An efficient, sufficiently strong air force, once it has acquired

the necessary specialized experience, is able to harass enemy daytime move-
ments even in narrow mountain valleys

2, Factors such as the snow line, weather, and avalanches necess-

tate a distinction between the location of summer and winter emplacements.

3. Fairly large glaciers can be defended with comparatively few

troops by including crevasses and seracs (fragments of glaciers) inside
one's main battle position.
 4a Moving into a mountain position and establishing a fire plan by
adjustment firing of the medium artillery requires considerably more time
and ammunition -than 'on level terrain

5, Artillery Oerations

a The employment of mountain artillery both as single ple'es

and by platoons at the point of attack proved successful. dne artillery
piece with a greater than normal amount of ammunition is more effective
than several pieces each with the normal amount of ammunition. The old
principle, "preferably fewer weapons with more ammunition than many
weapons with little ammunition" should be adhered too

b. A greater use must be made of observation posts located on

the right and left of a position, since the nature of the terrain
frequently permits observation only from the flanks0 However, an ele-
vated observation post, if available, is to be preferred to one situated
on the flank,
c. The practice of using a forward artillery observer from a
medium artillery battalion with combat groups attacking in a narrow,
deep formation along a valley proved very successful. The observer, who
accompanies the forward element, must be able to direct the fire of the
battalion in case of sudden enemy resistance0 In a fast moving attack
with rapidly displacing batteries, it was found effective to furnish
the forward observer with three or more radio teams to assist him in
directing artillery fire. The teams operating in relays formed an
advance communications system which was not interrupted even by rapid,
forward movements over long distances and over terrain technically un-
suited to the establishment of telephone communication lines.

d, In both offensive and defensive operations on the broad

front which lay diagonally across a valley, the medium artillery units
under regimental control were used either independently in mass or in
battalions combined with mountain artillery batteries. It was found
advantageous to set up two telephone switchboards one behind the line
for communication with the firing positions and one forward for communi-
cation with battery observation posts, the battalion forward observer,
and the artillery commander of the mountain units.

e, Forward observers found the information contained in

"Introductory Principles for the Training of Tank Observers and for
Firing from Tank Observer Cars," Artillery Pamphlet 24 , of value, es-
pecially the section on designation of targets by thrust lines and by
previously established reference points using azimuths and ranges (polar
coordinates )

6, In the mountains a platoon, contrary to the usual practice on

level terrain, is the smallest tactical unit which can carry out

- 9
independent missions. It is usually best to use reconnaissance patrols
in platoon strength except for special missions which one or two rope
teams can accomplish,

7, In the foothills and the secondary mountain chains reconnais-

sance troops mounted on native mountain horses combined with mountain
troops were used effectively.

- 10 -
 CHAPTER 4

M4APS, CGIMUNICATIONS, AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

I. MAPS AND COMPASSES*

1°, The old 1s42,000 Russian map, which was the only one available for
issue to troops at the beginning,; was very inaccurate

2., The 1100,000 Russian ' map with German overprint was usable as an
orientation map except in high mountain terrain,
3,:The 150,000 Russian map with German overprint was especially good
for combat use in the high mountain areaso This map is most suitable for
normal use.

4. The most efficient altimeter, which was also suitable for use as
a barometer, was the one made by the Lufft Manufacturing Company.

'5, The ordinary prismatic compass used by the German Wehrmacht is not
suitable for use on difficult glacial terrain; the Bazard declinator is
the only one suited for use on glaciers,

II o C 4MUNICATIONS

1, For distances up to five kilometers, especially when visual

contact between units separated by deep valleys was possible, the Navy
flag system, which has long been used by German mountain forces, proved to
be the simplest means of communication*

The maps, 1l1,000,000 and 1:s2000,000, issued by the German Army

General Staff were very useful as general maps. The Army General Staff
publication, "Military Geography of the Caucasus," was a good reference
for orientation purposes, Unfortunately combat activities left no time
for checking the data and correcting it.

-11
 2. Telephones During the advance two trunk circuits were installed
behind the omaln combat groups by the division signal battalion. To
achieve such a feat presupposes a maximum degree of efficiency. In the
highest mountain ranges, as in those of medium height, telephone cables
must be raised as high as possible above the surface. It proved effective
to lay the telephone lines approximately fifty meters to one side of the
route of advance, in order to avoid disturbing the cables where the route
was widened by felling trees or blasting. The practice of laying a
parallel ground to extend the range of a single telephone station--one
was extended as far as two kilometers at Klukhor pass-greatly improved
audibility. In this way good audibility was obtained without the use of
amplifiers.
3. Radio Communications The sites for radio stations in the
mountains must be selected with special ca:re. High antennas are a pre-
requisite for good communication between two stations separated from one
another by a mountain ridge, so that the angle created by hypothetical
lines drawn between the tops of the two antennas and between the top of
an antenna and the top of the intervening ridge is as small as possible.
Mounting antennas on tree tops stripped of their foliage proved to be
especially successful, In order to secure good signal communications,
radio stations often had to be set up far away from the command post; or
intermediary stations had to be established. Atmospheric disturbances
frequently disrupted electric communications. Even during the summer,
heavy fogs and thunder storms can completely paralise radio communi-
cations in the mountains. In the high Elbrus region atmospheric dis-
turbances are particularly prevalent from 1500 hours until 0500 hours
da ly.
III, SPECIAL FACTORS

1. A trained military mountain guide must be assigned to each

platoon as an advisor, unless the platoon leader himself has the necessary
mountaineering experience.

2. Dangers in the Mountain.

a. Special attention must be given to the danger of avalanches

and their prevention (Appendix A),

b. If at all possible, separate routes should be selected for

ascents and descents.

c. Rope railings should be constructed at difficult points.

d. Ice bridges across glacial crevasses must be checked daily.

 3, Marking the Trail0

a. On dangerous glaciers and in rocky regions, routes of

advance and communications lines between positions must be marked by
cairns or poles, and when possible with red flags,

b. On particularly rough terrain, road signs should also

include compass readings to the various locations.

c. In glacier regions remote from the enemy, simple noise

devices, made of metal cartridge cases which are jangled by the almost
ever present wind, have proved effective.

4. Mountain Eouipment.

a. In high, snow-covered mountains skis are indispensable as

a means of travel.*
b, In a region where there is danger of avalanches, each unit
must be equipped with red avalanche ropeso

c, For normal movement over glaciers the four-pronged, light

crampons, the so-called Groedeln such as are used in the Austrian Alps,
are sufficient. Ten- or twelve-pronged crampons are necessary only for
passage over particularly difficult ice.
d, Snow goggles for each man are an absolute necessity for all
operations above 2000 meters.

A ccording to the most recent experiences, she skis (one and one-
half meters long) are best suited for military use in high mountain
country,

- 13 -
 CHAPTER 5

SUPPLY*

I. SUPPLY PRINCIPLES

Based on the availability of roads and paths and on the steepness of

the terrain, supplies were progressively forwarded by motor vehicles;
four-wheeled, horse-drawn vehicles; two-wheeled, horse-drawn vehicles;
pack animals; and finally porters .

Motorcycles equipped with caterpillar treads fulfilled a special

function by providing a means of transportation from the motor vehicles
to the pack animals and eliminating the necessity of horse-drawn vehicles.
The sleds proved their usefulness here as well as elsewhere in Russia,
as °an emergency measure in transporting supplies during the muddy seasons.

Of the varied means of transport, the division supply officer had

only motor vehicles and horse-drawn supply train vehicles at his disposal;
the pack animal and porter units still had to be organized. To bring
supplies from the depots, motorized trains had to be improvised from the

S The supply services and the combat troops succeeded in assuring

adequate supplies for a considerable length of time even at the highest
passes, in spite of the totally insufficient preparations for supply
operations. This should not obscure the fact that any success was achieved
only through the maximum effort of the German .troops, thoroughly trained
in peacetime and unswervingly determined in their fight against Bolshevism,
under the leadership of daring, high-calibered officers.
*The mountain troops did not have helicopters. In future operations
helicopters should be provided and used in fighting, carrying supplies, --
and evacuating the wounded. Note the experiences of the United Nations
troops in Korea with helicopters, and their most recent use by the Swiss
Himalaya Expedition.
units" vehicleso Supply dumps must be located at the extreme limit
which can be reached by motor vehicles, These bases must be stocked in
advance to offset periods of bad weather or supply shortages due to
other causes. The supply bases at the operational limit of motor
vehicles is stocked with four weeks supply, and the combat bases stocked
for two weeks.

Troops not assigned to the front lines must not be allowed to draw on
supplies intended for combat troops.

Entirely different principles than those valid for supply operations

on level terrain apply to operations in the high mountains away from the
larger roads and routes. The negotiability of terrain and weather
conditions, rather than the enemy's position are the determining factors
in supply operations. Long-range .planning and strict, uniform management
of supply services are required to a greater than usual degree.

Only energetic officers, with clear insight, a talent for organization,

the ability to improvise, and with an exact knowledge of supply items will
be able to meet the high requirements and find the right procedures in
difficult situations,

II, EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS M'EANS OF TRANSPORT

1i Motor vehicles. Attention is again called to the particular

importance of motorcycles equipped with caterpillar treads,

2
S Of the horse-drawn vehicles only the Ipanye't type vehicle and the
_Russian military vehicle equipped with brakes proved usable; neither the
vehicle of German manufacture, which is common here, nor-the German
military vehicle, which is much too heavy, could be employed, The two-
wheeled, rubber-tired military vehicle type 8 with a loading capacity up
to 150 kilograms was useful

3m ck animals. The assignment of pack animal trains to division

supply services:::proved to be absolutely necessarys eight pack animal
trains of 200 animals each for a division.

.4 Porters must be able to carry at least fifteen kilograms; their

capacity decreases very rapidly, however, at altitudes above 3000 meters,

5. The most important auxiliary means of transportation over steep

terrain was the cable railway

- 15 -
III. SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORTATION REQUIRED FOR A REINFORiED REGIMENTAL
CBAT TEo (Approximately 3,000 men and 1,000 horsesa)
1. Daily Supply Requirements.
at Foodstuffs for troops s four and one-half tons
b. Oats and other grains: three tons,
.e. Hay (fall through spring only)s three tonso
d. Ammunitions five tons
Totals fifteen and one-half tons.
2, Minimum Transportation Facilities Required.
Approximately 900 pack animals are needed, each carrying an
average load of fifty kilograms in a triple relay system. Porters must
transport supplies up to the front lines; there must be at least one
porter battalion for every four 150-man companies,
On the average the distances covered from army supply bases
were: by motor vehicle, 60 to 120 kilometers; by motorcycle equipped
with caterpillar treads, forty kilometers; by horse-drawn vehicles,
forty kilometers; by pack animals, up to seventy kilometers.
IVo REGULATION (F TRAFFIC ALONG SUPPLY ROUTE
The following organization proved effective in regulating traffic
along narrow mountain roads:
e1 A road commander with the necessary subordinates and road
repair detail to inspect the roads and to insure the rapid repair of
damaged sections.
2. Oneway traffic controlled by road signs, on short stretches of
road where there is poor visibility.
3. Road blocks on longer stretches of road with poor visibility,
to maintain one-way traffic. In using road blocks these arrangements
were practicables

ao The assignment of one officer and three assistants at the

beginning and end of the block.

b. The installation of a telephone line between the two end

points; and a maintenance man assigned,

c. The assignment of a traffic guard at each end of the road

block. The barriers must be closed during periods of light traffic and
should be lighted at night, The guards must warn drivers of any diffi-
culties, report immediately any road damage, and prevent unauthorized
persons from using the roads.

d. The officer in command of the road block must have authority

to enforce the traffic regulations on officers of higher rank.

_ 16
 CHAPTER 6

PEONNEL PRBLIc~

Io SELECTION AND TRAINING

Troops must be trained and prepared during peacetime for high
mountain warfare. Personnel for new activations and replacements must
be selected and trained in time. Troop commanders must be specially
trained, not only in technical mountain lore but also in the tactics
of mountain combat° Officers and enlisted men with previous experience.
in mountaineering must be trained as alpine technical advisors and
military mountain guides. All members of mountain units must possess a
high degree of physical stamina so that they can be fully utilized at
altitudes above 3000 meters after a short period of acclimatization.
All mountain troops must be trained to ski long distances with heavy
loads, Mechanized units must have personnel who are familiar with
loading and unloading pack animals with weapons and equipmento Other-
wise they must rely on the help of the native population in an emer-
gency; and the natives may be inclined to commit sabotage or otherwise
be unsatisfactory. It is impossible to wage mountain warfare without
sufficiently welltrained personnel to handle pack animals.

II. A MENT
Mechanized units committed in the high mountains must be provided
with appropriate equipment. Cooking kits, water barrels, packsaddles,
and pack reels must be furnished in sufficient quantities. Packsaddles,
carrying baskets, saddle blankets, check ropes, and similar items can be
improvised in small unit workshops, but these makeshifts cannot completely
take the place of standard equipment.

The machine gun type 42 proved satisfactory even in the high

mountains; no particular difficulties arose. It would be practical to

= 17
introduce, in place of the awkward ammunition boxes used with MG 42,
canvas bags holding about 150 rounds, which can be carried slung over the
shoulders°* Attempts to transport the dismantled 4,2-cm antitank gun and
the Russian 4o5-cm antitank gun across the passes were unsuccessfuls the
weight of the dismantled parts A~etoo great for the pack animals. It
was possible to transport the\,20=mm antiaircraft gun, advantageously
used in air defense even in the -pases, by distributing its parts into
eight pack animal loads. The medium 8=cm mortar was obviously inferior
to the Russian 12 cm one The 8=cm mortar was not effective in snow-
covered terrain and on glaciers. Only one report favorably mentioned the
light mountain infantry g~un."

In the mountains, even more than on level ground, vital importance

is attached to the well-aimed, single shot. For this reason all troops
expressed the desire that their weapons be equipped with telescopic
sights. Without such an aid the probability of a hit on the first round
is extremely small because of the frequently rather long range.

III. CLOTHING AND PERSONAL EQUIPMENT

The special clothing issued to mountain troops, which included a

reversible ,parka and field trousers, was excellent, although these two
items were available only in limited quantities. The mountain boots used
by the German Wehrmacht generally proved good. Occasional cases of frost-
bite could not be entirely avoided and were chiefly due to the manner in
which the soles of the boots were nailedo, Opinions differed greatly
on the manner in which the cuffs of the field trousers should be fastened
around the legs. One group found the wrapped leggings of the field
trousers unsatisfactory because they restricted freedom of movement and
suggested that the trousers be fastened below the knee with long woolen
stockings and canvas leggings0 Another group favored the clothing as it
had been issued****

. The so-called disintegrating steel belt was not developed until 1943.
eIt appears that these guns were seldom employed and their issue to
the mountain infantry battalions might be discontinued, providing the
mountain artillery regiments are appropriately equipped with type 36
mountain guns
"RMn the basis of recent experiences in mountain expeditions by
civilian sportsmen, the most suitable equipment for such purposes is the
felt-lined mountain boot with rubber=tread soles.
****The writer is of the opinion that the clothing worn by the Italian
mountain troops is more suitable, especially because of the numerous combi-
nations which are possible. This clothing consists of a hat with a high
brim turned up in back, which furnishes protection against sun and rain,
and a knitted, close-fitting cap to go with it; a turtleneck sweater; parka,
long, woolen stockings; woolen shirt; loose-fitting blouse; knee-length
trousers; canvas leggings; combination mountain and ski boots with rubber.
tread soles; and a rain cape of a loden-like material for protection
against both rain and snow.
S18
IVo FOOD
It is particularly important to choose high calory foodstuffs which
at the same time do not occupy much room, such as canned meats and
vegetables, bacon which has been prepared to keep for long periods of
time, dehydrated vegetables and potatoes, hard-baked bread or crackers.
Raw potatoes and legumes are not suitable because it takes too long to
cook them at high altitudes and requires too much fuel, which is diffi-
cult to supply. As supplementary rations chocolate, dried fruits, and
grape sugar are good. Concentrates for the animals, since hay and grain
occupies too much space in the supply columns, were used successfully.

All units requested that the large company field kitchens be re-
placed by smaller stoves. Gasoline stoves were found to be particularly
good, but the stoves using solid fuels, such as the Esbit type, did not
give sufficient heat at altitudes above 3000 metew.

Vo HEALTH

For operations at altitudes above 3000 meters it is especially im-

portant to select troops who have the proper physical stamina. It was
proved that any healthy mountain infantry soldier between the ages of
eighteen and thirty-five who has good health habits and who is properly
fed is capable of meeting the physical requirements imposed by mountain
operations above 3000 meters. Cases of frostbite were encouragingly
rare because of appropriate preventive measures such as adequate pro-
tective clothing, continual checking by the unit commanders, and frequent
changing of sentries. The lack of ambulance sleds to evacuate the wounded
was a great disadvantage,* A porter company must be placed at the dis-
posal of each medical company to transport the wounded to the nearest
motor vehicle point, unless evacuation can be accomplished by helicopter.
A trained and experienced physician must be permanently assigned to each
company committed in the high mountains.

After a prolonged drinking of snow water or melted ice, several cases

of diarrhea were noted. Snow or glacier water apparently lacked the
minerals normally contained in spring water.

*Rescue sleds with boat-type, metal runners, which were introduced by

Red Cross mountain rescue stations as a result of experiences gained in
Russia and Finland, are particularly well suited,
"Himalayan mountain experts, those who climbed Nanga Parbat for
instance, recommend that salt be added to snow water. However, no ill
effects were observed even when this practice was not followed. Apparent-
ly at high altitudes the men did drink too cold water.

-19 =
 CHAPTER 7

CONSTRUCTION WORK

I. ROADS AND BRIDGES

All-weather roads extended far into the mountains in most eases, The
gradients on these roads never exceeded the capacity of the motor vehicles.
By dint of continual repair the roads were kept in good condition. The
mountain paths used by cart and pack animals were also kept in repair by
small road details. Although most of these paths had been well laid out
originally, they did have to be improved for use in supply operations. New
construction of cart roads was not feasible because of a lack of construc-
tion workers and time. The pack animal paths were improved as far as the
passes by prisoner of war labor details, These trails entailed lengthy
detours in order to minimise the danger of rock slides and avalanches and
to have the least angle of incline. Since pack animals could move on
these trails even in snow one meter deep, there was no necessity for the
subsequent construction of separate roads for winter use.

Numerous small, wooden bridges across mountain streams and rivers were
constructed or repaired for the use of porters and pack animals. The types
of bridges which were already there proved to be completely satisfactory.
A mountain engineer company built a large, stone crib bridge in five days,
despite high water during the period of construction. At the bridge site
the river was thirty meters wide, two and one-half meters deep, and flowed
at a speed of five meters per second. The sinking of bridge piling and
even the floating of pontons were completely out of the question due to
the violent disturbance of the river. All bridge projects were carried on
at a decided disadvantage, since the construction equipment had been left
300 kilometers away from the Caucasus front, The bridge engineer trucks
had to be used for troop transportation.

G 20 -
 Special preventive maintenance measures must be taken to keep the
valley roads clear of snow in the winter,*

II EMPLACEENTS

No experience in the construction of planned military emplacements

was acquired, since neither time nor supplies were sufficient for building
them, At the passes and other front-line locations the usual installations
were erected, using stones, snow, and ice as building materials, and
traditional construction methods were followed0

There is no available information on laying mine fields on valley

roads, In the opinion of the commanding officer of the 54th Mountain
Engineer Battalion the use of mines in high mountain passes is feasible
only in the spring on the crusted snow and glacier ice and during the
summer, In the fall and winter the surfaces of the passes and ridges is
so continuously altered by the daily winds and snowstorms that mines would
be buried deeply under the snow and be useless.'

II1 SHELTE1S

Particular importance should be accorded the construction of shelters

in high mountain areas. If there are no.regularly constructed shelters
available, improvised shelters, making use of snow or ice caves, can be
used, These were successfully utilized in the Caucasus. Other than tempo-
rary shelters, sometimes set up with help of tent squares, stone huts were
used, which had double inner walls of wood filled with moss for insulation.
A strong wooden frame, reinforced on all sides to withstand thrust and
pressure, prevented the stone wall, which had been braced with iron bars,
from collapsing. To provide additional protection against high velocity
winds, enemy shell fire and bombs, another stone wall, one meter thick,
was erected around the hut approximately one meter awayre*** None of the

The Organisation Todt Winter Service Handbook proved especially

valuable during winter warfare in Russia, All the details of preparatory
measures, necessary equipment and the like are discussed.
**There are other, more favorable reports on the use of mines in the
far north during winter, even though drifting snow and weather conditions
in that area are similar in many respects to. those of the high hmountains
***One platoon suggested in its report that the huts not be built in
spots protected from the wind as they usually were, since shoveling one's
way out after a heavy snowfall required a great amount of unnecessary
effort. General experience, however, including that gained in constructing
shelters in the far north and on all high mountain expeditions, does not
support this suggestion. The main purpose of this shelter is to provide.
protection from the cold wind, and for this reason it must always be built
on the lee side of a natural barrier.

_ 21
logs used in building should be more than two and one-half meters in
length; otherwise it is impossible to transport them by pack animal.
For the construction of shelters at base installations located nearer
the valley, the block construction proved best,

Finnish plywood huts, which can be dismantled and transported by

pack animal, were especially good as temporary shelters. Reconnais-
sance patrols at high altitudes used the excellent Zardsky type double.
sleeping bag.

To have light in a shelter is vitally necessary, Candles and

petroleum lamps were found superior to electric lights, because it was
easier to supply petroleum than electric light bulbs° Candles and oil
lamps also provided warmth. Even in summer it is mandatory that each
man carry a woolen blanket as part of his equipment. Captured Russian
fur sleeping bags were highly prized by the troops in the Elbrus areao*

ai ght, down quilts, which take up extremely little space when rolled
and used by all high mountain expeditions, should always be available for
special operations. They are considerably warmer and take up less space
than the blankets ordinarily issued to troops of the German Wehrmacht.

- 22
 CHAPTER 8

TRANSPORTATION

Io MOTOR. VEHICLE

Several types of motor vehicles proved useful in the Caucasus. The

motorcycle equipped with caterpillar treads, manufactured by the NSU and
Opel firms, can with a trailer transport 700 kilograms. Its average
gasoline consumption is 100 kilometers per twenty-five liters, Its narrow
gauge and exceptional maneuverability, which even permits its use in
heavily wooded areas, is a particular advantage. The trailer, however, is
too narrow to accommodds unwieldy items. Only the last third of its tread
takes hold on steep slopes, and the machine can slip backwards too easily.
Since it also has a tendency to slip on side slopes the vehicle must as-
cend any steep hill in the direction of the incline. Rain-soaked hill-
sides and mud more than fifty centimeters deep limit the maneuverability
of the motorcycle.

Lightweight vehicles of the Volkswagen type were good on any terrain,

The two and one-half ton standard diesel truck was also good on any type of
ground. The 1.3 and 8 ton prime movers, the Steyr A 1500 type used as a
command ear, the three ton Mercedes L 3000 type, and the three ton Opel
Blitz were all used and were good on any terrain for which they were suited.
However, none of these vehicles were used on snow-covered terrain. The
motorcycles with caterpillar treads were used generally only on the valley
roads.

*The motorcycles with caterpillar treads also worked well in deep snow
in the far north. They can be driven along the sides of roads in snow as
deep as forty centimeters. In the winter a sled can be used in place of
the usual trailer.

- 23 -
 Technical defects were noticed particularly. Uncased brakes failed
and water penetrated the differential gear and crank case, as a result
of driving through fords, which was frequently unavoidable, and through
heavy rainstorms. Motor vehicles used in the mountains will have a
greater tire wear, a 75 percent higher gasoline consumption, and 100
percent higher oil consumption than normal.

11. PACK ANIMAIS

Experience in the Caucasus revealed that it is best, as elsewhere

in Russia, to use the native pack animals and vehicles on difficult ter-
rain during the rainy and muddy periods . Pack animals suffered less
strain when they carried loads than when they were used to pull carts
along poor, stony mountain paths.

The small, native mountain donkey proved to be particularly usefulo

It is capable of carrying loads weighing forty kilograms over long dis-
tances. It cannot be used after fairly heavy snowfalls, This animal is
not at all particular about his fodder and even eats the foliage of
oleander and rhododendron bushes, which are among the most common plants
in the Caucasus. A complicated packsaddle is not required; an old skin
and a few bags in place of the hampers are sufficient,

The mule, which has long been used by all troops, continued to give
excellent service. Mules can be used in snow as deep as one meter if
the paths are marked for them in advance; they move faster than donkeys,
Their average carrying capacity is from sixty to 100 kilograms, and some
especially strong mules can carry loads of 120 kilograms, Their com-
parative high requirement in fodder is a disadvantage. The Russian
horses of the "panye" type, especially the small, wiry strains, served
very well as pack horses; and they have a very low food requirement.

The practice of unloading the animals completely even for a fifteen

minute rest period paid good dividends. If the rest period was to be
more than one hour long, the animals should be unsaddled.

similar experiences were had by the author during action in .he far
north where reindeer and boat-type sled runners were used,

= 24 ®
 CHAPTER 9

THE ENEMY

The Russians were inferior in aggressiveness, mountain climbing, and

leadership, but showed themselves to be masters in the exploitation of
terrain, camouflage, and the rapid construction of hasty field fortifi-
cations, They were skilled in the use of tricks, For example, a Russian
combat patrol would hide for days in the debris created by an avalanche
in the hope of enticing a German platoon into ambush. The Russians did
not undertake daring operations in the rear of German troops, but instead
stubbornly continued to attack known German military positions, even
after having suffered heavy, bloody casualties. Antitank rifles were
very successfully employed by the Russians even at altitudes above 3,000
meters, to cause rock fragmentation and ricochets.

The Russians were inferior to the Germans in all aspects of equip-

ment and training. Some of their better items of equipment included maps
of the Elbrus region, warm clothing and fur sleeping bags, oil for the
Russian leather mountain boots, and the easily digestible and tasty hard-
baked bread.

The support given us by the mountain people, who were usually friend-'
ly to the Germans' especially the Karaschaians, was very good. These
people rendered yeomen service, particularly as mountain gides. Opinions
differ as to the suitability of using local inhabitants for the trans-
portation services. In general, they probably could, like all the natives,
give valuable help.

- 25 -
 APPENDIX A

AVALANCHES

I, PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES

1, Check weather and snow conditions before starting out. The finer
the snow flake the greater its specific gravity. The colder the temper-
ature of the snow the more powerful are the pressures which hold the snow
masses together, and correspondingly, the danger of- avalanches is less.
Examine maps for slopes especially threatened by avalanches. The inter-
national map symbol for avalanche areas may appear on the ski maps, but
one must not be lulled into inattention on slopes not marked by this
symbol on the maps.
2. Establish the proper intervals before starting.

3. Take safety and rescue equipment including avalanche ropes; ski

teams and.larger groups should be equipped with snow probes and shovels.
Fasten the avalanche rope around the body and not to the knapsack.

4, Select the proper trail to be followed. A U-shaped valley,

which has a fairly broad floor, is always safer than a narrow, V-shaped
one. In narrow valleys, as a general rule, -one should walk along the
base of the warmer slopes in cold winter weather and along the base of
the cooler, more shaded slopes in warm spring weather, Ridges, crests,
and spurs are always safer than the slopes, hollows, and ravines, Every
steep slope must be well probed. Detours, even long ones, are not to be
shunned. If slopes have to be crossed, follow the upper edge, perhaps
even directly under the rocks, rather than the lower one, Tracks left
by previous parties should not be followed without further investi-
gation if they lead into avalanche areas. If slopes must be crossed and
there is danger of avalanches, a caterpillar-like movement by the group
is best, especially if the route is downhill. In this method the first
man proceeds from one safe point to the next and waits there until the
others, coming singly, have caught up with him, before he proceeds to the
next safe point, In a fog the same trail should be used when returning
which was used when going. Generally the lee side is safer from ava-
lanches than the shaded, winward sideo One should be careful of abrupt
slopes, especially those at the base of ridges and snow drifts. One

1 Thisappendix, while apparently written for civilians, has obvious

application to mountain troops.

- 26 -
must watch for local snow fences. The trail selected for the descent
should not be too steep.

5. Maintain a safe interval of about thirty meters between persons

who are roped together; an even safer precaution is to have 150 to 200
meters between each member. Pack bindings should be loosened and hands
removed fromn wrist straps of the ski poles.

6. The nose and mouth should be covered with a cloth to prevent them
from becoming elogged with snow.

7. If for urgent reasons it should be necessary during either the

ascent or the descent to cross an area imminently threatened by an avalanche,
the area should be negotiated on foot without skis either at the fall line
or the edge, The same intervals between footsteps should be maintained and
transverse lines avoided. If each man walks exactly in his predecessor as
footprints, the snow is tamped down firmly and crenelated. Ice axes or
inverted ski poles should be rammed in deeply,

8. Hollows where avalanches threaten should be crossed with a safety

rope; otherwise the use of the safety rope is not advisable

9. Rest periods should be taken only at points which are definitely

known to be safe from avalanches,

10. Under conditions of poor visibility all members of the group should
remain together. If necessary, skis should be removed and the group
descend on foot, keeping close together along the fall line. If the descent
is nade on skis, a connecting rope is used to ensure that the party stays
together.

II. WHAT TO DO WHN CAUGHT IN AN AVALANCHE

When one is caught in front of a descending avalanche, it is possible

that a quick dash on skis to either side may avert being overtaken by the
slide. If this is not possible, then the ski bindings should be unfastened
and the skis removed immediately, and each individual should anchor himself
to any firm object obstructing the path of the avaianche, If this cannot
be done, the individual must try to remain on the surface of the avalanche
by making swimming motions with his arms and legs, The most important thing
is to keep ones head clear and work one's way to the edge of the avalanche
path. The arms should be raised out of the snow, If the snow is loose and
powdery, it is a good idea to bite firmly on any reachable bit of one's
clothing in order to prevent the penetration of snow into the respiratory
system.' As soon as the avalanche has stopped moving, a buried person
should try to get into a crouching position, and hold out his arms and hands
as a screen in front of his chest and face,. In this way he can exercise a
certain counter-pressure and avoid having his chest crushed by the weight

® 27
of the snow and make sure there is a breathing space in front of his
mouth. Often a person buried by an avalanche will remain conscious and
alive for a long period. It is very important to conquer the first
feeling of panic and remain calm. The most dangerous moment occurs when
the avalanche actually stops moving, for it is then that the masses of
snow are quickly compressed into a wall of ice which envelops the victim
like a sheet of armor. He should attempt to get at least one arm free
and out of the snow and work his way out, He should make no violent
movements and should not try to shout, for this merely uses up precious
breath. He should not call out until rescue parties are in his vicinity,
He,should stand perfectly still if a signal pipe is used by the rescue
party. If the victim is able to move his arms and hands, he should try
to enlarge his breathing space.

IIIo SEARCH AND RESCUE METHODS (according to Paulcke)

Basic Rules Remain calm, observe carefully, consider all possi-

bilities and then act quickly but not rashly. Steps to be followed in
rescue operations:

1. Watch for victim; keep an eye on the point at which his body
disappeared; observe carefully the direction of the flow of the snow mass
in order to determine the point to which the body may have been dragged.
Special attention should be paid to whether the line of flow may have been
shifted by some terrain feature below the point at which the body dis
appeared from sight, and whether the victim may have been caught by an
obstructing object or carried beyond it in such a way that he may be lying,
on the sheltered side of it.

2. Determine the manner in which the avalanche has come to rest. It

may come to a stop gradually on either a slope or on level ground, result-
ing in a wedge-shaped field. In this case the victim is usually buried
fairly near the surface. The avalanche may be dammed by some obstruction
in its path such as a hammock or a lateral moraine, resulting ordinarily
in a heavily compressed avalanche field. In this case rescue is difficult,
because of the closely packed snow,

3. Be on the lookout for secondary avalanches; if possible, station

watchers to warn of their approach.

4. With a ski pole or similar object mark the points at which the
victim disappeared from sight, his probable location in the avalanche
field, and parallel reference points on the side of the avalanche in case
of subsequent slides dislodge the field markers.

5. Search the avalanche field from the point of disappearance downm

wards for signs of ayr objects lost by the victim or of any projecting
portions of his body or equipment such as his avalanche rope.

. 28 0
 6, Listen carefully for shouts or sounds of knocking° Rescurers
must periodically observe a brief period of complete silence.

7. If the victim was accompanied by only one person and if all

efforts on the latter's part to locate the point at which the.victim is
buried have failed, help must be summoned immediately from the valley
or from the nearest mountain base. It is, of course, vitally im-
portant to mark the location exactly before going for help. If the
victim was a member of a group, one of the group should go for help
while the others begin the search.

8, A systematic search, beginning at the lowest point of the

avalanche field, must be made with snow probes or with inverted ski poles
with the leather loops removed. If probing is unsuccessful, excavation
should be started immediately. Search ditches should be cut deep enough
and close enough together to permit a thorough examination of that
portion of the avalanche field which has not yet been investigated with
snow probes. Thin, flexible metal tubes, which can be folded up or
taken apart when not in use such as the Lindemann, Bilgeri, and Paulcke
types, and Iselin type shovels can be used in this work. In an emer-
gency inverted ski poles and the skis themselves can be used for probing
and digging.

IV. RESCUE PARTIES

In committing a resuce party, the following principles must be taken

into considerations

1. In an avalanche accident only rapid help is of any use,. and this

presupposes the commitment of a fairly large rescue crew provided with
adequate rescue equipment. The first rescue crew must comprise at least
twenty men,

2. Before starting out, the rescue equipment carried by the .group'and

the personal equipment of each man must be checkeds avalanche ropes, extra
underclothing, outer clothing, ski equipment, food rations carried in
knapsacks.' It should be determined which participants are not insured,
and an accident insurance policy immediately taken out for them.

30 The rescue crew should be composed of strong, healthy individuals

on whom inclement weather has little effect. Otherwise they are liable to
collapse after a few hours of performing the difficult work of probing.

4o The chief of the group must be given clear, unequivocable

instructions. A reporting system of runners and signals must be worked
out .exactly before the group departs on its mission.

5o Immediately after the departure of the first party, arrangements

must be made for supplying it with additional rescue equipment, food, and
replacements. The man in charge of rescue operations is responsible for
thiseo

S29