Nick Balatsos

Prof. Callahan
Crim Law
Situation 1a
10/31/16

1. The first issue is whether Croft possessed the military-issued knife and can thus
be found guilty of violating the possession statute in the hypo. If so, he can be
found guilty of a Class B misdemeanor, which is punishable by up to a year in prison
and a fine of up to $1,000.
Generally, courts have ruled that possession is an act and that it requires actual
possession. However, constructive possession has also been found to be sufficient.
In Maldonado, the courts determined that the defendant had such possession of the
drugs even though they were in another room because he had the key and thus the
power to control the drugs. Courts have defined constructive possession as the
power and intention to exercise physical control, or dominion and control, over an
object not in ones action possession.
Here, the knife was found underneath his backpack and not far from where another
former soldier was sleeping. The prosecution might argue along similar lines of
Maldonado, asserting that the knife was closer to Croft than the other soldier, and
thus Croft had a greater degree of constructive possession. Further, the close
proximity to the backpack suggests that it may have fallen out of it. Yet the defense
might argue that it was a coincidence that the knife was there, that it was stashed
by the other veteran, or that Croft had no knowledge of its existence. The defenses
argument would show the requirements of possession as being the ability to
exercise actual, physical dominion and control over an item to be lacking.
Additionally, because the prosecution doesnt appear to have solid evidence, the
court will likely find that Croft did not possess the knife.

2. The second issue is whether Croft can be convicted of violating the vagrancy
statute.

For the conviction to stick, inter alia, the statute must be found to be constitutional.
One constitutional requirement is that a criminal statute cannot be too vague. A
statute is too vague and violates the due process clause when people of common
intelligence must necessarily guess to the statutes meaning and differ as to its
application.
The language of the vagrancy statute here includes the phrase without proper
purpose as a condition for someone to be convicted of vagrancy after being found
in a public place. Its clear from the facts, so long as the sign was accurate, that the
abandoned building was a public place, but its unclear whether Croft was present
on the property without proper purpose.
He might argue that he was, that he was there so that he didnt freeze to death, and
that if an otherwise unused space can serve that purpose, that the purpose ought to
be proper. The prosecution, on the other hand, might disagree, asserting that
there is no public purpose of an abandoned building or that the purpose is to keep
people out as a matter of safety.
However, in more ways than one, this case resembles Chicago v. Morales, where an
ordinance criminalized loitering and the definition of loitering was too vague. If
loitering can be found too vague, then so too must the phrase without proper
purpose. The statute is thus likely unconstitutional and a violation of the due
process clause.