40836581

Economic History Association
Ottoman State Finances in European Perspective, 1500-1914

Author(s): K. Kivan Karaman and evket Pamuk
Source: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 70, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2010), pp. 593-629
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40836581
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Ottoman
StateFinancesinEuropean
1500-1914
Perspective,
K. Kivan Karaman and evketPamuk
states
theformation
acrossEuropeof centralized
The earlymodernerawitnessed
thatcapturedincreasingsharesof resourcesas taxes. These statesnot only
challenges,
theywere
capacityto deal withdomesticandexternal
enjoyedgreater
also able to shieldtheireconomiesbetteragainstwars.This articleexaminesthe
Ottomanexperiencewithfiscalcentralization
usingrecently
compiledevidence
Ottoman
frombudgets.It shows thatdue to high sharesof intermediaries,
and eighteenth
revenueslaggedbehindthoseof otherstatesin the seventeenth
centuries.Ottomansrespondedto militarydefeats,however,and achieved
increasesincentral
revenuesduringthenineteenth
century.
significant
across Europe of
early modernera witnessedthe formation
centralizedstatesthatcapturedincreasingsharesof resourcesas
taxes.Those statesthatwere able to establishand implement
a more
efficient
and centralizedsystemof taxationnot only benefitedfrom
greatercapacityto deal withdomesticchallenges,theyalso enjoyed
successin theinternational
arena.Theywerealso able
greatermilitary
to shieldtheireconomiesbetterfromthe large fiscal shockscreated
and avoidingfiscally
by thewarsby bettermanagingtheirborrowing
motivatedcurrencydebasements. Not all states achieved fiscal
centralization,
however,and amongthosethatdid,itstimingand extent
varied significantly.
As a result,thereemerged,by the second half
of the eighteenth
betweenthe fiscal and
century,
glaringdifferences
of
states
that
were
able
to
collect
morerevenueand
military
capacities
thosethatcouldnot.x
The Journalof EconomicHistory,Vol. 70, No. 3 (September2010). The Economic

Association.All rightsreserved.ISSN 0022-0507.
History
K. KivanKaramanis AssistantProfessor,
of Economics,Bogazii University,
Department
Bebek,Istanbul34342,Turkey.E-mail:kivanc.karaman@boun.edu.tr.
evketPamukis Professor,
LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience,HoughtonStreet,
London
EuropeanInstitute,
WC2A 2AE, UnitedKingdom.E-mail:s.pamuk@lse.ac.uk.
We would like to thankCihan Artun,Doga Kerestecioglu,
and Yigit Yiicel forexcellent
researchassistance.Earlierversionsofthisstudywerepresented*
in seminarsand conferences
at
London
Bilkent,Bogazii, Carlos III, Chicago,Northwestern,
Institute,
EuropeanUniversity
School of Economics,and Utrechtand Warwickuniversities.
We are grate
ftilto theorganizers
ofthesemeetings
andtheaudiencesformanyusefulcomments
andcriticism.
Fortwocollectionsofcase studies,see Bonney,Rise oftheFiscal State;and Storrs,
Fiscalclassicon thesubjectis Tilly,FormationofNationalStates;also
State;a long-standing
Military
O'Brien and Hunt,"England";and Epstein,Freedomand Growth;fora recentarticlein this
Journal,see Dincecco,"FiscalCentralization."
593
594
KaramanandPamuk
andin
Thecentralization
ofrevenuecollectionas a fiscalphenomenon
has beeninvestigated
thebroadercontext
ofstateconsolidation
primarily
withevidencefromEuropeanstates.In thisarticle,we examinethesame
oftheOttoman
state,whichwas
processwithevidencefromthefinances
at once part of the Europeanstate systembut whichalso inherited
institutional
elementsfromthe Middle Easternand CentralAsian
we examinethetaxrevenueseriesoftheOttoman
traditions.
Specifically,
reviewthe
tonineteenth
forthesixteenth
central
administration
centuries,
fiscal
between
and
discuss
the
fiscalandmilitary
institutions,
relationship
institutional
changes,andeconomicdevelopment.
performance,
overtimeand in the
theOttomanfiscalperformance
To investigate
contextof othermajorEuropeanstates,we make use of annualcash
measuredin tonsof silverbasedon
revenueseriesofthecentraltreasury
untilWorldWar
the"ex-post"budgetsfromtheearlysixteenth
century
thatemergesfromtheseseriesis low and fluctuating
I.2 The keypattern
centralrevenueswithoutan upwardtrendin theearlymoderncenturies
followedby rapid gains in the nineteenth
century.Ottomancentral
to the
revenueswereonlymarginally
higherin the 1780sin comparison
than
fifteenfold
between
more
increased
1560s. In contrast,
by
they
estimatesof per capita
the 1780s and WorldWar I. We also construct
tax revenuesin gramsof silverand adjustforchangesin pricesand
achieved
incomes. The basic patternthat Ottomanadministration
when
robust
remains
in
nineteenth
the
fiscalgainsonly
century
enduring
measuresofcentralfiscalcapacityareused.
thesealternative
We also compareannual Ottomancentralrevenueswiththose of
monarchy,
England,France,theDutchRepublic,Spain,Venice,Austrian
for
these
series
Revenue
and
Russia.
Prussia,Poland,
politiespointto
fiscalcapacityearlierthantheOttomans,
datingback
gainsin centralized
and
Western
for
centuries
and
seventeenth
to sixteenth
Europe eighteenth
the
Eastern
and
for
Central
century,
eighteenth
By
Europe.
century
had
a
that
half
of
the
second
emerged
century, large gap
especially
betweenthe per capita and total revenuesof most Europeanstates
and thoseof the Ottomans.As mostof theserevenueswere spenton
thisgrowingfiscalgap was accompaniedby the deterioration
warfare,
the
of Ottomanmilitary
againstits Europeanneighbors,
performance
the
same
of
and Russia. On the otherside
Austrianmonarchy
coin,
one mightarguethatthe sharpfiscalgains of the nineteenth
century
tothesurvivaloftheOttoman
contributed
EmpireuntilWorldWarI.
Thereweremanyreasonsforthe low levels of revenuesand fiscal
of the Ottomansduringthe earlymodernera. Difficult
centralization
2 Forthesixteenth
see Genandzvar,OsmanliMaliyesi,2
theeighteenth
centuries,
through
FinancialStatistics.
see Gran,Ottoman
vols.;forthenineteenth
century,
Ottoman
StateFinancesinEuropeanPerspective 595
ratesmade
vast distancesto the capital,and low urbanization
terrain,
tax collectionmuchmoredifficult
in comparisonto the smallerand
more urbanized Western European polities. Another possible
in percapitataxesis thedifferences
and
forthedifferences
explanation
in
income
levels.
levels
of
income
Higher
percapita
changes percapita
madeiteasierto collectmoretaxes,notonlyin absoluteterms,butalso
as a percentageof per capita income.However,per capita income
differences
betweenthe Ottomansand Europeancountriesremained
limiteduntilthenineteenth
withtheexceptionsof Britainand
century,
the DutchRepublic.Secondly,mostEuropeancountrieswere able to
achievesignificant
increasesin percapitatax revenueswithlittleor no
increasein per capita incomeduringthe earlymodernera.3In other
words,percapitataxrevenuesincreasednotso muchbecausepercapita
incomes increased,but more importantly
because administrations
achievedthecapacityto extractand collectat thecentergreatershares
ofa polity'sincomeas taxes.
The growingextractive
in turn,
capacityof centraladministrations,
relatesto intrastate
and
the
between
administrations
politics
relationship
and otherstakeholdersin taxation.Early modernstates could not
based on writtenregulations,
employbureaucraciesthat functioned
evaluatedon meritand receivingfixedwages.4Instead,in assessing,
relied on a range of
collecting,and spendingtaxes, administrations
functionaries,
officials,corporations,
councils, assemblies,and tax
farmers.
These intermediaries
also tookpartin themilitary
apparatus
and wereoftenmajorwealthholdersin thepolity.Due to theirrole in
fiscal and militaryapparatus,the intermediaries
influencedthe size
and incidenceof thetax burdenand captureda significant
portionof
tax revenueat the cost of the centraltreasurythroughtemporary
assignments,long-termalienation,or embezzlement.5
Accordingly,
therewas a close relationship
betweenlevelsof centralrevenueand the
changesinthetermsofintermediation.6
3 The GDP
percapitaestimatesby Maddisonsuggestthatwiththeexceptionof Britainand
theNetherlands,
ratesof growthforWesternand CentralEuropeancountrieswas
long-term
below 0.4 percentper annumfortheperiod1500 to 1820,Maddison,Contoursof the World
Economy.Estimatespreparedand compiledbyVan Zandensuggestevenlowerratesof growth
forall exceptBritainandtheNetherlands,
see Van Zanden,"EarlyModernEconomicGrowth,"
ratesof growthapproached2 percentperannumin mostpartsof Europe
pp. 69-87; in contrast,
thenineteenth
during
century.
4 Kiserand
Kane,"RevolutionandStateStructure,"
pp. 183-223.
Bonney,"Revenues."
6 For a recent
of tax farmingand the relationsbetweentax
studycomparinginstitutions
farmers
and thecentraladministration
in theOttomanEmpireand ancien rgimeFrance,see
Balla andJohnson,
"Fiscal CrisisandInstitutional
Change."
596
Karamanand Pamuk
Thereis an extensivebodyofliterature
thatidentifies
theintroduction
of credibleconstraints
on executiveauthority
as the criticaljuncture
in domesticpoliticsand fiscalconsolidation.
This argument
holdsthat
representative
regimeswereable to applytaxesto broadersectionsof
theeconomyand collectmoretaxesbecause therepresentative
bodies
forlimitson the
helpednegotiateand sanctionfiscaldemandsin return
of
the
use
of
the
monarch
on
funds,especiallyduringperiodsof
power
fiscalcrises.It has also been arguedin thiscontextthatthepowerof
the so-calledabsolutiststateswas not absoluteat all. These regimes
retainedthe controlof expenditures,
but struggledto collect taxes
withoutsuch deals withlocal eliteswho controlledlargesegmentsof
access to
the economyand were able to limitthe administration's
funds.7
In contrast,
revolutionand fiscalmilitary
on military
the literature
andrelated
statesemphasizedtheroleofchangesin military
technology
in drivingfiscalandcoercivecentralization.8
innovations
organizational
and exactsequencingof theinnovations
Whiletherelativeimportance
in
has arguedthatimprovements
is a matterof dispute,thisliterature
in
as
as
well
firearms
and artillery
gains discipline,drill,
technologies
and tactical capacity of troops favoredcentralizationof military
and
forceand led to massive expansionof centrallyadministrated
of
unitsat theexpenseof decentralized
production
infantry
provisioned
in
Eastern
of military
forcewas delayed
cavalry.The monopolization
the
modern
until
because
era,
cavalrywas the only effective
Europe
attacksof horseridingarchersof theCentral
defenseagainstrecurring
of
Asian steppe.9The rise of centralarmiesand the centralization
administrated
because
financeswerecloselyconnected
troops
centrally
consumedthebulkof thetax revenuesand in turnprovedinstrumental
in eliminating
domesticfiscalandjudicialfragmentation.
untilWorldWarI, theOttomanEmpirestoodat the
For six centuries
fromtheBalkansandthe
ofintercontinental
crossroads
trade,stretching
Black Sea regionthrough
Anatolia,Syria,Mesopotamia,andtheGulfto
Africancoast. The economicinstitutions
the
North
most
of
and
Egypt
and policiesof thisagrarianempirewere shapedto a largedegreeby
Untilrecently,
of a centraladministration.
and interests
the priorities
had depictedan empirein decline afterthe
Ottomanhistoriography
7 Hoffmanand
Norberg,"Conclusion,"pp. 299-310; Hoffmanand Rosenthal,"Political

andmore
Van ZandenandPrak,"Towardsan EconomicInterpretation";
of
Warfare";
Economy
Dincecco,"FiscalCentralization."
recently,
Brewer,Sinewsof Power; O'Brien and Hunt,"England,1485-1815"; and morerecently,
State;also, see Glete,Warand theState;and Bean, "Warand theBirth
Storrs,Fiscal-Military
oftheNation-State."
Revolution.
Chase,Firearm;Gat,War;andParker,
Military
Ottoman
sixteenthcentury.In contrast,a growingbody of literaturehas
been arguingthatthe Ottomanstateand societyshowedconsiderable
abilityto reorganizeas a way of adaptingto changingcircumstances
in Eurasiain theearlymodernera,well beforethenineteenth-century
reformsknown as Tanzimator "reordering."10
While pragmatism,
and selectiveinstitutional
flexibility,
changeweretraitsthatenabledthe
Ottomansto retainpower untilthe modernera, limitations
of these
traitsneed to be equally emphasized.Institutionalchange did not
applyequallyto all areas of Ottomaneconomiclife.Not all typesof
institutions
wereaffected
to thesame degreeby thesechanges.Equally
and selectiveinstitutional
important,
pragmatism,
flexibility,
change
forreachingits
by the centralbureaucracywere oftennot sufficient
objectives,as we willdiscussbelow.
In Ottomanhistoriography,
statefinancesand intrastate
politicshave
been studiedprimarily
a
based
on
centralization
through periodization
and decentralization.
The sixteenth
is generally
century
regardedas the
when
the
of
the
central
administration
was
at itspeak. In
period
power
thisperiod,thefiscalapparatusdistinguished
betweenrevenuesources
allocatedto thecentraltreasury
forprovisioning
of thestandingarmy
andparticularly
theeliteinfantry
on
the
one hand,andthe
(janissaries),
sourcesallocatedtoprebendaitimarsystemfortheupkeepofprovincial
and eighteenth
the
cavalry,on theother.In theseventeenth
centuries,
demands
of
warfare
and particularly
theneed to provisionan
growing
number
of
units
induced
the
administration
to adopt
increasing
infantry
a seriesof ad hoc fiscalinnovations
to increasethecashrevenuesofthe
centraltreasury.
Thisperiodis characterized
as politicallydecentralized
becauseof theriseofurbannotablesin theprovincesthatservedas tax
intermediaries
and also formedtheirown armedretinues.The notables
mobilizedtroopsin supportof administration's
endeavors,but
military
thesetroopswere oftenineffective
in battle.Occasionally,theyalso
cameintoviolentconflict
withtheadministration
andrivalnotables.
Despite the centraladministration'sfrequentattemptsat fiscal
innovation,centralrevenuesremainedlow duringthe seventeenth
and eighteenthcenturiesnot because of low tax rates or inability
to collect taxes but because a large part,more thanhalf according
to mostobservers,of the grosstax receiptswere retainedby various
mostimportantly
theurbanelitesin theprovinces.With
intermediaries,
theirlocal networks
andmilitary
forces,theurbaneliteswereoftenable
to frustrate
theefforts
of thecentraladministration
to raise additional
For recentstudiesemphasizingthe pragmatism
and flexibility
of Ottomansas well as
selectiveinstitutional
change,see Agoston,"FlexibleEmpire";Barkey,Empireof Difference',
andPamuk,"Institutional
Change."
598
Karamanand Pamuk
revenue.Whentaxesandvariousformsofdomesticborrowing
werenot
sufficient
to meetthedemandsof war,thecentraladministration
made
use ofcurrency
debasements
to generate
additionalrevenues.
Growingfiscaland military
disparitiesagainstthe Europeanstates
to thewestand northplaced enormouspressureson theOttomanstate,
its finances,and the economyespeciallyduringthe second half of
the eighteenth
century.As militarydefeatsbegan to cast doubton
theabilityof the Ottomanstateto survive,the centraladministration
reform
supported
by someelitesembarkedon a majordriveof military
duringthe reignof Selim III (1789-1807). The movementgained
of
momentum
aftertheabolitionofthejanissariesin thesecondquarter
thenineteenth
centuryand theOttomanstatewas able to bringabout
and large increasesin revenuesuntil
fiscal
centralization
significant
WorldWarI.
In the Ottomancentralization,
formalrepresentative
institutions
played a limitedrole. An Ottomanparliamentwas not established
untilaftertheYoungTurkRevolutionof 1908,withtheexceptionof a
briefinterludein 1876/77.The timingof institutional
changesand
the revenueseriessuggest,instead,thatOttomanfiscalconsolidation
was achieved primarilythroughthe adoptionof modernmilitary
organizationand othernew
techniquesand modes of administrative
suchas railroads,whichhelpedreducethelargesharesof
technologies
inthetaxcollectionprocess.
theintermediaries
We begin below with an overviewof the evolutionof Ottoman
until 1780. We will thenanalyze the revenuesof
fiscal institutions
and comparethemwiththoseof other
Ottomancentraladministrations
in
modern
era.We will also discussOttoman
the
states
early
European
centralization
and examinetherisein Ottomancentralrevenuesduring
the nineteenth
centuryand brieflycomparethatwith trendsacross
ourconclusions.
Europebeforewe summarize
WARS,FISCALPRESSURES,AND THE EVOLUTIONOF OTTOMAN
FISCALINSTITUTIONS
for Ottoman
Throughthe earlymodernperiod,a key distinction
revenuesourceswere betweenthoseallocatedto the accountsof the
centraltreasury{Hazine-i Amire) and those allocated to provincial
functionaries
throughthe prebendaitimar system.11The revenue
were ordinaryand extraordinary
to
central
sources
monetary
treasury
Mukataaor taxfarming
a rangeofmechanisms.
taxescollectedthrough
1xA third
trusts(waqf) forthe
categorywas revenuesourcesallocatedto unincorporated
oflocal publicgoods;see Kuran,"ProvisionofPublicGoods."
provisioning
Ottoman
systemwas employedfor the collectionof monetarytaxes in the
urban areas includingcustomdues and commercialtaxes, income
frommonopoliessuchas mints,saltworks,
and mines,and agricultural
dues fromcertainregions.Avariz were extraordinary
war taxes on
householdscollectedin kindand increasingly
in cash by apportioning
thedemandsof thestateamongsttaxpayersat thelocal level.12Cizye
was a monetaryhead tax payable by non-Muslimsubjectsof the
administered
based
empire.Itwas directly
bythecentraladministration,
on surveysspecificallykept for the purpose,but the administration
also resortedto lumpsum bargainsat a discountwithlocal religious
leaders.These revenuesto thecentraltreasury
wereprimarily
spenton
administrative
and pay of thecentral
expensesand on theprovisioning
standing
army.
The revenuesourcesallocatedto the prebendaitimarsystemwere
primarilyrural and agriculturaldues.1 Since Ottomanlands and
thepeasantsowed
populationwereconsideredthesultan'spatrimony,14
land rent,taxes,labordues, and otherfees designatedin kindand in
cash.15Provincialfunctionaries
ofthestate,sipahis,collectedthesedues
and spentto equip and preparea designatednumberof cavalrymen
formilitary
tasks.This practiceof
campaignsand otheradministrative
linkingcavalrymento ruralsourcesof revenuewas not peculiarto
the Ottomansand had its precedentsin iqta systemof the Seljuks
andproniasystemoftheByzantines.
Itsusefulness
the
layin discarding
need to circulateresourcesthrough
thewholefiscalcomplexin an era
withlimitedmonetization
and the ease of replicationafterterritorial
In
addition
to
these
conquests.16
regulartaxes,theOttomangovernment
made use of extraordinary
taxes on householdscalled avariz, which
were levied irregularly
in times of war and collectedin kind and
in cash by apportioning
thedemandsof thestateamongst
increasingly
tax payersat the local level. The avariz,whichbecame increasingly
moreregularduringtheseventeenth
was quitesimilarto taille
century,
in
ancien
France.17
personelle
rgime
Since a large part of the tax revenueswere spent for military
purposes,Ottomanstatefinancescame underheavypressureduring
12
McGowan, Economic Life; Darling, Revenue-Raisingand Legitimacy;and Inalcik,
andFiscalTransformation."
"Military
and Continuity";
and Cosgel and Miceli,
Cosgel,"OttomanTax Registers"and "Efficiency
Costs."
"Risk,Transaction
14
Inalcik,Devlet-iAliyye.
The Ottomans
weresimilarto Sweden,Russia,andPrussiainthisrespectanddiffered
from
WesternEuropeanpolities,wherecrownlands had disappearedearlier.Bonney,"Revenues";
andTilly,Coercion,Capital,and EuropeanStates.
Inalcik,DevletiAliyye;andGat,War.
andInalcik,"Military
and FiscalTransformation."
Darling,Revenue-Raising;
600
Karamanand Pamuk
periodsof war. These periodsof fiscal duresswere oftenthe key

periodswhentheOttomans
changedor modifiedtheirfiscalinstitutions
or adopted entirelynew institutionsfor tax collection,domestic
borrowing,or new revenue.The historicalliteratureidentifiestwo
major periods for Ottomanstate financesduringthe early modern
thatbeganin
The firstwas thelongperiodof centralization
centuries.
end of the
and
lasted
until
the
the middleof the fifteenth
century
sharein totaltax
whenthe centraladministration's
sixteenth
century,
revenuestendedto increase.The secondperiodbeganaroundtheturn
of the seventeenth
centuryand lasteduntilthe end of the eighteenth
As
the
declined,various
century.
powerof the centraladministration
groups,especiallythe notablesin the provinces,began to controlan
increasingshare of the tax revenuesat the expense of the central
administration.
ofOttomanstatefinanceswas the
One keyperiodinthedevelopment
builtup an
reignofMehmedII (1444 and 1451-1481)whosuccessfully
of
and
the
state
manpower therural
upon goodwill
emerging
dependent
intoan expandingempirewitha largearmyand specialized
aristocracy
A numberof harshmeasureswereused duringthis
centralinstitutions.
process.In additionto highertaxes,statemonopolieswereestablished
in such basic commoditiesas salt, soap, and candle wax. Land and
in the handsof privateownersor pious foundations
otherproperties
As a result,thecentraladministration
wereconfiscated.
beganto control
a largershare of the resourcesand revenuesat the expense of the
fromtheterritorial
also benefited
conquestsof
provinces.The treasury
fromvassal
of onetimeor annualtributes
theperiodand theextraction
states.
and fiscally
The reignof MehmedII was also a periodof frequent
the
of
content
The
silver
motivatedcurrencydebasements.
ake had
changedverylittlefromthe1320suntilthe1440s.Duringthenextfour
was reducedbya totalof30 percent
decades,however,itssilvercontent
Theseharsh
undertaken
debasements
everytenyears.18
roughly
through
encountered
fiscalmeasuresand strongdoses of interventionism
strong
withthesepoliciesuntil
MehmedII continued
discontent.
Nonetheless,
the end of his reignthrougha combinationof increasedpower at
the centerand the success of his military
campaigns,whichprovided
Afterhis death,his
involved.
of
the
to
considerable
groups
gains many
withthosegroups
son, Bayezid II, was forcedto seek reconciliation
alienatedduringhis longand forceful
thathis father
reign.In addition,
debasements.
he ended the policy of periodic
Duringthe following
18
Pamuk,Monetary
History,
pp. 47-58.
Ottoman
statefinancesremainedstrongthanksto therevenuesobtained
century,
thereare examplesof
through
rapidterritorial
expansion.Nonetheless,
the
sixteenth
These
short-term
the
state
borrowing
by
during
century.
servicesusuallyearnedthe financiers,
mostlyJewsand Greeks,the
taxfarming
insidetrackforthemostlucrative
contracts.19
The Ottomancavalrybeganto lose theireffectiveness
in thesecond
in
halfof the sixteenth
the
wars
the
century
against
Habsburgs,who
withfirearms
to thebattlefield.
As
broughtlargenumbersof infantry
theOttomansrecognizedtheneed to maintainlargerpermanent
armies
at the expenseof the cavalryfromtheprovinces,pressuresincreased
forhigherrevenuesat thecenter.The timarsystemsoon began to be
abandonedin favorof tax farming
in whichindividuals
arrangements
assets
made
cash
possessingliquid capital
paymentsto the central
in return
administration
fortherightto farmthetaxesof a givenregion
orfiscalunitfora fixedperiod,typically
forone year.20
Further
deterioration
of statefinancesduringtheseventeenth
century
increasedthe dependenceof the centraladministration
on the tax
Durationof
farmingsystemforthe purposesof domesticborrowing.
thetax farming
contracts
was increasedto threeyearsor even longer.
The centraladministration
also began to demand an increasingly
fraction
of
the
auction
higher
price of the contractin advance.21
Methodsof collectionof theirregular
avariztaxesalso wentthrough
a
of
decentralization
the
The central
process
during seventeenth
century.
administration
turned
to
local
notables
with
firsthand
increasingly
of
local
conditions
and
local
influence
inboththeimposition
knowledge
andcollectionofthesetaxes.22
The centraladministration's
pragmatic
yetad hoc responsesto fiscal
demandsand emergencies
createdby thewars led to theformation
of
a new stratum
of local notables(ayari)withlocal knowledgeand ties
inthelaterdecadesoftheseventeenth
andduringtheeighteenth
century
These
families
rose
from
the
ranks of administrative
and
century.
and
local
merchants.
officials,
scholars,
military
judges,religious
They
livedin urbancenters,accumulatedlargesuppliesof cash, engagedin
tradeand creditoperationsin additionto tax farming,
buthad limited
in thereorganization
involvement
of and investment
in agriculture
and
the othereconomicactivitiestheytaxed.The centraladministration's
financialtransactionswith these local elites often went beyond
19
Inalcik,"StateFinances,"pp. 212-14.
andFiscalTransformation."
Darling,
p. 27; andInalcik,"Military
21These Revenue-Raising,
to solvemoralhazardproblems.
changesmayalso reflect
attempts
22For an
with the spread of firearms,see Inalcik,
argumentlinkingdecentralization
"SociopoliticalEffects."
602
Karamanand Pamuk
collectionof taxes and entailedprovisionsof emergencyfundsthat

in revenueneeds. In the eighteenth
allowedit to financefluctuations
the
central
administration
also delegatedto thelocal notables
century,
thedutyto maintain
publicorderand askedthemtojoin warswiththeir
retinues.23
The last decades of the seventeenth
centurywere an especially
difficult
for
state
finances.
Followingtheunsuccessful
siege of
period
Viennain 1683,theOttomanslosta good deal ofterritory
andretreated
an
wars
an
alliance
of European
extended
of
during
against
period
these
powers,the Habsburgs,Poles, and Russians.Not surprisingly,
in
fiscal
to
a
of
fiscal
led
reforms,
changes
pressures
period major
of new taxes and revenue-increasing
and the introduction
institutions,
measures.
One new institution
introducedas part of the fiscal reformsat
was themalikanesystemin which
theend of theseventeenth
century
basis in return
therevenuesourcebeganto be farmedouton a lifetime
fora largeinitialpaymentto be followedby specifiedflowsof annual
One rationaleoftenofferedforthis systemwas thatby
payments.24
the statehoped thattax farmersmight
terms
of contracts,
extending
the peasant
take bettercare of the tax source, most importantly
In fact,
in
increases
and
to
achieve
production.
long-term
producers, try
the malikaneallowed the stateto use tax revenuesas collateraland
basis.
borrowon a longer-term
of largeradvance
Withtheextensionof termsand the introduction
assumedan
the
malikane
contracts
of
financing
long-term
payments,
even greaterimportance.Behind the individualthatbid in the tax
farmingauctions,thereoftenexisted a partnershipincludingthe
non-Muslimfinanciersas well as the agents organizingthe tax
collectionprocess itselfoftenby dividingthe initialcontractinto
5
smallerpieces and findingsubcontractors.Over the course of the
century,some 1,000 to 2,000 Istanbul-basedindividuals,
eighteenth
based in theprovinces,
withsome5,000 to 10,000individuals
together
and
as well as innumerable
accountants,
financiers,
contractors,
agents,
revenues.
the
state's
shareof
managerscame to controlan important
able
to
were
in
the
elites
acquireand pass fromone
provinces
Many
malikaneshareson
and
medium-sized
to the next smallgeneration
23
and Decentralization,"
and "Centralization
Inalcik,"Militaryand Fiscal Transformation"
"FiscalCrisisandInstitutional
Balla andJohnson,
Change."Fora
pp. 27-52; andmorerecently,
on theayan and therelationsbetweentheOttomancenter
reviewof therecenthistoriography
andtheprovincialelites,see RizkKhoury,"OttomanCenterversusProvincialPowerHolders";
ProvincialForces,"pp. 157-85.
andAdanir,"Semi-Autonomous
24
Gene,"StudyoftheFeasibility,"
pp. 345-73.
25
Evolution,
pp. 65-85 and 126-131.
izaka,Comparative
Ottoman
or
villages as long as theyretainedfavorwith local administrators
individualsin the
theirIstanbulsponsors.For boththewell-connected
in
a
and
those
the
capitalcity
provinces,getting piece of government
tax revenuesbecame an activitymore lucrativethan investingin
trade,ormanufacturing.26
agriculture,
In the longerterm,however,the malikanesystemdid not fulfill
It actuallyled to a decline
theexpectations
ofthecentraladministration.
in staterevenuesbecause of theinabilityof thestateto regaincontrol
of its revenuesources afterthe death of the individualswho had
with
The centraladministration
beganto experiment
purchasedthem.27
othermethodsfor tax collectionand domesticborrowingas state
finances came under furtherpressure from the 1770s onwards.
Afterthe end of the war of 1768-1774, which had dramatically
exposed the militaryas well as fiscal weaknessesof the Ottoman
introduceda new and relatedinstrument
of
system,the government
domesticborrowing
called esham.In thissystem,theannual
long-term
net revenuesfromtax sourcewere specifiedin nominalterms.This
amountwas dividedintoa largenumberof shareswhichweresold to
thepublic forthe lifetimeof the buyers.The annualrevenuesof the
sourcecontinuedto be collectedby the tax farmers. As the linkage
betweentheannualgovernment
and theunderlying
revenues
payments
of the tax sourceweakened,the esham increasingly
resembleda life
termannuity
at thetime.29
quitepopularinmanyEuropeancountries
EVIDENCEFROMTHE OTTOMANBUDGETS,1523-1788
The previoussectionemphasizedthe importance
of wars and the
fiscal pressurestheygenerated,the willingnessof the Ottomansto
with and embracechangesin theirfiscal institutions
in
experiment
response,and thegreaterroleplayedin tax collectionby risinggroups
of intermediaries
afterthe sixteenthcentury.In this sectionand the
next,we willtryto assess theoutcomeoftheseefforts
by analyzingthe
26
Salzman, "Ancien Rgime Revisited," pp. 393-423; zvar, Osmanli Maliyesinde
Malikane; also see Sadat, "Rumeli Ayanlari," pp. 346-63; and ahin, "Economic
Power,"pp. 29-48.
Z/Gen,"Study."
Cezar,OsmanliMaliyesinde
Bunalim,pp. 81-83; also see Gene,"Esham,"pp. 376-80.
29The Ottoman
Empireremainedoutsidethe Europeancapitalmarketsnetworkuntilthe
second halfof the nineteenth
century.In partbecause of this,interestratesin the Ottoman
Empireremainedsignificantly
higher.Calculationsbased on some of the esham auctions
interest
ratesat whichthestatecould
suggestthat,untilthemiddleof thenineteenth
century,
borrowremainedin the 12 to 15 percentrangeand roseto the 15 to 20 percentrangeand even
see Pamuk,Monetary
higherduringperiodsof distresssuch as wars or monetary
instability;
History,
pp.191-92.
604
KaramanandPamuk
600 -i
500 -
Otramanll
Ottomani
400 -
300 -
200-
100-
0 H
1500
'
'
1550
1600
1650
1700
1750
1800
Figuri-:1
REVENUES OF THE OTTOMAN CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION
(in tonsofsilver)
Notes:Fordetails,see thetext.
1Oarticledatabase.
Sources:See http://www.ata.boun.edu.tr/sevketpamuk/JEH20
trendsin therevenuesof theOttomancentraladministration

long-term
on
the
evidenceprovidedby the Ottomanbudgetsthemselves.
based
The Ottomancentraladministration
many"ex-postbudgets"in
prepared
itemizedand recordedthecash
theearlymodernera. These documents
A recent
receiptsof the centraltreasuryas well as its expenditures.
than
such
documents
all
of
the
more
has
forty
together
project brought
thathave been locatedto date in theOttomanarchivesfortheperiod
1523tol788.30
Ottomanbudgetspresentcentralrevenues and expendituresin
and intercountry
currentakes. In orderto facilitateintertemporal
to tonsor grams
we convertedall monetary
magnitudes
comparisons,
the revenuesin currentakes by its silver
of silverby multiplying
In Figures1, 2, and 3, we presenttwo revenueseries.The
content.31
firstseriesnamedOttomanI refersto thecash receiptsof the central
30
Genandzvar,OsmanliMaliyesi.
The silvercontentof the ake in different
yearsare takenfromthe tables in Pamuk,
Monetary
History.
Ottoman
40 -,
OttomanII
H Ottoraan
30 -
20 "
0 -j
1500
'
'
1550
1600
1650
1700
1750
1S0O
Kicii'Ri-: 2
REVENUES PER CAPITA OF THE OTTOMAN CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION

(in gramsofsilver)
1Oarticledatabase.
Sources: See http://www.ata.boun.edu.tr/sevketpamuk/JEH20
in Istanbul,or the centraltreasury.

The second series
administration
thereceipts
namedOttomanII includes,in additionto thecashreceipts,
the timarsystemin the formof
of the centraladministration
through
in the military
cavalrymenand otherauxiliarytroop contributions
forceswere
partof Ottomanmilitary
campaigns.Because a significant
until
the
nineteenth
suppliedby the provinces
century,OttomanII
series providesa more realistic,yet imprecisemeasureof Ottoman
military
capability.It has been estimatedthatthe cash equivalentof
thetax revenuescollectedby thecavalrymen
exceededby farthecash
of
the
central
the
sixteenth
Afterthe
receipts
treasury
during
century.32
timarsystembegan to be replacedby the centraladministration
in
in
theseventeenth
a
favor
of
central
century
larger
armypermanently
stationedin thecapitaland otherurbanareas,its contribution
beganto
decline.Forthislaterperiod,we includedin theOttomanII seriessome
allowanceforthesoldierstheprovincialnotablesprovidedto thearmy.
We estimatetheshareoftheseand otherindirect
contributions
declined
32
Barkan,"BirBtceOmegi,"pp. 25 1-329.
606
KaramanandPamuk
10 -,
5 -
6-
1500
OrtorcQD
OtODaaaI
4_
0 "I
: :"
.
!
1550
1600
*
1
16^0
1700
1750
1800
TAX REVENUES PER CAPITA/DAILYWAGE OF UNSKILLED WORKERS

1Oarticledatabase.
to less than30 percentoftotalrevenuesofthecentraladministration

by
the end of the eighteenth
We will not use Series II in
century.33
comparisonswith Europeancountries,but presentit nonethelessto
show thatour resultsdo not changemuchby the inclusionof these
indirect
revenues.
In Figure 2, we presentthe per capita tax revenues of the
Ottomancentraladministration
obtainedby dividingthetotalrevenues
in tons of silverby the populationof the empire.For the purposes
of thisexercise,we have decidedto exclude all the autonomousor
semiautonomous
territories
such as Crimea,Hungary,Wallachia,and
Moldavia (present-day
Romania),the Maghreb,thatis, presentday
and
Libya,Tunis,
Algeria,and thoseregionsof theArabianPeninsula
For the
at least nominallycontrolledby the Ottomangovernment.
did notsendanytax revenuesto thecentral
mostpart,theseterritories
Balkans, present-day
treasury.This leaves us with the present-day
and
and
Egypt.Since total
Iraq
present-day
Turkey,greaterSyria,
19 and 22
between
latter
areas
fluctuated
of
these
narrowly
population
33
Ibid.;andGene,"OsmanliMaliyesindeMukataa,"pp. 57-64.
Ottoman
millionfrom1550 to 1800,long-term
trendsin per capitarevenuesof
are verysimilarto thosepresentedin tonsof
thecentraladministration
silver.34
Figures1 and 2 indicatethatthecash receiptsoftheOttomancentral
administration,
expressedinbothtonsofsilverandalso percapitaterms
or not,increaseduntilthethird
andwhether
adjustedforsilverinflation
In
of
the
sixteenth
century.35 manyrespects,the latterperiod
quarter
in the
thepeak of Ottomanfiscalpowerand centralization
represents
of
the
central
administration
modern
era.
The
revenues
tended
early
to decline fromthe fourthquarterof the sixteenthcenturyuntilthe
end of theseventeenth
to collecta higher
century
despitetheattempts
shareof its tax revenuesin cash and directlyat thecenter,as a large
In
partof therevenuesbeganto be retainedby variousintermediaries.
to
both
the
fiscal
and
the
defeats,
response
growing
pressures military
Ottomangovernment
undertook
at theend of the
majorfiscalreforms
seventeenth
centuryand these effortssucceeded in raisingrevenues
Revenues
significantly
duringthe firsthalfof the eighteenth
century.
declinedonce again duringthe second
halfof the eighteenth
untilthe 1780s forwhichwe
century,
certainly
have evidencefromthe budgetdocuments.Perhapsmore important
thanthesemedium-term
trends,however,was the absence of a longtermupwardtrendin bothpercapitaandtotalrevenuesduringtheearly
moderncenturies
as a whole.Figures1 and2 makeclearthatpercapita
and totalOttomanrevenuesduringtheeighteenth
werenotany
century
As we will emphasizein the
higherthanthosein thesixteenth
century.
nextsection,while Ottomanper capita and totalrevenuesmay have
been comparableto thosein otherpartsof Europeduringthesixteenth
boththeper capitaand totalrevenuesof theOttomancentral
century,
administration
appeared low in comparisonto many othersacross
the
halfoftheeighteenth
second
Europeby
century.
34The Ottomancensusesof thesixteenth
aboutthenumbersof
century
provideinformation
male taxpayers.
The conversionof thesefiguresintoestimatesof totalpopulationposes many
difficulties
as householdsize varied greatlybetweenregions,urbanand ruralhouseholds,
and overtime.For thisreason,we chose to makeuse of largesurveysof Europeanand world
populationsuchas McEvedyand Jones,Atlas;Malanima,Premodern,
pp. 3-16; and Palairet,
BalkanEconomies.Thesesourcesarenotwithout
theirproblems,
buttheyprovideus withmore
realisticandworkableestimates
ofthetotalOttomanpopulationand itsevolutionovertime.On
thebasis ofthese,we estimatetheOttomanpopulationwithintheborderscitedin themaintext
at 19 millionin 1550,21.3 millionin 1600,20.2 millionin 1650,20.4 millionin 1700, 19.8
millionin 1750,and21.5 millionin 1800.We interpolated
forthepopulationestimates
between
thesebenchmark
years,takingintoaccounttheborderchangesespeciallyintheBalkans.
A largepartof thelargefluctuations
therevenuesof thecentraladministration
duringthe
sixteenth
in Figures1 and2 aredue to changesin definitions.
more
century
apparent
Specifically,
revenueitemswereincludedunderthebudgetdocument
of 1527/28,whichmaybe overstating
theactualrevenues.
608
Karamanand Pamuk
Anotherindicatorthatwould enableus to gain further

insightsinto
therevenuecollectioncapacityof thecentralgovernment
wouldhave
been to compareper capitarevenueswithsome indicatorof incomes,
our estimatesof per capita
preferably
averageincomes.Unfortunately,
incomesor per capita GDP in the early modernera are available
onlyfora fewbenchmark
yearsand eventhoseare subjectto somenot
of
error.
These admittedly
crudeestimatessuggest
insignificant
margin
thatin thecoreareasof theempire,directcash receiptsof theOttoman
thatis, theseriesOttomanI in Figures1 and 2, probably
government,
remainedbelow 4 percentof GDP duringthe earlymodernera. We
similarlyestimatethat total revenuesof the centraladministration
values of cavalryholders'service,thatis the
includingthemonetary
below6 percent
seriesOttomanII in Figures1 and2 probablyremained
theseratioswere
of GDP duringthethesecenturies.
Equallyimportant,
in
to the
lowerin thesecondhalfof theeighteenth
century comparison
secondhalfofthesixteenth
century.36
In contrastto estimatesof GDP, data for the daily wages of
workersin the urbancenters,especiallyin the leading
construction
urbancenters,are muchmoreabundantand muchmorereliableboth
For thisreason,
fortheOttomanEmpireand otherEuropeancountries.
we chose to followthe recentlead of othereconomichistoriansof
theearlymodernera and calculatedtheannualper capitatax revenues
as a multipleof the daily wages of
unskilledconstructionworkersin the capital city. Daily wages in
Istanbulwere quite comparableto thosein otherurbancenterssuch
and othersuntilthe
as Edirne,Bursa,Belgrade,Salonika,Jerusalem,
The seriespresentedin Figure3 indicatethatthe
nineteenth
century.37
basic trendin thetax revenuesof the Ottomancentraladministration
Equally importantly,
duringtheearlymodernera was also horizontal.
that
the
Ottoman
show
capacityto
government's
very clearly
they
low. Annualper capitacash revenues
collecttaxesremainedstrikingly
did not exceed threedays of wages of
in Istanbuland remainedbelow
worker
an unskilledconstruction
two days of wages formost of thisperiod.Even when we include
of timarandothersoldiersin
revenuessuchas thecontributions
indirect
campaigns,per capita revenuesof the centraladministration
military
exceeded
fourdaysofwagesin anygivenyear.
rarely
36Based on
GDP perCapita."
Pamuk,"Estimating
Pamuk,500 YearsofPricesand Wages;andOzmucurandPamuk,"Real Wages,"pp. 292the use of urbanwages as a measureof standardsof livingin the Ottoman
321; regarding
in zmucurandPamuk,"Real Wages,"pp. 313-16.
the
discussion
see
context,
Ottoman
It is noteasyto estimate
thetotaltaxburdenandthesharesofvarious
in theOttomanfiscalsystem.The basic difficulty
is that
intermediaries
the comprehensive
recordsfortheprovincesare not available,and it
is notclearwhetherall exactionswererecordedin a standardfashion
in thefirstplace. The fewavailableestimatesand accountsof taxation
in individualregionssuggestthatthe tax burdenincreasedafterthe
sixteenth
buttheamountretained
century,
bytherisingprovincialelites
also rose, resultingin the observedpatternof stagnantrevenuesfor
the center.It has been estimatedthatthe share of Ottomancentral
treasury'srevenuein the totalburdenon taxpayersdeclinedfrom46
percentin 1527/28to 25 percentin 1661/62. The declinein central
treasury'sshare mighthave been more dramaticthan these figures
also witnessedan increasein
suggest,because theseventeenth
century
exactionsby provincialnotables.Estimates
illegaland thusunrecorded
Mehmet
for
the
Gen
by
eighteenth
century
suggestthatapproximately
two-thirds
ofthenettaxrevenues,
thatis, ofgrosstaxcollectionsminus
andhigh-level
bureaucrats
financiers,
expenses,wentto thetaxfarmers,
who dividedup thelargetax farmsamongstthemselvesin thecapital
of thenetreceiptsendedin thecentraltreasury.39
city.Onlyone-third
It is thusclear thatthe inabilityto keep a tightreinon the amounts
retainedby theseintermediaries
limitedthe effectiveness
of Ottoman
fiscalreforms
the
seventeenth
and
centuries.
during
eighteenth
COMPARISONSWITHOTHEREUROPEANSTATESIN THE EARLY
MODERNERA
This section compares the revenues of the Ottoman central
administration
in the early modernera with those of the leading
states,
European
England,France,theDutchRepublic,Spain,Venice,
Austria,Prussia,Poland,and Russia.For each polity,theseriesforthe
netreceiptsof thecentraltreasury
was convertedto tonsof silverby
it withthe silvercontentof theunitof account.It should
multiplying
be emphasizedagainthatwe are focusingin thisstudyon theprocess
of fiscal centralization
and the tax receiptsthatreachedthe central
Tax receiptsthatremainedin the hands of local groupsor
treasury.
bodiesvarieda good deal acrossEuropeincluding
theOttomanEmpire.
Some of theserevenueswere spentby local bodies forcivilianand
military
purposes,buttheyremainoutsidethepurposeand focusof the
of
presentstudy.We have takengreatcare to applysimilardefinitions
38
akir,"Gelenekseldnem,"pp. 167-68.
39
Gen,"Iltizam";also citedin izaka,Comparative
Evolution,
pp. 165-68.
610
Kammern
and Pamuk
2000 ]
1500- 150e)
1550-1559
1600-1609
1650-I6S9
1700-1709
1750-1759
1780- 17X9
Figure 4
ANNUAL REVENUES OF EUROPEAN STATES
(10-yearaveragesintonsofsilver)
1Oarticledatabase.
in
revenueto all thestates,butthelimitations
imposedbythevariations
shouldbe keptinmind.
andfiscalstructures
accounting
procedures
4
of the leading European
and
5
total
revenues
Figures
present
states,includingthe OttomanEmpire,duringthe earlymodernera.
A numberof interesting
patternsemergefromthese figures.The
was comparableto those
revenueof theOttomancentraladministration
In fact,Ottoman
of largeEuropeanstatesduringthesixteenth
century.
revenuewas greaterthanall EuropeanstatesexceptFranceand Spain.
withOttomanmilitary
This patternis consistent
powervis vis the
didquitewell militarily
during
leadingEuropeanstatesas theOttomans
central
of
the
Ottoman
tax
revenues
Per
the sixteenth
century. capita
administration
were comparablewiththoseof largerEuropeanstates,
butwas below thoseof citystatessuch as Venice and Hollandin the
sixteenth
century.
Figures4 and 5 make clear thatrevenuesof mostEuropeanstates
and especiallytheeighteenth
increasedsharplyduringtheseventeenth
Ottoman
240
1S00-1S09
1550-1559
1600-1609
1650-1659
1700-1709
1750-1759
17S0-I7S9
Figure 5
ANNUAL REVENUES PER CAPITA
(10-yearaveragesin gramsofsilver)
1Oarticledatabase.
centuries.Most strikingin this respectwere England and Holland,

but othersincludingAustriaand Russia also experiencedsignificant
increases in tax revenues.At a time when the Ottomancentral
was struggling
withtheadverseeffectsof politicaland
administration
fiscaldecentralization,
theselargeincreasesin revenuesacrossEurope
led to the emergenceof large differences
in staterevenuesbetween
the Ottomansand most Europeanstates.These differences
reached
theirpeak, in most cases, duringthe second half of the eighteenth
whentherevenuesnot onlyof themoresuccessfuland more
century
statesin WesternEurope,butalso thosein CentralandEastern
powerful
such
as Austrian
andRussiawithwhichtheOttomans
Europe
monarchy
increasedsharply.
engagedmilitarily
As Table 1 makesclear,whilethesizes of armieswererisingacross
theOttomans
remained
Europeespeciallyduringtheeighteenth
century,
outside
this
trend.
This
in
shift
the
fiscal
and
mostly
long-term
military
balance of poweris consistent
withwhathappenedin thebattlefield.
6 12
Karamanand Pamuk
Table 1
SIZES OF ARMIES AND NAVIES OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES, 1550-1780
(in thousands)
1550
AN
1700
AN
1780
AN
109
115
79
41
25
76
England
183
85
14
224
118
43
France
22
27
86
90
DutchRepublic
64
62
37
26
145
18
Spain
0
62
0
253
0
9
Austria
0
181
37
0
Prussia
408
19
52
0
Russia
120
30
30
130
50
90
Ottoman
Empire
Sources:Data setprepared
byPeterBreckefor"My ProjectsRelatingPowerto ViolentConflict"
Ottoman
fortheOttomanEmpire,see Murphey,
at http://www.inta.gatech.edu/peter/power.html;
Warfare,
pp. 35-59; andAksan,OttomanWars,pp. 45-179.
Aftera longperiodof territorial

expansionintoEurope,theOttomans
began to be matchedby the Habsburgsby the end of the sixteenth
at
Nonetheless,
theywereable to makeanothermajorattempt
century.
Viennatowardstheend of theseventeenth
onlyto be defeated
century
by a largecoalitionof Centraland EasternEuropeanstates.Thanksin
thatshowveryclearlyin ourrevenue
largepartdueto thefiscalreforms
series,theOttomanswerethenable to holdtheirownmilitarily
against
the
half
of
the
first
Russia
and
Austria,Venice,
eighteenth
during
As thefiscalgap widenedfurther
duringthesecondhalfof the
century.
however,Ottomanmilitary
began to
performance
century,
eighteenth
in
falter.
Theyweredefeatedin mostofthewarsthattookplace thelate
centuriesagainstAustriaand Russia.
and earlynineteenth
eighteenth
but
on military
The literature
historyrecognizesthe fiscalconstraints
emphasizesmore the gaps in militaryorganizationand technology
betweenthetwo sides and thelack of disciplineamongsttheOttoman
soldiersto explain the Ottomandefeats.We would argue thatthe
low fiscal capacityof the Ottomancentraladministration
especially
of the
cause
a
as
be
seen
should
the
major
century
during eighteenth
of
absence
the
well
as
as
differences
discipline
militarytechnology
and
often
were
latter
as
the
the
equipped
poorly
janissaries
amongst
time.40
in
on
full
or
rarelypaid
40For the Ottoman

forthe
in the earlierperiod,see Murphey,OttomanWarfare;
military
the
Sultan.
Guns
and
Ottoman
see
Wars;
Aksan,
for
Agoston,
century,
eighteenth
Ottoman
WHYDID OTTOMANCENTRALREVENUESLAGIN THE EARLY
MODERNERA?
TotalTaxRevenues
inTonsofSilver= TotalGDP inTonsofSilver(1a)
* TaxRevenues
as percent
ofGDP
or
* RealGDP
TotalTaxRevenues
inTonsofSilver= Population
percapita(1b)
* PriceLevelin
silver* TaxRevenues
as percent
ofGDP
grams
As equationslA and 1b suggest,the emergingdifferences
in tax
revenuesmeasuredin tons of silver betweenthe OttomanEmpire
and other European states duringthe early modern era can be
cause was thesignificant
analyzedunderfourheadings.One important
in populationtrends.The populationoftheOttomanEmpire
differences
changedverylittlefromthemiddleof the sixteenth
centuryuntilthe
endoftheeighteenth
This is thecase evenifwe excludethose
century.
areasthatsecededfromtheOttomanEmpireandlimitourintertemporal
comparisonsto areas withinthe same borders.In contrast,
population
in most European countriesthat are included in our comparisons
increasedsharplyduringtheearlymoderncenturies,
doublingor more
thandoublingin manycases.41
Anothercause fortheemerging
in totalrevenuesin tons
differences
of silverwas the changingprice levels in termsof silver.In the late
fifteenth
and earlysixteenth
beforethe impactof the price
centuries,
revolution
beganto be feltin Europeand theNear East,pricelevelsin
southern
Europeand theOttomanEmpirewerehigherthanthosein the
restof Europe.Duringthenextthreecenturies,
however,pricelevelsin
northwestern
and moregenerallyWesternEurope,measuredin silver
terms,increasedmuchmoreas risingincomesand wagespulledup the
pricesof servicesand othernontradable
goods.As a result,pricelevels
measuredin silvertermsin northwestern
Europewere twice as high
as thosein theOttomanEmpireand in Italyby thesecondhalfof the
Witha higherprice level in silverterms,states
eighteenth
century.42
tendedto collectmoretaxesmeasuredin tonsof silver.However,even
in Europe,it is
thoughtherewas a commonmarketformercenaries
reasonableto assumeit cost morein northwestern
and moregenerally
in WesternEuropeto buythesame basketof military
goods including
soldiersand equipment.
In otherwords,thiscomponent
of thegrowing
in tax revenuesdid notnecessarily
difference
translate
intodifferences
inmilitary
power.
41
andJones,Atlas;andMalanima,Premodern.
42McEvedy
Allen,"GreatDivergence";andzmucurandPamuk,"Real Wages."
614
Karamanand Pamuk
Equation 1b suggests anotherpotentialcause of the growing

in revenueswas the differences
differences
in GDP per capita. Per
GDP
and
in
incomes
were
capita
risingrapidly Englandand theDutch
and eighteenthcenturies.By the
Republic duringthe seventeenth
second half of the eighteenth
century,
per capita GDP and incomes
in these countrieswere approximately
double those in the Ottoman
In
Empire. contrast,however,per capita GDP in the rest of the
continent
did not show any strongtrendduringtheearlymodernera,
to
some
extentin WesternEurope but probablydecliningin
rising
in terms
southern
Europe,especiallyin Italy.As a result,differences
of GDP per capita betweenthe lattercountriesand the Ottoman
limiteduntilthenineteenth
century.43
Empireremained
relatively
in tax revenues
The firstthreecauses of the emergingdifferences
citedabove, population,thepricelevel, and real GDP per capita are
all, by definition,
componentsof nominalGDP. In otherwords,one
in totalrevenuesbetweenthe
differences
basic reasonfortheemerging
of
the continental
on
the
one
and
most
hand,
Ottomans,
European
in nominalGDP.
on theother,was thegrowingdifferences
countries,
Of thesethreecomponents,
changesin populationand thepricelevel
in totaltax revenuesthan
moreto thegrowingdifferences
contributed
in
the
level
of
GDP
did thechanges
percapita,exceptforEnglandand
theDutchRepublic,whereincreasesin theGDP per capitawerealso
significant.
inrevenues
was therapidly
differences
Thefinalcauseoftheemerging
as a
administrations
in tax revenuesof thecentral
growingdifferences
againsubjectto some
percentof GDP or totalincome.Our calculations,
the
of
existingGDP per capita
degreeof errordue to theshortcomings
estimates
fortheearlymodernera,suggestthatshareof taxrevenuesof
as a percentof GDP or totalincomesrose in
thecentraladministration
fromless than5 percentin thesixteenth
mostof theEuropeancountries
and
10 percentand in a smallnumberof
5
to
a
between
century range
to morethan10 percent
cases thatincludeBritainand theNetherlands
in
the differences
to
measure
A
more
reliable
the
1780s.44
way
by
the capacityof statesto collecttax revenuesor the tax burdenof
the populationwould be to comparethe per capita tax revenuesof
43Based on Van
and Maddison,WorldEconomy,
Zanden,"EarlyModernEconomicGrowth";
andPradosde la Escosura,"Declineof Spain";these
also see Alvarez-Nogal
HistoricalStatistics;
arenotprecisebutforourpresent
GDP percapitaestimates
good
theygivea reasonably
purposes,
ideaofthebasictrends.
44For
example,O'BrienandHunt("England,1485-1815,"pp. 53-100) estimatethatthetax
revenuesover GDP ratioexceeded 10 percentin Englandbeforethe end of the eighteenth
century.
Ottoman
30 -i
--England
20 "
->-
DutchR
France
Spain
-r- Venice
Austria
- O- Prussia
- X- Poland
i^^^
/
HD Ottoman
^^r
^******>*^^^^
f
/
1500-1509 1550-1559 1600-1609 1650-1659 1700-1609 1750-1759 1780-1789
Figure 6
ANNUAL REVENUE PER CAPITA/DAILYURBAN WAGE
( 10-yearaverages)
1Oarticledatabase.
the stateswiththe dailywages of unskilledworkers.Figure3 above

suggestedthatthe ratio of per capita tax revenuesof the Ottoman
to dailywages of unskilledconstruction
workers
centraladministration
remainedlow duringthe earlymoderncenturies.In sharpcontrast,
in mostEuropean
Figure6 makesclearthesameratiorosesignificantly
that
countriesduringthe earlymodernera. Figure6 indicatesfurther
thedifferences
betweentheOttomanEmpireand mostotherEuropean
states in this respectwidened substantially
duringthe eighteenth
century.
Increasesin the revenueover GDP ratiosand in the revenuesper
capitaover the dailywage ratiosin manyEuropeancountriesdespite
thelimitedincreasesin per capitareal GDPs duringtheearlymodern
era suggestthatthe increasesin the fiscalcapabilitiesof centralized
administrations
precededtherapideconomicgrowthof thenineteenth
of an administration's
fiscal capacitywas
century.One determinant
the size of moneystockand degreeof monetization.45
Monetization
was a necessaryconditionforcentralizing
finances,because it allowed
revenues
to
the
center,
transferring
political
payinga standingcentral
45
Tilly,Coercion,Capital,and EuropeanStates,pp. 88-89.
616
Karamanand Pamuk
armyor mercenariesin cash, investingin militarytechnologiesand

thefundsaroundthecountry.
and if necessary,redistributing
training,
increaseinthesilvercoinageinthe
Had itnotbeenfora thirty-threefold
of Europeanfiscal
Old Worldbetween1500 and 1800, centralization
Within
not
have
occurred.46
Europe,however,therewas
systemsmight
a lag in increasesin percapitamoneystockas one movedfromwestto
of monetary
east. In the Ottomancase, the trajectory
systemmimics
Ottomanmoneystockis
thatof theadministration's
politicalfortunes.
at 1000-1500tonsof silverat theend of fifteenth
estimated
century.47
France'smoneystockat thesameperiodwas around700 tons,implying
a roughlysimilarper capita moneystock.48Money economyspread
in the sixteenthcentury,but the trend
in the Ottomancountryside
thatdue to
It is conjectured
was reversedin the seventeenth
century.
trade deficitwith the east, Ottomaneconomydid not accumulate
to locate silver
foundit difficult
Americansilver,the administration
supplies,and thenumberof mintsdecreasedfrommorethanfortyin
The Ottoman
to a fewin theseventeenth
thesixteenth
century.
century
also contrastedwith most European states by not
administration
to ascertainthe policy's
thoughit is difficult
adoptingmercantilism,
breakdown.It is reasonableto assume,
exact impacton themonetary
however,thatthebreakdownof monetary
systemhamperedOttoman
taxfarming.
tomonetizetaxcollectionthrough
administration's
attempt
revenues
in
the
central
rise
Moreover,a significant
part of the
thanincreases
oftaxesrather
overGDP ratioswas due to centralization
in the tax burdenper se. As a case in point,the eighteenth-century
increasein Englishrevenueover GDP ratiooccurredsimultaneously
of around90 percentof thegrosstaxrevenueat the
withconsolidation
after1660,
was achievedby thereforms
Consolidation
centraltreasury.
the
under
of tax administration
TreasuryBoard,
includingunification
ofupkeepofarmedforces.49
andcentralization
abolitionoftaxfarming,
thatonly40 percent
itis estimated
In ancienrgimeFrance,in contrast,
ofthegrosstaxcollectionmadeitto thecentraltreasury.50
thatdrovethe
offiscaladministration
If itis indeedthecentralization
gains in revenues,comparingthe figuresacross politiesshouldhelp
is thatsmall,densely
A visiblepattern
determinants.
underlying
identify
populatedand urbanizedpolities,such as England,Venice, and the
Dutch Republic,had higherper capitarevenuesthanlargeterritorial
46
FourthEdition,pp. 306-10.
Mulhall,Dictionary
ofStatistics,
51-52.
Pamuk,Monetary
History,
pp.
8 Glassmanand
Redish,"New Estimates,"
pp. 31^6.
Pamuk,Monetary
pp. 54-55.
History,
and RulingClass, p. 269.
LeDonne,Absolutism
Ottoman
states such as the Ottomans.As distancesfromthe capital cities
to the center
thetax extraction
increased,the logisticsof transferring
and a largershareof the grosstax
and back became moredifficult,
revenuewas spentwithoutenteringthe centralcoffersand budgets.
In fact,in largerpolities,thegreatshareof therevenueswereextracted
fromcore provinces,such as Castile in Spain, pays d'Election in
France,and Anatoliaand Balkansin theOttomans,and outerregions
contributed
smalleramountssporadically.A surveyof the polities
also suggeststerritorial
empirestendedto have largeragrariansectors,
whichwere harderto monitorand hence necessitatedelaboratetax
thatresultedin lower
withmultiplelayersofintermediation
apparatuses
netrevenuestothecenter.
Anothermajordeterminant
of the fiscalcapacityof the stateswas
thatgovernedtherelationship
and
the
institutional
framework
politics
All across
betweenthe centraladministrations
and tax intermediaries.
tax
collection
on
on
the
Europe,
depended politics,
bargainsreached
and varioussocial groups,and the
betweenthe centralgovernments
institutions
thatemergedduringthatprocess.It has been arguedthat
or representative
regimeswere able to apply taxes to
parliamentary
broadersectionsof the economyand collectmoretaxes because the
bodies helpednegotiateand sanctionfiscaldemandsin
representative
return
forlimitson thepowerofthemonarch,
especiallyduringperiods
of fiscalcrises.51
that
However,itis noteasyto identify
simplepatterns
characterized
therelationsbetweenthecentraladministrations
and the
elitesduringtheearlymodernera.
provincial
The historiography
of the seventeenth
and eighteenth
centurieshas
faced on
arguedthatthe challengesOttomancentraladministration
fiscaland military
fronts
wererelatedto theabsenceof monopolization
andcentralization
ofmilitary
forces.52
Instead,alongwiththeirgrowing
role in tax farmingcontractsand allocationof extraordinary
avariz
taxes,majorayan familiesin different
partsof theempireformedtheir
own retinueswithfirearms.
These forcesplayed an essentialrole in
taxcollectionat thelocal leveland also providedleveragefor
enforcing
theayan whentheybargainedwiththecentraladministration
overtax
contractsand forprivilegesin exchangeforjoiningthe armyduring
As the ayan families
periodsof war and suppressinglocal banditry.
remainedfinancially
dependenton theirrole in thetax apparatus,the
51For
example,Hoffmanand Norberg,"Conclusion";Hoffmanand Rosenthal,"Political
Economy";andDincecco,"FiscalCentralization."
52
and "Centralization
and Decentralization";
Inalcik,"Militaryand Fiscal Transformation"
Cezar, Osmanli MaIiyesinde; Aksan, OttomanWars; zkaya, OsmanliImparatorlugu'nda
ynlik;andFaroqhi,"CrisisandChange."
618
Karamanand Pamuk
was carefulto fosterrival familiesin each
Hencethehistoriesof
for
contracts
and assignments.
regioncompeting
individualayan familiespointto episodesof rewardsand promotion
with confiscationof estates and executionsjustifiedas
alternating
and failureto fulfillobligations.53
forwar profiteering
punishments
The Ottomanpatternof controlover provincialviolence through
selective,and short-term
co-optationof an evolvingarray
negotiated,
contrastswith
formations
and contractors
semiautonomous
military
frommid-seventeenth
the Europeanpatternparticularly
centuryon.
half
that
in
the
first
of
wide
continentcentury,
depredations
Following
who had previouslyrecruited
and entrepreneurs
militarycontractors
troopsbegan to be phased out and small-scalewarfareon a local
wars
or regional level was replaced by large-scale international
across Europe.54This contrastsuggests the set of technological
and
and organization
challengeson the path fromthe elite infantry
role
a
have
mass
to
played major
might
conscription
prebendaicavalry
indelayingOttomanfiscalcentralization.
notablesoftencooperated
and provincial
The Ottomanadministration
in tax collection and militaryservice duringthe seventeenthand
andstablepolitical
a long-term,
butwithout
credible,
centuries,
eighteenth
deal withwell-defined
obligationsand privileges.Such a deal called
Sened-iIttifak
(Documentof Alliance)was signedonlyin 1808duringa
thesurvivaloftheempire,butitdid
severepoliticalcrisisthatthreatened
forlongas themanysideschosenottohonorit.In the
notremainineffect
had severedifficulties
absenceof sucha deal,thecentraladministration
into
a steadysupplyof taxrevenuesandthisproblemturned
in ensuring
and
internal
a severecrisisduringthe periodof wars
rebellions,and
nationalist
uprisingsthatlastedfromthe 1760s to the 1830s. While
fiscallysuccessfulEuropeanstateswere able to deal betterwiththe
largefiscalshockscreatedby thewarsby managingtheirpublicdebt
the seriesof wars,internalrebellionsand
and avoidingdebasements,
central
fortheOttoman
createdveryseriousproblems
nationalist
uprisings
debasements
It was forcednotonlyto resortto frequent
administration.
duringthese difficultdecades but also employ practices such as
on domesticand
local monopolies
taxes,fiscallymotivated
extraordinary
stateofficials.
of thewealthof former
external
trade,and expropriations
as well
in
internal
decline
was
the
even
more
security
important,
Perhaps
53
ahin,"EconomicPower."
54
and Warand the World;see also Gat,
Black,"Introduction"
Wilson,"EuropeanWarfare";
War.
Ottoman
as external security.All of these led to a macroeconomicand
institutional
thatwas highlyunfavorablefor long-term
environment
economicdevelopment.55
MODERNERAREFORMS,FISCALCENTRALIZATION,
AND
EVIDENCEFROMOTTOMANBUDGETS,1800-1914
As military
defeatsandterritorial
lossesescalated,theOttoman
central
administration
to implement
a seriesof centralizing
reforms
struggled
in the military,administrative,
and fiscal areas. Not surprisingly,
theseefforts
beganduringthereignof SelimIII (1789-1808),whenthe
revenuesof thecentraladministration
in tonsof silverand in inflation
terms
reached
their low point but progresswas limited
adjusted
due
to
the
especially
oppositionof thejanissaries. His successor,
MahmudII (1808-1839), continued
withthereforms
especiallyafterhe
defeatedthejanissaries in 1826 and revokedtheremaining
timarsin
1831. The reignof MahmudII was a particularly
difficult
periodfor
the centraladministration.
While it was able to suppressthe various
of notablesin boththeBalkansand Anatolia,theSerbianand
uprisings
Greek revolutionsled to the secession of these territories
fromthe
Much
more
to
the
state
finances
than
empire.
costly
anyof thesewas a
seriesof warsagainstRussia,Iran,and Egypt.As thesize of thenew
army(Nizam-iCedid) rose froma mere2,000 aroundtheturnof the
centuryto 120,000 in the late 1830s, pressureson state finances
increased.56
Abouthalfof thebudgetexpenditures
were allocatedfor
untilthe 1840s; thisshare
military
spendingfromthe late eighteenth
was considerablyhigherduringperiodsof war.57The firstmodern
Ottomancensus and cadastralsurveyin 1831 closely followedthe
foundation
of the new armyand was motivatedby the need to raise
andmoneyforthenewarmy.
manpower
As thereform
movement
arena
beganto spreadbeyondthemilitary
in the 1820s, to administration,
justice,and education,demandsfor
resourcesincreasedas well. Fromthe 1760s Ottomanstatefinances
began to experiencelarge budgetdeficitswhichreachedtheirpeak
duringthewarsofthe1820sand 1830s.In response,thestateattempted
to eliminatethe intermediaries
or at least sharplyreducetheirpower
and controlof resourcesbothin the capitaland the provinces,made
use of various formsof internalborrowing,and when short-term
fiscalpressuresmountedespeciallyduringperiodsof war,resortedto
55
Gene,"XVIII. YiizyildaOsmanliEkonomisi,"pp. 52-61; andCezar,OsmanliMalivesinde.
6 ShawandKuran
Shaw,HistoryoftheOttoman
Empire,Vol.II, pp. 1-54.
Cezar,OsmanliMaliyesinde,pp. 244-80.
620
Karamanand Pamuk
debasements.
in Ottoman
The highestratesof debasement
and inflation
and reformist
historytook place duringthe reignof the centralizing
Mahmud
II.
The
silver
of
the
kurush
or piaster
content
Ottoman
sultan,
declinedbymorethan80 percentfrom1808to 1839.The exchangerate
of the kurushagainstthe Britishpound sterlingdeclinedfrom18 in
1808 to 110 per poundin 1844. Consumerpricesincreasedby more
thanfivefold
duringthesameperiod.58
A numberof scholarshave identifiedMahmud IPs reformsas
an exampleof "defensivemodernization"
and have notedtheparallels
in Russia and Meiji Restoration
in
betweenthemand Petrinereforms
These
that
all
of
these
reforms
were
out
Japan.
comparisonspoint
motivated
defeatsand territorial
losses and hence
primarily
by military
at theirheartlay the driveto acquireand mobilizethemeansof war
forsurvivalanddefenseagainstaggression
fromoutside.59
In the longerterm,the reformshelped the centralgovernment.
Especiallyaftertheabolitionof'thejanissaries,itbeganto moveagainst
theprovincialnotablesand theirfiscalpower.As partof the Tanzimat
of 1839,thecentraladministration
to abolishthetax
reforms
attempted
In the
and
collect
taxes
directly.
farming
systemaltogether
agricultural
absenceof a strongprovincialorganization,
however,centralrevenues
tax
to
be
back.Nonetheless,
the
and
the
farmers
had
brought
collapsed
succeededin wresting
greatercontrolof thetax
itsrevenues.The deal signed
collectionprocessand sharplyincreasing
betweenthecenterand theprovincialelitesin 1808 was neverputinto
effectandthepowerofthelatterdeclinedsteadilyduringthenineteenth
wheretheprovincialeliteswere
The firstOttomanparliament
century.
in
1
was opened
876 butlastedlittlemorethana year.The
represented
and empirewide electionsreturned
only afterthe Young
parliament
half
when
the
second
of thecentury,
TurkRevolutionof 1908. During
tax
the centraladministration
pushedto increaseits revenuesfurther,
collectorswere oftenmet with oppositionin the countrysideand
forceswereoftencalledinto deal withtheresistance.60
security
of the budgetdeficitsreacheda
the financing
Aroundmid-century,
new phase.Underthefiscalpressurescreatedby theCrimeanWar,the
markets
Ottoman
beganto borrowin theEuropeanfinancial
government
theproceedsof which
in 1854. Aftertwo decadesof rapidborrowing
was forcedto
the
wereusedmostlyformilitary
expenditures, government
in 1876.Aftera prolonged
indebtpayments
declarea moratorium
period
58
Pamuk,Monetary
History,
pp. 188-200.
59
Barkey,Empire of Difference;Ralston,Importingthe European Army,and Ortayli,
En UzunYzyili.
lmparatorlugun
zbek,"IkinciMesrutiyeti,"
pp. 46-50.
Ottoman
3500-i
3000
2500-
2000-
f'
1500
J*
1000-
/
*
500-
o1523
rf^r^r?""^""^
1566 1608 1669 1696 1704
1747
,,,,
1852 1872 1892 1910
Figure 7
OTTOMAN ANNUAL REVENUES
(in tonsofsilver)
1Oarticledatabase.
ofnegotiations
andinreturn
fora 50 percent
reduction
on theoutstanding
nominaldebt,thegovernment
of
agreedin 1881 to cede largesegments
itsrevenuesourcesto theOttomanPublicDebt Administration
(OPDA)
to be developedforthepurposesof futuredebtpayments.
The OPDA
inplaceuntilWorldWarI.
remained
Ottomanbudgetdocumentsdo notexistfromtheend of the 1780s
to the end of the 1830s. This is perhapsnot surprising
as thiswas a
institutional
period of rapid and far-reaching
changes for Ottoman
statefinances.As partof thecentralization
themulti-treasuries
efforts,
and budgetsof the earlierera were graduallydissolvedforthe single
rose as manyof
budgetsystem.Revenuesof thecentraladministration
therevenuesourceswereincorporated
inthecentralbudgets.
For the periodfromthe 1840s to WorldWar I, all of the ex-post
Ottomanbudgetary
documentshave been collectedand publishedin a
recentvolumeby TevfikGran.61
For theseOttomanbudgetstoo, we
convertedall revenuesgivenin kurushesintotonsof silver.Figure7
61
FinancialStatistics.
Gran,Ottoman
622
Karamanand Pamuk
Io
14 -
1^:5 l-;4? 5S? 653 '6(n 1696 I/O: 1754 1784
1S52 1868 1SS4 IPOO '9'2
Figure 8
ANNUAL REVENUES PER CAPITA/DAILYWAGES IN ISTANBUL
1Oarticledatabase.
duringthe
presentsrevenuesof the Ottomancentraladministration
8
in
of
silver
and
nineteenth
tons
Figure presentsper capita
century
revenuesas a multipleof the daily wage of unskilledconstruction
workersin the capitalcity.These seriesshow unequivocallythatthe
and
reforms
thatbeganat theendof theeighteenth
century
centralizing
continued
untilWorldWar I, led to largeincreasesin therevenuesof
thecentraladministration.62
This sharprise in revenuesduringthe nineteenth
centuryin many
ways reflectedan attemptat catchingup for the Ottomancentral
Since mostEuropeanstateshad experienced
administration.
significant
increasesin revenuesduringtheearlymodernera,especiallyduringthe
whentheOttomanrevenueswerein factdeclining,
eighteenth
century
in Figures7 and 8 reflecttheresultsof delayed
thetrendssummarized
Thisrisein revenues
fortheOttomans.
and
fiscal
centralization
political
62Centraladministration
revenuesshownin Figures7 and 8 do not includethe revenue
of the Ottomandebt in 1881. Annual
sourcesceded to the OPDA afterthe restructuring
to an additional2 percentofOttomanGDP
revenuesoftheOPDA fromthesesourcesamounted
orabout2 daysofwagespercapitaduringthedecadesbeforeWorldWarI.
Ottoman
35 -i
30 -
oJ
Spam
i i pu Aastru
-O-Piassa
<""O Ottonan
n~- ,
780-1789
D
1820-1829
^>|jbm
.^^^^
J^
^/^^
~~"
1850-1859
1880-1889
1900-1909
Figure 9
ANNUAL REVENUE PER CAPITA
(in gramsofgold)
1Oarticledatabase.
to improveits military
undoubtedly
helpedthe Ottomangovernment
until
World War I. The
the
and
keep
empiretogether
capabilities
revenuesof manyEuropeanstatesalso continuedto rise duringthe
nineteenth
however.This was notso muchor onlybecause of
century,
and the rise in the revenues/GDP
or
continuedfiscal centralization
of
but
also
because
of
the
onset
revenuesper capita/daily
wagesratios,
rapideconomicgrowthand increasesin GDP per capitaas well as in
populationand totalGDP. Countriesin WesternEuropesuch as Great
Britainand theNetherlands
who had experienced
thegreatest
degreeof
fiscalcentralization
beforethenineteenth
a
in
witnessed
decline
century
therevenues/GDP
or revenuespercapita/
ratios
but
their
dailywages
per
continued
torisethanks
torapideconomicgrowth.
On the
capitarevenues
otherhand,countries
withlowerlevelsof fiscalcentralization
beforethe
nineteenth
notonlyFrance,Spain,andPortugal
butalso Austria,
century,
and
in
increases
Russia, Italyexperienced
large
percapitarevenuesdueto
continued
fiscalcentralization
and evenmoredue to economicgrowth.63
As a result,
eventhoughitexperienced
fiscalcentralization,
the
significant
63
and Maddison,ContoursoftheWorldEconomy.
Dincecco,"Fiscal Centralization";
624
Karamanand Pamuk
to lag
continued
fiscalandmilitary
government
capacitiesoftheOttoman
4
behindmostEuropeanstatesuntilWorldWarI (see Figure9).
CONCLUSION
The evolutionof Ottomantax collectioninstitutions
duringthe
and
on theone hand,thewillingness
illustrates,
earlymoderncenturies
in
to
the
emergencies
capacityof theOttomansto reorganize response
createdby wars and other fiscal pressures.The pragmatismand
clues
exhibitedduringthisprocessalso providesimportant
flexibility
oftheempireas wellas thekeyposition
thelongevity
forunderstanding
untiltheend. On theotherhand,however,
of thecentralbureaucracy
not onlyits
centraladministration,
the
Ottoman
all
efforts
of
despite
revenuesremainedlow in absolutetermsbut the gap betweenthe
Ottomansand mostEuropeanstatesincreaseddramatically
duringthe
as revealed
century,
earlymodernera,especiallyduringtheeighteenth
our
study.
by
in tax
a significant
part of these large differences
Undoubtedly,
revenuesweredue to higherratesof populationgrowth,
monetization,
in otherpartsofEurope,especiallyin WesternEurope,
andurbanization
to collecttaxes.
whichmade it easier forthe centraladministrations
to comparetheper
In fact,it can be arguedthatit is not appropriate
in
administrations
central
of
tax
revenues
highlyurbanized,
capita
monetized,and geographically
compactpolitiesin WesternEurope
withthoseof the OttomanEmpire,whichwas muchmoreruraland
covereda muchlargerand diversegeography.However,thesebasic
causes can not accountforall of the largedifferences
and important
The differences
in per capitatax revenuesof centraladministrations.
werealso due to thefactthata largepartof thetax collectionsin the
and never
OttomanEmpirewereretainedby thevariousintermediaries
and
Eventhoughthecentraladministration
reachedthecentraltreasury.
and
military
provincialnotablesoftencooperatedin tax collection
well-defined
with
deal
and
stable
a
credible,
service, long-term,
political
obligationsand privilegeswas notput intoeffectuntilthenineteenth
century.
The growingfiscal and militarydisparitiesagainstthe European
statesto thewestand northplacedenormouspressureson theOttoman
ofthecentral
andtheeconomy.The fiscaldifficulties
state,itsfinances,
64
Because oftheshiftto gold-basedcurrenciesin mostcountriesand thelargedeclinein thepriceof
silverafter1870, we chose to presenttheper capitarevenueseriesforthenineteenth
centuryin grams
of gold. For thispurpose,we dividedtherevenueseriesin gramsof silverby the gold-silverratiofor
each decade. Changesin theaggregatepricelevel in termsof gold remainedlimitedafter1820.
Ottoman
but
forcedit notonlyto resortto frequent
administration
debasements,
also employpracticessuch as extraordinary
taxes and expropriations
of thewealthof formerstateofficials.Perhapseven moreimportant,
was the decline in internalsecurityas well as externalsecuritydue
to the fiscal difficultiesof the government.All of these led to an
institutional
environment
thatbecame distinctlyless forlong-term
economicdevelopment
forlargepartsoftheseventeenth
and eighteenth
centuries.We believe thatthe recenthistoriography
of the Ottoman
attention
to these
Empirein theearlymodernerahas notpaid sufficient
fiscal issues. The grand alliance betweenthe centralgovernment
andtheayan in theprovinceshas beenhailedas thekeyto theunityof
the empire,but the fiscal,military,
and economicconsequencesof
thesurrender
of largerevenuesto theintermediaries
havenotbeenfully
understood
orappreciated.
withthesupportof new military
and
Duringthenineteenth
century,
the
Ottoman
state
embarked
on
a
transportation
technologies,
large
centralization
drivethatsucceededin sharplyraisingitsrevenues.This
was achievednotso muchby reachinga deal withthenotablesin the
butby reducingtheirshareof thetaxrevenueswiththehelp
provinces,
ofthemilitary
and othertechnologies
of thenineteenth
century.
Higher
revenuesenabledtheOttomansto improvetheirmilitary
performance,
butstatefinancesremainedtheAchilles'heel oftheOttomanstateuntil
WorldWarI.
ExaminingOttomanstatefinancesin theearlymodernera withina
has providedimportant
Europeanframework
insightsnot only into
theOttomancase, but also the emergenceof centralizedstatesacross
Europe. Studyof the Ottomancase confirmsthatthe rise of more
centralizedand bigger states intensifiedthe interstaterivalryand
put additionalpressureon all statesacrossEurope.Not all were able
to respond,at least not quickly,however,as revealedby the military
defeats the Ottomansenduredespecially between the 1760s and
the 1830s. On the otherhand,the Ottomans'abilityto undertake
the
reforms
and
raise
their
revenues
the
nineteenth
centralizing
during
shouldalso remindus thatothercountriesin Europe,Austria,
century
Prussia,Russia, and otherswere able to respondto thesepressures,
butoftenwitha lag. In otherwords,while fiscalcentralization
began
in WesternEurope duringthe sixteenthand seventeenth
centuries,
the responseto it elsewherein the continent
did not arriveuntilthe
ornineteenth
centuries.
eighteenth
626
Karamanand Pamuk
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Economic History Association

Ottoman State Finances in European Perspective, 1500-1914

The Journalof EconomicHistory,Vol. 70, No. 3 (September2010). The Economic

Norberg,"Conclusion,"pp. 299-310; Hoffmanand Rosenthal,"Political

periodsof war. These periodsof fiscal duresswere oftenthe key

collectionof taxes and entailedprovisionsof emergencyfundsthat

trendsin therevenuesof theOttomancentraladministration

REVENUES PER CAPITA OF THE OTTOMAN CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION

in Istanbul,or the centraltreasury.

TAX REVENUES PER CAPITA/DAILYWAGE OF UNSKILLED WORKERS

to less than30 percentoftotalrevenuesofthecentraladministration

Anotherindicatorthatwould enableus to gain further

centuries.Most strikingin this respectwere England and Holland,

Aftera longperiodof territorial

40For the Ottoman

Equation 1b suggests anotherpotentialcause of the growing

1500-1509 1550-1559 1600-1609 1650-1659 1700-1609 1750-1759 1780-1789

the stateswiththe dailywages of unskilledworkers.Figure3 above

armyor mercenariesin cash, investingin militarytechnologiesand

1852 1872 1892 1910

1^:5 l-;4? 5S? 653 '6(n 1696 I/O: 1754 1784

1S52 1868 1SS4 IPOO '9'2

ProvincialForcesin theBalkansand Anatolia."In

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