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?yaSIIINGTON,
D.C.A'3lt{'.510{l
APRfi $ ?*N?
IJ-l 1-1,7991DA1.11A {FOIA)
This respondsto your rcquestunderthe Privacy Act and Freedomof Inforrnation Act dated
formal complaints{one
September11, 1006. Thereinyou requestedtwo self-prepared
ciassifie#one unclassified),your advisory statemeniandyow voluntary swsrn statement.I
apologizefor the dei.ayin respondingto your requstthat was causedby the needto consultwith
mi*tiple offi.ceswithin the agency.
A searchof DIA's systemsof recordslocatedthree documents(11 pages)responsivetc your
request. I-Infortunately,we were unableto lacateyour unclassifiedformal conipiaint that you
requested.
Upon review, it hasbeendeterminedthat someportions of the tlnee documentsaretrot
releasable.The withhsld partions are exemFtftom releasepwsuanl to Exemption 3 of the FOIA,
5 U.S.C. $$ 552{bX3),andExemptionb of the PrivacyAct, 5 U,S.C. $$ 552a{b).Exemption3
appliesto information specifically exemptedby a statuteestablishingparticular criteria for
withholding" The applicablestatuteis 10 U.S"C. $ 424 which protectsthe identity of DIA
employeesand the organizationalstructurer:f the agency. Privacy Act Exernptionb appliesto
information concerningother individuals which may not be releasedwithouttheir written
corsent.
If you are not satisfiedwith this action, you may exerciseyour right to appealby writing to
ihe addressbelow andrefening to casenumberPA-01i2-2006. Yow appealrnustbe postrnarked
no later than 60 daysafter the dateof this letter.
Defenselntelligence Ageacy
ATTN: DAN-14{F'OIA}
200 MacDiil Blvd
$/ashingtorr,D.C. 20340-5100
Sincerely,
AlesiaY. Williams
Chief, Freedomof Inforrnation Act Staff
8 May 2006
4orrEgl compl&imt to DeD Inspr$tgt Gu"ut"l r.: JFIC eod c"*e"gri"oat&qui"y
(U) The pu{poseofthis letter is to formally complainto the DoD InspectorGeneralthat
then-JointForcesIntelligenceCommand(JFIC), rvheninstructedin or before May 2002
to provide all original material it might haverelevantto al-Qa'ida and the 9/11 atlacksfor
a Congressionalinquiry, intentionally misjnfomed the Departmentof Defensethat it had
no puwiew on suchmattersand no suchmaterial. consequently,JFIC's role, and thus
DoD's role, in the pursuit of al-Qa'ida belirre gll i and timely analysisof the iargets
actually skuck by the 9/1 I attackershave remained unknown even to senior DoD
officials.
(U) According,oP __
Security
Jhg$rmer Counterinteiiigence
---,,,--Officer for JFCOM, and (b)
IJFIC informed the ilepartment of
Defenssthat it had no purview on al-Qa'ida and no original material relevantto ai-Qa'ida
or the 9/i I attacks,
{u) contrary to JFIC's formal report to the JCS staff, JFIC had a direct and assigned
purview on iirternafionaltersrism againstthe U.S., to inciude the operationsof al-Qa'ida
and the 9/11 attackers.JFIC was directly responsibleto both Joint ForcesCommand
(JFCOM) and its subordinate,Joint Task Force- Civi} support (JTF-cs) for all-source
intelligenceanaiysisof internationaiterrorjp_aealnsl the U,S,Io ensurethe quality of
such analysis,JFlC's cr:mmandingofficeri(o)
, iestablishdthe
' , ' .
- ",
Asymmetric rtreat Bgreh@l5L_g&arged with reportingon asymmefricthreats,
especiallyterrorism. 1or - ' . :: , -i was subsequentlypromotedto JFCOM J2- As a
RADM and PACOM J2, sheestablishedanotherAsyrnmetricThreat branchat PACOM.)
(U) The Asymmetric Threat Franch in JFIC was a forerunnerof currett all-sourcefi.rsion
csnters. Unlike other analyical cffices in the intelligencecornmunity,DO5 membershad
a wide mix af skilis in all six intelligencedisciplines- HUMINT, osiN'i', coMINT,
ELINT,IMINT, and MAStrNT. Consequentiy,DO5 was abie to developand use allsource,original analysisin a mannerprobabiy then unprecedentedwithin the intelligence
comrnunity. Do5 beganpreparinga wide rangecf original analysison asynrmekic
warfare,especiallyterrorism,ftom mid-1998 until mid-2001. This analysisincluded:
-(Si*{f}Numerous original reports, with original imagery, measurements&
signaturesintelligence,or elsckonic intelligence,identifying probableand possible
movemsntsand locationsof Usamabin Ladin and Mullah omar. Thesereportsoften
idenfified one houseas being bin Ladin's likeiy re-*idence
in eandahar* this was
evidentlythe housein which Khalid ShaykhMuhammedplannedthe 9/11 attacks. These
reportswre also ihe first to identify Muilah Omar,snew residence.
(U) Reportson the most likeiy targetsfor domesticand internationaiterrorists.
both within the U,S. and abroad,as wsll as adjuncttargetsduring a traditional war. "fhe
most sensitiveof thesereportslyere thoseidentifying targetswithin the U,S., developing
ttrysfA
uiq124
fq]f1)'10
bn "The Search{for UBL) - A CINC Level View" emphasizedthe gaps-anCopportunitiesin national searchesfor \Jpf.-Qg95Jide listed JFIC initiatives,
10usc
includinghelpprovidedto NIMA a"d Dr.Slq
_ It notedrhatJFIC provided
imagery analysisand open sourceintelligence to NIMA, verified HUMINT'rerorting,
and had at that point disseminatedelevenspecialreportsin the Daiiy intelligence
Summarycn UBL, Taliban leadership,Alghan military rnovements,U_.N.locations,and
the economicstatusof Afghanistan, 1tie brieflng provided numerousexampiesand
suggestionsof how UBL was being hunted by JFIC and couid be huntedby the IC. It
included a compendiumcf imagery of the suspectedUBL house,dating froin 23 August
1999until 11 April 2000.
--,.
3ry5|ifo3-!94g!trdprtrFtrt1ntraT-"-"
rheysubsequenrly
in deveioping
*o.leo]tosetv *it
in
response
to DIA DI{
IlR
Evaluations
forra,arding
additional TIUMINT on Afghanistan,
ai-Qa'ida
idsntified
a
likely
of
FIUM1NTreporting
analysis
Their
original
reporting.
3l3l14
usc
financial courin-. DO5 conducteda fact-finding trip to CIA, but was not impressedwith
the level sf CiA analysison UBL.
SJ) OSINT: DO5 usedand procriredopen sourceson Afgiranistanon a routine
b*sis, evenordering mapsftom the Library ofCongress- It provid# thesesources,
sornetirneson request,to NGA and CIA. It similariy identified possibleHUMINT
sourcesworking in Afglanistar\ and provided these nanresto DIA DFi.
{$'BF} ELINT: D05 conductedoccasionalELINT anaiysisof Afghanistan
thrcugh the NSA watch at JFIC. it identified the movernsntof airuaft associaterlwith
seniorTaliban leadership,inciuding Muliah Omar, and suspiciousmovementsvrhichihey
beiievedwere linlcedto th moysmentof bin Ladin. It provided additionalinformatian
on this analysis, upon requsst, to the CIA office on terrorist msvernent"
(U) Any JFIC ciaim that it did not know of the existenceof DOS and its seminal
counterterrorismwork would be disingenuousat best:
iast JFIC csmmandingofficer underwhish I
(U)ft]
,t':mthe
served,was adamantiyopposedto JFIC conductingany original analysisof al-Qa'ida,
and directedsuchwork be stoppedin late 2000-early2001.
{U) D05's work was very well-known within JFIC. Severalmembersof DO5
rennainedat JFIC or JFCOivI. Indeed,somewithin the cqmmandreinainedbitter that
dirmted EO5 to stopwork on al-Qa'ida, and enforcedthat crder upon
my deparfure.
ilJ) A review of JFIC's INTELLINK home pageindicatesthat, aithor:ghmost of
DO5's reportson Afghanistanwere rernovedfrom tha home page,somelists of the
erasedarliclesremain.
(U) I havs a sffong and abidingpersonalinterestin ihis matter, As a CounterAnalyst for Naval Crin-iinallnvestigativeServiceiNCiS),
Ten'orismlCounter-Intelligence
1998
to June2001, i servedasth Dputy of JFIC's
&om
April
to
JFIC
assigned
AsyrnmetricWarfare Branch (DO5), and servedas the Acting Branch Chief froni late
2000to June-2001.
(U) Foilowing my departuretc DIA, I remainedin contactwith many JFIC
personnel,inciuding DO5 personnel,subsequentto my departurefrom JFIC. I taughtl-wo
week-longclasseson Asymmetric Warfare at JFIC, using numerousslidesbasedupon
our original work in DOs. I taughtone of thoseclassesinla&24A2, and was pleasedthat
severalof,my former subordinatesmade the time ta attendthe classcr, at least,the
sectionon Target Matrix Analysis, which included discussioncf the pr+9/1 1 briefings.
(U) I retainedsomeof the documentscreatedby DO5, mostly briefing slides.
Upon ii:y arrivai ai DIA, I had thesedocumentse-mailedfrom JFIC to my DLA account,
so that I csuld usether* as referencesfor the asymmefricwarfareeourseI was drafting
II
I
they had
I-C-to_qnsure
l'
alreadysubmittedtt
Jo"u^.rrtr. t ,poi.* *ttl"
ipic nir, *no
]
"r" hadaireadysubmitteda response
infonaedme thatJFIC
wilholt anLdocuments.
I was
whenS3.glficqqorat Dosllbl '
surprisedanddisappointed
Fotifiedmeof lhe
i notilied]U6Eizi lin the Congressional
Affairs office,andwas
ful! JFICnon-response.
asDIA docurnents.
with anexplanatory
e-rnaii"I did soon
told to submitthedocuments
ight be overlooked,
29 May 2002,presumingfurobablyconectly)that
sincethev onsinatedat JFIC. I forwardedcopies
JFICthai*"rk)g--
lftussubordinate),
(b)t2),tbX3):10
usc 424
---''- ---lthe
formerDo5 chief who had been
(U) subsequ*ntiyL
transferred to duties as rhe CISO foftngO-lf (thus making me the acting chief cf DO5),
retired and took aposition-with ELa[,]ie informed me that, as CISO, he irad
infarmed JFiC of the full scopeof DO5's work, thoseinvolved, avaiiablematerials,etc.
at the time of the CongressionalInquiry. F{ehad beentold that JFIC's formal response
was that al-Qaida and ttie 9111attaekshad beenoutsideJFIC's purview and that JFIC
eonsequentlyheld no material on thcse issues. He told me that he insistedthat suchwas
not the ca.se,but was toid tlis was the JFIC response.
.{Sffi} There were mary, many people awareaf .}FlC's role i.nprepaing original
analysison al-Qa'ida - I will only provide a short iist. Theseincluded intelligeace
rersonnel at:
I\ \J
CTA
Et
1
(U) My raotivation for this complaint is rnulti-faceted. I do bslieve that knowledge of the
work done by DO5 rrouid add to DoD's uriderstanding of its role in the events leading up
to 9/1 1 and how to avoid fufure attacks. For liris reason, and other more psrsonal reasons,
I believe that DO5's analysis,especiallythe target analysis,should be reviewed and, if
pcssible,declassified. I havebeen falsely accusedofrevealing classified information on
DO5's work, when I am certain that that information is not and tras not been classified
since 9i 11, and I do waq!&_qgemvself clearqdgf that false accusation. In addition, I and
the deputy of that team,l(b) .
,especiallycanied the burden of
knowiedge of how ciose DoD cameto bin Ladin and perhapsbeing able to reducethe
number of lives iost on 9/11. i do not want that burden any ionger.l(b) ', ' . ' ' . .i
Ff-::..:land I discussedthis issuethe last time we spoke. ne rernairu tEeEi$st
missing man in Iraq in this war, and I want, one day, to be abie to explain ta his children
what their father foresaw.