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DEFENSE INTEI-I-IGENCE ACENCY

?yaSIIINGTON,
D.C.A'3lt{'.510{l

APRfi $ ?*N?
IJ-l 1-1,7991DA1.11A {FOIA)

This respondsto your rcquestunderthe Privacy Act and Freedomof Inforrnation Act dated
formal complaints{one
September11, 1006. Thereinyou requestedtwo self-prepared
ciassifie#one unclassified),your advisory statemeniandyow voluntary swsrn statement.I
apologizefor the dei.ayin respondingto your requstthat was causedby the needto consultwith
mi*tiple offi.ceswithin the agency.
A searchof DIA's systemsof recordslocatedthree documents(11 pages)responsivetc your
request. I-Infortunately,we were unableto lacateyour unclassifiedformal conipiaint that you
requested.
Upon review, it hasbeendeterminedthat someportions of the tlnee documentsaretrot
releasable.The withhsld partions are exemFtftom releasepwsuanl to Exemption 3 of the FOIA,
5 U.S.C. $$ 552{bX3),andExemptionb of the PrivacyAct, 5 U,S.C. $$ 552a{b).Exemption3
appliesto information specifically exemptedby a statuteestablishingparticular criteria for
withholding" The applicablestatuteis 10 U.S"C. $ 424 which protectsthe identity of DIA
employeesand the organizationalstructurer:f the agency. Privacy Act Exernptionb appliesto
information concerningother individuals which may not be releasedwithouttheir written
corsent.
If you are not satisfiedwith this action, you may exerciseyour right to appealby writing to
ihe addressbelow andrefening to casenumberPA-01i2-2006. Yow appealrnustbe postrnarked
no later than 60 daysafter the dateof this letter.
Defenselntelligence Ageacy
ATTN: DAN-14{F'OIA}
200 MacDiil Blvd
$/ashingtorr,D.C. 20340-5100
Sincerely,

ftlt *.p Ar't/'**


3 Enclosures

AlesiaY. Williams
Chief, Freedomof Inforrnation Act Staff

8 May 2006
4orrEgl compl&imt to DeD Inspr$tgt Gu"ut"l r.: JFIC eod c"*e"gri"oat&qui"y
(U) The pu{poseofthis letter is to formally complainto the DoD InspectorGeneralthat
then-JointForcesIntelligenceCommand(JFIC), rvheninstructedin or before May 2002
to provide all original material it might haverelevantto al-Qa'ida and the 9/11 atlacksfor
a Congressionalinquiry, intentionally misjnfomed the Departmentof Defensethat it had
no puwiew on suchmattersand no suchmaterial. consequently,JFIC's role, and thus
DoD's role, in the pursuit of al-Qa'ida belirre gll i and timely analysisof the iargets
actually skuck by the 9/1 I attackershave remained unknown even to senior DoD
officials.
(U) According,oP __
Security
Jhg$rmer Counterinteiiigence
---,,,--Officer for JFCOM, and (b)
IJFIC informed the ilepartment of
Defenssthat it had no purview on al-Qa'ida and no original material relevantto ai-Qa'ida
or the 9/i I attacks,
{u) contrary to JFIC's formal report to the JCS staff, JFIC had a direct and assigned
purview on iirternafionaltersrism againstthe U.S., to inciude the operationsof al-Qa'ida
and the 9/11 attackers.JFIC was directly responsibleto both Joint ForcesCommand
(JFCOM) and its subordinate,Joint Task Force- Civi} support (JTF-cs) for all-source
intelligenceanaiysisof internationaiterrorjp_aealnsl the U,S,Io ensurethe quality of
such analysis,JFlC's cr:mmandingofficeri(o)
, iestablishdthe
' , ' .
- ",
Asymmetric rtreat Bgreh@l5L_g&arged with reportingon asymmefricthreats,
especiallyterrorism. 1or - ' . :: , -i was subsequentlypromotedto JFCOM J2- As a
RADM and PACOM J2, sheestablishedanotherAsyrnmetricThreat branchat PACOM.)
(U) The Asymmetric Threat Franch in JFIC was a forerunnerof currett all-sourcefi.rsion
csnters. Unlike other analyical cffices in the intelligencecornmunity,DO5 membershad
a wide mix af skilis in all six intelligencedisciplines- HUMINT, osiN'i', coMINT,
ELINT,IMINT, and MAStrNT. Consequentiy,DO5 was abie to developand use allsource,original analysisin a mannerprobabiy then unprecedentedwithin the intelligence
comrnunity. Do5 beganpreparinga wide rangecf original analysison asynrmekic
warfare,especiallyterrorism,ftom mid-1998 until mid-2001. This analysisincluded:
-(Si*{f}Numerous original reports, with original imagery, measurements&
signaturesintelligence,or elsckonic intelligence,identifying probableand possible
movemsntsand locationsof Usamabin Ladin and Mullah omar. Thesereportsoften
idenfified one houseas being bin Ladin's likeiy re-*idence
in eandahar* this was
evidentlythe housein which Khalid ShaykhMuhammedplannedthe 9/11 attacks. These
reportswre also ihe first to identify Muilah Omar,snew residence.
(U) Reportson the most likeiy targetsfor domesticand internationaiterrorists.
both within the U,S. and abroad,as wsll as adjuncttargetsduring a traditional war. "fhe
most sensitiveof thesereportslyere thoseidentifying targetswithin the U,S., developing

scenarios,analysisof comrnonalitiesfor usein planning responses,and recommendalions


far preventativeaction. This U.S. tasking was given by JTF-CS.
{l#B{F}The reports were first prepared in the summer of 2000, in support
of JTF-CS, and were briefed to the JFCOM J2, JTF-CSJ2, andseniorJFCOM staff.
including the DCINC and J3. The JTF-cs commander may have also attendedthe
briefings. 'rlrc first version of the briefing was enritled"The wMD Threat to the u.s.",
{information cut off date 16 July 2000). The briefing slidesemphasizedthat New york
City was the most difficuit consequcrcemanagrnentproblem, andrecommendedusing
hfYC as the modei for plaruiing/exercises.The oral briefing itseif was much more
sensitive,indicating that the World Trade centers # 1 and # 2 warethe most likely
buiidings to be attackedin the U,S., followed cioseiyby the Pentagon.The briefer
indicatedthat the worst cassscenariowosld be onc tower collapsedonto the other. The
possibility af striking the buildings with a planemay have beendiscussedthen- it was
certainl
is leadingup to the briefing. The acting Depuiy
propcseCin the red cell analysisthat the buiiding
of DO5
could be struckby a j etliner. Discussionfoiiowed on contactingWorld Trade Center
securityand engineeringlarchiteotural
*aff but the idea was not further exploredbecause
of a commandclimate discouragingcortact with ths eivilian community. Howevsr, al
the end of the briefing, the JFCOM J3 directedthat the nationalmilitary terrcrism
exercisefor FY 02 be basedon a New York worse-casescenario. He indicatedhe
would've prefened to have doneso in FY 0i, but the military was alreadyfinanciaiiy
committedto anotheluse (a cruiseship) in FY01.
(U) Thesesamebriefing slideswere revisedinto a briefing on "The
Chemical and Biological Threatto the U.S." (information cut offdate 14 Septernber
2000). This briefing includeda mor detailedsiide on "some Likely Targets" which was
not included in the original slides,but was evidently included in the original briefing.
The slide iisted threecities as most iikely to be attacked:New York city, washington,
and lns Angeles. The slide iisted the first suchNew York target asthe,nVali Striet
dishict" and in Washingtonas the "Pentagon". The oral briefing agai.nemphasizedthe
World Trade Centerand Pentagonas the mosl likely targets.
="(fA:ialysis of the 120 U.S. cities consideredmost likely to be targetedby
intemationaiand domesticterrorists. A memo fiom DO5 dated i 1 january 2001 noteti
that JTF-CShad taskedJFIC to preparesupportpackagesfor these120 cities. In this
mmo, JFIC recommendedthe addition af fifteen new cities to that list.
(U) A briefingto the Headof CVCT riti',in XCtdEI (now ar
CIFA), aad approximately30 NCtrs agents, The briefing, entitled t'lIC sf,pport to Joint
ForcesIntelligenceCommandandNCiS Field office, Norfoik-, cleariy statedthat JFIC'g
AsyrnmetricThreat Division monitored'\rorldwide CT/CI traffic" and routineiy
prepared"analytical reports" and "supplementsnational agencieswith original
intelligenqeon llBL and Afghanistan". It noted,"JFIC in-houseskucture allows quicker
responsethan many national agenciesare capableof: NIMA analysis,NSA comintlelint
support".

briefingto a DIA seniorintelligence


offrceroncountertenoor*l$3Pfl

ttrysfA
uiq124
fq]f1)'10
bn "The Search{for UBL) - A CINC Level View" emphasizedthe gaps-anCopportunitiesin national searchesfor \Jpf.-Qg95Jide listed JFIC initiatives,
10usc
includinghelpprovidedto NIMA a"d Dr.Slq
_ It notedrhatJFIC provided
imagery analysisand open sourceintelligence to NIMA, verified HUMINT'rerorting,
and had at that point disseminatedelevenspecialreportsin the Daiiy intelligence
Summarycn UBL, Taliban leadership,Alghan military rnovements,U_.N.locations,and
the economicstatusof Afghanistan, 1tie brieflng provided numerousexampiesand
suggestionsof how UBL was being hunted by JFIC and couid be huntedby the IC. It
included a compendiumcf imagery of the suspectedUBL house,dating froin 23 August
1999until 11 April 2000.
--,.

(U) l'trumerousshort briefings to NSA counterterrorisms!AS,SQC-O!{p-ersonnel,


us" *|.
ait of
JFCOM senior leadership,and the Director of Analysis for DiAj(bxrl:to
thesebriefings included imagery from the original reporting.
([.f Other productsindicatirg DO5 overwhelming interestin globa] lerrcrisrn
inciuded its original analysisof "Russia:Tenodst LeaderAbu K-hattab"{13 SeptCI'nber
1999), Hadi Awang Kaddungga(a link betweenIndonesianterroristsand bin Ladin),
multipie rcports on the Ahned Ressami.ncident,the USS COLE incident, the Aftican
anbassy bombings, and the FARC. li{any of theseproductswere releasedin no1only
INTELINK but also in messagetraffic.
{U) JFIC's Asymrnetric -flhreatBranch was widely knorvn in the intelligence community
to be conductingall-sourceintelligenceanalysisof al-Qa'ida. Specificaily,in each
inteiligencediscipline:
DO5 conductedimagery analysisof Jelalabadand Qandahar,
ffiIMINT:
Afghanistan,with sporadicanalysisof Kabul, Sarobi, Khowst, and other locationsin
Afghanistan,{iom mid- 1999until June200-l-l!-w-arked-slasgly-li/i&I,GA'$
counterterrorismimagery office undetlq
pulled into a community-wideinitiativeon al-Qa'ida. Based,r,
DO5 were subsequently
cn
At-Qa'ida,
NGA provided D05 with a GG-13 imagery analyst,-_l-i
,upgn*Dl5lg lmrk
use
the
then-prototype
IEC system. withPrl
of
lioi
bnd
proffiiArradEm and a prototype systea, DO5 was able to "scoop" NGA and tile
intelligencecommunity on a routine tra"sis.DO5 also requested,paid for, and receivod
same cotnrnercialcalor imagery of Afghanista-.rduring that period - they were evidently
the first in the community to successfullyuse such commercialir.rageryaf Afghanistan"
DO5 issuedvery detailed SourceDirected Requirernents . _.
{#@.HUl\,{iNT:
(SDRs) on Afghanistnnand Chechnya._f$qlgh DIA DH's representative6t JFCOMI "j

3ry5|ifo3-!94g!trdprtrFtrt1ntraT-"-"

rheysubsequenrly

in deveioping
*o.leo]tosetv *it
in
response
to DIA DI{
IlR
Evaluations
forra,arding
additional TIUMINT on Afghanistan,
ai-Qa'ida
idsntified
a
likely
of
FIUM1NTreporting
analysis
Their
original
reporting.

3l3l14

usc

financial courin-. DO5 conducteda fact-finding trip to CIA, but was not impressedwith
the level sf CiA analysison UBL.
SJ) OSINT: DO5 usedand procriredopen sourceson Afgiranistanon a routine
b*sis, evenordering mapsftom the Library ofCongress- It provid# thesesources,
sornetirneson request,to NGA and CIA. It similariy identified possibleHUMINT
sourcesworking in Afglanistar\ and provided these nanresto DIA DFi.
{$'BF} ELINT: D05 conductedoccasionalELINT anaiysisof Afghanistan
thrcugh the NSA watch at JFIC. it identified the movernsntof airuaft associaterlwith
seniorTaliban leadership,inciuding Muliah Omar, and suspiciousmovementsvrhichihey
beiievedwere linlcedto th moysmentof bin Ladin. It provided additionalinformatian
on this analysis, upon requsst, to the CIA office on terrorist msvernent"
(U) Any JFIC ciaim that it did not know of the existenceof DOS and its seminal
counterterrorismwork would be disingenuousat best:
iast JFIC csmmandingofficer underwhish I
(U)ft]
,t':mthe
served,was adamantiyopposedto JFIC conductingany original analysisof al-Qa'ida,
and directedsuchwork be stoppedin late 2000-early2001.
{U) D05's work was very well-known within JFIC. Severalmembersof DO5
rennainedat JFIC or JFCOivI. Indeed,somewithin the cqmmandreinainedbitter that
dirmted EO5 to stopwork on al-Qa'ida, and enforcedthat crder upon
my deparfure.
ilJ) A review of JFIC's INTELLINK home pageindicatesthat, aithor:ghmost of
DO5's reportson Afghanistanwere rernovedfrom tha home page,somelists of the
erasedarliclesremain.
(U) I havs a sffong and abidingpersonalinterestin ihis matter, As a CounterAnalyst for Naval Crin-iinallnvestigativeServiceiNCiS),
Ten'orismlCounter-Intelligence
1998
to June2001, i servedasth Dputy of JFIC's
&om
April
to
JFIC
assigned
AsyrnmetricWarfare Branch (DO5), and servedas the Acting Branch Chief froni late
2000to June-2001.
(U) Foilowing my departuretc DIA, I remainedin contactwith many JFIC
personnel,inciuding DO5 personnel,subsequentto my departurefrom JFIC. I taughtl-wo
week-longclasseson Asymmetric Warfare at JFIC, using numerousslidesbasedupon
our original work in DOs. I taughtone of thoseclassesinla&24A2, and was pleasedthat
severalof,my former subordinatesmade the time ta attendthe classcr, at least,the
sectionon Target Matrix Analysis, which included discussioncf the pr+9/1 1 briefings.
(U) I retainedsomeof the documentscreatedby DO5, mostly briefing slides.
Upon ii:y arrivai ai DIA, I had thesedocumentse-mailedfrom JFIC to my DLA account,
so that I csuld usether* as referencesfor the asymmefricwarfareeourseI was drafting

II
I

work I ndghtpursueat DIA.


for DIA, andasreferencesfbr any futurecountr-terrorism
althoughthefact
I kepttheoriginalclassifications
on thesiides,ashistoricaldocuments,
wasclearly
thatal-Qa'idawaslikely to attackthetrVorldTradeCenteraqdthePentagon
nn longerclassified"
(U) lVhen theJustise
DoD in May 2002,I noti
that I rptainedthesedocuments. He

sd all documenlsreiating to 9l1l from


in the DIA CongressionalAffairs office

they had
I-C-to_qnsure
l'
alreadysubmittedtt
Jo"u^.rrtr. t ,poi.* *ttl"
ipic nir, *no
]
"r" hadaireadysubmitteda response
infonaedme thatJFIC
wilholt anLdocuments.
I was
whenS3.glficqqorat Dosllbl '
surprisedanddisappointed
Fotifiedmeof lhe
i notilied]U6Eizi lin the Congressional
Affairs office,andwas
ful! JFICnon-response.
asDIA docurnents.
with anexplanatory
e-rnaii"I did soon
told to submitthedocuments
ight be overlooked,
29 May 2002,presumingfurobablyconectly)that
sincethev onsinatedat JFIC. I forwardedcopies

JFICthai*"rk)g--

lftussubordinate),

who was departing


(who was also

depading JFIC that week).

(b)t2),tbX3):10
usc 424

---''- ---lthe
formerDo5 chief who had been
(U) subsequ*ntiyL
transferred to duties as rhe CISO foftngO-lf (thus making me the acting chief cf DO5),
retired and took aposition-with ELa[,]ie informed me that, as CISO, he irad
infarmed JFiC of the full scopeof DO5's work, thoseinvolved, avaiiablematerials,etc.
at the time of the CongressionalInquiry. F{ehad beentold that JFIC's formal response
was that al-Qaida and ttie 9111attaekshad beenoutsideJFIC's purview and that JFIC
eonsequentlyheld no material on thcse issues. He told me that he insistedthat suchwas
not the ca.se,but was toid tlis was the JFIC response.
.{Sffi} There were mary, many people awareaf .}FlC's role i.nprepaing original
analysison al-Qa'ida - I will only provide a short iist. Theseincluded intelligeace
rersonnel at:

I\ \J

CTA

Et
1

(U) My raotivation for this complaint is rnulti-faceted. I do bslieve that knowledge of the
work done by DO5 rrouid add to DoD's uriderstanding of its role in the events leading up
to 9/1 1 and how to avoid fufure attacks. For liris reason, and other more psrsonal reasons,
I believe that DO5's analysis,especiallythe target analysis,should be reviewed and, if
pcssible,declassified. I havebeen falsely accusedofrevealing classified information on
DO5's work, when I am certain that that information is not and tras not been classified
since 9i 11, and I do waq!&_qgemvself clearqdgf that false accusation. In addition, I and
the deputy of that team,l(b) .
,especiallycanied the burden of
knowiedge of how ciose DoD cameto bin Ladin and perhapsbeing able to reducethe
number of lives iost on 9/11. i do not want that burden any ionger.l(b) ', ' . ' ' . .i
Ff-::..:land I discussedthis issuethe last time we spoke. ne rernairu tEeEi$st
missing man in Iraq in this war, and I want, one day, to be abie to explain ta his children
what their father foresaw.

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