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December 1971 to July 1977 was a distinctive period in the history of Pakistan. During
this period at national level a number of new steps were taken and country started its
journey in a new direction. Same was the case there with foreign policy. Pakistan under
the governess of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto changed the mode of its foreign policy to greater
extent. Now Pakistan began to pursue relatively neutral policy and her relations with
Muslim World were strengthened. It was a great change. Pakistan also gave up support to
Western defense pacts.
This extra ordinary change in policy took place due to some major factors. Political
leadership was changed and Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed the charge of President of
Pakistan. Later he also assumed the power as Prime Minister of Pakistan. He was a wellexperienced and skillful minister. For a long time he served as foreign minister. Being an
ambitious person he had strong wishes to change the direction of foreign policy so this
point was one of the significant provisions of manifesto of Pakistan Peoples Party in the
elections of 1970 AD. On the other side Pakistan did not gain any advantage by pursuing
pro West foreign policy. In the most crucial period of the crisis of East Pakistan in 1971
AD. So at this time great change in foreign policy was a turning point in the diplomatic
history of Pakistan.
This short attempt is being made to critically and logically observe the factors
responsible for this change. The study will also focus the salient features of modified
foreign policy. The response to the emotions of development of cordial relations with
Muslim states of policy makers at home and abroad will also be undermined. In addition
to that, immediate and deep-rooted impacts of this policy on diplomacy of future as well
as on history of Pakistan will also be highlighted.
Setting the context
External relations have always been of major importance to Pakistan. The trauma of
partition and the unfortunate history of subsequent Indo-Pakistan relations ensured almost
an obsession with threats to national security. In search of ways to supplement military
capability, the Pakistani elite looked towards the only major source of assistance
available at the time, the United States.1
During its first two decades Pakistans foreign has had to go through the process much
adaptation and change. The time before seventies is very different from that the fifties
when bipolarize was established order, allowing few options to the smaller nations. The

most significant influence on Pakistans foreign policy has been that of the United States
which resulted in Pakistans

membership of SEATO and CENTO. The Indian threat, to which an ill-equipped Pakistan
exposed in the 1960s, drove it to seek security in the Western alliance system although it
is well known that defense pacts are never permanent and become eventually obsolete.
For example, although Pakistans anxiety vis--vis its unresolved disputes with India was
understandable, one cannot sympathize with the haste with the SEATO document was
signed at Manila on 8th September 1954, without clear guarantees being given against
Indias aggression by Pakistans prospective allies. In fairness to the sponsors of the pact
it may be said that the United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and other left
Pakistan in no doubt that the treaty aimed at the defense of member states against
communist aggression only and could not be invoked in the event of the war with noncommunist power. Major surprising was the disclosure by Prime Minister Mohammad Ali
Bogra, in an interview with the BBC on 1st October 1954,
We have not joined the Manila Pact. The Pakistans foreign minister has been sent to the
SEATO conference without any intention of entering in any commitments but he has put
his signature while making the reservation to transmit the treaty to the government for
consideration. We would consider the prose and cons of SEATO in the light of
clarifications form Britain and the US2
Pakistan participation in SEATO isolated her from the family of Asian nation, particularly
the Peoples Republic of China, which regarded it as an Anglo-American conspiracy
aimed that its encirclement. During the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, its alliance with the
West were put to test, the Secretary General of SEATO declared in and unmistakable
terms that the pact could be invoked against Indian aggression.
But Turkey and Iran, its Muslim parterres in the CENTO stood by Pakistan in its hour of
need. The United States imposed an embargo on the shipment of arms both India and
In these circumstances Pakistans leadership was really thinking about changing their
foreign policy. The balance brought into Pakistani foreign policy after 1962 led to the
normalization of relations with the Peoples Republic of China and Soviet Union. 3 Close
relations with the Islamic countries remained a desire but distant goal. US-Pakistan
relations dipped to a low after the American embargo following the Indo-Pakistani war of
1965. Not until after the elections of Richard Nixon to the US presidency and the subsequent Pakistani role in arranging Kissingers secret trip to Beijing did Islamabad
refocus on the American connection. 4
Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 was due to the rise of Bengali nationalism.

For observers the two-nation theory of Jinnah was based on false premise, the
disintegration of Pakistan of 1947 was eminent proof of the fact that twentieth century
nationalism needed more than religion to bind together a nation. Due to this
disintegration a clear change came in the policy of Pakistani government. A process of
closing and ever more deliberate identification with Islam began to take place. 5
In 1971, after the separation of eastern wing, Pakistani leadership was confronted with
the task of reshaping the countrys foreign policy to the changed geo-political and geostrategic realities of the region. It is generally believed that Pakistans foreign policy ever
since independence had been a failure. 6 The leaders at that time were unable to foresee
the disadvantages of Pakistans
alignment with the West which had not only compounded the vertical cleavage between
leaders and public internally but had also isolated Pakistan from the third world in
general and
the Muslim world particular. After 1971 war, Pakistan was in a complete state of
isolation. This was the period when the country, for the first time in its history, decided to
mould its foreign policy in the accordance of with changed geo-political situation and the
aspiration of public.
the mind of the Pakistani intellectual has often been agitated by a consideration of the
questions of our national identity. But since the traumatic events of 1971 this selfquestioning has assumed the properties of a compelling necessity...what the soul and
personality of Pakistan? What is our national identify and our peculiar oneness which
marked us a nation apart from other nations? 7
The Pakistan foreign office established the following guidelines for its upgraded policy
towards the Muslim nations in the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.
1.Pakistan considered Arab nationalism, Iranian nationalism and Turkish nationalism no
more antithetical to Islamic solidarity than Pakistani nationalism.
2.Pakistan remained scrupulously impartial in all inters Arab disputes.
Pakistan followed the principal of bilateralism in its relations with all nations, including
the Islamic states. The government emphasized its intention to maintain friendly relations
with one state or group of states without antagonizing others.
3. Pakistan intended to maintain relations with fraternal Islamic States irrespective of
variation in political systems, international alliances or ideology.

4. Pakistans relations with Muslim states would be expressed throughout the

establishment of permanent international institutions.
5. Pakistan would promote the Arab cause at the every opportunity

and raise the issue of Palestine from a regional to a universal plane.

6Pakistan would avoid becoming embroiled in conflicts between rival Muslim
States but it would urge bilateral settlement of disputes, or provide good offices or
mediation if called upon.
7Pakistan would aid Muslim Minorities residing in non-Muslim states and would
request the Islamic nations to join in the effort .8
After assumption of power, Bhutto vowed to pursue an independent foreign policy, free
from all pressures. Some of the major steps, indicative of real change in the foreign
policy, included:
1.Withdrawal from the Common Wealth.
2.Recognition of East Germany, the democratic republic of Korea and Vietnam, the
republic of Guinea-Bissau, the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia.
3.Withdrawal from the SEATO. 9
Bhutto undertook a whirlwind tour of twenty countries immediately after assuming
power, concentrating in the first instance on friendly countries that stood by Pakistan in
times of need. A re-affirmation of support from these countries enabled Pakistan to
negotiate with India from a position of strength. The desire to establish bilateral friendly
relations with big power took him to China in January, to the Soviet Union in March
1972 and the USA in September 1973. 10
Negotiations with India had always been a difficult chapter of Pakistans foreign policy,
but the surrender of 1971 made it more perilous. After assuming powers, Bhutto
expressed his desire to normalize relations with India and offered dialogue for seeking a
just and honorable settlement. As a result, the emissaries of both the countries met on
April 1972 in Murree and Rawalpindi to draw up an agenda and fix a date for a summit
meeting between India and Pakistan. Consequently, the Simla summit took place from
28th June 1972, leading to an agreement on 2nd July, named as The Simla Agreement. 11
The agreement brought an end to the state of conflict and confrontation between and
India and Pakistan and outlined the principles for normalization of their bilateral
relations, as well as for settling the problems arising out of the 1971 war. They committed
themselves to the settlement of differences through peaceful means, to respect each
others national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality,
to refrain from threat or use of force, and to cease hostile propaganda against each other.
The steps decided for a gradual normalization of relations included withdrawal of forces

to their respective sides and respect of the line of control in Kashmir, as arising out of the
cease fire after 1971 war, although this was not supposed to prejudice

the two sides recognized position on the Kashmir Issue.12 The national assembly dully
ratified the Simla Agreement on the 14 July 1972, and the instrument of rectification was
delivered to India on 18th July 1972, which intern handed over its own instrument of
ratification on 1st August 1972.
Another delicate issue between India and Pakistan was that of over 93000 prisoners of
war (personnel of the military and paramilitary, and civilian internees). In response to
Bhuttos request for treatment of this issue under the Geneva Convention. India took a
stand that they had surrendered to join command of India and Bangladesh, and could not
be released without the prior conceit of Bangladesh. Bangladesh threat to put at least 195
Pakistanis prisoners of war on trial a demand endorsed by India. Pakistan opposed this
and maintained that Bangladesh could not take such and action as the prisoners were
under Indian custody, and therefore, it was the duty of the Indian government to protect
their rights under international law.13
Meanwhile, Bangladesh applied for UN membership in August 1972. The resolution
calling for its admission was vetoed by People Republic of China .14During the general
assembly session in September 1972, Pakistan took the stand that Bangladesh should be
admitted only after the implementation of the General Assemblys resolution of 7th
December 1971 and Security Council resolution of 21 December 1971. 15 India and
Bangladesh issued a joint declaration on 17th April 1973 de-linking the humanitarian
issue of prisoners of war form the political question of recognition of Bangladesh.
Pakistan welcomed this, but it had to file a petition with the international court of justice
to prevent the transfer of 195 prisoners, which Bangladesh wanted to try for war crimes
by end of May 1973.
Talks were held between the representatives of India and Pakistan in Islamabad in the last
week of July 1973, but these remained inclusive because India could not make any
commitment without consulting Bangladesh. The talks were resumed in New Delhi on
18th August 1973 and continued till 28th August 1973, and first Delhi Agreement was
signed.16 The salient features of this agreement were:
Simultaneous repatriation of all Pakistani prisoners of war and civilians internees, all
Bengalis in Pakistan, and substantial number of non-Bengalis in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh agreed that no trial of the 195 prisoners of war should take place during the
entire period of re-partition and pending the settlement of question; these prisoners of the
war shall remain in India.
On completion of agreed repatriations, or earlier if agreed, Bangladesh, India, and
Pakistan will

discuss the question of the 195 prisoners of war. Bangladesh stated that it would be
participate in the meeting only on the bases of sovereign equality.
The government of Pakistan would initially receive a substantial number of non-Bengali
from Bangladesh who is stated to have to opt for repatriation to Pakistan. The Prime
ministers of Bangladesh and Pakistan or their designation representative, will meet after
initial repatriation are completed, decide what additional numbers of persons who may
wish migrate to Pakistan may be permitted to do so.
The repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war from India began in September 1973 and
was completed in April 1974. A lot number of Bengalis were repatriated from West
Pakistan to Bangladesh and non-Bangladeshi to Pakistan during the same period. 17
Meanwhile, important development took place in the relations of Pakistan with the
Muslim World. Pakistans effort to restored its prestige and revitalized its relations with
the Muslim Countries culminated in a decision to hold Islamic Conference in Lahore
1974 with help of King Faisal.
Representatives of 38 Muslim Countries participated included 24 head of states of these
38 Muslim Countries. This Summit bolstered Bhuttos at home and abroad. He managed
to have both the foreign dignitaries and his domestic critics praise his new foreign policy
approach.18 In this conference Bhutto confirmed his credential as a respective Muslim
leader by focusing more than half of his speech on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the polite
of Palestinians. 19
This was a golden opportunity for him to recognize Bangladesh officially by stating that
he had taken the decision on the advice of leaders of the Muslim World who are certainly
the well wisher of Pakistan. This was astute way to deflect potential opposition at home
by implying that because of the blessing of Muslim Countries Bhuttos decision must be
It is also important to point out that Bhutto not only wished to have his country fully
accepted by the Muslim World, but he also wanted to have Pakistan welcomed it to the
Third World arena from which it had been ostracized because of its membership of
CENTO and SEATO. It was galling to Bhutto to have Pakistan to refuse full status at the
third summit held in Colombo in 1976, while India which had close military ties with
USSR, was welcomed. Bhutto was highly critical of the non-alignment movement stating
...When a country enters into closer relations with one great power and still professes to
be non aliened in order to be butterball to establish its political domination over a

friendship, then what we witness in alignment masquerading as non alignment20

In order to promote him as a genuine and credible Third World Leader Bhutto suggested
in September 1976 the holding of a Third World Summit21, but this proposal was never
implemented. For the purpose of promoting unity between the Third World countries, he
planned to hold number of Third World of athletics and sports events. The government
pamphlet on the subject clearly indicated that events would underline central role that
Pakistan was playing under Prime Minister Bhutto for bringing together the countries of
the Third World.22
Although Bhuttos bid to be recognized as a Third World leader did not bear expected
fruit, yet his drive to expand Pakistans link with the Muslim Countries did succeeded. He
was fully aware
that a Muslim World was far from being homogeneous entity, Bhutto was very careful in
developing his Islamic ties so as not to offend the sensitivity of any one of the Muslim
Countries. Therefore, he applied his bilateral approach to develop Pakistans relations
with the three most countries Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iran.23Pakistan developed its
strongest ties with Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf State because of the potentials
economic benefits that could accrue for them. Firm religious links had always existed
between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia because of the latters role as guardian of two of the
holiest places in Islam. Although these ties were given a major psychological boost when
Saudi Arabia lent Pakistan 75 warplanes during the 1971 conflict. 24 The economic ties
between Pakistan and the Muslim Countries especially of the Arabian Peninsula grew
quickly because of a mutuality of interests. Pakistan, having lost its captive market with
the loss of East Pakistan found a new outlet for its goods, while the Gulf countries were
able to get readily available manpower, which they needed to assist them in developing
their capital infrastructure. As a result of these complementary needs and the ability to
meet them, the interests of Pakistan and the Persian Gulf states, Iran, Iraq, Libya and
Indonesia accounted for 24.8% of Pakistans export market compared to only 6.6% in
1969-70.Similarly, the number of Pakistani working in the Middle East, mainly on the
Arabian Peninsula, grew from approximately 170,000 to an estimated 1.25 million in
1979. These Pakistani sent back home more than $2 billions in annual remittances. 25
Pakistan also established good relationships with Libya in the leadership of Bhutto.
Because of these brotherly ties, Colonel Qaddafi, during OIC summit in Lahore26 told
Bhutto our strength in your strength, our resources are

your resources. This fraternal solidarity was given concrete form when Libya provided
$53 million in loan and investment funds for Pakistan in 1976 27.Pakistan also got
advantage of these rapid good relations with Muslim World after successful OIC meeting
when India tested its first nuclear devices. This was the moment when the Muslim World
was united at least in its rhetoric .It had emerged as a significant force in the sphere of
international finance, Muslim Countries generally supported Pakistans new Muslimoriented foreign policy, and Bhutto realized that this was the time for him to use all these
opportunities in order to obtain support form construction of Pakistans own nuclear
bomb. From the very beginning his political career, Bhutto was very ambitious that
Pakistan should have its own nuclear weapons. In 1965 he had stated, If India builds the
bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own..28
Bhutto was fully aware that it was not possible for Pakistan to finance a nuclear project of
it own therefore, he appealed to the religious feelings of the Muslim community in order
to muster financial support. He stated,
The Christians, the Jewish and Hindu civilization has this capability. The Communist
powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it 29...
Bhutto placed his nuclear ideas within the large contests of Islamic politics and managed
to do it with the certain aura of legitimacy, since it could be viewed as a weapon to
counter Israeli and Indian nuclear capability. It would also strengthen Pakistans drive to
become a major credible leader of the Muslim World.
In the past, Iran had stood by Pakistan through all crises, but during 1974, it gradually
moved towards India, causing suspicion in Pakistan. The Shah of Iran visited India in
October and announced that Iran would never assist Pakistan if it starts an aggressive
war against India. Iran also promised substantial economic aid to India and concluded
many arrangements. Bhutto, on the other hand, stated that Pak-Iran relations were based
on solid grounds and that Pakistan would maintain its friendship with Iran even if it
annoyed some great power.30
However, relations among the RCD countries continued flourish despite Irans friendship
with India followed by a meeting of the three heads of the states in Izmir in 1976, the
Treaty of Izmir was signed by the foreign ministers of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey in
March 1977. The treaty aimed at developing the RCD region into a free trade zone and
envisaged the establishment of various institutions in the RCD countries.
Pak Turkish relations, based

on solid grounds were steadily progressing without any fluctuations and strain. The
Turkish Pakistani joint ministerial commission signed a protocol in March 1977 for
increased co-operation in the fields of trade, industry, agriculture and technology. They
were having no common border yet Turkey was important to Pakistans security in as
much as Turkey supported Pakistan on the Kashmir question and rendered martial
systems during the 1965 and 1971 wars with India. In turn, Pakistan supported Turkey on
the Cyprus issue, and although Bhutto was a friend of Greek Premier Karamanlis, this did
not cause rift in the Pakistan-Turkey relationships. Rather, on the bases of this Bhutto
sought to mediate in the Turkey-Cyprus dispute.31
Afghanistan and Pakistan had had a troublesome relationship ever since 1947; Islamabad
had every reason to be on its guard when dealing with the Kabul authorities. Some of the
major issues over which the two countries had clashed in the past were: the legitimacy of
the Durand Line, the promotion of the Pakhtunistan issue, Afghanistans criticism of
Pakistans decision to establish One Unit 1955, the repeated severance of diplomatic
relations, the closure of their borders, and the allegation that the Afghan government had
considered sending its army to capture Peshawar during the 1971 war. It was in this
background that Pakistan in September 1974 did not take lightly Kabuls latest threat that
the long smoldering border dispute with Pakistan would erupt into a full scale war in
less than a month. Bhutto knew that this declaration was also mending to bolster the
Afghan governments legitimacy at home, since Sardar Daud had only recently careful
not to dismiss it outright. Pakistan expected Afghanistan to intensify its military support
for the Pukhtun and Baluch rebels in Pakistan. It was already accusing the Afghan
government of inciting the Pukhtuns to acts of violence and of harboring and training 25,
0000 guerrillas to start a peoples war against the Pakistan government.32
In order to resolve the growing differences between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Bhutto and
Daud held a series of talks in Kabul in June 1976. The Afghan government demanded
that it would only recognize the validity of the Durand Line after the Pukhtun and Baluch
NAP leaders, held
prisoners by the government of Pakistan were released. It was under intense pressure
from the Shah of Iran that Daud finally accepted Bhuttos original conditions in August
This agreement was signed, as in March 1978, without negotiation with the Afghan
government president Mohammed Zia ul Haq released all NAP leaders.33
Beside political relations Pakistan

also established military co-operation with Muslim countries from 1972 to 1977. Pakistan
concluded military protocols with the Kuwait, Iraq, Oman the United Arab Emirates,
Libya and Saudi Arabia and provided access to military installations and services to
Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Qatar, Syria, Sudan and Turkey. The
Palestine Liberation Organization also entered into separate agreements with Islamabad
provided training facilities in Pakistani defense institutions for members of the armed
forces of the contracting states. Islamabad also posted especial contingents from
Pakistans several services in these same countries.34
The mission of overseas contingents was declared to be training and technical assistance,
but some also assumed duties of a tactical nature. Saudi Arabia received the greater
attention in that well in excess of ten thousand men from the regular Pakistani army was
deployed there. Riyadh paid for such assistance in part by agreeing to assist Pakistan in
the purchase of sophistical weapons system from the United States and Europe. Oman
was another country receiving special military attention from Islamabad. The Sultan of
Oman compensated for the loss of British army personnel by both permitting the station
of Pakistani forces in the territory and by recruiting Baluchies from Pakistan to serve in
his Royal armed forces.35
Impacts of this change in foreign policy can be analyze as under,
1. Due to change in foreign policy a balance of relations with other countries was
created .Before 1971 Pakistan pursued pro-west policy because of which foreign
relationship became imbalance. Muslim world was not being paid special
attention but after assumption of power by Bhutto, foreign policy was balanced
.Now during and after his reign Pakistan was enjoying cordial relationship with
Muslim world .This relationship affected Pakistan in different angles.
2 .Before 1971 Pakistan was in state of isolation in the region and was not
enjoying good relations with neighboring Muslims countries, but due to this
change in foreign policy this state of isolation was ended. This state of isolation
was converted into state of friendly and strong regional relationship. Before and
during crisis of 1971 most of smaller and greater powers were either directly
supporting India or were indirectly benefiting her by their diplomatic and military
strategic etc.internationally Pakistan was pushed into state of isolation even the
trend of Muslim world was not enthusiastic infavour of Pakistan . But the state of
isolation was positively changed after creation balance in foreign relations.
Although diplomacy of greater

powers towards South Asian countries could not be changed positively but now Pakistan
was enjoying zealous support and harmonious relationships towards Muslim world.
Large and significant Muslim countries began to support Pakistan so at international level
this state of isolation was considerably removed
3. During the decade of 70s and80s Pakistan faced some significant internal and
external problems .at external level the danger of Indian aggression had also to be
faced. Under these circumstances the aids, grants and loans provided by Muslim
countries played vital role to deal with troublesome situation successfully whether
it was internal or external level .It was one of the impacts of change in policy
towards Muslim world that Pakistan was strongly supported after invasion of
Afghanistan by Soviet Union. During this period Pakistan had to face serious
threats and dangers with regards to security .So support by Muslim world to her
was very significant during that time.
4. Diplomacy adopted by Bhutto was proved successful when India exploded her
first nuclear device in 1974. After this explosion India became a nuclear power
and Pakistan had to face more serious threat with regard to security. Her integrity
and consolidation was now in a serious danger .At that time Muslim friend
countries of Pakistan supported her against the Indian aggression .So it was
because of the support by Muslim world to Pakistan that she dealt successfully
with situation and secured her self against Indian threat.
5. With the passage of time, Pakistan strengthen her diplomatic position with
Muslim countries. Pakistan did not enjoy any dominating or prestigious position
among these countries .now because of her special attention to develop
harmonious relations with Muslim countries, her diplomatic position was
improved. Even with the passage of time she became one of the leading countries
of the Muslim world .A number of ministerial conferences of Muslim countries
were held in Pakistan including two summits of heads of the member of
organization of Islamic Conference .Also a number of pacts composed and trade
activities were developed. These activities were the result of Pakistans sentiments
to develop cordial relationships with Muslim world and because of these activities
Pakistans diplomatic relations were considerably improved in Muslim world.
More over outside Muslim world at international level Pakistans position was
improved and Pakistan began to play more significant role at world levels
compared to pre-Bhutto era. It was also notable impact of foreign policy pursued
by Bhutto towards Muslim world.
If a comparison of Pakistans foreign

policy during the period 1947-77 is made, one can easily conclude that it was during
Bhutto era that Pakistan strengthened its relations with the Muslim World especially the
states of the Middle East. This period not only introduced Pakistan to the Muslim World
as a committed leader for the Islamic cause but also opened new avenues for Pakistanis
manpower, which in turn earned a huge amount of foreign exchange for the Gulf
countries. Bhuttos ties with the Muslim countries encouraged the religious elements to
demand greater Islamic content in public policies, and since the desire to have a more
Islamic society was not shared unanimously, this created greater societal divisions. The
American pressure upon Bhutto and Saudi support for Jamait-i-Islami were the factors
which changed the course of events for they facilitated the ouster of Bhutto and the
establishment of a military regime which posed as totally committed to a so-called
Islamic system of government .Zia quite shrewdly followed the path of pleasing the
American as well as the Saudi to strengthen his Islamization program and extracted
maximum advantage from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the revolution in Iran.
To sum up, it is easy to conclude that the establishment of close ties with Muslim
countries on the one hand come to absolve the policy failure of previous regimes, and on
the other, minimized the sense of isolation fostered by the changed geo-strategic
realities .As later developments proved this shift paid substantial dividends in restoring
the image of a difficult task of rehabilitation after the 1971 debacle. Islam became a
prominent part of Bhutto governments approach to foreign policy. This was not only
Bhuttos diplomatic skill but also was a requirement of time that in order to face the
challenges to country and nation, harmonious relationship with Muslim World should be
developed. By pursuing this policy not only the Mental, religious and Psychological
wishes were fulfilled at home, but also a number of diplomatic, religious and economical
advantages were gained abroad. So this change in direction and policy proved very useful
as well as successful both for country and politicians of the day. Later same skills were
also used by military Government of General Mohammed Zia- Ul- Haq and sympathies
of Muslim people were gained to greater extent at home and abroad.

End Notes
1. Shirin Tahir-kheli, In Search of an Identity: Islam and Pakistans Foreign
Policy, ed. Adeel Dwisha, Islam in Foreign Policy
(London: Cambridge) University Press, 1983), 70.
2. Masuma Hasan, Pakistan in a Changing World (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of
International Affairs, 1981), 172.
3. Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration
4. Tahir-Khali, 70.
5. Ibid.
6. WilliamJ.Barnds, Pakistans Foreign Policy: Shifting opportunities
andConstraints, ed.
Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: the long View (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1977), 372.
7. Tahir-Kheli, 70.
8. S.M Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistans Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 423.
9. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan: political Roots and Development 1947-1999(London:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 229.
10. Stanley Waldport, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1993), 248.
11. M.S.Naz, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (Lahore: Maqbool Academy, 1976), 60.
12. Burke and Ziring, 419-420.
13. Masuma Hasan, 204.
14. Muhammad Habib Sidky, Chinese World Strategy and South Asia: The China
Factor in Indo-Pakistan Relation, ed. Hameed A.K.Ray, Vol.1, Readings in
Pakistans Foreign Policy (Lahore:Aziz Publisher Urdu Bazar Lahore, 1981),374.
15. Burke and Ziring, 421.
16. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1971-1977(London: The Macmillan
Press, 1980), 74.
17. Safdar Mahmood, 232.
18. Saeed B. Rais, Public Policy and Reforms in Pakistan (1971-1977): An Analysis of
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Socio Economic Policies, Journal of South Asian and Middle
Eastern Studies Vol., No.3 (Spring 1988): 3738
19. Niloufer Mahdi, Pakistans Foreign Policy (1971-1981) The Search for Security
Karachi: Feroz Sons Pvt.Ltd, 1999) 256.

20. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, New Directions (London: Namra Publications, 1980), 39.
21. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan and India: Politics, Personalities and Foreign Policies,
Asian Survey, Vol.18, No.7 (July 1978): 711.
22. Niloufer Mahdi, 259.
23. Tahir-Kheli, 71.
24. Burke and Ziring, 407.
25. Dawn (Karachi), 15 January 1982.
26. Fazlur Rahman, Islam in Pakistan, Journal of South Asia and Middle Eastern
Studies, Vol.vii, No. (Summer 1985): 51.
27. Burke, and Ziring, 427.
28. Zalmay Khalid, Pakistan: The making of a nuclear Power, ed. Hameed
A.K.Rai, Vol.1, Readings in Pakistans Foreign Policy (Lahore:Aziz Publisher

Urdu Bazar, 1981), 191.

29. Z.A.Bhutto, If I am assassinated (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1982) 118.
30. Richard K.Betts,Incentives for Nuclear Weapons: India, Pakistan,
Survey, Vol.xxi, No.11 (November 1979): 1060.
31. Niloufer Mahdi, 265-266.
32. Rafi Raza, Bhutto and Pakistan (1967-1977) (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 1990) 235.
33. Bhutto, If I am assassinated, 107-108.
34. Hasan Askari Razvi, Pakistan and the Geo-strategic Environment: A case Study of
Foreign Policy (New York: St.Martins Press, 1993), 81.
35. Burk and Ziring, 425.


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3. Bhutto, Z.A. If I am assassinated. Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1982.

4. Burke, S.M. Pakistans Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis. Karachi: Oxford

University Press, 1990.
5. Burki, Shahid Javeed. Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1971-1977.London: The Macmillan
Press, 1980.

6. Feldman, Herbert. Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration.

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