FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998]

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul
and set aside the Resolution dated September 27, 1995 and the Decision dated April
10, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533, and the Orders dated
August 29, 1994 and February 2, 1995 that were issued by the trial court in Civil Case
No. Q-93-18394.
[1]

[2]

[3]

[6]

[4]

[5]

[7]

[8]

The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant petition, as stated in
the questioned Decision , are as follows:
[9]

On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight

Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. x x x
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff
went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi
and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals.Because it was almost
morning when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have
breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in te (sic)
room, Allah left on some pretext.Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted
to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel
heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police
came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an
accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA
officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They then
requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of
Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and
base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for the immediate
release of the detained crew members but did not succeed because

plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be tricked
into something she did not want because of her inability to understand
the local dialect.She also declined to sign a blank paper and a
document written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed
plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian
government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and
Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in
service by defendant SAUDI (sic). In September 1990, defendant
SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta
incident was already behind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr.
Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police station where
the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta
incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to
make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not
until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed
her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was
not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight
to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of
SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought
her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written
in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case
against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to
her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned
to Manila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to
Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further
investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIAs
Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary
and that it posed no danger to her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi
court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993,
a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the
Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the
airport, however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA

officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take flight. At the
Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr.
Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in
Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the
same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered
a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months
imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the
Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what
happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2)
going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of
Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of
Islamic tradition.
[10]

Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner
SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the Philippine
Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her
upkeep, she worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah
continued to serve in the international flights.
[11]

Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case
against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila,
she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the
cause.
[12]

On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA,
and Khaled Al-Balawi (Al- Balawi), its country manager.
[13]

On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss which raised
the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no cause of action against
Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or
demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case.
[14]

On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss) Saudia
filed a reply thereto on March 3, 1994.
[15]

[16]

On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint wherein Al-Balawi was
dropped as party defendant. On August 11, 1994, Saudia filed its Manifestation and
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint .
[17]

[18]

The trial court issued an Order dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Saudia.
[19]

From the Order of respondent Judge denying the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed
on September 20, 1994, its Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 29,
1994. It alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the
basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the
[20]

[21]

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On October 14, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To
Defendants Motion for Reconsideration).
[22]

In the Reply filed with the trial court on October 24, 1994, SAUDIA alleged that
since its Motion for Reconsideration raised lack of jurisdiction as its cause of action, the
Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply, even if that ground is raised for the first time on
appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines does not have any substantial
interest in the prosecution of the instant case, and hence, without jurisdiction to
adjudicate the same.
[23]

Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order dated February 2, 1995,

denying SAUDIAs Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent portion of the assailed
Order reads as follows:
[24]

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian

Airlines filed, thru counsel, on September 20, 1994, and the
Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on October 14,
1994, as well as the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi Arabian
Airlines filed, thru counsel, on October 24, 1994, considering that a
perusal of the plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which is one for the
recovery of actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees,
upon the basis of the applicable Philippine law, Article 21 of the New
Civil Code of the Philippines, is, clearly, within the jurisdiction of this
Court as regards the subject matter, and there being nothing new of
substance which might cause the reversal or modification of the order
sought to be reconsidered, the motion for reconsideration of the
defendant, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

[25]

Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals.
[26]

Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with Temporary Restraining

Order dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting the respondent Judge from further
conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in the interim.
[27]

In another Resolution promulgated on September 27, 1995, now assailed, the

appellate court denied SAUDIAs Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit:
[28]

The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is

hereby DENIED, after considering the Answer, with Prayer to Deny
Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder, it
appearing that herein petitioner is not clearly entitled thereto (Unciano
Paramedical College, et. Al., v. Court of Appeals, et. Al., 100335, April
7, 1993, Second Division).

SO ORDERED.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the instant
Petition for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order dated October 13,
1995.
[29]

However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent Court of Appeals
rendered the Decision dated April 10, 1996, now also assailed. It ruled that the
Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaints basis for
recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the
jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held that certiorariis not the proper remedy in
a denial of a Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to
trial, and in case of an adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
[30]

On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order dated April 30, 1996, given due course by this
Court. After both parties submitted their Memoranda, the instant case is now deemed
submitted for decision.
[31]

[32]

Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:

I

The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case No. Q-93-18394
based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code since the proper law applicable is
the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch as this case involves what is
known in private international law as a conflicts problem. Otherwise, the
Republic of the Philippines will sit in judgment of the acts done by another
sovereign state which is abhorred.
II.

Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a jurisdictional

requirement. Besides, the matter as to absence of leave of court is now moot
and academic when this Honorable Court required the respondents to
comment on petitioners April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With
Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order Within Ten (10) Days From Notice
Thereof.Further, the Revised Rules of Court should be construed with
liberality pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.
III.

Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996 decision in CA-G.R.
SP NO. 36533 entitled Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al.
and filed its April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer For
A Temporary Restraining Order on May 7, 1996 at 10:29 a.m. or within the 15day reglementary period as provided for under Section 1, Rule 45 of the

Revised Rules of Court. Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533

has not yet become final and executory and this Honorable Court can take
cognizance of this case.
[33]

From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the following issues
emerge for our resolution:
I.

WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY CIVIL CASE NO. Q-9318394 ENTITLED MILAGROS P. MORADA V. SAUDI ARABIAN
AIRLINES.
II.

WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING

THAT IN THE CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at
the outset. It maintains that private respondents claim for alleged abuse of rights
occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign
element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.
[34]

On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint
is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a
matter of domestic law.
[35]

[36]

[37]

Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that the
interplay of events occurred in two states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia.
As stated by private respondent in her Amended Complaint dated June 23, 1994:
[38]

2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign

airlines corporation doing business in the Philippines. It may be served
with summons and other court processes at Travel Wide Associated
Sales (Phils.), Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building, 114 Valero St., Salcedo
Village, Makati, Metro Manila.
xxxxxxxxx

6. Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian

government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and
Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in
service by defendant SAUDIA. In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA
transferred plaintiff to Manila.

7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta
incident was already behind her, her superiors requested her to see
MR. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police station where
the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta
incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to
make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not
until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and
allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
8. One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila,
plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Meniewy, the Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA
office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to
close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff
signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June 27,
1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report
to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further
investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIAs
Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary
and that it posed no danger to her.
10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same
Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28,
1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about
the Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At
the airport, however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA
officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take that flight. At
the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of
Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in
Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.
11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to
the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock,
rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five
months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that
the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what
happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2)

going to a disco, dancing, and listening to the music in violation of

Islamic laws; (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of
Islamic tradition.
12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the case, plaintiff
sought the help of the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah. The latter
helped her pursue an appeal from the decision of the court. To pay for
her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flights of defendant SAUDIA
while, ironically, Thamer and Allah freely served the international
flights.
[39]

Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign

element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a conflicts case.
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws
of two or more states is said to contain a foreign element. The presence of a foreign
element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations
are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.
[40]

The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign
element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or
has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves
properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a
complex form.
[41]

[42]

In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent
Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign
corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a
flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across
national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice
versa, that caused a conflicts situation to arise.
We thus find private respondents assertion that the case is purely domestic,
imprecise. A conflicts problem presents itself here, and the question of
jurisdiction confronts the court a quo.
[43]

After a careful study of the private respondents Amended Complaint, and the
Comment thereon, we note that she aptly predicated her cause of action on Articles 19
and 21 of the New Civil Code.
[44]

On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides;

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.
On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damages.
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that:
[45]

The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand

the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its
provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondents assertion that violations of Articles
19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal forum.
Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules
of Court on jurisdiction we find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Its authority to try and hear
the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:
[46]

[47]

[48]

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known

as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby amended to
read as follows:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction:
xxxxxxxxx

(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of

whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of
the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand
pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxxxxxxxx
And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Courtthe venue, Quezon
City, is appropriate:

SEC. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. [Now Regional Trial Court]

(a) x x x x x x x x x
(b) Personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be

found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the

election of the plaintiff.
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh
heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private
interest of the litigant.Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite
obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff
may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, vex, harass, or oppress the defendant,
e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.
[49]

Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the
case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be
forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. That
would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the
plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties
herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private
respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions praying for the
dismissal of Moradas Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex
Abundante Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit from the
motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably,
petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial courts jurisdiction by praying for
the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
[50]

As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and Company, Ltd.:

[51]

We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962, aside
from disputing the lower courts jurisdiction over defendants person,
prayed for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs
cause of action has prescribed. By interposing such second ground in
its motion to dismiss, Ker and Co., Ltd. availed of an affirmative
defense on the basis of which it prayed the court to resolve
controversy in its favor. For the court to validly decide the said plea of
defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it necessarily had to acquire jurisdiction
upon the latters person, who, being the proponent of the affirmative
defense, should be deemed to have abandoned its special
appearance and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
court.
Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that:

When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the

jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and
separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his
motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the court. A special appearance by motion made for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to
be a general appearance, if the party in said motion should, for
example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon the further ground that
the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
[52]

Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial court has jurisdiction over the case and that its
exercise thereof, justified.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to
answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation
where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what
extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
[53]

Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that
should ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically
advance both notions of justice and predictability, they do not always do so. The forum
is then faced with the problem of deciding which of these two important values should
be stressed.
[54]

Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what

category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as characterization, or
the doctrine of qualification. It is the process of deciding whether or not the facts relate
to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule. The purpose of characterization is
to enable the forum to select the proper law.
[55]

[56]

Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation,
event, or operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a test
or connecting factor or point of contact. Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a
factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or
point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
[57]

[58]

Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test
for the determination of the applicable law. These test factors or points of contact or
connecting factors could be any of the following:
[59]

(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;

(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed
to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights
are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such
as the place where a contract has been made, a marriage
celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is
particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the
place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power
of attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should
govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted
or done. The lex forithe law of the forumis particularly important
because, as we have seen earlier, matters of procedure not going to
the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because
the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable
foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason
that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign
law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal
relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers
contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment. (Underscoring
ours.)
[60]

After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the

Amended Complaint deemed submitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are
convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondents assertion that although
she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense
that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the
two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As
it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including
adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the handing over or
turning over of the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have
acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioners purported act contributed to and
amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of
private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and
prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioners authority as employer,
taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly
found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of private

respondent was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon
her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide
compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the
connecting factor or point of contact could be the place or places where the tortious
conduct or lex loci actus occurred.And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we
find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged
tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner
allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According
to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in
the performance of its duties, act with justice, give her her due and observe honesty and
good faith. Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or
parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view
what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the fatality of the alleged
injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had
lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not
without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti
commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh
judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories
on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the State of the most significant
relationship rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual
context of this case.
[61]

In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place
where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
[62]

As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and
lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a
resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged
here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the relationship between the
parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on
mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most
significant contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by private respondent as
plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly
established.
[63]

Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complaint of
and the place having the most interest in the problem, we find, by way of recapitulation,
that the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application to and control
in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the
respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter

of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could properly apply
Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioners insistence that [s]ince private
respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of pleading and proving the
applicable Saudi law on the matter. As aptly said by private respondent, she has no
obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of
action is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her
Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings she never alleged that Saudi law should
govern this case. And as correctly held by the respondent appellate court,
considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the applicability of the law of
Saudi Arabia, thus the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the
law of Saudi Arabia is.
[64]

[65]

[66]

Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding the
trial courts denial of defendants (herein petitioners) motion to dismiss the case. Not only
was jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was obviously
available, and the expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at
hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the state intimately concerned with the ultimate
outcome of the case below not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also for the
vindication of the countrys system of law and justice in a transnational setting. With
these guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed to try and adjudge the case in the
light of relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign element or
elements involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as prejudging
the results of the case in any manner whatsoever.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case
No. Q-93-18394 entitled Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines is hereby
REMANDED to Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST CHAIRMAN
RAMON T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et al., as members of the
PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING COMMITTEES ON THE UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION PETITION OF
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES IN JAPAN, respondents.

Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives
and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land
at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990. We
granted the prayer for a temporary restraining order effective February 20, 1990. One of the
petitioners (in G.R. No. 92047) likewise prayes for a writ of mandamus to compel the
respondents to fully disclose to the public the basis of their decision to push through with
the sale of the Roppongi property inspire of strong public opposition and to explain the
proceedings which effectively prevent the participation of Filipino citizens and entities in the
bidding process.
The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013, Laurel v. Garcia, et al. were heard by the Court on
March 13, 1990. After G.R. No. 92047, Ojeda v. Secretary Macaraig, et al. was filed, the
respondents were required to file a comment by the Court's resolution dated February 22,
1990. The two petitions were consolidated on March 27, 1990 when the memoranda of the
parties in the Laurel case were deliberated upon.
The Court could not act on these cases immediately because the respondents filed a motion
for an extension of thirty (30) days to file comment in G.R. No. 92047, followed by a second
motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days which we granted on May 8, 1990, a third
motion for extension of time granted on May 24, 1990 and a fourth motion for extension of
time which we granted on June 5, 1990 but calling the attention of the respondents to the
length of time the petitions have been pending. After the comment was filed, the petitioner in
G.R. No. 92047 asked for thirty (30) days to file a reply. We noted his motion and resolved to
decide the two (2) cases.
I
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9,
1956, the other lots being:
(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo which has an area
of approximately 2,489.96 square meters, and is at present the site of the Philippine Embassy
Chancery;
(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with an area of around 764.72
square meters and categorized as a commercial lot now being used as a warehouse and
parking lot for the consulate staff; and

(3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2 Obanoyama-cho, Shinohara, Nada-ku, Kobe, a
residential lot which is now vacant.
The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government
for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for
their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II.
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be
payable in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be
fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2, Reparations Agreement). Rep.
Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on procurement and
utilization of reparations and development loans. The procurements are divided into those for
use by the government sector and those for private parties in projects as the then National
Economic Council shall determine. Those intended for the private sector shall be made
available by sale to Filipino citizens or to one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities
in national development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year
Schedule and listed under the heading "Government Sector", through Reparations Contract
No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. The Roppongi property consists of the land and building "for
the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy" (Annex M-D to Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 503).
As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to
Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the
failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained
undeveloped since that time.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador
to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a
Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation which shall construct two (2) buildings in Roppongi
and one (1) building in Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine Chancery in
Nampeidai. The consideration of the construction would be the lease to the foreign
corporation of one (1) of the buildings to be constructed in Roppongi and the two (2)
buildings in Nampeidai. The other building in Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine
Embassy Chancery. At the end of the lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be
occupied and used by the Philippine government. No change of ownership or title shall
occur. (See Annex "B" to Reply to Comment) The Philippine government retains the title all
throughout the lease period and thereafter. However, the government has not acted favorably
on this proposal which is pending approval and ratification between the parties. Instead, on
August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of
Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through Administrative Order
No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens
or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or
disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned
in the first "Whereas" clause.

Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been
pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the
Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price of $225
million. The first bidding was a failure since only one bidder qualified. The second one, after
postponements, has not yet materialized. The last scheduled bidding on February 21, 1990
was restrained by his Court. Later, the rules on bidding were changed such that the $225
million floor price became merely a suggested floor price.
The Court finds that each of the herein petitions raises distinct issues. The petitioner in G.R.
No. 92013 objects to the alienation of the Roppongi property to anyone while the petitioner in
G.R. No. 92047 adds as a principal objection the alleged unjustified bias of the Philippine
government in favor of selling the property to non-Filipino citizens and entities. These
petitions have been consolidated and are resolved at the same time for the objective is the
same - to stop the sale of the Roppongi property.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following issues:
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine
Government?; and
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to
sell the Roppongi property?
Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047, apart from questioning the authority of the
government to alienate the Roppongi property assails the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 296 in making the property available for sale to non-Filipino citizens and entities.
He also questions the bidding procedures of the Committee on the Utilization or Disposition
of Philippine Government Properties in Japan for being discriminatory against Filipino
citizens and Filipino-owned entities by denying them the right to be informed about the
bidding requirements.
II
In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi property and the related lots
were acquired as part of the reparations from the Japanese government for diplomatic and
consular use by the Philippine government. Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi
property is classified as one of public dominion, and not of private ownership under Article
420 of the Civil Code (See infra).
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for public
service" in paragraph 2 of the above provision. He states that being one of public dominion,
no ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by the State. The Roppongi and related
properties were acquired for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and consular quarters, buildings
and other improvements" (Second Year Reparations Schedule). The petitioner states that
they continue to be intended for a necessary service. They are held by the State in
anticipation of an opportune use. (Citing 3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot be appropriated,

is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it cannot be alienated nor
be the subject matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]).
Noting the non-use of the Roppongi property at the moment, the petitioner avers that the
same remains property of public dominion so long as the government has not used it for
other purposes nor adopted any measure constituting a removal of its original purpose or
use.
The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying that the subject
property is not governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is
located. They rely upon the rule of lex situs which is used in determining the applicable law
regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property. They also invoke
Opinion No. 21, Series of 1988, dated January 27, 1988 of the Secretary of Justice which used
the lex situs in explaining the inapplicability of Philippine law regarding a property situated in
Japan.
The respondents add that even assuming for the sake of argument that the Civil Code is
applicable, the Roppongi property has ceased to become property of public dominion. It has
become patrimonial property because it has not been used for public service or for
diplomatic purposes for over thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and
because the intention by the Executive Department and the Congress to convert it to private
use has been manifested by overt acts, such as, among others: (1) the transfer of the
Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai (2) the issuance of administrative orders for the possibility
of alienating the four government properties in Japan; (3) the issuance of Executive Order
No. 296; (4) the enactment by the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law] on June 10, 1988 which contains a provision stating that funds may be
taken from the sale of Philippine properties in foreign countries; (5) the holding of the public
bidding of the Roppongi property but which failed; (6) the deferment by the Senate in
Resolution No. 55 of the bidding to a future date; thus an acknowledgment by the Senate of
the government's intention to remove the Roppongi property from the public service
purpose; and (7) the resolution of this Court dismissing the petition in Ojeda v. Bidding
Committee, et al., G.R. No. 87478 which sought to enjoin the second bidding of the Roppongi
property scheduled on March 30, 1989.
III
In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks this Court to rule on the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 296. He had earlier filed a petition in G.R. No. 87478 which the Court
dismissed on August 1, 1989. He now avers that the executive order contravenes the
constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the national patrimony stated in the
Preamble of the 1987 Constitution. It also allegedly violates:
(1) The reservation of the ownership and acquisition of alienable lands of the public domain
to Filipino citizens. (Sections 2 and 3, Article XII, Constitution; Sections 22 and 23 of
Commonwealth Act 141).
itc-asl

(2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony (Section 10, Article VI, Constitution);
(3) The protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade
practices;
(4) The guarantee of the right of the people to information on all matters of public concern
(Section 7, Article III, Constitution);
(5) The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino citizens or entities not wholly owned by
Filipino citizens of capital goods received by the Philippines under the Reparations Act
(Sections 2 and 12 of Rep. Act No. 1789); and
(6) The declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest (Section 28, Article III, Constitution).
Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public funds in the execution of an unconstitutional
executive order is a misapplication of public funds He states that since the details of the
bidding for the Roppongi property were never publicly disclosed until February 15, 1990 (or a
few days before the scheduled bidding), the bidding guidelines are available only in Tokyo,
and the accomplishment of requirements and the selection of qualified bidders should be
done in Tokyo, interested Filipino citizens or entities owned by them did not have the chance
to comply with Purchase Offer Requirements on the Roppongi. Worse, the Roppongi shall be
sold for a minimum price of $225 million from which price capital gains tax under Japanese
law of about 50 to 70% of the floor price would still be deducted.
IV
The petitioners and respondents in both cases do not dispute the fact that the Roppongi site
and the three related properties were through reparations agreements, that these were
assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property itself was specifically
designated under the Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine Embassy.
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is
dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of
procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the
property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot
be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment,
an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The
purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the
common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropration. (Taken from 3 Manresa,

66-69; cited in Tolentino, Commentaries on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition,
Vol. II, p. 26).
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks shores roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil
Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been changed because
the lot has been Idle for some years? Has it become patrimonial?
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service
does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only
if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66
SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials
insinuating a change of intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the
intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property
under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite Abandonment cannot be inferred from the
non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own
deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the
property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must
be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the
Roppongi property's original purpose. Even the failure by the government to repair the
building in Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a shortage
of government funds. The recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status and

conditions of government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did
not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an "authority to sell", does not have a
provision in its text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan
for the government sector. The executive order does not declare that the properties lost their
public character. It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to
Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other disposition. It merely eliminates the restriction
under Rep. Act No. 1789 that reparations goods may be sold only to Filipino citizens and one
hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities. The text of Executive Order No. 296
provides:
Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as amended, and of other
laws to the contrary notwithstanding, the above-mentioned properties can be
made available for sale, lease or any other manner of disposition to nonFilipino citizens or to entities owned by non-Filipino citizens.
Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong premise or assumption that the Roppongi and
the three other properties were earlier converted into alienable real properties. As earlier
stated, Rep. Act No. 1789 differentiates the procurements for the government sector and the
private sector (Sections 2 and 12, Rep. Act No. 1789). Only the private sector properties can
be sold to end-users who must be Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality
provision which was amended by Executive Order No. 296.
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the sources of
funds for its implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the
Government in foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being
classified as one of public dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section
63 (c) refers to properties which are alienable and not to those reserved for public use or
service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the
Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as
and when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299.
Obviously any property outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source of
funds.
The respondents try to get around the public dominion character of the Roppongi property by
insisting that Japanese law and not our Civil Code should apply.
It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all people, should be the ones
to insist that in the sale of extremely valuable government property, Japanese law and not
Philippine law should prevail. The Japanese law - its coverage and effects, when enacted,
and exceptions to its provision is not presented to the Court It is simply asserted that
the lex loci rei sitae or Japanese law should apply without stating what that law provides. It is
a ed on faith that Japanese law would allow the sale.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation
exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or
ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the
formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private
International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need
to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the
property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to
validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted
to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of
the lex situsrule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real
properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to
sell them. In discussing who are capableof acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains
that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the
constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and
entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in belaboring whether or
not this opinion is correct. Why should we discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when
there is no showing that it can be sold?
The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino of the recommendation by
the investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least,
conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the
approval does not have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her
legislative powers. The Congress had already convened for more than a year.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no longer of
public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance.
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides
Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party.
In cases in which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a
party to any deed or other instrument conveying the title to real estate or to
any other property the value of which is in excess of one hundred thousand
pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary
papers which, together with the proper recommendations, shall be submitted
to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed,

instrument, or contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the

Philippines on behalf of the Government of the Philippines unless the
Government of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly
vested by law in another officer. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292).
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real
property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested
by law in another officer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the
name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her
own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by
the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of
the Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from public domain much less
authorize its sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning the public
character of the Roppongi property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is
conducting hearings on Senate Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy
considerations and calls for a fact-finding investigation of the circumstances behind the
decision to sell the Philippine government properties in Japan.
The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., supra, did not pass upon
the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. Contrary to respondents' assertion, we did
not uphold the authority of the President to sell the Roppongi property. The Court stated that
the constitutionality of the executive order was not the real issue and that resolving the
constitutional question was "neither necessary nor finally determinative of the case." The
Court noted that "[W]hat petitioner ultimately questions is the use of the proceeds of the
disposition of the Roppongi property." In emphasizing that "the decision of the Executive to
dispose of the Roppongi property to finance the CARP ... cannot be questioned" in view of
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, the Court did not acknowledge the fact that the property
became alienable nor did it indicate that the President was authorized to dispose of the
Roppongi property. The resolution should be read to mean that in case the Roppongi
property is re-classified to be patrimonial and alienable by authority of law, the proceeds of a
sale may be used for national economic development projects including the CARP.

Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not materialize. The petitions before us question the proposed
1990 sale of the Roppongi property. We are resolving the issues raised in these petitions, not
the issues raised in 1989.
Having declared a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property
from public domain to make it alienable and a need for legislative authority to allow the sale
of the property, we see no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issues raised by
petitioner Ojeda.
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are
properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination
of the case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will not pass upon a constitutional
question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some
other ground such as the application of a statute or general law (Siler v. Louisville and
Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
[1941]).
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 states why the Roppongi property should not be sold:
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given to the
Filipino people in reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and
suffered during the Japanese military occupation, for the suffering of widows
and orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred, for the homes and other
properties lost by countless Filipinos during the war. The Tokyo properties are
a monument to the bravery and sacrifice of the Filipino people in the face of an
invader; like the monuments of Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino heroes, we do
not expect economic or financial benefits from them. But who would think of
selling these monuments? Filipino honor and national dignity dictate that we
keep our properties in Japan as memorials to the countless Filipinos who died
and suffered. Even if we should become paupers we should not think of selling
them. For it would be as if we sold the lives and blood and tears of our
countrymen. (Rollo- G.R. No. 92013, p.147)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 also states:
Roppongi is no ordinary property. It is one ceded by the Japanese government
in atonement for its past belligerence for the valiant sacrifice of life and limb
and for deaths, physical dislocation and economic devastation the whole
Filipino people endured in World War II.
It is for what it stands for, and for what it could never bring back to life, that its
significance today remains undimmed, inspire of the lapse of 45 years since
the war ended, inspire of the passage of 32 years since the property passed on
to the Philippine government.

Roppongi is a reminder that cannot should not be dissipated ... (Rollo92047, p. 9)

It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated
prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all
Filipinos veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties
will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must
concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and
disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. A writ of
prohibition is issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale of the
Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The February 20, 1990 Temporary Restraining Order is
made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur completely with the excellent ponencia of Mr. Justice Gutierrez and will add the
following observations only for emphasis.
It is clear that the respondents have failed to show the President's legal authority to sell the
Roppongi property. When asked to do so at the hearing on these petitions, the Solicitor
General was at best ambiguous, although I must add in fairness that this was not his fault.
The fact is that there is -no such authority. Legal expertise alone cannot conjure that
statutory permission out of thin air.
Exec. Order No. 296, which reads like so much legislative, double talk, does not contain such
authority. Neither does Rep. Act No. 6657, which simply allows the proceeds of the sale of our
properties abroad to be used for the comprehensive agrarian reform program. Senate Res.
No. 55 was a mere request for the deferment of the scheduled sale of tile Roppongi property,
possibly to stop the transaction altogether; and ill any case it is not a law. The sale of the
said property may be authorized only by Congress through a duly enacted statute, and there
is no such law.

Once again, we have affirmed the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men,
where every public official, from the lowest to the highest, can act only by virtue of a valid
authorization. I am happy to note that in the several cases where this Court has ruled against
her, the President of the Philippines has submitted to this principle with becoming grace.

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez, Jr., I only wish to make a few
observations which could help in further clarifying the issues.
Under our tripartite system of government ordained by the Constitution, it is Congress that
lays down or determines policies. The President executes such policies. The policies
determined by Congress are embodied in legislative enactments that have to be approved by
the President to become law. The President, of course, recommends to Congress the
approval of policies but, in the final analysis, it is Congress that is the policy - determining
branch of government.
The judiciary interprets the laws and, in appropriate cases, determines whether the laws
enacted by Congress and approved by the President, and presidential acts implementing
such laws, are in accordance with the Constitution.
The Roppongi property was acquired by the Philippine government pursuant to the
reparations agreement between the Philippine and Japanese governments. Under such
agreement, this property was acquired by the Philippine government for a specific purpose,
namely, to serve as the site of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. Consequently,
Roppongi is a property of public dominion and intended for public service, squarely falling
within that class of property under Art. 420 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion :
(1) ...
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
(339a)
Public dominion property intended for public service cannot be alienated unless the property
is first transformed into private property of the state otherwise known as patrimonial property
of the state. 1 The transformation of public dominion property to state patrimonial property
involves, to my mind, a policy decision. It is a policy decision because the treatment of the
property varies according to its classification. Consequently, it is Congress which can decide and
declare the conversion of Roppongi from a public dominion property to a state patrimonial
property. Congress has made no such decision or declaration.

Moreover, the sale of public property (once converted from public dominion to state
patrimonial property) must be approved by Congress, for this again is a matter of policy (i.e.
to keep or dispose of the property). Sec. 48, Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987
provides:
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real
property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, by the President, unless the
authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but
titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate
agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency
or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
But the record is bare of any congressional decision or approval to sell Roppongi. The record
is likewise bare of any congressional authority extended to the President to sell Roppongi
thru public bidding or otherwise.
It is therefore, clear that the President cannot sell or order the sale of Roppongi thru public
bidding or otherwise without a prior congressional approval, first, converting Roppongi from
a public dominion property to a state patrimonial property, and, second, authorizing the
President to sell the same.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to make PERMANENT the temporary
restraining order earlier issued by this Court.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

The central question, as I see it, is whether or not the so-called "Roppongi property' has lost
its nature as property of public dominion, and hence, has become patrimonial property of the
State. I understand that the parties are agreed that it was property intended for "public
service" within the contemplation of paragraph (2), of Article 430, of the Civil Code, and
accordingly, land of State dominion, and beyond human commerce. The lone issue is, in the
light of supervening developments, that is non-user thereof by the National Government (for
diplomatic purposes) for the last thirteen years; the issuance of Executive Order No. 296
making it available for sale to any interested buyer; the promulgation of Republic Act No.
6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, making available for the program's financing,
State assets sold; the approval by the President of the recommendation of the investigating
committee formed to study the property's utilization; and the issuance of Resolution No. 55

of the Philippine Senate requesting for the deferment of its disposition it, "Roppongi", is still
property of the public dominion, and if it is not, how it lost that character.
When land of the public dominion ceases to be one, or when the change takes place, is a
question our courts have debated early. In a 1906 decision, 1 it was held that property of the
public dominion, a public plaza in this instance, becomes patrimonial upon use thereof for
purposes other than a plaza. In a later case, 2 this ruling was reiterated. Likewise, it has been held
that land, originally private property, has become of public dominion upon its donation to the
town and its conversion and use as a public plaza. 3 It is notable that under these three cases, the
character of the property, and any change occurring therein, depends on the actual use to which it
is dedicated. 4
Much later, however, the Court held that "until a formal declaration on the part of the
Government, through the executive department or the Legislative, to the effect that the
land . . . is no longer needed for [public] service- for public use or for special industries, [it]
continue[s] to be part of the public [dominion], not available for private expropriation or
ownership." 5 So also, it was ruled that a political subdivision (the City of Cebu in this case) alone
may declare (under its charter) a city road abandoned and thereafter, to dispose of it. 6
In holding that there is "a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi
property from public domain to make it alienable and a land for legislative authority to allow
the sale of the property" 7the majority lays stress to the fact that: (1) An affirmative act
executive or legislative is necessary to reclassify property of the public dominion, and (2) a
legislative decree is required to make it alienable. It also clears the uncertainties brought about by
earlier interpretations that the nature of property-whether public or patrimonial is predicated on
the manner it is actually used, or not used, and in the same breath, repudiates the Government's
position that the continuous non-use of "Roppongi", among other arguments, for "diplomatic
purposes", has turned it into State patrimonial property.
I feel that this view corresponds to existing pronouncements of this Court, among other
things, that: (1) Property is presumed to be State property in the absence of any showing to
the contrary; 8 (2) With respect to forest lands, the same continue to be lands of the public
dominion unless and until reclassified by the Executive Branch of the Government; 9 and (3) All
natural resources, under the Constitution, and subject to exceptional cases, belong to the State. 10
I am elated that the Court has banished previous uncertainties.

FELICIANO, J., dissenting

With regret, I find myself unable to share the conclusions reached by Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr.
For purposes of this separate opinion, I assume that the piece of land located in 306
Roppongi, 5-Chome, Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter referred to as the "Roppongi

property") may be characterized as property of public dominion, within the meaning of Article
420 (2) of the Civil Code:
[Property] which belong[s] to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service -.
It might not be amiss however, to note that the appropriateness of trying to bring within the
confines of the simple threefold classification found in Article 420 of the Civil Code ("property
for public use property "intended for some public service" and property intended "for the
development of the national wealth") all property owned by the Republic of the Philippines
whether found within the territorial boundaries of the Republic or located within the territory
of another sovereign State, is not self-evident. The first item of the classification property
intended for public use can scarcely be properly applied to property belonging to the
Republic but found within the territory of another State. The third item of the classification
property intended for the development of the national wealth is illustrated, in Article 339 of
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, by mines or mineral properties. Again, mineral lands owned
by a sovereign State are rarely, if ever, found within the territorial base of another sovereign
State. The task of examining in detail the applicability of the classification set out in Article
420 of our Civil Code to property that the Philippines happens to own outside its own
boundaries must, however, be left to academicians.
For present purposes, too, I agree that there is no question of conflict of laws that is, at the
present time, before this Court. The issues before us relate essentially to authority to sell the
Roppongi property so far as Philippine law is concerned.
The majority opinion raises two (2) issues: (a) whether or not the Roppongi property has
been converted into patrimonial property or property of the private domain of the State; and
(b) assuming an affirmative answer to (a), whether or not there is legal authority to dispose of
the Roppongi property.
I
Addressing the first issue of conversion of property of public dominion intended for some
public service, into property of the private domain of the Republic, it should be noted that the
Civil Code does not address the question of who has authority to effect such conversion.
Neither does the Civil Code set out or refer to any procedure for such conversion.
Our case law, however, contains some fairly explicit pronouncements on this point, as
Justice Sarmiento has pointed out in his concurring opinion. In Ignacio v. Director of
Lands (108 Phils. 335 [1960]), petitioner Ignacio argued that if the land in question formed
part of the public domain, the trial court should have declared the same no longer necessary
for public use or public purposes and which would, therefore, have become disposable and
available for private ownership. Mr. Justice Montemayor, speaking for the Court, said:
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore
is no longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for

purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for

coast-guard service, the government shall declare it to be the property of the
owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe
that only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the
authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the
sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, or for coast-guard service. If no such declaration has been
made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain.
(Natividad v. Director of Lands, supra.)
The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case of
Vicente Joven y Monteverde v. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134 (cited in Velayo's
Digest, Vol. 1, p. 52).
... is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed
in a position to determine whether any public land are to be used for the
purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters. Consequently, until
a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive
department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no
longer needed for coast-guard service, for public use or for special industries,
they continue to be part of the public domain not available for private
appropriation or ownership.(108 Phil. at 338-339; emphasis supplied)
Thus, under Ignacio, either the Executive Department or the Legislative Department may
convert property of the State of public dominion into patrimonial property of the State. No
particular formula or procedure of conversion is specified either in statute law or in case law.
Article 422 of the Civil Code simply states that: "Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State". I respectfully submit, therefore, that the only requirement which is legitimately
imposable is that the intent to convert must be reasonably clear from a consideration of the
acts or acts of the Executive Department or of the Legislative Department which are said to
have effected such conversion.
The same legal situation exists in respect of conversion of property of public dominion
belonging to municipal corporations, i.e., local governmental units, into patrimonial property
of such entities. In CebuOxygen Acetylene v. Bercilles (66 SCRA 481 [1975]), the City Council
of Cebu by resolution declared a certain portion of an existing street as an abandoned road,
"the same not being included in the city development plan". Subsequently, by another
resolution, the City Council of Cebu authorized the acting City Mayor to sell the land through
public bidding. Although there was no formal and explicit declaration of conversion of
property for public use into patrimonial property, the Supreme Court said:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for
registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such

withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an

ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use of for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very
clear and unequivocal terms, states that "Property thus withdrawn from public
servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real
property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."
Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its
subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a
registrable title over the lot in question. (66 SCRA at 484-; emphasis supplied)
Thus, again as pointed out by Sarmiento J., in his separate opinion, in the case of property
owned by municipal corporations simple non-use or the actual dedication of public property
to some use other than "public use" or some "public service", was sufficient legally to
convert such property into patrimonial property (Municipality of Oas v. Roa, 7 Phil. 20 [1906]Municipality of Hinunganan v. Director of Lands 24 Phil. 124 [1913]; Province of Zamboanga
del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968).
I would also add that such was the case not only in respect of' property of municipal
corporations but also in respect of property of the State itself. Manresa in commenting on
Article 341 of the 1889 Spanish Civil Code which has been carried over verbatim into our Civil
Code by Article 422 thereof, wrote:
La dificultad mayor en todo esto estriba, naturalmente, en fijar el momento en
que los bienes de dominio publico dejan de serlo. Si la Administracion o la
autoridad competente legislative realizan qun acto en virtud del cual cesa el
destino o uso publico de los bienes de que se trata naturalmente la dificultad
queda desde el primer momento resuelta. Hay un punto de partida cierto para
iniciar las relaciones juridicas a que pudiera haber lugar Pero puede ocurrir
que no haya taldeclaracion expresa, legislativa or administrativa, y, sin
embargo, cesar de hecho el destino publico de los bienes; ahora bien, en este
caso, y para los efectos juridicos que resultan de entrar la cosa en el comercio
de los hombres,' se entedera que se ha verificado la conversion de los bienes
patrimoniales?
El citado tratadista Ricci opina, respecto del antiguo Codigo italiano, por la
afirmativa, y por nuestra parte creemos que tal debe ser la soluciion. El
destino de las cosas no depende tanto de una declaracion expresa como del
uso publico de las mismas, y cuanda el uso publico cese con respecto de
determinados bienes, cesa tambien su situacion en el dominio publico. Si una
fortaleza en ruina se abandona y no se repara, si un trozo de la via publica se

abandona tambien por constituir otro nuevo an mejores condiciones....ambos

bienes cesan de estar Codigo, y leyes especiales mas o memos
administrativas. (3 Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol, p. 128 [7a
ed.; 1952) (Emphasis supplied)
The majority opinion says that none of the executive acts pointed to by the Government
purported, expressly or definitely, to convert the Roppongi property into patrimonial property
of the Republic. Assuming that to be the case, it is respectfully submitted that cumulative
effect of the executive acts here involved was to convert property originally intended for and
devoted to public service into patrimonial property of the State, that is, property susceptible
of disposition to and appropration by private persons. These executive acts, in their totality if
not each individual act, make crystal clear the intent of the Executive Department to effect
such conversion. These executive acts include:
(a) Administrative Order No. 3 dated 11 August 1985, which created a Committee to study the
disposition/utilization of the Government's property in Japan, The Committee was composed
of officials of the Executive Department: the Executive Secretary; the Philippine Ambassador
to Japan; and representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Asset
Privatization Trust. On 19 September 1988, the Committee recommended to the President the
sale of one of the lots (the lot specifically in Roppongi) through public bidding. On 4 October
1988, the President approved the recommendation of the Committee.
On 14 December 1988, the Philippine Government by diplomatic note informed the Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic's intention to dispose of the property in Roppongi.
The Japanese Government through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that it interposed no
objection to such disposition by the Republic. Subsequently, the President and the
Committee informed the leaders of the House of Representatives and of the Senate of the
Philippines of the proposed disposition of the Roppongi property.
(b) Executive Order No. 296, which was issued by the President on 25 July 1987. Assuming
that the majority opinion is right in saying that Executive Order No. 296 is insufficient
to authorize the sale of the Roppongi property, it is here submitted with respect that
Executive Order No. 296 is more than sufficient to indicate an intention to convert the
property previously devoted to public service into patrimonial property that is capable of
being sold or otherwise disposed of
(c) Non-use of the Roppongi lot for fourteen (14) years for diplomatic or for any other public
purposes. Assuming (but only arguendo) that non-use does not, by itself, automatically
convert the property into patrimonial property. I respectfully urge that prolonged nonuse, conjoined with the other factors here listed, was legally effective to convert the lot in
Roppongi into patrimonial property of the State. Actually, as already pointed out, case law
involving property of municipal corporations is to the effect that simple non-use or the actual
dedication of public property to some use other than public use or public service, was
sufficient to convert such property into patrimonial property of the local governmental entity
concerned. Also as pointed out above, Manresa reached the same conclusion in respect of

conversion of property of the public domain of the State into property of the private domain
of the State.
The majority opinion states that "abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone
especially if the non-use was attributable not to the Government's own deliberate and
indubitable will but to lack of financial support to repair and improve the property" (Majority
Opinion, p. 13). With respect, it may be stressed that there is no abandonment involved here,
certainly no abandonment of property or of property rights. What is involved is the charge of
the classification of the property from property of the public domain into property of the
private domain of the State. Moreover, if for fourteen (14) years, the Government did not see
fit to appropriate whatever funds were necessary to maintain the property in Roppongi in a
condition suitable for diplomatic representation purposes, such circumstance may, with
equal logic, be construed as a manifestation of the crystalizing intent to change the character
of the property.
(d) On 30 March 1989, a public bidding was in fact held by the Executive Department for the
sale of the lot in Roppongi. The circumstance that this bidding was not successful certainly
does not argue against an intent to convert the property involved into property that is
disposable by bidding.
The above set of events and circumstances makes no sense at all if it does not, as a whole,
show at least the intent on the part of the Executive Department (with the knowledge of the
Legislative Department) to convert the property involved into patrimonial property that is
susceptible of being sold.
II
Having reached an affirmative answer in respect of the first issue, it is necessary to address
the second issue of whether or not there exists legal authority for the sale or disposition of
the Roppongi property.
The majority opinion refers to Section 79(f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which
reads as follows:
SEC. 79 (f). Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party.
In cases in which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party
to any deed or other instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any
other property the value of which is in excess of one hundred thousand pesos,
the respective Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary papers
which, together with the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the
Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed, instrument,
or contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the Philippines on
behalf of the Government of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be
expressly vested by law in another officer. (Emphasis supplied)

The majority opinion then goes on to state that: "[T]he requirement has been retained in
Section 4, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)" which reads:
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real
property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested
by law in another officer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the
name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality.
(Emphasis supplied)
Two points need to be made in this connection. Firstly, the requirement of obtaining specific
approval of Congress when the price of the real property being disposed of is in excess of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) under the Revised Administrative Code of 1917,
has been deleted from Section 48 of the 1987 Administrative Code. What Section 48 of the
present Administrative Code refers to isauthorization by law for the conveyance. Section 48
does not purport to be itself a source of legal authority for conveyance of real property of the
Government. For Section 48 merely specifies the official authorized to execute and sign on
behalf of the Government the deed of conveyance in case of such a conveyance.
Secondly, examination of our statute books shows that authorization by law for disposition of
real property of the private domain of the Government, has been granted by Congress both in
the form of (a) a general, standing authorization for disposition of patrimonial property of the
Government; and (b) specific legislation authorizing the disposition of particular pieces of
the Government's patrimonial property.
Standing legislative authority for the disposition of land of the private domain of the
Philippines is provided by Act No. 3038, entitled "An Act Authorizing the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to Sell or Lease Land of the Private Domain of the
Government of the Philippine Islands (now Republic of the Philippines)", enacted on 9 March
1922. The full text of this statute is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now
Secretary of the Environment and Natural Resources) is hereby authorized to
sell or lease land of the private domain of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, or any part thereof, to such persons, corporations or associations as
are, under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and seventy-

four, (now Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) known as the Public Land
Act, entitled to apply for the purchase or lease or agricultural public land.
SECTION 2. The sale of the land referred to in the preceding section shall, if
such land is agricultural, be made in the manner and subject to the limitations
prescribed in chapters five and six, respectively, of said Public Land Act, and if
it be classified differently, in conformity with the provisions of chapter nine of
said Act: Provided, however, That the land necessary for the public service
shall be exempt from the provisions of this Act.
SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, March 9, 1922. (Emphasis supplied)
Lest it be assumed that Act No. 3038 refers only to agricultural lands of the private domain of
the State, it must be noted that Chapter 9 of the old Public Land Act (Act No. 2874) is now
Chapter 9 of the present Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) and that
both statutes refer to: "any tract of land of the public domain which being neither timber nor
mineral land, is intended to be used forresidential purposes or for commercial or industrial
purposes other than agricultural" (Emphasis supplied). In other words, the statute covers the
sale or lease or residential, commercial or industrial land of the private domain of the State.
itc-asl

Implementing regulations have been issued for the carrying out of the provisions of Act No.
3038. On 21 December 1954, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
promulgated Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-6 and 7-7 which were entitled, respectively:
"Supplementary Regulations Governing the Sale of the Lands of the Private Domain of the
Republic of the Philippines"; and "Supplementary Regulations Governing the Lease of Lands
of Private Domain of the Republic of the Philippines" (text in 51 O.G. 28-29 [1955]).
It is perhaps well to add that Act No. 3038, although now sixty-eight (68) years old, is still in
effect and has not been repealed. 1
Specific legislative authorization for disposition of particular patrimonial properties of the
State is illustrated by certain earlier statutes. The first of these was Act No. 1120, enacted on
26 April 1904, which provided for the disposition of the friar lands, purchased by the
Government from the Roman Catholic Church, to bona fide settlers and occupants thereof or
to other persons. In Jacinto v. Director of Lands(49 Phil. 853 [1926]), these friar lands were
held to be private and patrimonial properties of the State. Act No. 2360, enacted on -28
February 1914, authorized the sale of the San Lazaro Estate located in the City of Manila,
which had also been purchased by the Government from the Roman Catholic Church. In
January 1916, Act No. 2555 amended Act No. 2360 by including therein all lands and
buildings owned by the Hospital and the Foundation of San Lazaro theretofor leased by
private persons, and which were also acquired by the Philippine Government.

After the enactment in 1922 of Act No. 3038, there appears, to my knowledge, to be only one
statute authorizing the President to dispose of a specific piece of property. This statute is
Republic Act No. 905, enacted on 20 June 1953, which authorized the
President to sell an Identified parcel of land of the private domain of the National Government
to the National Press Club of the Philippines, and to other recognized national associations
of professionals with academic standing, for the nominal price of P1.00. It appears relevant to
note that Republic Act No. 905 was not an outright disposition in perpetuity of the property
involved- it provided for reversion of the property to the National Government in case the
National Press Club stopped using it for its headquarters. What Republic Act No. 905
authorized was really a donation, and not a sale.
The basic submission here made is that Act No. 3038 provides standing legislative
authorization for disposition of the Roppongi property which, in my view, has been converted
into patrimonial property of the Republic. 2
To some, the submission that Act No. 3038 applies not only to lands of the private domain of
the State located in the Philippines but also to patrimonial property found outside the
Philippines, may appear strange or unusual. I respectfully submit that such position is not
any more unusual or strange than the assumption that Article 420 of the Civil Code applies
not only to property of the Republic located within Philippine territory but also to property
found outside the boundaries of the Republic.
It remains to note that under the well-settled doctrine that heads of Executive Departments
are alter egosof the President (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 [1939]), and in
view of the constitutional power of control exercised by the President over department heads
(Article VII, Section 17,1987 Constitution), the President herself may carry out the function or
duty that is specifically lodged in the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil. 328 [1957]). At the very least, the President retains
the power to approve or disapprove the exercise of that function or duty when done by the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources.
It is hardly necessary to add that the foregoing analyses and submissions relate only to the
austere question of existence of legal power or authority. They have nothing to do with much
debated questions of wisdom or propriety or relative desirability either of the proposed
disposition itself or of the proposed utilization of the anticipated proceeds of the property
involved. These latter types of considerations He within the sphere of responsibility of the
political departments of government the Executive and the Legislative authorities.
For all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss the Petitions for Prohibition in both G.R. Nos. 92013
and 92047.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ., concurring.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur completely with the excellent ponencia of Mr. Justice Gutierrez and will add the
following observations only for emphasis.
It is clear that the respondents have failed to show the President's legal authority to sell the
Roppongi property. When asked to do so at the hearing on these petitions, the Solicitor
General was at best ambiguous, although I must add in fairness that this was not his fault.
The fact is that there is -no such authority. Legal expertise alone cannot conjure that
statutory permission out of thin air.
Exec. Order No. 296, which reads like so much legislative, double talk, does not contain such
authority. Neither does Rep. Act No. 6657, which simply allows the proceeds of the sale of our
properties abroad to be used for the comprehensive agrarian reform program. Senate Res.
No. 55 was a mere request for the deferment of the scheduled sale of tile Roppongi property,
possibly to stop the transaction altogether; and ill any case it is not a law. The sale of the
said property may be authorized only by Congress through a duly enacted statute, and there
is no such law.
Once again, we have affirmed the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men,
where every public official, from the lowest to the highest, can act only by virtue of a valid
authorization. I am happy to note that in the several cases where this Court has ruled against
her, the President of the Philippines has submitted to this principle with becoming grace.

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez, Jr., I only wish to make a few
observations which could help in further clarifying the issues.
Under our tripartite system of government ordained by the Constitution, it is Congress that
lays down or determines policies. The President executes such policies. The policies
determined by Congress are embodied in legislative enactments that have to be approved by
the President to become law. The President, of course, recommends to Congress the
approval of policies but, in the final analysis, it is Congress that is the policy - determining
branch of government.
The judiciary interprets the laws and, in appropriate cases, determines whether the laws
enacted by Congress and approved by the President, and presidential acts implementing
such laws, are in accordance with the Constitution.

The Roppongi property was acquired by the Philippine government pursuant to the
reparations agreement between the Philippine and Japanese governments. Under such
agreement, this property was acquired by the Philippine government for a specific purpose,
namely, to serve as the site of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. Consequently,
Roppongi is a property of public dominion and intended for public service, squarely falling
within that class of property under Art. 420 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion :
(1) ...
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
(339a)
Public dominion property intended for public service cannot be alienated unless the property
is first transformed into private property of the state otherwise known as patrimonial property
of the state. 1 The transformation of public dominion property to state patrimonial property
involves, to my mind, a policy decision. It is a policy decision because the treatment of the
property varies according to its classification. Consequently, it is Congress which can decide and
declare the conversion of Roppongi from a public dominion property to a state patrimonial
property. Congress has made no such decision or declaration.
Moreover, the sale of public property (once converted from public dominion to state
patrimonial property) must be approved by Congress, for this again is a matter of policy (i.e.
to keep or dispose of the property). Sec. 48, Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987
provides:
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real
property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, by the President, unless the
authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but
titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate
agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency
or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
But the record is bare of any congressional decision or approval to sell Roppongi. The record
is likewise bare of any congressional authority extended to the President to sell Roppongi
thru public bidding or otherwise.

It is therefore, clear that the President cannot sell or order the sale of Roppongi thru public
bidding or otherwise without a prior congressional approval, first, converting Roppongi from
a public dominion property to a state patrimonial property, and, second, authorizing the
President to sell the same.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to make PERMANENT the temporary
restraining order earlier issued by this Court.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

The central question, as I see it, is whether or not the so-called "Roppongi property' has lost
its nature as property of public dominion, and hence, has become patrimonial property of the
State. I understand that the parties are agreed that it was property intended for "public
service" within the contemplation of paragraph (2), of Article 430, of the Civil Code, and
accordingly, land of State dominion, and beyond human commerce. The lone issue is, in the
light of supervening developments, that is non-user thereof by the National Government (for
diplomatic purposes) for the last thirteen years; the issuance of Executive Order No. 296
making it available for sale to any interested buyer; the promulgation of Republic Act No.
6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, making available for the program's financing,
State assets sold; the approval by the President of the recommendation of the investigating
committee formed to study the property's utilization; and the issuance of Resolution No. 55
of the Philippine Senate requesting for the deferment of its disposition it, "Roppongi", is still
property of the public dominion, and if it is not, how it lost that character.
When land of the public dominion ceases to be one, or when the change takes place, is a
question our courts have debated early. In a 1906 decision, 1 it was held that property of the
public dominion, a public plaza in this instance, becomes patrimonial upon use thereof for
purposes other than a plaza. In a later case, 2 this ruling was reiterated. Likewise, it has been held
that land, originally private property, has become of public dominion upon its donation to the
town and its conversion and use as a public plaza. 3 It is notable that under these three cases, the
character of the property, and any change occurring therein, depends on the actual use to which it
is dedicated. 4
Much later, however, the Court held that "until a formal declaration on the part of the
Government, through the executive department or the Legislative, to the effect that the
land . . . is no longer needed for [public] service- for public use or for special industries, [it]
continue[s] to be part of the public [dominion], not available for private expropriation or
ownership." 5 So also, it was ruled that a political subdivision (the City of Cebu in this case) alone
may declare (under its charter) a city road abandoned and thereafter, to dispose of it. 6
In holding that there is "a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi
property from public domain to make it alienable and a land for legislative authority to allow
the sale of the property" 7the majority lays stress to the fact that: (1) An affirmative act
executive or legislative is necessary to reclassify property of the public dominion, and (2) a
legislative decree is required to make it alienable. It also clears the uncertainties brought about by

earlier interpretations that the nature of property-whether public or patrimonial is predicated on

the manner it is actually used, or not used, and in the same breath, repudiates the Government's
position that the continuous non-use of "Roppongi", among other arguments, for "diplomatic
purposes", has turned it into State patrimonial property.

I feel that this view corresponds to existing pronouncements of this Court, among other
things, that: (1) Property is presumed to be State property in the absence of any showing to
the contrary; 8 (2) With respect to forest lands, the same continue to be lands of the public
dominion unless and until reclassified by the Executive Branch of the Government; 9 and (3) All
natural resources, under the Constitution, and subject to exceptional cases, belong to the State. 10
I am elated that the Court has banished previous uncertainties.

FELICIANO, J., dissenting

With regret, I find myself unable to share the conclusions reached by Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr.
For purposes of this separate opinion, I assume that the piece of land located in 306
Roppongi, 5-Chome, Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter referred to as the "Roppongi
property") may be characterized as property of public dominion, within the meaning of Article
420 (2) of the Civil Code:
[Property] which belong[s] to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service -.
It might not be amiss however, to note that the appropriateness of trying to bring within the
confines of the simple threefold classification found in Article 420 of the Civil Code ("property
for public use property "intended for some public service" and property intended "for the
development of the national wealth") all property owned by the Republic of the Philippines
whether found within the territorial boundaries of the Republic or located within the territory
of another sovereign State, is not self-evident. The first item of the classification property
intended for public use can scarcely be properly applied to property belonging to the
Republic but found within the territory of another State. The third item of the classification
property intended for the development of the national wealth is illustrated, in Article 339 of
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, by mines or mineral properties. Again, mineral lands owned
by a sovereign State are rarely, if ever, found within the territorial base of another sovereign
State. The task of examining in detail the applicability of the classification set out in Article
420 of our Civil Code to property that the Philippines happens to own outside its own
boundaries must, however, be left to academicians.
For present purposes, too, I agree that there is no question of conflict of laws that is, at the
present time, before this Court. The issues before us relate essentially to authority to sell the
Roppongi property so far as Philippine law is concerned.

The majority opinion raises two (2) issues: (a) whether or not the Roppongi property has
been converted into patrimonial property or property of the private domain of the State; and
(b) assuming an affirmative answer to (a), whether or not there is legal authority to dispose of
the Roppongi property.
I
Addressing the first issue of conversion of property of public dominion intended for some
public service, into property of the private domain of the Republic, it should be noted that the
Civil Code does not address the question of who has authority to effect such conversion.
Neither does the Civil Code set out or refer to any procedure for such conversion.
Our case law, however, contains some fairly explicit pronouncements on this point, as
Justice Sarmiento has pointed out in his concurring opinion. In Ignacio v. Director of
Lands (108 Phils. 335 [1960]), petitioner Ignacio argued that if the land in question formed
part of the public domain, the trial court should have declared the same no longer necessary
for public use or public purposes and which would, therefore, have become disposable and
available for private ownership. Mr. Justice Montemayor, speaking for the Court, said:
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore
is no longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for
coast-guard service, the government shall declare it to be the property of the
owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe
that only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the
authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the
sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, or for coast-guard service. If no such declaration has been
made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain.
(Natividad v. Director of Lands, supra.)
The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case of
Vicente Joven y Monteverde v. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134 (cited in Velayo's
Digest, Vol. 1, p. 52).
... is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed
in a position to determine whether any public land are to be used for the
purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters. Consequently, until
a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive
department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no
longer needed for coast-guard service, for public use or for special industries,
they continue to be part of the public domain not available for private
appropriation or ownership.(108 Phil. at 338-339; emphasis supplied)
Thus, under Ignacio, either the Executive Department or the Legislative Department may
convert property of the State of public dominion into patrimonial property of the State. No

particular formula or procedure of conversion is specified either in statute law or in case law.
Article 422 of the Civil Code simply states that: "Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State". I respectfully submit, therefore, that the only requirement which is legitimately
imposable is that the intent to convert must be reasonably clear from a consideration of the
acts or acts of the Executive Department or of the Legislative Department which are said to
have effected such conversion.
The same legal situation exists in respect of conversion of property of public dominion
belonging to municipal corporations, i.e., local governmental units, into patrimonial property
of such entities. In CebuOxygen Acetylene v. Bercilles (66 SCRA 481 [1975]), the City Council
of Cebu by resolution declared a certain portion of an existing street as an abandoned road,
"the same not being included in the city development plan". Subsequently, by another
resolution, the City Council of Cebu authorized the acting City Mayor to sell the land through
public bidding. Although there was no formal and explicit declaration of conversion of
property for public use into patrimonial property, the Supreme Court said:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for
registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an
ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use of for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very
clear and unequivocal terms, states that "Property thus withdrawn from public
servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real
property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."
Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its
subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a
registrable title over the lot in question. (66 SCRA at 484-; emphasis supplied)
Thus, again as pointed out by Sarmiento J., in his separate opinion, in the case of property
owned by municipal corporations simple non-use or the actual dedication of public property
to some use other than "public use" or some "public service", was sufficient legally to
convert such property into patrimonial property (Municipality of Oas v. Roa, 7 Phil. 20 [1906]Municipality of Hinunganan v. Director of Lands 24 Phil. 124 [1913]; Province of Zamboanga
del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968).
I would also add that such was the case not only in respect of' property of municipal
corporations but also in respect of property of the State itself. Manresa in commenting on

Article 341 of the 1889 Spanish Civil Code which has been carried over verbatim into our Civil
Code by Article 422 thereof, wrote:
La dificultad mayor en todo esto estriba, naturalmente, en fijar el momento en
que los bienes de dominio publico dejan de serlo. Si la Administracion o la
autoridad competente legislative realizan qun acto en virtud del cual cesa el
destino o uso publico de los bienes de que se trata naturalmente la dificultad
queda desde el primer momento resuelta. Hay un punto de partida cierto para
iniciar las relaciones juridicas a que pudiera haber lugar Pero puede ocurrir
que no haya taldeclaracion expresa, legislativa or administrativa, y, sin
embargo, cesar de hecho el destino publico de los bienes; ahora bien, en este
caso, y para los efectos juridicos que resultan de entrar la cosa en el comercio
de los hombres,' se entedera que se ha verificado la conversion de los bienes
patrimoniales?
El citado tratadista Ricci opina, respecto del antiguo Codigo italiano, por la
afirmativa, y por nuestra parte creemos que tal debe ser la soluciion. El
destino de las cosas no depende tanto de una declaracion expresa como del
uso publico de las mismas, y cuanda el uso publico cese con respecto de
determinados bienes, cesa tambien su situacion en el dominio publico. Si una
fortaleza en ruina se abandona y no se repara, si un trozo de la via publica se
abandona tambien por constituir otro nuevo an mejores condiciones....ambos
bienes cesan de estar Codigo, y leyes especiales mas o memos
administrativas. (3 Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol, p. 128 [7a
ed.; 1952) (Emphasis supplied)
The majority opinion says that none of the executive acts pointed to by the Government
purported, expressly or definitely, to convert the Roppongi property into patrimonial property
of the Republic. Assuming that to be the case, it is respectfully submitted that cumulative
effect of the executive acts here involved was to convert property originally intended for and
devoted to public service into patrimonial property of the State, that is, property susceptible
of disposition to and appropration by private persons. These executive acts, in their totality if
not each individual act, make crystal clear the intent of the Executive Department to effect
such conversion. These executive acts include:
(a) Administrative Order No. 3 dated 11 August 1985, which created a Committee to study the
disposition/utilization of the Government's property in Japan, The Committee was composed
of officials of the Executive Department: the Executive Secretary; the Philippine Ambassador
to Japan; and representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Asset
Privatization Trust. On 19 September 1988, the Committee recommended to the President the
sale of one of the lots (the lot specifically in Roppongi) through public bidding. On 4 October
1988, the President approved the recommendation of the Committee.
On 14 December 1988, the Philippine Government by diplomatic note informed the Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic's intention to dispose of the property in Roppongi.
The Japanese Government through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that it interposed no

objection to such disposition by the Republic. Subsequently, the President and the
Committee informed the leaders of the House of Representatives and of the Senate of the
Philippines of the proposed disposition of the Roppongi property.
(b) Executive Order No. 296, which was issued by the President on 25 July 1987. Assuming
that the majority opinion is right in saying that Executive Order No. 296 is insufficient
to authorize the sale of the Roppongi property, it is here submitted with respect that
Executive Order No. 296 is more than sufficient to indicate an intention to convert the
property previously devoted to public service into patrimonial property that is capable of
being sold or otherwise disposed of
(c) Non-use of the Roppongi lot for fourteen (14) years for diplomatic or for any other public
purposes. Assuming (but only arguendo) that non-use does not, by itself, automatically
convert the property into patrimonial property. I respectfully urge that prolonged nonuse, conjoined with the other factors here listed, was legally effective to convert the lot in
Roppongi into patrimonial property of the State. Actually, as already pointed out, case law
involving property of municipal corporations is to the effect that simple non-use or the actual
dedication of public property to some use other than public use or public service, was
sufficient to convert such property into patrimonial property of the local governmental entity
concerned. Also as pointed out above, Manresa reached the same conclusion in respect of
conversion of property of the public domain of the State into property of the private domain
of the State.
The majority opinion states that "abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone
especially if the non-use was attributable not to the Government's own deliberate and
indubitable will but to lack of financial support to repair and improve the property" (Majority
Opinion, p. 13). With respect, it may be stressed that there is no abandonment involved here,
certainly no abandonment of property or of property rights. What is involved is the charge of
the classification of the property from property of the public domain into property of the
private domain of the State. Moreover, if for fourteen (14) years, the Government did not see
fit to appropriate whatever funds were necessary to maintain the property in Roppongi in a
condition suitable for diplomatic representation purposes, such circumstance may, with
equal logic, be construed as a manifestation of the crystalizing intent to change the character
of the property.
(d) On 30 March 1989, a public bidding was in fact held by the Executive Department for the
sale of the lot in Roppongi. The circumstance that this bidding was not successful certainly
does not argue against an intent to convert the property involved into property that is
disposable by bidding.
The above set of events and circumstances makes no sense at all if it does not, as a whole,
show at least the intent on the part of the Executive Department (with the knowledge of the
Legislative Department) to convert the property involved into patrimonial property that is
susceptible of being sold.
II

Having reached an affirmative answer in respect of the first issue, it is necessary to address
the second issue of whether or not there exists legal authority for the sale or disposition of
the Roppongi property.
The majority opinion refers to Section 79(f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which
reads as follows:
SEC. 79 (f). Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party.
In cases in which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party
to any deed or other instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any
other property the value of which is in excess of one hundred thousand pesos,
the respective Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary papers
which, together with the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the
Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed, instrument,
or contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the Philippines on
behalf of the Government of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be
expressly vested by law in another officer. (Emphasis supplied)
The majority opinion then goes on to state that: "[T]he requirement has been retained in
Section 4, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)" which reads:
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real
property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested
by law in another officer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the
name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality.
(Emphasis supplied)
Two points need to be made in this connection. Firstly, the requirement of obtaining specific
approval of Congress when the price of the real property being disposed of is in excess of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) under the Revised Administrative Code of 1917,
has been deleted from Section 48 of the 1987 Administrative Code. What Section 48 of the
present Administrative Code refers to isauthorization by law for the conveyance. Section 48
does not purport to be itself a source of legal authority for conveyance of real property of the
Government. For Section 48 merely specifies the official authorized to execute and sign on
behalf of the Government the deed of conveyance in case of such a conveyance.
Secondly, examination of our statute books shows that authorization by law for disposition of
real property of the private domain of the Government, has been granted by Congress both in
the form of (a) a general, standing authorization for disposition of patrimonial property of the

Government; and (b) specific legislation authorizing the disposition of particular pieces of
the Government's patrimonial property.
Standing legislative authority for the disposition of land of the private domain of the
Philippines is provided by Act No. 3038, entitled "An Act Authorizing the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to Sell or Lease Land of the Private Domain of the
Government of the Philippine Islands (now Republic of the Philippines)", enacted on 9 March
1922. The full text of this statute is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now
Secretary of the Environment and Natural Resources) is hereby authorized to
sell or lease land of the private domain of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, or any part thereof, to such persons, corporations or associations as
are, under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and seventyfour, (now Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) known as the Public Land
Act, entitled to apply for the purchase or lease or agricultural public land.
SECTION 2. The sale of the land referred to in the preceding section shall, if
such land is agricultural, be made in the manner and subject to the limitations
prescribed in chapters five and six, respectively, of said Public Land Act, and if
it be classified differently, in conformity with the provisions of chapter nine of
said Act: Provided, however, That the land necessary for the public service
shall be exempt from the provisions of this Act.
SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, March 9, 1922. (Emphasis supplied)
Lest it be assumed that Act No. 3038 refers only to agricultural lands of the private domain of
the State, it must be noted that Chapter 9 of the old Public Land Act (Act No. 2874) is now
Chapter 9 of the present Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) and that
both statutes refer to: "any tract of land of the public domain which being neither timber nor
mineral land, is intended to be used forresidential purposes or for commercial or industrial
purposes other than agricultural" (Emphasis supplied). In other words, the statute covers the
sale or lease or residential, commercial or industrial land of the private domain of the State.
Implementing regulations have been issued for the carrying out of the provisions of Act No.
3038. On 21 December 1954, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
promulgated Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-6 and 7-7 which were entitled, respectively:
"Supplementary Regulations Governing the Sale of the Lands of the Private Domain of the
Republic of the Philippines"; and "Supplementary Regulations Governing the Lease of Lands
of Private Domain of the Republic of the Philippines" (text in 51 O.G. 28-29 [1955]).

It is perhaps well to add that Act No. 3038, although now sixty-eight (68) years old, is still in
effect and has not been repealed. 1
Specific legislative authorization for disposition of particular patrimonial properties of the
State is illustrated by certain earlier statutes. The first of these was Act No. 1120, enacted on
26 April 1904, which provided for the disposition of the friar lands, purchased by the
Government from the Roman Catholic Church, to bona fide settlers and occupants thereof or
to other persons. In Jacinto v. Director of Lands(49 Phil. 853 [1926]), these friar lands were
held to be private and patrimonial properties of the State. Act No. 2360, enacted on -28
February 1914, authorized the sale of the San Lazaro Estate located in the City of Manila,
which had also been purchased by the Government from the Roman Catholic Church. In
January 1916, Act No. 2555 amended Act No. 2360 by including therein all lands and
buildings owned by the Hospital and the Foundation of San Lazaro theretofor leased by
private persons, and which were also acquired by the Philippine Government.
After the enactment in 1922 of Act No. 3038, there appears, to my knowledge, to be only one
statute authorizing the President to dispose of a specific piece of property. This statute is
Republic Act No. 905, enacted on 20 June 1953, which authorized the
President to sell an Identified parcel of land of the private domain of the National Government
to the National Press Club of the Philippines, and to other recognized national associations
of professionals with academic standing, for the nominal price of P1.00. It appears relevant to
note that Republic Act No. 905 was not an outright disposition in perpetuity of the property
involved- it provided for reversion of the property to the National Government in case the
National Press Club stopped using it for its headquarters. What Republic Act No. 905
authorized was really a donation, and not a sale.
The basic submission here made is that Act No. 3038 provides standing legislative
authorization for disposition of the Roppongi property which, in my view, has been converted
into patrimonial property of the Republic. 2
To some, the submission that Act No. 3038 applies not only to lands of the private domain of
the State located in the Philippines but also to patrimonial property found outside the
Philippines, may appear strange or unusual. I respectfully submit that such position is not
any more unusual or strange than the assumption that Article 420 of the Civil Code applies
not only to property of the Republic located within Philippine territory but also to property
found outside the boundaries of the Republic.
It remains to note that under the well-settled doctrine that heads of Executive Departments
are alter egosof the President (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 [1939]), and in
view of the constitutional power of control exercised by the President over department heads
(Article VII, Section 17,1987 Constitution), the President herself may carry out the function or
duty that is specifically lodged in the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil. 328 [1957]). At the very least, the President retains
the power to approve or disapprove the exercise of that function or duty when done by the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources.

It is hardly necessary to add that the foregoing analyses and submissions relate only to the
austere question of existence of legal power or authority. They have nothing to do with much
debated questions of wisdom or propriety or relative desirability either of the proposed
disposition itself or of the proposed utilization of the anticipated proceeds of the property
involved. These latter types of considerations He within the sphere of responsibility of the
political departments of government the Executive and the Legislative authorities.
For all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss the Petitions for Prohibition in both G.R. Nos. 92013
and 92047.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ., concurring.

Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while
she and some co-workers were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker tried
to rape her in a hotel room. Fortunately, a roomboy heard her cry for help and two of her
Arab co-workers were arrested and detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudia Airlines reassigned her to work in their Manila office. While working in Manila, Saudia Airlines advised
her to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in Saudi. She did but to her surprise, she was
brought to a Saudi court where she was interrogated and eventually sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated Muslim customs by partying with
males. The Prince of Makkah got wind of her conviction and the Prince determined that she
was wrongfully convicted hence the Prince absolved her and sent her back to the
Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada. Morada then sued Saudia Airlines
for damages under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudia Airlines filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the
applicable law should be the law of Saudi Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed for other
reliefs under the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines contention is correct.
HELD: No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines when the latter
filed a motion to dismiss with petition for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs effectively
asked the court to make a determination of Saudia Airliness rights hence a submission to
the courts jurisdiction.
Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the
complaint of Morada, she is bringing the suit for damages under the provisions of our Civil
Law and not of the Arabian Law. Morada then has the right to file it in the QC RTC because
under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff may elect whether to file an action in personam (case at
bar) in the place where she resides or where the defendant resides. Obviously, it is well

within her right to file the case here because if shell file it in Saudi Arabia, it will be very
disadvantageous for her (and of course, again, Philippine Civil Law is the law invoked).
Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a case, if there is a foreign
element involved, is the so called locus actus or where an act has been done. In the case
at bar, Morada was already working in Manila when she was summoned by her superior to
go to Saudi Arabia to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer. She was not informed that she was
going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into appearing before a court
trial which led to her wrongful conviction. The act of defrauding, which is tortuous, was
committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation, misery, and suffering. And applying the
torts principle in a conflicts case, the SC finds that the Philippines could be said as a situs of
the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place).